Magellan Manufacturing Marketing Corporation vs CA, Orient Overseas

Container Lines and F.E. Zeullig, Inc.

Facts:
On May 20, 1980, Magellan entered into a contract with CHOJU CO of Japan to
export 136K anahaw fans for $23K. x a credit was issued for payment. Magellan
contracted Zuellig, shipping agent, to ship the anahaw fans to Orient Overseas,
specifying the he NEEDED an on-board bill of lading AND transshipment is not
allowed under the letter of credit. Magellan paid Zuellig the freight charges and
secured a copy of bill of lading presented to Allied Bank. The bank credited the
$23K to appellants account. However, when appellants president went back to
the bank later, he was informed that the payment was refused by the buyer
allegedly because there was no on-board bill of lading, and there was a
transshipment of goods. As a result of the buyer to accept, upon appellants
request, the anahaw fans were shipped back to Manila. Orient then demanded
for payment of P246K. Appellant abandoned the whole cargo and asked the
appellees for damages.
According to Orient, the bill of lading it issued is an on board bill of lading and
that there was no actual transshipment. According to them when the goods were
transferred from one vessel to another BELONGING to the same owner, there is
no transhipment.
Orient gave Magellan the option of paying the sum of P51K for the demurrage
OR to abandon the Anahaw for them to be able to sell it in a public auction to
cover the costs. Magellan opted to abandon. Orient later demanded payment of
P298K for freight charges from Japan to Manila, demurrage and charges for
shipping container van.
Petitioner filed a complaint praying that respondents be ordered to pay whatever
petitioner was not able to earn from Choju amounting to P174K and damages.
Lower court in favor of Orient X ground that petitioner had given its consent to
the ocntents of the bill of lading where it is clearly indicated that there will be
transshipment. Ca agreed modified, Magellan cannot be held liable for
demurrage for they had no knowledge that the goods were already in Manila in
addition to the fact that private respondent had given petitioner the option of
abandoning the goods for the cost of demurrage.
ISSUE: Was there transshipment? If there is, did Orient breached the contract?
Abandonment proper?
1. Yes - Transhipment, in maritime law, is defined as "the act of taking cargo
out of one ship and loading it in another," 9 or "the transfer of goods from
the vessel stipulated in the contract of affreightment to another vessel
before the place of destination named in the contract has been
reached," 10 or "the transfer for further transportation from one ship or
conveyance to another." 11 Clearly, either in its ordinary or its strictly legal
acceptation, there is transhipment whether or not the same person, firm or
entity owns the vessels. In other words, the fact of transhipment is not
dependent upon the ownership of the transporting ships or conveyances or
in the change of carriers, as the petitioner seems to suggest, but rather on
the fact of actual physical transfer of cargo from one vessel to another.
That there was transhipment within this contemplation is the inescapable
conclusion, as there unmistakably appears on the face of the bill of lading
the entry "Hong Kong" in the blank space labeled "Transhipment," which
can only mean that transhipment actually took place.
2. Bill of lading acts both as a receipt and as a contract. The holding in most
jurisdictions has been that a shipper who receives a bill of lading without
objection after an opportunity to inspect it, and permits the carrier to act on
it by proceeding with the shipment is presumed to have accepted it as
correctly stating the contract and to have assented to its terms. In other
words, the acceptance of the bill without dissent raises the presumption
that all the terms therein were brought to the knowledge of the shipper and
agreed to by him and, in the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped
from thereafter denying that he assented to such terms. This rule applies
with particular force where a shipper accepts a bill of lading with full
knowledge of its contents and acceptance under such circumstances
makes it a binding contract.

In the light of the series of events that transpired in the case at bar, there
can be no logical conclusion other than that the petitioner had full
knowledge of, and actually consented to, the terms and conditions of the
bill of lading thereby making the same conclusive as to it, and it cannot
now be heard to deny having assented thereto. As borne out by the
records, James Cu himself, in his capacity as president of MMMC,
personally received and signed the bill of lading.

As between such stilted thesis of petitioner and the contents of the bill of
lading evidencing the intention of the parties, it is irremissible that the latter
must prevail.
 In sum, petitioner had full knowledge that the bill issued to it contained
terms and conditions clearly violative of the requirements of the letter of
credit. Nonetheless, perhaps in its eagerness to conclude the transaction
with its Japanese buyer and in a race to beat the expiry date of the letter of
credit, petitioner took the risk of accepting the bill of lading even if it did not
conform with the indicated specifications, possibly entertaining a glimmer
of hope and imbued with a touch of daring that such violations may be
overlooked, if not disregarded, so long as the cargo is delivered on time.
Unfortunately, the risk did not pull through as hoped for. Any violation of the
terms and conditions of the letter of credit as would defeat its right to
collect the proceeds thereof was, therefore, entirely of the petitioner's
making for which it must bear the consequences.

3. Now, there is no dispute that private respondents expressly and on their

own volition granted petitioner an option with respect to the satisfaction of
freightage and demurrage charges. Having given such option, especially
since it was accepted by petitioner, private respondents are estopped from
reneging thereon. Petitioner, on its part, was well within its right to exercise
said option. Private respondents, in giving the option, and petitioner, in
exercising that option, are concluded by their respective actions. To allow
either of them to unilaterally back out on the offer and on the exercise of
the option would be to countenance abuse of rights as an order of the day,
doing violence to the long entrenched principle of mutuality of contracts.

It will be remembered that in overland transportation, an unreasonable

delay in the delivery of transported goods is sufficient ground for the
abandonment of goods. By analogy, this can also apply to maritime
transportation. Further, with much more reason can petitioner in the instant
case properly abandon the goods, not only because of the unreasonable
delay in its delivery but because of the option which was categorically
granted to and exercised by it as a means of settling its liability for the cost
and expenses of reshipment. And, said choice having been duly
communicated, the same is binding upon the parties on legal and equitable
considerations of estoppel.
G.R. No. L-6393 January 31, 1955

A. MAGSAYSAY INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANASTACIO AGAN, Defendant-

Appellant.

Custodio A. Villava for appellant.

Quijano, Alidio and Azores for appellee.

In 1949, SS San Antonio, owned by AMInc, embarked on its voyage to Batanes

via Aparri. It was carrying various cargoes, one of which was owned by Agan.
One fine weather day, it accidentally ran aground the mouth of the Cagayan
River due to the sudden shifting of the sands below. SS San Antonio then
needed the services of Luzon Stevedoring Co. to tow the ship and make it afloat
so that it can continue its journey. Later, AMInc required the cargo owners to pay
the expenses incurred in making the ship afloat (P841.40 each). The expenses,
AMInc claims, fall under the General Averages Rule under the Code of
Commerce, which is to be shared by ship owner and cargo owners as well.
ISSUE: Whether or not general averages exist in the case at bar.
HELD: No. General averages contemplate that the stranding of the vessel is
intentionally done in order to save the vessel itself from a certain and imminent
danger. Here, the stranding was accidental and it was made afloat for the
purpose of saving the voyage and not the vessel. Note that this happened on a
fine weather day. Also, it cannot be said that the towing was made to save the
cargos, for the cargos were not in danger imminent danger.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7675 March 25, 1913

G. URRUTIA & CO., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BACO RIVER PLANTATION

CO.,Defendant-Appellee.
M. GARZA, intervener-appellant.

Antonio Sanz, for plaintiff.

Hartford Beaumont, for defendant.
Recaredo M.a Calvo, for intervener.

MORELAND, J. :chanrobles virtual law library

This action spring from a collision between the steamship Nuestra Seora del
Pilar, owned by the plaintiff, and the schooner Mangyan owned by the defendant,
which occurred in the early morning of the 8th of April, 1910, in Verde Island
North Passage. The sail vessel was sailing with a fresh breeze dead astern, her
sails wing and wing. The steamer was seen by those on board the sailing vessel
some time before the actual collision, sailing erratically. The sail vessel kept her
course steadily until just before the actual contact when her helmsman threw her
hard to port in an effort to avoid the collision. The movement, however, was
unsuccessful and the sail vessel rammed the steamer on the starboard quarter
well aft. The steamer sank and eight lives were lost. The sail vessel was
considerably injured.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This action was brought by the owners of the steamship against the owner of the
sail vessel, to recover the value of the destroyed steamer and the damages
caused by reason of its destruction, alleging as a basis therefor the negligence of
the said vessel. The defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint
and set up a counterclaim for damages, alleging as grounds therefor that the
injuries sustained by the said vessel were due to the gross negligence of those
handling plaintiff's steamer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Before the action was tried, M. Garza made an application to intervene under the
provisions of section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he alleging in support of
his application that the steamer was carrying for him at the time several thousand
pesos' worth of merchandise as freight, which was lost as a result of the collision.
He was permitted to intervene and accordingly filed a complaint setting up the
loss of this merchandise and the value thereof and alleging, as the basis for his
right to recover, the negligence of one or the other of the vessels, without
specifying which, and praying that the court award him damages against the
vessel the negligence of which, upon the trial, was shown to have caused his
loss.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The case turns upon the question which of the vessels was negligent in failing to
conform to the International Rules for the Prevention of Collissions at Sea. The
learned trials court found that those managing the steamer were guilty of gross
negligence and that for that reason the plaintiff could recover
nothing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An examination of the record leave no doubt that the finding of the trial court that
the steamer was handled in a grossly negligent manner is clearly and fully
supported by the evidence. No other finding could be
sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Relative to the alleged negligence of the sail vessel the learned trial court said:

I am satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that the steamer Ntra. Sra. del
Pilar was sailing erratically, that it did not have a proper watch on board, and that
it therefore contributed neglect to the
collision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

I am thoroughly satisfied that the sailing vessel Mangyan had its lights properly
on it long before the time the collision occurred, and that the lights were so
arranged upon the rigging of the vessel as to comply with the rules, and that they
were visible and were seen by the crew of the steamer Elcano and could have
been seen by the wathcman or the chief officer of the steamer Ntra. Sra. del
Pilar, if they had been on the lookout for them; chanrobles virtual law library

That the steamer Ntra. Sra. del Pilar, being bound to keep out of the course of
the sailing vessel and suddenly seeing the sailing vessel very close, went over
hard to port and crossed the course of the sailing
vessel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

I also find that the sailing vessel, notwithstanding the erratic movements of the
steamer, proceeded directly on its course regardless of consequences when with
all the searoom there was it could easily have maneuvered so as to very well
avoid the collision, and thereby having contributed neglect to the collision, neither
is entitled to recover from the other any damages which may have occurred.

These facts and circumstances clearly appear in the record and fully sustain the
conclusions reached.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are of the opinion that under the facts stated in the decision of the trial court
the defendant was entitled to recover upon its
counterclaim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It being clear from, the evidence that the gross negligence of those managing the
steamer brought it into such close proximity to the sail vessel that a collision was
apparently inevitable, the question is whether or not the sail vessel was negligent
in continuing its course without variation up to the moment that it found itself in
extremis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Article 20 of the International Rules for the Prevention of Collission at Sea is as

follows: "If two ships, one of which is a sailing ship and the other a steam ship,
are proceeding in such directions as to involve risk of collision, the steam ship
shall keep out of the way, of the sailing ship." chanrobles virtual law library

Article 21 is as follows: "where by any of these rules one of two vessels is to

keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course and speed." chanrobles
virtual law library

Generally speaking, in collisions between vessels there exist three divisions of

time, or zones; The first division covers all the time up to the moment when the
risk of collision may be said to have begun. Within this zone no rule is applicable
because none is necessary. Each vessel is free to direct its course as it deems
best without reference to the movements of the other vessel. The second division
covers the time between the moment when the risk of collision begins and the
moment when it has become a practical certainty. The third division covers the
time between the moment when collision has become a practical certainty and
the moment of actual contact.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

It was during the time when the sail vessel was passing through the third zone
that it changed its course to port in order to avoid, if possible, the collision. This
act may be said to have been done in extremis, and, even if wrong, the sailing
vessel is not responsible for the result.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The question before us, as presented by the finding of the trial court, arises
wholly over the action of the schooner in keeping her course through the second
zone, that is, during the period when there was a risk of collision. In resolving this
question we have to note the well-established presumption which favors the sail
vessel in cases of this character. The rule relative to this presumption is
conservatively stated in volume 25 of the American and English Encyclopedia of
Law, page 926:

Subject to the general rules of evidence in collision cases as to the burden of

proof, in the case of a collision between a steam vessel and a sail vessel, the
presumption is against the steam vessel, and she must show that she took the
proper measures to avoid a collision.

Hughes on Admiralty, page 242, declares the law thus:

A steamer must keep out of the way of a sail vessel. In doing so she must allow
the said vessel a wide berth. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

A steamer may take her own method of passing a sail vessel. The mere
approach of the two vessels does not bring about risk of collision. The steamer
may assume that the sail vessel will do her duty and do nothing to embarrass
her. Hence the steamer may shape her course so as to avoid the sail
vessel. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This rule that vessels may each assume that the other will obey the law is one of
the most important in the law of collision. Were it otherwise and were vessels
required to take all sorts of measures to keep out the way, when they are not in
each other's way, navigation would be impossible. . . . There is, however, one
important qualification which must be borne in mind. It is that a steamer must not
approach so near a sailing vessel, and on such a course as to alarm a man of
ordinary skill and prudence. If the man on the sailing vessel makes an improper
manuever, he is not responsible. It is what is called an "error in extremis." . . .
The leading case on the subject is The Lucille (15 Wallace, 676). In that case a
steamer and schooner were approaching on converging course only half a point
apart, so that they would have come within thirty yards of each other, and that in
Chesapeake Bay. The court held that this was too close and condemned the
steamer."

On page 245 the same author says:

Article 21 . . . renders it obligatory on the vessel which has the right of way to
pursue her course. . . . She must rely on the other vessel to avoid the collision
and not embarrass her by any maneuver. All she need do is to do nothing. Then
the other vessel knows to expect and navigates accordingly. . .
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In collisions between steam and sail vessels the steamer's defense is almost
invariably that the sail vessel changed her course.

On page 255 of the same work appears the following:

In The Clara Davidson (24 Fed. 763), the court said: "But I do not find my self at
liberty to ignore the inquiry whether a statutory rule of navigation was violated by
the schooner. These rules are the law of laws in cases of collision. They admit of
no option or choice. No navigator is at liberty to set up his discretion against
them. If these rules were subject to the caprice or election of masters and pilots,
they would be not only useless, but worse than useless. These rules are
imperative. They yield to necessity, indeed, but only to actual and obvious
necessity. It is not stating the principles too strongly to say that nothing but
imperious necessity or some overpowering his major will excuse a sail vessel in
changing her course when in the presence of a steamer in motion."

Spencer on Marine Collisions, page 154, says:

The duties imposed upon vessels are of a mutual character; and where the
statute directs one to give way to the other, it imposes an equal duty upon the
latter to continue on its course, and a change of course on its part is as unlawful
as it would be for the other refuse to yield the right of way. . .
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is one of the conditions of the duty to keep out of the way," that the other vessel
shall act intelligently, and afford reasonable evidence of her intention; while it is
doubtful what the other will do, the former should hold her course. Like all other
rules for the prevention of collisions at sea, there may be special circumstance
which would warrant a ship in departing from her course, where collision appears
inevitable by pursuing it; indeed, it is her duty to do so; but until it plainly appears
that there is no other alternative, a vessel should hold her course when in a
position required to do so by the statute."

On page 181 the same author says:

The duty of one vessel to keep her course is not intended by the rules as a
privilege conferred, but as an obligation imposed, in order to enable the other
vessel with certainty to keep out of the way. In order to warrant a vessel to either
change her course or speed, there must be reasonable certainty that the other is
not doing her duty, and that the situation imperatively demands a departure from
the rules. It is the duty of the vessel required to keep out of the way to give an
early and intelligible expression of her intentions to do so; and while there is any
doubt as to what her actions will be, the vessel required to hold her course may
presume that the other will act intelligently and lawfully, and she should hold her
course until the contrary appears. it is no excuse for a vessel taking a course
forbidden by law that the unlawful course was the best one.
In the American and English Encyclopedia of law (vol. 25. p. 925) the rules is
stated as follows:

But it must be a strong case which puts the sail vessels in the wrong for obeying
the rule to hold her course, for the court must clearly see, not only that a
deviation from the rule for would have prevented the collision, but that the officer
in charge of the sail vessel was guilty of negligence or a culpable want of
seamanship in not perceiving the necessity for a departure from the rule and
acting accordingly. The sail vessel is justified in holding her course to the last
minute possible for the steamship to avoid her by making the necessary
maneuver.

In the case of St. John vs. Paine (10 How., 557), the collision was between a
schooner and a steamer. The schooner had no lights visible; the night was
starlight and clear. The court reviewed the rules governing the management of
sail vessel at some length, explained the rules applicable to the management of
steam vessels, and gave the reasons why the rules which govern travelers on
the highways of the sea should be strictly enforced. After showing the greater
facility of manuevering which a steamer has over a sail vessel and, therefore, the
greater ability to avoid collisions, the court said:

As a general rule, therefore, when meeting a sailing vessel, whether close hauled
or with the wind free, the latter has a right to keep her course, and it is the duty of
the steamer to adopt precautions as will avoid her. (Cites cases.) chanrobles
virtual law library

By an adherence to this rule on the part of the sailing vessel the steamer with a
proper lookout will be enabled, when approaching in an opposite direction, to
adopt the necessary measures to avoid the danger, and she will have a right to
assume that the sailing vessel will keep her course. If the latter fails to do this,
the fault will be attributable to her, and the master of the steamer will be
responsible only for a fair exertion of the power of his vessel to avoid the collision
under the unexpected change of the course of the other vessel, and the
circumstances of the case.

A similar case is that of The Genesee Chief vs. Fitzhugh (12 How., 443). This
pertains also to a collision between a steamer, The Genesee Chief , and a sail
vessel. The two watched each other for some time before the collision. The
sailing vessel kept her course until in extremis when she made a wrong
maneuver. The court said:

The collision took place in the open lake. It was a starlight night, and although
there was a haze near the surface of the lake, it was not sufficient to conceal the
Cuba from those on board of the propeller. . .
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The lake was smooth. The steamboat had the entire command of her course and
a wide water, by which she might have passed the Cuba on either side, and at a
safe distance. She was going at the rate of eight miles an hour. And if proper
care had been taken on board the GeneseeChief , after the schooner was first
seen, it would seem to be almost impossible that a collision could have
happened with a vessel moving so slowly and sluggishly through the water even
if she was carelessly or injudiciously managed. There was no necessity for
passing so near her as to create the hazard. The steamboat could choose it own
distance. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

And the captain and crew of the Cuba appear to have been watchful and
attentive from the time the propeller was discovered. Nor do we deem it material
to inquire whether the order of the captain at the moment of collision was
judicious or not. He saw the steamboat coming directly upon him; her speed not
diminished; nor any measures taken to avoid a collision., And if, in the excitement
and alarm of the moment, a different order might have been more fortunate, it
was the fault of the propeller to have placed him in a situation where there was
no time for thought; and she is responsible for the consequences. She had the
power to have passed at a safer distance, and had no right to place the schooner
in such jeopardy, that the error of a moment might cause her destruction, and
endanger the lives of those on board. And if an error was committed under such
circumstances it was not a fault.

In the case of The Ottawa (3 Wall., 269), the court said:

Rules of navigation are obligatory from the time the necessity for precaution
begins, and continue to be applicable as the vessels advance, so long as the
means and opportunity to avoid the danger remain; but they do not apply to a
vessel required to keep her course after the approach is so near that the collision
is inevitable, and are equally inapplicable to vessels of every description while
they are yet so distant from each other that measures of precaution have not
become necessary.

This case exemplifies the three zone theory already referred to. In the first zone
no rules apply. In the second the burden is on the vessel required to keep away
and avoid the danger. The third zone covers the period in which errors in
extremis occur; and the rule is that the vessel which has forced the privileged
vessel into danger is responsible even if the privileged vessel has committed an
error within that zone.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The duty of the sailing vessel to keep her course is well exemplified in the
leading case of The Lucille vs. Respass (15 Wall., 676), which was a collision
between a schooner and a steamer. Both vessels saw each other in time to have
avoided the collision. The court said:

The principles of law applicable to the case are well settled. They are not
disputed by either party. In the case of The Carrol (8 Wall., 302), it is thus laid
down, "Nautical rules require that where a steamship and sailing vessel are
approaching each other from opposite directions, or on intersecting lines, the
steamship from the moment the sailing vessel is seen, shall watch with the
highest diligence her course and movements so as to be able to adopt such
timely means of precaution as will necessarily prevent the two boats from coming
in contact. Fault on the part of the sailing vessel at the moment preceeding a
collision does not absolve a steamer which has suffered herself and a sailing
vessel to get in such dangerous proximity as to cause inevitable alarm and
confusion and collusion as a consequence. The steamer, as having committed a
far greater fault in allowing such proximity to be brought about, is chargeable with
all the damages resulting from a collision." chanrobles virtual law library

The rule laid down in the case of The Fannie (11 Wal., 238( is still more
applicable to the case before us. It was held that a schooner meeting a steamer
approaching her on a parallel line, with the difference of half a point in the course
of the two, ought to have kept in her course; that a steamer approaching a sailing
vessel is bound to keep out of her way, and allow her a free and unobsructed
passage. Whatever is necessary for this it is her duty to do, and to avoid
whatever obstructs or endangers the sailing vessel in her course. It, therefore,
the sailing vessel does not change her course so as to embarrass the steamer,
and render it difficult for her to avoid a collision, the steamer alone is answerable
for the damage of a collision, if there is one.

In the case of The Sea Gull (23 Wall., 165) the court said:

Steamers approaching a sail ship in such a direction as to involve risk of collision

are required to keep out of the way of the sail ship; but the sail ship is required to
keep her course unless the circumstances are such as to render a departure
from the rule necessary in order to avoid immediate
danger.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Vessels with sails being required to keep their course, the duty of adopting the
necessary measures of precaution to keep out the way is devolved upon the
steamer subject only to the condition that the sail ship shall keep her course and
do not act to embarrass the steamer in her efforts to perform her duty. Doubtless
the steamer may go to the right or left if she can keep out of the way, but if not
and the approach is such as to involve risk of collision she is required to slacken
her speed, or, if necessary, stop and reverse, and if she fails to perform her duty
as required by the rules of navigation she is responsible for the consequences if
the sail vessel is without fault. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Attempts is made in argument to show that the schooner also was in fault and
that the case falls within the rule which requires that the damages shall be
divided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Support to that charge is attempted to be drawn from the assumed fact that the
schooner changed her course in violation of the rule of navigation which requires
the sail ship to keep her course, as a correlative duty to that of the steamer
whenever the latter is required to keep out of the way. . .
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Two answers are made by the libelants to that defense, either of which, if found
to be true, is sufficient to exonerate the schooner: . . . (2) That the schooner
made no change in her course until the collision was inevitable, nor until it
became indispensably necessary in order to avoid immediate danger caused by
the fault of the steamer. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Rules of navigation continue to be applicable as long as the means and

opportunity remain to avoid the danger, but they do not apply to a vessel required
to keep her course after the wrongful approach of the opposite vessel is so near
that a collision is inevitable. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Nor will an error committed by the sail vessel under such circumstances of peril,
if she otherwise without fault, impair the right of the sail vessel to recover for the
injuries occasioned by the collision, for the plain reason that those who produced
the peril and put the sail vessel in that situation are chargeable with the error and
must answer for the consequences. (Steamship Co. vs. Rumball, 21 How.,
383.) chanrobles virtual law library

Subject to that exceptions the sail vessel must keep her course.

In the case of The Benefactor (102 U. S. 214), the court laid down the following
conclusions.:

1. Upon the steamship and schooner discovering each other proceeding in such
directions as to involve risk of collision, as stated in the foregoing findings of fact,
it was the right and duty of the schooner to keep her course, and the duty of the
steamship to keep out of the way of the schooner, and the steamship was in fault
in failing to perform that duty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

2. It was also the duty of the steamship under the circumstances stated, to
pursue a course which should not needlessly put the schooner in imminent peril;
and the steamship was in fault in failing to perform that
duty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. It was the duty of the steamship before the time when she did so, to slacken
her speed or stop, and the steamship was in fault in failing to perform that
duty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. If, when a collision had become imminent by reason of the fault of the
steamship, any error was committed in extremis by those in charge of the
schooner, the schooner is not responsible
therefor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

5. The steamship had no right, under the circumstances stated, needlessly to

place herself in such close proximity to the schooner that the error or a moment
would bring destruction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

6. The collision was occasioned by the fault of the steamship, and the steamship
should be condemned therefor.

In the case of The Badger State (8 Fed. Rep., 526), the court said:

Where a sailing level and one propelled by steam are approaching each other
bow, on the steamer must give away, In case of a collision between such
vessels, the steamer is prima facie in fault.

In the case of The Gate City (90 Fed. Rep., 314), the court held, according to the
syllabus:

The rule requiring a sailing vessel meeting a steamer to hold her course is a
broad and general one intended to put the burden of avoiding a collision upon the
steamer; and, if the sailing vessel departs from the injunction the burden is on
her to show some reasonable excuse
therefor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A disregard of the rule not demanded by a clearly existing exigency should not be
excused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, she will not be held in fault for adhering to her course, although the
steamer seems to be manuevering in an uncertain and dangerous way.

We are satisfied from the authorities that, under the facts stated in the opinion of
the trial court, the defendant is entitled to recover such damages as reasonably
and naturally flowed from the collision. There is sufficient evidence in the record
to fix such damages with reasonable accuracy. It was proved upon the trial that it
would require an expenditure of P3,525 to put the sail vessel in the condition in
which it was before the injury; that it cost 245 to get the vessel to Manila after the
injury; that the value of the supplies lost was P240.99. The evidence relative to
the loss of earnings is not sufficient to permit the court to formulate any
conclusion in relation thereto, even if it be considered a proper item of
damage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We think the judgment of the trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint of
intervention. The intervener had no "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both." Their action was
personal, involved no rights in property which extended beyond their immediate
selves, and touched no third party in any of the ramifications of those
rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment of the court below, in so far as it finds against the plaintiff and the
intervener, is hereby affirmed. As to that portion which dismisses the
counterclaim of the defendant, the Baco River Plantation Company, the judgment
is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to the trial court to enter
judgment in favor of the defendant, The Baco River Plantation Company, and
against the plaintiff, G. Urrutia & Company, for the sum of P4,010.99 and costs.
No costs on this appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

While it was held in the case of Philippine Shipping Co. vs. Vergara (6 Phil. Rep.,
281), that, in accordance with articles 837 and 826 of the Code of Commerce,
the defendant in an action such as the one at bar cannot be held responsible in
damages when the ship causing the injury was wholly lost by reason of the
accident, we do not apply it in this case for the reason that the vessel lost was
insured and that the defendant collected the insurance. That being the case, the
insurance money substitutes the vessel and must be used, so far as necessary,
to pay the judgment rendered in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

In coming to this conclusion we have not lost sight of the case of

Place vs. Norwich and N. Y. Trans. Co. (118 U. S., 468), in which it was held that,
under the provision of the Act of Congress relative thereto, insurance money
obtained by reason of the loss of a vessel causing damages, as in the case at
bar, was not subject to the payment of the damages sustained by the negligence
of the vessel lost by reason of the accident in which the damages occurred. We
do not follow that case because we are met in this jurisdiction with article 1186 of
the Civil Code, which provides that "after the obligation is extinguished by the
loss of the thing, all the actions which the debtor may have against third persons,
by reason thereof, shall pertain to the creditor," and with article 2 of the Code of
Commerce, which provides that where the Code of Commerce is silent to the law
relating to the matters of which it treats, those matters shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

That said article 1186 is, under the Spanish jurisprudence, applicable to money
obtained from the insurance of the thing lost or destroyed, there can be no doubt.
(Manresa, vol. 8, 353.) chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment in this case is, therefore, collectible, but the amount collected
cannot exceed the amount of insurance money actually
received.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The writer of this opinion had doubts of the applicability of article 1186, referred
to; but has yielded to the learning of the majority relative to the Roman and
Spanish jurisprudence on this point.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Trent, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-21749 September 29, 1967

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
The present case comes by direct appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Case No. 44572) adjudging the defendant-appellant, Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation, liable in damages to the plaintiff-appellee Republic of
the Philippines.
In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L-1892, owned by the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig river by tugboats
"Bangus" and "Barbero"1 also belonging to the same corporation, when the barge
rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge,
smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river, at the time, was
swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour of Manila and
the surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960.
Sued by the Republic of the Philippines for actual and consequential damage
caused by its employees, amounting to P200,000 (Civil Case No. 44562, CFI of
Manila), defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation disclaimed liability therefor,
on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused
by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan
bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.
After due trial, the court rendered judgment on June 11, 1963, holding the
defendant liable for the damage caused by its employees and ordering it to pay
to plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge which
amounted to P192,561.72, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of
the complaint.
Defendant appealed directly to this Court assigning the following errors allegedly
committed by the court a quo, to wit:
I The lower court erred in not holding that the herein defendant-appellant had
exercised the diligence required of it in the selection and supervision of its
personnel to prevent damage or injury to others.1awphl.nt
II The lower court erred in not holding that the ramming of the Nagtahan bailey
bridge by barge L-1892 was caused by force majeure.
III The lower court erred in not holding that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an
obstruction, if not a menace, to navigation in the Pasig river.
IV The lower court erred in not blaming the damage sustained by the
Nagtahan bailey bridge to the improper placement of the dolphins.
V The lower court erred in granting plaintiff's motion to adduce further
evidence in chief after it has rested its case.
VI The lower court erred in finding the plaintiff entitled to the amount of
P192,561.72 for damages which is clearly exorbitant and without any factual
basis.
However, it must be recalled that the established rule in this jurisdiction is that
when a party appeals directly to the Supreme Court, and submits his case there
for decision, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact
made by the trial Court. The only questions that may be raised are those of law
(Savellano vs. Diaz, L-17441, July 31, 1963; Aballe vs. Santiago, L-16307, April
30, 1963; G.S.I.S. vs. Cloribel, L-22236, June 22, 1965). A converso, a party who
resorts to the Court of Appeals, and submits his case for decision there, is barred
from contending later that his claim was beyond the jurisdiction of the aforesaid
Court. The reason is that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable
practice of appellants' submitting their cases for decision to either court in
expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction
should the decision be unfavorable (Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaia de
Seguros) et al., L-10096, Res. on Motion to Reconsider, March 23, 1966).
Consequently, we are limited in this appeal to the issues of law raised in the
appellant's brief.
Taking the aforesaid rules into account, it can be seen that the only reviewable
issues in this appeal are reduced to two:
1) Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of
the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure, and
2) Whether or not it was error for the Court to have permitted the plaintiff-
appellee to introduce additional evidence of damages after said party had rested
its case.
As to the first question, considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable
and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for
the passage of water craft, including barges like of appellant's, it is undeniable
that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant,
rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of
appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the
ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper care is used. In
Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the "res
ipsa loquitur" rule (Scott vs. London Docks Co., 2 H & C 596; San Juan Light &
Transit Co. vs. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 56 L. Ed., 680; Whitwell vs. Wolf, 127
Minn. 529, 149 N.W. 299; Bryne vs. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 269 Mass.
130; 168 N.E. 540; Gribsby vs. Smith, 146 S.W. 2d 719).
The appellant strongly stresses the precautions taken by it on the day in
question: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its
barge L-1892; that it assigned to the task the more competent and experienced
among its patrons, had the towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and
inspected; that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and concludes
that it had done all it was called to do, and that the accident, therefore, should be
held due to force majeure or fortuitous event.
These very precautions, however, completely destroy the appellant's defense.
For caso fortuito or force majeure(which in law are identical in so far as they
exempt an obligor from liability)2 by definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is,
therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or
to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to
foresee the same: "un hecho no constituye caso fortuito por la sola circunstancia
de que su existencia haga mas dificil o mas onerosa la accion diligente del
presento ofensor" (Peirano Facio, Responsibilidad Extra-contractual, p. 465;
Mazeaud Trait de la Responsibilite Civil, Vol. 2, sec. 1569). The very measures
adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only
foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.
Otherwise stated, the appellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, knowing and
appreciating the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current,
voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assured
the risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the precautions it
adopted turned out to be insufficient. Hence, the lower Court committed no error
in holding it negligent in not suspending operations and in holding it liable for the
damages caused.
It avails the appellant naught to argue that the dolphins, like the bridge, were
improperly located. Even if true, these circumstances would merely emphasize
the need of even higher degree of care on appellant's part in the situation
involved in the present case. The appellant, whose barges and tugs travel up and
down the river everyday, could not safely ignore the danger posed by these
allegedly improper constructions that had been erected, and in place, for years.
On the second point: appellant charges the lower court with having abused its
discretion in the admission of plaintiff's additional evidence after the latter had
rested its case. There is an insinuation that the delay was deliberate to enable
the manipulation of evidence to prejudice defendant-appellant.
We find no merit in the contention. Whether or not further evidence will be
allowed after a party offering the evidence has rested his case, lies within the
sound discretion of the trial Judge, and this discretion will not be reviewed except
in clear case of abuse.3
In the present case, no abuse of that discretion is shown. What was allowed to
be introduced, after plaintiff had rested its evidence in chief, were vouchers and
papers to support an item of P1,558.00 allegedly spent for the reinforcement of
the panel of the bailey bridge, and which item already appeared in Exhibit GG.
Appellant, in fact, has no reason to charge the trial court of being unfair, because
it was also able to secure, upon written motion, a similar order dated November
24, 1962, allowing reception of additional evidence for the said defendant-
appellant.4
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the lower Court appealed from,
the same is hereby affirmed. Costs against the defendant-appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.P. J., on leave, took no part.
Footnotes
1
The lead-tugboat "Bangus" was pulling the barge, while the tugboat "Barbero"
was holding or restraining it at the back.
2
Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 661.
3
Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429.
4
p. 89, Record on Appeal.

MANILA STEAMSHIP CO., INC. vs. INSA ABDULHAMAN (MORO) and LIM
HONG TO
1956 || Reyes JBL, J:

Facts:
Respondent Abdulhaman filed a case against Manila Steamship Co Inc,
owner of MS Bowline Knot, and Lim Hong To, owner of M/L Consuelo V to
recover damages for the death of his 5 children and loss of personal
properties on board the M/L Consuelo V as a result of a maritime collision
between the 2 vessels
In 1948, the M/L Consuelo V left the port of Zamboanga City for Siokon. On
the same night, The M/S Bowline Knot was heading to Zamboanga City. The
weather was good and fair. Abdulhaman, his wife and 5 children had paid their
fare beforehand
It began raining and there were strong winds for an hour. This weather lasted
for an hour then it became fair although it was showering and the visibility was
good enough.
The two vessels collided while the passengers were sleeping. M/L Consuelo V
capsized quickly (before the passengers realized it, they were already floating
and swimming) 9 died and the cargo was lost.
 Before the collision, none of the passengers were warned or informed of the
impending danger as the collision was so sudden and unexpected. All those
rescued at sea were brought by the M/V Bowline Knot to Zamboanga City.
The Board of Marine Inquiry found that the commanding officer of the colliding
vessels had both been negligent in operating their respective vessels. It held
the owners of both vessels solidarily liable to Abdulhaman for the damages
caused to him by the collision, under Article 827 of the Code of Commerce;
but exempted Defendant Lim Hong To from liability by reason of the sinking
and total loss of his vessel, the M/L Consuelo V. CA affirmed.
Manila Steamship appealed because it was the one who was ordered to pay
damages.
o it is exempt from any liability under Article 1903 of the Civil Code
because it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of its employees, particularly Third Mate Simplicio Ilagan, the
officer in command of its vessels, the M/S Bowline Knot, at the time of
the collision.
o It shouldnt be liable for the actions of its agent (captain) and employees

Issue: WON Manila Steamship is liable YES

Ratio:
DUE DILIGENCE
The defense of due diligence is untenable. While it is true that Plaintiffs action
is based on a tort or quasi-delict, the tort in question is not a civil tort under
the Civil Code but a maritime tort resulting in a collision at sea,
governed by Articles 826-939 of the Code of Commerce. Under Article 827
of the Code of Commerce, in case of collision between two vessels imputable
to both of them, each vessel shall suffer her own damage and both shall be
solidarily liable for the damages occasioned to their cargoes. The
characteristic language of the law in making the vessels solidarily liable for
the damages due to the maritime collision emphasizes the direct nature of
the responsibilities on account of the collision incurred by the shipowner under
maritime law, as distinguished from the civil law and mercantile law in general.
This direct responsibility is recognized in Article 618 of the Code of Commerce
under which the captain shall be civilly liable to the ship agent, and the latter
is the one liable to third persons
It is a general principle, well established maritime law and custom, that
shipowners and ship agents are civilly liable for the acts of the captain (Code
of Commerce, Article 586) and for the indemnities due the third persons
(Article 587); so that injured parties may immediately look for reimbursement
to the owner of the ship, it being universally recognized that the ship master or
captain is primarily the representative of the owner. This direct liability,
moderated and limited by the owners right of abandonment of the vessel and
 earned freight (Article 587), has been declared to exist, not only in case of
breached contracts, but also in cases of tortious negligence

ACT OF AGENT
It is proven that the agents and employees, through whose negligence the
explosion and fire in question occurred, were agents, employees and
mandatories of Manila Steamship. Where the vessel is one of freight, a public
concern or public utility, its owner or agents is liable for the tortious acts of his
agents (Articles 587, 613, & 618 Code of Commerce; & Article 1902, 1903,
1908, Civil Code).
Manila Steamship cites cases which are about principals and agents in
general BUT this case is about the relations between ship agent and his
agents and employees.
It is easy to see that to admit the defense of due diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias (in the selection and vigilance of the officers and crew) as
exempting the shipowner from any liability for their faults, would render
nugatory the solidary liability established by Article 827 of the Code of
Commerce for the greater protection of injured parties. Shipowners would
be able to escape liability in practically every case, considering that the
qualifications and licensing of ship masters and officers are determined
by the State, and that vigilance is practically impossible to exercise over
officers and crew of vessels at sea. To compel the parties prejudiced to
look to the crew for indemnity and redress would be an illusory remedy for
almost always its members are, from captains down, mere wage earners.

Liability of Lim Hong To HE IS LIABLE

Both the master and the engineer of the motor launch Consuelo V were not
duly licensed as such. In applying for permission to operate, despite the lack
of properly trained and experienced, crew, Lim Hong To gave as a reason
that the income derived from the vessel is insufficient to pay licensed officers
who demand high salaries, and expressly declared That in case of any
accident, damage or loss, I shall assume full risk and responsibility for all the
consequences thereof.
His permit to operate, in fact, stipulated that in case of any accident,
damage or loss, the registered owner thereof shall assume full risk and
responsibility for all the consequences thereof, and that said vessel shall be
held answerable for any negligence, disregard or violation of any of the
conditions herein imposed and for any consequence arising from such
negligence, disregard or violations.
CA held that his permit and letter didnt contain waivers of his right to limit his
liability to the value of his motor launch and that he did not lose the statutory
right to limit his liability by abandonment of the vessel. WRONG
 By operating with an unlicensed master, Lim Hong To deliberately increased
the risk to which the passengers and shippers of cargo aboard the Consuelo
V would be subjected. In his desire to reap greater benefits in the maritime
trade, Lim Hong To willfully augmented the dangers and hazards to his
vessels unwarry passengers, who would normally assume that the launch
officers possessed the necessary skill and experience to evade the perils of
the sea. Hence, the his liability cannot be the identical to that of a shipowner
who bears in mind the safety of the passengers and cargo by employing duly
licensed officers.
The international rule is to the effect that the right of abandonment of vessels,
as a legal limitation of a shipowners liability, does not apply to cases where
the injury or the average is due to shipowners own fault.

FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA)

REGALADO; October 1, 1998

NATURE
Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision holding FESC and
Gavino solidarily liable
FACTS
- On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the
USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC),
arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila
International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked
by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant
Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to
conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.
- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed
himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him.
After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its
cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to
the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for
docking maneuvers. - When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by
the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine
stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the
vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the
anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A
commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued
between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all
the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. -
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines
half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel
was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not
take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor
and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into
the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel
sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his
report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority.
Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. - The rehabilitation of the
damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25.
PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE
- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under
compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority
Administrative Order No. 03-85:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a harbor and anchoring
thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as
docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another,
every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under
compulsory pilotage.
- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities
of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same
regulation:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On compulsory
pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be
responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports
due to his negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the
accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has
exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage
grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the
Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life
and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be
the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned
without prejudice to recourse against said Master
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be
determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of
the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
 SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. The
duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx
xxx xxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time
he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed
safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the
Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order.
- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier
likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots:
Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel
from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from
shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master
neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions.
xxx xxx xxx
Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under
their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels.
ISSUE WON both the pilot and the master were negligent
HELD
YES.
- The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object
and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object
(based on common sense and logic). It then went on to determine who between
the pilot and the master was negligent.
PILOT
- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct
a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert whos supposed
to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot
is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary
care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock
are at stake.
- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction
time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too
fast was too slow. As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly to any such
happenings.
MASTER
- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the
vessel. The master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems
there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the
pilot is drunk. - Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never sensed the any
danger even when the anchor didnt hold and they were approaching the dock
too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right
beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the
pilot was seeing and hearing.
- The masters negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and
in turn means negligence on the part of FESC.
CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS
- As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need
not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring
with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of
the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries,
person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of
them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is
an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no
defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have
resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of
the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery
may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable,
and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No
actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. -
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since
both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive
negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party,
they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage
under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino and FESC are solidarily
liable.