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Mark Anthony B.

LTD 2-4
5:00-7:00 PM

How much to pay in case of redemption of a real property mortgaged

Section 31 of C.A. 459

The mortgagor or debtor to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank * , whose real
property has been sold at public auction, judicially or extra-judicially, for the full or
partial payment of an obligation to said Bank, shall, within one year from the date
of the auction sale, have the right to redeem the real property by paying to the
Bank all the amount he owed the latter on the date of the sale, with interest on
the total indebtedness at the rate agreed upon in the obligation from said date,
unless the bidder has taken material possession of the property or unless this has
been delivered to him, in which case the proceeds of the property shall
compensate the interest ( Emphasis Ours)


G.R. No. L-29130 August 8, 1975

DIONISIO MIRANG, defendant-appellant.
Jesus A. Avancea and Lualhati Estrella-Hilario for plaintiff-appellee.
Roque V. Desquitado for defendant-appellant.


Mirang obtained a loan amounting to P 14,000 from Rehabilitation Finance

Corporation. It was secured by homestead. The loan was released gradually to the
appellant up to a total of P13,000.00. Thereafter the appellee refused to make any
further releases because the plantation which was being financed was attacked by
mosaic disease, which destroyed the abaca plants. Upon default, the same was
foreclosed, the Bank was the highest bidder. The appellant was duly advised of
the sale, with the information that the same was subject to his right of redemption
within one year from July 30, 1957. This right he had not exercised when the
complaint was filed by the appellee on May 29, 1962.


1. Whether or not the creditor Development Bank of the Philippines has a

right to recover the balance of the indebtedness after the mortgaged
property was sold for less than the amount thereof under extrajudicial
foreclosure pursuant to Act 3135?

2. Whether or not the mortgage debtor who wishes to repurchase his

homestead should pay therefor only the price paid by the purchaser at the
auction sale, or the total obligation incurred by him and still outstanding.

1. A reading of the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended, (re extrajudicial

foreclosure) discloses nothing, it is true, as to mortgagee's right to recover
such deficiency. But neither do we find any provision thereunder which
expressly or impliedly prohibits such recovery.

2. Based on Section 31 of C.A 459, the borrower should pay the entire amount
he owed to the Bank on the date of the sale, with interest thereon at the rate
agreed upon

G.R. No. L-28165 December 19, 1970


appellees, JOSEFINA B. JIMENEZ redemptioner-appellee.

Jesus A. Avancea and Hilario G. Orsolino for appellant.

Antonio Carretero for appellees.


Spouses Leonardo Jimenez and Corazon Benito are registered owners of a parcel
of land. the said spouses mortgaged the said property to the DBP for P15,000 and
P2,000, respectively. The mortgages were duly registered. On 25 March 1966, the
same property was sold at a public auction in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale,
due to the mortgagors' inability to pay the amortizations on said loans. The only
bidder at the public auction was the mortgagee itself, the DBP, represented by its
Branch Attorney, and which paid P11,000. In 1967, the mortgagors sold their said
registered land, including the right of redemption to their daughter and
redemptioner herein, Josefina B. Jimenez. She filed a petition praying for an order
of this court requiring the Branch Manager of the Development Bank of the
Philippines, Dagupan City, to cause the delivery of Original Certificate of Title No.
14483, to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, for the purpose of
annotating the deed of redemption.

Issue: Whether or not The lower Court erred in issuing, without previous hearing,
the Order of April 1, 1967 directing the mortgagee-DBP to surrender the owner's
copy of OCT No. 14483 to the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on the basis of
redemptioner-appellee's ex-parte motion, contrary to Section 111 of Act No. 496?

Held: No. The Court did not commit an error.

While it is true that the redemptioner should have applied to the court by petition
instead of mere Ex-parte Motion and that a hearing should have been had to
enable said Bank to interpose its objections to the surrender and consequent
cancellation of the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title in its
possession. However, that procedural defect was cured when the DBP presented
its Motion for Reconsideration of the said orders of 1 April and 7 April 1967,
contesting the validity of the Deed of Redemption on grounds discussed therein.
When the court, therefore, overruled the DBP's said objections and arguments and
affirmed its previous orders, the DBP was given its day in court, and the objection
of lack of notice or opportunity to be heard is overcome.

CHAPTER 10: Public Land Act Registration

CHAPTER 6-7 Assigned Cases



Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria applied to have a 1,729-square meter lot (Lot5176-D,
Mcadm-590-D of the Taguig Cadastral Mapping) in Bambang, Taguigregistered in
her name on 2 November 2004 before MeTCTaguig City. The Officeof the Solicitor
General (OSG) which represents Republic of the Philippines,opposed her
application. Victoria testified and oered documentary evidence showing the
subject lot is a portion of a 17,507-sq. m. parcel of land originally owned by her
father Genaro Sta. Ana and previously declared in his name for tax purposes.
Upon her fathers death, Victoria and her siblings inherited the land and divided it
via deed of partition among themselves. The Conversion/Subdivision Plan that
Victoria submitted as documentary evidence showed that the land is inside the
alienable and disposable are certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on 3
January 1968 (under Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623). She also testified that
she and her predecessors-in-interest possessed that property
continuously,uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely and in the concept of
owners since the early 1940s (or for more than 30 years) and have been declared
as owners for taxation purposes. The Republic did not present any evidence in
support of its opposition. The MeTC Taguig City granted Victorias application via
its 25 January 2006decision, finding that Victoria sufficiently established her claim
and right under the land registration law to have the property registered in her
name. The Republic appealed the MeTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), as
they pointed out that Victoria failed to: first, establish continuous,
uninterrupted,open, public, adverse possession in the concept of owner; second,
the subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The CA
reversed and set aside the judgment of MeTC Taguig via its 19 June2007 decision.
The Appellate Court upheld the second argument/point of the OSG, as Victoria
failed proving the property as alienable and disposable land. They said that she
could not rely on the notation in the Conversion/Subdivision Plan submitted before
the MeTC.

1.Whether Natividad Victoria amply proved the subject lot is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain?
2.Whether she has amply proved her claim of ownership?

Legal Provisions:
Section 14 (1)of the Property Registration Decree hasthree requisites for
registration of title: (a) that the property in question isalienable and disposable
land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a
bona fide claim ofownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Held and Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the MeTC Taguig Citys decision and granted Natividad
Victorias petition. The Court ruled that Victoria was able to establish establish
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adversepossession in the concept of
owner since the early 1940s. More so, she hasalso submitted tax declarations
way back in 1948 in her fathers name coveringthe said land, contrary to the
OSGs contention. The applicant must also present acopy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR
Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. The Court also ruled that the
certification obtained by Victoria from the DENR. CENRO declared the land to be
alienable and disposable



On January 19, 2001, petitioner DCD Construction, Inc., through its President and
CEO Danilo D.Dira, Jr., filed a verified application for registration of a parcel of land
situated in Taytay, DanaoCity with an area of 4,493 square meters. It was alleged
that applicant which acquired the property by purchase, together with its
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous, open, adverse, public,
uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property
for more than thirty (30) years. Thus, petitioner prayed to have its title judicially
confirmed. Based on petitioners documentary and testimonial evidence, it
appears that the approved technical description is allegedly identical to that of
another lot consisting of 3,781 square meters. 712 square meters of said lot can
be segregated as salvage zone pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 97-
05.On August 22, 2002, the trial court declared that the applicant DCD
CONSTRUCTION INC., has a registerable title to subject lot.On appeal by
respondent Republic of the Philippines, the CA reversed the trial court. The CA
ruled that the evidence failed to show that the land applied for was alienable and
disposable considering that only a notation in the survey plan was presented to
show the status of the property. It was further noted that the earliest tax
declaration submitted was issued only in1988. It was also held that petitioner did
not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

Whether or not the subject lot is indeed alienable and disposable.


No. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that
the land formspart of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain and (b) that theyhave been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

The bare statement of petitioners witness, Andrea Batucan Enriquez, that her
family had been in possession of the subject land from the time her father bought
it after the Second World War does not suffice. Moreover, the tax declaration in
the name of petitioners father was issued only in 1994, whilethe other in its own
name was issued in 2000. She never mentioned any act of
occupation,development, cultivation or maintenance over the property throughout
the alleged length of time.
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties Inc.


In 1999, T.A.N. Properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an application for the
registration of a land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an area of
56.4007 hectares. To support its application, it submitted two certificates, issued
by CENRO and FMS-DENR and both certifying that the land applied for was
alienable and disposable. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of Lands,opposed the application on the ground that T.A.N. Properties did
not prove that the land was alienable and disposable.

Whether or not the applicant proved that, the land is alienable and


No. It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to registration is
alienable and disposable and for such the applicant must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable. In the present case, T.A.N. Properties did not
provide the needed proof. For the documents provided by the company, the Court
cited DENR Administrative Order No. 20 (DAO No. 20) and DAO No. 38; DAO No.
20 proves that FMS-DENR has no authority to issue certificates, classifying lands
to be alienable and disposable; and DAO No. 38 provides that CENRO can issue
certificates of land classification for lands having a maximum area of 50 hectares.
The land applied for in the case has an area of 56.4007 hectares, thus CENRO has
no jurisdiction over it. It is clear from the aforementioned DAOs that the
documents submitted by T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.

Union Leaf Tobacco Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines


In December 1, 2004, the Corporation filed before the RTC of Agoo, La Union four
applications for land registration covering various parcels of land. The Republic
opposed the applications, citing Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution. The
corporation presented testimonial evidence as well as documentary evidence,
particularly the Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans, which all noted that
thesubject lands are "inside alienable and disposable area as per project No. 5-A,
LCMap No. 2891," to support its claim .After the trial, the RTC granted the
application of the corporation by relyingon the testimonies oered by the
witnesses of the latter. On appeal by the Republic, the CA reversed the trial
courts decision, holding that the corporation presented no evidence to show that
the subject parcels of land have been reclassified by theState as alienable or
disposable to a private person. The corporation in its answer,I nsisted that the
Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans it presented proved that theparcels of land
are alienable.

Issue: Whether or not the parcels of land are proven alienable and disposable.
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans are
hardly thecompetent pieces of evidence that the law requires. The notation by a
geodeticengineer on the survey plans that properties are alienable and disposable
does notsuffice to prove the lands classification.

Yu Change vs. Republic

G.R. No. 171726 : February 23, 2011


PHILIPPINES, Respondent.



Petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in representation of her brother and
co-petitioner, Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petition for registration of title over a piece
of land. In their petition, they declared that they are the co-owners of the subject
lots; that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, physical,
material, exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the above described
parcels of land for more than 100 years; and that allegedly, they have
continuously, peacefully, and adversely possessed the property in the concept of

The trial court rendered a Decision granting petitioners' application. The CA

reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed petitioners application for land
registration on account that the land is classified as forest land and is thus not
subject to appropriation and alienation. The CA considered the petition to be
governed by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land
Act, as amended, and held that petitioners were not able to present
incontrovertible evidence that the parcels of land sought to be registered are
alienable and disposable.

Petitioners insist that the subject properties could no longer be considered and
classified as forest land since there are buildings, residential houses and even
government structures existing and standing on the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing their application for
registration of title on the ground that they failed to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.


The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the eect that the lots subject of their
application are alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Instead,
petitioners contend that the subject properties could no longer be considered and
classified as forest land since there are building structures, residential houses and
even government buildings existing and standing on the area. This, however, is
hardly the proof required under the law.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that eect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not

Republic of the Philippines v. Candido Vergel De Dios


Candido filed with the RTC of Bulacan a petition for reconstitution of theburned
Original of TCT No. T-141671 and issuance of a new owners duplicate copyin lieu
of the destroyed one. Attached with his petition are the Kasulatan, Plan, Technical
Description and Tax Declaration of the land. The RTC granted the petitionbut the
Republic appealed the ruling to CA arguing about the sufficiency to order
areconstitution of the lost title of those presented by Candido. The CA also held
insufficient evidence the Kasulatan, which was executed only in 1996, long after
theoriginal TCT was burned and the owners duplicate title was lost but it also
affirmedthe RTCs order regarding the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy in
lieu of the destroyed one.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of the
Certificate of Title in lieu of the destroyed one is proper.


No. The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original

form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person
to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after
observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the
same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. When reconstitution
is ordered, this document is replaced with a new onethe reconstituted titlethat
reproduces the original. After the reconstitution, the owner is issued a duplicate
copy of the reconstituted title. In the present case, it is clear that the CA cancelled
the order of reconstitution, which was previously granted by the lower court, thus,
it shouldfollow that no new owners duplicate copy of certificate of title should be
issued. Without the order for reconstitution, the order to issue a new owners
duplicate title had no leg to stand on.