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DCSOPS
Katherine A Mull
IMALTSVERZEICHNIS
0F
THE MUSSOLINI
i
TABLE_O|^C0r^12.
I To 'pp 206=214
\ 11 *2
The Unknown Residence of Mussolini 37-51
s9
Maddal@na'? 52-56
; 111 9 1
Strength and Organisation of the Italian Military Forces
T.<i
I I 7x 'A
/ Estimate of the Situation*, The Plan.
I.TI96
Authorisation of the Offensive Measures* Discussion in
IV.
"Great Sa?is?99 Time between ?fMaddalenaf? and "Great Sassf% .
149-180
IV,1.
8 Sep 1943 .
IV*2.
9 Sep 19-+3 '
215-220
XV,3.
Plan for the Freedom Action of "'Jreat Sasso"
221-234
IV,4.
Mussolini Family . '
234=240
T 'S*
"JO Sf-iate^be^ 1Q4^ 24X252
T ' f i
1 1 tve<ni5r^rti-1hP'r lQ4' a ?S"?<=>284
IV-7*
12 SeDtetber
Maps
\.
I 2
INDEX OF MAPS
M ki
Rome and Chieti, li250000 ITALY, Sheet 23 & 29, First Edition,
for the 12 Sept 19^3 PXan^ with the approach route of the mountain
61
-Operational
j j - _ _ - - outline
^ ^ 400map
0' of(Operation
i )
"GRAH SASSO" 12,Sept
troops which wer supposed to have held ground until the end of the war o |
Tk Bast front, after the big blow at Stalingrad just a half year earlier, j
observer, however, that the great offensive.was eompletely ended by the Russian |
Army* Other offensive results were produced by isolated German divisions and j
corps which nevertheless eould sot get beyond the initial phase9 The great. de~ j
the enemy f men-and 'materiel, were mostly o^erratedo' The Operations Staff eoi {
puted facts based on the exhausted appearaaee of the Russian Arayo In the same
way, they hoped that the great manpower reserve of. Russia would be similarly sx- |
exclusively the supplies which were transported over the Iranian railroads^
When the Front was only several hundred kilometers east of the German
border, the fixed recoil of the front lines was being threatened as early as the
first part of 19^2o Particularly threatening at that time, howevere was the fact
that although the front lines were propitiously situated and ^ery strong, they
could not keep ground against the counterattacks of the Russian Array And a
s!Oable War Command Headquarters in Russia was unavoidable0 This required, howev
Th African campaign was almost lost After Rommel's advance to Egypt was
possible, though that a mor defensive war could be furthered in this campaign*
And. then troop deployment was accelerated by the Allied landings in Africa,
opening of the second front, and neither the number of troops nor reinforcements
was increased.'' The Air Fore alon could not close the keypo.int at Malta and
first invasion of the Allies in Europe had already shown that the same results
would take plaee ithr against the Italian mainland itself or against one of its
camps on Sardinia - and the latter took place in June 19^3 (Pantellaria) and
Staff and the General Staff, I learned then that this development was not gener- |
war. Many high-ranking posts were against Hitler's point of iriew in 19^-0 and *fl j
that first the re@ strength of the 'Mediterranean problem area should be i
cleared - eompletely s@ The fall of Egypt, Palestine and Syria had'swung Turkj |
to the 8ide f the Axis Powers and presented the possibility that Russia sould !'
b@ attacked not only from the western but ale from the |
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
REGISTRY NUS88ER PAGE NUMBER
The isucce'sses of the German war at sea, which resulted almost "exclusively
from; the U-boatsf were only slight in 19^-3 The Allies had had evident successes
through the improvement of defense measures, through their convoy system and the
a new U-boat type was put off for some unknown reason*, Perhaps mostly to have
some success against the convoy system, German air reconnaissance penetrated the
American waters zone* For this purpose there were only two types German air-
t available for duty - the HE-177 SLnd th JU-29Qd The former was an out*and
failure and was almost abandoned - by. the pilots The JU-29O. which was
rd@red as the second^type to reach the necessary maximum range, was available n
in BO small a number that a true cover of the reconnaissance area was impes
A separate problem occurred at the same tine - that of the accuracy life
The air position also began to become critical. Our flyers were forced to
g into battle with almost 1939/^0 types aircraft Fighter aircraft of the
Messerschmidt type were still of equal footing with the Allied fighter aircraft,
perhaps even somewhat superior The bomber types of 1939* however9 were held
back and were bj no means sufficient They could not justifyv either numberwise
The fixed offensive war staff of the Russian Army Staff could keep ground
against the German Army only through stronger air supporto The attack on English
war industry was also filled with casualty. Because of this split-up,, more and
more completely insufficient number of aircraft were made available for duty in
the Mediterranean area*, This was sure to lead to reverses directly on this
theater of war in the long run*. The failure of a German strategic Air Fore
came into Italy that sme government ehaages were actually taking place* The re j
ports were mostly scanty and confused* At 7 asso<9 the German radio brought to thef
public the news of the successful government reformation in Italy,, II Duce was tog
be removed, the King had again taken state affairs into his own hands and Marshall
Badog'li was charged with the governments King and Badolgio, further backed the f
Axis and had issued an official declaration that the war would be continued and
that Italy would fight on until Tie&ory side by side with the Axis might.
ing this turn of vents* was abo^e all still a mystery. It was well known that
Mnesolini had received a false vote at a noting of the Great Fascist Council by
which, he had assumed power without any further ado The assumption took place
without any kind of ceremonies* Great differences must have appeared within the.
highest Fascist circles Ciano had authoritatively a share in the plan of the
Manifesto which had shaped the foundations for that false vote, and also agreed
in the Council t the vote agaiast his father-in-law* For the German circles.
particularly for the average body of officers, this development came as a com-
political foreign news service had for quite some time given reports to the Ger
man command of the actual situation in Italy, reports of the evident strength
against the developments in Italy and there was pen propaganda carried right
through the high posts of the German Armed Forcese The question still remained
open* however* as to how the military security of this optimism was furthered in
the knowledge f the actual circumstances which had been intentionally managed
Broadcast from foreign news services had reported that the interpolitieal
i Italy had several causes<, In 19^-0 Italy entered the war o The popula
neither prepared tor this entry into war nor inspired over it. Neither
were industry nor the oonomj in Italy prepared for war nor for the situation
without special help from without (imports f raw material and coal) 9 in impres
sive manners or numbers to undertake warfareo The war was unpopular to most f
The political groups which w@r gathered around the Kisg*s household itself
bhat of the Crown Priac0 were already adversaries of war, th latter group
Russian theater of war* thus making morale considerably worse * Then came the big
in dead &n& also the blam@ for- a further depression in the beginning s
short order, one position after the other was lost in North Africa, But even so e
it must no be. 'overlooked that just a few years earlier a hard war had been fought
f other services were still in Abyssinia Even their situation was uncertain
in that the Colonies,, at a distance from the motherland, which was now. at'war,
were"completely shut off from her Another especially strong 9 pronounced family
trait of the Italian peopl lay in the long separation which the even stronger
after-effects of these events had on the morale and war fatigue of the people
The Italian economy itself was adjusted to an effective support of the colonial
polities - even for th decline of the warlike engagements in the colonies. The
German reverses in North Africa followed shortly after the Allied land-
Ings on Pantellaria and then on Sicily e With this there was an immediate threat
to the Italian mainland and the disinclination of the Italian people for th al
ways unpopular war and their fear of the coming events was even greater* From
within, there same more and more noticeable distrust toward Germany and there
were outward expressions against the German Armed Forces* The original cause of
the disaster was sought for in Germany and Hitler and in Mussolini's weak reli
;hese* One indeed forgot, or overlooked, the fact that Italy's entrance
war in 19^*0 resulted not only from Italian and German publicity but also
from, th surprising and unwelcome German high commands* . And Italy's downfall in
Albania and Greece was extremely disagreeable to the German leadership Italy*-s
entranc into the war cam at the very end of the victorious and world-surprising
quick end f the German campaign in Franceo The above described developments f
the war and surprisingly unfavorable effects on the morale of the Italian popu
lace only made it possible for the powers over the Italian palace and the Crown
accessible in the circles of the higher and middle class mobility, military
through the influence of the Crown Prince and his followers * it overlapped the
this movement, was an open seerets 19^3 found this growth so developed that a l
ready some leading Fascists joined th@ movement either openly or secretly* Be-
cane f this the political situation of. Fascism was so definitely weakened that
these eirel^s needed t.o wait only for the appropriate moment to bargain, and for
the Italians this was an'especially untimely growth of the military situation in
Mussolini himself at that time - perhaps through the fall of Pantellaria - had
ther was adequate authority published by those who were explicity concerned with
the occasion of Mussolinies resignation through the political foreign news ser
vice and then later through the Italian news service, since I hadn't concerned
myself with such problems before* Part f the new was given to me on the oc
gence service that authoritative circles in the neighborhood of the King and the
gressed, or else which- plans had already been agreed upon for the future, was not
As already pointed out* after the first news of Mussolini's resignation and
after the first loud announcements over the German radio of the reorganization of
the Italian government, no later details were experienced* Reports from Italy
were very contradictory, some coming'from the Ambassador^ some from military
or some from, foreign news service channels in the hands of the high corn-
First of all 9 it was clear only that Mussolini had received a vote of
no confidence from the main Fascist council. Besides, he had tendered his resig
nation to the King himself and he had had an audience with the King at the filla
Savoy<;, which th latter had since already abandoned, and from this moment on
failed him on every eeasioxie In addition, the official statement of the King
meeting* First the King heaped upon Mussolini the heaviest reproaches - he
driven Italy into the war and would have to answer for the ultimate fall of
the creation f the "Empire was an intrinsic gain of the Fascist governments This
politic, and it was still the historical merit of Fascism and the'March on Rome,
that fee had prevented & slip to the radical Leftist side and therefore removed
Mussolini forever as his eousin* He would never forget the successful work which
Lni had accomplished for the Italian people and the Statee (The designa
, "cousin", on the king's part was offered to all holders of the General
^CONTINUATION SHEET)
INTEU.IGENCE TRMVSIATION RESiSTft NUBSBER PAGE NUMBER
H 7563 8
- t all those who were spoken of as "cousin" by the Italian king*)
hours of 13 September 19^3 in the Imperial Hotel in Vienna - especially the initia
excitement of the king, who ran around the audience room and emphasized his words
I . ' . - .. .
jvery stronglye Quite suddenly, then, hie voice changed and the dismissal was out
spokenly hearty, although the king certainly knew what fate awaited II Duce after
Outside the rooff, Mussolini was already awaited by more earabinieri (police)
officers* These .explained to him that he must follow them without resistance, as
they had orders to bring him-to the police barracks*. Mussolini had regretted
so he continued in his talk with me, that he had not followed the advice of
friends, crusted ones, to forego the farewell audience with the king without
ic@ barracks in a sanitation van which bore the Red Cross insignia* There
he was kepi under strict guard for severalcfeys in a room on the first flooro This
description also coincided almost exactly with our findings in Home, when we tried
to find out Mussolini's place of arrest * Even the location of the room was known
to us,, but w@ barely knew it when Mussolini was taken off to his second place of
On the occasion of these talks on 13 Sep 19^3 Mussolini also spoke about his
plais'for. the future, which he thought over well during his captivity and during
tho night following his release * He no longer desired9 after his return to Italy,
a. higher coi/imand in the Fascist Party, which had been smashed through the change
in the government*. He indicated that his greatest political error was that hefl
an'i therefore Fascism, had concluded a compromise with the House of Savoy and that
.ht?-h&& stopped the Fascist downfall of the royal house* He regretted especially
ithr.t he had presented the belief to the King and the Crown Prince of his fixed
la&ser{;ion regarding their loyalty and cooperation toward the Fascist Regime* And
r$Q'M hi and the Italian people had to gay the bill for this lightheartednesso The
ilast nnd optimum moment for the downfall of the royal house was victoriously em
plet/d Abbysinian campaign and it seemed that this point was- unexplainably wasted
hi? fate as being a pure report of facts*, Th German embassy'in Rome had sought,
trrough its official Italian position (perhaps through Badoglio and the Crown
back to the statement of the then Office of Foreign Defense (military news ser
vice) under Admiral Ganariso The latter gave9 as I later learned, a comparative
Staffe' And there was a feeling,, too, that the remaining Italians in the Axis
Alliance would be safe also under the new government, and no sort of weakness of
the Italian was potential was expected in any way through the collapse of Fascisms
noon around 1500 hours, to come by air to Hitler's field headquarters at once* Asa
immediate reason for this command wasn't giveno Since this was the first time
that I had been called t the field headquarters, this order case unexpectedly
and surprisingly* A special purpose plane, a JU 52$ stood ready for me at the
the morning events in Italy4 but the role that ray unit was to play in this was
-fully gave the ord^ to put the 5Q2& Rifle Battalion on the alerte
It might be neeessary to mention here that this battalion was on its initial
assignment and at that time had a strength of around 120 men available for duty
(East Prussia)* whieh at that time was the location of Hitler's field headquar
ters <> I was taken from there in a personnel carrier and brought through various
5 officers of various branches of service These, too, had not been informed as
.to the purpose of their presence at headquarterso Shortly after the introduction^
we were ordered together before the presence of Adolf Hitlere For me, this was
the first meeting with the German head of the nationo Each of us 0 in brief state
ments , had to describe our careerso I was the only Austrian from the 6 officers
presents Also, I was the only one who had come by private journey from Italyo
The Fuehrer asked rr. the following question; What is your attitude toward Italy
ward Italy has already been described through events of the earlier World War and
Thereupon, the other 5 officers were dismissed and I was detained by Hitlero
In the short conference which followed with Hitler, which took place under
k eyes, he'-fjirst' shoved some lack of confidence in the House of Savoy! The gist
"This House of Savoy has betrayed tis this time,, too Although I was assured
by all officials of German posts in Rome that there was no thought as yet of any
Italian abandonment of the Axis, I felt I was deceived by this position by the
Italians themselves and I couldn't see the true position e A kingdom which shows
itself so ungrateful to the rescuer of its Italian state and people, and even
" I I Duce i s , in my eyes, one of the last of the Romans, he is certainly the
last remaining symbol of a proud Rome which onee ruled the world* His life, his
rise and his deeds ar@ equalled only by a few f the old Roman rulers * II Due
is"also more than jnst an ally, more than the representative and promoter of the
befriended Italian Fascism;'he came to le as a man, and, as with only a few men
"The Skorgenys were to liberate my friend, Mussolini but the terrible fate
which our enemies intended for him was turned aside. They were dispersed b y the
"Only one thing causes me great sorrow and that is the discontinuance of the
German posts in Rome The German embassy heeds only the monarchy And one b@
lieves everything which comes from this side*, They've become soft in the south
era sun, they've even become half Italian. Even Kesselring believes what is told
by the Italian Crown Prince and others in that circle* And I know that the
Horn dared not be lost, or the southern front will collapse Genera
19
his staff must under no circumstances know of this 0 The 3 men, who must help
"to find and free a man, whose place of confinement was kept
casion to observe and speak with him, made a very great impression on me. His art|
sThis belief in the completion of the order -was- also necessary to eliminate any j
[be missing - to recognise and charge those in the plan that they were in dangero \
("teahouse." General of the Air Force Student also ease there and I was introduced!
111 Air Force Then i mt the aatioaal&S Chief, H@inrich Himmler, and took part in f
I ' - . . . . . J
1 I
named some Italian political figure, and forbade us in -the strongest terms to raak
any kind of notes on th:.so ile, too., like the Fuehrer, was convinced that the
Royal House and the Badoglia'-government-would shortly be separated from the Axis
Alliance and go over to the Allied -side6 This surely could no longer be pr@vent
ed*, although we had to be warned a&d be prepared for t The important supply hub
of Rome eould? under no-circumstances, be lost to the German war effort* This
therefore resulted in tha shift.of the XI Air Force from the air channels over
southern France to the space over Rome in Italy This consisted of two'parachute i
divisionso These two divisions were the only ones* explained Himmler, that were
available quickly and were the only ones lfto This strength must be sufficient
,to fulfill the assigned missiono He further explained that under no circumstances
jwere we to let ourselves be influenced by the opinion about the present situation
iin Italy, especially in the south, an opinion dominated by the German Embassy as
jwell as by the st&'U of Fild Marshal General von Kesselringo These circles were
|of the opinion tha', the recent event of the government change in Italy would have
an unfavorable effect on the German war situation* One believed that because of
this situation repeated assurances were given at random from the circles of the
Crowp Prince and the Royal House as.well as from the circles within the high
Italian General Staff that until now Italy remained in the war on the side of the
who in his opinion were ready to go over to the Allied side and
just as with Hitler, for the first time on this occasione The
[complete impression, that I got through this was that he seemed to be very nervous
[and. obviously attributed essentially more significance to the events in Italy than
actually wanted to. 'It was rather difficult not to let this nervousness
tagiousa It was almost midnight and bth General Student and I still had a
These were to leave soon by type JB52 plane on the morning of 27 July 19*4-3
France, In the ensuing hours, then, I gave all the necessary orders and instruct
ions to my Adjutant in Berlin, then 1st Lt in the Reserve, Karl Radl* The latter
25 men in ray unit should leave Berlin in the first transport* The selection of
the rest of the officers and enl-isted personnel I left to my administrative offi
cer in Berlin. I ordered only that men with a fluency in the Italian language be
men. and average engineer troops* All those who were to belong to the commandos
were to "be uniformly dressed in paratroop uniforms, the basic order given by Hit
ler to me as well as to the officers and enlisted men of the Air Force (Paratroop
equipment plan had to ba well thought out, all eventualities &ad to be considered
B
still wasn t known where Mussolini was located, whether in Rome or someplace els@
r in.some prison or in a more neutral place under the strictest close guard, etc
All telephonic and teleprint orders wer dispatched throughout that night At
30 a o m e ? all f the m@n who had been selected for the undertaking were ready to
take off, together with the required equipment, from the airstrip. Around 20 men
remained in Berlin on the alert for they would be called to Italy within the com
ing weeks, s tnat the total strength of personnel directly under me ? most of
land I took'of from the Rastendorf Airfield around 8 a,m o @n 27 July 19^+7 (Trans
jlator^s note? should b 19^3) and landed after a non-stop flight, around noon 0
I Mussolini's matterso'
| active sensation and interested all the German and Italian public, even all the
I Italians serving in the German Army, as well as any others in German high command
developed during the new Badoglio governmento The answers, however, were evaded
and never were near the truth And therefore most were informed that the Duce
was well and still no one knew where his residence was locatedo
that tried to find9 through private sources in the inner circle of the first
Italian Partye some clues about Mussolini5 hiding place and about his intended
fate0 Despite the part the very narrow personality relation among the Italian
specially Roman - company*, played, there still had to be found some successful
guesses and clues turned out to b false ones. In part, they had to contend her
with some clever steps at concealment and deliberate misdirections Behind thes
false clues and misdirections stood the excellently functioning Italian military
intelligence service*, t .
the exact whereabouts of II 'Due* The Fuehrer had ordered a deluxe edition of
Nietzsche as a personal gift for ?4ussolini The German Embassy in Rome was to in-J
I duce an agreement with the Italian government that this personal gift from Hitler
Marshal General K@sselringe At first it seemed that the Italian government had
the desire to carry out this wish and the Crown Prinee promised Field'Marshal
General Kesselring to personally speak up for him that the German government
would be granted this wisha However, as the birthday date arrived, the Italian
posts became more careful and stated finally that Mussolini's whereabouts was
unknown even to . them, and that because of this triev unfortunately could give no
help, Badogli himself stated to Field Marshal General Kesselring that he had
Shortly after his freedora, I learned from Mussolini himself that the books
had beenv..presehted to him in St o ?4addalena TC@ had expressed the desire to thank
the Fuehrer for this through a personal letter9 but this wish was refused As
T maintain, the services of the German posts for German control over Musso
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
NUMBER PAGE NUMBER
H 7563
this, it became an intensive thought.to the masses that Mussolini must have
played into the hands of the Allies, Hitler had feared Mussolini's extradition
to the West even fram the very beginning* He believed that this surrender made
up a part of the p?ice for a separate peace between the Allies and Italy9 a price
which the Royal House was ready to pay0 Even the Allies, as Hitler opined, were
The personal services of Field Marshal Kesselring were also fruitless at the
Italian Royal touse, as were repeated @fforts by high Italian officials, to obtai
Military fecurity" of.the High Command and of the Armed Forces, under Admiral
Ganarisf #as also kept busy about Mussolini's person and the events in Italyo
Between the AA,W0 (Foreign Office, Military Security) and the Italian
waived mutual rights to the military intelligence service work performed by the
other in the homeland of the other ally0 As a result of this agreement, there
existed in Italy at this time no completed nets of agents and V-personnel (secret
ion with this planned action of the Foreign Office of Military Security, or of
any office waich was related to this office in Italy, and no suggestion was made
to me from any side to 'make use of such a connection,, Because of this, the
Foreign Office of Military Security wasn't connected with me. This office, how-
I sould not etimate to what extent there was a connection between Admiral
C@r-tainXy it was interesting to note in just what way the Service worked and
the German high command appeared through the Military Security Servicec The
'.Foreign Office Military Security provided the German high command with periodic-
illy revealed instructions and estimates of the situatione These were determined
by military control right down to detailed staff and Generals Corps, of both the
August 19^3 there appeared such an estimate of. the situation in Italy which
claimed in it that after the fall of -Mussolini the political situation in Italy
had been confirmed as being absolutely in favor of Germany Through the taking
over of governmental deals and the widening control of the war by the King and
Badoglio, Italian politics $?er placed on an essentially solid basis0 There was
no doubt that the King and Bado^lio kept their given promise - to remain faith
ful to the Axis and to continue the war to a victorious endo Any breaking off
from the.Axis was not obtainable* This type of report was obviously believed in
(CONTINUATION SHEET*
PAGE NUMBER
H7563
various political and military chief posts in the German Reicho This was
known through numerous talks with German officers and various other measures
Nothing more than this could be accomplished, not even through prearranged meas
ures o This was perhaps the greatest danger point with a view toward corang
events in Italy after 25. July-.-19^3 and above all those following the going over
of the Italians to the Allies, on,8 Sep 19^3* It should be noted here that the-
Chief of the German Military Security, Admiral Canaris*, together with the then-
ColoFAel von Lahous@n9 toward the end of -Aug. 19^3 met secretly with the Italian
now been proven that at that time, on the part of the German' Security Service9
(and. it was the same from both leaders) that the most important classified Itali
an matters were handed over..to. both high ranking Italian officers* Undoubtedly
the German Security Service generally was itself not'very well informed about
this<, BO that only through .efficient subordinate positions a greater danger w&s
averted for German control in. .Italye In a later chapter - in the section '*Madda<
te
Xna. = we'll speak more of thise (Se pages l 4 3 ~ l ^ in text - page herein) o
After all the knowledge and previously described truths, it is assumed that
the Italian Security Service had furnished the information to its German' col~
concealing the Mussolini affair and the coming events from the German leaders
From this sort of thing is also explained the completely - deliberate or not
Only Hitler hinself and. a few7 of the men in his close circle dared to believ^
have foreseen this split opinion at the time f the assignment of my mission on
26 July 19^-3 in Hitler's headquarters in the field. That is .probably also why
x
it could be traced back that :Hitlei 's ensuing order of secrecy were expressly
This split concept of the situation and the later developments in Italy and
the consequent unreliability of the various political and military posts became
cribed developmentso
During th@ time when we wer still in intensive preliminary work for- Opera=
pare for a .paraehute jumping, sorti on an island near the island of Elba e Th@
alert for readiness of action was set for within 72 hours* Groundwork: for this
could b found at the referenced iirae as a ?0W on this islando And this was at a |
tin when we knesi to an almost 100% certainty that Mussolini could not b found |
-thre under any ci^cuG?.8tanc@.so A check of bhe place and region also confirmed |
OUT fies*. . For us this was a confirmation that headquarters was being furnished
with incorrect information^, which was 'deliberately launched and relayed in good
ately relayed incorrect information^, This sortie was, from a technical viewpoint
1 terrain was so irregular that the majority of the leading jumpers would end in
1 the.seao and most of these, in full paratroop combat outfits9 would end by drown
I ing to deatho Since the operation, in our viewpoint, must undoubtedly fail,
I . f
j since s far as we knew Mussolini was not located on the island, no thought was i
I ' " : f
! : f
| jeopardizede
similar action,.
And Likewise, the that
so it seemed overall plan,,
at the even
last in its
moment it lowest scale,
would be was also
possible for i
\
p .
1
!
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
iWTELUGi&iCE TRANSLATION ' I EESISTHV NUMBER I PAGE NUMBER
H 7563 ' T
Toward the end of August 19^3.it became even easier to recognize that Badog~
liols Italian government had the idea of coming, to an armistice with the Allies
and to'pull out of the A^is Allianceo This development of a fundamental position
f the new government against a tie with Germany became oven stronger through the
general withdrawal deployment on all fronts0 and especially for Italy through the
significance f the setback in Sicily and the continuous allied air attacks on
with the Allies over the terms for an armisticeo The disappearance of several of
the .former leading Italian personalities from Rome, who were always well hidden
during the official govez-nrnent period^ gave additional hints, as to this trans
action0 Particularly interesting in this connection is the fact that the depart
ure of the one-time Fascist leader and Minister Dino Grandi from his alleged
Italian post was not noticed (this based on our sure basic knowledge)9 and the
fact that he had taken the road across Spain toward Portugal for the negotiations,
had out plan which was based on good new$ the necessary platform for these talks
We presumed that one of th@ main conditions for the armistice would be the
deliverance of Mussolini to the Alliese Too 9 time was very urgent Hitler's
Alsop the ever increasing-reinforcement of Italian troops in and around Rome* the
the facts .that the Italian traffic patrols picked up information on German ve j
| hides,, on eviry-German vehicle number9 unit and name of any scheduled authorized I
travel9 it was easy to learn from this sort of identification the composition f g
| carefully pursued all traces which were held close concerning his place of resi
(denceo 1'n spite of thise his location^ surely impeded by the search, was changed
1 every 1-2 weeks, and we always succeeded*, after a comparatively short time, in
|locating new clues* After the Duce had been brought away from the island of
the next clue on him was missingo From Hitler's headquarters the alleged most de*
pend&ble information given to us was completely useless and falseo Somewhere '
around the middle of August the trace led to the area of Sardinia,, It was then
not clear if Mussolini could be found on Sardinia itself or on one of the n@igh~ I
Sardinia a It was known that a number f former Fascists were located in camp on j
-fIthe isle
brought
of Porco9 a very small islando Rven so, captured Fascists were to be
to Caprera*. Some hints even indicated that Mussolini was on the island
of Caprera, Intensive research work and finally9 by accident, the clues led
definitely to the small island of Maddalena* This island was almost at the north
seamens were detailed to a joinfe naval staff in Maddalena harbor. Cautious sight
seeing harbor tours and photographs from air and ship were made. Technical naval
statistics were gathered from the harbor commandant* The picture of the situation
police (carabinieri) guard He was brought to a small villa some 500 meters west
of the'city of La Maddalena*-' The guard company was about 150 men in strength*
They were quartered on the property which surrounded the villa o The property,
along the street,, about 2^0 meters wide and about ^00 meters long, rising along
high. Approximately in the middle of the street front of the property stood
the huge iron~forgd entrance gate* The garden climbed like a stratiform,, es
pecially in the western half, and was interspersed by walls within in several
spots c, The Villa itself was located on one=-third of the property and a terrace
faced the west and easto The house was one-storied with about 15 rooms* In the
garden*- toward the city, located on about the same height as the villa, was a
gardenhouse, to which a part of the guard company was broughto The garden con
sisted of trees*, one street leading from the entry gate toward the villa, circ
ling the separated terraces and walls, and thus divided the property in two
Day and night a double post of carabinieri patrolled the street in front of
the houseo A second double post was stationed right at the entry gateo In the
garden itself there even appeared to be posted some roving sentries> Exact con
firmations in this connection were not possible to determine,, Even so, we had
no knowledge about the guard directly located within the house itselfo In any
case, we had to contend with a comparatively strong police reserve on the prop
erty0 The guns9 which could be safely carried by us,, consisted of rifles and
Italian machine guns,, However9. it was definitely fenderstood that one had to
count on machine guns within the property itself0 Several telephone lines led
into the villa, probably set in there by the Italian post commander to make con~
tact with the duty stations * The exact number (lines) could not be definitely
ascertained,? It was also possible at any moment that we*d have to deal with some
telephonic - and very rapid - alarm systemo- At one of the last personal recon
naissances on 27'August 19*09th@ night before the planned day of action, I-dis
covered more new field cables, which hadnt been taken into account before0 This
revealed there was a separate0 direct line from thes probably to Italian quar*
ters located on the nearby shores At these quarters, there were several barracks
determined whether these barracks held midshipmen - so ran one report - or Ital
ian Air Force personnel - so.another soure reported*. The quarters were con
nected directly with the ground floor, where Mussolini was held captive * and0
through a narrow shore streete led into the main street whieh ran through the
'weapons and at least light machine guns had to be acquired. On the shore 0 some
20 meters distance from th barracks a small breakwater was located which mad
barracks,; there was a small bay,'.which' sloped about 10 meters and which ran level
a smooth^ slippery roky surface under sea level9 which allowed for a land-
circled overhead. The reports about the purpose of the seaplane were con^
One report said that the aircraft were readied for any emergency
to a doctor at a'military hospital since he was very ill; and yet another that
the presence of the s@a-rescue plane was connected with the visit of Mussolini9s.
physician, who was quite concerned about his (Mussolinis) physical con-
of the plan t fr@ Mussolini from *!addalenao "e had to consider the danger of
the appropriately timed passing of Mussolini through these planes for the success
might- be caused foy actual engagement - and direct air attack - or pursuit of
Mussolini's route and alerting of Italian posts on the mainland (Navy, Air Foree)<
Therefore, thr@ were just these 3 aircraft observed continuously and. our first
look was applied to -all harbor visitors, harbor tours and9 above all0 flights
On the heights of Mad&alena Island itself, on the snail island between Sar
of Maddalena to the east and on passing points of land, Italian flack batteries
were in plae@ as AA. defenses against eneay air attacks on the ocean-fortress.
From the favored high altitude position, these flack batteries <eould dangerously
rake the harbor itself with fire as well as a, considerable distance out towards
A radio station was located on the heights above (north westerly) the eity of
The harbor entrance t Maddalena was protected by coast artillery guns and
barrier which was moved by a fighter patrol boato For this hindrance a special,
'Maddalena itself. Besides, these there, were, other smaller numbers of naval units
located in the harbor, s that in eas of an alert at any rate the flank was pro
On Sardinia itself, Italian divisions were located near the German troops
However^ with exception of the Italian Air Force these could be left alonee
sine an advance in case of-an alert could follow inopportunelyo Because of this<
an Italian Air For@ alarm had to be reckoned with* The Vieno Fiorita air base9
near -Olbia, was located about 80 km distance .away, consisting of Serbian and Ital
ian unl^s, although the air base itself was under Italian control Other air
bases w@re strictly Italians At Vieno Fiorita there were predominantly Italian
assumed*, through the distance of the air base from Maddalena0 through the early
-morning hour of the planned operation,, and the speed with which an aiarm could
be carried dirt, that the operation itself could b jeopardised* On the open sea
we couldn't reckon with the impressive strength of fighter planes, ie* with any
direct attackse The .whole Mediterranean Sea was a zone of hostile fighter planes
and it was k&own that the Italian fighters didn't go out too far into the sea0
Just the the impresssii-m strength of fla@k and oast were defensive in na
Interference of the flack batteries, the coast artillery and torpedo defenses
e^uld probably be expected during the retreat with the released Duce over the
waterway9 when .an alarm would be broadcast The same defense, however9 could also
b eatpeete'd if a battle actually took pla@ in the vicinity of the villa and a
fir alarm were aoundedo The action, therefore, must b developed on a possible
silent @3ce@utiosio Therefore, the surprise moment was the next most important
etepo The fighter patrol boat in the harbor entrance9 too0 had to. be taken
.quietly and effectively9-.to avoid a premature, alarm prior-.to the beginning of the
actino The radio station could relay the alarm to the mainland and so call
naval and air support0 That is why the radio station couldn't be put out of
a@tla with jamming and attacks until the mainland was considered after a success*
ful pr&tio&9 The three seaplanes in the harbor could at once take up the pur~
auit in such & case and establish goammieations with the Italian posts on
(Italian),, we also had to reckon with enemy landings0 Since the hi^h com
mand in Germany estimated neither the fighting power nor the fighting morale of
the Italian troops too highly, we had to reckon with serious practical defenses
of only those German troops stationed right thereo Since the strength of these
there was sufficient supply area available0 there still wasn't suitable protecti
through use of any marine combat units The Italian fleet was not yet completely
in the war.-.with the escccsption of a few U-bdat tactical units and ,so.ne special
combat units f the "XeMA$rt type and showed no signs of letting itself be drawn
into any sea campaigns* The Seraaii 'Tavy. was much too weak nunber-wise, consist
ing of only a few U-boat (submarine) chasers, submarines, minesweepers and tcrjsdo
and thes, at that time, were tied up either in the Sicilian theater of
Our view-of; the situation was clear, . #e believed in the correctness of the
reports about the secret peace negotiations .(armistice terms) of the Italians
the Allies and saw that the termination of these negotiations lay directly
On the other .hand*.- we saw the imperfect battle moral of the Italian \
tion of the German control in Italy* 'Ve saw the general, war fatigue f the
recognized the aim of. .the Italian government, which steered toward-an armistice
1*he disappearance of the Fascist Party was clearly recognised, although the
of'the. formr.Fascist after they were removed from the leading posi~
was not understandable 0' This we. could, explain through the great shock
which suddenly hit many. Fascists who tednet expected it wen up to now,-, caused
t 9fi
C di@=liard ) Fascists, who were the moat faithful supporter f Mussolini0 seemed
utterly disabled and showed n kind of inclination for any political power. Even!
an Aehill Muti - who at the end of August was shot on the street ?= and Seor&a
remained conpletely reserved and trained the new government toward strong
Loyalist lines. Only & few until now confessed, especially .the earlier forces
of former Fascists,, that they were still very much interested in. the person and
they worked without a plan* Neither did they have any connection with any kind
of troops with thloh they could have been able to successfully complete, such an
a later date* Since the work of this group could become dangerous for
this a^@a instead f trying to develop the information based on the results of
ways a danger point in 'itself, could be encountered Even more, there had to be
presupposed that eventual parallel running plans for a release action would b
on Sardinia were a German Pauses .Rifle Division and Air Force units
Tfte former consisted of th 90th Panser Rifle Division^, and the so-called
'"Sardinian Ais8 Fore C@raitand" made up the Air Force elementso Tb.@ Army units
were - located mainly in the south and were not quie&ly aobile due to ba# roads
German antiaircraft were located mainly in the neighborhood of the mixed Italian
and German occupied air base of Vieno Fiorita9 and another section-(battalion)
was. ia the -kills south of Palan* 3?his base was assigned along with- the Italian
AAA operations ares, in the region of Maddalena to defend it afaisist enemy aerial
fh German Air Fore units on Vien Fiorita were there mainly for
There -were some -German fighter.- squadrons n the air base and
these still flew si&gie-se&i fighters which* until now^ were decidedly on the
In !4addalena itself ther was located only one 'lerraan liaison officer to the
Italian harbor-and fortress coa.nanders, a frigat captain .of the German Navy., and
On- Corsica9 a French possession before the war, ther was stationed a combat
unit of SS troops * Tfe@y were generally known as' t'le'"SS-attack brigade of Cor
sica*" They were <empletely mobilized .and' had an anti-aircraft unit located at
the island and placed supplies in parts of it- Above all the supplies of weapon
and ammunition for the partisans went this. - way6 too'e In-spite of the French tri
there., the going legal tender in Ajaeco was tho dollar and the
aas so long as these were not strongly anti-Italian^ sold them their'arms
and pushed a lively trad witti the foreign exchange0 T'hey vere
these bands sometimes wore Italian Array uniforms bought from their friends, it
was often difficult to distinguish between friend and enemy* These bands atta@k
d all who came in their vicinity and immediately seised whatever booty (captured
materiel), whether it was German or Italian vehicles. Only the eastern part of
the island, in'the area around Bonifacio (Southern point) across Porto Vecchio
toward Bastia, was to some degree safe* There, too, were located soae Gerauan
naval units* The western part of the island was also scarcely penetrable for any
population. Sine the German naval unite were the predominant users of the
supplies fro* the mainland to Sardinia, as well as the defenders of these sup
plies, these units had practically no combat value. In the harbor of i:astia, on
One of the torpedo boat divisions pulled fro-i t^e '-egeau area, .viiich ,/ere
now layingin this area of the Mediterranean, displayed the only combat strength
These forces were to play a leading role in the subsequent plan to free
ultimate collapse of the Axis*.the German high eomnarad "didn't seem-to be ready*
without undo .eomnent* t end this situation and even .in itself .to. bring about
steps'but sided, with the execution of;either an eventual erueial Italian step or
anticipated .one .for Germany-at.the appropriate momenta Thus all the German post
reckoned with, so. that, with it..the Italians eould effect a collapse, of tne Axis
all&B?@ through Germany Italy had remained fcru to' the-.ne'j? official order of
the Axis even after Mussolini's-resignation and had even promised participation.
as a war partner until the final victory Therefor, a military action carried
out by official German positions * even if its result was completely free, of
blod^h@d9 'and on which, li-^ht have as its aim or result *'tae annulment of a.-le^al
and neeessary measure promulgated and carried out by the King and the ne4j govern
ment? had t be regarded as an hostile act* Through this, the Italian government
the alliancet .an. act which-could only be fully welcomed by the Italian.government.
This doubtlessly-, caused the be forewent toned strength of morale f t;i@ enemy and
a&vers effect-on th@-. German troops on all fronts^ particularly in. Russia* where
Sin<@ Husso-lifti's plae of' eonfinement on Maddalena was with -^reat probabil
strong diserepai?.sy at. the "noaiejit of terror" need be reckoned with* Any ...relief
attempt fro.& the conntrj euld easily be protected and sr&rded of through the
favorable terrain^ The problem lay in another region* 4ow would the-, approach >
tak placeffi -aAd:.how:rould the-personnel get away from the pl&ee with the freed
for the departureo Through its use as many as possible of the smaller and quick
er units were &%>! to be successful As fast ships, there were some speedboats
and minesweepers available for use o These were considered as nmeh for their
aetiv sortie^'they could .-give - good fire support Through available secondary
practically safely-'control the whole area ot the' sea fortress and the harbor
ThereforeV"we- had.to;-adapt our plan at this point so that the Italian'flaek posi
tions would -be denied": any knowledge of the situation, or, as much as possible9
would pe. postponed so' a later tisae so that any alarm would actually be given too
late." For' this reason, the speed of the boats a.t our disposal played a big role*
In an emergency, -enemy anti-aircraft 'and naval batteries were put under fire and
when considering the great rangeo' They could merely furnish fire protection t
Another difficulty lay in the fact that I had a unit of merely 50 sen in
r@ly VL-p&n the efforts of a part of the Corsimun SS Assault Brigade, and the few
marine .complement which were located there to protect the few boats and at most
the approximately 10CV120 men of the Corslcan Assault Brigade attached to me0
These'couldnt'-be taken1, through-by torpedo boat since there was too little room
that is t 3LJC> it. .had to appear that they couldn't be seen aboard any shipso
?o for merely this.. purposef the flat and very slow flare-barges had to be appr^
priate^ The disadvantageof these was their slow speed, but their advantage for
just this action was that win.:? to their very flat and broad bow and their s
draught, they war appropriate for a laad maneuver Landing and re-loading: of
these-boats., which would take place'on thea, could therefore be very quickly
fo're such' an operation, or -during the course of the sa!ae9 that-new,' not hereto
fore-though-of 'difficulties were met 0 which only with th most rapid decision
a.nd through- the beet preparation of'all, could be masteredo The. choice of offi
7563 .
27
and earlier military service of the' average German soldier. Special, intelligence
and assured decisiveness of each member were required just as much as ready -in
dication of courage and fighting spirit', .calm, reasoning, and steady, "nerves, . In
the selections9 howeverfl we also had to consider unity and cooperation in the
unit fen in a small force such as this group (9 ^n)o This selection ..seemed, to
tionc and then these were u-nnoticedo A surprise attack operation should have.
this as a goal Knowledge'of this operation should be passed to only a very few
peopleia who had to have adequate naval technical knowledge to use both in'a.sur
prise attack oh-the blockade emplacements as well as .in the overall operation
changes in'the ~ Mediterranean area, the resolution was made to carry out the plan
changed'any more in .'the short time remaining^ forced our action* particularly
since he'd" been there' on Nfaddalena-for almost two^feeks now. Two different
places of his confinement were known to us up to this point* Firsts the Caserne
given*, Very shortly after the approval we hit upon some completely unexpected
reported once that Mussolini was not located on Maddalena but later, after
a report from the mainland, he was reported as on an Italian warship, and, after
in an opposite order. - for us not to take any further action concerning Madda
lenao (See pp 15 and lS) On the other hand, we were informed through the top
military leaders that we should take off on the approved Maddalena operation
only after we were 1009a certain that Mussolini was present there Such certain
ty wasn't.-easy .to attain, but it was also a far step from likelihood . Besides,
the military 'regime seemed to occupy itself more with the problem of the failure
f the Axis .alliance .through'-Germany than in the event of this operation (see
pg 17), and. it 'was.- made known to us that .in the event of failure of the opera
of confinement - drew-a blankQ. we would have to bear the full blame., for any.re
that Captain Otto Skorseny.and-1st Lt Karl Radl would be branded before the pub
lic at large as the instigators-of this thoughtless act Vs! naturally were
aware f the consequences:. and results of a failure and were prepared to answer
any charges resulting in a. military discharge, but for the reality .of the action
Hitler, the:.head. of .the state and Commander-in-chief of all Arraed Fox^ces - and
these orders, were sufficiently legitimate ones. Any denial before the general
public would therefore-b@ .in conflict with this. This reality was in.no.. way
olded any sudden decisions and demanded of u&q tob 0 that each
plan b worked out completely.beforehand Since the officers of the general staff
of the. Comsaandb Corps, of the XI Air Force weren't of the same opinion, the entire
pre-planning of the reports and the news items9 as" well, as the usual orientation
of the military intelligence work and of the possible results and plans, were
left from the rrj start in von Radl's and my hands $e both were also almost
larly,-the report as., to the exact location of Mussolini were such that, they were
never 100i e@rtaia Personal, knowledge and exact notices, such as .ffere normally
obtained at the front lines themselves through patrol and- shock troop operations,
weren't possible t attain in this smse* But any direct reconnaissance- was for
therefore often reaeh@d conclusions and decisions, which in themselves were more
our operation was inevitably (and completely new and unaccustomed for us soldiers)1
A brief explanation of the reconnaissance trip until the very day .of'the
Around 7^10 August (the exact date cannot be reconstructed without the
fro^r the island of Pohza, and, after an unknown elapse of time, .vas- brought to an
unknown spot'*. 7ho, news itself was definite, aj<d was confirmed by Italian naval
-sour&es.as well.as from private sources -froa 3aeta, As the next clue, 'tie desti
nation of the warship had ..to be ascertained* A. few days later ?fi;& .ilex* - informed
us, via radio message.froa Hitler's-field headquarters, that Mussolini tfas locate
b-is order- to te@ the Dus from this war-ship and carry through aeeordiBg to a
Ignored i^as the .fact that we knew at this point that -Mussolini}
tiie advantages 'thereof, if such ah action could- be suecessfully carried out and
how, without remotely thinking't>f. the carrying out of these orders * Our full
6
effort was concentrated on-further inquiry into Mussolini s actual plage of eon-
Some days.. later, through the com-.and headquarters of. the Sernan Navy
ttated that ther@ were vari?i vailitary typ changes, such; as strengthening* of
at Pratiea d@ Mare to Sardinia 'We landed on the lieno Fiorita airfield at Olbia
of the
a-s reported
rather than not being h@l& without interest9 was certainly not obvious*- The ?
ing with the lsarb3? commander also followed according to .plans0 HQ again reported
ation,- mainly of'the strengthening &i@s between the 5eroah and Italian units
different versions about this business appeared - among many others, less signifi^
ant --to be most interesting,, On- concerned .the report thai the"Duee'was held ia
allegedly ^ery sick for quite so'ae time already and yras to be found
Santa Maria,' a small village abut'l^ fca south fro^n Palau on Palau01bia
The. th'trd and most probable report stated that Mussolini was bein^ held
in the area very aear the city of Kaddalena in a villa, under endurable''~circum
diplomat who was supposed to have married an Kn<?lish wo-nan - or the other
any r@@onnaisas@ thereo For the @eond reports spoke the fact that
9 so by the -leraan
9 with an attack
took the last ''reports' as more' truly realistic and didn*t concern myself
and took th sara photography by boat .from the villa ia ?4addalenao This' asle-v
'e in'order to avoid being-conspicuouso.. It was therefore agreed upon with the
the harbor commander and9- in order-'to exclude'any suspicion and establish * liaison.
ttith the eivilia population, was dressed iu the uniform of a simple, bluejackete
-located, %h adjacent buildings0 the guard squad, the strength and armament of
the latter- telephone communications etc o VJarger was also provided with suffi
cient mnY$ @igartt@ and alcohol to enable him to make contact with all'circles
of *the civilia-n population is inns and other pleasure spots'o He was to stimulate
the people there .throughial&s of Mussolini' death9 about whleh h@ had the' meat
positive information,.-; through eontradietions and through giving out tha news about
bear is mind th reports in reference'to Santa Maria and to learn any information
'about thi&o (Actual plaee of confinement was to b most welcome inforasation for
tli l@@ati@E and lauds there s@naed dowaright strident and appropriate
harbor comssanderi' I left 7/argr in Palau and returned to 'the" Vieno Fiorita
via a personnel arriero I had in mind to fly.in th same HIS 111 which
had'brought m to Sardinia9 froM there'to Corsica9 where I had agreed upon-a. meet
ing with the cominander of the SS Assault- Brigade0 fSGorsieatJ During the flight
'therip I intended-to fly'bver Maddalena and would try?, with ay Leica^ to talcs
photographs of the Villa and of the east in the neighboring region*. The aireraft
took off shortly after my"arrival at"the alrbase .and it took a'course to the north
over T^ddalena'o I had given Instructions'to fly ftt rather high altitude* Th
-Haddalena' seetor was also approacshed at about ^000 meterso ''% had9- however9 not
yet'reached the' island^ but were just a'little out'over 01bias when the radio
pe^at^ ga^@. sti@e of nmj aircraft'in the".vicinity Tha pilot seemed to want
ic5 tak@ iover in low pressure !u&@ as 1 enddaly becaaa^ awar that'the. aircraft
the handle'of 'the' aiiw&ft gmn when the. plane', hit hard in', the watero Through !
the'"$plintering of the gl^@@ turrets 'thm impact and the onrush'of ^at@r<, I lost
for. a few e@m!so One i the erew pulled m<& tfom th shattered
and we were able to get out of the water-filled aircraft tta>ugh the air
31
a few more"' secondo ' This made it possible for the the:? members of '
the @rw located in the rear compartments of the aircraft to'fe saileda They
| same'tirae I was able to salvage mj map equipment from the nose' isorapartiuent
I Shortly thereafter9 the HE 111 sank* The iif raft was further inflated and the
lon-swia.iiers were put into it Th rest of the crew and I remained swimming
the boato -.swa.ii toward a roeky reef<8O2e 500 at@rs away9 and 'we .reached
I it safelye I was the only one of the group who was injured, and at that only
| slightly*' It was the only case in a hundred where an lift 111 crashed into the
j sa without loss of aay of its erw Several hours later9 by-using a flare gun
| which-we had oil hand, we-were able to signal an Italian.wareraft which then
I took us to land9 toward.Glbia*. It was through this crash that my meeting with
I .sonnel carrier toward. Pulau again, made & long-distanc request of the ?$ritan
| harbor coa-'iandsr ~ to put some kind-of boat of a smaller type at. ay disposal for
the (grossing eould b@ undertaken* Sine the harbor barrier was normally
only <in.-daylight hour ~ and this was'an entirely Italian affair - the Italian
to gi@ sufficient reasons for the trip9 etc* Then @vea after
.cbuntersd difficulties-with the bloekade patrol boats e The exact same diffi
ulties confronted in when *ve tried to enter Bonifacio harboro Long after mid-
Bight we reached -Bosifacio barbor Fro.it there then'in the .arly corning. hoursy
I- was able to send qv first radio message to Fraseati, where T had been expected
t return bh aft@rp.v^an before. Thre -the aircraft had actually been reported
as overdue sines the flight crew hadn't been able, to .send a report yet After J
f? {
I Bom tiate spent in searching* I finally met the com-iiander of the Coraiea ' bri
They were to be ready i.i full combat equipment within two days iii the vicinity
f Bonifacio and &r@ io await further order there* A fer days later9 I was
again from Bastia air'bis hj an HB 111.to. Ciasapin airbase a@ar Frascatie Be~
few more definite final words with him, so. that with th@ instructions he coul
aircraft *' assumed -jhat the entire erw was lostq and'held private - conference
with individual < cor lenders and at the Corps headquarters -of the XI Air Corpse
Sine the event of an Italian break fr-.i the Axis circle was already foreseen as
-reparations for'fchis* and to follow through with parts of there This inf.or- j
ivas passe? on to. Ra&L in sueh a. for-a that he* in. ease I were lost in the
' " i
that Ied fly again to Sardinia within a few days and there, in "taddallena^v as in
Corsica, Id meet with the leaders of the military circles, just as soon as .ve
had definite new as to Mussolinis stopping place. General Student agreed, and
on 23S**3 2adl and I flew to Sardinia-Vieno Firorita and drove from there to
Palau in a cargo truck* In Palau the harbor commander and our assigned observers
Warger confirmed for us that in all probability Mussolini was still located
in this aforementioned vilLa6 He himself had seen him in the distance on the
balcony, since he recognized him from his stature and white uniform* Despite
his stopping place9 At the same time we were sure that this effective recon
naissance meant that we had definitely achieved this probability as to his loea
Also 9 the esouting trips with details of the local areas were well carried
decided then that the harbor commander, unless there was special approv
al 'longer be- instructed in. bur daily plans, while .Vargers who until
place of- the Duee@ would b@ completely informed <> Another round trip
ted' of the best, well-selected personnel For the most part they were eombat
informed of the operation on the very day of action, and above all, the
there was the possibility of s@me sorties taking place against the SS
aft artillery unit stationed on the southern tip of the island of Gor
the day before the operation by the high eosmnd itself. The de
.point0 it was already clear to ne that I would be able to take at the most
me
on 2*to8{t3.we ^ with General Student and
All technical aaval personnel were requested of and approved by the command
The 3 flack badges left Haddalena the day before X-day and made anchor in
Port Veeehio harbor .on Corsica Likewiset the day before X~&ay$ the 3 mine
sweepers entered Porto'Vecohig harbor. The 8O9O selected personnel.of the Cor
sica SS brigade wr@ billeted'.-on'.the flack barges o These sea had t go on board
in small.-groups and remained below deck until the actual beginning of the @per&
the 3 minesweepers during- the..night before- Xday The exact moment of the sail
ing'was given hj my adjutants who himself had hauled off the boat in Porto .
V@@@hi@ and brought it t Mad.daleaao The boats were yet t reach the Italian* " '
Italian harbor authorities earlier and justified the particularly important car
go of the crafts tor .Sardinia,, On this basis 0 the boats didn6t anchor in
justification for -the.'.r trip and the visit to th nearby Italians: training
trip On board these speedboats were the commander of the speedboat .division?.
carried special aiequa^e smoke and screen ammunition which were to be used for
By @arly dawa3s light on X-day (28,8#^3) at the e^act time previously set
(but I eanet recall :'.t at th moment) 9 all 9 boats9 ready for action^ left their
berths and prepared .or sailing, an action which the Italians themselves were not
The 3 'minesweepers lay at a .distance of some 80*1000 meters froa the coast
Bl'furnished 9 in emArgenuys fire protection with its 2era twin anti-aircraft can
nons aimed toward the barracks (described earlier) on the shore southwest of the
villa | (in Plan M-">/** showa ,-as qpot marke-d lfp) and controlled simultaneously the
bs-aeh &n& beach road to the left of the Barracks ft2 andRj took over fire -pro*
ing of fire was unobjectionable only against known enemy objects and only upon
fire18 order. c> J;fee C/a@d@r@ <Corve.fete Captain 5@JEUlg> on th' S3).
/ o
3-speedboats took their position as shown on map lfM3'* at Y-time 31 lay about I
, ' . : - . ' . i
200 meters, goj|y^he landing place and could hold out in case of eraer^ej|C^..with
I its own fire power in the danger areao In case S2 were put out of eonra&ib.&.,
| SI would take over its position* The 32, shortly after the Fl and F2 had landed
the troops (the landing could easily be accomplished due to the shallow con
struction there and the good fortune to find a suitable beach landing directly on
8ho'x*e)? would join one of the barges and from there take the liberated Duee on
boardo 'Here* too, the open fire order would be only on the order of the comao
dore* 5>o with the comno'dore,, is. to take position about 6OO8O@ meters from the
shore in'order to have the most favorable vieiv possible0 It is-also the thought
"Open fire'* order for this boat would first.be given by the Com-nodore if heavy
<gmbat were to t'a'^e place on land and even then only if the liberation action _y/e.xe
A small commando team of 3 men should, during the action, be put out from
the S3 on a rubber boat and as silently as possible and unnoticed aprroach the 3 f
The 3 flack barges** with the 3 squads of 9 men (approximately) below deck,
the prescribed spots The personnel leave the boats in groups 'and take the. desig
responsible for the carrying out of the orders. to the exact letter* he company
t each 3 squads0 each 9 uen in strength* Kach platoon is on a flack, barge and
light m&chihegunsv the' rest carry the 10-round automatic paratrooper fighter
weapo&o Two men of each squad are assigned as engineer demolition squads to
j, er&j technical sergeants and other NCp*s have- additional pistols0 Hteel helmets,
1 tion of which wasn't too familiar -to anyone^ since special a inanition of a slower
1 propellant charge is usede. . (At the time 'the 'excellent English silencer
I. map. M-3/% hj the letter K) 9 piit:'th garrison there out of action by making full
I BS @f the .surprise moment and disarm th@m At least 1 squad of this platoon is
up the hill t take a position above the' barracks^ and from there likewise.
streets t the west so that the villa' is well observed The squad has as
main.mission to eo^er.the 3 platoons going toward the villa, and at the same
Q if necessary to-screen "the left flank* This cover and screening. tiust be
xpeven after the successful completion of the .-main action* Only after
35
S2 takes off can the first platoon be brought back.
exactly designated position in a small inlet (se mp M-3A)o Exactly above the
2d platoon., and these will take up positions there A squad will give support to
the east, that ia0 toward th right flank side'of Maddalena Cityi the other squad
will tak a frontline position against the Villa, to give protection to the main
action frora the ast'* The 3d squad is regaining in action as an active reserve
for the eooi$aiiy coa-iander, to give protection for the eventual withdrawal and
pen under evasive. action of th hostilities * This open march, first of all,.is
to surprise the sentries &n& to as&ke it possible to achieve this close touch with*
out battlec Any further action &$&&e& on the situation at the moment and n
the reaction f the guard company* Our only goal is, as quickly as possible and
under evasive aetia -of hostilities, to .push forward to the captured Puce, with
th view toward reaching him still alive (we counted on the guard company having
the order to kill Mussolini in the event a successful attempt were made.- for his
landing f F2-is to destroy the telephone cables, which locations were definitely
known an, which led from the Villa to the city and the barrackSo
| are t provide protection for this boato Then 51, "2 arid S3 are to settle in a
Y-formation with "fastest boat in front" and start in the direction<of- the harbor
HI and H3 flank this formation, and R3 settles itseli as the rear pro-
with utmost speed without assoufiag. However,_ if any action occurs during the
sion* or if Italian flack action begins9 the raft are to lay a sHQke
Uo make sure-that the Ssarbor barriers are open, a separatev small operation
is Bet up9 which should bring us control' over the Italian patrol boato Some
Gferman sailors* speaking perfect Italian, stORe* ia a boat near the patrol craft
some time-before I-timc They appeared to be a group of drunken sailors, who had
the intent, to' celebrate further with'the few personnel aboard the Italian patrol
craft and-approached this patrol boato At a signal from speedboat S3, the con
trol f the patrol boat.would be taken over by the German sailors and the harbor
draw back'to Palais n the barge as soon after the completion f the mission as
The Gsraaa M battaliss in Falau received the order to make a small change
>@?iiin. From the new position, th Italian -A.A batteries on Maddaietta .and
.small island t the south,of it can some under direct fire* (See .Map M3)..
Italian battery can foe opened only if Italian artillery opens fire during the
mission on the S-boats, R-bbats'oi<AA barges. If the Italians open fire first9
then, on tb&G$rmB.n boats, when the latter have passed the harbor Barrd^, or are
passing through,, and are at a comparatively approximate distance where the smoke-
screening'of the boat is still to be considered, then only fire from the German
Should firing between the Italian and German AA open* then a German battery
is to put a known Italian radio station located on the hill of Maddalena Island
under fire and place it put of corm&ssion. (See Map H5) The AA battery of the
Corsica SS brigade is also on stand-by alert for X-day It has the special mis
sion of guarding the routes froa Bonifacio and the movements of the vessels from
there* Should the S- and ifcboats in any way become involved in a sea battle on
their way back r put under aerial attack* then the batteries of the AA battalion,
at a'given light signal from the S-boats, will open fire In case of attack by
aircraft9. fire is to be opened without any further signal, since the C>~ and *<
boats have only 2 twin AA guns available which are appropriate only for elose
coiabato This plan appeared strange to every normal line officer, even a sorae^
what careless :ne-c This held true above all for the plan to approach the Villa
in open approach marh9 Such special operations aren't calculated in the usual
all, the comjandtng officer of such an action, as each officer and NCO must be
in this situation, must seek to bring the situation to* an end as quick as lighte
ning and nitride If--be -responsible for ay changes in carrying out the plan*, Iroa
discipline and so If-control are necessary above all things, -.vhen, as in this in
stance, the individual order to q^en fire is. not to be given under any circu<3stan$
'?hon all these requirements are.'*3et one still needed so.ne ''G.I*"- luck ior
success of the operation*, without which success is at the best slightly diffi
cult to attain*,
Scjtiu'lZf General Student and myself0 3ev@ral suggestions were discussed,,, for
example9 oae was that the 3d platoon should wear English steel helmets -.vith their
Grerman uniform sines they were characteristic and conspicuous -in their shape.
we
The plan was approved in the proposed form by General Student, even to nam
ing 23 August 19*8-3 as Xday<> General Student again hinted to me at that time that
official denial,. in any cas@9 would surely t&&@ place if the operation nisearried
B t me and my adjutant the night bejfor Xday The situation was '
eal these days' about our report ver Mussolini's plaee -of confinement0 since
At this time9 besides General Student, Radl and. I?, there w@r only the Gerp
| the pian& The Germa naval control group in Italy, the Corsica SS brigade0- the
AA battalion on Corsica and those in Sardinia near Palau0 wre informed only that
@& only through d@finit@ preparations using special methodso X wa3. responsible:
for th joint*control of th operation0 and Corvattd Captain Schuls for all teeh
a . .
and that all \sas in readiness for actiono Likewise the AA battalion
. .
j om. Corsica was put a stand-by alert on 2?o8o^3 and reported combat'readiness
a ' .
I '
i orders w3?e pr^oaally brought v@rbally by my adjutant 1st Lt Radl9 who was to
| a@empaay th Fl ^nd th 1st p!at& in the action on land, and who was t direct
I boats9 together with Gowett Captain .Sehuls9 Radl and Lt Grinke0 with Haddalena
1 a the g@mlo The'3d speedboat'was already waiting ^ust utsid Maddalegiae Dur-
I ing the stormy crossings the additional details were discussed with Corvette Gap&
i|| aln Setmls*. Bue to th unexpected heavy str which b3?ught about the breakdown
I of an agin n the eeeond Sb@ate the crossing ^as delayed several hours* '$&
the Due himself on the terrace f the Villa and recognised him0 A double guard
of ar&bijaieri patrolled both day and night th roadway in front of the premises<
S uraly It was b^@sss t m that nly on of the ombafc seaplanes was anohored at
| the as a&l spot9 wfeil th@ S@MI coiibat es*&t and the rescue alsk.eraft
r
were
determined to 'carry out the personal* last reconnaissance *Je took off our
of officers rank and put on plain navy shirts I myself went with Lt s
aees of Fl f to find out the exaet particulars on the general terrain* and
to listen to th latest news from the native populace and the Italian
W&rger and I went right past the Villae where there was nothing eg
Only a new cable ^ a plain field telephone cable - which led into the house
had not been reported up to now was obvious to ae<> From the terras of the
neighboring house (shown.on map M3 by the letter MN") to which we were driven as
buyers for our boat, one had an excellent view over the premises of the
From a email hill directly behind the house0 one could see even better
into the garden and the Villa itselfo Terrace steps and walls, whose lo
already known, but which I actually noticed for the first tiaec
proTiised definite difficulties in case.of complications and any action But they
already considered' in the plan* t noticed that soldiers and guards were
the Duce, due to an illness which kept him bedridden for quite
5
sn t I03?: in being expressed* He related openly that he himself belonged to
guard 6ismp&ny and described in the smallest dot ail how they had escorted
ihl 'early this very morning from the Villa to the mooring place of the sea-
o' The' Due was then placed on the white air rescue plane 9 As previously
rraaged in a. meeting with the German harbor commander, Maddalena^ the take-off
consultation and eventually, either that same night or the next day*
mi&ing the first stage of th alert* Returning to the ship, uy adjutant was
the mission for the'time being - the double guard, too9 was to be sailed in
evening and were- t zaaic it appear to the Italian garrison that arrangements
re being made for a general- departure - although the S- and 'S-boats were to re
in readiness for several days*; The -tertian harbor comsander was to relay any
se' Radl and I fle:v back to 3OOLG on 23 39^-5 in an HE 111 which stood ready
After the return to Rome9 General Student was given.the report on all vents
and the preparation takea for'the action-on Maddalena .Lto Warger and Qrienke
and investigationso They w@re to inform the German harbor comsander in ease of
agreed upon way is @&@o- The situation in Rome in August was developing-more
more to the detriment'of conduct f German operationso Almost daily the IC9
XI Air Force, @ u M identify Italian troop relaforeeaentsv this being SoQ.oPo f@r
every'of ficer a-nd -''so Idler Ideated in the vieiaity of fcome to report on immediate
skirts and the nearby environ of the. city0 But even.in the remote outskirts
there were reports of..a gmiliar nature This took place at the same time as dis-
cushions over ih statement about ^aie as an "open city" reached its high point
B.@au R@m@ itself9 its railraods an'd apen & buildings- in the city were fre
quently bombed hy theATliea* the German high eomand agreed to decisr* Sora an
op@n city* From ih. on a combat elements were permitted in the township9 even
in t!t@@ areas occupied'by the German sideo Just as unf^v'orsJble as "this was th@
military situation of'the" German troops outside R&me% resulting; in the ever in
creas'ing streugt'i f the ''Italians The .Italian high eomaand justified these
collections bf troops with th@ military developments a the southern front and
with the resultant necessity* of prearranged and foreseen measures for the defense
of-the. Allies near.Somep H@w@ver9 this resulted in the billeting of troops and
beia^ made in eas of'a military "disagreement" with the Serma'n troopso 'Ahtitank
quipped with the a@e@s8ary weapon and ordnance^ items o . Their emplacement caused
mostly all of the arterial roads of Some as well as the auxiliary roads t be
that a complete. staggla@rationf? of German and Italian troops were joined, in.
net'of' traffic patrols .to" control all - even the German .- motor vehicles". Tnis
was o'$ive the Italians plainly accurate information concerning the strength of
part9" so'that there was '&-rather clear'picture by the I.C, of the 'proportionate.
I strength of Germ&a and Italian troops* On 25 August 19^5? too 9 all orspleliedl
description.p .which can only be briefly outlined here, seemed to confirm our
concept that Qiae wag jus;f:. getting ready for the Italian side to start arguing
with the <M:md^, l:-'QOVBo, who. had' to defend our. concept against the soon-tovtak:
place fall of the Italians free the Axis group and the end Of an" interim armistios
. , there were only some very small German craft available @ 'namely, ex
Germany to Italy, destined, for Rome9 where they hadn't y^t arrived* Their timely
arrival was scarcely considered* These craft of tbe. 3CJ Air'"Force were sufficient
prolong the 'expected-'fall of the Italians as' long as possible9 to at least soften
any direct compliance,.and thus to accomplish tho collapse which in'this" case was
to be hindered by completely cutting off the southern front from the northo "
Shortly after our return from iteddalena* we discovered that the nominal
Italian government had put forth definite ideas about Germany concerning an al-
ate ^ from the combined German troops and the Fascist ' ;
ircles gathered around the nvirons of Rome* Goal.of the action was to bring
Fascism back into, p@w@r again. Since we'had' heard similar indications, during the.
vening of 2?g8o^5 trip, to Maddale'nae we assumed that perhaps this .could possibly
be a cause for. the re.moviBii Of. Mussolini from Haddalenao Also to be 'can-sldered;
^as the possibility that the Puce was only being flown.:..for a medical consultation
and perhaps would b@ brbii^ht" bacjo^ a further hope for a'return to Maddalenab . Jffl
for'instance^ were the Badogli government to see that an action, which supposed
ly was upheld by it* not take., .place, then this would furnish thea with A basis
for concealing any plan, for taking Mussolini to.another place* Since our .prepa
rations ..for Maddalena were, known :to the Italians*,- they were co:ipletely excludedb
How far; these specific military preparations Of the XI Air ^oree would g@ in
the Italian, armed, f r@ &n& government posts, of . the .already' -mentioned eoinsidesssi
of-.the German 'and Italian intelligence chiefs meeting in Hotel Daniele in Vene
;
h<, a's- well as Admiral Canarisfl had at- that-, time fbrward
on
Italian action of 28,3 was not planned *
simaraK^KRssB^ajri
w@ were'supposed'to hear of. a report irom Hitl@r8 headquarters in th@ field con
cerning Mussolini's supposed location, whiefe was exactly opposite to our findings,
of Elba| the' name of this island has in the meantime slipped my memory and I can
not recall ite Siae this report was received a few days before 28 August, our
findings therefor had to b wrong Combined with the report was the order to
Hitlers headquarters when ready for astion in the shortest timo This meant,,
according to our views9 a definite jump into th unknown,, not counting the hoped-
field headquarters' and could ejepeet to be su&fflosed there at least on short not too
This order dld'eoiae ami w@ fie?/ on one f the last day in August, or on one of
the first September day - I can't recollect it anymore - to Hitler's field head-
I Marshall General Keitel; the 3ommander~n~Chie of the SJavy, Admiral of the Fleet
I 1 was requested' to give the report about our findings and investigations & I
I r@port@d in about a 'half-hour long speech on our work and had proof that Mussolini
| near Elba was without doubt either false information or a misunderstanding, and I
prayed 'for the revocation*of the rders in this eonnectioa^ After the end of ay
Hifcieif 'stood vp, shook my hand and said something to this effects "I'll
longer believe a Skorzeny. and . I tak back my promulgated order 'what sort of
''I' therefore explained the situation and the unified plan for Ma&dalena with
| the aid f a sketch Hitler said he agreedv directed the Admiral of the JJavy to
I pla@@ the @p@@dbit division at ray disposal, for this missionc and ordered action
1 the cir@umstaneaae The government of the Heich had to explain9 under the cir
I cumstane'es, that 1 had acted on my own respnsibilityo #ith this rather .unclear
I explanation," General Student and I left East Prussia and again returned to Roraeo
i (this ^as the eo^e' word' for Italy breaking away r*i the A.Kis alliaaae) were t
! '
I be completed with a l l speedQ since the @nt ft Attila TS could take placs any day*
IV "Gran Sass" \ ' '
Time< between "MaddaXena" and "Gran Sasso" (38o8 - 89<A3) O Further Recon=
headquarters took place@ this having been described in the previous sections
turn to Mad&alena and we had prepared for this event0 immediately after our r#
turn to Fraseati on 28 O 8 O ^3 on that very day, intensive pains were taken to find
we started the ss&eting and taxing small job9 the gathering of the least bit of
.$ven from troop identifications like the I.Co* would we get clues which could
tic sources 'These definite reports came from high posts in the governments from
| vi@w of the.-mentality f the Italians and their attitude toward war* t.o Fascism,,. '
% to Hussolini personally or'to Germany and the German Army in' Italye It was @x !
gee those in which the alleged source was based merely on a rumor9
thes reports dita9t correspond with the facts 0 Errors0 as well as known
controlling through Italian official posts o ' Nothing else remained than to put
to build something like a mosaic out of each group, from which9 then an
positions B.B to the probable location of Mussolini9 since in such a manner each
a trj small perBoaal group with whom w@ (even thoygh they wanted-to-know &@~
tails about us.and till sonldn't ask questions of us about our mission) assoei
who worlced for is ? in that they furnished us with all interesting news re
ports'^ without- actually knowing of th xast plan -in detailo However9 tjhey were
'connection*' with Mussolini himself and that because of this all tren the smallest
and simplest@ of reports that had any connection with this individual in any way,,
w@ wanted at our disposal* And so reports ov@r the last hours before Mussolini's
abdication^, as" well as reports on the Fascist Party and significant personalities
of the same,-, about the treatment and the location of Mussolini and about the
evaluated repeats* but pure, unbiased^ factual findings* These two individualsfl
on pi whom helng$. t@ the irele of the German embassy9 the other known t o n s
of. the German colony in 'Rome9 learned from UII that definite military
ans from. 6he kx&. - ia ^hich connection we were supposed, to have been-assigned*
Both ger.tlemsifc had a larg@ group of special acquaintances in Rom with whom they
offi@ie.ily and privately held very go@d and absolutely trustworthy relations*
Thus ttiey could advise us both as to what news to seise and forward as well ae t
possession of the first reports that dealt with the present probable location f
'Mussolini/ From 'the abundance f reports X picked out a few of them which 1
Reports' earn daily from Maddalena ~ reports which stated that 'lussolini
would rat be brought back* One report from a very reliable source stated that
' Hi>> permanent.* personal physician., 'i check this reportv w found a man from
tbd-German colony who al@ suffered from-a stomach disorder* He w@nt for a en~
''fultatiozi to the doctor in question and declared that he was mor@ disturbed than
v@r over his disorder sine he knew that the Duee's ailment had beeoae worse
and this caused him great concern In the course of his conversation with the
doctor5 this ' .German*) who k&ew the doctor personally, was to bring ut & through
clever ..means & i@a@ti@n from the doctor9 who .-certainly. muat. know MussoliniQs
state of hea'ith* This took place promptly* He brought us- confirmation that the
Dut*J state of ...health w^g definitely good at the rao&ent9 that a rect for a time
Another report brought the hope that Mussolini was to be found for a t.im
in the Villa Savoy''in '3oxaeo (The king at thistiiae was a& his summer location
while the' Crown Prince and his family lately were living, not in the Villa Savoy
but i the ^uirinal). ."e * Radl and I - went to the Villa lavoy. our
and found It not to be guarded, in any manner outsider & sign that it was
unoccupied at'the ia@at9 sine in-, ofther in$t.n&&& meaiberis of the king fs guard
our most trusted Men also entered the Villa and was definitely able to determine
| One rep%x*ts sine it earns from a man who was extraordinarily reliable, seemed
I onsisted in this - that th@ Duce was located at this time in a district south of
Perugia^Chieti line and no doubt south of Lake Trasimenero The man couldn't
Ghieti lin played an important role in connection with military security 'Ve
then thought that perhaps the man euli have mixed up Chieti with the city Chiusi*
a battalion of "M19 division was then .located there - the former bodyguard unit of
I Mussolinio So,-, w took it to mean that the report perhaps meant a location south
. ' - . !
the Perugia-Chiusi line, a location ^hieh also connected with Lake Trasimenero i
we further assumed,, Mussolini was already taken away in a seaplane and was
land either la the wat@r near the seacoast or. on a lakeo Our' man set out to :
.e:nt-in. which two high Italian officers * I believe there was a Colonel and a Lt<
olbnel - were seriously'injured^. Both were police authorities* The Colonel died
hortly after the accident, Through closer examination it turned out that both..
I C ' . I
i| ^h circle- of' acquaintances' of : pur man from the embassy, a visit was ?sade to the
| ft the two 'i?ra aud p@rhap also to find out the purpose of their duty travel*
t> .Even (before our agent had returned with the results of this visit9 we r=>
:
j @@iv@d a radi message which me through the Department of the Interior* This
] message, which definitely was issued bj the Minister of the Interior9 announced
by a man aa.m@a Cueli*-reported that security measures in the Gran Sasso area had
partment ' of .the Interior for Mussolinis'safetyo He. held the rank of a Brigadier
General This radio message supposedly was delivered in Isolae Isola is .a small
The outcome of the questioning of the' seriously injured officer revaale.d tha
men were'n duty travel from 'Aquila t Chieti and Home (or on the return
1 jiarny -'I canst 'remember exactly-any .aore). /The city of Chieti appeared now
f dealt with definite identification' of the bearer of the reports Oio? assumption
I that he was mistaken and aeazrfc Ghiusi was w o n g and also, as it turned out later,
I &w? BLBBumptton that Mussolini had land@d on .Lake. Trasimener was a false con-
I'-nearby region of the Italian Gran ^asso. The town .of Isola seemed .to be of par-<
^W-^^^
point f the. TBY trip -of both officers connected with the'escort detachment of
perhaps for. the d@ey plasic> "Attllao1* Tfe man drove off in an Italian per-
the same day, an Italian-who spoke perfect Geraas was sent'to Aqul'la and
Tills supposedly was a family from 'Some, who had-fled .to Assergi because of the
was/to send a message to the Rossi family - HtQ Rossi was to return to :
also the Rossi daughter was"to be given a personal letter from me -. whreby
3ssi family0 for whom the man searched, was -no longer there, we concluded
| than t TOakn the-unfavorable impression which could result from., the non-fulfill<
i - -
| exercises were taking plae@c thr were, till n hand in the vicinity sotae Itall
| .an troop .unlt8e' Even'in .the higher located parts of AbKu^zj.. such .events weren*t
|.-reportedb Only a foot path ^rhich was very difficult to tracers led to the
i The courier^ srlio-had returned from Aquila .and Assergi reported that he had not
|. found a family..named Rossi in /Issergi - that in the last few months no.one fr&m
| . . . "
I the vicinity'of. Do.se, had-arrived there0 But @serthless h did ha^e some other
| perhaps tr>j sigaifiean^^ information t gi^e,, The^e wer very .nany carabinieri
| billeted in the -Immediate vicinity of Assergio Some Italiasi divisions were lo-
J atea ia the region of Aquila itself.. Th@r@ iyer@ very strong traffic controls
% - '
| led-to Assergi, near the town of Ortes Basean9 a barrier was 'erectedq -at which
I In @iilian eircles they pk about the fact that' Mussolini was located in the.
| neighborhood| the eis&sfc plae euldn9t be revealed, although m&ny people were of
I the piai@n that he was ia the area of the Italian Graa Sasso and specifically
j in the big.winter sports hot@l9 "O&mp lisperatore" (named after the famoua skiing!
j area of the sasi naa@ aad upon which - the .hote'l was built )
as?aijri b e
intensifieda Above all, naturally9 the reconnaissance work of the Gran Sasso
and the surrounding area had priority* Nevertheless, all other reports still
eame to us and. were carefully tested and followed up0 Yet the other reports
interesting report from .the labor groups,, the trade union groups, that all kit
chen and hotel employees of the Canpo Xmperatore Hotel on Gran Sasso had been
dismissed,. They had h@n sent home without any further reason* Therefore9 the
rumored ^xpres^ion was tied to this, that Mussolini was quartered in this hotel
now9 and in contrast- to such service, this Fascist couldn't possibly foe located
there Another report stated that &h cable railway up the Gran Sasso was stop
pedo Only some Italian police9 and only those belonging to a special unit dared
to use the cable railway9 th@ running of it. was kept up by the police, and
also'began to carefully gather data for an eventual sortie on Gran Sass< Hext '
Aforussi and especially the area of the Gran Sassoa It turned out that in all i
of Rome @wu from the smallest suburban bookstores' all map material had dia> :
appearedo I* was evn explained that these maps were not to be obtained any~
whe're. Evidently, a confiscation of .this map material had been conducted by the
Ministry .of the Interior9 but. at least a rather adequate sales restriction with
an implicit ly heavy duty had been proclaimed Our next attempt was to procure
tourist @&3>s and, traveling guides mainly in sports stores The Italian police
had thought ahead even in this field The. same failure was encountered when we. ;
tried t get advertising booklets and hotel-prospect! from travel bureaus and
travel associations n the- Aquila region, and Gran Sasso Then a requisition for
muh prospect! was suecessful when I requested it of the Central Europe Travel ;
Ia it (the prospectus) were all the details about the. Camp laperatore Hotel and
even had an xact pistur f !t 9 as well as! some pictures of the skiing area9
Gamp Xaper<itore Drawn-to-scale cutouts of the topographic maps were not there9
Too, .the fsw photographic pictures showed a snow scene of about 2-3 meters snow
fall and. vjgrnst at all suitable for. our purpose .in aid-sumiier, since terrain
rder to obtain more details on the Gran Sasso region after additional useless-.. !
sity f *!Otte,. a geographic and geological work on the Abruzziso. But even this
Aft attempt, to @btais aerial photographs.'of the German Air Foree was also
out any more aerial photography flights over the Gran $asso (For alternate plan
'A^tila", there was finally carried out a onetime aerial photography flight over
den't^,. at that moment a cloud hovered over the uirinalQ so that the J.uiri
:.te aerial photography flight was set tor ? September ^ 5 * Xn those days, w
with the problem of Mussolini9s captivity and.who had the intention of freeing
hiffio (See Part IXX2O) I myself had a discussion with so'-ne of these officers in
I '
JOUTFknowledge -of thai? plan and our enta.cts9 which influenced them*, we eould
I neutral is any &@tin a their part Cur knowledgec. through conversation $?ifeh I
i . . ' I
?
them* clearly showed.that they had absolutely no hypotheses for the ae<3.npli@fe
sent of their plan - thes* than their good intentions for it. Thirdlye we intend-;
.' - . ''' - 1
relaaa attempte Tteis -wodld --fore the surprise moraente, put the. Italian-guards im |
doubt'and In the" dark0 if they were personally to see Italian @fi<e@rs in uni<ori
in iToxit :of th^m and were to-'hear .them converse with thea&.iii their owsi Italian
pf
language = particularly if'in GGlo" language An agreement was made - that this
gr-^p-po through am@ complicated way9. would a@t..passively between Germany and Italy
&& lake; Brae las o There-were" mixed Italian-^ernian. seaplanes ther60 The
^aaa airfield eomraand@r meatioaed.3 " during ^^s eon^rsatiGas9 that the ^e
fThis tsok plaee 'for the'first'tlane on 27o8ov. sinee-at the time of sin aerial alert
1 all'"Ges:; mh troops--of the airfield so implement were la trie under ground -shelters and
;
;j as -sstablis-h'ed' by the. a i r f i e l d corriiianderB no^ t.uafc 1 tl.ii.a. t back on it'V could per- |
| haps DB connected." ;vith .the bringing of Mus3iiai;'frrfi Haddalena *: Tho--officer-tan
'I further related t h a t ' a t t l ie'end " of t:iis alert.*.aa I t a l i a n riea-^rdscue plane as in
if the -harbor1, Wiich'hadn't bsen noticed - before . Upon ay question as to-virhether or
;| . . , * , '
i mot ha; fead heard, rmraorwis about thi sea-^reseue plane 9 the of f ieer replied that |
;i osatM.ag had beeii' said about i t 9' that Miisselini had arrived ' n ito Junior also !
thad i'fe., s'saiid I t a l i a n ' s o l d i e r s 9 that -this : usrson (Mussolini) ??as saen debsrkiji?? I
J
i] ' ' . ' . " : ' I
jaffcer the ^ea landing of t h i s airc?aft and-thsa was taken a^ray in aja ambulaaeso J
:
i ' "' - ' ' - !
j] Tha Italian had also giB the a e r i a l a l e r t zlgnal bj sedeo' T@ the questioii^ wiiv|
1 had he &t reported-this9'th'ffi@e.? answered that these fasts seemed i n s i g n i f i - |
leant to -Bisu FF the pMFps of ^.r in^estig;aition9 a report in t h i s connection
H 7563 ^8
would have been immensely significant, foj* at that time we could Have followed up
on this clue and would not have had to go off to another spot in useless inquiry
1 ("wild goose chase o ") Besides, this report again confirmed our assumption tiat
1 Mussolini's airplane had landed on Lake Trasimeno - in connection with the first
I ation in and around Horse developed more and more at this time in our disfavor
araong the tfoman civilian population. The airfields in the vicinity of Some were
constantly under attack* In the city limits of Rome itself, ever*increasing and
stronger night street controls were carried out. After nightfall, cars were not
consisted oi 3-10 men who also used firearms if cars didn't stop immediately on
1 call. Thus - still in August - the wiie of the Turkish ambassador, who failed
I ' - '
J to stop when she-.did, not hear the order - as she was returning home at nightfall
place on the GracSasso* then fchese facts i-juatt mentioned convinced us and .focused
our attention completely in planning :&n, action in tiis area. I)ue to the impossi
harmless :nountaifl clinbing group up the highest mountain peak of the \bbruz25i
mountain climbera -fe were nevertheless warned at the right time, through a
directive, that at this time of the year no one undertook a mountain trip in this
area and those who did had t be prepared for arrest when they arrived at this
high Alpine area* So this plan, top, had to be dropped* A member of th# Gerrsan
the Gran Sass and Caapo.-Imperatore, since he had once been skiing there9 but
f the soil through several meters of layers of snow and the problem of the con~
dition of the ground in summer when it was completely free of-snow. Another
completely unsolved * question, was .that, of'nihe ^rarm, air .currents n .this area* ones
A After; the .preliminary, discussions |o^.:,a '*<>ran Sasso" Plan among General Stu
dent, Kadi and myself9 the following was clearly decided: A grand operation,
approaching from tfee valley% was hopeless from either side, since a surprise ap
proach because of the terrain and the supposed security measures0 seemed out of
the question, Th@ only approach way, then* was from the air; Tiis was possible
first method ..seemed to offer us- the most successv since ah almost vertical land
ing with slow landing speed..- and this in a very restricted area - and a similar
take-off were possible because- pf the difficult and unfamiliar terrain. General
Student then sent some..of .his General Staff officers to Germany with the
k9
usage of the same in high mount&inous areaso The result was negative - bringing
the machines her from Erfurt was supposedly not possible! besides0 they hadn't
yet b@& tested conclusively for a mountain operation* So there remained now
only the two other possibilities* A decision would be made shortly before the
twit would eventually have to b quickly available , I transferred the unit, which
because of low supplies was about 50 men in strength , from the Fratica di Mare
airfield, #her it haS'beon located since 280809 directly to Fraseati* f'ais tools
flight over the Gr&B ftasso was planned for 8 aofflo, since the TO of XI Air v orce
was to be carried cut together with Radl and me* The takeoff had to be post
poned at the last moment^ however, since there was no photo aircraft available
equipped With an aerial eamersu This presumably had to be brought first from
southern *rkne@o The? flight was therefore postponed for one day o
officer, 'a'1st Lt* in the Medical Corps, without bringing hia in on the secrete,
to th@ Gtein Basso II also had orders to drive to Assergl9 and from there to
ta:te tb* cable ear up to the Oran Sasso Up there, h was to put in at the Caapo
Iaper9 4ore Hotel and demand a consultation with the Italian medical officer on
duty* (It sheuld ^@ noted here that shortly before0 even before Mussolini had
been brou.^kt up the <5ran < Sasso, Italian convalescent oldiers could be found re-*
ihm* that he eame on a mission from the Commanding Generals of the XI Air Force
This Would be profitable not only in the sense of aiding the soldiers
It Was impressed upon the doctor that he was to eeek9 at all events^ per-
lor his own admission to the hotel and wasnt to let any pretense prevent
him from getting no In case the cable car wasn't in bperation for some reason
or-othero he Was to atte.npt,.at all events, to telephone the doctor at the Camp
Imperatore"' Hotel
Otar assumption wasfl then9 tfiat the doctor probably wouldn't reach the hotel*
However, he was to' bring us definite information about this; wiiy and in *hat
he was turned back, and probably could ven bring us reports as to what h events
ually would observe and hear durin-; th trip in the vicinity of Asser<gi* Perhaps
If the doctor was actually able to get into the hotel, this would be a clear
that Mussolini was not, on th ^raa '5A-SSO and eventually it would follow that
recuperation<> The doctor's departure was to take place very early in the morning
of 8o9o Since the outcome of his trip would have to be known in a conference in
Rom, it w||^|^*'ed that the doctor, upon, his return from AsBergi,V!ra|||^,meet ma
"Radl and I were to accomplish the aerial photography flight with the IC that
1. 8 September-.'1943.' -.
8.9<A5'.'we took off from the Iratica die :iare airfield with an
suf 1'1'cien.t detailed photographs @f the cableway from Assergi up the Gran
Sasso,: .as well as'of the mountain station, the hotel and the very close surround
ing apa<, The decision, -then', .if a par a troop assault was possible or if only a'
I obtain, through ..special technical facilities, plastic pictures with very exact
I vert-ic'al off slats The aircraft was I to be brought that evening from Nancy,
| samera unfortunately wasnet functioning. -Se here explained the handling of the
Sj hand c&nera'. This had tofoeused in such a.way that'we couldn't be observed
I ing photographse~ That is, we didn't dar ake the shots from the tail-gun
f
s turret but froaa the opened entry hatch at the bottom of the
And thus it was that one of us two had to lay on the floor to take pie-
from "the plane with, the hand camera,' while the other had to hold his legs
| to. prevent 'the'former fr@m slipping out." The IC then climbed into the nos
!
I i ..- . . .
and read through our instructions quickly* It was noticed here that we
completely blameless for any aerial photographs which, because of our handi~
| cap due t the danger of inexperience, would be useless,. -The flight crew of the
j plan v'ere to'have n knowledge of the real plan of our photographic mission..
| The plane kept exactly on course' and maintained cruising altitude* The pri
I-oh the Adriatic Therefore we flew at a'height of 5000 msters from Fratica di@
J-
.: Kare on a eours over Pescara-Anc@naRiaini almost to 3avenna0 From there, th
|: sdme stretch- back t Peseara-Pr&tiea. -In both'courses, the flight plan was so
but' that it took .us. exactly over the top'of the Italian Gran S'assoe Sino
uniforms, 'we Cladl and I) "'had to'--tolerate''the* cold.''Since* it was still morn
ing,'at this height the reading was'several degrees below freezing point, the re
wind was more than 300 kmh9 and the truth of the matter was that #e had to
it pen bubble with bare arms out- in the pen* On the flight up<,
the pictures, with '^iadl holdin'g", and on the return'flight 'fiadl did the
Gran Sas@ mountain range showed'us a grandiose, deeply fissured rocky terrain
eousitle^g high peaks, deep valleys and filled with ravines* Even at the
51
first glance of the high,, mountainous t^Tain with sharp and steep, rocky cliffs
we knew that there i?as no question of the possibility of a parachute jump opera
tion here* But all these considerations were eliminated when we flew directly
over the Campo Imperat.ore Hotelo 'He attempted to take as many shots as possible
with the hand camera ia the hope that we could possibly use some of theme *ie
s
dida t have.auch confidence in our technical knowledge in this area The .flight
took place during the best flying weather and in an absolutely cloudless, and mist
free sky0 the sight of which was excellent Something which' couldn't be known I
from this great height was the difference in elevation,. The difficulty of the I
&ra0 because of the steep rocks and the deep ravines was easily recognized^ but
could not be cjosely evaluatedo As far as we could observe <, the 'Hotel seemed to
he located on a hilly plateau* The green surface - as'well as the? Alpine meadow
soil - seesiei almost.to melt right into the area'surrounding the hotel like a
surfaeo (it was somewhat in a trapezoid shape with small buildings dotted here
l r
and tber^o #e assumed that it actually was an Alpine meadow, as ifc_ddn.._t create
an iaprission that the surface could be very steepe In g@n@ral9 our observation
f . The flight there and back went smoothly and toward noon we again reached the
I open sem by Praties die (fare* As we looked in the direction of Frascati while we
''mmlanding9 we saw countless huge billows of smoke rising thereo Shortly before0
the small city had been under heavy bombing attack by the Allied Air Forcesa The
sight from th Pratica airfield already showed that very heavy damages must have
General of the 2d 4ir Division and the XI.Air Force were located there9 we had
actually anticipated this attack for quite some time 0 Our immediate concern was
applied now to -the members of my unit9. who were protecting our living e.nd office
quarters, as well s to both officers- whose reeall from Maddale-na was momentarily
expected-.todays and the orders which awaited us at our quarters in the Villa
Tuculum II a Besidesfl of course9 our concern for our official and private belong
ings , writing materials, maps and documentsQ In addition, we wer also worried
about the other surrenders and the danger which arose through the fall of the
military governmento Just then the situation in the-south -_landing of the Allies
on the mainland and the imminently beginning offensive was ^ery troublesome0
A <e&3? brought u close to Frascati and on the route we met .nany bewildered
and even soue.wounded fugitives of the Italian civilian population In the vil
lages near Frascati, the town of.Grotta Ferrata was particularly heavily bombedo
Frora there on in 9 auto travel was no longer possible T-is streets were almost
torn up 9 and collapsed h o w e s and trees as .well as bomb craters blocked all ap~ .
proachese After we had covered tho distance to Tusculum II hy foot0 we found only
j a couple of walls of it left tandizigo The Villa had received 3 direct bomb hits,
since'it was perilous and endangered life* The b.crabing was so severe tiiat in
several places even the landscape itself was changedo At the entrance to the
garden of Hilla Tuseulum, we met one of our officers who was in the Villa during
th attack*. As though by a miracle, no one inside was injured,, Ale, the two
officers hsNJ|iiiirn@d from Maddalena but nothing further had been heai*i|Mf them
since the time -of the attack on the city* Shortly afterwards, larger returned and
informed'us'that Lt, Grienke had been buried alive by one of the f.filing bo-nbe in
tal. I looked for him there. - h@ was seriously injured and was quickly, taken by
ambulance to.3bae He died there during the next day* Te immediately be.gan. sal
vaging our buried things.from Villa Tuseulum, and tried to get everything.out of
cated at Villa Pusmet, where the officers' quarters for the General Staff of the
'XI Aif Torse was located*, There were comparatively few military .offices destroyed
-there9 The signal communications had suffered heavy damages9. although relief had
Air Force had suffered no dajaage whatever I informed the Commanding General
heavlly'boobed and therefore our aerial photos could not be developed there,,
It was, feTO@r9 possible to take the photographs to one of the nearby located
a delay of a whole day, In 'ray report/I described to. General Student our obser>
plati in the next few hours before evening and to present it to him then* In any
ias@^ General Student would order, the procurement of-the troop-earrying gliders
of theDFS-23O'fcype and their transport from southern France, The order to south
ern France ^as to be put ut immediately after the rev-air o the communications
first, the e'ffect of .the- reco'ni.a. Jssauce of the medical officer ilst Lto), and
officers, in order to-.be able to take along a unit. of Italians in. uniform on this
operation. Hadl and I ..therefore went to 3ome late in the afternoono An eventaal
meeting with the Air Fore doctor in a house in Rome was agreed-upon, or at least
t leave behind for-us the rosulta of his services* While on the road to 3ome,
it was already obvious to us that all completed and armed posts of the Italians
were werj busy* Pack and ordnance artillery seemed to be in aetioiio vven the
ifehiele control was stricter - German vehicle with transportation orders couldn't
g any further0 The overall impression was that all the Italians had dedicated
I wante'd oalj with one of our'informants9 t look for one 1* the th@r of
the'Italian officer group in:his hoae 1 intended to take one .of the most
:-snaaE3Bi:.o
e ;
Mussolini s stopping place". " T wanted to make it clear t hiss that it had been
provided in-our plan to take in ..with us one. or more Italian officers who9 if pos
sible, would be f the higher gradeso- These were, at the approach of an Italian
security guard or else at any meeting with any ..kind of Italian soldiers who flight
question them, "to give an exact, fixed.reply. In this:way,- the Italian soldiers
sible later/date or''tine, that is, to a time when the'actual purrose eventually
were .to b@ .fcriown.. Unfortunately, our search was fruitless, the homes of those .
.concerned were cut- off and no-one could get to them* 1st V U 3adl took off to a
get aome- netfa of meeting the doctor. The latter,' however, had still not arrived
at the agree/ifcupoh place* After I. had waited for him for about an hour0 I went
to the restaurant where Hadl was waiting for rae0 Even during our meeting, in Rome,
and later etn more @ we -encountered heavy pedestrian traffic in the streets and
in the plafcad' of-Some* A general nervousness seemed to have grasped the people
JPhere was particular activity on Via emeto in and btwe@n the e@e@ houses , the
embasay, I learned that at 1900 hour the Italian radio would release an important
to listen to1 the radio announcement - and-observed the populace was quit
excited. Many troops were milling around on the streets, people were embracing
bable picture. .Amid all..th noise and screams there was alwaya one phrase heardV
?
Arai@ii<B@! the war is over!'8 FTOIE aome'polioe, we got an anawer .to our_ ques
tion, that the Italian had signed an armistice with "the Allies* Detailed parti
culars were.not available*:. My adjutant, who had heard the news, given directly
cided t leave, oiae immediately after the meal, since very shortly we'd have to
reckon with the military personnel who perhaps.would, be withdrawing .from aome.
It was just at'aunset. By going down some quiiefc side streets - we had acquired
a very escaet knowledge of the street layout f Rome - we left the heart of the
the ^i^inity of'.Give Citta* Although we could have been held there on some pre
'text, juat then.at this spot, pack, artillery, tank, eto. ware, getting-ready
ault, til entir German regine in Italy waa coaipletelj cut off from "all signal
oonaunicatibna with Germany and the 3uthera fronto 3 hadn't even contemplated
5k
tim@ o Such a concentration of high ranking officials and practically all of their
combined signals equipment and facilities could not have been unknown to the enemy
and had to^obrput to the test some day by these enemies? who could put^mWt- of it
la Fraseati, there was a great deal of activity going on aaong the various
German.command posts in preparation for action* Phase "Attila'' had begun* How
ever, certainly not according to the plan prepared by tho high com-nand since the
n& of July* Preparations for phase "Attila" were so made that the German high
command, shortly before the actual fall of the Italians,-could take the initia
Secret Serviee. The unfortunate role played by the most important of these ser
vices . !*<, the Office of Foreign Counterintelligence, has already been des
views existed about the political situation and of any further development in ItaJ
is that neither timely.nor- appropriate directives were put out by the German
high eora&aiid in .Italy*- .So. too, did they overlook th Italian initiative, v/hich
naturally was a serious drawback to the German military command* The German eoa
aaad had at .the -onset only a few hours to wait to diagnose the situation and re
cognise.any further intentions of the Italians, and could .handle these accordingly*
First of all.- they also had to .see how they could bring about negotiations
for surrender and disarmament for the Italian troops located in the immodiate
vicinity This.'then..made it clear to the German 'hi?h coatiand that first of all
awaited only the nesst step of-. the Italians after the armistice on that would be
Armj was-the order.-.of .the momento A'e could possibly expect* too. in perhaps only
a. few instances* an ath of- loyalty from various Italian units,' who actually wer
however Some.would, have, to com into German hands sins this concerned th vital
question of German suppliea and other rearward connections Also, the chief Army
called "Arabian Legion*f( These soldiers made an excellent impression zn& in cas
fre suitable. e@@OTity. measures were ordered ia effect immediately* Du'ring' that
Air Free, wh@ were-sent t this unit, obtained the surrender and disarming of
Legion*". In this way, the imne'diate ' critical point for Frascati
and Gerrans was such, that so.netliisig like t^o German par.atroop divisions, which
Pratiea di Mare airfield and Ostia, optosed at' least 5~6 Italian divisions of war
strength in Rome and in the in-nediate vicinity Due to the general development
and my small unit were transferred directly to Frascati* By chance, I had my unit
again but of the city On 7 Septembers raoving it. to a small wooded area on the
'southeastern shores of tlie Albanian Sea Their former quartering area, in the
garden of Villa Borghese9 was very heavily bombedo Liaison.with the command head
quarters there and with the paratroopers located at Pratica di Mare and Ostia was
not disturbed during the latest developments since no Italian troops of any kind
were deployed along the routes over Albano-So Faloaba toward Pratica9 so they
sion were located in the '''Albano-Ariccia area therefore,, these routes were also
not to be atL
fhe next step'-of-the-German high conun&nd was the disarming, also,-of the
Italian units is the'nearby environs., Jith the disarming of the parts .of the
jmeace "the disarming action on' the morning f 99>*tft &&y resistance to. be broken
forceo in the framework-of this action, a*y co$-*and, too, was to be. em-
'-wasn't, possible, these were at least to render uselsss the normal functioning and
giving of. ooanands of the Italian high command through this surprise attack.
The German paratroop units located in southern part of Rome, in the Pratica
and Ostia'area, were to engage Any nearby located Italian troops-in combat <, so
that th connecting routes.to Iraseati could be kept open Besides, the Pratiea
di Mare airfield was t fee protected against any action whatsoever Cia-apin
airfield was definitely in dermaa handso These, however^ had nothing to do with
the plans and measures which were ta!<ten by command headquarters .of the XI Air
Force and with ay activity, other than the small part takea ia the- framework of
At night, I want- to my small unit 'to give them approximate instructions for
the next day's action-and to inform them'of the tactical reason for th i:saediJftte
action itself-to be'taken under the paratroop instruction battaliono 1st I*t
long aotor column, &lso various other official Ser'iian.-higli officials came, from
Frascati and passed through the area* They reported on the situation in $oae
Evidently the .Italian government .was absolutely master of the situation in floae.
H 7563
In any event, that night the doctor who had been sent to Assergi reached
Frascatio le reported that unfortunately he had had no success with his mission.
Camp tmperatore Hotel To be sure, though, he probably had some sensational ne.vs
to bring us 0 He had heard from the circle of the Italian civilian population, thai
Mussolini was located & the Gran Sasso? all signs - which already were known to
9 was -one more stone in &r mosaic, although we still didn't have, the much-
During that same night, both our informants also arrived in Fraseati from
They were led to our quarters, .'iith them came a nan of our Itallian offi
that there stood,.directly in front of the valley station of the cable railway, an
Italian police-radio; ca.ro This also was confirmed through questioning of our head
physician (1st Lto). Opportunity for sleep this night wasn't afforded any of us;
That same evening, it also became clear that now.at least for the next 2 to
3 days, our r@al galQ that of'/freeing the Duoe9 must be postponed^ at least until
the military situation became so clear and the initiative of the German troops s
to eoapile this oefntr ibu';on to. the ..History of world iVar II, we weren't quite
sure of the setesit of.the finished worfe, as are had .never written a work of this
sort*. .Besides, *e had n pp@rtunitj to speak with other -Crerzaaa officers who up
.to: this time had already been wor.king tor . two years on''the compilation of the war
and .who eoulu give us advice and any f-uiowledge At their disposal. Addi=?
were really qu;e inadequate* There still remained.the possibility that the;..other
g@ntlmn ir. Keust&dt, whq..always mutually consulted each other, would help pro*
duc@ a very broad work basis .'Ve ask only that all these circumstances be taken
int '.conr iteration when evaluation is made of this effort a There wasn't availab
t@ UB &'/iih@r a war diary (intelligence log)'of the German high eoamand, nor per
photostats, .nor some e@rt f report r order at &nat une@rtair& time The only
pr>f was our m&morj This ai@mry was, and has been at American hands for &k
yr-trs,--i.n part under strict confinement and undeserving treatinent, and jgeVerely
:S10M? -FfUCOM for the excellent treatment we received for the time
are have Been under their protection and still are* The accommodations, particu
larly, including messing and personal treatment, are without, doubt superior and
any. rate long periods have flown by-since 19^3 and strong memory gaps have been
filled in.by the events of the last few years* But we have done oiir utmost to
reconstruct each individual detail as exactly as possible*- 1st Tjte Sioraeny him
self has been. hindered 'from working on ...this for quite some time now due. to a
S&ss of Italy at ur disposal* All of this has essentially delayed the progress
of this work* Thrcugh lack of the *ie-Ationed resords? there arises a definite in
This is. als th explanation as to ^riy the foregoing taslc isn*t a finished
work but only a rongk draft It'was planned li.e'that hj us and was in reality
drawn up first t establish our documentary proof for the final drafto There
fore, th foregoing work is also written "in the first person* (fff-IfS and."we" fon
H.7565
It was our purpose to write the final draft in pure, unbiased descriptions, evad
of th work at Che HISTORICAL .DIVISION Ve would pay any price if we could possi
bly obtain9 through EUC/Jtf HEAD#JA3TFRS, permission to carry out this work to the
@n& o.urs.elvffSo v@ were always accustomed to working only according to the exact
since it deals with a contribution to an historical work which nust'. exist perma
nently as a history for the'cooing generations,, a'e are well acquainted with the
during the time, at @ur disposal and with the means placed at- our disposal*
e&eh #ord precisely'and appropriately" Certain expressions and words can be-made
undrstandable only through the .aost exact, translation* IIere9 too^ is the fact
draft9 to make changes relating to style and to raak& shorter sentences (for
still bel'isT '# have sufficient knowledge of it to judge a true-- and accurate
translation and so to recognise any subsequent -errors which arise through, -false
opinion "and our remarks before"* the final .'work is turned over to the archives of
^at9 at'home eV ?/e'are interested solely and only in a correct and exact present*
To @nslud the''foreword9 we. dare 'to .coae up with 'so'me explanations whieh
This'work'jras tp-. have, been completed exclusively for the-War; Department tor
the purpose of study and for research in connection with "?rl& -Var IIo Special
parts :- at the discretion .of .-the U 0 C. "ar I)apartment we're'to be used later fof
both authors uni that any'copyrights were explicitly reserved for theeu Any
v7ar Department itself), any elaboration .for radio or iilzs,, would eease with
our explicit agreement*. This applied to the completed .vjork as well as to any part
km a result of the armistice between the Italians and the Allies, Italy was
n longer an ally'of the AXQ0 . The' to-be-disarmed Italian army was9 since .it
didn't lay d o m arms willingly* considered as an enemy force* The plan for action
could also be Annulled since-.it could be charged to enemy resistance* This opened
through Plan Maddalenao .On..the other side it -indicated a complication which dust
be taken into.consideration which would result in a very hasty opening - of fire and
with it losses on ur sid.0 The necessity i&r a surprise content also remained9
only .the basis for this was in the Maddalena Plan tatting into neesssary consider
at ion the A&is alliance and the avoiding of higher casualties in.' the Gran
tion as to. Mussolinifs-stopping place on the Gran Sassoo For ourselves9 however,
it was l@a'r that Mussolini himself - at least on 89^3 -was located at Campo
indicated a pledge for the.granting of. the armistice0 It was also-with a greater
by a part -of the Italian Armya..t0 bring Mussolini away from Gran S&sso, or at
least .to protect the resting place,, as-.strongly as possible* loweYe-r^- final set
tlement of the"disarmament action in the iteme sector wasnut reckoned with in the
The- action ordered .for-9*9''+3 .in the towns.of the Albanian Mountains went
according to piano Only-in' a ver.y i'ew of the towns was there any Italian resist
ance earrie'a out9 resistance - which':could'be quickly broken down through the
special' parachute battalion employed there, whereby both sides received' casualties
Toward aon these actions.. #ere. terminated, comple-tely and totally e My own small
unite which was attached., to this: special battalion^ had-'to. be part of this action
Less favorable were the report concerning the paratroop operation on the
Italian headquarters on Monte 4otondo The battalion, no doubt9 could take Monte
^sneral Staff were ready beforehand &nd evacuated,, tlvea upon arriving there^
there were nly a. few.aircraft (J0-52) shot down'by the Italians* besides the
Italian headquartersi the government and royal families together <*ent -to -southern
Italy during that last ni^hto The battalion w"-as t'hen uad@r very heavy Italian
shell attack in the area around Monte Rotondo and had suffered very n.e&w$ :
7565: 60
the battalion decided on an arade honorable retreat, so that the Italians would
South from Home, the situation was obscure. The arterial roads in the dir
ection of Ostta and toward the southeast were heavily invaded and in a state of
defenses Only a very snail number of parts of Italian troops in the Immediate
vicinity of German units laid down their arms and went hoiae From this combined
picture of the situation, the Italian Army seemed to be scattered around* Only
the troops in-Rome'showed any/sighs of a firm military comnando Since the German
raeasures vrhibh. were planted for the disarming and capitulation of the Italian
troops in. Rome had not yet been startede it was comparatively quiet in 3ome and
1 1
In tlie late afternoon hours of 9..9 >3* we also received copies of our aerial
photographs^ Only 3 or ^ exposures were usable r but these were rather good ones.,
:;@ at least had enough exact proof about the topography and the surface and
observations during that flight* On the basis of the photos and all documents
docunentary proof all other conditions which -normally are considered in a aiili
tary plan of action and ar to be dealt with siuiply9 were not determinable Ve
therefore had to stay rather flexible in issuing orders and taking possible
action* It was essential that both of us, i possible, be at the scene of the
aetioft"'early~ to look over the situation on the spot and to handle it securely^
coaraand headquarters9 to present ur final plan (Gee map Gl->6) For this,
without being able to pinpoint an exact day for S-day and for Y~day* we had
61
g
5. Plan' for the Liberating Action on Gran 5assoe
SLSL.
The operation v/as to be accomplished through a glide landing with gliders of
the BFS~23>Q type* Thelanding, 'in our pinion, should take place on the slightly
slanted9 trapesoid&l meadow above the Campo X&peratore Hotela There were 12 gli
ders participating in the operation! flight crew of each was 10 men (9 combat
troop men and 1 pilot)e The flight <rew of both of the first 2 aircraft (1 and 2
on the chart) would land a@ originally planned and immediately proceed to the
nearest vicinity to this spot* They must give emergency covering fire during the
landing of the, ..other 10 aircraft while advancing on the hotelo The next 2 planes
(3 and k) were to be occupied by men from ray unit9 #3 under ay costBand, P* under
command of 1st. Lto. Radio Both aircraft would be assigned the mission of the
same liberating action^ They are both to be plaeed under my personal comuando
along After the landing, the crew of both aircraft are to take the shortest
route toward the hotel*, By taking along both the officers and through quiek~as
the hotel* ,ven before an effective alarm can be sounded, the guard posts
aircraft #6:.are-.to land immediately^ without regard to the eveats at the hotel9
at the landing; field at the mountain station of the cable railway At the same
ti'mei this er@w has to occupy th@ tunnel-like- way which leads directly from the
cable rail station to the hotel, and safeguard ito Aircraft #7<a 8* 9 a< 10 are
to land in order according to their number* The crew are to proceed directly be
hind those of ?3o ^ and 5 to the.hotel* They are to serve as reserves and rein
pa'nys 1st Lto von 'Berlep8ch will be flying in aircraft 4*7 Aircraft fll and. 12
will carry Heavy weaponso i<>o 2 heavy machine guns9 2 medium-mortars, and 2
light parachutists rifleso This group is to take its position inmediatelY upon
landing and is to be used only at my special order0 All of the assembled groups
will havestrict orders not to'open fire under- any circumstances, in order to in-.
us of a s@d flare sigaalo The flare signal is- to b@ given specifically to one .
of the sel@<sted mn of mj unit at the moment when I myself fire the first shot*
But in eas Io. together with ay nsne aa Inside'the hotel and the situation out
side beeo^a critical0 we will give th "open fire" coaaiand through the company
coni'nander of th para troop cupany, ts?h then als will take over coiitnand outside
The n@?sy situation wasn't known to us in detail* We knew that the guard
curity of the hotel ean only fee presumedo 7'e suppose there are some individual
strong sentry posts (see sap-35)* besides-perhaps9 some patrols^ so-ae special
occupation parties in the mountain station of -the cable railway, and various
fixed posts at specified points such as at the entry and exit points directly in
62
the hotel.
. , , <
. . '
."'..
' ' . .
allow it. 'TOSn^i/b still will have t be done on short notice sinee"^'v%i^fc|iour is
precious Therefor, plan and preparations must be finished even to the smallest
As Y-tima>, 6 ao.m. was proposed At this time the capacity for reaction of
Besides., at this hour the warm air currents also would be most favorable to the
for all altitudes, as compared to the strong difference in the exceedingly >iot
r . ' ' . . .
So'nucn for the-action'on the 3ran Sas.so Protection in the Assergi valley
must also b@ thought about6 The entrance'to this valley.meant the only possible
j retreat route for. the assigned troops Moreover9 it is required for the evacua
tion -of the liberated Duce..-- Besides9 through this valley any eventual reorgani
sation-of the Italian division located in the vicinity of Aquila would be kindered
either by an approach of aircraft and the ensuing action on the mountain which
would be'noticed from the valley9- or through the radio from the mountain station'^
The special paratroop battalion under direction of Major Mors was assigned
this taste* It is its mission to reach Assergi Valley-at'the end of a night march*
Therefore, the valley station of the cabl railway in Assergi- must be occupied
1) After the successful' liberation, all of the men stationed on the mountain
would teaye there,.' after disarming the Italians, and would go up the Gran Sass
on the cable railway0 The cable railway, after the mountain and valley stations
| are occupied? will, only be put into operation following *ny explicit orders. The
disarmed Italians tay in the hotel* Officers will be taken along as prisoners
-to.'prepare, for a aareh for an additional mission* Since 'the altitude and condi
tion f the Italian division located in the vicinity of Aquila arent known and
negotiations for laying down of arms there weren't-yet carried through, an emer
for this brief delay are to be taken by the special battalion. During the occu
pation of the Aquila airbase9 which will be reported to Rome by radio, 3 HtJ-111's
will take off from Rome, fly over Aquila airbas.and will, land there only upon an
agreed flare signal. The liberated Due will leave the airbase in one of these
the other H-lll9s leave at the same time and take a course toward Germany, to
make any pursuit by air difficult. After this action.,, the. sp&cial battalion will..;
withdraw with the forces assigned to. the mountain areas avoiding'any'actual a<st
ion &s far as possible* first in a'.westerly, direction .and- then to Rome0 The TQ-
H 7563 63
increase in larger numbers of casualties9. the following plan is to take the place
of l)s
the closest proximity possible to the Assergi valley stations It will take the
Ducee liberated from the mountain station by cable railway, aboard and fly him,,
be carried out!
security-checked pilot - for this the personal pilot of General Student,, Captain
Gerlaeh, was selected - will try to land, following a special flare signal9 at
Ifflperatore rlotelo ^he F-S aircraft is to fly over the hotel at Y<*time plus 20
&&utes and is to wait for this flare signal Under protective cover and safety
possible tittie with Mussolini and okoraeny to Fratica di Mare, where additional
aircraft will be standing ready for the flight to Germany In case it is impossi
ble to take off again from up there9 then the 0torch will be blown up and Captain
Gerlach will turn back to Rome with the special paratroop battalion,. If this
with General Student and the final preparations were ordered. The 12th September
was proposed as probable X-day? Details of the plan still were to be worked
in detail by 1st Lt Radl and 3ieo Above all 0 armament and equipment must be
pinpointed in detail*, The most ctoct calculation of the importance of the per~
sonnel and the 'equipment of the D?3 230 with its load capacity and proportionate
space utilisation, was requireda It was equally important to compute the exact
I marching time for the special battalion and the flying time for t^ie gliders9 in
the valleyo Up to this point, through General student9 various officers of his
headquarters who until now had had no knowledge of the scheme to free
were "read in" and were charged with the technical aspects of the
planning This 9 however9 concerned only a -very siaall circle of the close General
Staff-o.
transmitter (probably a North African transmitter Tunis?) brought the news that
the Due arrived on the African coast on 99oV5 on board an Italian warship and
This news was naturally very significant for us, Could the report be a bonafide
one or was it a deception nanouver of the 3er/3an high coraiandV Our reasons were
the Grnn '"aeso. All results of the rocomviissance indicated thiso Any transfer
of r-Iussollhi' over a secondary route diagonally across Central Italy during night
time must be called for at least by early on 99 Therefore, any arrival "on""the
African mainland during the course of 9<>9 by sea route wasn't at all possible or
Italian wa^r flaet had moved out of La Spezie during the night of 89 to 9<*99 and
La Spesie itself was invaded by German troops on 9*9* It was hardly to be assumed
that a single $ swift warship had remained behind and had taken the Duce on board
somewhere along the Central Italian Mediterranean coast This would have had to
us that the Bad&gllo government had no reason for such an act* The entire armis
tice action was s pre-arranged by the Italian high com.n*ind that the German high
eofrnand in the south could have been cut off from their rear lines0 Therefore9.
Central Italy was used for the raost part as the Italian main cosrtond area? thus
there existed little motive to take the Duse from the Gran Sasao prematurely and
to face the danger of hasty exposure of the plan Besides0 Caiapo Imperatore had
ports This- lf& no $ay slowed down our confidence - after all B it was all carefully
thought lit and planned - and convinced us e at the same tlmeQ that any extreme
haste was not in order, It was also agreed upon that the information ouldnt be
Likewise9 @n 9o9 a se@nd plaa9 to liberate the Mussolini family0 was discussed'
Shortly after our arrival in Italy, we received the order to concern our
selves also with the Du@9s family and above all to protect his wife from any
enemy action^ Should sh be deprived of her personal freedom9 she was likewise
to be freed from this situation*. To this placeg too9 the remaining next f kin
of the Bu<s@ were to omen Madame Mussolini Donna Rachels, lived with the two
minor children'^ Romano and Anna Maria, at the time of the Duce9s arrest9 at a
0
for Mussolini hiding place9 around the middle of Augusts we also had assistance
in the search from a married eouple in Rome associated with Donna 3aehele who
uld put us in touch with her. The wife ;7as to look for both of Mussolini9s
daughtersinlaw9 the widow of the Duce's son who was killed in action Bruno9
--and the wife of his son Vittorlo who until now e was located in Germany Up to
place9 but we were to discover this on the occasion of''this search9 " It was
therefore decided to establish contact with Donna Rachel at onceo This was Q how^
ever9 ut of the question momentarilyQ sine there was a strong guard of some
police around the houses Alone9 the daughter-in-law didnt dare look for Donna
I?aehei^9 s infrequently was she allowed to leave the houseo Too.they were
also confined according to the rules'9 These relatives didn have any exact i~
formation about Musaslini himself9 although they had definitely heard about his
the reonnaissane@ trips were carried out,by Captain Mandl of my unit under ex
ploitatio'n of the possibility that this information was already received from
Bdda9' Mussolini's daughter and wife of Count Caleazso Ciano lived with her
children in a hov^e i Homeo Ciano had already laaneuvered himself for quite some
9
time out f Hur4olini s government - fie was one of the chief conspirators of the
the draft *nd" drawing up of the Manifesto which led to the downfall of Mussolini
at the b'*g Fascist council meeting on.25o7o^3 - and became in the meantime
Italia-r Ambassador to the Vatican Re actually lived in/, the Vatican itself,
newer left it and was protected against any possible act of revenge. It was
sur-ly attributed^ to the most part9 to his function as diplomat to the Vatican^
Bi
tdt the armistice negotiations ran so smoothlyo Toward the end of August f3.,
wife requested the German government to rjjrant asylum for herself and her
.children*. This was accorded her 0 Shortly thereafter, she sought the same pro
J
tection for Wr 'husband and free escort to Germany and this0 too, was grantedo
Cnly then did Ciano leave the Vatican^ resigned as Italian Ambassador and shortly
Mussolini0s stopping place0 without her knowledge that such a reconnaissance was
taking - place o An informant who as an .'Italian personality9 could make the most
out of a-private business association with Edda 0 was allowed to interrogate Sdda
on &&y$ asking her if she knew anything about har fathers stopping place* Basis
spoke th* truth in this instancefl could we also use her n this way as a I
I genuine informant? (Slnoe she had already written a letter to ^addalena she
I - , ' . '
lifiust assert iereelf in this instance )D 2, Did E&da Rave reliable informatics
1 '
omthingg perhapso from hex husband which would Gome out of the Vatican) o I
sr did Sdda stand with aer father? . (To asiewer this9 sh@ was to be approached|
f the DueeK Ta@ answer t this question ale - where her father is-
a; w$ pw
himeeHf desired this r^mtlng place for the past fead had aosse connection
m d moreover t
as her father
After itl
*jas ale determined that Donna Seichele was interned in strict. isolation. ia Rocea
? ' "
|dell Caminat'e with her two minor @hildren<. Captain Mo established contact with
I- '
I the coasiandant of n<& of the German airbases located nearby a'nd ensured his suppoj
and
the ehildr@u was prepared tor tfa earn Xday and .-=time planned for Mussolini8 s
liberation fiction* The villa in 3oeea' was constantly guarded by 810 earabinieri
and any additional safety me&aux0. #@r@ not. known o Captain Maadl-also received
I these iaen at the. disposition of. the German .airbass eoanmnd@ro Ytime would be I
I hildren were to ka^ ben brought safely'to the airfield^ avoiding as isch of the!
|-aetion aa possible o ' The^ details of the aetion were determined .on the spot aeord=|
| ing to the situation hj Captain M,g wh was .'fully responsible for all of'thiso I
I After the liberation, the family tms to fly immediately t Geriaanyo They w.ere to I
H 67
IV o 5: 10 September -19^3
of the'city of Rome itself together with its environs, was still in Italian hands.
At the sous t h e m entrance into Some 9 particularly along the road from Ostia
t Rofflee heavy combat was taking place9 which lasted the entire dayo The stubborn
defense of the enemy could scarcely be overcomeo. The entry into Roue was to be
forced during the night of ll9o' After the withdrawal of the "higher" German
officials from Rdine -- these had left Rome the evening of. So9 in their cars and
in special trains <*<=. the personnel, the "little" people were left behindo Noth
ing was known ;of their fat.eo It was a question primarily of the embassy personnel
the eignal^edramunieations women of the array handling itome telephone central and
lesser employees and soldiers of the German supply and maintenance serviceso
From Upper Italy, .seyoral German divisions had now been in an advance march
for many days'** It consisted mostly of the armored infantry rifleman division0
"Great Qeratiin Chafctpion" $ the; SS bodyguard of Adolf Hitler; and one or two Panzer
(tank) divisions* Up to this pointQ they had occupied the area of Upper Italy
down to La 5pesi&o A tank division was definitely advancing toward Home and
should reach Xoae somewhere around 9 02* 10.Sept However0 they were some place
march and b^d not yet reashed Home the'evening of 10 o 9* This essentially compli
cated the situation in Boae? since the locations would now have to be subdued
keavy<> .scattered forces of the XI Air Force alonee (The statements from
Itenser Division <, another time the 26th Panaer Division) o Opening of the avenue
to %or} must also be accomplished<, without which the arrival of the awaited
^he spdCial paratroop battalion^ after carrying out the disarmament mission
in ^he area of the Albanian tiountains9 had again been billeted in Frascati<> in
th epresd-ont olive gardens of Villa Borghese<> Even my small command' was also
transferred th@reo Toward noon of 10 3ept O9 there occurred a very acute and re*
Battalion eotiLqander ^as ill and not in Italy - assumed by Major Mors, and the
to energetically take the part of my officero -Major Mors had9 in such a manner?>
r^-oeived an e^der from hifl9. felt it. was in no way justifiedQ ignored itfl and only
telephone attempts by officers of the XX Air Force to convince Mors of the tin-
tenability'of h'is steps I even offered, to Ppl the intervention of General student
Mors6 These events must'be mentioned here while the growing tension regained as
was and very linfavorabl^ for our 'additional plans snd preparations9 as well as
for the operation itself and even later were unfavorable as- to, the resiilts of the
southern France0 for our operation0 had taken off* They had to make the flight
man machines. However9 we> ounted on their arrival at the latest by 11 Septo0 to
With a view toward our plan of operation, it was urgent for us to restore our
association wit$ our circle of Italian officers One smn from this group had al
|ready appeared in Fraseati on 8 Sept* and lived with us But he was a civilian
visable for a German to go;to Home. My adjutant therefore took this Italian^
and fruit9 t the vicinity'of th outskirts of Rome and let him out there tin
notie@do This was the only way of sending &men@ to Tiorag since the Italians
I allowed people into th city who brought in foods particularly vegetables and
fruito This was all checked out very carefully4 This man was to look only for
his friends3 was t arrange with them that one or two of them would be needed
within th next few days for action in Home* Then, immediately after the occupa
tion of Some'by the Gersan troops, they were to inform us of their location
During the ours of the day9 I had additional discussions with the General
Staff officers of the.XI Air Fore concerning the technical details of our pera=>
tlpnal preparationso I was met with a very skeptical reception^ even to a partial
refusalo Tlw entire operation was labeled as impracticableo They tried to eon
practically impossible and besides had not yet been tested0 The landing speeds
at this altitude w@r@, because of th thin air 9 mueh too fast and the vertical
altitude for a precision landing9 so that a rack-up -of'the majority of the air- .
-craft would, have t be reckoned witho Moreover9 thermal conditions and streaas
| in this r@gi& wr practically unknown* They made a seeur and automatic land
ing practically impossible* A landing at places not well known and recognised
particularly at this altitude - couldn't be carried off and meant suicideo These
1
statements were aade-to me by the A*>1 (Air)v a major on the General Staff (with
the parachute troops there were two A~les<, the'Al Ops I &&d A-l Ops-II one of
them.for air and'one for ground operations) This offleer9 wh@ was one of th
were a total loss9 this would be as a result of th landing operation and could
not he asso@iated with any engagemento He rebuked us also for the improbability
like mo Particularly so sine this man hlmA&lf had already had such a combat
aiission behind h$M9 'namely'the aerial ssission on-the Belgian Fort Bben Smaelo
This mission was prpSL%'& quit some time ago - I believe over a quarter of a
all,-, the objective was located practically in the oeean and several good meadows
H 7563 69
that he had spoken out against the success of this operation to his commanding
The @<nd Operations (la) officer also expressed the same views to m@
w@n more objections* He held the opinion that the proposed strength (namely <,
12 x 9'nAh 108 align)?, particularly in view of the expected heavy fatalities dur
ing landing, wouldn-t be enougho A surprise moment was not to be taken into con
* sin-se through the truth of the matter that a vertical dive was
impossible at this altitude - the Italians would give the alarm at the
first glider landing as well as when they caught sight of the first aircraft and,
if there were enough time 0 the surprise would be lost* He 0 too, explained to me
I talked over all these arguments with my adjutant and we had to express and
gard the predicted loss figures as too high9 especially since I felt that we had
the best available and sharpest pilots that could be found But 9 based on the re
carrying out the liberation order All possibilities were discussed by us to the
smallest detailo An operation from the valley here, by land, also had less than
e
Campo Iniperator isn t impossible <, However9 this required selected mountain
troops completely armed; moreover9 such a military undertaking would bring very
havy losses9 daily and weekly, losses by the enemy whieh9 all terrain advantages
taken into consideration9 must be reckoned with* During the duration of such an
action lasting only 1 to 2 days - in our eas@ - the Italians would have enough
time t evacuate the Duee up some rocky trail in any direction9 since two r thr@
mountain divisions would be needed to block off the areao Besides9 the Italians
could also have killed the Bu@e for which, the' order existed9 in case an attempt
X also had the choice of voluntarily scrapping the whole plan and to inform
the Fuehrer of the impossibility of carrying out his order'0 or to try to oppose
the professional advic and objections of the General Staff officers by causing
the Gominan&ing General to give the order to carry out the mission. Then, since
chances for a euecsssful operation with few losses existed9 there were no doubts
on our parto I was of the opinion that an'officer must at least attempt to carry
out a military order of his Supreme Comsmnder of the Armed Forces*, whether the
prospects for suecese were gre&t or only slighto Above all, the officer who be
liev<d in-the successful completion of such a difiicult operation had the obliga
tion to inarch at the head of his troop* Also 9 he dare not force any of his
Qn the waning of 10 3epto0 Genaral Student told me. that he had also received
bjections t the arrying out of this operation iron officers of his staffo He
himself was reserving the right of the deeisionQ Preparations were to be continu
@do I presented General Student with the results of all the previous
70
I'had'had in discussions with my adjutant and implored him to give the order for
carrying out the mission at ail events9 particularly since there was no other
quarterso
In the evening hours of 10 September 19^3 the offensive of the German para
troops became increasingly strong on Via Ostia- toward Home?, the head columns had
pierced the southern suburbso During the course of the night the l*st of the
Italian resistance was broken and the entry into Rome v/as force do By the rsorn
ing hours the meat important points in 3ome were in German hands; the main
telephone and telegraph office9 the Department of the Interior0 and the German
Embassy* The safe entry into Rome was from the direction of Via Cstia* The areas
outside these 3 points and the barricading of those located in the city quarter
were comparatively qui@t9 but not under control of German troops The arterial
road to the norths west and east had not been securedo The effects of the re
connaissances gave d@finit reports that the Italian troops had deserted their
dugln positions - from the heights from Frascati one eoiald observe through field
glasses a movement of Italian troops among the only sections remaining of their
defensive districto Particularly easy to observe in the bright sun before noon
of Ilo9 was. the region f the sain arterial roads leading to Frascati in the
vicinity of Give Cittao The nois of battle was no longer heard0 only occasional
In the first hours of the morning of Ilo9 as the battle of Rotie drew to a
close9 both of our informants were on'their way to Rome after agreement with the
CoaLsanding General that they were taking responsibility for themselveso It was
agreed that I would send an officer of. ray unit to the German embassy before noon,,
Thi development meant for us the possibility that we could change the plan
for freeing Mussolini actually t the intended time as set fortho Firsts however,,
it wasrfortfiwhile tor us. to look for the Italian officers la Horn who were to
time to take control without having previous Isarned the exact details.
Antfer very important question was whether or not Mussolini was still on
the &r&.n Sasso Tfeer oould hav been another change in the last 3 days o There
information of this 0 Sine the Department of the Interior was strongly in Geriaan
hands0 ve concluded that the Minister of the Interior as well a the police presi
dent could- supply the appropriate informationo Th6y siuut' be located in the
occupied Department of the Interior buildings since they had been working there
steadily in the last *fS hours,, Besides^ the Police Chief0 General Senise9 who
question^ This m&n was 9 definitely and basically% ir oar opinion^ a -lore
come willingly from this fellow9 it could be obtained without too much trouble
.".e then decided on 11<>9 in the morning, to clear up both of these questions
in Rome itself before noono 1st Lto Hadl received orders to try to reach Rose
from Frascati9 without using the secured approach roads from 0stia9 and go direct
ly to the German Embassyo He had at his fingertips a very good local and street
knowledge of 3om$o Since the situation in this part of the city wasnt well de
fined as yet * h@ took along 5 selected Tien of our unit as cover and started out
around 11 affio toward Home in a heavy Italian towing trucko Before starting the
trip3 Hadl warned his men to keep utmost silenceo An attempt must be sought to
reach the embassy completely undiscoveredo Too9 in ease the comnando group were
fired without his order The heavy .armament that was taken aionge served only to
enable them to break out of a particularly difficult situation Since none of the
men had ever been in Roue - even the driver didn9t know Rome - Radl explained the
xaet rout of the m&reho The primary target was to reach the embassy9 to clear uj
important questions there.and then to return safely to Frascatio The trip went
smoothly aheadQ Severe difficulties weren't evidenced0 The attitude of the civil*
ian population9while they passed through the professed working-class district was
The embassy was safely reached Radl wanted to drive directly to the riinistag
Interior after consultation with our informants who had arrived safely
the lines,, so that he could immediately talk with either General Student
or the Minis%wm of the Interior This wasa e t possible right away0 In Homee mean
while0 there was a German City Comaandant who reserved for himself the carrying
out. of any official discussion with any of the Italian posts whatever9 and such a
discussion depended on his own personal permission It took some time until Radl
ould explain his special purpose t ths Co^rsand&nt - a Major General in the Air
Forego A flat refusal followedo Radl could have aade my mission known9 and the
eoa-'iandant. would then b concerned with carrying it dut For this, even Radl
didnt have the authority^ since the special secret order was still in effect
:3adl called attention to the fact that although it was a matter of a military
secret9 it was one again rejected* Then^ with reference to the direct order of
the Fuehrer and the rather effective consequences of a further refusal and under
intervention of. a fw of our informants9 approval was obtained to look for either
General Senise er the Minister of the Interior Both of our informants were.taken
along to the Department of the Interior0 Arrived there, an officer of the para
troop battalione which had occupied the Department of the Interior9 explained that
neither th@ Minister of the Interior9 General Senise nor anyone else of the De
.partaent of the Interior was there to be spoken fcoo Someone had "driven thes
awayp" In spite of the long discussions with the Oity Goaraandant, it appeared
that there was absolutely-no more hope of learning anything about our well-known
Italian'officerso Even the courier ordered out by J?adl the day before had been
and still was siissing. Therefore,, this nission of 3adls also seemed to be a
7563
completely negative n@ o Just as Radl and his companions were preparing to leave
the Department of the Interior* they noticed a civilian in rather excited conver
sation witf^iome German officers and soldierse Prom his gestures^ it c t & d only
personality of the government or theltalian Armed Forces, since any sntry of this
[..place had been emphatically denied to any Italianso <7e decidedq then9 to send
[.one'of our men to this group to look on from the side and observe any further
tirade concerned an Italian General by the name of Soleti. The latter9. a Cavalry
GeneralQ was sorah@w the oaassndant of the c&rabinieri and/or of the police of thi
ity of Romo At the moment of this situation,, he appeared to be the only seis-
able Italian general wh was concerned with poli@like functionso After the
identity of the man was explained^, Hadl ordered-the informant to talk with this
General and to ask him point blank where Mussolini could be foundo At the same
time9 he was t 6tress that h@ was ordered to find this out by the highest German
military authorities in Italy. Whether the man refused or wasnt willing to tell,
he .couldn't' threatie& hins further with arrest or other measures9 The General was
ready to talk when k hard that this was to b followed through by order of the
lini loe&ted siow?v% w^ry -briefly0 "That0 X dat knowofl To an additional0 more
sp<t@ifie.' question^ Geaeral Soleti answered that h truly knew nothing about
.Mussolini s whereabouts* But he eould say where Mussolini had been located three
days ag@ Kame'3Qr Cto tSs, appropriate question).- ia Hotel Camp I?ttperatore on
'the Graa Sass of JtaXjo T@ further q.ustioa@ eonGersaing any elues as to the
credibility of th's 9 the General xplaiaed that he definitely knew that Mussolini
:
day0 sine h !iad ^omsthing to do with this matter in the-line of duty & Abov
all9 due-to. th &i eoisbat and developments of the last 3 days 0 no sort of n@ws
son in ';her and all @nnetion was broken off Neither could he guarantee
the Duee .-was .at this "moment still oa the Gran Sasrso, HOP had there been
measure as to his removal forthcoming from Romeo With this most favosable out
Toward nocn9 I looked for my special commando unit in the garden of Villa
2brghes* and had all the m&n line up in .rankso I explained to them that a most
difficult special paratroop operation was set up for sme of them for the next
day is? the ours of carrying out a'direct personal order from the Fuehrero I
furtbdr explained that it was predicted by experts that there would be very
losseso vea up to 8G$ O I emphasised that I myself was ready to carry out
_ __ L r________3_73S3____ {' ,. 1 73
expectedo I would personally understand the reasoning of any man who was to step
baakc The fact that he had stepped back would not be used against him or be made
known outside of here I experienced the great joy then that to a man9 without
Now I designated the 26 officers9 NCjsfO9s and enlisted men who were to carry
out the action on Gran Sisso with ae> Unfortunately,, I had to leave a group of
these men behind later on, since for my commando unit the distribution in 2 gli
ders was limited to 1 officer9 1 KCO and 2 enlisted mon9 detailed for action in
the valley station? 2 officers and 6 EM under the command of Captain Mandl were
to carry out the liberation of Doana Raehele and Mussolini's youngest children
from Roeca della Caminateo Even up to now not all officers were informed as to
the Plan0' since secrecy-to the highest degree had to be carried out right up to
informed me that with the arrival of the glider pilot detachment on Ilo9 prob
ably nothing more could'.be eosjputedo It was also- to be decided just when a new
X^day and new Y-tis could be fixedo The most favorable times4 from operational~
technical grounds,, were they .to be delayed Zk hours9 could be set up on 13<\9-^3
for 6 a,naio 'Sinee, however9 measures by the Italians with respect to Mussolini
were to b feared9 and even sueh schemes were made known through Allied radio
I therefore set the postponement ahead 8 hours, to ikQO aours on the same
X-dayo. We preferred to take the bad thermal conditions into the bargain0 as
though to lose even more lost tiae In the meantime, almost 3 days had <*one by
ainc.e the announcement of the armistice o General Student concurred and even
ordered the action for 12 September 19'*3 Ytime 1^00 hours for the mountain and
valley station action^, in ease the gliders actually weren't able to get there
any more The final decision should come about in the afternoon. Ho longer could
eaeh detail be diseussed point for point andphe final decision was fixedo In this
conversation with General Student, my adjutant9 toward the end, also took parto
He had just returned from loiae* He brought ua at once the very disappointing in
formation, that the important circle of Italian officers who were necessary for
the success, of our plan eouldnt be locatedo- It wa^then attempted again, during
that any help @n th@ir part was n longer, to be.foundo Besides, 1st Lt Radl re
ported the tacticalQ entirely wrong steps taken by th Battalion in' the. Depart
ment of the Interior0 of all of the civil servants who had been chased out of the
building by the Chief.of the Police/ instead of being held for the upkeep of pea@e
and rdr in Rmeo In.various spots in Rome it had already reached a stage, be
tween looting and small riots which the Roman police were powerless to subdue,
since the police and Depart .lent of the Interior no longer were functioningo He
spoke further of General-'Soleti's questionings who also had for the first time
whether or not Mussolini had been taken away from there during the course of the
last 3 days was also a risk on our parto During the course of further discussions
a to the problems which had occurred during the search for our Italian,, Radl
suddenly made the suggestion to take General Soleti along up the Gran Sasso
7/hen the B^frtfisFr was chief of the Military Police (Guard Force )9 by tlte ^4ry natuza
of his position it was at least known to him (already made clear through his des
cription) that th Guard was at the most surprised about his knowledge of the
liberation and probably also heeded him<> If the General didnt want to ta*e part
in it f then one could simply "take him along", Hadl meant. General Student'sen
thuslasiB over this suggestion v?asn*t very great* But we reached an agreement
| be carried out by avoidance of any combat activity and therefore elimination and
avoidance ..-of any additional losses on ur sideo We therefore resolved that R&dl
would nc again travel immediately to Home and make @ae last effort to bring'1
Should this again be unsuccessful* then Radl was to present himself to General
Soleti as a Staff Officer from General Student and request him to a@company him
of all German troops stationed in and around Roie," Radl should so arrange it
that he would arrive at the general command headquarters in Villa Dusaet with the
General approximately after the approach' of darkness* General Student would then
talk over some military problems with General Soleti, with a view toward learning
the conditions in Rome, and then he would invite the General to suppero If it
impossible -to &i through Rome and the city limits after nightfall because of
would be too dangerouso Then<, the next mornings General Soleti was to be inform
free Mussolinio With this mission 3adl. left for Romeo Since nothing more was
said of any eventual necessary changes in action9 Radl still was of the same
opinion* that neither the day nor time of the mission had been changedo tfe hoped
tooQ that somehow the arrival of the gliders would be. in in the evening f Ilo9*
In the meantime^ the immediate preparations and discussions for the mission
The operation plan for the action at the valley station was to be
tha vicinity of Tivoli who fean9t yet 8urrenAe*ea"f -it &&*&& appropriate to- s**
lect an approach route for this group that would eliminate any eorabat action on
the part of the Italians as well as avoid othor problems such as continuous re
tinaQ over.Tivoli, was not selected as the approach route9 but the other detour
It. was thereupon established that the wareh column-, would probably be started
up in the direction toward the southern front and hence no suspicion would be
formed by the Italian side'. The streets themselves were excellent, the greater
part of the way could be retraced.at night0 immaterial as to whether Y-tiffie was
set for 6 or lh hours--. For th rest, the decision was made in the afternoon
Since the aircraft were abl'j to reach Pratica d& Hare only in the corning of
12(5 99 the operation was set for Y-time at 1'+ hours 0 -Vith this, there was a de
parture time for the valley team set for approximately midnight* The most im
portant thing was now t& plan both the movements by land and by air so exactingly
that suddenlye at Ik femurs exactly, both the goal would be reached and its success
would be guaranteedo Under no circumstances could it dare seem that a post were
being established n the mountain or in the valley that could give timely warning
to the otherso Hi^ht up to the entry Into the valley from Assergi there would
have to be a single march @Xumno Then a small advance group0 extra strong0
precisely reae'i the valley station of the cable railway in Assergi by forced
have to fight independently along the way and must,, through other incidents9 und<
other similar things to keep them from their most important task; namely0 at the
Aquilag small9 mobile signal troops were to step into the action and jam all
Risible telephone cables since here9 too 0 eventual telephonic warnings from any
people alrng the march route had to be made impossible to accomplisho I had
hoped th"*t.after the unpleasant ineidents with Major ?tors concerning the assign~
3en't of the leadership of the paratroop battalion^ I -would be given other airemf
t'hf.'A to order the paratroop battalion for this action He could understand the
b&d: psychological effect.which could result from this realitye But he was con-
r'^icsd that from now on, since it was a matter of such a big operation0 it might
*>@ possible to have mutual support of good 'will from both sides He therefore
proposed that Major Mors direct the action in the valley station and I that on
tfe mountain stationo For the sortie on /the mountain9 Major Mors must detail
the best of his company cor.^ianders 1st Lt von Berlepsh0 with selected nen o
After all details were plotted^ General Student gave me the task of looking for
Ttajor Mors and now to tell him of this plan as an order from the XI Mr Force
And the last details for the mountain action were also settled during this
discussion and final orders were givene In the same way, the plan for liberat
bring General Soleti on this night but only the following morningo He himself
was to return to Fraseatisnd call for General student ,iaa Roase the next mornings
I immediately #ent to the garden o f Villa Eorghese-to meet Major Mors and-
to forward the orders from General Student to hias0 At the same time0 I explain^
e.d t hin msk the smallest detail all the worked out plans and measures0 It.
was at this moment that I^jor Mors reeeivedg for the first time - and this from
?6
v?ill be iaore about this in the epilogueo Up until this very moment he had had no
part in the :plonnisgo The instructions for the operation were already worked out
in detallo*'s This pertained even to the exact approach route0 I also requested
Ilajor More to : lnsf^et 9 outside the individual company commanders, none of the
officers and men until immediately before reaching the operation area o The march
at -this time to 1st Lt von Berlepseho He e .too 9 was to be informed about the plan
Von Berlepseh received the mission to select 90 of his best officers NCO'ft and
enlisted nn, all who would be volunteers only. During the selecting period0 no
one was to be informed of the exact nission. Instructions would be given immedi~
ately before the start o.f the operations at the Pratica di Mare airfield Out of
the 90 men 9 10 who fitted well together wore to be set up together as one aircraft
cooperation and .geve my guarantee as to the obvious departure time for the Ber
avoid any bloodshed and t keep Ytiae schedule at 14 hours at all events * A.
short time later9 this group w a s the first to put into effect the big joint piano
If9 in th late hours of the night9 the valley unit was to set out on its march,
the dice w<;uld finally be cast and then the operation on the mountain must also
the Italian officerso Vhen this proved still unsuccessful by late afternoon* it
was given up-. 3adl nw went to look for General Soletl to inform him of General
the faet that che General was usually in uniform as an active reservist, but this
afternoon was to wear civilian slothese After a long search and many telephone
calls TiB.dt /ound the General at a 'Stiwtv&gg &it'fife :&'.;$tfl&Qft ibsannBtf^s -$& IteSBd -
Solcti was requested by phone to co;ne to the Department of the Interior as a per=>
sonal message from the German Cojamanding General was to be delivered to him by a
messenger, The fact that 5'oletl had just conducted a swearing in of some police
attested that he. would be in uniform.- A.s a matter of fact 9 he soon thereafter
appeared in a large limousineo i&a&l explained to him then after he had presented
all the German forces located in and around lciieo General "oleti lmraealately
corsentodo It -Jas agreed upoii that. Radl v/ould pick hia up at the Department of
too, that "oleti would really be in uniform* -\s a companion^ he took an interpre
ter - s. policeman from the crinr -'ustria-Hungnrlan monarchy who same from
i.he latter*s ear*. Purins the journey, Ltadl gave the Italian - General another des
cription of General Students personality and also informed CSoleti of some sig
Student to inform him ot General 3oleties arrival and presence.. General Student
and his staff i?ere ve?y olarmed since they had telephoned to Home to notify J3adl
to pick up the "& General only'the next morningo This telephone message hadn't
After a shori conference between Radl and General Student' - at this time I
was someplace ovtside Krascatl - it was agreed to delay the conference because of
the matter of t.n interpretero I?adl then introduced both Generals General Studen
then apologised, during the conversation for having to ^ut off the. actual military
conference an* 11 the next day Because of the'Importance 'of the problem, he could
hold this meeting only if he had available an absolutely reliable and dependable
translator Unfortunately, this one man was busy with the surrender negotiations
in Sivoli - this accidentally was true and happened so appropriately and would-
unfort^sate^ but he couldn't request that General Soleti wait so longo He there
for asked the General .to Join him'and the staff of the XI Air Force for supper
ari to drink a glass ofraisea Ills Staff officer0 ^adl 9 .^rould then, tak@ General
safely back to "^oa and pick, him up again the nest morningb: General Soleti
and had .my oeal with the Staff in Villa Dusmeto Around 2.55Q hoursft Radl received
the task of oscorting General Soleti *s care with a side-car rootorcycle - with ap
pr^priate armament9 since in the meantime independent firing? could again be hoai-Q.
1 " - '
}
litk the suburbs - to give him personal protection and escorto The next morning^ at
1-07309 ladl was to again pick up General Soleti at the Department of the Interioro
I General Soleti wouldn't have to use his own vehicle, Radl'assured:hia9. for-he,
Hadl 9 would.come .in his own car pud would himself_return General Soleti to Rome*
(Thistfasjtfdone so th-E.t the s.a$>^6xiduct of- General Soleti, if not already impeded
could'be carried out ;?ith the least hindrance possible)* After aidni&ht.,. I^adl re
turned to Fraseatio
I again sat down alone- with Radl in. a secluded corner, of Borghese garden to
redisduss everythin^o ",'e had slept only a few- hours sine 8 September neverthe
less9 tbe enpriftous strain allowed.ua to have no feeling or desire for sleep today
two of UB know'of the wery slim chances for the.success.of the mission* But
we saade up our jainds to watch out for the slightest chance- and to rely on ju3t
plain soldier9s luck for the rest - for success requires any big risk and in this
Kven more thaa this 0 however9 every one of us was concerned with th ques-*
tlonss '^ould we find Mussolini on the Gran O P S S O ^t nil? "Vhnt .vould happen if 9
in the meantime9 he hnd already been taken away? Vould they put the blame on us?
Uight from the s-/cart9 we v/ere to proceed only if we had definite proof as to his
plee of confinemento At leastf thats what they meant at desk level* In prac
never be given- If liussolini is. still on the Gran 3asso 9 could we- possibly
be fast enough to prevent the directed killing (of Mussolini) in case of an ?*t~
tempt made to free him? The first question9 if Mussolini was still up there,
completely steady9 iron nerveso And we relied completely on this* To carry out
the mission without bloodshed was our main desire9 but also our biggest worryo
Particularly in case the Duce really 1&&M wasn 9 t on the Gran Sassc No personnel
should be sacrificed in vain! And for this the plan with Soleti was our main
hope., He only had to be along,-, so we hoped? that he ould win over most of them
to avoid a battle tfe then discussed some other personal things concerning our
next-ofkiu9 things we had to think about in ease one of us was not to co^ns b?.cko
If 8085 of u9 as was forecast, were to be totally lost even without combat<, then j
For the rest9 the Chief of Staff of the XI Air Force had onco again tried in
pointed out tp General Student in the name of *11 staff members of the General j
Still barely past midnight9 the personnel for the valley station took off <, j
and with this the operation was practically rolling along-, Even on the trip to
Pratiea di Mare airfield.on the morning of 12 September, also a. few hours before
the mission,, ist&ff members of the. XI Air Force still tried to convince individual
officers of my unit as to tiie infeasibility of the ope rat ion9 a very unfriendly
would disseour&g soldiers just before the onset of an ordered and n=more~to-be~
After our private conference9 3adl and I departed to spend the night before
the operation with out meno In this ;\ray0 additional informal1 instructions and
directions could be-gif/ene And still9 outside of the two of us and three other
$:Cieers9 no ode knew .what kind, of an operation it wasjt b@ and why it wan really I
going to- worke We spent one more wonderful9 southe-rn^starlit night in the Br J
& Garden and finally got just a very short sleep in the early morning hours |
12/September 19^3 . -.
After a short sleep in the tent, there is a general reveille early in the
Radio is ready for his trip to Rome, to pick up General Goletio Lto larger is
going $$/pfd with him in order to have a better understanding with the Generalo
ask the General not to accompany hint to general command headquarters in Fraseati
but to coae-to Pr&tiea di Mare airfieldo This may evoke lack of confidence on
their goyernnento (From Ciarapino airfield also)* These two airfields, in view
fb'thlSfi Cuidxiei have a very good name on the part of Italian personalities*
Vittorlo Mussolinig Pavolini, Farinaeei, the Ciano family, are some of the names
of well-known Italians who started off in the last fe-jr .weeks'and months from
these airfields unnoticed and without authority* They are now in Germany* The
Italians didn't know tftat all of these had taken off at their own desires*
was postponed? today9 from the normally used conference place of a Commanding
General - his -com&and headquarters - the conference was transferred to an air fie Is
and above all q to Pr&iicsa di Mare* It is left to Lt Hadl to explain this change
credibly in whatever way he can to General Soleti* Because of this he must have
an interpreter along*
I talk once more-with Radi before he takes a course out of Rome* To both
I of us it is clear that we must have the General alongo Right now he appeared to
us rather friendly9 rauch more so than the first eared-for officers* Firsts he's
all 'personnel^ at least 30.1& of them who had seeii hia once someplace or the
other* And ..in every case9 the officers - they have to recognize him* His appear?
once.-on the scene will at first be a surprise and this9 so we-hoped, would pre~
;, vent the opening--of hostilities* At least there would be 0 aside from the avoid
e still had this to considers tjo will Soleti behave upon the news of his
task? Probably he will be interested in not committing himself to any side* The
Duce was a deposed had of a government0 Soleti had also served the f'newfl govern
ment o These were now on the side of the enemy* Further developments weren't
any side o No one knew what was yet to comet ;Ve, must leave open all possibili
tieao In any events whether it was froia a personal motive or out of a sense of
responsibility toward his native land, the fellow would do his duty* F-ven Radl,
since I had evaded any profascist conversation with the General the night- be
fore9 believed this o Kor was there any reason for this since according to our
false* Me therefore believed that if. someone were to step in and explained some
what diplomatically the proposal for his cooperation in the liberation of the
80
idea of Mussolini6s reappointment were not realized In any other case 9 he v?ould
just be sil^S^ t?taken alongo" The suggestion could be well presented ^ % l l dip==>
loaacy and are but in spite of this, any approach would appear favorable and a
refusal as rather hopeless6 This 9 of course, came up in the course of the conver
satio.no Therefore the General's action in any case would publicly be a possible
In' any event9 however9 it must be avoided that General 3oleti hear before
time the nature of the operation and its dangero If so 9 his cooperation would be
less probablo In any ease0 after the mission conference9 I wanted to put him in
my personal ear * apart from this, lie was already scheduled for the flight in ay
aircraft. - to protest him fro& any danger which might arise from his personal Con
duct o The conference in Iratiea dl.Mare was set for 10 amP Had! must also pre
vent a-large convoy of Italians frov joining'-and if this vQp&n9t possible0 then
hed -have to worry abut making sur that only Soleti0 accompanied by no more than
brie escort9 ccuae to the conference in tiie siaall, store airport administrative
'buildings There General Soleti was to give his consent to his participation
?f
s that unnecessary bloodshed could be avoided.." He was to give this promise in
and say 18 m e n are on the way to Pratica'di infers * There are radio messages that
the transport aircraft are taking off on schedule and will land at Pratlea between
10 and lie Then there would'be just enough time for the operation conference be
fore the start0 At Tratica the last preparations for the operation are being
carried outo Supplies weapons and ammunition checkedo Nations ttrere to be given
0 11
out for 3 days "j-uaj- rations '0 a very definitely highly concentrated ration set.
The personnel were gathered together I explained in a fear words the purpose9
the method and the execution of the missiono The z&en knew of the danger and in
spite o.f this 9 their eyes glistened^ since it concerned a "dasi\ing thing*" fit
last the long9 unsolved 'py&z\e is solved^ there are no longer any sec.ret^' as to
our pldnso . Tais v^as a joy to my menL.*.7ho hsd xp&at the entire time in Italy
feigning the secret which I never revealed and which they hadn't known of sooner.
They no longer believed -strongly in a missions "nothing will come of it*fS they
aid5 "one day we'll be going back hoae'again and we911. still not have raised'-a
finger<>rf For. those of my men v.?h could not take part, in it e this was a' big dis
appointmento They had all 'volunteeredo Next 0 announcement of the mission eon~
tinned to.be made to the meno v&ch aircraft'would definitely hold 9 men^, the
The leaders of these groups and their appointed deputies, and fdr all
the operation with the piltso I have still .one more discussion with the IoCo
of- the XI Air Force o lie had ma^l the photo reconnaissance flight with us (Ra&l
and JOB) on'8 Septo He knew the approach routes and the target area o He was to
lead (point maa)^ in an aircraft without a glider in tow9 the entire flight group
Suddenly, there appears an Italian 1st Lt close to :*adl and General 3oleti and'he
shout 2 ".a;&om&m> disaraatoo!" ("we are disarmed" )<> The bad luck Jj$,Jiappened*
None of us knew frosi where the man came* A'h&t use of any reproach to the two
ty^ it is unbelievable, I must remain here<, I can't come tfith you now 9 o" The
interpreter is on hand*, Hadl 2t3 an ideag speaks quietly something like thiss
ooo General the measures take'n. here are a scandal., I myself heard only yester
day ^ how the Corani&nding General not only forbade any disarming action against the
policcs but on the contrary, had ordered that the police be strengthened and be
supported in every s-aja It e s case here of an arbitrary act of the local com*
isaader, who will be held responsible for this o General Student has already been
siain points of your- .conference with General Student, It all .concerns-the sesuri~
ty of your capital itjs resides,- General .Student requests, since he h.?,s waited (.
for over two hours sow ip fraseatl, that you noB$jj&j$b accompany me to Pratlea di
Mareb' The Coat-Banding general had a very pressing operational conference there
which he could m longer keep from happening" Because of this 0 I requested him ta
come with me i%aiediately, in the interest of Itoae and the Italians*. There are
Goleti spates and says hes ready to drive to Pratiea with us o But he wants'to
take hi*' adjutant a long9 ^adl urges departure, Sole ti insists on his adjutant
joes into the Ministry of the Interior t talk with the commander of the
0
| i* o cloek! Kadi demanded of the Batallion Adjutant to know where the Italian
| c Colonel Vase 1110. is o Answer: *ro'ohQv wfeor ,ju.st put In prison.-.ff ;iadl demanded
| his immediate release Only the comiuamder can authorize this 9 he is in a very
personal orders of the Fuehrer ^ he succeeded the in having Colonel Vase 111
brought out ur the- cellar whore the poli.ee off leers were locked up o The latter
plstc'lse I&ca minute is costly5 finally Had! persuades him to come along right
away9 gives him another pistol Outside9 his general is waiting0 There are stil]
just a few minutes of conversation doura by the cars It's mostly about the young
mother niid child ftald premises to give the General some, sauce0 butter<, skoco=
late &n& baeon ^en some canned milk at Pratica to take with him He 8 s happy
and drives offa f&dl leads the way in his car 0 behind coaes General Soleti He
insisted upon driving with his o.-/n car ;7ith him9 in the o-passe'nder limousine^
are the adjutante'largerfl k carabinieri and the Italian driver Radl is to atop
a ways from the airport administration -building aa& then escort Soleti and Colonel
7aselli to- tho stone houseo The earabinieri must remain in the car- Finally9
they arrive ith suefe lateness9 I had almost given up hopeo And Soleti is tbeni
The two officers were taken to the agreed upon roosa by r?adle Then General.
Student arrives :.s --rset both ''oleti &polor;iZ3s for the delayo Colonel Vase I'
ll was reqiieuted to wait briefly at.the entrance, so that General Soleti eould b
to that operations area at the command of the commnding generale He knew the
landaar-ts in these fissured mountains and would find the way ^accurately* The
pilots of the towing aircraft and the gliders didn9t have this knowledge* So
dangerous loss of time due to search was safely avoided. In the meantime, 1st Lt
Radl is in Home*, At exactly 7s3O he entered the Ministry of the Interior* There
was great excitement there* In front of the building, there stood hundreds and
hundreds of Italian police of the City Police They talked wildly together,
gesticulating and shoutingo What is happening? The batallion which had disabled
the Ministry of the Interior and "put it out of commission^' had disarmed the
entire Homan City Police force in the early raorning hourso The only guaranteeors
for the maintenance of peace and order on the part of the Italians who still
managed to be operational had been disarmedo :hat resulted can not be overlot>lae&
1 And at the iioaent* it wasn't very interesting for Radio For him* only one
question mattered; where is General Soleti? The latter was not at the scheduled
police stations is without success? the telephone k his hoste isn't answered0
Has he perhaps deliberated? Had he received word of the disarming f his polls?
Then such a deliberation was the logical thing for him*. Had he perhaps left
3oae because of this or had he taken himself out of a danger gone? The lives of
many soldiers on both Italian and German sides now depended on him*, ..7hat would
happen if Sadl didat bring him along? He would be made responsible - he must
find him now! On hur passed by, 1% hours and 2 hours - no trace of General
Soleti o The operational siseting 1st to begin in a short tiraeo fta&l is also sup^
Gould there be ai evil star watching over the operation? Very many small and
large difficulties of both material and personal types had taken place in the
last days and hourso The Commanding General asks me whore Sadl is, but I donet
<sa without him*. He had stationed Lt Varger and the driver on both ends o the
doss come - fr& diseo\?@ring that his polie are disarmedo This would probably
make him change his decision., He must per'iaps stay in Rom then and on his part
request a delay of the conference And thsn it must still be made perfectly
believable and eli>ar to hisa that'it. will take place in Pratica and not in Fras
satio fAl$l a<> Italian aiuefc accompany hia. Then a large Lancia-lianousihe
turns the aimr<, Radl recognizes it? it is General r'olcti in uniform, Thank
3adl hurries to rtoleti, the latter juiQps out of the car, he gives orders
in Swiss excuses -hiuiself in very excited tones s his sister gave birth to a
child that mornings no doctor, no medication* no food* chocolate &n<L milk v/ero
not to be had0 no butter oo! therefore tiie ^enerff.1 had to help* And thus the
dalayo Thanks be to God he cLoesn't appeax^o know anything about the disarming!
H 75^3 83
given a brief notice which is only for him personally* Vaselli acquiesces to the
I '
I plains* in the presence of mefl 3adl and the interpreter, Lt Varger0 to the Italian
I General, that the Fuehrer had ordered the very urgently seeming liberation of Mus
aolini from prison to be carried out* General loletl already had the kindness
9
yesterday of .'confirming Mussolini s place of confinement on the Gran Sasso9 for
ihieh he thanks him sincerely* The Fuehrer now personally requests General Soleti
t take part in this liberating action*, Through thisoaetive combat can be avoidec
on both sides r at least to cut down on active measures<> Soleti listens very
(sensation)0 that this man*, too 9 volunteers to take parto He must now send
Qolonel Vaselli to Rome but under no circumstances to say a word to him of the
planned operation* Soleti promises this and keeps his word In the presence of
me and Rsi&lc, H@ dismisses Vaselli tells him that the conference will probably
stretch out into the night hourso *s is to take along a package for Soleti9s
eistero In Horn he 9 s also supposed to check into the police matter and pick up
Soleti again toward evening in Praticao Hadl leaves the area with Vaselli9 to
place the order for the promised provisions &n& shortly thereafter Radl takes him
to. his car,-, and hQ together with the entire earabinieri garrison^ drives off in
shortly by Radio I go over the flight plan with General Student9 ^ust prior to
passing oa the information to the glider crews9 V/ can see the invasion of the
station from th house* The noise dies away and one glider after another lands o
I All come 'in smoothly, there are 12 altogethero 16 aircraft started from France?
k were lost hy the time Pratica di Hare was reached0 00 that w li&ve now just
the first mentioned number available at our disposalo It's then Immediately made
slear that the starting time and flight time must be reeheckedo At 13 hours 9 the
General Soleti also views tits* aircraft -invading from the window f the room
in which he and-Radl were just eating breakfasto Until now he has no idea what
flying to Aquila and will "take off" from there He sees only the landing, shows
a great interest is ito Meanwhile, the pilots of the gliders como in o Radl s&tfa
f
to, {ssneral "oleti completely unexpectedly:. ' .owe fly in those aircraftpoo"
The' latter is. surprised,.'he'doesnt'believe it* For some time now, r?Air Said'
has be&n announced0 % enemy bomb flights are reported? they^re coming from North
Africao Ratfeer larg distans between the two The sirens go off - the first
flight is here.o. Everything hurries in preparation and the flak is already flying
and the flight Is still hcreo It drops only a few bombsQ doesnt hit our place
a. ne.a?by abandoned plaeo This happens so often that the ones at Pratica are
C| this exeiteoient is endedo If the bombers had met our gliders! Shouldn't
'm $m
H 7563 I 83
a brief notice which is only for him personally Vaselli acquiesces.-to the
| plains, in the presence of mefl Radl and the interpreter, Lt larger0 to the Italian
f General, that the Fuehrer had ordered the very urgently seeming liberation of Mus
| solini from prison to be carried outo General Soleti already had the kindness
i?hich he thanks hi9 sincerelyn The Fuehrer now personally requests General Soleti
Ifctake part in this liberating actiono Through thisoa<etive combat can be avoidec
I on both sides or at least to cut down on active measureso Soleti listens very
j (sensation},, th^t this man<, too*, volunteers to take pa.rto He must now send
Colonel Vaselli to Some but under no circumstances to say a word to him of the
planned operation* Soleti promises this and keeps his word In the presence of
me and Ra&lg lie dismisses Vaselli0 tells him that the conference will probably
stretch out into the night hourso " is to take along a package for Soleti*s
j sistero In Horn he9s also supposed to check into the police matter and pick up
I Soleti again toward evening in Pratieao Hadl leaves the area with Vaselli9 to
I place the order for the promised provisions &n& shortly thereafter Hadl takes
to. his car9 and hc> together with the entire earabinierl garrison*, drives off In
shortly by Radio I go over the flight, plaa with General Student9 just prior to
passing oa the information to the glider crews? Vie can see the invasion of the
station from the house* The noise dies away and one glider after another lands
| All come in smoothly9 there are 12 altogether0 16 aircraft started from France
k were lost by the time Pratica di Hare was reached0 so that re have now.-just
the first mentioned number available at our disposalo It's then lime diately mad
clear that the starting time and flight time must be recheckedo At 13 hours9 the
'General .Soleti also views ths* aircraft invading from the window f the room
in Which he and Radl were just eating breakfasto Until now he has no idea what
the nature of the Puces liberation is to beo Perhaps he believes that w@ll be
flying to Aquila and will "take off" from there 0 Fie sees only the landing, shows
a great Interest in ito Meanwhile, the pilots of the gliders come ino Radl smys
j The latter is surpris'ed,.'he' doesnt'believe it For some time. now,. ?fAir Said'*
I has been announced0 2 enemy bomb flights are reported? they0re coming from Korth
lAfricao Rather larg distance between the twbo The sirens go off - the first
I flight is hereo Everything hurries in preparation and the flak is already flying
Sand the flight is still hereo It drops only a few bombs doesnt hit our place
|but a nearby abandoned pla@eo This happens so often that the ones at Pratica are
fused to ito For us its a climax to the exeiteaento Most are laying someplace-
minutes9 this exelteaieni is endedo If the bombers had met our gliders! Shouldnt
Large groups of clouds are coming up9 although no cloud ceiling is formingo This
ii favorable just now9 since in this way our takeoff can e t be observed so exactly
from the valley a Toot, no one will pay too much attention to us 9 since there is az
air raid alert all over the area0 at least there is aerial danger for places at a
Ve sit pressed close together in our transport glider, one in the -diddle,
the others along the sides 0 General Soleti.sits in front of me and in front of
hia.g Lt Sckwerdto Morale is high'9 th men eat a part of their jump ration * the
hoeolate first of all* Beneath us ? through the large holes in the clouds, the
Italian landscape is seen, just as itedl and I already got to know it from our
reconnaissance flight-
Then my pilot informstfiethat his tow pilot (in the formation) has just in~
formed him that the single lead aircraft, with the I0C0* along v^ith air crafts 1
andi 2 9 the first who are to fly the planned route and also the first who are to
land55 arent in sight,, He cannot orient thea<, either0 since he doesn^t know this
stretcho I look at my map and recognise some known landmarks beneath raeo It is
1335 hours o Since the other aircraft are no longer to be seen9 I take over eo3~
mand of the formation*. The group must close up s for through a belly hole0 which
is somewhat enlarged by using side arms,, I can observe below very well 5 the course
is true and my pilot gives orders by throat microphone up forward to his tower 0
Far below us an aircraft with a glider in tow appears 9j at least at **00 meters
know that I can rely on the commander of ;#f - its 1st Lt Radl! The other air*
X'-caaH gee at all* We gradually go higher <, the altimeter shows 3300=3^00
Left and right* here and there mountain tops plunge up out of the holes
in the clouds? they seem to be about 2000 meters higho It is 1330 hourso Only
trance to Aguila, at the s?aall village of Baaaano? :"e fly alon* the valley, it
is elose to l^f hours - then I see down below on the road,, an aafeo coluzan driving
in the direction of Assergi and just past Assergi9 on the winding road to the
valley -station9 a smaller unit is driving to this spoto It can only be the val
ley unit saen! And there0 now9 through a hole in the eloads.9 our target is
land! It-.is.--followed silently,, we are still above and between clouds - and then
w wing fr@ . the motor aircraft fly offo "7e soar through the first turnfl I
see Campo Imperatore something like 1^001500 asters beneath tae look for our
selected landing pot, the trapezoidal meadow northwest from the hotels I ean9t
find the f9littl@ used madowfV and then I see that we have erred terribly! Cur
aerial photograph had deceived us! Instead.of.a somewhat 10 -sloped meadow with
fallftas close to-the hotel as possibleo" And Lt Meyer tilts the glider <,
against the express order given by the Commanding General that rapid fall and
target jumping are forbidden! And behind us glider #** is already tilting! All
ling tightly to the struts9 roky pinnacles shoot by and then Meyer.-callss
"Hang o n J ^ ^ n ^ h snaps up the tilting plane (glider) with the parachute brake
a shoeko a^las'n0 we lose ur eyes for a-fraction of a second* And We'*fi' landed!
On the groundo fresh air streams in9 we jump out of the aircraft and we0re stand
ing in front of the hotel! Lt Meyer has set the aircraft down 15 meters from the
hotel! The gliders ean9t glide since the boundaries are strongly circled with
barbed wire* There8 a mass, already in position behind the machine gun; the
the personnel of my raft go toward the hotelo General Soleti is in the raldst of
us*, there's an Italian posto Hes called over by his General,, and spoken to in
his native tongues f*Dont shoot!" The guard doesnt mover, ','e leave him alone
and fall into the hotelo An op& door leads into the radio room. An Italian is
handling the radio equipment he hasnt yet noticed anything. A call pulls him
from his "chair*- with o&$ two hits with the butt of a pistol,, the apparatus is
put out of commissions But no-door leads from this liar room up into the
hotel 3ack--out! ' go-around the corner <, along the porch Another guard0
agsin his Italian General says* <sNon abagliare" ("dont shoot") and this guards
tooc remains quiet and does absolutely nothing! He is motionless with terrorn
ahoul-ders of one of ay men^ the others are pulled up after me 0 and were standing
'on the- terrace before the main entrance to the hotels First of all9 I see the
-rocky and stonecovered high surface close by in which a second aircraft has just
crashed.- its been only about l}i> minutes since #e landedo And there the air
craft is landing*, only 100 aeters away from uso It is Noo kl And we can already
see 1st Lt 3adl Hensel and his men climbing outo And just then a window on the
first floor of the hotel is raised and at the windows Mussolini! And he fleets
us and nods!
I call to him*. "Ducev away from the window'% since I fear either onset of
action or eventually a well-aimed shot toward the windowo The Duee steps back
the window a Had! strides toward the hotel with-.his men a nly -Menzel* the
'second 1st Lt<> reiaains laying in tho air@rafto lie had broken his ankle o; -.Ve
'hLvent time to waito Even before Radl had entered the hotels I entered th^
vestibule by force-.with Lt S@hwerdto Just then the arabiniori begin coming out
of the hotelo Th^yv just had their aftern'ooh rest and are almost completely
bewilderedo so-that they almost fall all over each other getting out through the
.oor k few blows with th butt-end and a'few pokes in the ribs .-,and the road
is freej I'm alone with Lt Schwerdt on the hotel porche e ds.sh up the stairs
the door must be someplace her$o I tear the door open and have chosen correctly*
Inside stands Mussoliniv near him are 2 officers in uniform and a aan in civilian
clotheso These are immediately pulled out, in order to avoid any eventualities6
there already aprear two of my NC0s9 CJfaeHer and Glaesner; they had
up one floor by use of a ladder and now take over the securing of the
I inform the Du@ "Duee9 the Fuehrer sends us to set you free.,1* Just
as I finish^ the door flies Q-pen and 3ad'l and Varger also aro in the roomc Frotsi
window we can see more gliders landingo Tho personnel of one aircraft are
H 7563 87
now running to the hotel* The Duee is very moved9 he can answer only: ftI knew
that the Fuehrer wouldn't leave me in the lurcho" He squeezes my hand and em
braces me, also Hadl Sehwerdt and larger& I send for the Italian commander,, He
appears, a Colonels I request his immediate surrender and state that'any resist
ance is useless, there are additional reinforcements on the way, &he valley sta
tion is already in our controls He requests time to talk it over with the General
He means the,-van in .civilian clothes^, whoa we later learn is General Cueli e whose
wireless message to the Ministry of the Interior we had interceptedo I give the
Colonel a couple of minutes and turn toward outside Someone is shooting out
thereo Nobody knows whyo And no ^ e is hit$ as it later turns out* It is just
rather difficult for daring soldiers not to fire at all during an operatione
f9
ur answer 9 n
I @ay to the cousnandant He goes out of the room is ba@k in a
Italian soldiers stack their weapons in one spot in front of the hotel and gather
in the large dining room of the hotel* Lt larger takes over the rest of the
During the landings of the rest of the gliders9 we lose one when it crashes
into a very steep, roeky slope and can be seen smashed there* Through binoculars
it can be &e@n that at least some of the men are alive9 but they appear to be
badly wounded? At the aoa&ntt they.canH be helped at all, since the spot seemed
rather difficult to reaeho Their fescue must be delayed Gliders are landed
one is laying on the rocky slopeo Even 1st Lt von Berlepseh is here now and the
The main part of the operation is. therefore successful*, Without combat
ation0 without loss of life9 if one doesnet include the loss of life of those
in that one.glidero How there remains only the last act of the operation^ to
take the Duee away from Gran Sass and bring him to Germany*
1st Lt von Berlepsch announces that the hotel and the mountain station are
definitely secured<> There are telephone tie-line's *ith the valley station From
v before
there too9 things 'take, a good turn^Ln that news is received that shortly/tfte ap
proach had b^en captured after a brief resistance? The station itself and the
eableway a.?-6. J*ot destroyed and are in working condition^, The road barricade to
the valley station entrance was run down by some of the dispersed advanced troop
new time for Plan :Bo" 25y this was meant the time at which the HE 111 was to
appear over the Aquila airfields After a short decision I give the order 10
landed and of these one is losto There is no clue whatever of the other glider
airera-ft .and-of the leading aircraft with the IoCo Soise first aidfl mountain
limbers are on their way to the downed aircrafto But theyll not be back be=>
fore 2-3 hourso v or all.the other0 a very hard landing results only in insig
nificant injurieso
Then I received the report from the valley station that the first wireless
message to Rome<, which announced the success of the action9 was received and had
been ace^Sii^oyfullye, The second message*, that of the new Y-timeg coij&dnH |
have gotten through since no more wireless traffic was possible Communications0
given upo Then^ over the hotels Captain Gerlaeh appears with the Storch plane0
In the meantime I return to Mussolini in the room and find him in heated
constantly and to protect his life* General Cueli is in the room,, too* whom I
no longer would acknowledge as being there; and moreover General Soleti is there
and I had completely forgotten him in the meanwhile * The Italian commandant '<
brings red wine and offers .it to me with the words; ''The victor*,'* ;e drink to
this and he doesno.t seem to be so unhappy any more with the outcome as he seemed
to be at. the onset0 The Due declares that his delivery to the Allies had been
prepared for for several days now<> But it hadnt yet coue to that0 because he
to kill him on-the^spot ia the event of any attempt at his release0 But the sur<
prise was evidently too sudden and we had reached the hotel room, in an unbeli$v
I talk it over with Capt Gerlaefe again9 first in another room and then in
front of the hotel All those present are removed from the Duces rooia9 only
HadI remains alone with hiau We are now seeking only a possibility for making a
taksoff with the Strhe. First0 however9 the other possibility of taking off
in-the Storh9 which has landed in the vicinity of the valley station^, must be
firmly establishedo Qna an l@ok right into the Storch down there in the valley
the reply that at the- iioment taw is no ehaja?'for a take-off since damage had
been suffered to the driving frame during the landing* So this second possibili
ty is ale shut off! Most of the pilots located there n the mountain and
among these are.th^ baste most daring pilots * xxegats the possibility of a take<=
'off o A few of th@Bi Are skeptical stating that the takeoff isnt iapoesible0
The taxi strip must be completely cleared f stones and rockso It must be taxied
(the Storch) downhill, and the path is very short and uneven., I order the prepa
ration of the take'-of dbrip for 1600 hourso There are cow still other measures
to be taken for the taking away of Mussolini0 Mussolini requests that the
Italian soldiers not; be turned over to the POW camp but to leave them behind at
Carapo Imperator@o Ihis fits in9 to0 with our intentlono It is determined that
eomeiunieations lines which lead from.the mountain station into the valley are
1 put 01i t -of esoaoiis 3 Ion so' that t h e return .march cannot b endaiageredo Both j
\ g@aerxls a r e to fo e taken along% t o Romeo During the departure of the personnelo
I1 w@ mm st &e carefu1 that iin. Itsiliai i officer aceoaipany each @abLe s a r " until the
last !aan is taken away * to make any kind of act of sabotage improbable The
Around 1530 hours Captain Gerlach informs us that the Storeh and the take
off strip are ready for the take-offo He is very surprised when I tell him that
sistence the take~off will.be an extremely difficult task* I reply that this is
quite clear ...to.me* However, since the take-off of the Duce from Gran Sasso is u
pon .ay'order9 I tell him therefore that I am also responsible for ito If the
take-off do#snt su@@eed and Mussolini should lose his life because of it, then
nothing else -.remains for me to do than to place a bullet through my heado Ther=
fore,' its aor favoaable for me to take the risk of. the- take-off myself and,
in'case of an accident,' to go on down with ito 'Bo- greater risk can be taken on
?ay part a "Qer.lach agrees to this o For this decision, I. receive later, from
The ' jDucevhiaself is definitely enthused about the flight from the mountain.
He is a pilot himself, knows the Storeh aircraft and knows the terraino He
would rattier, he: tells Radl<> drive .to.Rocca della Caminate first ahd pick up
something -there before he turns himself over to the Fuehrer. There is no one
;
left'in:oe.ea9'.-Radl replies o.o "your wife and your children are now already in
Munich and wait there for you, Duce^'9 *. But still he would prefer to go to
'.Roeca firsto- H tells me this - I say .to hims "The Fuehrer desires that I
bring you to him immediatelyoo'9 Then Mussolini agrees reluctantly*, His trunk
are packed* But he can take along only a very small hand case with toilet .
^ article's ,$inoe. th@r isnt r@om for aore in the Storeh0 3adl takes it upon him
self to personally guarantee the - safekeeping of the trunks and to bring them
' along'himself, to Borneo In the meantime, the Duce is prepared for the journey
Take-off is set for 1550 hours* Around 1535 hours*, Major Mora arrives at Csapo
Imperatore .with ay officer, 1st <'Lt-Schulso. Just then Mussolini leaves the Hotel
with his -escort and finds himself .put in the open f/here numerous soldiers with
cameras h&dvbeesi'waiting for this moment Major Hora requests me to present him
to the Du@ ? This takes pla@e. The whole- scene lasts about 5 minutes, the
Duee exchanges' some words with Major itorso This conversation is photographed hj
war correspondent, Lt 'won .Kayser^ and is presented some 3 weeks later in the
Only a-few- brief iastrutions and then the'take-offo A few minutes later9
tap 9. tail wind* over the un@ven<, stony groundo Toward the end f the take-off
trip there ruas a small dried up ditch, oblique t the runway_ Capt Gerlaeh
now tries to take--off fr@m the geoundo' H@ definitely clears the'ditch, but the
aircraft X S & E balance and shoots over the steep ro@ky slope to the plain 9: after
first hitting the ground again with the left wheel of the frame* The precipice
is our deliverancea Because of the free fail we gain enough speed and Cap to Cier=
la@h can again eateh the glidero 7e9re airborne! '.Ve look at each ther^and are
glad for rewinning our lives0 Mussolini had even anticipated the unprecedented
neath us whi@h lie nows in detail , the Gran Sasso having been his place of rest
denee for all winter sportsa We fly very low and soon Fras@ati is in sight9 then
and now even Pratisa &i Mare airbase is in sighta The landing is carried ou
particular caution, for Gerlagh fears that the framework is possibly damaged
due to that hard blow @n the left wheel. The landing is smooth and waiting on
the field are the & llles which are to take us to Vienna., The one in which we
ourselves ar t fly0 the other two with various flying speeds in order to cut
later we again meet the second 3torch which had landed in the vicinity of
J the valley station and in which were both the Italian generals9 Sole'tl and Culi
The 3torch was again sa&e airborne and Radl sent both of them (the generals) to
Pratica di Mar since they are not to'participate in the return flight, The
HE lll*s take off around 1700 hours9 they fly about the same course - as protect
airbase to- obtain landing instructionso Traffi re@e/pti@n is and is not su<
leather onditions become increasingly wo^seo vl'e even lose radio contact
with, both escort aircraft and still no contact with Viennao Fuel9 according to
the calculations of the cretf^ is enough for k3 minutes zaore and we should be over
A..large ar?ao if head downwards through the eloud ceiling that must be Lake
Keusiedler9. southwest of Vienna And it is! Now a steep turn9 first to the nor
until the Banube* thea upstream froa the Danube to Vienna<, In complete darkness
and with almost the last liter of gase we land at the Aspern airfieldo
Itafc morning we fly with a JU5-2 to Munich-9 where we meet Donna 3ach$le and
the ehiVdreno And even this plan is smoothly carried out without incident <
Prussia-, where I gi^s a detailed report concerning the carrying out of the orders
SSI BU
H 7563 . ! 91
The draft is completed in its original form with 330 pages (without the
number of pages of this epilogue) Since it was the original intent of the auth
or to revise this rough draft before an ensuing publication is made to the War
Department0 not all chapters are written in chronological sequence of the devel~
praent of the ventso The pages are continuously numbered,, corresponding to the
progress of the work in rough drafto S<> it must be explained also that the Pre~
fa*, which only came later some time after the beginning of the work 0 was put
in the draft* but from pageis $m 57.to 59 (pages 206 to 2l4 in draft text)*
Radl are both the only persons who are truly acquainted with even the most detail
@d parts since they9ve personally gone along with this work froai the preliminary
As one ojf.. the individuals who was in on the beginning of the plan 0 there is
still the matter of General Student, as he was informed by the Fuehrer himself ,9
II. is absolutely the only expert on the joint development9 at least in so far as
the XI Air. ..Force is sheeted with ito Concerning the preliminary work$ which
Als@ toward the beginning of the work - pages 10-11 (pages 27-28 of ri~
ginal draft) . it e s mentioned that also the commander ~in~<ghief, South9 at that tijfe
positions had to be put out of circuit9 were self^evidneto But even for these
So it must also be stated that on the same day &s we freed Mussolini from Gran
Sass^ and in&eed with troops which the Commander~in~Chief South held - and sent
forth by the tame Comaiander-in-Chief* relative to his service post0 a radio mes
sage to the-troops in Sardinia, (at. that time the first evacuation of troops of
the German-.Army frea Sardinia had begtasa)9 immediately requested that the Italian-
In spits of the very small circle of knowledgeable persons9 there have been
many wh have written about, this chapter in political and war writingso At times
ailed for5 at-others usaealled foro Therefore* there exist very many incorrect-
ions and very many untruths* There .-is no reasone as it is firaly established
for this rough draft not to be considered as the only completely authentic
1st Lt.. Hadl had written a fev/ days after 12 September 19^3 0 still by pure
and provided-a eojy of it to-Adolf Hitler under my signaturea The report was
completed .-in. three copies One of.. these goes to-the Fuehrer (it also is to be
included in the icts pfthe Fuehrer8s headquarters0 the Army General Staff and in
copies9 of whieh this work is almost a duplicate) The second copy goes to
General Stwl@nt at the XI Air Force $ the third stays in ray possession 9 was
H 75S3 92
reasons in the days of the breaking up of the R@ich Even Mussolini has
his story in the press , and this was in a long interview with some Spanish newsps*
per* whieh then brought out a series of articles on it ilis portrayal didnt
correspond In all points to the actual facts9 since he had changed,things which
h hadnt.. experienced himself but knew only from hearsay? This hearsay9 together
with his own experience and meaning* di&nH give an exactly true picture which
by the war correspondent $ Lt von Kayser* In this account9 the sequence of events
were pictured in snh a misrepresented fashion that I was obliged to - lodge tha
historical report
So Lto Kayser finished it off by showing in the first article covering the
entire frost"pagea a huge picture of the heads of tha Duce 9 Major Mors and 1st Lto
Sehulzo. This picture aras taken just before the departure time of the cable car
up on the oo'untain whan I introduced Major Mors - at his special request - to the
Unee (See report*, y>ag 89)0 .Under.the picture stood the text 1 (approximately)
"A few iJiinutee afte? the liberation The Duee in conversation with hi libera
tor o-11. Kadi and I had thereupon^ on a radio broadcast which took place on the
evening'of ay protest over all the raajor German networks9. described the requested
events in this way, (The records which were made of our radio sending are per
the factso They were taken for the aost part one week after the Gran Sasso
operationo of the re-saining severely damaged gliders and for this purpose9 of
the sieobere of the yaratroop units As the s&rae Lt o Kayser took off with two
eye and ear witness of their conversations.. Even Marshall Badaglio had changed
his story of tho operation both officially and unofficially,* By thisfl according
to reliable reports0 he had maintained that I had bee.n in Italy -vith otror* a
thousand men hnd had spread a "Gestapo^ITet'1 over all of-. Italy with this groupo
could state say and write consisted of 49 aen e This can be proved iit any tiae
la all, th^re were 80 wen o& the aountairi station9 actioa~anxious soldiers
fco begin tie landing by gliders.*. From, thesee. altogc^Ser only the crew of the
thre aircraft as well as 30 mem survived the first phase f the operation*
ried out the .assault on the hotel* Cf these 20 tmn^ 1& men belonged to my unit5
<e> the pilots, were members .of the Air i:'orde<> All othx reported assertions
H 7563 * ,. -,
the loss - of' life and with it received heavy indignation of the German peopleo
and I were supposed even to have pretended to speak about the heavy losses
over the ra&io This could have been aeant to be only the report of the German
radio on 12 or 13 September 19^3 with words something like this? "Ooo-.a third
of the deployed men have fallen in the mountains or are missing; heavy losses
As I, at 1550 hours9 took off from Gran Sasso with the Duce 9 ther had ar
rived only 8 of the 12 gliders which had shared in the take-off from Pratica di
?1D.?@ airfield Of'.these9 I had personally seen one of them0 with ray own eyes,
crash into a/steep, rocky slope and break up o Since the mountain climbing -per
sonnel had not returned up to the tiae of my take-off9 I could not know if they
were knotfn to be dead for sureg although the possibility certainly was there*.
Exactly one third, of the aircraft were missinge I hadnt received any report
about their reiaaiiaing in Pratiea while I was in flight to Hitler's' field head
quarters*.' Later I received a truthful and exact rep6rt as to the situation after
r-iy take^oif namely % 1/3 had landed \ 1/3 had crashed or were missings and no
had lost his life during- the loss of aircraft and no one knew whether the missing
aircraft had zsade emergency landings or perhaps h&da9t evaa gained altitude on
taking off - and this tooQ without loss of life? this information was also sent
. forward4 Just the same0 this fact was clearly announced in the master text writ"
ten-by Hadl* for which-I have counter signed as being also responsiblee '-E-hy no
In no @as did I receive any kind of reproaches concerning this big sacrifice
thousands of congratulatory messages, gifts -. shared with the men-of the XI A.ir
iioisr t4a.j.or IZarald MOSSfl too 0 had pretended to aiake a report of this operation
for his- "Fas&ly Chronicle o:" He had publicly brought out copies of this family
chronicle,and had endeavored to bring those to ihe Historical Division0 . The te^t
"personal'vanity .and the sickly - or morbid - arabifciojs -of 14a jor Mors to express
himself -7e both opposed giving approval of the detailso Sine ae had to count
n a copy of., the text o this : pamphlet'.la the Historical Division^ there is
ThQ fact isfl above all9- that y-Jajor lor&9 on ths afternoon of 11 ;>eptember
1>V>9 also just 12 hours before his .take-off for the operation^ was let in on all
the details by me and given the definite order placing him in charge of the XI.
Air Foreeo Before this pointy he had no idea as to which plan had to do with the
liberating of Mussolinio Just the. saae 0 he eould either know or'guess whet
T
Atltfli" I itler had ordered General' Student and'me on 26o?o^3o T'oo9 he had,not
taken part in 9 for even one second9 in the notice of the coapjgted order9 in any
Sof the actual planning, discussions or suchq including the fira decision of his
I laareh route over Frassinpaeo After the action in the valley station, carried out
I had to wait in the valley station only for further directions from the mountain
I station*, whieh I then permitted to bare 1st Lt von Berlepach telephone fo him
I Then something-like 1 hour and 35 minutes laters after the ensuing delivernaee,
| - immediately upon tak-off0 he earn tip the mountain by the cable a? and was
1 introduced to the Due at his own personal request and this took, place in the
in front of the hotels asjthe Due was OJG his way to the Storeh aircrafte
The following pages give brief extracts out of this paper and in parentheses
ooo written by the bat&llion colander <, as the responsible leader.-of the
action at that time*<of' (Mo was not, the commander9 but was charged with the eom=
isand during the illness of the comstander of the Special Batalliono .Responsible
"oo General Student <> at his request <> from the SS leader and head of the
26o7o43o General student had definitely given a orders to the 53 Chiefo .Hy .
fighter, ba'tallion* of which I was the commander0 was a purely 35-weapons unit as
well as branch f the armed services Rone of these soldiers were members of the
ing", unitso Only my adjutant had formerly belonged to the BorderPolice (Pass
. uooo when General Student ordered me before hia toward 15 hours and gave me
&h@ order that without delays and immediately <, without digression^ to bring the
Duee down from the Gran Sass the next morning at 7s15 hours 0 and "dead or alive
with paratroops. eOleft me .-still some tiae to think things over for making joy own
carrying out the already. decided upon'and knovrh^to-hiai orders,, He had never seen
rt
odo when"! first ras able to pl&c the Buee ii&a^diately under guard? se
with ara&^d forceo< e.f*. (freely devised and boastfulo In Aquila9 there afas located
an'-Italian division? "Altogether at one time* these wreat strong enough? only
'8 l@atln<, requested the General for permission to take part in. the ;
operation and take soa@ people along aoO' was-attached t aie0 his 17 aes assigned
&s reinforcements t 1st Lt von Berlepslu ooa but Skorseny was to escort the Bus
the aircraft to the Fuehrerg which reduced the value on my part of the urgent
, the original planQ the wide roads over Tivoli to Pescaraooo I had to
at the last saoraentooe I had received information at the right time froaa
> street oiabat thereo<> German garrisons for the most part aptur& 000
Italian tanks drove" through the cityoo people in open revoltooo I.determinedoOOe
quite a detour.ooooe"' (All plainly made up o Detour had already been set exactly
*in'the plan btg@aus this ja$ was safero See pages ' 7 ^ 7 6 ) o
'oc*o the' ountrysi&a teemed with the demobilised and escaped*oo Italian
soldiersooe and also sev@!QJa thousand Anglo-American war prisonersQ who had re
grained their freedomQ' loafed in the Neighborhood around hereoo.e" (can only
be labeled as an halucination)'o
.f'r>;w* .t teew only in part about the landing of the gliddrs0o*o less than
100 steters away from the valley station*, o<> observed this****." (Observation
?
'oooo I drove at high speed to the valley stationoo'*oo got into the abl
with 20 .'hastily lleeted men of ay; staff ooo* assembled some 25 minutes after
-o o o o a r> o .
o Completely Imaginary or falsified 1) hy personnel ''hastily oH~
U " where things were already settled"? 2.) Gable car holds only 1012 pers
the assigned men were diffused in the building0 captured the unsuspecting
dor''guards . in front, of the Duees room and freed, the unsuspecting captives Oo.
were the flight (grew of "3 .md-.*k9 also of ay unito 2)"I forced ay: way intd'
was .already, at the, window when 2 was still in v.ox-ot the hot elo I had
even Galled to him to step SLway0 which he dido As I stepped into the roosi as
the first.-persona- lie was definitely at the- door and awaited our entraneeo)
the Du@ aaked ae not to hold captive the approximate SO^man strong ^uard force
if
o(1.,oftS h@ n^svered ay requests P@ with me what you &ille* ooooo" (all
plete . fietip:io Sheer falsehoodo' see'page 89o Ifejor Mors had, in the e
12 Septeiaber 4 j 9 in Assergi9 requested 1st Lt 3?adl to tell him how the action
was progrs;ing and was very interested in the detailso Radl had readily a~
iplished ihia re^uestp .Ma^r Mors eant bring home the point here that he ha
lie xiivj exQctly9 through -Radio how the action ran off,, and so its a
matter of 7>ure falsification hero o ) "oooo that just then my batallion had
o o o o o
had aeeoaitanied. t in those"' days oo' dlep tou.^h of luk for a few.minutes to b
COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS
r9
o <><?<> a the .agitation of German mothers waQnt long to bfc expected following
be the sacrifice "of German bl@od for an Italian* be it the Chief of State hira
a.oeo.o. begak the'campaign.'of afyoooo that the-. Fuehreroeo sent from Group
Xeador SkorzAny to the SS-leader,, to bestow on him the Knight s Cross of the Xr&>
Cross (Skorze'ny didnt even'have the Iron Cross II) and marked hlmQ by thia 0 as
the hero of the missionaoo of0 (no comment\ only fjL @oxsf irmation of the
f8
S!torseny'wore the Iron Cross II since 19^1) oooo I had .to lay down
9
Knight s .Cros8*oooooo my. officers and soldiers thought otherwise0ooo To them it
was completely clear.that the responsibility for carrying out the mission lay
with aie0 and 'exclusively with aeSooo and that I would also have to carry, the
highlyo oo not get v.er the .insult0 whish lay her^ 0 that the fGuestft of the &?> ha
ts
thereoft>], o o o, after -the paradeooo argumentsoo. to appease the "boiling soldiers0
Significant and'unusual war events were always carried out with dangerq and
This work was unfortunately only in draft based on pure factso It was
attemptedo through insertion of details and episodes to work out all contexts
/&/ Karl^ladl
formerly Reserves