G.R. No.

L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,

VS.

HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant

January 31, 1963

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he
became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this
country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5,
1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but
left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been
declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be
applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore
Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of
the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for
the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code,
the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of
California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a
testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally,
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?
Case Digest: G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner,

vs.

Republic of the Philippines, respondent.

Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a

male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as
a female and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment,
breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on,
petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel
Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered
a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the
OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in
his birth certificate.

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA
9048 Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name
on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his
given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no
error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of
the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration
of civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such
special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

VS.

HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of

Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City
and

RICHARD UPTON, respondents

October 8, 1985

FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were
married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the
Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA
in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The
private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioners
business is a conjugal property of the parties and that respondent is
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court,
where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as
of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent as petitioners husband is entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets?
Republic vs Cagandahan
Republic vs. Cagandahan
GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth.

During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on
diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor
menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male
characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According
to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries
in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first
name be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the
view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor
in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of
himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur,
Branch 23, granting respondents petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed
with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was
naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the States that his wife had
remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking
par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent
and allowed him to remarry.

The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the
instant case.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

Held:

Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his
naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET
ASIDE.

Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
the Philippine laws.

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26
does not apply to the instant case.

However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that
Globe Mackay vs.CA 176 SCRA 778

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay in dual
capacity as purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager.
In 1972, the respondent discovered fraudulent anomalies and transactions in the said corporation
for which it lost several hundred thousands of pesos. The private respondent reported to his
superiors including Henry, the petitioner. However, he was confronted by Hendry stating that
Tobias was the number one suspect. He was ordered to take a one week forced leave. When he
returned to work, Hendry called him crook and swindler, and left a scornful remark to the
Filipinos. The petitioners also charged six criminal cases against the respondentfive cases of
estafa and one for violating Article 290 of the RPC (Discovering Secrets through Seizure of
Correspondence). The petitioner also sent a poison letter to RETELCO causing the respondent to
be unemployed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondent.

HELD: Petitioners invoked the right of damnun absque injuria or the damage or loss which does
not constitute a violation of legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. However,
this is not applicable in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have
had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must be held liable.

The court awarded Tobias the following: Php 80, 000 as actual damages, Php 200, 000 as moral
Ang Yu Asuncion vs. CA, Sunday, August 24, 2014

Facts:
July 29, 1987: An amended Complaint for Specific Performance was filed by petitioners Ang Yu
Asuncion and others against Bobby Cu Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan before RTC.
Petitioners (Ang Yu) alleged that:
- they are the tenants or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by Bobby Unijeng and others
located in Binondo, Manila (since 1935)
that on several occasions before October 9, 1986, the lessors informed the lessees (petitioners) that they
are offering to sell the premises and are giving them priority to acquire the same;
- that during the negotiations, Bobby Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6-million while they made a counter
offer of P5-million;
- that they wrote them on October 24, 1986 asking that they specify the terms and conditions of the offer
to sell; that when plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter dated January 28, 1987 with
the same request;
The RTC found that Cu Unjiengs offer to sell was never accepted by the petitioners (Ang Yu) for the
reason that they did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was no
contract of sale at all. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. This decision was
brought to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari which subsequently denied the appeal
on May 6, 1991 for insufficiency in form and substance. (Referring to the first case filed by Ang Yu)
November 15, 1990: While the case was pending consideration by this Court, the Cu Unjieng spouses
executed a Deed of Sale transferring the subject petitioner to petitioner Buen Realty and Development
Corporation.
Petitioner Buen Realty and Development Corporation, as the new owner of the subject property, wrote a
letter to the lessees demanding that the latter vacate the premises.
August 30, 1991: the RTC ordered the Cu Unjiengs to execute the necessary Deed of Sale of the property
in litigation in favor of plaintiffs Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur Go for the consideration of P15
Million pesos in recognition of petitioners right of first refusal and that a new Transfer Certificate of Title
be issued in favor of the buyer. The court also set aside the title issued to Buen Realty Corporation for
having been executed in bad faith. On September 22, 1991, the Judge issued a writ of execution.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling.