Phil Consumers v Sec of DECS

Facts:

On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) submitted a report entitled
"Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The
report favorably recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with
respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for the school year
1987 to 1988. The DECS allowed private schools to increase tuition fees by 15% to
20%. The petitioner sought reconsideration for the increase was too high. DECS
issued Department Order 37 decreasing the increase to 10% to 15%. The petitioner
still opposed the increase.

Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest,
went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that
judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional.
The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any
legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order
was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in as much as
the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department
Order was issued.

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents
are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before
school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order
constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.

Issue: Is there a violation of due process of law?

Held: No, there is no violation of due process of law. The function of prescribing
rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative
function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by
an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice
and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates
laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character.
Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based
upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Under the Rules
of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, that presumption prevails. This being so, the
burden of proof is on the party assailing the regularity of official proceedings. In the
case at bar, the petitioner has not successfully disputed the presumption.
Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma

Facts:

On 02 March 1988, the Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization (ADFLO) filed
an application for registration as a national federation alleging, among others that it
has twelve (12) affiliates.

After proper evaluation of its application and finding ADFLO to have complied with
the requirements for registration pursuant to Articles 234 and 237 of the Labor
Code, the Bureau (of Labor Relations) issued on 22 March 1988 a Certificate of
Registration No. 11399-FED-LC to the federation.

On 15 February 1989, the Confederation of Labor and Allied Social Services (CLASS)
filed a petition for the cancellation of the Registration Certificate issued to ADFLO.

Finding the petition to be in order, the Bureau furnished ADFLO a copy of said
petition and directed the latter to file an answer/comment thereon. The Bureau also
directed CLASS-TUCP to substantiate its allegations in the petition.

ADFLO filed a Motion to Inhibit the Bureau Director from hearing and deciding the
case on the ground that the Director prejudged the instant petition when she
verbally declared that the federation obtained its certificate of registration through
fraud and misrepresentation; that the recommendation to hold in abeyance the
election at Allen Arthur, Inc., was based only on her unilateral finding of a prima
facie case; that she has shown personal interest in this petition when made
personal calls to all locals and affiliates without notice to the respondent, ADFLO

Issue:

Was the decision cancelling the registration of petitioner rendered in violation of the
due process clause?

Is the decision supported by substantial evidence?

Held:

First Issue: Due Process

Yes, there was a violation on the due process clause. The fact that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character. The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard, and as
applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side. Such
opportunity was denied petitioner in this case. The cancellation of a certificate of
registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor organization. For
without such registration, it loses - as a rule - its rights under the Labor Code. Under
the circumstances, petitioner was indisputably entitled to be heard before a
judgment could be rendered cancelling its certificate of registration.

Second Issue: Substantial Basis

No, there was no substantial evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
never made any ruling on whether the exhibits submitted by CLASS were admissible
in evidence. The said exhibits cannot be made use of in deciding the case. And, in
the absence of this evidence, there is nothing in the record to support the assailed
decision. Therefore, the latter must necessarily fall for lack of substantial basis. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.

Serrano v NLRC

Facts:

This is a petition seeking review of the resolutions, dated March 30, 1994 and
August 26, 1994, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner Ruben Serranos complaint
for illegal dismissal and denied his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a security

checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise. Initially
hired on October 4, 1984 on contractual basis, petitioner eventually became a
regular employee on April 4, 1985. In 1988, he became head of the Security
Checkers Section of private respondent.

Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase

out its entire security section and engage the services of an independent security
agency. For this reason, it wrote petitioner a memorandum on the day of his
dismissal which is contrary to the termination requirement that a notice of
termination must be issued 30 days prior its actual termination.

Issue: Is there a violation of due process of law?

Held:

No, there is no violation of due process of law. Only the Government has the right to
take life, liberty or property, hence, the constitutional right can be used to limit
governmental powers, not in the exercise of private power. The violation committed
is the procedure of termination making the termination ineffectual.
Var Orient v Achacoso

Facts: The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and
Adjudication Office, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against
the private respondents Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul
Tumasis, Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis,
crew members of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their
Contracts of Employment with the petitioners which supposedly resulted in
damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport
Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.

After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987 where the parties
agreed to submit their respective position papers and thereafter the case would be
submitted for decision. Only the private respondents submitted a position paper.

Issue: Is there a violation of due process?

Held:

No, petitioners 'allegation is unmeritorious that they were denied due process
because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

In the hearing of the case on March 4,1987, it was agreed by the parties that they
would file their respective memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted
for. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes.
However, only the private respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did
not. On June 10, 1987, the respondents filed a motion to resolve. The petitioners'
counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to Resolve" or the respondents "Motion
for Execution of Decision" dated October 19, 1987, both of which were furnished
them through counsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they had been
denied due process in the form of a formal hearing, they should have opposed both
motions.

Sumulong v Guerrero

Facts:
On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares,
(in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia
Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters
respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one
peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial
assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of
property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the
properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine
National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five
hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy
on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation."

On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge issued the following Order:

Plaintiff having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Heart Center Extension
Office, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, the amount of P158,980.00 representing
the total market value of the subject parcels of land, let a writ of possession be
issued.

Issue: Is there a violation of due process?

Held:

Petitioners assert that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, violates procedural due
process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of
property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the
issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing.

It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat or
clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after
expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and
considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously
evaluated.

On the matter of the issuance of a writ of possession, the ruling in the Ignacio case
is reiterated, thus:

[I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in

expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be
a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; (2) A provisional
determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated
must be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive)
discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be
complied with.