Schopenhauer's Laughter

Author(s): Peter B. Lewis

Source: The Monist, Vol. 88, No. 1, Humor (JANUARY 2005), pp. 36-51
Published by: Oxford University Press
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 Schopenhauer's Laughter

Schopenhauer is famous for his pessimism. Many people are surprised

to learn that he articulated an important theory of laughter. While this
theory has been scrutinised by aestheticians exploring the nature of
humour, little has been written on the role of laughter in Schopenhauer's
pessimistic vision of the world.1 Admittedly, this latter topic is only a minor
theme in Schopenhauer's work: yet I contend that what he has to say illu
minates the human predicament.

1. Laughter
Schopenhauer's theory of laughter is initially presented as part of his
theory of concepts in Book I of The World as Will and Representation
(henceforth, WWR)2 and is developed at greater length in Supplementary
Essay No. VIII in Volume 2 of the second edition of WWR. Here are two
representative passages:

In every case, laughter results from nothing but the suddenly perceived in
congruity between a concept an the real object that had been thought through
it in some relation; and laughter itself is just the expression of this incon
gruity. ... All laughter therefore is occasioned by a paradoxical, and hence
unexpected, subsumption, it matters not whether this is expressed in words
or deeds ( WWR I, p. 59).

... the origin of the ludicrous is always the paradoxical, and thus unexpect
ed, subsumption of an object under a concept that is in all other respects
heterogeneous to it. Accordingly, the phenomenon of laughter always
signifies the sudden apprehension of an incongruity between such a concept
and the real object thought through it, and hence between what is abstract
and what is perceptive. The greater and more unexpected this incongruity in
the apprehension of the person laughing, the more violent will be the
laughter (WWR II, p. 91).

These passages make abundantly clear that Schopenhauer's theory is

a theory of "all laughter." As such, it is obviously false. It is not the case

"Schopenhauer's Laughter" by Peter B. Lewis,

The Monist, vol. 88, no. 1, pp. 36-51. Copyright ? 2005, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354.

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 SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 37

that every case of laughter results from the sudden apprehension or per
ception of some kind of incongruity. The familiar counter-examples are
laughter brought on by tickling or by inhaling nitrous oxide.
In a late essay on philosophy and natural science,3 Schopenhauer
comments on the physiology of laughter and, in doing so, mentions laughter
as a result of tickling.4 He does not, however, consider this case in relation
to his theory of laughter. It is possible that he doesn't regard it as a problem
for his theory because he thinks of such laughter as being "excited entirely
physically," whereas normally laughter has a mental cause ("stimulus
mentalis"). But even restricting Schopenhauer's theory to cases of "men
talistic" laughter would not save the theory, for laughter from nervousness,
embarrassment and hysteria have mental causes, through not necessarily
perception of incongruity.
What tends to happen at this point in discussions of Schopenhauer's
theory is that his theory is interpreted as a theory of humorous laughter;
that is, laughter as the expression of amusement at something humorous.
According to this version of the theory, it is the sudden perception of in
congruity which amuses and in certain cases results in laughter. However,
I believe that such a rescue mission requires giving up on Schopenhauer's
theory too quickly. It seems to me that the phenomenon Schopenhauer is
interested in is what might be called intentional laughter. By this I do not
mean deliberate or voluntary laughter, but rather laughter that is directed
at something or other. Schopenhauer's theory is that in all cases what in
tentional laughter is directed at is a perceived incongruity. This interpretation
does differentiate the subject of Schopenhauer's theory from hysterical or
nervous or embarrassed laughter, for in these sorts of cases the laughter is
not directed at anything but is simply a manifestation or symptom of the
emotional or nervous condition. If you laugh nervously on being intro
duced to the queen, you are not laughing at the queen or the dignity of the
occasion: you are not laughing at anything?it is just that your nervous
ness emerges in the form of laughing. In some cases of hysteria, you might
be laughing hysterically at something or other, or become hysterical through
laughing at something: but these are not counter-examples to Schopen
hauer's theory.
As a theory of intentional laughter, Schopenhauer's theory is meant
to extend to cases of laughter beyond humorous laughter. One of Schopen
hauer's examples is "our own bitter laughter when the terrible truth by

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38 PETER . LEWIS

which firmly cherished expectations are shown to be delusive reveals

itself to us" (WWR, II, 99). Yet he acknowledges that this kind of laughter
is atypical. For he notices that "as a rule, laughter is a pleasant state"
(WWR, II, 98) and indeed that laughter is normally an expression of
pleasure at the perceived incongruity. The contrast between normal and
such atypical laughter is captured by Damon Runyan in his story "The
Lemon Drop Kid." At the end of the story, as he realizes that it was his
own unwitting error which destroyed his family and his happiness, "the
Lemon Drop Kid begins to laugh in his low voice, ha-ha-ha-ha-ha, but
somehow there does not seem to be any laughter in the laugh, and I [the
narrator] cannot bear to hear it, so I move away."5
Schopenhauer maintains that "The greater and more unexpected this
incongruity in the apprehension of the person laughing, the more violent
will be the laughter" (WWR, II, p. 91). This ignores the contextual factors
that affect the intensity and the occurrence of laughter. His neglect of
these factors is due, I suspect, to his view that laughter is a reflex
movement: "... laughing and weeping ... are as definitely involuntary
or automatic movements," albeit that they occur, as in the case of erection,
"on a mere stimulus mentalis."6 However, as Darwin notices, "laughter
from a ludicrous idea, though involuntary, cannot be called a strictly reflex
action. In this case, and that of laughter from being tickled, the mind must
be in a pleasurable condition; a young child, if tickled by a strange man,
would scream from fear."7 The need to be in a pleasurable condition is il
lustrated by the habit of the arrangements made by television studios to
have someone "warm up" the audience before recording a live comedy
show in order to ensure greater laughter. Moreover, laughter is well known
to be infectious: laughter in a largely empty cinema or theatre will be more
subdued than it would in a full house of enthusiastic laughers. Again, the
same joke told by one person may gain a bigger laugh than when told by
another just because of the difference in the presentation and timing of the
joke?the perceived incongruity might be the same on both occasions.

2. Incongruity
The distinctive feature of Schopenhauer's theory of laughter is the
claim that it depends on "perceived incongruity between a concept and the
real object that had been thought through it in some relation" (WWR, I, p.
59); or, as he puts it in the second edition, the apprehension of "the para

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 SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 39

doxical . . . subsumption of an object under a concept that is in all other

respects heterogeneous to it" (WWR, II, p. 91). One of Schopenhauer's
examples to illustrate this thesis is that of an epitaph for a physician:
"Here like a hero he lies, and those he has slain lie around him": this
subsumes under the concept "lying surrounded by the slain," which is ho
nourable to the hero, the physician who is supposed to preserve life (WWR,
II, p. 93).8
Schopenhauer emphasizes that it is the sudden perception of incon
gruity that excites laughter. This overlooks the fact that we are often
amused by, and laugh at, what is familiar and hence expected, such as a
favourite line or gag in a well-known text or film or performance of a play
or comic routine. Schopenhauer's conjunction of the "paradoxical, and
hence unexpected, subsumption of an object under a concept," when 'un
expected' is taken in a dynamic sense, is illicit; though it may well be
argued that 'unexpected' can be understood as unconventional or atypical.
Schopenhauer's concern with the suddenness of the perception of incon
gruity stems from his project of specifying the sufficient conditions for
laughter. Such a project tends to confuse the causes of laughter with the
objects of laughter.9 Michael Clark has argued that the incongruity theory
is most plausibly construed as a theory of the objects of laughter, specifi
cally the formal object of amusement.10 Thus, we need to distinguish the
claim that the perception of incongruity, sudden or otherwise, results in
laughter or amusement, from the claim that what we laugh at, what our laugh
ter is directed at, when we are amused is some perceived incongruity, some
thing we perceive as incongruous. Such a distinction enables the incon
gruity theory to evade what otherwise would be a problem, that in many
cases perceived incongruities are irritating, stupid, disgusting or even tragic.
Identifying the formal object of laughter or amusement leaves open the
question of what causes us to laugh at some rather than other incongruities.
It is the notion of incongruity that stands in urgent need of clarifica
tion. As we shall see, Schopenhauer does make some effort in this
direction. Yet many of his own examples do not conform to his own
account of incongruity. Thus, the description of bitter laughter already
referred to?"firmly cherished expectations are shown to be delusive"?
does not seem to demand the official formula of incongruous subsumption
under a concept. The case is adequately described as one of disappointed
expectations. No doubt it would be possible to regiment the example in

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40 PETER . LEWIS

order to make it conform to the theory. But other more recalcitrant

counter-examples would soon swim into view. Consider, for instance,
Roger Scruton's example of a caricature of Mrs. Thatcher: "it may
represent a non-deviant example of a woman, but still be a caricature of
her. So what is the concept with which this instance is to be compared?
Should we say: the concept of Mrs. Thatcher?"11 Again, this is not impos
sible, though it is unpromising. The ensuing theory would surely be more
sophisticated than is necessary to make sense of the lovely example of the
baby in the cot laughing at Daddy's head popping in and out of vision
above the edge of the cot. While talk of subsumption under a concept may
be superfluous here, the case might nevertheless be understood as one
involving incongruity, as would all the examples mentioned so far. For, as
it has been noticed, the notion of incongruity is one "that has the breadth
needed to capture the enormous variety of things we are amused by."12
If some version of the Incongruity Theory can evade the Scylla of
over-precision, it then has to confront the Charybdis of vacuity: "vacuous
because to know what is meant by the 'incongruous' you would have to
consult, not some independent conception, but the range of objects at
which we laugh."13 And this difficulty is highlighted by the fact that we
might equally well sometimes describe what we laugh at in terms of its
congruity, as in Sprigge's example of "laughing at another instance of
Schopenhauer's curmudgeonliness."14 Scruton offers the example of a
caricature which "amuses, not because it does not fit Mrs. Thatcher, but
because it does fit her, all too well."15 But if the notion of incongruity were
empty of content, as Scruton alleges, then we would not be able to ac
knowledge, as we surely do, the correctness of his characterization of the
caricature. What is more, while Scruton cavils at the notion of incongruity,
he seems to have no scruple in talking of a picture fitting its subject more
or less well. The difficulty that he claims to see in the Incongruity Theory
derives not from the apparent arbitrariness in the uses of 'incongruity' and
'congruity', but rather from his requirement that the terms in a philosoph
ical theory conform to a single standard of meaning given independently
of the circumstances of their application. But the absence of an ideal
definition of incongruity need not mean that we cannot understand its use
in particular cases, any more than, as Wittgenstein notices, the absence of
an absolute standard of exactness rules out our distinguishing between
what is exact and inexact in a variety of different circumstances.16

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 SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 41

In Schopenhauer's Incongruity Theory, the terms 'incongruous' and

'congruous' are correlative, for if it makes sense to say of an object that it
is incongruously subsumed under this concept it also makes sense to say
that this concept is congruous with this object. The point can be seen in
the example of the epitaph on the physician's grave. The words 'those he
has slain lie around him' are, of course, most appropriate to the hero; but
those same words do apply to the physician. It is not a misdescription; it
is not gibberish. The physician is subsumed under this concept. And yet it
is (also) an incongruous subsumption, just because it draws attention to
the physician's incompetence and thus to his lack of resemblance to a
hero. The structure of this example parallels that of Scruton's example of
the caricature of Mrs. Thatcher. It is she we see in the picture, although
one or more of her typical characteristics have been exaggerated so that
she somewhat resembles, say, a soldier stoutly defending his homeland.
Schopenhauer's initial presentation of his version of the Incongruity
Theory makes clear the relativity involved in speaking of incongruity
when he emphasizes the differing points of view involved in the sub
sumption of an object under a concept.
[Laughter] often occurs through two or more real objects being thought
through one concept, and the identity of the concept being transferred to the
objects. But then a complete difference of the objects in other respects make
sit strikingly clear that the concept fitted them only from a one-sided point of
view. It occurs just as often, however, that the incongruity between a single
real object and the concept under which, on the one hand, it has been rightly
subsumed, is suddenly felt. Now the more correct the subsumption of such
actualities under the concept from one standpoint, and the greater and more
glaring their incongruity with it from the other, the more powerful is the
effect of the ludicrous which springs from this contrast (WWR I, p. 59. My
italics.).

Schopenhauer's position here is well illustrated by the joke that open's

Woody Allen's film, Annie Hall. "Two elderly women are at a Catskills
mountain resort, and one of 'em says: 'Boy, the food at this place is really
terrible'. The other one says, 'Yeah, I know and such . . . small
portions'."17 Ordinarily, when assessing hotel food, "small portions" is an
acceptable complaint; but, in this case, while "small portions" is a correct
description, it is a paradoxical complaint in the light of the fact that the
food is especially poor. The humorous incongruity derives from the con
trasting points of view conjoined in the application of the concept on this

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42 PETER . LEWIS

occasion. In the second edition of WWR, Schopenhauer forgoes the termi

nology of points of view in favour of what is appropriate in some respects and
inappropriate in other respects. Thus he writes of "The subsumption, un
derlying everything ludicrous, of what is heterogeneous in one respect under
a concept in other respects appropriate to it" (WWRII, p. 95; cf. p. 91).

3. Metaphysics
Schopenhauer's emphasis on subsumption under a concept constricts
his version of the Incongruity Theory. As Scruton rightly observes, the
language of concept and object is "no more than an attempt to squeeze his
analysis [of incongruity] into the brave metaphysical system of which it is
designed to form a part."18 This is seen most clearly in Schopenhauer's ex
planation of the pleasure normally expressed through laughter, viz., "the
triumph of the knowledge of perception over thought" (WWR II, p. 98).
What we laugh at is an incongruity between a perceived object and a
concept. Concepts are the work of the faculty of reason (WWR I, p. 39)
whose exercise involves exertion and which is opposed to the immediacy
of perception and desire. Hence, Schopenhauer argues, it is "delightful for
us to see this strict, untiring, and most troublesome governess, our faculty
of reason, for once convicted of inadequacy" (loc cit.). Here Schopen
hauer's metaphysics is engaged to account for the cause of, as opposed to
the reason for, laughter; an explanation which anticipates the relief from
restraint theories of humour to be found in Spencer and Freud. One
obvious drawback that Schopenhauer notices is that not all cases of in
congruity involve perception of an object; in many witticisms, "instead of
a real object of perception, a species-concept appears that is subordinate
to the higher or genus-concept" (WWR II, p. 92). Anice example is Woody
Aliens' comment on bisexuality, that it immediately doubles your chances
of getting a date on Saturday night. What is supposed to happen in such
cases is that the imagination supplies an image of the species concept?
"a representative of perception"?and a conflict is noticed between this
perceptual token and the higher-order concepts. If it is far-fetched to propose
that in the course of appreciating Woody Allen's witticism we visualize
bisexual individuals on the look out for Saturday night dates, the implau
sibility derives as much from the inadequacy of Schopenhauer's theory of
language as from his determination to preserve his theory of laughter.

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 SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 43

In the late essay in which he comments on the physiology of laughter,

Schopenhauer summarizes his Incongruity Theory: "we suddenly
recognize the incongruity of an intuitively perceptual representation and
an abstract representation that is in other respects appropriate thereto."19
This encapsulates the division between the perceptible and the conceptu
al that is fundamental to Schopenhauer's system. For Schopenhauer, as for
Locke, concepts are abstractions from perception. Since perception yields
representation or idea (Vorstellung), concepts are representations of repre
sentations, ideas of ideas (WWR I, p. 40). Whereas perceptual representation
is individual, concrete, and conceptual representation is abstract, universal;
there is nothing in the content of concepts that is not already in percep
tion. Concepts are thus derivative, parasitic on the world of perception.
And it is a major theme of Schopenhauer's philosophy that concepts are
ultimately worthless. Perception is what matters in gaining knowledge, in
creating art, in achieving wisdom concerning the significance of
existence. It is undoubtedly this traditional understanding of the nature of
concepts and hence of language (WWR I, p. 39) which underlies Schopen
hauer's dismissive attitude to puns where the humour derives from bringing
"two different concepts under one word by the use of chance or accident"
(WWR I, p. 61; II, p. 95). The modern revolution in our view of the nature
of language and its significance for thought is what enables us to recognize
the force of Wittgenstein's observation that we feel a grammatical joke to
be deep.20
Schopenhauer's favourite analogy characterising the relation of per
ceptual, non-conceptual knowledge and abstract knowledge, knowledge
expressed in judgements, is that "the latter always only approximates to
the former as a mosaic approximates to a painting" (WWR I, p. 59).
Whereas concepts necessarily have edges, boundaries, the world of per
ception is infinitely various and continuous. Schopenhauer sums up this
divide by talking of the "incongruity of knowledge from perception and
abstract knowledge." And, he says, it is this very incongruity that "is the
cause of a very remarkable phenomenon," viz., laughter (loc. cit.).
It is unfortunate, to say the least, that Schopenhauer should use the
same term, 'incongruence' (Inkongruenz), for the division between, on the
one hand, the perceptual and the abstract, and, on the other hand, the
perceived incongruity that provokes laughter. For in the first place, the

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44 PETER . LEWIS

division between the perceptual and the abstract is theoretical, determined

by the alleged essential nature of concepts and of perception. As such, it
is not the sort of incongruence that is perceived when one notices that a
description of an object may be understood differently from the way it
typically is understood. Secondly, the incongruity of the perceptual and
the abstract is a necessary incongruity, while that which provokes laughter
is what might be called a contingent incongruity. That is to say, the object
that is incongruously subsumed under this concept is in some respects
congruously subsumed under the very same concept, and, furthermore, it
makes sense to say that the object is congruously subsumed under some
other concept. The discrepancy here is highlighted by what Schopenhauer
has to say about the state of mind he calls seriousness, "the opposite of
laughter and joking": seriousness "consists in the consciousness of the
perfect agreement and congruity of the concept, or the idea, with what is
perceptive, with reality" (WWR II, p. 99). To be sure, the serious person
may be deluded in thinking that "he conceives things as they are and that
they are as he conceives them." But this is a correctable error rather than
a logical impossibility.
It seems that there are two distinct notions of incongruity at work in
Schopenhauer's discussion. Concepts are incongruous with perception in
the sense that they are incommensurable with perception: given what a
concept is, a concept cannot be said to possess the characteristic features
of perception. That is, as it were, a comment on the grammar or logical
form of 'concept' and 'percept'. In the theory of laughter, Schopenhauer
is addressing the application of particular concepts to particular objects
such that, given the context of this concept, given what these words mean,
its application is in some cases more appropriate, fits better, than it does
in other cases. It is this fact about the application of concepts that allows
for the possibility of heterogeneous subsumption, the perception of in
congruity that provokes laughter. Were it this notion of incongruity that
was in operation in the description of the essential difference between
concept and perception, then merely drawing attention to the fact that this
is an object and this is a concept would be a suitable subject for laughter.
This is evidently non-sensical. Nevertheless, given Schopenhauer's thesis
of the logical incongruence between concepts and perception, it perhaps
can be maintained that whenever a concept applies to an object there will

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 SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 45

always be a lack of perfect fit, so that there will always be the possibility
of perceiving an incongruity that can provoke laughter. That is, everything
in the world of perception can be the subject of laughter.

4. Laughter and Aesthetic Experience

Though Schopenhauer does not actually say this, I assume that seri
ousness is the normal state of mind of the average person. For what
Schopenhauer does maintain is that everyday perception is dominated by
practical, goal-seeking concerns, or, in Schopenhauer's terminology, everyday
perception is in the service of the Will. And the successful pursuit of
practical projects would seem to require that we at the very least believe
that we conceive things as they are and that they are as we conceive them.
Ordinarily, then, we attend to things only in so far as we need to in
order to satisfy our immediate desires, solve our problems, and so on. Per
ceiving the incongruities between objects and concepts which provoke
laughter demands a drawing back from practically oriented perception
(except perhaps in the case of the professional comedian!), for it involves
noticing the relationships between things and the concepts they fall under.
Joking and absurd behaviour which interrupt the seriousness of everyday
living are ways of bringing such relationships to our attention.
This account of laughter as disrupting the ordinariness of existence
would on the face of it fit neatly into Schopenhauer's account of aesthetic
experience. For Schopenhauer's view famously maintains that aesthetic
experience involves the suspension of everyday practical activity and
modes of perception. As he puts it, "we relinquish the ordinary way of
considering things . . . and let our whole consciousness be filled by the
calm contemplation of the natural object actually present, whether it be a
landscape, a tree, a rock, a crag, a building or anything else" (WWR I, p.
178). But closer attention to Schopenhauer's theory of aesthetic experi
ence reveals that far from admitting laughter it actually rules it out. The
words omitted from the previous quotation read as follows: "we no longer
consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither in things, but
simply and solely the what. Further, we do not let abstract thought, the
concepts of reason, take possession of our consciousness, but, instead of
all this, devote the whole power of our mind to perception, sink ourselves
completely therein and let our whole consciousness be filled by the calm

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46 PETER . LEWIS

contemplation of the natural object." (loc. cit.). Since laughter is in the

paradigm case excited by the perception of incongruity between a per
ceptual object and the concept it falls under, by, that is, noticing a
relationship between perception and a concept of reason, it seems to
follow that laughter is antithetical to aesthetic experience as Schopen
hauer understands it.
Considerations similar to these, if not identical, also pose problems
for Schopenhauer's account of aesthetic experience involving the literary
arts. The arts of poetry and drama essentially depend on concepts, so an
account of aesthetic experience which emphasizes perception at the
expense of concepts is going to run the risk of denying these the status of
genuine art forms. Schopenhauer's solution to the problem is to declare
that in attending to poetry "a perceptive representative appears before the
imagination" (WWR I, p. 243). The poet, if he is worthy of the name,
"knows how to precipitate, as it were, the concrete, individual, the repre
sentation of perception, out of the abstract, transparent universality of the
concepts by the way in which he combines them" (loc. cit.). This is exactly
the same move that Schopenhauer makes in order to accommodate certain
forms of wit within his theory of laughter. If it is implausible as an account
of enjoying witticism, it seems to be totally incapable of providing an
adequate account of our appreciation of the conceptual ingredients in
poetry and drama. It follows that Schopenhauer is in need of some alter
native view of the literary arts just as an alternative view of the nature of
laughter in aesthetic experience is required.

5. The Humorous

In the extended essay on laughter in the second edition of WWR,

Schopenhauer not only provides lots of examples to illustrate his theory,
he also draws numerous distinctions within the genre of the ludicrous,
such as that between wit and folly, parody, and irony.21 Here I wish to
attend to Schopenhauer's distinctive notion of the humorous.
Schopenahuer complains of a "miserable mania" prevailing in the
Germany of his time "for giving things a more distinguished name than
belongs to them. . . . Thus every public house is called a hotel, every
money-changer a banker" (WWR II, p. 101).22 Another example he
mentions is that of calling every clown or joker a humorist. Schopenhauer

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 SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 47

protests that this should be resisted, for "the word humour is borrowed
from the English, in order to single out and denote a quite peculiar species
of the ludicrous which ... is even akin to the sublime. [I]t is not meant to
be used as a title for any jest and buffoonery" (loc. cit.).
According to Schopenhauer, humour depends on "a special kind of
mood or frame of mind," "... a subjective yet serious and sublime mood,
which is involuntarily in conflict with a common external world very
different from itself (WWR II, p. 100). Samples of Hamlet's melancholy
wit are quoted in illustration. Furthermore, Schopenhauer says, "every
poetical or artistic presentation of a comic, or even a farcical scene,
through which a serious thought yet gleams as its concealed background,
is a product of humour, and thus is humorous" (WWR II, pp. 100 f.). The
humorous frame of mind is, then, to be distinguished from cheap and
frivolous vulgarity by the seriousness of the thought which it expresses,
but it is unclear from what has so far been said how it is supposed to be
akin to the sublime. I suggest that the kinship between the humorous and
the sublime derives from the fact that in both states there is a conflict with
the external world.
Whereas the aesthetic experience of beauty is one of calm contem
plation, the experience of the sublime is troubled and turbulent. Due to the
objects of attention?tempestuous nature, vast empty spaces of deserts or
the night sky?the perceiver feels a constant threat of danger to himself
and to his sense of identity. For this reason, the experience of the sublime
is liable to collapse into, be reduced to, one of sheer anxiety (WWR I, p.
202). The maintenance of the experience of the sublime requires strain or
struggle. Consequently, the experience of the sublime involves a kind of
reflexiveness or self-awareness foreign to the experience of beauty.
The humorous mood, as Schopenhauer describes it, also derives
from a conflict with the external world. Instead of pursuing his desires and
projects along with everyone else, the humorist finds himself struck by the
incongruity, the absurdity and the folly, in the lives of his fellows. And, as
in the experience of the sublime, the maintenance of the humorous mood
requires some strain or struggle, for it is in constant danger of collapsing
into sheer bitterness or anger, on the one hand, or into mere triviality and
silliness, on the other. Like the experience of the sublime, the humorous
mood involves a self-consciousness and reflexiveness that distinguishes it
from the consoling pleasures of more familiar aesthetic experiences of

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48 PETER . LEWIS

beauty. Yet, Schopenhauer claims, it is this humorous mood that is

expressed in and is the source of the art of comedy.

6. Comedy
Like all the arts in Schopenhauer's aesthetic, with the exception of
music, comedy presents the eternal structure lying beneath or behind the
surface appearance of the phenomenal world. Specifically, comedy reveals
the Form or Idea of humanity, the essence of human life. However, it is
the function of the art of tragedy also to reveal the essential nature of human
existence. But whereas comedy inspires amusement and laughter, tragedy
excites pity and fear. How is it that two art forms which reveal the nature
of human life can result in such different responses? Schopenhauer's
answer is that comedy and tragedy present the drama of human life from
different points of view.
Seen as a whole, an individual's life "is really a tragedy"?he is born,
he suffers, and he dies: "that's all, that's all, that's all, that's all."23 Seen in
detail, an individual's life "has the character of a comedy. For the doings
and worries of the day, the restless mockeries of the moment, the desires
and fears of the weak, the mishaps of the hour, are all brought about by
chance that is bent on some mischievous trick; they are nothing but scenes
from a comedy" (WWR I, p. 322). Such mundane events are, we might
say, life's little incongruities (taking 'incongruity' here in its broadest
sense), and they reflect the underlying conflict between the demands of
the species and the desires of the individual (WWR II, pp. 553-54). This
is the serious thought expressed when these kinds of event are presented
in the smiling mask of comedy.
And yet, of course, these little incongruities are no laughing matter
for the individual who lives through them: they are rather the source of
frustration and misery. What makes it possible for us to laugh at them
rather than to weep is the manner of their presentation. In a comedy, we
do not have the opportunity to dwell on the pain and misery of daily
disasters, for "it exhibits them as fleeting" and "hastens to drop the curtain
at the moment of delight" (WWR II, p. 438). As someone once said, farce
is tragedy speeded up.
Whereas tragedy prepares us for the renunciation of life, comedy, by
bringing out "the inexhaustible material for laughter with which life . . .
[is] filled," tends to keep us in a good mood and "declares that life on the
whole is quite good" (loc cit.). Wisdom, for Schopenhauer, consists in

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 SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 49

coming to realize that this is a shallow perspective on life, and that it is

tragedy that reveals the deepest truth about human existence.

7. Laughter and Pessimism

While Schopenhauer presents a pessimistic vision of life, his pessimism

does not take the simplistic form which maintains that the sad events in
life outnumber the happy. For he holds that life is filled with "inexhaustible
material for laughter." It is only when viewed in the appropriate manner
that this material gives rise to laughter. The function of comedy is to present
this material in the appropriate manner to the general public, and the art
of comedy originates in the humorous mood of the artist.
Various features of Schopenhauer's theory can be developed further.

1. Schopenhauer claims that life can be seen as tragic or comic. This

seems to mean that different aspects of life?the whole as opposed
to the detail?are highlighted in the different art forms of tragedy
and comedy. A more radical thesis is that the very same features
that are at one time seen as tragic are at another time seen as
comic. This is suggested by Schopenhauer's remark that "life and
even its very adversities" (WWRII, pp. 438) provide the material
for laughter. Just as it has been claimed that anything may be the
object of aesthetic experience, so anything may be a subject for
humour and laughter. There is some evidence for this in the
emergence of jokes concerning 9/11, jokes arousing laughter
about people who died jumping from burning buildings or from
the impact of the planes smashing into the World Trade Center.

2. The proposed radical thesis provides one way of interpreting

Schopenhauer's assertion that the material for laughter is "inex
haustible." Laughter is excited not merely by certain kinds of
features of things but by the way one sees the features of things.
While this appears to be incompatible with the Incongruity
Theory, it is in fact compatible with Schopenhauer's initial pre
sentation of the theory according to which the relevant
incongruity is determined by differing points of view: what from
one point of view is congruous is from another point of view in
congruous. This helps to explain what it is for someone to lack a
sense of humour?due to an excess of seriousness or literal-mind

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50 peter ?. lewis

edness, the individual is unable to see things from the appropriate

point of view. The loss of this ability may be temporary, as is the
case when one is engulfed in misery.

3. Schopenhauer locates the humorous in a certain kind of mood, in

part because he regards the humorous as a distinctive sub-category
of the ludicrous. Now, although as I mentioned in Section 1 above,
moods are related to one's tendency to laughter, locating the sense
of humour with a mood downplays the cognitive dimension in
seeing or noting incongruity. This is more akin to a skill that can
be cultivated through exposure to examples and to people who
have "a wild eye." Wittgenstein maintained that the deeper and
more important aspect of humour derived from its being "not a
mood, but a way of looking at the world."24 This fits better with
the emphasis in Schopenhauer's thesis that comedy involves a
different view of life from that of tragedy.

4. Schopenhauer wishes to restrict the scope of humour and comedy

to forms of art that have an underlying serious intent. But it is
plausible to think that most, if not all, jokes and witticisms play a
similar role in everyday life of keeping us "in a good mood." Jokes
are little comedies, small works of art, which are "an invitation to
the continued affirmation of the will to live" (WWR II, p. 437).

Schopenhauer's positive view of comedy and laughter might seem to

work against his pessimism?despite the misery, there is room for humour.
In fact, however, it adds a diabolical dimension to the pessimism. For
Schopenhauer maintains that this "world of ours is the worst of all
possible worlds" (WWR II, p. 583). We can imagine worse worlds, but
they would be intolerable. In our world, we can laugh at the very things
that cause pain, thereby enabling us to bear what would otherwise be un
bearable.25
Peter B. Lewis
University of Edinburgh

Notes
1. An honourable exception is T. L. S. Sprigge, "Schopenhauer and Bergson on
Laughter," Comparative Criticism, 10, (1988), 39-65.
2. The Word as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969).

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 SCHOPENHAUER' S LAUGHTER 51

3. Parerga and Paralipomena, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974),

voi. 2, pp. 103-76.
4. Ibid., p. 168.
5. Damon Runyan, "The Lemon Drop Kid," Runyan on Broadway (London: Picador,
1975), p. 301.
6. Parerga and Paralipomena, p. 168 (cited in n. 3 above).
7. Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 199.
8. Schopenhauer had disdained to provide any examples in the first edition of WWR
(1819). He supplies lots of examples in the second edition (1844) in order, as he says, "to
come to the aid of the mental inertness of those readers who always prefer to remain in a
passive state" (WWR II, p. 92).
9. In his lectures of 1933, Wittgenstein criticized Freud for encouraging "a confusion
between getting to know the cause of your laughter and getting to know the reason why
you laugh" (G. E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33," Philosophical Papers,
London: Allen & Unwin, p. 316). This confusion is manifest in Freud's assertion that "we
do not in the strict sense know what we are laughing at" in Sigmund Freud, The Joke and
Its Relation to the Unconscious, trans. Joyce Crick (London: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 99.
10. Michael Clark, "Humour and Incongruity," Philosophy, 45 (1970), pp. 20-32;
reprinted in John Morreall, ed., The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor (Albany, NY:
SUNY Press, 1987), pp. 139-55.
11. Roger Scruton, "Laughter," The Aesthetic Understanding (London: Methuen,
1983), p. 157.
12. Mike W. Martin, "Humour and Aesthetic Enjoyment of Incongruities," British
Journal of Aesthetics, 23 (1987), 74-85; reprinted in John Morreall, ed., The Philosophy
of Laughter and Humor (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1987), pp. 172-86.
13. Scruton, cited in n. 11 above, p. 157.
14. Sprigge, cited in n. 1 above, p. 64, n. 5.
15. Scruton, cited in n. 11 above, p. 157.
16. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), ?88.
17. The narrator continues with a joke at Schopenhauer's expense: "Well, that's essen
tially how I feel about life. Full of loneliness and misery and suffering and unhappiness,
and it's all over much too quickly." Woody Allen and Marshall Brickman, Annie Hall, in
Four Films of Woody Allen (London: Faber and Faber, 1983), p. 4.
18. Scruton, cited in n. 11 above, p. 157.
19. Parerga and Paralipomena, cited in n. 3 above, p. 168.
20. L. Wittgenstein, cited in n. 16 above, ?111.
21. See Sprigge, cited in n. 1 above, for clarification of some of these categories.
22. Plus ?a change!
23. T. S. Eliot, "Fragment of an Agon," The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot
(London: Faber and Faber, 1969), p. 122.
24. L. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, revised ed'n., ed. G. H. von Wright, trans. P.
Winch, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 88.
25. I should like to thank the members of the Department of Philosophy at the Univer
sity of Edinburgh for helpful discussion of ideas in this essay.

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