CASE NO.

1
ANTONIO MONTEJO vs. VICENTA UROTIA
G.R. No. L-27187 July 22, 1971

Facts:
Plaintiffs in their complaint, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, on July 2, 1962, Antonio Montejo and Consolacion Bibera seek: a) to
prevent the foreclosure of a mortgage on several parcels of land they claim
to own in common with the defendants, as well as on several personal
properties allegedly belonging exclusively to plaintiff Antonio Montejo; b) to
have said parcels of land partitioned among its co-owners; c) the release,
from the aforementioned mortgage, of the said personal properties and of
plaintiffs' shares in said land; and d) the collection of certain sums of money
allegedly due from the defendants to plaintiff Antonio Montejo. There were
24 defendants under the original complaint, which was amended to include
20 additional defendants. Inasmuch as 17 defendants had not been
summoned as of September 27, 1963, said court then issued an order, inter
alia, directing the plaintiffs to exert efforts to cause said defendants to be
summoned. Over two years later, or on October 25, 1965, the court
dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with said order.
Plaintiffs-appellants assail the order of dismissal appealed from upon
the ground that 1.) the duty to serve summons upon the defendants
devolves upon the clerk of court not upon the plaintiffs and 2.) that service of
summons by publication is not feasible. The appellants contend that under
sections 1, 2, and 3, of Rule 31, Rules of Court, it is the duty of the clerk of
court and not of the plaintiff to include a case in the trial calendar after the
issues are joined and that it is also the duty of the clerk of court and not the
plaintiff to fix the date for trial and to cause a notice to be served upon the
parties. But the duty imposed upon the clerk in these sections of the Rules
does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently,
for the non-performance of that duty by plaintiff is by section 3 of Rule 30
made an express ground for dismissing the action. If the clerk, therefore, in
the present cases had been negligent, it was plaintiff's duty to call the
court's attention to that fact so that the administration of justice would not
suffer delay.
The second ground did not justify plaintiffs' inaction for three (3) years.
If there was no means of summoning any of the defendant's, plaintiffs should
have so informed the court and moved for their exclusion from the
complaint, within a reasonable period of time, so that the case could be
disposed on one way or another instead of being left pending indefinitely,
the contributing to the clogging of our court dockets. Besides, plaintiffs could
have asked that the defendants be summoned by publication, pursuant to
sections 16 and 17 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the action being one for
partition of real properties in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not Section 3 of Rule 17 of Rules of Court will apply

Held:
Section 3 of Rule 17 of Rules of Court which is a reproduction of Section
3 of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court as reads:

Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to

prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided
by court.
As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," within the
purview of the above-quoted provision, We have ruled that it "depends upon
the circumstances of each particular case that the sound discretion of the
court in the determination of said question will not be disturbed, in the
absence of patent abuse and that the burden of showing abuse of judicial
discretion is upon appellant since every presumption is in favour of the
correctness of the court's action.
Thus, the Court refused the orders of dismissal for failure of the
plaintiffs to prosecute for a period of four (4) years, about three (3)
years, over a year, less than a year, and even less than three (3) months, as
well as for failure of the plaintiffs to comply, for less than two (2) months,
with an order directing him to file a bill of particulars.
The duty imposed upon the clerk does not relieve the plaintiff of his
own duty to prosecute the case diligently, for the non-performance of that
duty by plaintiff is by section 3 of Rule 30 made an express ground for
dismissing the action. If the clerk, therefore, in the present cases had been
negligent, it was plaintiff's duty to call the court's attention to that fact so
that the administration of justice would not suffer delay.

CASE NO. 2

G.R. No. L-29098 July 22, 1971

PEOPLE'S CAR, INC. vs. JOSE ARCELLANA, and THE CAPITAL INSURANCE AND
SURETY CO., INC.,

FACTS:
This is an appeal from order of dismissal for failure to prosecute.

This is a case for the collection of a sum of money from defendants Jose
Arcellana and the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. It was initiated in the City Court
of Manila, on April 20, 1966. Judgment for plaintiff People's Car Inc., having been
rendered, on September 7, 1967, defendant Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.,
appealed to the Court of First instance of Manila. On October 24, 1967, the latter issued
a notice to the parties, advising them that the appealed case had then been docketed in
said court. Counsel for the appellant received, on December 18, 1967, notice to the
effect that a pre-trial would be held on January 4, 1968. He, however, failed to appear at
said pre-trial.
Appellant alleges that the failure of his counsel to appear at the pre-trial was due
to the fact that he then had to attend the trial of another case; that he had filed, on
December 27, 1967, a motion for postponement of said pre-trial upon such ground; and
that, although the motion was denied on December 29, 1967, notice of the order to this
effect was not received by him until January 12, 1968, or eight (8) days after the
scheduled pre-trial.
Hence, the Court forthwith ordered the appeal dismissed and the judgment
appealed from revived, for failure to prosecute on the part of said appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of dismissal of the motion was proper

HELD: YES. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the present Rules of Court, which is a reproduction
of Section 3 of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court effective July 1, 1940, reads:
Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or
to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply
with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise provided by court.

Construing this provision, it was held in Smith Bell & Co. v. American President Lines,
Ltd., and this view was reiterated in subsequent cases, that "... (t)he dismissal of an
action pursuant to this rule rests upon the sound discretion of the court ... ." .

Appellant was represented by the "Achacoso, Ocampo and Simbulan" Law Firm, on
behalf of which Atty. Sabino P. Palomares, Jr. had appeared. If Atty. Palomares had
another case set for trial on January 4, 1968, any of the three (3) members of the law
firm could have and should have appeared at the pre-trial of the case at bar. Moreover,
in the absence of an order granting said motion for postponement, appellant's counsel
was not justified in assuming that the motion would be granted.

The fact that the plaintiffs had filed a motion for continuance ... does not entitle the
plaintiffs to presume that their motion for continuance would be granted. Motions for
postponement are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and unless there be an
abuse of such discretion this Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.

CASE NO. 3
G.R. No. 139337 August 15, 2001
MA. CARMINIA C. ROXAS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE
ANTONIO F. ROXAS
FACTS: On November 4, 1997, petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Roxas filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Civil Case No. 97-0523, which is
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of her husband, Jose Antonio F. Roxas, private
respondent herein, with an application for support pendente lite for their four
(4) minor children. The case was raffled to Branch 257 of the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque City presided by Judge Rolando C. How. But the
petitioner, soon thereafter, filed in the said RTC Branch 257 a Notice of
Dismissal dated November 20, 1997, to dismiss the complaint, without
prejudice, pursuant to the provision of Section 1, Rule 17, of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, considering that summons has not yet been served and no
responsive pleading has yet been filed.
The same complaint, now docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0608, was re-filed on
November 25, 1997. It was raffled in due course to Branch 260 of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City presided by Judge Helen Bautista-
Ricafort.
On May 13, 1998, when the case was called for a pre-trial conference, the
matter of plaintiffs (petitioners) application for support pendente lite of
their four (4) minor children was taken up. On May 19, 1998, Judge Bautista-
Ricafort, issued an Order granting the application for support pendente lite.
On July 22, 1998, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying the
trial court to cite private respondent in contempt of court after the latter
failed to comply with the said Order. Private respondent, filed a counter-
manifestation and motion praying that the manner and mode of payment of
his contribution to the expenses of his minor children be modified such that
he will pay directly to the entities or persons to which the payment for such
expenses are intended. On September 23, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort
issued an Order directing the private respondent "to comply fully with the
Order within 10 days otherwise, he would be cited for contempt of court.
Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
questioning the Orders of the trial court. The appellate court nullified the
Orders and the proceedings of the trial court for the reason that the
certificate of non-forum shopping of the petitioner did not mention the prior
filing of Civil Case No. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge Rolando C. How and
the dismissal thereof without prejudice. Hence this appeal.

ISSUES: Whether or not the case at bar requires a certification of non-forum

shopping.

HELD: NO. Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse

judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Since a party resorts to forum shopping
in order to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, it
has been held that a party cannot be said to have sought to improve his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable
decision has ever been rendered against him in any of the cases he has
brought before the courts.
In the case at bar, there was no adverse decision against the petitioner in
Civil Case No. 97-0523 which was the first case filed and raffled to the sala
(Branch 257) of Judge How. The dismissal without prejudice of the complaint
in Civil Case No. 97-0523 at the instance of the petitioner was pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure15 considering that it
was done before service of answer or any responsive pleading. The dismissal
does not amount to litis pendencia nor to res judicata. There is no litis
pendencia since the first case before Judge How was dismissed or withdrawn
by the plaintiff (herein petitioner), without prejudice, upon her filing of a
notice of dismissal, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. To use the wording of that rule, Judge Hows order is one merely
"confirming the dismissal" of the complaint by the plaintiff (herein
petitioner). Neither is there res judicata for the reason that the order of
dismissal was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal "without
prejudice".

Case No. 4
International Container Terminal Services Inc. vs Court of Appeals,
C.F. Sharp Inc.,
G.R. No. 90530

Facts:
Respondent Sharp Inc. filed a complaint for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against petitioner and the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) where the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the
posting by Sharp of a bond issued by the Integrated Bonding and Insurance
Co. Petitioner filed an answer with a compulsory counterclaim against Sharp
claiming that as a consequence of the complaint and the writ of preliminary
injunction, it had suffered injuries. The PPA, together with petitioner, filed a
motion to dismiss Sharps complaint where the same was granted by the
court and further resulting to the dismissal of the counterclaim. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision stating that the
counterclaim for damages being compulsory in nature, for which no filing fee
has been paid, was correctly dismissed after the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint operated to dismiss
the counterclaim.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner itself joined the PPA in
moving for the dismissal of the complaint, hence it did not object to the
dismissal of the respondents complaint. The compulsory counterclaim was
so intertwined with the complaint that it could not remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court after the dismissal of the complaint
which had provoked the counterclaim in the first place. As a consequence,
the dismissal of the complaint on the petitioners own motion will also
dismiss the counterclaim questioning that complaint.
The Rules provides that, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss,
the action shall not be dismissed against the defendants objection unless
the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court.
The fact that petitioner caused the dismissal of its counterclaim when
it not only did not object to, but actually moved for, the dismissal of the
complaint. The petitioner cannot undo that act. Petitioner should have had
objected to the dismissal of the complaint or at least reserved its right to
prosecute it.

Case No. 5
Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et.al
GR No. 125468, October 9, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Producers Bank filed a complaint with a prayer for preliminary

attachment. It was filed before the RTC of Makati and the latter granted the
writ. Petitioner also filed a motion for issuance of summons, which the RTC
granted. Only private respondent Wilson Kho was served through substituted
service. The whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown.
The Bank moved for reinstatement of the writ. It was at this time when
the trial court observed that there were no returns of the service of
summonses from the three other defendants. Without any manifestation
from either parties, nor any application for service of summonses by
publication, the RTC deferred deliberations on the motion to reinstate the
writ of attachment until the summonses were served. When Respondent Kho
moved that pre-trial be set without having to wait for the service of
summonses upon the other defendants, the RTC ruled to deny the motion.
There was also inordinate delay during pre-trial proceedings. In four
instances, specifically on August 3, 1991, September 17, 1991, May 8, 1992,
and July 13, 1992, pre-trial conferences were re-set either because Banks
counsel for witnesses could not appear. Finally, when trial commenced, the
Bank moved for postponements for three times.
The Banks counsel filed a motion for postponement of the hearings
scheduled. He cited as reason his having to leave for the province to
arbitrate a peaceful settlement of a land dispute among members of his
family. In his stead, he sent Atty. Cotaco to attend the hearing and to inform
the court about his predicament. Kho opposed any further postponements
and undue delays and prayed for the dismissal of the case.
The RTC finding no merit in the reasons for postponement and finding
Kho's opposition well taken, issued an order dismissing the complaint for
failure of the petitioner to prosecute the case. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration filed by the Bank was denied. The Bank appealed to the
Court of Appeals. The CA issued the assailed decision, dismissing the appeal
and affirming the order of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred and abused its discretion when it affirmed the
RTCs dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute.

HELD: No. The CA did not err nor abuse its discretion when it upheld
the RTCs dismissal of complaint for failure to prosecute for five years. The
RTC in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the RTC, applied
Section 3, of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which states that: Sec. 3. Failure to
prosecute. - If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules
or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided
by the court.
Undoubtedly, five years have been an unreasonably long time for a
defendant to wait for the outcome of a trial which has yet to commence and
on which his family, fortune and future depend. In a number of previous
cases, the SC have consistently warned that courts must ensure that
litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. SC also held that
although the grant or denial of postponements rests entirely on the sound
discretion of the judge, SC cautioned that the exercise of that discretion must
be reasonably and wisely exercised. Postponements should not be allowed
except on meritorious grounds, in light of the attendant
circumstances. Deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated
especially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any
party. "The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all
possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence
and either in the plaintiff's being non-suited or of the defendant's being
pronounced liable under an ex-parte judgment." While a court can dismiss a
case on the ground of non-prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such
power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want
of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.
To declare the dismissal in this case without prejudice would open the
floodgate to possible circumvention of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court on dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute. SC held that the
dismissal of petitioner's complaint is with prejudice and should have the
effect of adjudication on the merits.

Case No. 6
GR NO. 103185 CONRADO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and FILIPINAS MANUFACTURERS BANK, respondents.
FACTS
A complaint for a collection of a sum of money was filed by private
respondent against Calalang who filed a motion to dismiss which was denied.
Respondent's bank failed to appear during the first two scheduled hearings
for pre-trial causing the dismissal of the case. The dismissal was set aside
upon respondent's motion for reconsideration. On the two scheduled dates of
hearing, counsel for defendant Hugo Arca failed to appear. The court
informed the plaintiff that it shall not consider Acropolis trading Corp as
having brought under their jurisdiction in view of improper service of
summons. Calalang filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent
bank failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time. The
court resolved that if plaintiff was not able to cause service of alias summons
then this court will dismiss the complaint. At the pre-trial conference, the
case had been dismissed for failure of the plaintiff's counsel to appear
despite notice and considering that his case had been pending for 7 years. A
motion for reconsideration was filed citing that said counsel arrived late due
to heavy traffic. Such motion was denied and so respondent bank appealed
in the CA which reversed the decision and ordered the case to be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the acts of respondent bank manifest lack of interest hence
respondent court's decision to set aside the dismissal of said case an abuse
of discretion.
HELD: No. petitioner's contention that the fact that respondent bank had not
caused service of summons on the two other defendants, the Acropolis
Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda, for almost seven years after the
complaint was filed on April 29, 1980 indicated "abuse of judicial leniency
and tolerance" is bereft of merit. Summons is issued by the clerk of court
upon the filing of the complaint. When it was informed later on by Judge
Alikpala, Jr. in his Order dated March 6, 1987 that there was an improper
service on defendants Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda,
respondent bank, in compliance therewith, filed a motion for alias summons,
as permitted by the law. Considering the judicial reorganization which took
place during the pendency of this case and the numerous instances raised by
both petitioner and respondent bank as contributing to the delay, petitioner
cannot now claim that respondent bank's "abuse of judicial leniency and
tolerance is the single greatest component of this delay". The acts of the
respondent bank do not manifest lack of interest to prosecute, in the
absence of proof that it indeed abandoned or intended to abandon its case
against petitioner and the other defendants. Admittedly there was delay in
this case, but such delay, the SC held that, is not the delay warranting
dismissal. To be a sufficient ground for dismissal, delay must not only be
lengthy but also unnecessary and dilatory resulting in the trifling of judicial
processes. While it is true that the dismissal of an action on grounds
specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court is addressed
to their discretion such discretion must be exercised soundly with a view to
the circumstances surrounding each particular case. If facts obtain that serve
as mitigating circumstances for the delay, the same should be considered
and dismissal denied or set aside, especially where the suit appears to be
meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent and no injury results
to defendant. It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for
postponement and the setting aside of orders previously issued, rest
principally upon the sound discretion of the judge to whom they are
addressed, but always predicated on the consideration that more than the
mere convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of
justice and fairness would be served thereby. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
CASE NO. 7

G.R. No. 151215 April 5, 2010

PCI LEASING and FINANCE, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO C. MILAN, Doing Business Under the Name and Style of "A. MILAN
TRADING," and LAURA M. MILAN, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed on February 18, 2000 a Complaint for Sum of Money against herein
respondents Antonio and Laura Milan, alleging that it extended loans on different dates to
respondents for which Deeds of Assignment were duly executed by respondents. Under the terms
of the Deeds, respondents sold, assigned and transferred to PCI Leasing the formers rights to
various checks for and in consideration of the various amounts obtained and in case of default or
nonpayment of the checks, respondents were obligated to pay the face value of the checks,
interests and late payment charges. Petitioner then presented the checks for payment but were
dishonored for different reasons. It thereafter demanded from respondents to settle its
obligations, but the latter failed to do so prompting the petitioner to institute the complaint in the
RTC of Quezon City to enforce payment of the total loan obligation. The RTC issued summons
to respondents, addressed to their place of residence as stated in the complaint yet it was for
naught because the respondents had already transferred to an unknown location thus, returned
unserved. Petitioner filed a motion to archive the case for it was conducting an investigation in
order to ascertain the whereabouts of the respondents, subject to its reinstatement after the same
was determined. It was however denied because the circumstances of the case were not within
the purview of the provisions of paragraph II (c) of Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92
(Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases). The RTC then ordered the petitioner "to take the
necessary steps to actively prosecute the instant case within ten days from receipt" under pain of
dismissal of the case "for lack of interest." The petitioner filed motion for issuance of alias
summons but both were denied and the case was subsequently dismissed due to the absence of
the counsel for the latter during the hearing for the second motion filed by it. Subsequent motion
for reconsideration and ex-parte motion for reconsideration were also denied by the court. A
notice of appeal was filed by the petitioner in attempt to challenge the order rendered by the trial
court which the latter later on dismissed because the same was filed beyond the reglementary
period. Petitioner then assailed the above Resolution before the Court of Appeals through a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but it was dismissed outright holding
that its appeal had been taken out of time. Citing Section 13, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal for
having been taken out of time. It further holds that it has no jurisdiction over the petition since it
only involves question of law. Thus, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

1) WON the appeal was filed out of time.

2) WON the petitioner is deprived of \ its right to recover the sums it had loaned to the
respondents.

HELD:

1) YES. The Court hold that the conclusion of the RTC that PCI Leasing belatedly filed its
appeal was correct, but the premise therefor was evidently mistaken. In accordance with
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary appeal of a judgment by the RTC
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Said period shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the Court had the occasion to clarify the rule regarding the
period within which an appeal may be taken should a motion for new trial or
 reconsideration be filed. Thus: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical
to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the period within which
to file the Notice of Appeal should be reckoned from the date which denied the Ex Parte
Motion for Reconsideration of PCI Leasing. As PCI Leasing was not able to file the
Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period allowed therefor, the RTC Order
dismissing the case should be deemed final and executory.

2) NO. Notwithstanding the doctrine on immutability of final judgments, the Court finds,
after a thorough review of the records, that compelling circumstances are extant in this
case, which clearly warrant the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Invariably, rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this
Court itself had already declared to be final. It will not serve the ends of substantial
justice if the RTCs dismissal of the case with prejudice on pure technicalities would be
perfunctorily upheld by appellate courts likewise on solely procedural grounds, unless the
procedural lapses committed were so gross, negligent, tainted with bad faith or
tantamount to abuse or misuse of court processes. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court states that: If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of
the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court,
the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. The Court thus found that the
RTC grievously erred in dismissing Civil Case No. Q-00-40010 because the dismissal
were due to the absence of petitioners counsel at the hearing scheduled for that day and
due to the directive of the RTC to petitioner to "take the necessary steps to actively
prosecute its case, otherwise, the same shall be dismissed." While trial courts have the
discretion to impose sanctions on counsels or litigants for tardiness or absence at
hearings, such sanctions should be proportionate to the offense and should still conform
to the dictates of justice and fair play. It does not escape this Courts notice that PCI
Leasing failed to successfully prosecute the case for several months due to the difficulties
it encountered in locating respondents, who appeared to have a propensity for changing
addresses and refusing to accept court processes. Under these circumstances, the delay in
the trial court proceedings was not entirely the fault of PCI Leasing. Verily, it can hardly
be said that PCI Leasing engaged in a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the
case or committed a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules.
CASE NO. 8
FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAARES,
EMILIA GATCHALIAN and FIDEL BESARINO, petitioners,
vs.
ELIZABETH BALISING et al.,respondents
G.R. No. 132624 March 13, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares,
Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal
cases for estafa2 filed by the private respondents. The cases were assigned
to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II.After the petitioners
were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty,3 they filed a Motion to
Dismiss the aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the same
was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation
proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig, Antipolo,
Rizal. The municipal trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss on the ground that they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral
of the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It
added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to the Lupon
amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as
basis for dismissing the cases. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in the Revised Rules of
Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be deemed waived if
not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. On November 13, 1995, the
municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases
against petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Then, private respondents through
counsel, filed a motion to revive the abovementioned criminal cases against
petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for
conciliation had already been complied with. Petitioners filed a comment and
opposition to motion to revive claiming that the Order of the municipal trial
court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases had long become final
and executory; hence, private respondents should have re-filed the cases
instead of filing a motion to revive . The municipal trial court issued an Order
granting private respondents' motion to revive. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned Order which was denied by the
municipal trial court. Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, a petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition assailing
the Order, dated March 18, 1996 of the municipal trial court. The regional
trial court, likewise, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without
prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period,
as in the present case; and
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without
prejudice may be revived by motion after the order of dismissal had become
final and executory.
HELD:
1.YES. An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no
motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.

32
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, we stated, thus:

The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean

that said dismissal order was any less final. Such Order of dismissal is
complete in all details, and though without prejudice, nonetheless
finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order
but a final disposition of the complaint.

The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his
receipt of the court's decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding
to appeal or move to reconsider the same. After the lapse of the fifteen-day
period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final
judgment or order cannot be modified in any respect, even if the
modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion
by the court which rendered the same. After the order of dismissal of a case
without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the
court's power to amend and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case
has no other remedy but to file a new complaint. Thus, the regional trial
court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and
prohibition and ruled that the order of the municipal trial court, dated
November 13, 1995 dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases against
petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be reinstated by the
mere filing of a motion to revive.

2.) NO. The action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice cannot
be revived by motion after the order of dismissal had become final and
executory.
Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the
issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject
of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under
the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said
case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within
which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed. Moreover,
It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases
subject to summary procedure especially since the objective of the Rule
governing the same is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously. To
construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the revival of dismissed cases by
mere motion even after the lapse of the period for appealing the same would
prevent the courts from settling justiciable controversies with
finality, thereby undermining the stability of our judicial system.
CASE NO. 9
SPS. LYDIA AND VIRGILIO MELITON VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 101883 DECEMBER 11, 1992

Facts:
In June 1988, Nelia Ziga filed a complaint for rescission of a contract of
lease over a parcel of land before RTC Naga, Branch 27 against Lydia Meliton
on the ground of breach of contract. She alleged that Meliton failed to pay
the monthly rentals due, constructed a concrete wall and roof on the leased
premises and subleased the property without her consent.
Meliton filed an answer and set up counterclaims for the recovery of
the value of her kitchenette constructed on the leased parcel of land and
which was demolished by Ziga.
In May 2009, Ziga filed a motion to dismiss her complaint alleging that
her cause of action had become moot and academic by the expiration of the
lease contract. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The counterclaims of
Meliton were also dismissed for non-payment of docket fees.
In December 1989, Meliton filed a complaint against Ziga for the
recovery of the amounts involved in her counterclaims. Ziga filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment.
The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the dismissal of the
counterclaims in the earlier case is not an adjudication on the merits as the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaims for failure of Meliton
to pay the docket fees, hence the said dismissal does not constitute a bar to
the filing of the later complaint.
The CA reversed the RTC's decision and ordered the dismissal of the
case stating that the failure of the respondents to seek a reconsideration of
the dismissal of their counterclaim or to take an appeal therefrom rendered
the dismissal final. Such dismissal barred the prosecution of their
counterclaim by another action.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in nature

2. Whether or not petitioners, having failed to seek reconsideration of or to

take an appeal from the order of dismissal of their counterclaims, are already
barred from asserting the same in another action.

Held:
1. The counterclaims of petitioner are compulsory in nature.

Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a counterclaim is

compulsory if (a) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

The "one compelling test of compulsoriness" is the logical relationship

between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim, that
is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time, as where they
involve many of the same factual and/or legal issues.

In the aforesaid Civil Case No. 88-1480, all the requisites of a compulsory
counterclaim are present. The counterclaims are logically related to the
complaint. Private respondents complaint was for rescission of the contract
of lease due to petitioner's breach of her obligations under the said contract.
On the other hand, Petitioner's counterclaims were for damages for unlawful
demolition of the improvements she introduced pursuant to her leasehold
occupancy of the premises, as well as for the filing of that civil suit which is
contended to be clearly unfounded.

Both the claims arose from the same contract of lease. The rights and
obligations of the parties, as well as their potential liability for damages,
emanated from the same contractual relation. That contract of lease pleaded
by private respondent constitutes the foundation and basis relied on by both
parties for recovery of their respective claims.
2. Petitioners are not barred by res judicata.

In order that a prior judgment will constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the
judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action.
The first case, Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480, was dismissed upon motion of
private respondent, plaintiff therein, under Section 2 of Rule 17. Dismissal
thereunder is without prejudice, except when otherwise stated in the motion
to dismiss or when stated to be with prejudice in the order of the court. The
order of dismissal of the first case was unqualified, hence without prejudice
and, therefore, does not have the effect of an adjudication on the merits. On
a parity of rationale, the same rule should apply to a counterclaim duly
interposed therein and which is likewise dismissed but not on the merits
thereof.

In the order of dismissal of the complaint, the counterclaims of herein

petitioners were dismissed by reason of the fact the court a quo had not
acquired jurisdiction over the same for non-payment of the docket fees. The
said dismissal was without prejudice, since a dismissal on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction does not constitute res judicata, there having been no
consideration and adjudication of the case on the merits.

The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a

decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a
subsequent action as though the dismissal action had not been
commenced. The discontinuance of a case not on the merits does
not bar another action on the same subject matter. Evidently, therefore, the
prior dismissal of herein petitioners' counterclaims is not res judicata and will
not bar the filing of another action based on the same causes of action.

CASE NO. 10
G.R. No. 159699. March 16, 2005
ACANCE VS CA

FACTS: Angela Quijano got married to Jesus Acance in 1990 after her former
husband's death in 1989. Upon death of Jesus, his children, together with
Angela registered the disputed property on the Acance siblings name who
are all resideing in the U.S. Upon knowledge of such, the children of Angela
with her first spouse, the Quijano siblings, herein respondents, filed an
amended complaint in the RTC. The complaint was to annul the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of deceased Jesus Acance. The quijanos claim that
the subject properties were acquired during the existence of their deceased
father and Angela. Petitioners failed to file an answer and was declared in
default. The Acances, through their attorney in fact, Rosalino Acance, filed a
motion to lift/set aside the order of default. Rosalno alleges non-receipt of
the complaint THe motion was denied. Petitioner filed before the CA for
grave abuse of discretion. They maintained that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners because no valid extraterritorial
service of summons was made on them. The CA denied for their omission of
the motion for reconsideration with the lower court. Hence the petition.

Issue: WON petitioners were served a valid extraterritorial service of

summons.

HELD: NO. The procedural requirement that a motion for reconsideration

must first be filed before resorting to the special civil action of certiorari may
be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice and, among other
recognized instances, when the need for relief is extremely urgent and
certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.4 Among other
remedies, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by
default is available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or
even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of
discretion attended such declaration

Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court " Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service.
When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within
the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under Section 6; or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court
shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant,
or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting
such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty
(60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer."
There was obviously no proof of service presented by respondents. While
the respondents claimed that they had complied with the service of
summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation,10 it does not
appear that they had presented to the court a quo the "affidavit of the
printer, his foreman, or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or
advertising manager" of the "Remate," where the publication was allegedly
made, to prove such service by publication. The failure to strictly comply
correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies
of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the
service of summons. Petition granted.
CASE NO. 11

ALEJANDRO BAYOG and JORGE PESAYCO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON.

ANTONIO M. NATINO,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique,
and ALBERTO
MAGDATO, respondents.
G.R. No. 118691. July 5, 1996

Facts:
On 16 June 1973, petitioner Alejandro Bayog and private respondent
Alberto Magdato entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a lot
with an area of 0.8 hectares located in Centro Pojo, Bugasong, Antique, with
Bayog as the LANDOWNER-LESSOR and Magdato as TENANT-LESSEE. On 19
April 1983, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, pursuant to P.D. No. 27, R.A.
No. 3844, and P.D. No. 1425, issued a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold to
Magdato. On 3 September 1990, Bayog, in consideration of P250,000.00,
executed a so-called Deed of Equitable Mortgage, with right of redemption
within five years, in favor of Santiago Pesayco. In a letter dated 19 October
1992, Bayog asked Magdato to remove his house from Bayog's land. As
Magdato did not comply, Bayog and Jorge Pesayco, Jr. filed with the Third
MCTC for Ejectment and/or Abatement of Nuisance with Prayer for
Demolition. Magdato had then ten days from service of summons to file his
Answer, but he filed it 13 days after. Magdato alleged that the court had no
jurisdiction over the case, It being an agrarian dispute. On 20 September
1993, the MCTC issued an Order holding that since Magdato's Answer was
filed outside the reglementary period, it could not take cognizance thereof
without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Magdato
filed a petition for relief from judgment with injunction and prayer to litigate
as a pauper with the RTC. Bayog filed a Motion to Dismiss. RTCs decision is
to set aside the MCTCs decision and let the case be remanded back to that
court for proper disposal, thus, this petition by certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the MCTC could take cognizance of the answer
belatedly filed.

Held:Yes. The MCTC should have met and ruled squarely, on the issue of
jurisdiction, instead of simply adopting a strange theory that it could not take
cognizance of the answer belatedly filed without exceeding its jurisdiction
under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Plainly, there is nothing in the said section
which bars the MCTC from taking cognizance of the answer. The Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, does not provide that an
answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from the
records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a
defendant fails to file his answer. It must likewise be pointed out that
Magdato's defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even be raised in a
motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The Answer asserted that the MCTC
had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy
relationship between Bayog and Magdato, which is clearly evidenced by their
Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold
issued in Magdato's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per
se, did not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the
ejectment case, nevertheless, in view of Magdato's defense, the MCTC
should have heard and received the evidence for the precise purpose of
determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case. And upon
such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should have
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed Magdato were an
agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of
jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

CASE NO. 12

G.R. No. 146262 January 21, 2005

HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R.
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA
CITY, respondents.

FACTS:
Sandoval and Ozaeta, Jr. filed an application for registration of title
before the RTC of Pasig City. The land registration court issued an order of
general default and hearings on the application followed. The land
registration court granted the application. The decision became final and
executory, the National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA)
issued Decree in the names of Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta
and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.
Petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., et. al heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a
motion in LRC alleging that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the
application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. and praying that the court issue the
decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio
Lopez, Sr.
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT in
favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses only.
Petitioners filed another motion to declare void Decree. Petitioners
questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to recall
the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request and explained the
inconsistencies.
Petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an application to
annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT on the ground that
petitioners have filed with the land registration court a motion to declare
OCT void, however the ROD of Marikina City denied the application to
annotate the notice of lis pendens.
Thus, petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA. The LRA agreed
with the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is
not registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA
ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice
of lis pendens relative to the pending case.
The LRA declared that petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a
land registration case is a proceeding in rem, an order of general default
binds the whole world as a party in the case. Petitioners are mere movants
whose personality the court has not admitted. Based on Section 26 of PD
1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the
order of general default.
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for review. The
appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Reiterating the LRAs
ruling that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice
of lis pendens. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON PETITIONERS MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES IS A

PROPER BASIS FOR FILING THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS.

HELD:
The SC held that the petition has no merit. Petitioners have not
complied with the requisites. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied
the application for a notice of lis pendens because petitioners are mere
movants, and not original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not
parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to
present the requisite pleading to the ROD of Marikina. The Supreme Court
hold that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the application for a notice
of lis pendens.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or
the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant,
when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the
office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is
situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall
contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or
defense, and a description of the property in that province affected
thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a
 purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and
only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real
names.
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of
real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title
thereof, or for partition or other proceedings of any kind in court
directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or
the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate
or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as
against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum
or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the
court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the
institution thereof, together with a reference to the number of the
certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected and
the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered.
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they filed a motion in
LRC No. N-18887. The remedy of petitioners is an action for reconveyance
against Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses.
The Court stated that petitioners position is in conflict with their 25
November 1998 motion to have the decree and the titles declared void.
Petitioners now assume the roles of both successors-in-interest and
oppositors. This confusion of roles brought about petitioners grave error in
procedure.
Furthermore, petitioners filed both motion to consider the deed of sale
in the registration and motion to have the decrees declared viod, long after
the decision in LRC No. N-18887 became final and executory.
Consequently, Petitioners failed to lift the order of general default.
Records disclosed that without first filing a motion to lift the order of general
default, petitioners filed a motion to declare as null and void the decrees and
titles. Until the order of general default is lifted by the court, petitioner could
not be considered as a party to the action. They are deemed movants whose
personality as far as the case is concerned is not yet admitted by the court
considering that the order of default has not been lifted.
In Lim Toco v. Go Fay A party declared in default loses his standing
in court. As a result of his loss of standing, a party in default cannot appear
in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be entitled to notice. A party in
default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered by the court, unless
he files a motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds provided
in what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Considering the facts and arguments as presented above, The SC hold that
the motion filed by petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in the
land registration proceedings for purposes of filing an application of a notice
of lis pendens.
The SC stated that Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing act
between the objective of the Rules of Court to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding and the strict
requirements for a notice of lis pendens. .The facts in this case show that
petitioners have not complied with the requirements.
WHEREFORE, The SC DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the CA.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 13

G.R. No. 88954 October 29, 1992

DATU SAMAD MANGELEN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO HABALAYUS and
HABALAYUS ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review is the Resolution of the public
respondent Court of Appeals reversing its previous Decision which affirmed in
toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in favor of herein
petitioner ordering private respondents to pay the former the sum of
P600,000 plus 12% interest and moral damages (P50,000), exemplary
damages (P10,000) and attorneys fees (P100,000).
The controversy arose from a compromise settlement between the
parties regarding a logging concession of the plaintiff (herein petitioner)
located somewhere in Datalblao, Columbia, Sultan Kudarat which appears to
be included in the logging concession located on same general vicinity
granted to private respondent, Habalayus Enterprises. It is stated therein
that the consideration for the Compromise Agreement would be the waiver
on the part of the plaintiff (herein petitioner) of whatever rights he may have
over his logging concession in favor of the defendants (herein private
respondents) and that private respondents shall pay petitioner the total
amount of P600,000.00, one fourth of the amount of P150,000.00 shall be
paid and/or delivered on February 28, 1983 and the remaining balance of
P300,000.00 shall be paid in three (3) equal installments.
Private respondent refused to issue checks in compliance therewith,
thus prompting petitioner to complain to the Bureau of Forest Development
which directed Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc., to refrain from continuing with
the logging operation inside the area complained of by the petitioner.
Thereafter, private respondent issued two (2) post-dated checks in favor of
the petitioner but both checks were dishonored on the ground of
insufficiency of funds. Demands were made but there was no favorable
response. Plaintiff was thus constrained to write a formal demand letter yet it
still did not heed the demands of the petitioner. The latter was compelled to
initiate two criminal complaints for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in
RTC.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Instead of filing an Answer, private

respondent submitted a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
improper venue, a supplemental motion to dismiss on the ground of
pendency of another case in the RTC Quezon City and a second supplemental
motion to dismiss on the ground of lis pendens-- all of which were denied.
Although they received a copy of the denial order, private respondents still
did not file any answer to the complaint. Consequently, petitioner filed a
motion to declare defendants in default and to be allowed to present
evidence ex-parte, which the trial court granted.

Private respondent filed a motion to set aside the order of default and
to hold in abeyance further proceedings on the ground that they had filed
with the then Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari raising the
issues of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and litis pendencia which it also
denied. Still unable to accept the verdict, private respondent filed a motion
to reconsider the decision. Court of Appeals then reversed its earlier decision
stating that Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. has good and valid defenses as
amplified in their motion for reconsideration and remanded the case to the
lower court for further proceedings.

Hence, this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES: W/N the trial courts decision (declaring private respondents in

default for failure to answer the complaint within the reglementary period in
view of the pendency of the motion to dismiss and the motion for
reconsideration, and authorizing the petitioner to present his evidence ex-
parte) was correct?

1. W/N Court of Appeals seriously erred in remanding the case to the

Lower Court for further proceedings?

2. W/N the Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding that herein

respondents have a valid and good defense?

RULING:
1. YES. The pleadings disclose facts which, as earlier summarized, clearly
reveal respondents' attempt, through different procedural maneuvers,
to delay a simple case. It is obvious that they were unmoved by any
sense of urgency to protect their interests. It appeared, that the filing
of the petition much later was but part of a well-planned strategy to
gain more time to delay the case. If the trial court aborted such
strategy, private respondents have only themselves to blame. The trial
court acted correctly and in accordance with Section 1, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court in declaring private respondents in default and in
authorizing petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte.

2. YES. Public respondent ordered the remand of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings, placing the latter in a quandary as to
what it was supposed to do. The trial court would not know what
"further proceedings" means as the public respondent neither nullified
the order of default nor set aside the evidence received ex parte. Thus,
the former would be hard pet at finding a satisfactory solution to the
problem presented for its resolution.
Petitioner claims that it is for the waiver of his rights over a portion of a
logging concession mentioned in the Compromise Agreement; on the
other hand, private respondent claim that it is for the maintenance of
peace and order by the petitioner. Both the trial court and the public
respondent in its 30 January 1989 decision upheld the theory of the
petitioner. The Supreme Court is thus unable to see how further
proceedings by the trial court could produce a result consistent with
the theory of private respondents. Besides, the interpretation of the
Compromise Agreement involves a question of law; the remand of the
case would thus serve no useful purpose.

3. YES. Whether private respondents had a valid or good defense is

entirely irrelevant considering the circumstances obtaining. CA gravely
erred in "reversing" its decision of 30 January 1989 on the basis of
respondents "good and valid defenses".

Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3 Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may

at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment file a motion
under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that
his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, and meritorious
defense. In such case the order of default may be set aside on such
terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of
justice.
 A meritorious defense, which public respondent considers as
synonymous to a "good and valid defense," is not the only basis for the
lifting of an order of default; it is merely one of two requisites which a
party must comply with. The first is the existence of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect. Needless to say, these two requisites
must concur.

While it is not required for the court to inquire into the nature,
character and quality of the defense interposed by private
respondents, it should nevertheless be stated here that such a defense
relates to the interpretation of the provision in the Compromise
Agreement regarding the purpose of the P600,000.00 consideration.

CASE NO. 14
HUTAMA-RSEA/SUPERMAX PHILS., J.V., Petitioner,
vs.
KCD BUILDERS CORPORATION, represented by its President CELSO
C. DIOKNO,Respondent.
G.R. No. 173181

Facts:
On 10 December 2001, appellee KCD Builders Corporation filed a
complaint for sum of money against appellants before the RTC of Makati. Its
cause of action arose from a written contract which was the Notice to
Proceed executed by the parties whereby appellant [Hutama] as principal
contractor contracted with appellee [KCD] as sub-contractor for the said
project. The final billing was submitted to appellant Charles H.C. Yang, and
despite a joint evaluation by the parties through their respective
representatives who agreed on the amount [of] P2,967,164.71 as HUTAMAs
total obligation to appellee [KCD], and a letter of demand, appellant
corporation [Hutama] failed and refused to pay.
Summons was served on appellants which was received by their
secretary, Ms. Evelyn Estrabela in behalf of the two defendants [Hutama and
Yang]. On 21 February 2002, their counsel filed an Entry of Appearance and
Motion for Extension of time to File Responsive Pleading. They were given a
20-day extension period to file the responsive pleading, or until 16 March
2002.

On 11 April 2002, appellee [KCD] filed a Motion to Declare Defendant/s

[Hutama and Yang] in Default for failure to file the responsive pleading within
the extended period, and set the same for hearing on 26 April 2002.
On 23 April 2002, appellant Charles H.C. Yang filed a Motion to Dismiss
for failure of the complaint to state a case of action against him, On the
same date, appellant HUTAMA filed an Urgent Motion to Admit Attached
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, together with the said answer.
During the hearing on appellees motion to declare defendant/s in
default, the trial court noted the filing of appellants respective motion to
dismiss and answer with counterclaim but noted that the filing thereof on 27
March 2002 was too late considering that they were only given an extended
period up [to] 16 March 2002 to do the same. Thus, the trial court granted
the motion to declare defendants in default and directed, upon appellees
motion, the presentation of evidence ex-parte before the branch clerk of
court who was appointed as commissioner to received evidence.
Appellants filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default. During
the hearing, the trial court ordered appellee to file an opposition or
comment. After the Manifestation filed by appellee on 24 June 2002, the trial
court set anew the hearing on the motion to set aside order of default on 22
August 2002, but appellants failed to appear. The trial court then denied the
said motion in the Order dated 19 September 2002.
During the ex-parte presentation of evidence, appellees witness Celso
C. Dioko testified that there was a contract executed between appellants and
appellee regarding the construction of Package 2 Site Works in Philips
Semiconductor Phils. Inc., Calamba, Laguna where appellee was the sub-
contractor as evidenced by a Notice to Proceed.After the completion of the
project, he [Dioko] billed them the total amount of P3,009,954.05. After they
received the bill, they asked him [Dioko] to have a joint evaluation by their
engineer and his engineer on site. The authorized engineer to evaluate the
amount arrived at was Engr. Jose De Asis. Thus, their authorized engineers
came out with the total amount of P2,967,164.71 as cost of the project. After
the joint evaluation, he [Dioko] again sent the bill to appellant Charles H.C.
Yang and wrote a letter to HUTAMA to pay the final billing. The appellants,
however, failed to comply with the demand. Upon the filing of this case,
appellee paid P30,000.00 acceptance fee and P3,000.00 per appearance fee
and a contingency of 15% of the total amount due as attorneys fees.
Engr. Jose De Asis testified that he is an employee of appellee
corporation and knows the appellants to be the representatives of HUTAMA.
He and appellants were present when the agreement was prepared and the
amount agreed upon was promised to be paid to Dioko.

Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS,
REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT
RESPONDENT ABANDONED THE PROJECT AND IT IS THE LATTER
(sic) LIABLE TO PETITIONER;

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS,

REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS RIGHTS TO
PRESENT ITS EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS; AND

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS,

REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT
RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ON VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING;

WON CA COMMITED A SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR, IF NOT GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION, IN DENYING PETITIONER[S] MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WITHOUT STATING CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS THEREOF.

Held:
A petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions of
law. As a rule, findings of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the CA, are
binding upon the Supreme Court. This rule admits of only a few exceptions.
The RTC acted within the confines of its discretion when it issued the order of
default upon the motion of KCD when Hutama failed to file an answer within
the extended period. The RTC did not hastily issue the order of default. It
gave Hutama the opportunity to explain its side. On August 22, 2002, the
motion to set aside the order of default was set for hearing, but neither
Hutamas counsel, nor any other representative of petitioner corporation,
appeared.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge
or based on authentic records. The party does not need to sign the
verification. A party's representative, lawyer, or any person who personally
knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.
The power of a corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the board of
directors that exercises its corporate powers. However, it is settled and we
have so declared in numerous decisions that the president of a corporation
may sign the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping.
The CA ruled that it found no plausible reason to depart from its earlier
decision wherein all the issues had been exhaustively passed upon. That
ruling contained a sufficient legal reason or basis to deny the motion. There
was no need for the CA to restate the rationale for its decision that the
petitioner wanted reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated October 14, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 19, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78262 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

CASE NO. 15
GR No. 120496
FIVE STAR BUS CO., INC. and CARLOS SALONGA, Petitioner, v. COURT
OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KALOOKAN CITY, BR. 129 and
PEDRO and LYDIA SANTOS, Respondents.

FACTS:
Sps. Salonga filed a suit against herein petioner, Five Stat Bus Co. For
breach of carriage and damages for the indemnification of the death of their
son who died aboard in the accident met by the bus along the way.
Subsequently trial court set the pre-trial and instructed counsels for both
parties to notify their respective clients and file pre-trial brief. Nevertheless,
on the day of the pre-trial, petitioner failed to appear and file a pretrial briefs
which caused to declare them as default and present their evidence. On the
next schedule pre-trial the defendants failed to appear and declared in
default and to present evidence ex-parte by the plaintiff. The trial court
rendered in favour of the respondents. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision
of the lower. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the counsels served with notice of pre-trial is charged with the
duty of notifying the party represented by him.
HELD: YES. The SC ruled that when the court schedule a case for pre-
trial, notices must be served on the party separately from his counsel which
may be made directly to both party and counsel. It is preferred, however,
that service of such notice on a party be made through or care of his counsel
at counsels address "with the express imposition upon counsel of the
obligation of notifying the party of the date, time and place of pre-trial
conference." It is the duty of counsel upon whom a pre-trial notice is served
to see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial.
CASE NO. 16

CASE NO. 17
Meralco vs La Campana
GR No. 97535, Aug 4, 1995
Facts:
A complaint filed by la campana against meralco for recovery of money
w/ prelim injunction after it receive a notice of disconnection and for alleged
non payment of the following: differential billing of 65k as value of electric
energy used but it was not registered in the meter due to alleged tampering
discovered on sept 22 1986 and the underbilling of 169k (w/ balance of 28k)
due to meter multiplier failure. Summons and copy of complaint was
received by meralco on aug 23 1990. RTC judge QC Lopez inhibited and was
reraffled to Judge Dayaw. Meralco filed a motion for extension of time of 15
days within which to file an answer at the clerk, allegedly refused the same.
And the motion not acted upon bec it did not contain a notice of hearing as
req at sec 4 &5 Rule 15. Meralcos Answer w/ counterclaim was received on
Sept 21 1990.(beyond the period to answer. La campana filed exparte
motion to declare meralco in default, (granted) Instead of appealing to CA,
Meralco filed on dec 3 1990 a motion to set aside judgement by default
and/or for new trial that it filed it answer and the judgement by default was
obtained by fraud. Denied by Judge Dayaw, that the motion for extention did
not containany notice of date and place of hearing, also stated that the
motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial was a pro forma
motion because it did not set forth the facts and circumstances which
allegedly constituted the fraud upon which the motion was grounded.
Meralco filed a notice of appeal, but opposed by la campana on gorund of out
of time and since the motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new
trial did not stop the running of the period to appeal, which expired on Dec
14, 1990, or 15 days from the time Meralco received the decision on Nov 29,
1990. TC denied notice of appeal and granted the execution of la campana.
Meralco filed the instant petition for certiorari and profibitionclaming judge
commited grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: W/N judge dayaw commited grave abuse of discretion in its order.
Held: No. The case of Gozon, et al vs CA: It is well-entrenched in this
jurisdiction that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of
paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority
to act upon. Meralco was aware of the importance of such a notice since it
insisted in its motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial
that it should have received notice of hearing of the motion to declare it in
default which La Campana filed ex parte. When it filed in Branch 78 its
answer with counterclaim on Sep 21, 1990, fourteen days after the
expiration of the period within which to file an answer, Meralco was already
in default and, naturally, it had to bear all the legal consequences of being in
default. It chose to play it safe. Under the Rules, what an aggrieved party
seeks to set aside is the order of default, an interlocutory order which is,
therefore, not appealable, and not the judgment by default, which is a final
disposition of the case and appealable to the CA. Notice that in the following
pertinent provisions, the Rules expressly state that what may be set aside is
the order of default, while the judgment itself may be appealed to a higher
court: sec 3 relief from order of default, Sec 9 Service upon party in default
and Sec 2 judgement or orders subject to appeal. While a motion for new
trial grounded on fraud, thisMeralco's motion likewise fails to convince.
Meralco claims that the reason for the ex-parte motion was "to deprive the
defendant of the opportunity to oppose it, knowing that defendant actually
filed its answer." But how could La Campana have known about the answer
with counterclaim when it was actually received only on Oct, 1990, as
evidenced by the registry return receipt attached to Meralco's Annex
"H,"while the ex-parte motion to declare Meralco in default was filed much
earlier on Sep 27, 1990? "Fraud, as a ground for new trial, must be extrinsic
or collateral, that is, it is the kind of fraud which prevented the aggrieved
party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used to
procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy."Meralco's
failure to go to trial in this case is solely attributable to its failure to comply
with the Rules of Court. Judge correct a pro forma motion, it did not interrupt
the running of the period to appeal. Accordingly, having received the
decision on Nov 29, 1990, Meralco had until Dec 14, 1990, within which to
file a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal which it filed on Jan 28, 1991,
was clearly filed out of time. Hence, Dismissed
CASE NO. 18
G.R. No. 101256. March 8, 1993.
SPOUSES PEPITO AND LORETO LAUS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR C. CEGUERA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
82; NILO SM. CABANG, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Quezon
City and CONSUELO P. TORRES, respondents.

Facts:
This case arises from the complaint filed by Private Respondent
Conseulo P. Torres against herein petitioner for a collection of sum of money.
10 October 1989, Deputy Sheriff Nilo Cabang then went to petitioners'
address at 122 Molave Park Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila to serve
the summons and a copy of the complaint. Failing to serve the summons
personally upon the petitioners after waiting for ten (10) minutes, he
resorted to a substituted service through one Josephine Areola, who
purportedly represented herself to be the maid of the said petitioners.
Petitioner did not file an answer. Consequently, upon the motion of the
plaintiff, the petitioner-defendant was held in default and subsequently the
trial court rendered judgment by default in favor of the plaintiff. It is only On
2 February 1990, before receiving a copy of the 22 January 1990 decision,
petitioners, by way of a special appearance, filed a motion to dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. They allege that the service of
summons was ineffective because it was not indicated in the return that the
sheriff had first exerted efforts to serve the same personally before resorting
to substituted service. They alleged that Josephine Areola is not known to
them. The motion was dismissed as well as the MR, thus, the petitioner-
defendant appealed in Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the rulings of the
RTC citing that the motion is rather too late in the day for the defendants-
petitioners' motion to dismiss to be considered by the respondent Court. A
motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendants is proper only when made within the reglementary
period for filing a responsive pleading and before such responsive pleading is
filed. Hence, this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the petitioners by virtue of the substituted service of
summons effected by Deputy Sheriff Cruz

Held:
NO. THE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE SUMMON IS NOT VALIDLY
EFFECTED.
It is all too obvious that no earnest efforts were exerted by Deputy
Sheriff Cruz to effect the personal service of summons. Deputy Sheriff Cruz
resorted to a substituted service on his first and only attempt to effect a
personal service. Upon being informed that the petitioners were not around
at that time, he immediately resorted to a substituted service through
Josephine Areola, a person whose age he did not even know or attempt to
discover. He did not even inquire about the whereabouts of the petitioners,
the time they were expected to return home, the hours of the day they could
be contacted at their house or the location of their offices, if any, in order
that he could faithfully comply with the requirement of personal service.
It must be noted that the substituted service should be availed only
when the defendant cannot be served promptly in person. Impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be
made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is
in derogation of the usual method of service.
Since the substituted service of summons in this case was not validly
effected, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
petitioners. The order of default, the judgment by default, the writ of
execution issued by it, as well as the auction sale of the petitioners'
properties levied on execution are, therefore, all null and void.

CASE NO. 19
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION),
FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS:
IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), represented by the OSG, filed a petition for forfeiture
before the Sandiganbayan. In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of
the aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow in the PNB, as
ill-gotten wealth. In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25
million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos
couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately
acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order
issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General
Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements dated December 28, 1993
were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family.
Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion for the approval of
said agreements and for the enforcement thereof. Hearings were conducted
by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental
Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the
purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said agreements.
Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the
pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was
later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the
compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motion for summary
judgment." Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998
claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise
Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10%
belonging to the Marcos estate. After the pre-trial and the issuance of the
pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and
January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was set for trial.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents admission made during the pre-
trial tenders no genuine issue or controversy as to any material fact in
present action, thus warranting the rendition of summary judgment.
Held:No, there was no genuine issue raised. The pre-trial brief of Mrs.
Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos
stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their
answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acquired
lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that
would show and prove the truth of their allegations. It is unquestionably
within the court's power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs
and to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and
a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give as well as
to disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a description of
the nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the
witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known,
in addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if
genuine issues are being put forward necessitating the holding of a trial.
Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal identification and
specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put these matters in
writing and submit them to the court within the specified period for the
prompt disposition of the action. Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and
describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names of
witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared
certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously
claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the substance of
her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either. Such
cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We
hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for
summary judgment.

CASE NO. 20
G.R. No. 135384. April 4, 2001
MARIANO DE GUIA and APOLONIA DE GUIA, petitioners, vs. CIRIACO,
LEON, VICTORINA, TOMASA and PABLO, all surnamed DE GUIA,
respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for partition of land against defendants.
Shortly after defendants filed their traverse, an amended complaint was
admitted by the lower court, in which plaintiff Tomasa De Guia was
impleaded as one of the defendants for the reason that she had become an
unwilling co-plaintiff. The Clerk of Court issued a Notice setting the case for
pre-trial conference on June 18, 1992 at 8:30 a.m. Copies of said notices
were sent by registered mail to parties and their counsel. It turned out that
both defendants and counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference. Hence,
upon plaintiffs motion, defendants were declared as in default and plaintiffs
were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte. The defendants alleged
upon filing their Motion for Reconsideration that they received the Notice in
the afternoon of the scheduled date, giving them no chance to appear.
Plaintiffs contended however, as evidenced by a Postal Delivery Receipt, that
defendants' counsel received the notice 1 day before the pretrial. The RTC
denied the MR. CA ruled in favor of respondents and ruled that they were not
in default.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in not finding respondents in default.
HELD:
No. The case happened in 1992, hence, the applicable rule was Sec. 1, Rule
20, which mandates for the separate service of notice upon the parties and
the counsels. While service of such notice to party may be made directly to
the party, it is best that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party
through or care of his counsel at counsels address with the express
imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notifying the party of the date,
time and place of the pre-trial conference. Hence, before being declared non-
suited or considered in default, parties and their counsel must be shown to
have been served with notice of the pretrial conference.[10]Moreover, if
served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly direct him or her to
inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial
conference. In this case, although the Notice was also sent to their counsel, it
did not contain any imposition or directive that he inform his clients of the
pretrial conference. Such belated receipt of the notice, which was not
attributable to respondents, amounted to a lack of notice. WHEREFORE, the
Petition is DENIED.
***applicable provision now is Sec. 3, Rule 18

CASE NO. 21
Alberto G. Pinlac vs CA
G.R No. 91486 September 10, 2003

FACTS:
The controversy is this case stemmed from a Petition for Quieting of
Title filed by petitioners over 3 vast parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 1, 2 &
3. Lot No. 1 is covered by TCT No. 5690, while Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were
originally covered by OCT No. 614 and OCT No. 333, respectively. On March
21, 1988, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision in favor of petitioners and
against the defendants who were declared in default, including respondent
owners of Vilmar-Maloles (Vilma) Subdivision whose properties were within
Lot No. 2. The dispositive portion of which reads:
1. Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners hereof, to wit:
Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty. Eriberto H. Decena, Rodolfo T. Reyes, Felipe
Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as absolute owners in fee simple title of
the aforesaid Lots 1, 2 & 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary
prescription, with the exception of the lands covered by the respective
transfer certificate of title belonging to the non-defaulted respondents
2. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT
No. 3548 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and the subsequent
TCTs issued therefrom, with the exception of those titles belonging to
the non-defaulted respondents, as null and void ab initio
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel OCT No. 614,
TCT No. 5690 and TCT No. 3548 as well as the subsequent TCTs issued
and emanating therefrom, with the exception of those titles belonging
to the non-defaulted respondents, from its record;
4. Declaring the area of TCT No. 333 in excess of its true and actual area
of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as well as the TCTs subsequently issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, covering the area in excess of said
actual area, with the exception of those belonging to non-defaulted
respondents, as null and void ab initio
5. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel all TCTs
subsequently issued based on OCT No. 333 in excess of the actual area
of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the exception of those titles belonging to the
non-defaulted respondents;

Vilma, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul the Partial
Decision of the trial court, which was granted in a decision Petitioners filed
motion for reconsideration of the said decision and but it was denied for lack
of merit and affirming the Judgment of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration contending, inter alia, that Lot no. 3 should not
be annulled because the petition for annulment of judgment filed by the
respondents concerned only Lot No. 2. They prayed that the January 19,
2001 decision of the Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals be reconsidered insofar as Lot No. 3 is concerned.
On November 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution partially granting
petitioner's motion for reconsideration by reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of
the dipositive portion of the trial court's Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No.
3,
On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that
judgment be rendered declaring:
1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in line with the decisions
this Honorable Court had already rendered;
2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its original area of
52,949,737 square meters;
3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest land and is
covered by OCT No. 333;
4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35673 with
respect to OCT No. 333 are null and void; and
5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35672 is null and
void, no notice of the hearings/proceedings having been sent to the
Republic and other interested parties
The OSGs prayer that OCT No. 333 be held as a valid and existing title. The
Republic likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable
under the circumstances.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not intervention is allowed notwithstanding the rendition of
the judgement by the trial court
2. Whether or not the judgment of annulment in partial decision in OCT No.
333 null and void.

HELD:
1. Yes, intervention is allowed even when the petition for review of the
assailed judgment were already submitted for decision in the Supreme
Court. Clearly. The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure
is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely
available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness
of the filing thereof. The intervention of the Republic is necessary to
protect public interest as well as government properties located and
projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an
indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, while the provision is intended as a protection of
individuals against arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked
by the Republic to protect its properties.
 2. The Court of Appeals held that the annulment of the trial courts Partial
Decision with respect to the declaration of nullity of paragraphs 4 and
5 of the dispositive portion of the decision a quo concerning Lot No. 3,
renders the disposition in paragraph 1 insofar as it affects Lot No. 3,
also void. Under the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 47,
Section 7 thereof, a judgment of annulment shall set aside the
questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same
null and void, without prejudice to the original action being re-filed in
the proper court.

CA noted that paragraph 4 does not at all specify which portions are in
excess of the 4,574 square meter area of OCT No. 333 and which areas
belong to the defaulted and non-defaulted respondents. Neither did the
body of the trial courts decision state the metes and bounds that
would serve as basis in implementing the dispositive portion
thereof. Verily, the flaw goes into the very identity of the disputed land
Paragraphs 4 and 5 are therefore null and void for having been
rendered in violation of the constitutional mandate that no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Hence, the
November 20, 2001 Resolution reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
trial courts Partial Decision should be modified.

CASE NO. 22
G.R. No. 111159 July 13, 2004
NORDIC ASIA LIMITED and BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et. Al., respondents.

Facts:
When the day that an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings was
initiated by herein petitioners-mortgagee over the vessel M/V Fylyppa
against the mortgagor Sextant Maritime, respondents Nam Ung Marine Co.,
Ltd, manning agent of the vessel, and 27 of its crew members filed a
collection case before the RTC against the M/V "Fylyppa" (the vessel),
Maritime (the registered owner of the vessel), P.V. Christensen Lines (time-
charterer of the vessel), TheilBolvinkel Shipping, A.S. (ship manager) and
Jibfair Shipping (the alleged local ship agent of the vessel)
Upon learning of the collection case, petitioners filed with the RTC a
motion for leave to intervene in the collection case, alleging that they hold a
mortgage over the vessel and that their intervention is only for the purpose
of opposing the crew members' unfounded and grossly exaggerated claim.
The RTC eventually rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiff, against the
defendants and the petitioner- intervenor. Petitioner elevated his case to the
CA and, aggrieved with its decision, elevated the same to the SC. The SC on
its June 10, 2003 decision dismissed the petition based on two grounds: 1)
Petitioners have no right to intervene because the complaint-in-intervention
fails to state a cause of action and because the requisites for intervention are
not present; and 2) Petitioners are guilty of forum shopping. Petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the complaint-in-intervention state a cause of action
2. Whether or not the requisites for intervention are present.
Held:
1. Petitioners, in their motion for reconsideration, insist that their cause of
action springs from the bloated and exaggerated claims of respondents so
that nothing will be left to answer for their own claims. Thus, they should be
allowed to intervene, even if it is only to oppose the claims of the manning
agent and crewmen. The Court finds no merit in this argument.
2. No. The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter
in litigation; and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or
prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not. Petitioners failed to meet both requirements.
Legal interest, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment. Petitioners' remedies as unpaid
mortgagees remain preserved as the collection case will not preclude the
foreclosure of the vessel. Also, that petitioners would be adversely affected
by the disposition of the property is contingent upon two eventualities: 1) the
successful foreclosure on the vessel; and 2) the proceeds of the sale being
insufficient to cover the loan amount. Clearly, the outcome of the collection
case has no "direct" effect on petitioners.
As for the second requisite for intervention, petitioners' rights were already
protected through their extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, while on the
other hand, the rights of the manning agent and crewmen, who are the
original plaintiffs, have been unduly delayed or prejudiced. The decision of
the RTC, rendered in October 30, 1987, has not attained finality, even though
the actual judgment obligors did not appeal. The only parties prolonging the
case are the intervenors, in the persons of petitioners.
Petitioners claimed that a lien or statutory right of preference clothed them
as intervenor with an interest in the subject-matter in litigation. Petitioners
herein prayed that they be allowed to intervene, on the basis of
their secondary right as unpaid mortgagees. The SC found no merit for such
claim because petitioners prayer was merely to oppose the claims of
respondents and not for the purpose of enforcing their own claims.
Petitioner further claimed that their intervention was in the nature of an
intervention pro interessesuo, arguing that intervention pro interessesuo is a
mode of intervention wherein a stranger desires to intervene for the purpose
of asserting a property right which is the subject matter of litigation without
becoming a formal plaintiff or defendant. The SC found no merit for such
claim since petitioners wanted only to oppose the claims of
respondents without asserting their unpaid mortgage.

CASE NO. 23
Francisco vs House of Representatives
GR No 160261, November 10, 2003

FACTS:
An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice HilarioDavide and
seven Associate Justices was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The
House Committee on Justice on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix
Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives et al,
most of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5, Article XI of the
Constitution, no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within the period of one year.
Among those who filed the petitions are Atty. Jaime Soriano, who filed a
"Petition for Leave to Intervene"; Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. who filed a Motion for Intervention; and
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. who also filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene"
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to
Intervene and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction
of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment
cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be
recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution."

ISSUE: Whether or not the interventions must be admitted.

HELD:
Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to
possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it
may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy
the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang

Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco invoking their right as
citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of
the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this
Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue
of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of
the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the
respective motions to intervene were granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for
the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that
differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this
Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the
independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the
Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of
Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein
petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial
issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted.

As to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied

for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing
requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits. In praying for the dismissal of the
petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in
illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to
any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar
does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment

complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives is constitutional.
RULING: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representativesare are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred
under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

CASE NO. 24
G.R. No. 147950. December 11, 2003
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC, vs. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.

FACTS:

State Investment House, Inc.(SIHI) granted Delta Motors

Corporation(Delta) a credit line for P25,000,000.00. Meanwhile, petitioner
California Bus Lines, Inc. (hereafter CBLI), purchased on installment basis 35
units of buses and 2 units of engines from Delta, secured by 16 promissory
notes. When CBLI defaulted on its payments, it entered into a restructuring
agreement with Delta. It provided for new schedule of payments and a
management takeover clause. Delta executed a Continuing Deed of
Assignment of Receivables in favor of SIHI as security for the payment of its
obligations to SIHI per the credit agreements. CBLI continued having trouble
meeting its obligations to Delta. This prompted Delta to threaten CBLI with
the enforcement of the management takeover clause. To pre-empt the take-
over, CBLI filed on May 3, 1982, a complaint for injunction docketed as Civil
Case No. 0023-P. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, Delta
executed a Deed of Sale assigning to SIHI five (5) of the sixteen (16)
promissory notes. SIHI demanded payment from CBLI for the five promissory
notes, but the latter replied informing SIHI of Civil Case No. 0023-P and of the
fact that Delta had taken over its management and operations.

Thereafter, Delta and CBLI entered into a compromise agreement. CBLI

agreed that Delta would exercise its right to extrajudicially foreclose on the
chattel mortgages over the 35 bus units. On the other hand, SIHI applied for
a writ of preliminary attachment and was thereafter followed by a motion to
sell the buses. The trial court ruled that the best interest of the parties might
be better served by denying further sales of the buses and to go direct to the
trial of the case on the merits.

The trial court discharged CBLI from liability. The CA reversed this
decision. On appeal, CBLI contends that the compromise agreement
discharged the subject five promissory notes. It argues that SIHI
is estopped from questioning the compromise agreement because SIHI failed
to intervene in Civil Case No. 0023-P after CBLI informed it of the takeover by
Delta of CBLIs management and operations and the resultant impossibility
for CBLI to comply with its obligations in the subject promissory notes.
ISSUE: WON SIHI is estopped from questioning the compromise agreement
because it failed to intervene in Civil Case No. 0023-P.

HELD:

No. The assignment of the promissory notes had the effect of

separating the five promissory from CBLIs other obligations with Delta. Thus,
any breach of these independent obligations gives rise to a separate cause
of action in favor of SIHI against CBLI. Considering that Deltas assignment to
SIHI of these five promissory notes had the effect of removing the said notes
from Civil Case No. 0023-P, there was no reason for SIHI to intervene in the
said case. SIHI did not have any interest to protect in Civil Case No. 0023-P.
Moreover, intervention is not mandatory, but only optional and permissive.
Notably, Section 2, Rule 12 of the then 1988 Revised Rules of Procedure uses
the word may in defining the right to intervene. The present rules maintain
the permissive nature of intervention in Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.

In light of the foregoing, SIHIs refusal to intervene in Civil Case No.

0023-P in another court does not amount to an estoppel. This is especially so
since it does not appear that a separate proceeding would be inadequate to
protect fully SIHIs rights. Indeed, SIHIs refusal to intervene is precisely
because it considered that its rights would be better protected in a separate
and independent suit.
CASE NO. 25
51 SCRA 363
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 118492, August 15, 2001

Facts:
Godofredo, Casheir of the Philippine Racing Club (PCRI), went to respondent
bank to apply for a demand draft in the amount AU$1,610.00 payable to the
order of the 20th Asian Racing Conference Secretariat of Sydney, Australia.
He was attended to by respondent banks assistant cashier, Mr. Yasis, who at
first denied the application for the reason that respondent bank did not have
an Australian dollar account in any bank in Sydney. Godofredo asked if there
could be a way for respondent bank to accommodate PRCIs urgent need to
remit Australian dollars to Sydney. Yasis of respondent bank then informed
Godofredo of a roundabout way of effecting the requested remittance to
Sydney thus: the respondent bank would draw a demand draft against
Westpac Bank in Sydney, Australia (Westpac-Sydney) and have the latter
reimburse itself from the U.S. dollar account of the respondent in Westpac
Bank in New York, U.S.A. (Westpac-New York).
 However, upon due presentment of the foreign exchange demand
draft, the same was dishonored, with the notice of dishonor stating that
there is No account held with Westpac. Meanwhile, Wespac-New York sent
a cable to respondent bank informing the latter that its dollar account in the
sum of AU$ 1,610.00 was debited. In response to PRCIs complaint about the
dishonor of the said foreign exchange demand draft, respondent bank
informed Westpac-Sydney of the issuance of the said demand draft, drawn
against the Wespac-Sydney and informing the latter to be reimbursed from
the respondent banks dollar account in Westpac-New York. The respondent
bank on the same day likewise informed Wespac-New York requesting the
latter to honor the reimbursement claim of Wespac-Sydney. Upon its second
presentment for payment, the demand draft was again dishonored by
Westpac-Sydney for the same reason, that is, that the respondent bank has
no deposit dollar account with the drawee Wespac-Sydney. Gregorio Reyes
and Consuelo Puyat-Reyes arrived in Sydney on a separate date and both
were humiliated and embarrassed in the presence of international audience
after being denied registration of the conference secretariat since the foreign
exchange draft was dishonored. Petitioners were only able to attend the
conference after promising to pay in cash instead which they fulfilled

Issue: Whether or not respondent bank is liable for damages due to the
dishonor of the foreign exchange demand drafts.

Held: Yes. The evidence also shows that the respondent bank exercised
that degree of diligence expected of an ordinary prudent person under the
circumstances obtaining; the respondent bank advised Westpac-New York to
honor the reimbursement claim of Westpac-Sydney and to debit the dollar
accountof respondent bank with the former. The degree of diligence required
of banks, is more than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary
nature of their relationship with their depositors is concerned. In other words
banks are duty bound to treat the deposit accounts of their depositors with
the highest degree of care. But the said ruling applies only to cases where
banks act under their fiduciary capacity, that is, as depositary of the deposits
of their depositors. But the same higher degree of diligence is not expected
to be exerted by banks in commercial transactions that do not involve their
fiduciary relationship with their depositors. The case at bar does not involve
the handling of petitioners deposit, if any, with the respondent bank.
Instead, the relationship involved was that of a buyer and seller.

CASE NO. 26
LORENA O. COLLADO vs. TERESITA G. BRAVO, Clerk of Court,
Municipal Trial Court of Naguilian, La Union
A.M. No. P-99-1307
April 10, 2001

FACTS
Complainant Collado charged respondent Bravo with Grave Misconduct
and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service when the latter
issued a subpoena directed to the former to appear before the court but with
no complaint having been filed against Collado. The complainant claimed
that she felt humiliated, harassed and experienced extreme nervousness as
a result of the issuance of the subpoena. Respondent averred that her only
purpose in issuing the subpoena was to enable the complainant and the
Baterinas, the labor recruiter of complainants son, to settle their differences.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the
complaint be docketed as an administrative matter and respondent be fined
P5k for Grave Misconduct with a Warning that the commission of a similar act
would merit a more serious penalty.

ISSUE: WON the subpoena was properly issued.

HELD:
No. The subpoena was issued without power nor authority.
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend
and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation
conducted by competent authority, or for the taking of his deposition. The
process is the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the
defendant before it; or a compliance with its demands. Hence, absent any
proceedings, suit, or action commenced or pending before a court, a
subpoena may not issue.
In this case, respondent knew there was no case filed against
complainant. Neither had complainant commenced any proceeding against
the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was issued. Respondent, then,
had absolutely neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a
subpoena to the complainant.
Respondent is found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

CASE NO. 27
[G.R. No. 139665. August 9, 2001]
MA. VILMA S. LABAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES, THE BOARD OF
REGENTS/HON. RICARDO GLORIA (DECS Secretary) Chairman, DR.
EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA, Vice Chairman and USP President, and
NEDA DIR. SANTIAGO ENGINCO, JR., Member, and EVA M.
ANTEPUESTO, USP PTA-LABORATORY SCHOOL PRESIDENT, ET
AL., respondents.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Court of

Appeals dismissing the appeal of Ma. Vilma S. Labad herein petitioner, and
the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner.

Petitioner was a probationary faculty member of the University of

Southeastern Philippines (hereafter respondent) Laboratory (high school).
Sometime in February 1996, the officers and members of respondent
universitys Parents Teachers Association filed a letter-complaint with the
president of respondent university, charging petitioner with Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, and Unfitness as a Teacher. Petitioner denied the charges
against her. The Office of the President of respondent university then created
an Investigating Committee to investigate the complaint which later
recommended penalty of dismissal from the service through the non-renewal
of petitioners probationary status on the ground of dishonesty and
misconduct, which the universitys Board of Regents subsequently approved.
Petitioner appealed said decision to the Civil Service Commission but it
affirmed the decision of respondent universitys Board of Regent. A motion
for reconsideration was filed but likewise denied.

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of
Period to File Petition for Review asking for 15 days from December 28, 1998
or until January 12, 1999 to do so.

On January 12, 1999, petitioner filed her Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals. However, petitioner through counsel received a copy of the CA
Resolution dated January 28, 1999, granting an extension of 15 days from
December 26, 1998, or until January 10, 1999, to file the petition for review
which meant that petitioner was already 2 days late in the filing of her
petition for review.

Because of this, a resolution was issued by the Court of Appeals, dismissing

Labads petition for review. A motion for reconsideration was filed but
likewise denied.
Hence the petition.

Petitioner contends that since December 26, 1998 was a Saturday, it was on
the next business day, December 28, 1998 which was a Monday, that
petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Period to File Petition for Review
instead of filing her petition for review.

She insists that the 15-day extension was timely sought since December 28,
1998, a Monday should be considered as the fifteenth day of filing her
appeal, not December 26, 1998, which was a Saturday. In support of her
claim, petitioner relies on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

1. whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for
review filed by petitioner before it on the ground that the petition was
filed late

2. When should the 15-day extension be reckoned, should it be counted

from December 26, 1998 or December 28, 1998?

RULING:

1. YES.

Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court and as applied

in several cases, where the last day for doing any act required or
permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working
day. In this case, petitioner still had until December 28, 1998, a
Monday and the next business day to move for a 15-day extension
considering that December 26, 1998, the last day for petitioner to file
her petition for review fell on a Saturday. The motion for extension filed
on December 28, 1998 was thus filed on time since it was filed before
the expiration of the time sought to be extended

2. It should be from December 28, 1998.

The extension should be tacked to the original period and

commence immediately after the expiration of such period. Petitioner
 specifically manifested that she be granted an extension of 15 days
from December 28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 for her to file her
petition for review. Hence, the period for reckoning the commencement
of the additional 15 days should have been from December 28, 1998,
and not December 26, 1998. Thus, the petition filed by petitioner with
the Court of Appeals on January 12, 1998, exactly 15 days from
December 28, 1998, was filed on time.

Petitioner would be outright denied her right to appeal if the

original period of December 26, 1998 would be the basis of the 15day
extension period. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural
right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the
right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause,
freed from the constraints of technicalities.

CASE NO. 28

Russel vs. Ebasan & Austria

G.R. No. 184542 April 23, 2010

FACTS:
The petition stems from a complaint for forcible entry filed by
petitioner Russel against respondents Ebasan and Austria. The MTCC
of Iligan City heard the ejectment proceedings and rendered judgment on in
favor of petitioner. The trial court ordered respondents to vacate the property
involved and to pay attorneys fees and costs.Prejudiced by the ruling,
respondents appealed to the RTC. The RTC, in its March 28, 2007 Decision,
reversed the ruling of the MTCC and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner received her copy of the RTC decision on April 13,
2007. Inclined to appeal the adverse ruling to the CA, petitioner, on April
20, 2007, filed a motion for an extension of 15 days from the expiry of the
reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review. Petitioner attached
to her motion postal money orders representing the filing and docket
fees. She consequently filed via registered mail her petition for review with
the appellate court on May 15, 2007.
In the assailed June 18, 2007 Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal
on several grounds, one of which is that the petition is filed out of time, in
violation of Sec. 1, Rule 42. Even if petitioners Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review were granted, the Petition would have still been
filed six (6) days late from the requested extension of time. Petitioner
received her copy of the June 18, 2007 Resolution on July 18, 2007. On July
27, 2007, petitioner filed by registered mail her MR and admission of her
amended petition. She pointed out in her motion that the petition was filed
within the extended reglementary period.
The appellate court, however, in the assailed August 26, 2008
Resolution, denied petitioners motion. It ruled that the MR was filed only on
October 4, 2007, or 63 days after the expiry of the reglementary period for
the filing thereof. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to this
Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review and motion for reconsideration
before the CA were filed well within the reglementary period for the filing
thereof.

HELD:
Yes, the petition and MR were filed within the reglementary period
for the filing thereof.
It must be noted that petitioner received her copy of the RTC decision
on April 13, 2007. Following the Rules of Court, she had 15 days or
until April 28, 2007 to file her petition for review before the CA. Section 1 of
Rule 42 provides the time for filing an appeal stating in part that: the petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision
sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days.
On April 20, 2007, petitioner filed before the CA, via registered mail,
her motion for extension of time to file the petition for review. She pleaded in
her motion that she be granted an additional 15 days, counted from the
expiry of the reglementary period. Petitioner likewise attached to her motion
postal money orders representing the docket fees. Fifteen days from April 28,
2007 would be May 13, 2007. This was, however, a Sunday. May 14, 2007,
the following day, was a legal holiday that is the holding of the national and
local elections. Section 1 of Rule 22 on how to compute time states that: in
computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by
order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event
from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and
the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place
where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
Therefore, when petitioner filed her petition for review with the
appellate court on May 15, 2007, the same was well within the extended
period for the filing thereof. Petitioners MR was likewise filed on time. She
received a copy of the June 18, 2007 CA Resolution on July 18, 2007. Under
Section 1 of Rule 52, she had 15 days from notice, or until August 2, 2007, to
file an MR. Petitioner filed by registered mail her MR on July 27, 2007. The
fact of mailing on the said date is proven by the registry return receipt, the
affidavit of service, and the certification of the Office of the Postmaster of
Iligan City. Section 3, Rule 13 of the ROC provides that: if a pleading
is filed by registered mail, then the date of mailing shall be
considered as the date of filing. It does not matter when the court
actually receives the mailed pleading. Thus, in this case, as the pleading was
filed by registered mail on July 27, 2007, within the reglementary period, it is
inconsequential that the CA actually received the motion in October of that
year.