23/4/2017 InSearchofanEURoleintheSyrianWarCarnegieEuropeCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace

InSearchofanEURoleinthe
SyrianWar
MarcPierini
Paper August18,2016

Summary:TheEUsfutureroleinSyriawillbealitmustestofagenuinecommonforeignandsecurity
policy.

TheSyrianwarhaslefttheEUinasecondtierpositionamonginternationalactors.Theviolentpoliciesof
theSyrianregime,Russiasshowofforce,TurkeysambivalentpolicyontheselfproclaimedIslamicState
andtheSyrianKurds,andtheEUsinternaldivisionshavegiventheunionlittleinfluenceonthecourseof
eventsinSyria.Yetthebruntofthewarshumanitarian,economic,andsecurityconsequencesfallsonEU
countries.TheEUsfutureroleinSyriawillbealitmustestofagenuinecommonforeignandsecuritypolicy.

Key Themes
Asapeaceproject,theEUcanhardlycomprehendtheclanofSyrianPresidentBasharalAssad.Atthe
beginningoftheSyrianrevolution,theEUwronglyassumedthattheAssadregimewouldcollapsein
shortorder.YettheregimehassofarassureditssurvivalbycombiningRussianinterestsintheregion
anditsownlimitlessviolence.

TheUnitedStateshasenteredanunexpectedrelationshipwithRussiaonSyria,creatinganewsituation
fortheEU.

RussiahasrescuedtheAssadregimeandisbackatthetablewheretheworldorderisshaped.Beyond
savingAssad,RussiasobjectiveinSyriaistoestablishpoliticalparitywiththeUnitedStates,a
developmentthatsidelinestheEU.

WithitsambivalentpolicyontheIslamicStateandtheSyrianKurds,Turkeyisnotonthesamepageas
theEUonSyria,eventhoughAnkaraandBrusselsstruckadealonrefugeesinMarch2016.ButTurkey
isnowrecalibratingitsSyriapolicy,especiallythroughanincipientnormalizationwithRussia.

IransregionalrolehasbeenboostedbytheJuly2015internationalnucleardeal,buttheEUhasnotused
itsdialoguewithTehrantoinfluenceIransSyriapolicy.

Major Findings for the EU

TheprevailinginstitutionalarchitectureofEUforeignpolicyhasresultedinacompletelackofEuropean
influenceondevelopmentsintheSyrianwar,beitfromtheEUcollectivelyorfrommemberstates
individually.ThishasnegativeconsequencesonacriticalregionalissueliketheSyrianconflict,especially
becausethebulkofthesecurity,humanitarian,andeconomicconsequencesimpacttheEU.

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TheEUneedstoadjusttothenewgeopoliticallandscapecreatedbytheSyrianconflictbyrecalibrating
itspositionvisvisothermajorplayers,contributingtoregionalsecurityissues,andstandingfirmonits
values.Itneedstouseitslargeforeignpolicytoolboxinamuchbettercoordinatedmannerunderthe
leadershipofitsforeignpolicyhighrepresentative.

IftheEUisunabletocraftaneffective,wellcoordinatedpolicyonSyria,itmayseeitsrolelimitedto
humanitarianactions.

Introduction
CivilianunrestinSyriastartedinMarch2011andquicklybecameaninternationalizedproxywar,withthe
involvementofFrance,Iran,Russia,Turkey,theUnitedStates,andotheractors,aswellastheriseofa
transnationalterroristmovement,theselfproclaimedIslamicState.Thewarhasbeenfoughtatthepriceof
massivelossoflife,hugeflowsofrefugees,widespreaddestruction,andmultipleatrocities,manyprobably
meetingthequalificationsforwarcrimesorcrimesagainsthumanity.

Fiveandahalfyearslater,itisnotcertainthatoneofthemostintractableconflictsofthetwentyfirstcentury
lendsitselftoanymeaningfulforeignpolicyanalysis.However,fromaEuropeanstandpoint,certaintrends
standout.TheforeignpolicypositionstakenovertimebytheEuropeanUnion(EU)intheSyrianconflict
havehadlittleinfluenceonthecourseofevents.Conversely,therebalancingofthediplomaticlandscape
triggeredbytheSyrianwarhasentailedprominentandcoordinatedrolesforRussiaandtheUnitedStates,
adevelopmentthathasendedupmarginalizingtheEU.

GiventhestarkcontrastbetweentheEUsdaringinitialpositionthatSyrianPresidentBasharalAssad
mustgoanditsmodestmilitaryanddiplomaticfootprintsofar,theSyrianwaralsoofferssomelessonsfor
theunionsfuturepositioninconflictresolutionefforts.Akeyconsiderationisthediscrepancybetweenthe
EUslimitedinfluenceonthecourseofeventsandthefactitbearsthebruntofthehumanitarianeffectsof
thecrisis,withmassivesocial,political,andsecurityconsequencesforEuropeansocieties.Yetthishuge
gapbetweeninactionandconsequencesisunlikelytotriggeradifferentEUpolicyonSyria,asthe
implementationoftheEUsLisbonTreatyandtheresultingforeignpolicyarchitectureandpracticeshaveleft
theEUlessequippedthanbeforetodealwithsuchamajorcrisisinanefficientandcomprehensivemanner.

TheSyrianwarhasnohappyendinclosesight.Evenifhostilitiesweretoceasetomorrow,thetasksof
rebuildingthecountryspoliticalsystem,security,infrastructure,andprivatedwellingsandofclearing
unexplodedminesandordnancewouldprobablytakeadecade.RehabilitatingthetraumatizedSyrian
peopleandpiecingtogethercommunitiesthatpreviouslyhadatraditionofcoexistencewouldtakeseveral
generations.TheEUhasthepotentialtoplayakeyrolehere.Butbecauseofthehabitspickedupduring
thefirstsixyearsofimplementationoftheLisbonTreaty,itisfarfromcertainthatinthediplomaticand
rehabilitationphasestheunionwouldfindtheroleithaslackedduringthewar.

TheSyriancivilwarconstitutesoneofthemostunpredictableconflictsinmoderntimes,onethatwill
undoubtedlybecomeacasestudyinforeignpolicycynicism.Fortheforeseeablefuture,theEUsrole
remainsconfinedtohumanitarianactionsonamassivescaleinSyria,inneighboringcountries,andonits
ownterritory.

The EUs Incomprehension in Syria

Inrecentdecades,theEUhasnotpaidmuchattentiontoSyria,withwhichitnegotiatedbutdidnotsignan
AssociationAgreement,aswithothercountriesaroundtheMediterranean.1Similarly,theAssadregimehas
neverconsidereditsrelationshipwiththeEUorEUmemberstatesacrucialcomponentofitsforeignpolicy
whencomparedwithSyriastiestoRussia,theUnitedStates,orLebanon.Itisthereforenotsurprisingthat
EUleadersdidnotpaymajorattentiontoorwieldinfluenceonthecourseofeventsfrom2011onward.

WhenconfrontedwithcivilianunrestinSyriassouthernprovinceofDeraainMay2011,theAssadregime
couldhavechosendialoguewiththeyoungunarmedactivists.Instead,theregimespolice,intelligence,and
armedforcesunleashedunspeakableviolence,includingtortureofchildrenandharassmentoftheirfamilies,
tosendthesignalthatdespitewidespreadArabmovementsdemandinglibertiesandaccountability,Syria
wouldhavenoneofit.2

AsearlyasMay2011,RamiMakhlouf,afirstcousintoAssad,gaveaclearformulationoftheregimes
approach:Wewillsithere.Wecallitafightuntiltheend...Theyshouldknow[that]whenwesuffer,we
willnotsufferalone.3InNovember2011,Assadconfirmedthisline,saying,StrikeSyriaandtheworldwill
shake.4ThetonewasreminiscentofformerSyrianpresidentHafezalAssadsattitudetotheIslamist
5
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uprisinginHamain1982.5Operatingstrictlywithintheparametersofthepolitical,security,andeconomic
systembuiltbyhisfatherandpredecessorandcontrolledbytheentireAssadMakhloufclan,Basharal
Assaddidnothavetheconceptualabilityletalonethepoliticalwilltoconceiveofadifferentwaytorun
thecountry.

Asaresult,unrestdevelopedintoafullfledgedcivilwarwithmassivecasualties,mostlyatthehandsofthe
regime.CurrentestimatesindicatethatasofJuly2016,280,000peoplehadbeenkilled,over13.5million
wereinneedofhumanitarianassistance,5.5millionlivedininaccessibleareas,and4.8millionwere
registeredasrefugees.6

The Syrian civil war constitutes one of the most unpredictable conflicts in
modern times, one that will undoubtedly become a case study in foreign
policy cynicism.

ViolenceexertedasamatterofpowerandsurvivalistheoppositeofwhattheEUstandsfor.Asapeace
projectbornoutofEuropessuccessiveanddevastatingwarsinthetwentiethcentury,theEUcanhardly
comprehend,muchlessanticipate,theunlimitedviolencethatiscustomarytotheAssadMakhloufclan.
Consequently,theshockingrepressionofpeacefulopponentsbytheregimeduringthefirstphaseofthe
SyrianrevolutionresultedinastrongdeclaratorypolicyfromEUleaders.TheEUcouldnotremainsilentin
thefaceofsuchlevelsofviolenceandthereforereactedrapidlywithastraightforwardpositionthatAssad
mustleaveofficebasedonanearly(andmistaken)assumptionthattheregimewouldfallinshortorder.
Althoughthispositionnevertranslatedintoswiftactioninthemilitaryordiplomaticfield,forseveralyearsit
remainedtheEuropeanUnionssolemantra.

Bycontrast,concreteEUactionunfoldedessentiallyinthehumanitarianfield.7HostilitiesinSyriatriggered
massivemovementsofpeople,bothwithinSyria,wheretheUnitedNations(UN)counted6.6million
internallydisplacedpeopleasofMay2016,8andinneighboringcountries:2.7millionrefugeesare
registeredinTurkey,or3percentofthatcountryspopulation1millioninLebanon,or22percentofthe
populationand600,000inJordan,or9percentofthepopulation.9Overall,theEUanditsmemberstates
haveallocatedatotalof5billion($5.5billion)inassistancetoSyrianrefugeesfrom2011tomid2016and
pledgedanadditional3billion($3.3billion)attheSupportingSyriaconferenceinLondoninFebruary
2016.10

An Unexpected U.S.-Russian Convergence

WhiletheEUsroleintheSyrianwarhasbeenlimited,otherglobalactorshavebeensignificantlymore
engaged.SeenfromEurope,U.S.policyonSyriahasfollowedmultipletwistsandturns,themostimportant
beingthestrongconvergencebetweentheU.S.andRussiandiplomacies.

TheUnitedStatesinitiallydeployedPatriotmissilestogetherwithGermany,whichlaterwithdrew,andthe
Netherlands,whichwasreplacedbySpaintoprotectTurkeyfrompossibleScudmissileattacksbythe
Assadregime.ThiswasfollowedbytwotrainandequipprogramsforSyrianrebels.Washingtonthendrew
aredlineinAugust2012attheuseofchemicalweaponsinSyria,followedbyadecisioninAugust2013not
tobombDamascusaftertheywereused.TheU.S.decisiontorefrainfrominterveningwasinfluencedby
theAugust2013voteintheUnitedKingdom(UK)HouseofCommonsnottoauthorizeBritishmilitary
involvementinsuchanoperation.

Soonafterward,aU.S.agreementwithRussiatoeliminatetheSyrianstockofchemicalweaponsmarked
thebeginningofanententerarelyseensincetheendoftheColdWar.Thiswasperhapsauniquecaseofa
jointdiplomaticmoveinaconflictinwhichthetwocountrieshaveotherwisedifferedonmostsubjects.11

Subsequently,WashingtonsuneasymanagementofitsrelationshipwithTurkeyhadanumberofdistinct
results.In2015,TurkeygrantedtheUnitedStatesbaserightsatncirlik,abasenearthesoutherncityof
AdanaalreadyusedforotherpurposesbytheU.S.AirForce,andatthesoutheasterncityofDiyarbakr.
TurkeyandtheUnitedStatescooperatedineffortsagainsttheIslamicState.AndtheUnitedStates
maintainedakeyrolefortheSyrianKurdishDemocraticUnionParty(PYD)intheconflictdespite
Ankarasopposition12byprovidingmilitarysupporttothepartysarmedwing,thePeoplesProtection
Units(YPG),13whilesettingupanairfacilityinRmeilaninKurdishcontrollednorthernSyria14andsending
specialforcestoSyrianKurdishterritory.15
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ThemostunsettlingpolicymoveforFranceandtheUK,whichwereduetosendbomberaircraftoverSyria
inconjunctionwiththeUnitedStates,wasU.S.PresidentBarackObamaschangeofmindbetweenhis
declaredredlineonchemicalweaponsin2012andhisdecisionin2013nottobombDamascus.16
ContrastingwithEuropeanandU.S.perceptionsofhispolicyonSyriavariousmediaoutletsdescribedthe
U.S.presidentasareluctantwarrior,whilethreeformerU.S.diplomatslabeledAssadthelesserevil17
Obamahassinceconfirmedthathethinkshispolicychoiceswerewise.18

IncontrasttotherelativelymodestdiplomaticactivityoftheEU,RussiaandtheUnitedStateshavejoined
effortsinseveralways.TheyhavebeencochairingtheInternationalSyriaSupportGroupsinceNovember
201519theyareinvolvedinUNledintraSyriantalksinthesocalledGenevaIIIframeworkandthey
craftedanagreementonthecessationofhostilitiesinFebruary2016.20Overall,suchalevelofcooperation
betweenRussiaandUnitedStateshasnoprecedentinthepreviousstagesofthecrisis,exceptforthe
chemicalweaponsagreementin2013.

Despitethemanydifferencesbetweenthetwocountries,suchaU.S.Russiandiplomaticconvergence
constitutesanewelementforEUleaders,whowillhavetoadjusttothisrelativelyunexpectedreality.This
situationleavestheEUwithachoice:eithertohaveacollectivevoiceandexertinfluenceonthecourseof
actioninSyria,ortoletoneortwoEUmembercountriessatisfythemselveswithfollowingtheU.S.lead.

Russias Political Parity With the United States

RussiasdirectmilitaryinterventioninSyriathatbeganinSeptember2015achievedfourmaingoalsinSyria
andcontributedtotheemergenceofanewdiplomaticandmilitarylandscapetowhichtheEUwillhaveto
adjust.Followingtheintervention,thepartofSyriaundertheAssadregimescontrolhasbecomeaRussian
protectorateofsorts.

ThefirstgoalwasundoubtedlytorescuetheAssadregimefromthebrinkofcollapseandthereforeshore
upalongstandingpoliticalallyandmilitaryclientintheMiddleEast.TheimpliedmessagetoWestern
leadersnotleastEUleaders,whoareseeninMoscowasthedriversofthe2011interventioninLibya
wasthatRussiaalsohasfriends,itcaresaboutthem,andtheycannotbeoustedatwillbyWesternpowers.

ThesecondobjectivewastoestablishaforwardmilitarybaseintheMiddleEast.ThecivilianBasselal
AssadInternationalAirportneartheeasternSyriancityofLatakiawasswiftlytransformedintoanefficient(if
rusticbyU.S.standards)airforcebaserenamedKhmeimim,andtheuseoftheRussiannavalfacilityin
Tartuswassubstantiallyincreased.ThisallowedRussiatolaunchintensiveaircampaigns,mostlyagainst
thoserebelsthreateningtocutoffthevitallinkbetweenLatakiaandDamascus.Despitestatementsby
Westernpowers,itwasnobigsurprisethatRussiasprioritytargetswereforcesmovingclosertothe
regimescoreassetsintheAleppo,Hama,Homs,andIdlibprovinces,andnotIslamicStateforces.22

ThethirdaimwastoputmeatontheargumentmadebyRussianPresidentVladimirPutininhisSeptember
28,2015,speechtotheUNGeneralAssembly,inwhichhesaid,WeallknowthataftertheendoftheCold
Wartheworldwasleftwithonecenterofdominance,andthosewhofoundthemselvesatthetopofthe
pyramidweretemptedtothinkthat,sincetheyaresopowerfulandexceptional,theyknowbestwhatneeds
tobedoneandthustheydontneedtoreckonwiththeUN.23Putinsimpleterms,thisassertiveRussian
narrativemeantthatfromthenon,theworldorderwouldbeshapedwithRussiaatthetable,notbythe
UnitedStatesanditsEuropeanalliesalone.TheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)military
campaignin2011inLibyawhichMoscowconsidersanabuseofUNSecurityCouncilResolution1973of
March17,2011,concerningthewayoutoftheLibyanconflictwasinretrospectthetypeofdevelopment
thatRussiawantedtoavoid.

In many ways, the Russian campaign in Syria played the role of a war
showroom, exhibiting the use of weapons in an operational context and
illustrating Russian force projection capabilities.

ThefourthgoalwastodemonstratetoWesternandregionalpowersthatcontrarytosomeanalyses,Russia
hadthemilitarymightnecessarytotackleimportantcrisesinaswiftandrationalmanner.Tothateffect,
Putinorderedthedeploymentofmuchmorepowerfulmilitaryassetsthanneededforfightinganinsurgency:
S400missiles,24cruisemissileslaunchedfromtheairandfromshipsintheCaspianandtheMediterranean
25 26
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Seas, andsophisticatedairreconnaissanceassets.26Theseoperationswereconductedinafastand
25

flexibleway,insideandoutsideSyria,includingthroughamassivemaritimeresupplymissionviatheTurkish
Straits.SyriaalsoservedasademonstrationthataccesstotheMediterraneanSeabyseaandairwasinno
wayaconstraintforRussianforces.

Inmanyways,theRussiancampaigninSyriaplayedtheroleofawarshowroom,exhibitingtheuseof
weaponsinanoperationalcontextandillustratingRussianforceprojectioncapabilities.27EvenRussias
supposedwithdrawalinMarch2016createdsurpriseinSyriaandtheWest,whichwasprobablythemain
objective.Putindidnotwithdrawhisforcesentirelyandsoongaveaclearsignalthattheycouldbeback
anytimeandinshortorder.28Initself,thissurprisemoveconstitutedanothertacticalachievementofsorts.21

Overall,therapidsequenceofRussiasmilitaryoperationsasofSeptember2015,itspartialwithdrawal,and
itsparalleldiplomaticactivitysetthetempofortheGenevaIIItalks.Duringthetalks,byentertainingthe
notionofwiderautonomyforSyriaslocaladministrations(thatistosay,fortheKurds),Moscowignored
concernsthattheUnitedStatesmighthaveaboutTurkeysreactiontoapoliticalrolebeinggiventoSyrian
KurdishentitiesthatitconsidersalliesoftheKurdistanWorkersParty(PKK)insurgencyinTurkey.

Onthepoliticalside,MoscowindeedrescuedAssadfromthebrink,butitappearsthattherescueoperation
hadamoregeneralobjectivethanjustsavingafriendlydictator:tousetheSyriancrisisasavehiclefor
challengingtheassumedU.S.monopolyintheMiddleEastandachievingRussiandiplomaticparitywiththe
UnitedStates.ThislongtermobjectiveofRussiandiplomacyhasbeenlargelyachievedifjudgedby
RussianmilitarysupremacyinwesternSyria(includingadefactoairinterdiction)andtheintensityof
MoscowsdiplomaticworkwithWashington.Thedraftinginearly2016ofanewSyrianconstitutionby
MoscowisanotherexampleofRussiasfirmintentiontoweighinontheworldorder,asisitsoffertothe
UnitedStatesofconductingjointoperationsagainsttheIslamistgrouptheNusraFront.29

ThisnewequilibriumbetweenMoscowandWashingtononSyriaimpliesarelativemarginalizationofthe
EuropeanUnion,includingitslargestmemberstates.Itwillhavelastingconsequencesontheway
internationalrelationsareconducted.

Turkey: Stuck Between Domestic Issues, Historical

Worries, and an Ambivalent Foreign Policy
SeenfromEurope,TurkeyspolicyonSyriahasbeenpuzzling.Onapracticallevel,Turkeysconcrete
movesinSyriahaveoftenprovedtobeatoddswithEUnormsorwiththemilitarydecisionsofsome
membercountries.Onamoregloballevel,thebroadobjectiveofforeignpolicyconvergencewiththeWest
oneoftherequirementsofTurkeysEUaccessionnegotiationsisoutofreachonthekeyissueofthe
Syrianconflict.

Afteraphaseofpositiverelationsaimedateconomicreformsandincreasedtrade,Ankaratriedin2011to
convinceAssadtomanagethecrisisinapeacefulmanner.Neithereconomicreformsnorapeaceful
handlingofprotestersmaterialized.RecepTayyipErdoan,thenTurkeysprimeministerandnowits
president,rapidlyswitchedtoafirmlyheldpositionthatAssadmustgo.Thatstancewassimilartotheinitial
EUandU.S.positionsbutalsohadareligiousandideologicalbackground:Turkeyscitizensare
predominantlySunni,whiletheAssadregimeisAlawite,abranchoftheShiafaith.Thispolicyofopposing
AssadinvolvedtrainingSyrianrebelsanddeliveringweaponstosomeofthem.

AnkarahasalsolongbeenperceivedinEuropeastryingtomanagearelationshipwiththeIslamicState,a
SunniinsurgencyagainstaShiaregime.30Observershavenotedstrikingsimilaritiesbetweenthegroups
narrativewhenitproclaimeditscaliphateinJune201431andTurkeysnarrativeaboutitsdutytostopthe
factthateachconflictinthisregionhasbeendesignedacenturyago.32

In2015,AnkarastartedtoperceivetheKurdsinandaroundTurkeyinanewlight,withthreesimultaneous
developmentsthatevokedAnkarashistoricalworryofanindependentKurdistan.InIraq,theKurdish
RegionalGovernment,analreadyautonomousentity,benefitedfromincreasedmilitarysupportfromthe
UnitedStatesandEuropeancountries.InSyria,theYPGreceivedmilitarybackingfromboththeUnited
StatesandRussiaandaccumulatedterritorialsuccessesinAfrin,Koban,andTellAbyad.33Andin
Turkeystwo2015legislativeelections,theproKurdishPeoplesDemocraticParty(HDP)received13
percentand10percentofthevoteintheJune7andNovember1ballotsrespectively,becomingapolitical
obstacletoErdoansambitionforanexecutivepresidentialregime.34Internally,thisdevelopmentwas
followedasofJuly2015byamassiveflareupinhostilitiesbetweenthegovernmentandthePKKdomestic
insurgencyaswellastheabandonmentofthesocalledKurdishpeaceprocessthatErdoanhadlaunched
asprimeministertogreatapplaudsfromtheEU.

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Ankaraslongstanding(andfailed)attempttopersuadetheWesttoimplementanoflyorsafezoneinSyria
createdasharpdivergencewithboththeUnitedStatesandtheEU.Officially,Turkeyseffortaimedat
keepingSyrianrefugeesonSyriansoil,butinpracticeitsoughttomakethereunificationoftheKurdish
districtsmoredifficult.35Inearly2016,AnkaraattemptedtoconvinceGermany36andtheEuropean
CommissiontospendonSyriansoilsomeoftheEUassistanceforSyrianrefugeesonwhichAnkaraand
BrusselsagreedaspartoftheEUTurkeyrefugeedeal.Thatdecisionisstillpendingasofmid2016.37The
dangersofestablishingsuchaseeminglysafezonewithoutanysemblanceofinternationalagreementor
militarycover(whichwouldimplygroundtroopsfromWesterncountries,anoptionrepeatedlyexcluded)
weredemonstratedonMay5,2016,whentheSyrianairforceshelledarefugeecampestablishedby
Turkishnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs).38

Moregenerally,TurkeysentireSyriapolicyhasbeenfrozensincetheRussianinterventiontorescuethe
Assadregime,especiallyasRussiaestablishedaneffectiveairinterdictionzoneovernorthwesternSyria.A
numberofnegativeepisodesaffectedtheTurkishRussianrelationshipinlate2015:theTurkishdowningof
aRussianSukhoibomberaircraftinNovember39andRussianaccusationsofTurkishcorruption,secret
dealings,andoilsmugglingthatboostedtheIslamicStatesfinancialstrength40claimsthatAnkarafirmly
rejected.41However,anexchangeofdeclarationsonJuly1,2016,setinmotionanormalizationprocess
thatstartedmaterializinginameetingbetweentheTurkishandRussianpresidentsinSaintPetersburgon
August9.

TheIslamicStatesincreasedterroristoperationsinTurkey,includingamultiplesuicideattackonIstanbuls
mainairportonJune29,2016,areboundtotriggerapolicyrecalibrationonthepartofAnkara.Afteryears
ofambivalencetowardtheIslamistgroup,Turkeylaunchedadifficultprocessofcounterterrorism
cooperationwithsomeEUmembercountries.Counterterrorismcooperationwillprobablysoonbecomea
dominantthemeofTurkeysrelationswithboththeEUandRussia.42

Counterterrorism cooperation will probably soon become a dominant

theme of Turkeys relations with both the EU and Russia.

ThehumanitarianemergencyresultingfromtheSyrianwarhitTurkeymostinabsoluteterms.Itisestimated
thatsincetheendof2011,Turkeyhasreceivedatotalof2.7millionrefugeeswhoareregisteredwiththe
UNrefugeeagency.Ofthese,285,000(10.6percentofthetotal)arehostedincampsrunbytheTurkish
emergencyagencyAFAD,theTurkishRedCrescent,andlocalmunicipalities.43Whilenearly90percentof
therefugeesorganizetheiraccommodationsprivately,allreceiveatemporaryguestidentitycardandcan
benefitfromfreehealthcareinpublichospitals.

AdealbetweenTurkeyandtheEuropeanUnionreachedingeneraltermsonNovember29,2015,and
finalizedonMarch18,2016,resultedinitiallyinasharpdecreaseinthenumberofuncontrolledmigrants
arrivingontheGreekislandsintheAegeanSea.Butthedealquicklybecameembroiledinlitigationabout
theconcessionsofferedbytheEUandtheconditionstobemetbyTurkey.

Irans Renewed Regional Presence

TheEUsmaininteractionwithotherregionalpowersinrecentyearshasfocusedlargelyonIranandonthe
managementoftalksbetweenIranandthefivepermanentmembersoftheUNSecurityCouncilplus
Germany(theP5+1)thatresultedinadealonTehransnuclearprogram.44InitsdealingswithIransince
theJuly2015agreement,theEUhasnotgonemuchfartherthandiplomaticstatementsconcerningIrans
roleintheSyrianwar,althoughTehransstrongsupportfortheAssadregimeremainsamajorobstacletoa
politicalsettlement.45

AnumberofEuropeanandWesternanalystshavemadetheassessmentthatthenucleardealgaveIranan
openingforamoreassertivepolicyintheregionandhelpedTehranachieveitsprimaryobjectivetobe
backontheregionaldiplomaticsceneafteryearsofisolation.46Iransofficialstatementafterthenuclear
dealwascouchedinverygeneralandappeasingterms:TheGovernmentoftheIslamicRepublicofIranis
determinedtoactivelycontributetopromotionofpeaceandstabilityintheregioninthefaceofincreasing
threatofterrorismandviolentextremism.47YetacrucialelementofTehranspolicyintheregionisto
maintainanactiveShiacrescentthroughTehran,Baghdad,andDamascus,withthesupportofthe
LebaneseIslamistgroupHezbollah.Indeed,ithasbeenarguedthatIranianinvolvementinSyriaisessential
tothesurvivalofAssadsarmy.48

The EUs Diplomatic Absence

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The EUs Diplomatic Absence

TheEuropeanUnionhasbeenconspicuouslyabsentfromcoreinternationaldiplomaticdiscussionsonSyria
andhasnottakenanymeaningfuldiplomaticinitiativessince2011.WhilemostEUmemberstatesinvolved
inantiIslamicStateoperationsarefocusingonIraq,theEuropeanmilitaryinvolvementagainsttheIslamist
groupinSyriacomesmostlyfromFrance,whoseairforcecomplementsU.S.operations.49TheUnited
StatesandFrance50aresupporteddirectlyorindirectlybyDenmark,51Germany,52theNetherlands,53the
UnitedKingdom,54and,recently,Belgium.55

Moreimportantly,theverylimitedroleoftheEUasablocintheSyrianconflictalsohasasystemicorigin.
TheimplementationoftheLisbonTreatythemostrecentevolutionoftheEUslegalarchitecture
weakenedthepolicyinitiativeroleoftheEUinstitutions,inparticulartheEuropeanCommissionandthe
EuropeanExternalActionService,givingthisresponsibilitybacktothememberstates,especiallythelarger
countriesandatthelevelofheadsofstateandgovernment.56Examplesofthisshiftabound:thelarger
memberstateshavemademultiplestatementsontheSyriancrisisthebiggerEUcountrieshavemade
deliberateeffortstohavenationaldiplomatsappointedtoheadimportantEUdelegationsandforeign
ministershavebeenexcludedfromtheEuropeanCouncil,whichbringstogethernationalleaders.

Inaddition,byanunfortunatecoincidenceoftimelines,thenewEuropeanforeignpolicyarchitecturecame
intobeingattheverysamemomentthattheArabSpringunfolded,raisingentirelynewchallengestoa
disruptedEUforeignpolicymechanism.57ContrarytoexpectationsinBerlin,London,orParis,theprevalent
voicesofthebigthreememberstatesandthediminishedvoiceoftheBrusselsbureaucracydidnotleadto
anyincreaseinefficiencymuchtheopposite.

True,thetoolboxofEUdiplomacyhumanitarianassistance,developmentaid,tradesanctions,
agreementswiththirdcountries,andsoonremainedwiththeEuropeanCommission.ButtheEUsability
tousethesetoolsinconjunctionwithandinsupportofbroaderpoliticalinitiativesinshort,theEUs
capacitytoexertpoliticalleadershiphasbeenseverelycurtailed.TheexperienceoftheSyriancivilwar,
includingthecaseoftherefugeedealwithTurkey,hasshownthatasinglememberstatecannotbecomean
acceptableleaderfortheentireEU.Instead,thisnewarchitectureproducedeitherinaction(witnessthe
EUsnonpolicyonSyria)orconfusion(asontherefugeedealwithTurkey,whosekeyfeatureswere
negotiatedbyGermanyinsteadoftheEUinstitutions).

The experience of the Syrian civil war, including the case of the refugee
deal with Turkey, has shown that a single member state cannot become
an acceptable leader for the entire EU.

Themassiverefugeecrisisthatbeganin2015,albeitnotmadeupexclusivelyofSyrianasylumseekers,
quicklyshowedatripledivideintheEuropeanUnion.Germany,initiallywithSweden,wastheonly
EuropeancountryopentohostinglargenumbersofSyrianrefugees.Thiswashardlysurprisingasthe
countryhasastrongeconomicgrowthrecord,nearfullemployment,abudgetarysurplus,unfilledjob
positions,andapositiveattitudefromitscitizenstowardrefugees(theWillkommenskultur).Inasecond
groupofEUmembercountrieswerethosethatrefusedtoplayanypartintherefugeecrisis,suchasthe
UK,Denmark,andtheentireCentralEuropeangroupofmemberstates,whichhadoptedoutoftheEUs
Schengenpassportfreetravelzone.ThencamethecountriesthattriedtoshowsolidaritywithGermanybut
hadneithertheeconomicleewaynorthepoliticalwilltodoso.

AftertheEUCouncilofMinistersfailedtodecideonnewasylumandmigrationpoliciesinMay2015,
politicalpanicbrokeoutduringthesummer,andmanyEUcountriesrefusedtosharetheburdenof
refugeeswithGermany.Asaresult,andatBerlinsbehest,EUinstitutionsinitiatedanegotiationwithTurkey
meanttoensurerefugeeretentioninTurkeyinexchangeforfinancialsupportandthepromiseof
concessionsinunrelatedfieldsavisafreeregimeforTurkishcitizenstravelingtoEUcountriesand
TurkeysEUaccessionnegotiations.Thishighlyunusualdiplomaticdealcoincidedwithanacutedomestic
politicalcrisisinTurkeyandhencequicklybecameextremelydifficulttomanage.Ofparticularconcernwere
TurkeysnonapplicationofcertainprovisionsoftheUNRefugeeConvention,therenewedarmedconflictin
thesoutheastofthecountry,andTurkeyssharplydegradedsituationonhumanrightsandtheruleoflaw.
Theconflictualdiscussionsaboutthisdealcontinueasofthiswriting.

Adjusting to the New Landscape

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Adjusting to the New Landscape

ItwouldbeexaggeratedtostatethattheEUhasbeenwatchingtheSyrianconflictfromthesidelines.Yet
themajordevelopmentsthathavetakenplaceinrelationtotheSyrianwarformanewpoliticallandscapeto
whichtheEUmustnowadjust.

TheEUneedstorecalibrateitspositionvisvisothermajorplayers.TheUnitedStateshasbecomemore
reluctanttoguaranteetheregionssecurityandstabilitythaninthepastseventyyears.Meanwhile,Russia
hasestablishedapermanentmilitaryinfrastructureintheMiddleEastandregainedamoreimportant
diplomaticroleontheworldstage.Moscowhasalsolaunchedadiplomatictandemofsortswith
Washington,atleastontheSyrianwar.TheexitfromtheSyriancrisiswilllikelyrequireanevendeeper
convergencebetweenRussiaandtheUnitedStatesonapoliticalsolution.Thisnewtrendisalreadyforcing
Turkeytoamenditsforeignpolicy.TheEUmayhavetofinetuneitspolicyaccordinglybybringingits
varioustoolshumanitarianaid,developmentaid,reformsupport,NGOfunding,coordinationcapacity,and
apoliticalmilitaryroleinafuturesettlementtobearthroughamoreproactiverolefortheEUforeignpolicy
highrepresentative.

TheEUmayalsowanttoweighinonregionalsecurityissues.TherearedivergencesbetweentheWest
andRussiaonthefutureofAssadandthefightagainsttheIslamicStateintermsofcombatoperations
andpossibleprosecutionsforwarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity.TheEUcancontributeintwo
differentways:theindividualmilitaryactionsofsomeofitsmemberstatesandthediplomaticroleoftheEU
highrepresentative.

Atthesametime,theEUisnowdealingwithaTurkeythatisamoreuneasypartnerthaninthepast.With
itshithertoambivalentpolicyontheIslamicState,itsunwillingnesstofactorinstrategicchangesatthe
regionallevel,aquasicivilwarinthesoutheast,thenegativeevolutionofitsruleoflawsituation,andthe
aftermathofthefailedcoupattemptonJuly15,2016,TurkeyismoredistantfromEUinternalstandards
andforeignpolicyprinciplesthaninthepastfifteenyearsorso.FortheEU,thismeansthatTurkeys
interestinitsEUaccessionprocessisboundtobesignificantlyreduced,andasaresult,theEUleverageon
Turkeysruleoflawarchitecturewillbeconsiderablydiminished,ifnotannihilated.Yet,closedialogueand
cooperationwillneedtocontinueonkeymatterssuchasenergy,trade,counterterrorism,andrefugees.

ConcerningSyria,theEUshouldalsostandfirmonitsvalues.Itisfarfromclearthattheprinciplesthatthe
EUiskeenonupholdinginitsforeignpolicytheruleoflaw,fundamentalliberties,coexistence,and
tolerancestandachanceofbeingappliedinapostsettlementSyria.Russianinducedrealpolitikmightnot
leavemuchroomforEUstandardsinSyria.ButwhattheEUcando,irrespectiveoftheimmensedifficulties
ahead,istokeeppromotingtheseprinciplesandofferingtosupportkeyelementsofademocraticstate
thereconstructionofthecountrysadministration,judiciary,freemedia,andcivilsociety,aswellas
transitionaljusticeifandwhenapoliticalsettlementisreached.

Russian-induced realpolitik might not leave much room for EU standards

in Syria.

Giventhesenewrealities,conditionsmayseemripeforanEUforeignpolicycomebackintheSyriancrisis.
Yet,engineeringsucharevivalwillmeetconsiderabledifficulties,especiallybecausethepolitical
preferencesofkeymembercountriestendtokeepdecisionsinastrictlynationalframework,withonly
limitedinvolvementoftheEUasanorganization.InGermany,thedomesticpriorityhasshiftedfrom
welcomingthewaveofrefugeesfromSyriatocurbingit,andhencetomanagingtheEUTurkeyrefugee
dealasdifficultandpoliticallycostlyasthismaybe.InFrance,especiallysincethemassiveterrorist
attacksinParisonNovember13,2015,thepriorityistoshowcitizensthatthegovernmentisactingagainst
theIslamicState,hencetheextensionoftheFrenchmilitaryoperationtoSyria.TheUK,foritspart,is
currentlymanagingtheaftermathofitsvotetoleavetheEU,inwhichresistancetorefugeeflowsplayedan
importantpart,andisthereforehighlyunlikelytotakeanyfreshinitiativeinanEUcontext.

Atatechnicallevel,expertshaveraisedthequestionofwhetheranEUforeignpolicyroleinamediation
capacitycouldbecomepossibleinSyria.58Theissueiswhether,atonepoint,aconsensuscouldemerge
amonginternationalstakeholderstoentrusttheEUwithmanagingdiscussionsbetweenkeyplayersonan
eventualtransitionagreement,liketheP5+1formatintheIrannuclearnegotiations.Theconvenienceof

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havingasomewhatneutralmiddlemanorconvenerinthediscussionmight,itisargued,proveusefulagain
forMoscowandWashington.

However,thereareconsiderabledifferencesbetweenthenegotiationsontheIrannucleardealanda
prospectivesettlementinSyria.Inparticular,Russia,whichhadadistinctinterestinlimitingthemilitary
nuclearcapabilitiesofIran,issquarelysidingwiththeAssadregimeinSyria.Forthetimebeing,theformal
roleentrustedtotheUnitedNations,albeitineffectivesofar,seemstobetheonlyformatacceptabletoall
parties.

TheroadtoafutureEUrolemightbefoundinanotherdirection,especiallyifEuropeanleadersfindthetime
andenergytorethinktheunionsroleinmajorcrisesonthebasisoftheEUglobalstrategypresentedon
June29,2016,bytheEUsforeignpolicychief,FedericaMogherini.59Thekeywordsofthestrategyare
[serving]commonEuropeaninterests...bycommonmeans.

Syria as a Litmus Test for EU Foreign Policy

ThelackofproactiveandcollectiveEUengagementintheSyriancrisishasdeprivedtheunionofany
significantinfluenceonthedirectionofeventsinitsimmediatevicinity.Yet,mostofthehumanitarianand
economicconsequencesoftheSyriancrisisfallonEUcountries.Arguably,suchamajordiscrepancyis
politicallyunsustainable.

ThenatureoftheEUsroleintheresolutionoftheSyriancrisisconstitutesoneofthelitmustestsofa
genuinecommonforeignandsecuritypolicy.IfanEUconsensusonastrongerpoliticalstanceonSyria
doesnotemerge,theEUmayendupbeingconfinedtotheroleofanaccessoryactorinmodernconflicts
aproviderofhumanitarianassistance,reconstructionsupport,developmentandtechnicalassistance,trade
concessions,orsanctions.

Causes of the EUs Indecision

TheEUsabsencefromanydecisiveroleintheSyrianwarbeitattheleveloftheinstitutionsorofthe
memberstatesistheresultoftwodistinctelements.

First,theEUgrosslymiscalculatedtheAssadregimesresilienceandtheextenttowhichbothIran(and
thereforeHezbollah)andRussiawouldprovidemilitarysupporttoDamascus.TheSyrianwarisacontextin
whichtheEUsvaluedbasedreasoningisoflittlerelevancetoAssadsalliesandtheU.S.aversionto
militaryriskishigh.

Second,thethreelargestEUmemberstateshaveshownalackofunity.Britainhasbeenaverseto
engagingmilitarily,hadoptedoutofEUpoliciesonrefugees,andhasbeenpreoccupiedwithitsvoteto
leavetheEU.Germanyhastraditionallybeenreluctanttobecomeinvolvedmilitarilyabroadandhad,at
leastinitially,auniquelyopenpolicyonrefugees.Francehasbeenwillingtoengagemilitarily,withinlimits,
buthasanoverestimatedassessmentofitsroleasaglobalpower.Thisdisunityresultedinatotallackof
influencefromEuropeancountries,collectivelyorindividually,onthedirectionofeventsintheSyrianwar.
TheEUslackofinfluencemaynowbeconsiderablyreinforcedwhentheUKleavesthebloc,althoughEU
UKforeignpolicycoordinationmechanismscouldpalliatesomeoftheinconvenience.60

Consequences for EU Foreign Policy

ThelongtermconsequencesoftheSyrianconflictarefarfrompredictableatthisstage.Yet,theyremainof
crucialimportanceforEuropeancountries,asillustratedbyterroristacts,flowsofmigrants,andthe
consequencesoftherefugeecrisisonEUrelationswithTurkey.

TheconclusionsifanythatEUleadersdrawfromtheirlackofinfluenceontheevolutionoftheSyrian
crisiswill,toasubstantialextent,definethefutureofEUforeignandsecuritypolicy.Morethangrand
strategies,letalonetreatyrevisions,whatisneededisapoliticalunderstandingaboutwhere,when,and
howtheEUshouldact.

The conclusionsif anythat EU leaders draw from their lack of

influence on the evolution of the Syrian crisis will, to a substantial extent,
define the future of EU foreign and security policy.
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Inthisrespect,SyriacouldprovidetheEUwithademonstrationofacrisisinwhichnosingleEUmember
statehascrucialeconomicormilitaryinterestsinthecountryinquestionbutinwhichtheentireEUfacesthe
substantialmoral,socioeconomic,andsecurityconsequencesofnotacting.

In2011,asimpleanalysisoftheAssadregimespoliticalandsecuritymindsetandaconcomitantanalysis
oftheinterestsofthirdpartiesIran,Qatar,Russia,SaudiArabia,Turkeyshouldhavesufficedtoinduce
EUleaderstogettheiracttogether,forexamplebysettingupaSyriancrisismanagementcenterentrusted
withthecoordinationofdiplomatic,military,andhumanitarianactionsoftheEUanditsmemberstates.Most
importantly,closeEUinvolvementwithregionalactorscouldhaveinfluencedtheirpoliciesandtriggered
muchearlierengagementonthehumanitarianfrontwiththethreefrontlinestatesofJordan,Lebanon,and
Turkey.Inallthesedimensions,theEuropeanExternalActionServiceandtheEuropeanCommissionare
appropriatelyequippedforthetaskathand,aslongasthepoliticalwillatthedecisionmakinglevelisthere.

TheEUcouldusetheunfortunatestoryofitslackofinfluenceintheSyrianwartodrawusefullessonsfor
thefuture.SuchlessonswouldbeespeciallyrelevantintermsofthepossibleoperationalformatstheEU
coulduseincaseslikeSyriawherethemilitaryweightofthefewmemberstatesinvolvedcannotmakea
decisivedifferencetotheconflict.TheEUglobalstrategy,publishedinJune2016andyettobewidely
discussed,comprisessomeusefulthoughtsaboutfuturepolicies,inparticularinthefieldsofsecurityand
defense,counterterrorism,cybersecurity,energysecurity,andstrategiccommunications.Butoverall,this
remainsacaseofpoliticalwillwhetherornotEUleaderswillseeabenefitincollectiveaction.

ItwillprobablybeawhilebeforeBritainsvotetoleavetheEUisdealtwithandanotherwhilebeforethe
newEUglobalstrategyisprocessed.Butoneoverwhelmingfactremains:themosttragicconsequenceof
thewarinSyriaistheunspeakablesufferingofSyriansofallcreedsandages,atraumaboundtogenerate
frustrationandresentmentforgenerationstocome.61Andinevitably,theEUsforeignpolicyambitionswill
bejudgedatleastinpartonitscontributiontothealleviationofSyrianssuffering,whileathome,EUleaders
seemsettopayaheavypoliticalpricefornotfindingacourseofactionthatEuropeancitizensdeem
appropriate.

Notes
1FactSheet:TheEuropeanUnionandSyria,EuropeanUnionExternalAction,February5,2015,
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131018_01_en.pdf.
2HumanRightsWatch,Assad'sDungeons,Executive Magazine,May4,2011,

https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/04/assadsdungeonsSyria:CrimesAgainstHumanityinDaraa,
HumanRightsWatch,June1,2011,https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/01/syriacrimesagainsthumanity
daraa.
3AnthonyShadid,SyrianElitetoFightProteststotheEnd,New York Times,May10,2011,

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/world/middleeast/11makhlouf.html?_r=2.
4HalaJaber,StrikeSyriaandtheWorldWillShake,Sunday Times,November20,2011,

http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/article826193.ece.
5ReportFromAmnestyInternationaltotheGovernmentoftheSyrianArabRepublic,Amnesty
International,November1,1983,https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/004/1983/en/andJason
Rodrigues,1982:Syria'sPresidentHafezalAssadCrushesRebellioninHama,Guardian,August1,2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/fromthearchiveblog/2011/aug/01/hamasyriamassacre1982
archive.
6GlobalCenterfortheResponsibilitytoProtect,Syria,lastupdatedAugust15,2016,
http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/syria.
7EuropeanCommissionHumanitarianAidandCivilProtection,SyriaCrisisECHOFactsheet,last
updatedMay2016,https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf.
8UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,SyrianArabRepublic,lastupdated
May2016,http://www.unocha.org/syria.
9UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees,SyriaRegionalRefugeeResponse,lastupdatedMay
19,2016,http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.
10
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10EuropeanCommissionHumanitarianAidandCivilProtection,SyriaCrisisECHOFactsheet.

11U.S.DepartmentofState,FrameworkforEliminationofSyrianChemicalWeapons,September14,
2013,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm.
12CherylPellerin,U.S.,TurkeyFinalizingDetailsofAntiISILAirstrikes,U.S.DepartmentofDefense,
August14,2015,http://www.defense.gov/NewsArticleView/Article/613670.
13U.S.ResuppliesKurdishForcesFightingISILNearKobani,U.S.DepartmentofDefense,October20,
2014,http://www.defense.gov/NewsArticleView/Article/603484.
14ClarissaWardandTimLister,InsideSyria:TheFarmAirstripThat'sPartoftheU.S.FightAgainstISIS,
CNN,February3,2016,http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/02/middleeast/syriaisisusairstrip/index.html.
15RemarksbyPresidentObamainAddresstothePeopleofEurope,WhiteHouseOfficeofthePress
Secretary,April25,2016,https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/2016/04/25/remarkspresident
obamaaddresspeopleeurope.
16RemarksbythePresidenttotheWhiteHousePressCorps,WhiteHouseOfficeofthePressSecretary,
August20,2012,https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/2012/08/20/remarkspresidentwhitehouse
presscorpsandJohnKerry,StatementonSyria,U.S.DepartmentofState,August30,2013,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213668.htm.
17DanaMilbank,BarackObama,theReluctantWarrior,Washington Post,July6,2016,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barackobamathereluctantwarrior/2016/07/06/ac2aacb443ba
11e688d06adee48be8bc_story.htmlandRyanCrocker,WilliamLuers,andThomasPickering,Howa
U.S.IranNuclearDealCouldHelpSaveIraq,Washington Post,July11,2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/howausirannucleardealcouldhelpsave
iraq/2014/07/11/cd2d1b72085c11e4a0ddf2b22a257353_story.html.
18JeffreyGoldberg,TheObamaDoctrine,Atlantic,April2016,

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/theobamadoctrine/471525/.
1914November2015,StatementoftheInternationalSyriaSupportGroupVienna,UnitedNations
DepartmentofPoliticalAffairs,November14,2015,http://www.un.org/undpa/en/Speeches
statements/14112015/syria.
20JointStatementoftheUnitedStatesandtheRussianFederation,asCoChairsoftheISSG,on
CessationofHostilitiesinSyria,U.S.DepartmentofState,February22,2016,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/253115.htm.
21MarcPierini,Assadland,aRussianProtectorate,CarnegieEurope,September22,2015,
http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=61358.
22JointDeclarationontheRecentMilitaryActionsoftheRussianFederationinSyria,U.S.Departmentof
State,October2,2015,http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/10/247802.htmandEuropeanCouncil,
CouncilConclusionsonSyria,October12,2015,http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press
releases/2015/10/12facconclusionssyria.
2370thSessionoftheUNGeneralAssembly,OfficialInternetResourcesofthePresidentofRussia,
September28,2015,http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50385.
24MoscowtoDeployS400DefenseMissileSystemtoKhmeimimAirbaseinSyria,RT,November25,
2015,https://www.rt.com/news/323379s400russiasyriaairbase/VladimirPutinsAnnualNews
Conference,OfficialInternetResourcesofthePresidentofRussia,December17,2015,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971andS400MissileRadiusMap,InstitutefortheStudyof
War,December21,2015,http://understandingwar.org/map/s400missileradiusmap.
25RussiaDeploysMissileCruiserOffSyriaCoast,OrderedtoDestroyAnyTargetPosingDanger,RT,
November24,2015,https://www.rt.com/news/323329russiasuspendmilitaryturkey/.
26MikhailKhodaryonok,ThreeLayersofRussianAirDefenseatHmeimimAirBaseinSyria,TASS,
February12,2016,http://tass.ru/en/defense/855430.

27
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27MansurMirolvalev,Syria'sWar:AShowroomforRussianArmsSales,Al Jazeera English,April6,2016,

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/syriawarshowroomrussianarmssales160406135130398.html
andDmitriTrenin,RussiaintheMiddleEast:MoscowsObjectives,Priorities,andPolicyDrivers,Carnegie
MoscowCenter,April5,2016,http://carnegie.ru/2016/04/05/russiainmiddleeastmoscowsobjectives
prioritiesandpolicydrivers/iwni.
28MeetingWithRussianArmedForcesServicePersonnel,OfficialInternetResourcesofthePresidentof
Russia,March17,2016,http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51526.
29Al-Akhbar,RussiaPensDraftConstitutionforSyria,SyrianObserver,trans.anded.,May25,2016,

http://syrianobserver.com/EN/Features/31079/Russia_Pens_Draft_Constitution_Syria/.
30Ahuzyurt,SympathyfortheDevilThatIsISIL,Hrriyet Daily News,September26,2014,

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/sympathyforthedevilthatisisil.aspx?
PageID=238&NID=72179&NewsCatID=515.
31MaliseRuthven,TheMapISISHates,New York Review of Books,June25,2014,

http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/06/25/mapisishates/andMarcPierini,UnderstandingTurkeysTake
ontheIslamicState,Judy Dempseys Strategic Europe(blog),CarnegieEurope,October14,2014,
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=56959.
32AgenceFrancePresse,PresidentErdoanSlamsModernLawrencesofArabiainMiddleEast,
Hrriyet Daily News,October13,2014,http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/presidenterdoganslamsmodern
lawrencesofarabiainmiddleeast.aspx?pageID=238&nid=72903.
33PresidentBarzani:TimeIsAptforKurdistantoHoldReferendum,KurdistanRegionPresidency,
February3,2016,http://www.presidency.krd/english/articledisplay.aspx?id=RY+rNq+QXIQandSyriaCivil
War:KurdsDeclareFederalRegioninNorth,AlJazeera English,March17,2016,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/syriacivilwarkurdsdeclarefederalsystemnorth
160317111902534.html.
34TurkeysRecentElections:FromMarch2014toNovember2015,CarnegieEurope,October22,2015,
http://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/10/22/turkeysrecentelectionsfrommarch2014tonovember2015/ijna.
35SerdarKaragz,TurkeyinFullCooperationWithAntiISISCoalition,SaysPresident,Daily Sabah,

September27,2014,http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/09/27/turkeyinfullcooperationwithantiisis
coalitionsayspresidentandTurkey:TopSecurityMeetingFocusesonTerrorMeasures,AnadoluAgency,
May26,2016,http://aa.com.tr/en/todaysheadlines/turkeytopsecuritymeetingfocusesonterror
measures/579360.
36AngelaMerkelOffersTurkeyAssistanceforBorderRegion,TheFederalChancellor,February8,2016,
https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Reiseberichte/2016/20160208merkelankara_en.html.
37Ibid.

38RajaAbdulrahim,AirstrikesKillsDozensinCampforDisplacedSyrians,Wall Street Journal,May6,

2016,http://www.wsj.com/articles/airstrikeskillsdozensincampfordisplacedsyrians1462481075and
HumanitarianReliefFoundation(IHH),WhereandWhatDoWeDo,
http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/pages/suriyeicinneyapiyoruz/312.
39CommanderinChiefoftheRussianAerospaceForcesPresentsFactsoftheAttackontheRussianSu
24MAircraftCarriedOutbytheTurkishF16FighterintheSkyOverSyriaonNovember24,Ministryof
DefenceoftheRussianFederation,November27,2011,http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?
id=12066900@egNewsandMeetingWithKingAbdullahIIofJordan,OfficialInternetResourcesofthe
PresidentofRussia,November24,2015,http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/50775.
40CommercialScaleOilSmugglingIntoTurkeyBecomesPriorityTargetofAntiISISStrikes,RT,
November27,2015,https://www.rt.com/news/323603isisoilsmugglingturkey/.
41AgenceFrancePresse,ErdoanSaysWouldResignifPutinISILOilTradeClaimsProven,Hrriyet

Daily News,December1,2015,http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogansayswouldresignifputinisiloil
tradeclaimsproven.aspx?pageID=238&nID=91910&NewsCatID=352.

42
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42MarcPierini,TensionsoftheTurkishBorder,CarnegieEurope,September22,2014,
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=56694.
43SyriaRegionalRefugeeResponse:Turkey,UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees,last
updatedMay19,2016,http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224.
44IranDealAnHistoricDay,EuropeanUnionExternalAction,July14,2015,
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2015/150714_iran_nuclear_deal_en.htm.
453DaysofIntenseDiplomacyinMunich,EuropeanExternalActionService,February15,2016,
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2016/150116_3_daysofintensediplomacyinmunich_en.htm.
46JulienBarnesDaceyandDanielLevy,SyrianDiplomacyRenewed:FromViennatoRaqqa,European
CouncilforForeignRelations,November2015,http://www.ecfr.eu/page//Syria_memo_1127_1550.pdf
RossHarrisonandAlexVatanka,Syria'sPeaceTalksWouldBeNowhereWithouttheIranNuclearDeal,
National Interest,November2,2015,http://nationalinterest.org/feature/syriaspeacetalkswouldbe
nowherewithouttheirannuclear14230andWeekinReview,IranNuclearDealKeytoPoliticalSolution
inSyria,Al-Monitor,November10,2013,http://www.al
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/weekinreview.html#ixzz49r17l8sA.
47IranStatementFollowingUNSCResolution2231EndorsingJCPOA,IslamicRepublicNewsAgency,
July20,2015,http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81688987/.
48AronLund,NotJustRussia:TheIranianSurgeinSyria,Syria in Crisis(blog),CarnegieEndowmentfor

InternationalPeace,May23,2016,http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=63650.
49TheGlobalCoalitionPartnersArchiveTheGlobalCoalition,http://theglobalcoalition.org/partners/.

50OprationChammal,MinistryofDefenceoftheFrenchRepublic,lastupdatedJuly13,2016,
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/iraksyrie/dossierdepresentationdeloperationchammal/operation
chammal.
51BroadSupportintheDanishParliamentMakingDenmarkaFrontrunnerintheFightAgainstDaesh,
DanishMinistryofDefence,lastupdatedApril19,2016,http://www.fmn.dk/eng/news/Pages/broadsupport
inthedanishparliamentmakingdenmarkafrontrunnerinthefightagainstdaesh.aspx.
52FightAgainstTerroristOrganisation:BundestagApprovesMandateforSyriaMission,GermanFederal
MinistryofDefence,lastupdatedDecember4,2015,http://www.bmvg.de/portal/poc/bmvg?
uri=ci:bw.bmvg.journal.sicherheitspolitik&de.conet.contentintegrator.portlet.current.id=01DB010000000001|
A4TKU5007DIBR.
53DutchMilitaryContributioninIraq,DutchMinistryofDefence,
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54MPsApproveMotioninSyriaonISIL,UKParliament,December2,2015,
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