Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal
Search and Seizure
Title Facts
Abenes v. CA Rodolfo Abenes, a barangay
GR No. 156320 chairman, was charged with
14 February 2007 illegal possession of high
Austria-Martinez, J. powered firearm and its
ammunitions during the election
period. Two Informations were
filed for (1) illegal possession of
firearms and its ammunitions;
and (2) violation of the Omnibus
Election Code.
The firearm was confiscated
from Abenes at a checkpoint
wherein his vehicle was stopped
and he was asked to alight the
same for routine inspection. The
police saw the firearm tucked in
his waist, and asked him to
produce a license for it. When
Abenes could not produce one,
the police confiscated the
firearm. It was then found that
Abenes was not a registered nor
a licensed firearm holder.
The trial court then convicted
Abenes on both charges. Abenes
appealed to the CA alleging that
the checkpoint was not shown to
have been legally set up, and that
his constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure was
violated. The CA affirmed the
trial court.
Issue/s
W/N the checkpoint was legally
set up.
W/N Abenes’ constitutional right
against unlawful search and
seizure had been violated.
Ruling
YES. The production of a
mission order is not necessary in
view of the fact that the
checkpoint was established three
days before the May 11, 1998
elections; and the circumstances
under which the policemen
found the gun warranted its
seizure without a warrant (plain
view).
NO. The law enforcement
officers lawfully made an initial
intrusion because of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and
were properly in a position from
which they particularly viewed
the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, the policemen
came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating
Abenes where they saw the gun
tucked into his waist. The gun
was in plain view and discovered
inadvertently when Abenes
alighted from the vehicle.
However, there is insufficient
evidence that the firearm Abenes
carried had no license. Thus, for
failure of the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Abenes was carrying a
firearm without prior authority,
license or permit, the latter must
be exculpated from criminal
liability under the illegal
possession of firearms law.
However, Abenes is still
convicted for violation of the
Comelec Gun Ban.
Doctrine
Not all checkpoints are illegal.
Those which are warranted by
the exigencies of public order
and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are
allowed. For as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative
of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search.
Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in the “plain
view” of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as
evidence.
The plain view doctrine applies
when the following requisites
concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can
view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence
in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to
the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal
Aniag v. COMELEC In pursuance of the Gun Ban,
GR No. 104961 Representative Francisco Aniag
7 October 1994 instructed his driver, Ernesto
Bellosillo, J. Arellano, to pick up his two
firearms which were issued to
him by the House of
Representatives. Aniag told
Arellano to deliver the guns to
the Sergeant-at-Arms of the
House of Representatives.
Outside the Batasan Complex, a
checkpoint was set up. The car
being driven by Arellano was
flagged down and searched. The
firearms were found neatly
packed in their gun cases and
placed in a bag in the trunk of the
car. As such, he was
apprehended and detained.
COMELEC then filed an
Information against Aniag and
Arellano for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. Aniag
was also disqualified from
running in the elections.
Summerville General Summerville General
Merchandising v. CA Merchandising, Co. sells Royal
GR No. 158767 Playing Cards. Its
W/N the warrantless search of
Aniag’s car and the seizure of the
guns violated his right against
unlawful search and seizure.
W/N the seeming acquiescence
of Arellano to the search
constitutes an implied waiver of
Aniag’s right to question the
reasonableness of the search of
the vehicle and the seizure of the
firearms.
W/N the cards inside the plastic
containers are also “subject of
the offense” and should not have
YES. The records do not show
that the manner by which the
package was bundled led the
PNP to suspect that it contained
firearms. There was no mention
either of any report regarding
any nervous, suspicious, or
unnatural reaction from Arellano
when the car was stopped and
searched. Given these
circumstances and relying on its
visual observation, the PNP
could not thoroughly search the
car lawfully as well as the
package without violating the
constitutional injunction.
Consequently, the firearms
obtained in violation of
petitioner’s right against
warrantless search cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any
proceeding.
NO. Arellano did not know the
purpose of the checkpoint. In the
face of 14 armed policemen
conducting the operation,
Arellano being alone and a mere
employee of Aniag could not
have marshaled the strength and
the courage to protest against the
extensive search conducted in the
vehicle. In such scenario, the
“implied acquiescence,” if there
was any, could not be more than
a mere passive conformity on
Arellano’s part to the search, and
“consent” given under
intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent
within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.
NO. Summerville’s assertion that
the Crown Playing Cards are
“subject of the offense” is
As a rule, a valid search must be
authorized by a search warrant
duly issued by an appropriate
authority. However, this is not
absolute. Aside from a search
incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of moving
vehicles and the seizure of
evidence in plain view, as well as
the search conducted at police or
military checkpoints.
An extensive search without
warrant could only be resorted to
if the officers conducting the
search had reasonable or
probable cause to believe before
the search that either the motorist
was a law offender or that they
would find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the
vehicle to be searched. The
existence of probable cause
justifying the warrantless search
is determined by the facts of each
case.
There exists a constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal
26 June 2007 President/General Manager Ang
Chico-Nazario, J. complained to the authorities that
Arotech International
Corporation had violated the
Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines by engaging in
unauthorized manufacturing,
distribution, and sale of Royal
Playing Cards. The authorities
applied for a search warrant
against Arotech, which was
granted. They were able to
acquire, among others, Crown
Playing Cards which used the
plastic containers which were
alleged to have infringed the
containers of the Royal Playing
Cards.
Arotech moved for the return of
the seized items, claiming that
the cards that were seized were
Crown, not Royal, Playing
Cards, and so could not have
been subject of the offense.
Moreover, the warrant that was
issued was a general search
warrant because the warrant
failed to describe the things to be
seized with particularity.
The RTC then ordered that the
seized Crown Playing Cards
should be released to Arotech,
leaving only the plastic
containers in the custody of
Summerville, since the violation
of the intellectual property right
of Summerville was limited only
to the plastic container cases,
which should have been the only
items subject of the warrant. CA,
on appeal, affirmed the RTC.
Yao v. People The Yaos are incorporators and
GR No. 168306 officers of Masagana Gas
been returned to Arotech.
W/N there was probable cause to
issue the search warrant.
erroneous. The articles seized
had little, if any, evidentiary
value for the criminal action of
trademark infringement relating
to the use of the plastic
containers. Moreover,
Summerville does not dispute
that the design and/or mark of
the Crown Playing Cards is
owned by Arotech. In fact, there
is no allegation that the design
and/or mark of such playing
cards is a reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of another registered
mark legally owned by another;
hence, no trademark
infringement appears to have
been committed or perpetrated to
warrant the inference that the
Crown Playing Cards are
“subject of the offense,” fruits of
the offense, or used or intended
to be used as means of
committing an offense.
YES. The NBI operatives were
able to present testimonial,
refers to the immunity of one’s
person from interference by the
government, included in which is
his residence, his papers and
other possessions. The
Constitution, however, does not
provide a blanket prohibition
against all searches and seizures;
rather, the fundamental
protection accorded by the search
and seizure clause is that,
between persons and the police,
there must stand the protective
authority of a magistrate clothed
with the power to issue or refuse
such search warrant.
The responsibilities of a
magistrate do not end with the
granting of the warrant, but
extends to the custody of the
articles seized. In exercising
custody over these articles, the
property rights of the owner
should be balanced with the
societal need to preserve
evidence, which will be used in
the prosecution of a case.
A search warrant can be issued
only upon a finding of probable
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal
19 June 2007 Corporation, which is engaged in
Chico-Nazario, J. the refilling, sale, and
distribution of LPG products.
Two applications for search
warrants were filed against
Masagana which alleged that the
containers they were using the
steel cylinders of LPG owned by
Petron and Shell, without
authority from the two entities,
in violation of the Intellectual
Property Code. The search
warrants were issued after the
judge found probable cause, and
the containers of Gasul and
Shellane were confiscated from
Masagana’s premises. Also
among the items seized were a
motor compressor and an LPG
refilling machine.
Masagana alleges that the search
warrants served on them are in
the nature of general warrants as
the items enumerated to be
seized were being used in the
conduct of Masagana’s lawful
business and the same are not
being used in refilling Shellane
and Gasul LPGs. It also avers
that the search warrants were
general in nature as the
Masagana compound is about
10,000m2 with several structures
erected on the lot, the search
warrants should have defined the
areas to be searched. The RTC
ruled against it. The CA affirmed
the RTC.
documentary, and object
evidence that they had personal
knowledge of the fact that
Masagana has been using the
LPG cylinders bearing the marks
of Gasul and Shellane without
permission from Petron or Shell,
a probable cause for trademark
infringement.
W/N the search warrants are NO. The search warrants in
general warrants for not question commanded any peace
particularly describing the place officer to make an immediate
to be searched. search on the Masagana
compound located at Governor’s
Drive, Barangay Lapidario,
Trece Martires, Cavite City. It
appears that the raiding team had
ascertained and reached the
Masagana compound without
difficulty since Masagana does
not have any other offices/plants
in Trece Martires. Moreover, one
of the NBI officials who was
with the raiding team was
already familiar with the
compound as he was one of
those who monitored and
conducted test-buys thereat. And
even if there are several
structures inside the compound,
there was no need to
particularize the areas to be
searched, because the structures
constitute the essential and
necessary components of
Masagana’s business and cannot
be treated separately as they
form part of one entire
compound. The compound is
owned and used solely by
Masagana. What the case law
merely requires is that, the place
to be searched can be
distinguished in relation to the
cause. Probable cause for search
warrant means such facts and
circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place to be
searched.
Mere unauthorized use of a
container bearing a registered
trademark in connection with the
sale, distribution or advertising
of goods or services which is
likely to cause confusion,
mistake or deception among the
buyers/consumers can be
considered as trademark
infringement.
The determination of probable
cause does not call for the
application of the rules and
standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires
after trial on the merits. As the
term implies, “probable cause” is
concerned with probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty.
The standards of judgment are
those of a reasonably prudent
man, not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a full
blown trial.
The long standing rule is that a
description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in
the community. Any designation
or description known to the
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Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal
other places in the community.
Indubitably, this requisite was
complied with in the instant case.
W/N the search warrants are NO. The items to be seized under
general warrants for not the search warrants were
particularly describing the things described with particularity. The
to be seized. articles to be confiscated were
restricted only to those which
bear direct relation to the offense
(violation of Sec. 155 of RA
8293). Thus, the requirement of
particularity of description is
satisfied. Given the foregoing,
the indication of the accurate
sizes of the Gasul and Shellane
LPG cylinders or tanks would be
unnecessary.
locality that points out the place
to the exclusion of all others, and
on inquiry leads the officers
unerringly to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement.
In the determination of whether a
search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has
been held that the executing
officer’s prior knowledge as to
the place intended in the warrant
is relevant. This would seem to
be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on
whose affidavit the warrant had
been issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the
warrant intended the compound
described in the affidavit.
While it is true that property to
be seized under a warrant must
be particularly described therein
and no other property can be
taken thereunder, yet the
description is required to be
specific only in so far as the
circumstances will ordinarily
allow. The law does not require
that the things to be seized must
be described in precise and
minute details as to leave no
room for the applicants to obtain
a search warrant as they would
not know exactly what kind of
things they are looking for. Once
described, however, the articles
subject of the search and seizure
need not be so invariant as to
require absolute concordance
between those seized and those
described in the warrant.
Substantial similarity of those
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal
People v. Nuevas Police officers Fami and
GR No. 170233 Cabling, during a stationary
22 February 2007 surveillance and monitoring of
Tinga, J. illegal drug trafficking in
Olongapo City, came across
Jesus Nuevas, who they
suspected to be carrying drugs.
Upon inquiry, Nuevas showed
them a plastic bag which
contained marijuana leaves and
bricks wrapped in a blue cloth.
He then informed the officers of
2 other persons who would be
making marijuana deliveries.
The police officers then
proceeded to where Nuevas said
his associates, Reynaldo Din and
Fernando Inocencio, could be
located. Din was carrying a
plastic bag which contained
marijuana packed in newspaper
and wrapped therein. When the
police officers introduced
themselves, Din voluntarily
handed the plastic bag over to
them. After the items were
confiscated, the police officers
took the three men to the police
office.
Police officer Fami then revealed
W/N Din and Inocencio waived
their right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
NO. The search conducted in
Nuevas’ case was made with his
consent. However, in Din’s case,
there was none. There is reason
to believe that Nuevas indeed
willingly submitted the plastic
bag with the incriminating
contents to the police officers. It
can be seen that in his desperate
attempt to exculpate himself
from any criminal liability, he
cooperated with the police, gave
them the plastic bag, and even
revealed his associates, offering
himself as an informant. His
actuations were consistent with
the lamentable human inclination
to find excuses, blame others,
and save oneself even at the cost
of others’ lives. Thus, the Court
would have affirmed Nuevas’
conviction had he not withdrawn
his appeal. On the other hand,
with respect to the search
conducted in the case of Din, the
Court finds that no such consent
had actually been given. The
police officers gave inconsistent,
dissimilar testimonies regarding
the manner by which they got
hold of the plastic bag. Neither
can Din’s silence at the time be
articles described as a class or
specie would suffice.
The law does not require that the
property to be seized should be
owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is
directed. Ownership is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient
that the person against whom the
warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought
to be seized.
Our Constitution states that a
search and seizure must be
carried through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search
and seizure becomes
“unreasonable” and any evidence
obtained therefrom is
inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. The exceptions
are:
(1) Warrantless search
incidental to a lawful
arrest;
(2) Search of evidence in
“plain view”;
(3) Search of a moving
vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless
search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
Elements of search of evidence
in plain view:
(a) Prior valid intrusion
based on the valid
warrantless arrest in
which the police are
legally present in the
pursuit of their official
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal
that when the receipt of the construed as an implied
evidence was prepared, all 3 acquiescence to the warrantless
accused were not represented by search. Thus, the prosecution
counsel. He likewise disclosed failed to clearly show that Din
that he was the one who escorted intentionally surrendered his
all the accused during their right against unreasonable
physical examination. He also searches. On the other hand,
escorted all 3 to the Fiscal’s Inocencio’s supposed possession
office where they were informed of the dried marijuana leaves was
of the charges against them. sought to be shown through his
act of looking into the plastic bag
The 3 were found guilty by the that Din was carrying. The act
trial court, and the case was attributed to Inocencio is
automatically elevated to the CA insufficient to establish illegal
for review. However, Nuevas possession of the drugs or even
withdrew his appeal. Thus, the conspiracy to illegally possess
case was considered closed and the same. The prosecution failed
terminated as to him. The CA to show by convincing proof that
affirmed the trial court. Inocencio knew of the contents
of the bag and that he conspired
with Din to possess the illegal
items.
duties;
(b) Inadvertent discovery
of the evidence by the
police who have the
right to be where they
are;
(c) The evidence must be
immediately apparent;
and
(d) “Plain view” justified
mere seizure of
evidence without
further search.
In the instances where a warrant
is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the
latter cannot be performed except
without a warrant, what
constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is
purely a judicial question,
determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose
of the search and seizure, the
presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched and the
character of the articles procured.
A search incidental to a lawful
arrest is sanctioned by the Rules
of Court. The arrest, however,
must precede the search; the
process cannot be reversed.
Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the
arrest if the police have probable
cause to make the arrest at the
outset of the search.
An object is in plain view if it is
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Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal

plainly exposed to sight. Where

the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself
is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether
by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or if its contents
are obvious to an observer, then
the contents are in plain view and
may be seized.

It must be seen that the consent

to the search was voluntary in
order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search—the
consent must be unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by duress or
coercion.

The consent to a search is not to

be lightly inferred, but must be
shown by clear and convincing
evidence. It is the State which
has the burden of proving, by
clear and positive testimony, that
the necessary consent was
obtained and that it was freely
and voluntarily given.

In case of consented searches or

waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obstrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that:
(1) The right exists;
(2) The person involved
had knowledge, either
actual or constructive,
of the existence of such
right; and
(3) The said person had an

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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal
Silahis International Hotel v. Employees (and officers of the
Loluta hotel union) of Silahis
GR No. 163087 International Hotel, Inc. were
20 February 2006 being accused of having violated
Carpio-Morales, J. the Dangerous Drugs Act when a
plastic bag containing marijuana
flowering tops was found inside
the union office.
Due to the “suspicious
circumstance of confiscation” of
the plastic bag, it was deemed
inadmissible in evidence by the
trial court, and the accused
employees were acquitted.
The employees then filed a case
against Silahis International
Hotel for malicious prosecution
and violation of their
constitutional right against illegal
search. As such, the trial court
held the hotel along with the
others who conducted the search
liable for damages. The CA
reduced the amount of damages,
but affirmed the decision.
Abuan v. People A search warrant was applied for
GR No. 168773 to search the premises of the
27 October 2006 house of Eliza Abuan for
W/N the constitutional protection
against illegal searches and
seizures is meant to be invoked
against private individuals.
W/N the search warrant issued
by the Executive Judge is void
for not being based on probable
YES. When the officers of the
Silahis International Hotel
barged into and searched the
union office without a search
warrant, despite having ample
time to procure one, they
violated the rights of the union
officers against unlawful search
and seizure. The course they took
stinks in illegality, it not falling
under any of the exceptional
instances when a warrantless
search is allowed by law. Their
violation of the rights of the
union officers against
unreasonable search thus
furnishes the basis for the award
of damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code.
NO. The evidence presented by
Abuan that Gorospe was not a
resident or transient of their
actual intention to
relinquish such right.
Obiter:
To behold is not to hold.
According to the New Civil
Code, even private individuals
who violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs the right of
any person against unlawful
searches and seizures shall be
liable to the latter for damages. It
is not even necessary that the
private individual who violates
the same right should have acted
with malice or bad faith. It
suffices that there is a violation
of the constitutional right.
While it is doctrinal that the right
against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived expressly
or impliedly, a waiver by
implication cannot be presumed.
There must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual
intention to relinquish it to
constitute a waiver thereof.
What constitutes a valid waiver
of a right:
(1) That the right exists;
(2) That the person
involved had
knowledge, either
actual or constructive,
of the existence of such
right;
(3) That the said person
had an actual intention
to relinquish the right.
The requisites for the issuance of
a search warrant are:
(1) Probable cause is
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal
Callejo, Sr., J. violation of RA 6425. A Marissa
Gorospe was called on to
substantiate the existence of
probable cause. Afterwards, the
search warrant was issued.
When the search warrant was
served on Abuan, police officers
were able to acquire from her 57
sachets of shabu.
During the trial, it was found that
Marissa Gorospe was a fictitious
person. However, after trial,
Abuan was still found guilty.
The CA affirmed.
cause but mere fabrications.
barangay, even if true and present;
credible, is not at all material or (2) Such probable cause
necessary to the determination of must be determined
probable cause. Whether Abuan personally by the
and Gorospe were dealers of judge;
Avon Cosmetics may be relevant (3) The judge must
to the issue of whether there is examine, in writing and
factual basis for the finding of under oath or
probable cause by the Executive affirmation, the
Judge against Abuan; however, complainant and the
Abuan’s evidence to prove this witnesses he or she
claim is tenuous and does not may produce;
warrant the quashal of the (4) The applicant and the
warrant and the suppression of witnesses testify on the
evidence seized after the facts personally known
enforcement of the search to them; and
warrant. (5) The warrant
specifically describes
the place to be
searched and the things
to be seized.
Probable cause is defined as such
facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be
searched.
The judge in determining
probable cause is to consider the
totality of the circumstances
made known to him and not by a
fixed and rigid formula, and must
employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard. Probable
cause exists if a practical,
common-sense evaluation of the
facts and circumstances show a
fair possibility that dangerous
drugs will be found in the
asserted location.
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 Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal
Solid Triangle Sales v. Sheriff The Economic Intelligence and
GR No. 144309 Investigation Bureau (EIIB)
23 November 2003 applied for a search warrant
Kapunan, J. against Sanly Corporation for
unfair competition. By virtue of
the warrant, they obtained 451
boxes of Mitsubishi
photographic color paper.
Solid Triangle, which claims to
be the sole and exclusive
distributor of the said paper, then
filed a complaint for unfair
competition against the members
of the Board of Sanly and LWT
Co., Inc. It alleged the LWT was
in conspiracy with Sanly in
selling and/or distributing the
said paper.
Subsequently, a motion to quash
the search warrant was granted
by Judge Bruselas, who stated
that he doubts whether the unfair
competition is criminal in nature.
Thus the evidence seized were
returned to Sanly. Solid Triangle
opposed, stating that the seized
items were needed as evidence in
the investigation for unfair
competition. On certiorari, the
CA ruled that the quashing of the
warrant deprived the prosecution
of vital evidence to determine
probable cause. However, on
MR, the CA reversed itself and
held that there was no probable
cause for the issuance of the
search warrant.
W/N Judge Bruselas, by
quashing the warrant, has
unjustly deprived Solid Triangle
of its evidence for the
preliminary investigation.
W/N a court which issued a
search warrant could entertain a
motion to quash or suppress
evidence while a preliminary
investigation is ongoing.
NO. It may be true that, as a
result of the quashal of the
warrant, Solid Triangle is
deprived of vital evidence to
establish its case, but such is the
inevitable consequence.
Nevertheless, the inadmissibility
of the evidence obtained through
an illegal warrant does not
necessarily render the
preliminary investigation
academic. The preliminary
investigation and the filing of the
information may still proceed if,
because of other (admissible)
evidence, there exists “sufficient
ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for
trial.” The finding by the court
that no crime exists does not
preclude the authorized officer
conducting the preliminary
investigation from making its
own determination that a crime
has been committed and that
probable cause exists for
purposes of filing the
information.
YES. The court which issued a
search warrant may be prevented
from resolving a motion to quash
or suppress evidence only when
a criminal case is subsequently
filed in another court, in which
case, the motion is to be resolved
by the latter court. If this were
not so, a person whose property
has been seized by virtue of an
invalid warrant would be without
remedy while the goods procured
by virtue thereof are subject of a
Only judges have the power to
issue search warrants. This
function is exclusively judicial.
Inherent in the courts’ power to
issue search warrants is the
power to quash warrants already
issued. In this connection, the
motion to quash should be filed
in the court that issued the
warrant unless a criminal case
has already been instituted in
another court, in which case, the
motion should be filed with the
latter.
In the determination of probable
cause, the court must necessarily
resolve whether or not an offense
exists to justify the issuance or
quashal of the search warrant.
The determination of probable
cause during a preliminary
investigation has been described
as an executive function.
The proceedings for the
issuance/quashal of a search
warrant before a court on the one
hand, and the preliminary
investigation before an
authorized officer on the other,
are proceedings entirely
independent of each other. One is
not bound by the other’s findings
as regards the existence of a
crime. The purpose of each
proceeding differs from the
other. The first is to determine
whether a warrant should issue or
be quashed, and the second,
whether an information should be
filed in court.
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Constitutional Law Case Digest Matrix Set 4 – Stef Macapagal

preliminary investigation. The effect of the quashal on the

ground that no offense has been
committed is to render the
evidence obtained by virtue of
the warrant “inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding,”
including the preliminary
investigation.

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