1

Note: This paper was accepted for publication in Journal of Cooperation and Conflict
on 1st Feb 2014, for publication online in Summer 2014 and hardcopy 2015.

An exploration of the limitations of bureaucratic organizations in

implementing contemporary peacebuilding

Andrew P Williams, Berhanu Mengistu

Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration, Old Dominion University,
United States
Corresponding author

Andrew P Williams, Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration, 2084

Constant Hall, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529. Email: awill123@odu.edu

Author Note

Andrew Williams is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Urban Studies and Public
Administration at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, and is employed full time
as an analyst for an international organization. His research interests include:
organizational collaboration, peacebuilding, program evaluation and policy theory.

Berhanu Mengistu is a Professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Public

Administration at Old Dominion University. His research interests include alternative
dispute resolution and peace-making, privatization, public finance and budgeting and
state capture and public corruptions.
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An exploration of the limitations of bureaucratic organizations in

implementing contemporary peacebuilding

Abstract

This article seeks to unpack the implications of contemporary peacebuilding for

bureaucratic organizational forms. It argues that if the contemporary peacebuilding

literature is taken as given, fundamental alterations are required in predominately

Western peacebuilding systemsspecifically in the structure and function of

bureaucratic organizations that typically fund, manage and execute peacebuilding

interventions. The analysis proceeds by matching five peacebuilding principles derived

from contemporary literature, with an organizational framework that highlights key

structural and functional aspects of bureaucracies, thus allowing organizational

deficiencies to be identified. The article argues that current peacebuilding scholarship

would benefit from theoretically guided organizational research on the various

organizations and systems involved in peacebuilding implementation. It concludes that

peacebuilding scholars can be informed by the significant body of knowledge in the

fields of public administration and policy, which bring a rich history of studying

implementation situations that parallel in many ways complex peacebuilding

interventions.

Keywords

Peacebuilding, organizational requirements, theory development, public administration,

policy, implementation, planning, evaluation

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Introduction

Peacebuilding literature has evolved considerably since its inception and has drawn from

and informed many predominately Western interventions in conflicts and the diverse spectrum of

peacebuilding approaches implemented. Yet even given this significant body of knowledge and

expertise, many interventions can hardly be considered a universal success. Research indicates

that 25% to 50% of peace processes fail within five years (Suhrke and Samset, 2007), and that

out of the 18 United Nations (UN) attempts at democratization since the Cold War, 13 have since

suffered some form of authoritarian regime (Call and Cook, 2003). While the peacebuilding and

conflict literatures have examined the sources of failure via a variety of macro-comparative,

institutional, political, economic and cultural lenses, a small body of recent work identifies the

technocratic aspects of peacebuilding as a potential challenge for practice. This is partly in

reaction to the technocratic turn (Mac Ginty, 2012: 293, 289) in institutional responses to

complex interventions, referring to the systems and behaviors that prioritize bureaucratic

rationality embedded in the institutional fabric of Western aid, development, and military

organizations.

This issue is critical given that peacebuilding is largely implemented via bureaucratic

organizations and systems, a fact unlikely to change in the near future. While many international

organizations, development agencies and NGOs continually adapt their peacebuilding approach

in response to both academic work and policy-led practitioner involvement, policymakers may

be unaware of the unintentional pathologies that arise from the intrinsic nature of bureaucratic

structure (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Only a few studies have focused on the implications of

technocracy for the overall conduct of peacebuilding (Donais, 2009; Goetschel and Hagmann,

2009; Krieger, 2006). Many case studies have analyzed peacebuilding interventions and made
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organizational recommendations (Bensahel et al., 2009; Dijkstra, 2011; Junk, 2012; Piiparinen,

2007; Rathmell, 2009; Simon, 2010), but few have incorporated an organizational framework of

analysis (some exceptions are Herrhausen, 2007; Lipson, 2007, 2012). Peacebuilding studies

generally treat an intervention or conflict as a single unit of analysis and employ narrative or

descriptive analyses that mix together variables such as organizational mission, goals, structures,

policies, culture, historical factors and conflict actors. In some respects, this approach is

understandable given the contextual nature and long duration of interventions, and the large

number of possible variables active in a single case study.

We argue, however, that to understand comprehensively the myriad factors affecting

peacebuilding interventions requires theoretically-informed organizational research on the

various organizations implementing the intervention. The fields of public administration and

policy bring ample examples of implementation situations that parallel in many ways complex

peacebuilding interventions, albeit with major differences. This literature has breached some of

the challenges of researching complex organizational implementation, which generally features a

multitude of important variables, actors, relationships and networks (Hill and Hupe, 2009).

This study aims to shed light on key questions of implementation: to what extent can

bureaucratic organizations implement the strategies for successful peacebuilding identified in the

current body of peacebuilding literature, and what changes in structure and function may be

required? In analyzing these questions, we aim to bridge a gap in peacebuilding literature by

suggesting organizational frames of analysis, while encouraging cross-pollination of ideas from

public administration, policy, and organizational science to the study of peacebuilding.

The general approach is as follows. First, by drawing from recent literature in third

generation contemporary peacebuilding, we develop a set of peacebuilding principles, which,

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from the position of the third generation literature, are relatively invariant to context and

assumed to be fundamental for intervention success. Second, we define a framework of analysis

using standard approaches from the administrative sciences, in order to prioritize and organize

key variables of importance in bureaucracies. Third, for each variable in the framework, we

analyze how it operates in bureaucracies assuming the peacebuilding principles as given.

Structural and functional deficiencies in organizations are identified. Finally, broad conclusions

about the implementation of peacebuilding by bureaucracies are drawn and a future research

agenda is suggested.

In many ways, our approach reverses the standard way of thinking about the technocracy

problem. Rather than considering the implications of technocracy for peacebuilding as recent

work has done (Mac Ginty, 2012, 2013), this article questions the implications of peacebuilding

for technocracy. In other words, rather than viewing peacebuilding through the lens of

bureaucracy, we view bureaucracy through the lens of peacebuilding. The set of peacebuilding

principles developed in this article are considered as independent variables; while the

technocratic aspects and the implications on organizational structure and function are the

dependent variables. Given the immaturity of organization science-informed peacebuilding

research, this approach is primarily an exercise at conceptual scoping. Consequently, this article

outlines tentative ideas that can stimulate further research on the matter. This approach is a

reverse way to critique the current international system of peacebuilding by showing how far

our institutions are from being able to meet the requirements clearly specified in the conflict

literature.
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Peacebuilding principles

We begin by defining peacebuilding and developing a set of peacebuilding principles.

We assume that from the perspective of third generation literature, these principles are general to

any context and that, in totality, they represent an overall strategy for proceeding in

peacebuilding interventions to establish peace. While there are multiple definitions of

peacebuilding (Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009), we assume the broad conception taken by many

scholars, which incorporates parallel elements of transformative conflict resolution to overcome

structural and cultural violence, conflict settlement peacemaking, and conflict containment

peacekeeping (Pugh et al., 2008; Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Richmond, 2010). Activities such as

post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction, and state building, are considered as tasks within

peacebuilding rather than as ends in themselves.

The debates between liberal, local or bottom-up, and hybrid third generation

peacebuilding are ongoing in the literature. These three ontologically different approaches

conceive the process of peacebuilding and the end state of peace in fundamentally different

ways, contingent upon the particular assumptions in each approach. For the purposes of

proceeding, this article assumes the third generation, local-liberal hybrid approach of

peacebuilding as a given. Hybrid peacebuilding combines the essential characteristics of

modernization, with elements of a critical paradigm rooted in liberation from sources of

domination and attainment of social justice, and a transformative paradigm that emphasizes

cosmopolitanism, discursive rationality, and transcendence of differences (Mac Ginty, 2008,

2010; Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Richmond, 2010). This approach attempts to move beyond state-

centric solutions in response to conflict, envisioning instead an emancipatory form of peace that

reflects the interests, identities, and needs of all actors, state and non-state, and aims at the
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creation of a discursive framework of mutual accommodation and social justice which

recognizes difference (Richmond, 2010: 26). The challenge will be to connect new liberal

political orders and institutions with traditional economies, cultures and values, while

maintaining the core ideas of transformative conflict resolution (Lederach, 2003).

This choice could be a major point of contention given the ongoing debate and valid

objections and criticisms to the recent body of literature. From a theoretical perspective, the third

generation literature has not yet merged basic political theories concerning rights and self-

determination, with the strategies required for conflict management, resolution and

transformation, which may involve temporary suspension of self-determined politics, and elite-

international biases towards certain groups. Furthermore, aside from the organizational

implications addressed in this article, there are deep practical issues with the third generation

literature.

We sidestep these major debates for the purposes of proceeding. We see this as a

necessary route to cumulative development of a discipline: holding certain concepts and theories

as given, thus allowing closer scrutinizing of others and a retrospective look at the concepts held

as given. For this reason it is unhelpful to attempt to address the faults with the third generation

literature, while simultaneously examining the organizational question. Therefore, our analysis

does not enter into this discussion and focuses its investigation into the limitations of

bureaucratic organizations in implementing third-generation peacebuilding.

We turn now to the peacebuilding principles. Space considerations do not permit a full

analytical derivation from the literature, however, a brief explanation of the methodology

demonstrates that the peacebuilding principles rest on solid foundations of research and are

representative of key elements of third generation scholarship. First, two main bodies of
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literature were reviewed: research from critical and post-structuralist traditions, conflict

transformation, and liberal-local hybridity; and research on organizational aspects of

peacebuilding. This initial review quickly revealed a scarcity of organizational approaches to

studying peacebuilding, which provided further impetus to conduct this work.

Second, now focusing on the peacebuilding literature and following initial sorting and

reviewing, a theoretical coding iteratively identified and refined key themes (Patton, 2002) until

a typology with nine elements was reached (understanding peace as a process and end-state,

cultural knowledge, knowledge generation, local-international relationships, local-local

relationships, locally-adaptive implementation, locally-tailored mission objectives, locally-

sequenced tasks, political economy). Articles were grouped according to these themes, with

priority placed on review articles and edited books, which typically summarize literature in the

opening or concluding chapters. Articles were cross-checked against these themes, and

redundancies and duplications of concepts identified. By identifying the most common themes, a

further iteration generated a typology of five elements (knowledge of peace, knowledge

generation, relationships, implementation, mission objectives and tasks), which subsequently

became the five principles.

We now capture the latest research on third generation peacebuilding in these five

principles that are postulated to hybridize the liberal and transformative traditions. They should

not be thought of as specific prescriptions, but as outlining general peacebuilding requirements

relatively invariant to a particular context. These principles are the basis against which

organizational requirements can be derived, assuming the principles as given.

Principle 1: Peacebuilding requires a deep understanding of peace

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Peacebuilding requires a deep understanding of peace outside of liberal state mechanisms

(Richmond, 2009, 2010), and recognition that the absence of a state does not mean absence of

political power, take for example, Somalia (Chesterman, 2004). There are many sources of peace

in society and the existence of liberal order does not guarantee the resolution or transformation

of centurys old conflict. Moreover, societies should not be pathologized, which fixes

culpability for war on societies in question, rendering the domestic populations dysfunctional

while casting international rescue interventions as functional (Hughes and Pupavac, 2005: 873).

Consequently, rather than viewing peacebuilding as state-building to fix failed states (Ghani

and Lockhart, 2009), it must be thought of as an emancipatory endeavor that hybridizes political

and institutional order with local concerns by developing a social contract between society and

the polity (Richmond, 2010). Peace must be understood in a holistic manner and constructed by

all parties rather than framed or owned by external agencies that may unintentionally reinforce

neoliberal prescriptions or be insensible to the overall impact of global capitalism or other forces

(Pugh et al., 2008).

Principle 2: Peacebuilding requires significant understanding of how knowledge is generated in

society

Peacebuilding requires an exceptional understanding of objective societal components

such as organization and structure, local culture, tradition, and history, but also an understanding

of events from multiple perspectives. Peacebuilders must develop privileged knowledge from

analysis of complex dynamics and causal relationships that drive conflict, but be able to

distinguish their perspective from local perspectives. Peacebuilders should understand how

knowledge is generated in societies through social construction of narratives. The notion of

fact should be replaced by a fact-value continuum in which empirical statements are always
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contextual, and values are both emergent and determinable by reasoned processes (Frederickson

et al., 2012; House and Howe, 1999). Peacebuilders should be self-reflective by considering how

interventions are perceived by locals, and should develop the capacity for double-loop learning

in which contextual knowledge leads to modification of an organizations underlying norms and

mission goals, rather than incremental changes in methods or tools (Argyris and Schn, 1989;

Campbell, 2008).

Principle 3: Peacebuilding is fundamentally about relationships and must involve all actors

A deep and permanent peace requires a normalization process in relationships between

conflict parties, which allows inequalities and differences to be addressed, and closer social

integration (Kriesberg, 2007). While much literature focuses on ways to bring conflict parties

together constructively, often the relationships between the interveners and the conflict parties

themselves are often forgotten. Peacebuilding requires significant external intervention and

interference in a conflict, thus the relationship between the interveners and the conflict parties is

equally important as that between the conflict parties, especially in the case of asymmetric and

serious power imbalances between outsiders and insiders (Donais, 2009: 15).

Consequently, principle three calls for a social and psychological contract between

international peacebuilders and local actors that reflects the social contract within the polity.

Practically, this means that while international guidance is offered on, for example, technical

aspects of governance and institution building, it is done so without introducing hegemony,

inequality, conditionality, or dependency (Richmond, 2010: 33). Clear objectives are needed

with regard to the relationship between local and international actors and its dynamic over the

duration of mission (Chesterman, 2004). Finally, peacebuilding must consider the relationships
 11

with the funders, especially of governmental origin: political will and sustainability is needed in

donor and intervening countries (Menon and Welsh, 2011; Williams, 2011).

Principle 4: Implementation should be locally adaptive and sensitive to the tensions and

dilemmas of peacebuilding

Peacebuilders should endeavor to secure quick transfer of responsibilities and power in

all areas to local actors (Pugh et al., 2008) such that ownership of peace processes is

reconceptualized from international-local elite to local-local, where the geometry of

power(is)in local community structures, which enable a constant feedback of local needs to

decision making (Pugh et al., 2008: 393). Local decision making processes should therefore

determine basic political, economic, and social norms to be institutionalized in any type of

centralized state (Richmond, 2010). Yet this process must be tempered by serious consideration

of political economy issues generated by constitutional distribution of power, especially where

centralized states are supported by foreign interveners (Myerson, 2011).

Awareness is needed of the fundamental contradictions of peacebuilding, which lead to a

set of policy dilemmas in implementation. Paris and Sisk summarize the contradictions well:

outside intervention and international control is required for self-government and local

ownership; universal values are roughly applied to myriad of local cultures; statebuilding

requires a clean slate of political order, yet must reaffirm historical cultural identities; and short

term imperatives like peacekeeping often conflict with longer term objectives like conflict

resolution (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 305-306). A key tension in implementation is between past and

future: peacebuilding should balance forward looking aspects of political and economic power in

a future peace, with backward looking issues of reparation for injustice, reconciliation processes,

and reaffirmation of historical cultural identities (Sandole et al., 2009).

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These contradictions and tensions lead to various policy dilemmas of finding balance

between: a heavy international footprint to achieve security or reconstruction versus a light

footprint to allow unencumbered development and self-equilibrium of local society; a short term

presence to avoid the occupation syndrome of irritating local population, versus long term

presence to see through the lengthy process of statebuilding; and a peace process that involves

and legitimizes former combatant parties and factional groups versus one that involves the whole

population and does not placate warlords by offering them positions of power. The policy

decisions made around these dilemmas can create a range of dependencies where political and

economic patterns in society are greatly distorted by international peacebuilders (Paris and Sisk,

2009: 307-308).

Principle 5: Objectives and tasks of peacebuilding missions should be tailored to fit local

requirements, not international priorities

The objectives and tasks of peacebuilding missions should be planned from the outset by

incorporating local political and economic priorities and focusing on the most marginalized

groups (Pugh et al., 2008). Any free-market reform or assistance offered from international

peacebuilders should be by local consensus and knowledge rather than expert or elite input,

which limits democratic potential by undermining the social contract and leading to a counter-

productive class systems. Economic development should be coupled with careful establishment

of a social-economic safety net that supports citizens. Privatization programs stipulated by many

large international donors should be reframed to local geometry to include public, socially owned

and community property that is protected from dispossession by private accumulation (Mengistu

and Vogel, 2009; Richmond, 2010). Rather than only security force assistance projects

(Rathmell, 2010), peacebuilders should recognize security as an intricate, almost unconscious,

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network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the

people themselves (Jacobs, 1961: 31) and establish multiple and overlapping community

structures that offer redundancy and balance (Kilcullen, 2010).

Organizational framework of analysis

The five principles (P1 to P5 hereafter) endeavor to capture the essence of contemporary

conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature, yet say little about their practical realization.

This articles purpose is to examine one key aspect of practice: peacebuilding interventions using

bureaucratic organizations. Drawing from principles in administrative and organizational

science, we now describe a framework of analysis to highlight variables important to how

bureaucratic organizations function in executing peacebuilding interventions.

Although it is challenging to define the parameters of a distinct sample for study, the

arguments in this research focus primarily on bureaucratic organizations, which constitute the

vast majority of government agencies, international and large nongovernmental organizations

(Mac Ginty, 2012). As a result of their bureaucratic template, these organizations have several

characteristics in common: a hierarchical structure in which departmentalization of functions

such as planning, implementation and evaluation occurs; levels of command with clearly defined

responsibilities and authority; a formalized set of legal rules and procedures; a formal process for

the appointment and retention of staff based on competence; and requirements for specialized

expertise (Weber, 1947). This Weberian rational-legal bureaucratic form was created to

achieve efficiency and is the prevalent form of organization in Western society. The

specialization of knowledge, planning, evaluation and production functions is a consequence of

the technical rationality of this way of organizing (Scott, 2003). It should be noted, however, that
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bureaucracies only function well and achieve the intended efficiencies where organizational

activities and missions are stable and clearly defined (Perrow, 1972).

While compositional elements vary widely across different mission types and

organizational size, most organizations conduct a core set of functions independent of mission

and size (Mintzberg, 1979). Our framework of analysis considers the following organizational

functions that are almost universal in rational bureaucracies: Knowledge, Planning,

Implementation, and Evaluation. These functions are chosen because of their centrality to design

and conduct of an organizations mission in any peacebuilding intervention (Allard, 2005;

Wentz, 1998, 2002). These categories are also widely identified in general the public and private

management literature as standard functions (Mintzberg, 1979; Rainey, 2003).

Exploring the organizational requirements for peacebuilding

Having established the peacebuilding principles and the organizational framework of

analysis, the research question of this article is now addressed: how might technocratic-

orientated organizations need to change in order to meet the requirements of the peacebuilding

principles? By matching peacebuilding principles to the organizational typology of knowledge,

planning, implementation, and evaluation, we generate conclusions and tentative research ideas

for future studies. We acknowledge immediately that there are obvious political and practical

difficulties in the various recommendations, but for the purposes of not constraining thinking we

consider the full range of possibilities rather than only the practicable.

Knowledge requirements for peacebuilding organizations

Technocracies typically use formalized knowledge systems and resident or contracted

experts who possess objective factual information and much tacit experience. Government and

military organizations often develop vast databases on conflict areas. Many international
 15

organizations conduct elaborate conflict assessments to understand conflict drivers or societal

needs before any intervention starts (UN, 2007, 2012), for which there is a large system of

private civilian experts and companies (de Coning, 2011). These observations reflect the fact

that complex peacebuilding interventions generate high organizational requirements for

knowledge. While organizations have the intent of following peacebuilding principles one and

two, which call for a deep understanding of the final end of peace and significant knowledge

as the means, the operationalization of this requirement seems to have generated increasing

specialization, bureaucratization, and treatment of knowledge as a resource rather than process.

Rationalized bureaucracies are forced, by their intrinsic nature, to create categories and

classification schemes, which serve to make the transfer of organizational knowledge efficient

and simple. Labels such as locals, powerbrokers or key leaders created for management

plans and knowledge databases often lose their original meaning or begin to mask situational

complexities and socially constructed meanings (Stone, 2002). The key question is how can

organizations translate temporary, localized, mission-based knowledge into both intrinsic tacit

knowledge and formalized explicit knowledge in a manner accordant with the principles?

Based on an appreciation of the nature of wicked problems, complexity, and

interdependent systems (Li et al., 2012; Rittel and Webber, 1973), organizations must develop

new structural responses to knowledge requirements. One such response is to abandon

formalized engineering-style mission planning for an evolutionary, adaptive approach that

seeks generation of knowledge, rather than using a-priori knowledge at the start of missions

(Watkins and Mohr, 2001). Another response is to consider personnel deployment durations and

the ways in which an organization captures mission-based knowledge. In the military and other

government departments, for example, personnel deploy for periods of up to one year, yet the
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transition time between deployments is disruptive to peacebuilding, as contextual and time-

sensitive mission based knowledge is lost (Rathmell, 2009). Although an unpopular concept and

one that stretches the boundary between diplomatic service and development functions,

governments may have consider extended multi-year deployment periods.

Structurally, the importance of incorporating dynamic local needs and perspectives into

all aspects of decision-making, planning and implementation as specified by P4 and P5, require

that organizations have mechanisms and resources to incorporate local views before, or in the

early phases of a mission. This entails radical changes in organizational knowledge management

and control. For example, knowledge systems must receive input from a wide variety of sources

to encourage alternative and contradictory perspectives, yet this conflicts with basic operative

principles of bureaucracy: that complex task specialization rests upon specialized knowledge of

personnel (Perrow, 1972). Given that bureaucracies tend to evolve to control information, a

strong organizational culture of sharing is required (Zelizer, 2013).

To meet requirements for P3, understanding of peace must be framed through multiple

lenses including justice, reconciliation, and relationship building, rather than absence of

violence. High levels of expertise and knowledge on various techniques of conflict resolution

must be present. Knowledge systems (e.g. reference databases) required for mission planning

that contain objective facts should also consider interests, needs and perceptions of conflict

parties. Furthermore, knowledge systems should incorporate systems analysis that considers

conflict environments as a holistic, multi-level system, linking to wider regional or global

contexts (Ropers, 2008). Practically, this redefines the success of knowledge systems by

utilization and increased understanding of all stakeholders, rather than accumulation of facts or

data per se. Peacebuilding organizations must encourage constant personal learning, the ability to
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see other perspectives, and continual questioning of assumptions to meet the knowledge

requirements specified in P1 and P2. Leadership must prioritize understanding of the

complexities of conflict situations over making quick decisions, and recognize that knowledge of

a complex system is inherently limited.

Planning requirements for peacebuilding organizations

Planning in a bureaucracy serves to reduce complexity, rationalize decision making

through formulation of clear goals based on assumed objective knowledge, and identify the

means and ways to achieve goals (March and Simon, 1993). A core criticism of technocratic

planning has been that its underlying rationale, when based on supposedly objective knowledge,

is controland dominationof a situation or environment from a singular perspective; and that

the process is not supportive of inclusive or participatory logics, especially given the chain of

decision-making in complex bureaucracies (Allmendinger, 2002). This criticism is especially

relevant in the context of peacebuilding, as highlighted by P3 and P4.

At this stage it is pertinent to raise the subject of rationality, meaning the normative

conception of reasoning employed at an individual level of analysis. Technocracy assumes

instrumental rationality, in which individuals are conceived as reasoning on the basis of

objective information to attain clear goals, and true knowledge is defined by that which

permits prediction and thus control (Fay, 1975). The implication of this conception of rationality

for peacebuilding organizations is the prioritization of scientific empirical knowledge over other

forms, the notion of expertise as an accumulation of factual knowledge and experience, and the

tendency to create the impression that solutions can be engineered or discovered and thus

planned in order to solve social conflict.

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Yet other types of rationality are possible. Many scholars have investigated interpretive

rationality: a mode of reasoning based on continual social construction of meaning among

involved actors in which the very definition of knowledge is that which causes increased

communication. Increased communication between actors opens up the possibility of increased

understanding of each persons reflective viewpoint of the shared constitutive meanings and thus

the possibility of changing ones viewpoint (Bevir, 2010; Fay, 1975; Stone, 2002). Others have

expanded Habermas (1981) communicative rationality, in which rational reasoning is conceived

as a discursive process to uncover realities hidden by socially constructed understandings, thus

rationality is defined by process rather than knowledge outcome. In their landmark text on urban

planning, Innes and Booher (2010) argue for collaborative rationality, which like Habermas

theory is defined by process conditions of a diversity of participants with interdependent interests

engaging in authentic dialogue to develop shared meanings and heuristic solutions (Innes and

Booher, 2010: 35). It is relevant to note that collaborative rationality is foundational to many

conflict resolution strategies important in peacebuilding, such as Alternative Dispute Resolution,

in which the dialogue proceeds around discussion of underlying interests rather than instrumental

positions, in order to develop mutual gain solutions (Fisher et al., 1991).

Any type of planning in any paradigmatic lens assumes an intention to change something

in the world; yet P2, P4, and P5 require that this change is determined primarily by affected local

actors rather than by external agents. Consequently, peacebuilding organizations must ensure

that mission plans are framed against locally-owned conflict theories that describe underlying

conflict drivers. The process of planning involves moving from a picture of the current situation,

to an intended future situation by employing instrumental organizational tools. Bureaucracies

often plan using impact models, which identify causal assumptions between planned
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interventions and change. P2, P4, and P5 require that impact models are constructed with wide

stakeholder participation.

The capacity to undertake this, however, involves a move from the instrumental and

systems rationality of bureaucracy, to the collaborative rationality described by Fisher and

Forester (1993); Forester (1981), and Innes and Booher (2010). Planners and analysts move from

operating within the existing system of power structures and one-sided communications, to

changing the existing system through collaborative planning, questioning and focusing attention.

The danger of impact models, even if based on broad stakeholder impact, is that they merely

represent pragmatism without principlesa form of incrementalism (Lindblom, 2010).

Instead, impact models should pattern attention selectively to meaningful parts of (the) world

and bring together the ways of knowing and ways of deciding to correct distorted

communications about the problem, and the solutions (Forester, 1981: 167).

This requires organizations to have an institutional, explicit understanding of their

particular fundamental paradigmatic orientation (e.g. realism, pluralism etc.), which determines

the particular planning strategy adopted by an organization (Jantzi and Jantzi, 2009;

Ramsbotham et al., 2011). For example, military planners are explicitly realist: although recent

doctrine mentions peacebuilding and local ownership (NATO, 2011), the underlying assumption

remains that external intervention can manipulate society through instruments of power

(Hunter et al., 2008). To adopt the peacebuilding principles presented in this article,

organizations require a paradigm of transformative learning that emphasizes externally

supported creation of new understandings in interventions, rather than the assumption that

societal change can be driven by external forces (Affolter et al., 2009).

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Bureaucracies do not cope well with rapid change and uncertain inputs and outputs

(Perrow, 1972). P1 calls for the final goal of peace to be clearly operationalized via a process

involving wide participation from all stakeholders, yet P3 and P4 indicate that both

understandings and context will change as situations and conflict parties understandings evolve.

Organizationally, this requires that goals, underlying planning assumptions, and conflict theories

are continually reassessed and adapted, and may not even be specified before the start of a

mission. Mission planning should be conducted via an evolutionary approach, where goals are

adapted and refined as peacebuilders gain on the ground experience, rather than in a linear

engineering approach (Clement and Smith, 2009; Rittel and Webber, 1973).

P3 requires that peacebuilding organizations place relationships with local actors at a

focal point of all activity. Consequently, planning should be framed from the perspective of a

social contract with local actors, rather than Western governments or donors. Organizations

should plan their relationships with conflict parties at all levels and consider how they might or

should evolve over the duration of a mission. Consequently, mission planning should incorporate

strategies of conflict transformation, based on dynamic construction of different perspectives

amongst stakeholders (Lederach, 2003; Zelizer, 2013).

Given the strong emphasis on locally sourced knowledge and local involvement in all the

peacebuilding principles, it is evident that mission knowledge, theories of conflict, and theories

of change require an open and transparent development process with the ability to identify where

management, leadership, or donors have had influence. In this vein, strategic, budgetary and

management planning should be responsive to mission contexts and evaluation knowledge,

rather than vice versa. Organization budget processes must be flexible and not based on fixed

annual allocations or mission success. Political or high level decision-making must be not
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decoupled from mission-based planning, implying adaptability to changes in goals or mission

scope. These factors require a fundamental shift from traditional bureaucratic structure:

specializations of fixed departments must yield to a flexible, networked-based organization in

which short term mission-based expertise is balanced against long term management experience,

which focuses on organizational priorities over immediate mission concerns.

P3 further calls for consideration of relationships and coordination with other

peacebuilding organizations. This is important to achieve both for overall policy coherence

between actors (OECD, 2003) and to ensure operational coordination and appropriate division of

labor and responsibility between actors (de Coning, 2008, 2009). The implications for planning

are significant. First, organizations must establish the extent to which their operations are

impacted by other organizations. Second, planning must involve a process of interorganizational

communication and decision-making, which vastly complexifies the process, making the dangers

of instrumental planning harder to avoid with the increase in actors.

A common response to the coherence and coordination challenge is a centralized

approach such as the UN integrated mission concept and the Peacebuilding Commission. Yet

participation in these systems by peacebuilding organizations comes at a high price: forging

comprehensive working relationships with a variety of actors represents a formidable

administrative task of unparalleled complexity; and traditional bureaucratic principles are subtly

altered as organizational boundaries are blurred and questions of legal-rational authority,

responsibility and accountability arise (Williams, 2010). In a hierarchical bureaucratic structure,

ability to plan and take ownership of goals usually implies authority to commit resources towards

that goal. For organizations to develop coordinated impact models with classical means-end

project plans requires that the level of organization engaging in coordination has the authority to
 22

commit resources. Yet the typical place of coordinationon the ground in a missionis not

where senior level staff with authority operates. Consequently, high level planning authority may

need to be decentralized to ground level units, which generates challenging administrative issues

concerning accountability and responsibility (Provan and Kenis, 2007).

A final issue for strategic and budgetary plannersto meet the requirements of P3is to

establish organizational sustainability by securing long term commitments from donors, owners

and taxpayers to support interventions of years or decades. This requires organizations to assume

significant amounts of risk when planning resources and budgets.

Implementation requirements for peacebuilding organizations

Implementation means the execution of an organizations mission, or as Ferman (1990:

39) describes, what happens between policy expectations and (perceived) policy results. A

challenge of implementation is the balance between top-down controls over an organizations

activities versus bottom-up adaptation. A top-down perspective assumes that plans identify

goals against which performance can be measured and appropriate organizational tools selected.

An implementation chain (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984) then moves from planned goals to

actual impacts, via inputs and outputs. If the plan fails, it is due to implementation failure

resulting from lack of resources, lack of commitment, or lack of ability of the top to control the

process (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). Top-down control is necessary for accountability,

financial control, or to meet the instrumental rationality that governs an organization, which is

especially prevalent in military and government agencies (Caforio, 2006). Conversely, a

bottom-up perspective assumes adaptation to local conditions during plan implementation.

Missions and goals are seen as ambiguous and often conflicting with goals of other of

organizations involved in implementation. Depending on the context, staff on the ground

 23

interpret the meaning of goals in different ways, or realize that they are no longer relevant or

appropriate, thus implementation is a series of continual compromises, conflicts and adaptation.

A fundamental tension exists between the top-down need for control, and the contextual needs of

the mission for adaptation and flexibility (Frederickson et al., 2012).

The implications of this challenge when viewed through the peacebuilding principles are

significant. P1 and P2 call for both a deep understanding of peace and a broad knowledge of the

conflict environment. Yet considering the theme developed so far in this discussion, knowledge

is evolving continually, thus organizations require significant resource commitment to

knowledge development during implementation. To meet P3 and P5, decisions and plans have to

be synchronized on the basis of local decision-making, and an organizations knowledge may be

in conflict with locally generated perspectives. This requires exceptional flexibility in decision-

making. Bureaucracies tend to desire clear and objective policy goals and plans, yet as P4 shows,

defining a clear strategy is challenging given the various peacebuilding policy dilemmas.

Implementation takes place in the context of active or latent conflict, which requires that

regardless of the particular mission of the organization (aid, development, security etc.) all

activities must be conducted around a framework of conflict resolution (USIP, 2010).

The source of these issues lies in the inherent wickedness of conflict problems.

Experience has shown that wicked problems are solved by evolution rather than engineering, and

bureaucracies are ill-matched for the localized adaptation required. De Coning notes that

peacebuilding should not be understood as an activity that generates a specific outcome, but as

an activity that facilitates and stimulates the processes that enable local self-organisation to

emerge (de Coning, 2012: 293). In terms of implementation, peacebuilding is squarely in the

bottom-up perspective. Therefore, top-down control should facilitate resources and expand
 24

political space, rather than enforce fixed visions about achievement of specific, externally

defined goals.

Peacebuilding organizations operate in a complex system with high interdependence with

other organizations (de Coning, 2008). Defining boundaries of responsibility for achievement of

goals is challenging when no one organization has the capability to achieve them independently,

thus collaboration is important (Kettl, 2006). The implications of multiorganizational

collaboration are extensively addressed in public administration, public policy, and management

literature (Ansel and Gash, 2007), but receives little attention peacebuilding and conflict

resolution studiesa peculiar fact considering the repeated observation of the importance of

coherence and collaboration (de Coning, 2008, 2009; OECD, 2003; Paris and Sisk, 2009). There

are several key implications that occur with increasing organizational collaboration.

First, to achieve high levels of coherence, organizations must align overarching mission

goals, and increase coordination throughout the structure. This requires allowing lower level staff

more flexibility in defining outputs and goals and the appropriate authority and knowledge to

make decisions about building relationships with local actors (Chisholm, 1992). A tension exists,

however, between the level of collaboration and organisational independence. As the shift from

hierarchical to more flexible network based structures occurs, some organizational autonomy

must be conceded and risk assumed. Accountability dilemmas become more complex with closer

integration between organizations (Thomson et al., 2009). Furthermore, hybrid decision making

structurescommittees, meetings and management boardsmust be set up to implement the

coordination between organizations (McNamara, 2012).

Second, organizations require extra resources devoted to the task of coordination.

Huxham and Vangen (2005: 37) were clear on this subject: Dont do it unless you have to! Joint
 25

working with other organizations is inherently difficult and resource consuming (p.37). Thus in

addition to considering the various peacebuilding dilemmas of P4, leadership and management

have another dilemma in deciding the level of cooperation with interdependent organizations.

Evaluation requirements for peacebuilding organizations

Evaluation has gained in importance in recent decades with the increasing call for

transparency and accountability in international interventions (Picciotto, 2003). Many

international aid and development organizations have independent departments to manage,

conduct or contract out evaluations (OECD, 2010), while military organizations generally have

their own personnel in operations assessment departments. From the many purposes for

evaluations, this analysis focuses on summative evaluations that monitor inputs and outputs to

determine program improvement, and knowledge generation evaluations for organizational

lessons (Patton, 1997).

Evaluation systems in major international and governmental organizations generally

assume the form of rational input/output monitoring, with focused post-facto impact

assessment (Williams and Morris, 2009). While intended uses vary, evaluations tend to feed

bureaucratic systems for purposes of accountability, mission knowledge, or progress

measurement (Mac Ginty, 2013). The implications of the peacebuilding principles for evaluation

in peacebuilding organizations are similar to those of planning. Evaluations of peacebuilding

interventions must continue focus on impacts, but their planning must involve participatory

designs to reduce the likelihood that evaluations are framed with an instrumental logic.

Participatory designs emphasize local ownership of evaluation methods, development of

findings, and utilization of results, to give those who are often powerless a voice in both
 26

evaluation process and program implementation (Cousins and Earl, 1992). The organizational

implications are profound.

Evaluations in rational results-based management systems focus on objective evidence-

based adjustments to plans; in the scientific logic of bureaucracy these functions are technical

specializations that can be departmentalized and separated by time (Williams and Morris, 2009).

Indeed, every development agency of OECD member states has a centralized evaluation unit that

conducts independent evaluations, separated from program implementation (OECD, 2010).

Participatory evaluations invoke an entirely different logic and require a blurring of the planning

and evaluation roles, in direct conflict with the traditional notions of evaluation independence

and accountability. Furthermore, organizational units responsible for evaluations must be highly

coordinated or merged with organizational units generating knowledge for conflict analysis and

planning.

Rational evaluation systems also rely on stable goals and objectives against which

progress can be measured, yet the reality of peacebuilding interventions, and even the

implementation of many government projects, shows that fixed objectives are notoriously hard to

achieve. Peacebuilding organizations locally adapt as needed and respond to constraints and

opportunities as they arise, thus many aspects of missions cannot be planned in advance. This

adaptivity coupled with the typical departmentalization of organizations in mission contributes to

a situation where objectives are either continuously interpreted or retrospectively reconstructed

in evaluations (Brusset, 2012). Thus objectives and end-states are informal and socially

constructed, with views not equally shared by all stakeholders. In response to this situation, the

evaluation scholars and practitioners have developed goal-free or developmental

evaluations, which avoid rationalistic template approaches (Patton, 2011; Scriven, 1991)
 27

Conclusions

This article developed a set of peacebuilding principles drawn from recent work on

hybrid peacebuilding and transformative conflict resolution, and considered which aspects of

bureaucratically-structured peacebuilding organizations would need to change, assuming the

peacebuilding principles as given. The tentative results indicate that profound changes in

bureaucratic structures and functions would be required. Implementation of these conclusions is

an obvious challenge; a consistent lesson from organizational change literature is that traditional

structures do not easily yield to new ones (Lawler and Worley, 2006).

First, hierarchical structures in organizations need considerable flattening, or conversely,

authority needs to be more horizontally distributed rather than vertically. This would change the

operating controlling mechanism to a collaborative system of power where organizational

direction is achieved by understanding the competing requirements of different departments

though a process of continuous debate, rather than through centralized command system where

orders are transmitted downwards. The traditional bureaucratic impartial system of staffing based

on experience rather than patronage may be hard to implement; however, an organizational

culture that valued long term field experience above all may provide counterbalance.

Second, the idea of rational, organized knowledge databases that can be accessed when

required needs considerable modification, replaced instead with a system of continual knowledge

generation and the abandonment of objective truth. The underlying operating assumption of

privileged externalized knowledge, especially prevalent in militaries, must be abandoned to a

culture of assuming incomplete knowledge as a starting point, and the idea that knowledge only

can exist when it is co-created with all stakeholders affected by an organizations actions.
 28

Third, the classical engineering approach to planning and implementation needs

rethinking to give organizations considerable flexibility. Most decision-making processes assume

a linear stream of events, in which plans are formed, then approved and then executed, with

senior decision makers reviewing and approving as necessary as implementation proceeds.

Decision making would instead need to accommodate simultaneous processes of goal planning,

activity planning, and implementation, and much higher coordination with other related

peacebuilding organizations. This is challenging in governmental organizations, which require

certainty about mission scope and resource commitments due to budgetary cycles and

accountability requirements.

Finally, organizations need to consider the concepts of accountability and legitimacy in

all aspects of their operations. The peacebuilding principles clearly require organizations to

reframe their operations from the perspective of locally-derived justice, fairness and equity.

There is an implicit criticism of other peacebuilding generationsespecially the modernist

liberal generationthat this was lacking. Organizations need to continuously evaluate their

accountability to all stakeholders affected by their actions, and take measures to establish

legitimacy, ideally through a framework involving regional compacts (Brown, 2008; Williams

and Taylor, 2013). This is fundamentally about the question of what to do in peacebuilding,

rather than the means used, as described in this article; however, this issue is likely to reduce

significantly the efficiency of peacebuilding organizations, given the high resource and time

requirements for deliberative discourse.

In addition to the structural and functional aspects of organizations, this analysis hints

that hybrid peacebuilding is hard to operationalize, raising several challenging questions about

whether the peacebuilding principles can realistically be met. Peacebuilding runs into the same
 29

foundational questions found in political science, or even urban planning: how to establish

political legitimacy following conflict; how to establish legitimacy of intervention without some

anchor of legitimate power in the region of operation; how to achieve transformation in the mind

of an entire population rather than just leadership and elites; how to scale up local approaches to

regions and nations without a national government? In this vein, peacebuilding scholars should

review analogous debates about participatory local approaches versus instrumental external

means in the fields of urban planning and public administration.

A limitation to this analysis and a broader implication for the study of peacebuilding is

the potential bias that stems from attempting to fix the identified issues with bureaucracies.

While this explicitly was not the aim of this article, we must acknowledge the potential biases

that may result from our Western-orientated training in organizational science and peacebuilding,

and our normative assumptions about the wider role of Western institutions in peacebuilding.

Future researchers would be well-advised to consider seriously the question that even genuine

attempts to reform organizations based on recommendations from third generation literature may

unintentionally blind us to the fact that we are still operating from within the liberal disciplinary

matrix of assumptions and beliefs, and even worse, that these attempts may serve to

unintentionally reinforce the systems from which we are trying to break free.

This article intentionally steered away from these wider debates in peacebuilding,

focusing instead on the more objective features of peacebuilding organizations. Yet even within

this scope, the analysis was limited. The coverage of each organizational function could easily

deserve an entire article, and the analytical framework was simplistic and didnt consider a

holistic view of how organizations operate; however, research on these topics was limited. A

major empirical project is needed on the organizational structures of peacebuilding to allow close
 30

scrutiny of operating problems, principles, and structures. With these ideas in mind, the closing

recommendation is that peacebuilding scholars should consider partnerships with researchers in

organizational science, public administration and urban planning as a worthy endeavor.

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