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Mutual assured destruction

Mutual assured destruction or mutually assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of

military strategy and national security policy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or
more opposing sides would cause the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender
(see pre-emptive nuclear strike and second strike).[1] It is based on the theory of deterrence, which
holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy's use of those
same weapons. The strategy is a form of Nash equilibrium in which, once armed, neither side has
any incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm.

The MAD doctrine assumes that each side has enough nuclear weaponry to destroy the other
side and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate without fail with equal
or greater force. The expected result is an immediate, irreversible escalation of hostilities resulting in
both combatants' mutual, total, and assured destruction. The doctrine requires that neither side
construct shelters on a massive scale. If one side constructed a similar system of shelters, it would
violate the MAD doctrine and destabilize the situation, because it would not have to fear the
consequences of a second strike.[2][3] The same principle is invoked against missile defense.

The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a first strike because the other side
would launch on warning (also called fail-deadly) or with surviving forces (a second strike), resulting
in unacceptable losses for both parties. The payoff of the MAD doctrine was and still is expected to
be a tense but stable global peace.

The primary application of this doctrine started during the Cold War (1940s to 1991), in which MAD
was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the United States and
the Soviet Union while they engaged in smaller proxy wars around the world. It was also responsible
for the arms race, as both nations struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain second-strike
capability. Although the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the MAD doctrine continues to be

Proponents of MAD as part of U.S. and USSR strategic doctrine believed that nuclear war could best
be prevented if neither side could expect to survive a full-scale nuclear exchange as a functioning
state. Since the credibility of the threat is critical to such assurance, each side had to invest
substantial capital in their nuclear arsenals even if they were not intended for use. In addition, neither
side could be expected or allowed to adequately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles.
[citation needed]
This led both to the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems (such as
nuclear missile silos, ballistic missile submarines, and nuclear bombers kept at fail-safe points) and
to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

This MAD scenario is often referred to as nuclear deterrence. The term "deterrence" was first used in
this context after World War II; prior to that time, its use was limited to legal terminology.


One of the earliest references to the concept comes from the English author Wilkie Collins, writing at
the time of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870: "I begin to believe in only one civilizing influencethe
discovery one of these days of a destructive agent so terrible that War shall mean annihilation and
men's fears will force them to keep the peace."[4]

Richard Jordan Gatling patented his namesake rotary gun in 1862 with the partial intention of
illustrating the futility of war.[5]

After his 1867 invention of dynamite, Alfred Nobel stated that "The day when two army corps can
annihilate each other in one second, all civilized nations, it is to be hoped, will recoil from war and
discharge their troops."[6]

Jan Gotlib Bloch in The Future of War, published in 1898, argued that the state could not fight a war
"under modern conditions with any prospect of being able to carry that war to a conclusion by
defeating its adversary by force of arms on the battlefield. No decisive war is possible that will not
entail even upon the victorious Power, the destruction of its resources and the breakup of society.
War has therefore become impossible, except at the price of suicide."[7]

In 1937, Nikola Tesla published The Art of Projecting Concentrated Non-dispersive Energy through
the Natural Media,[8] a treatise concerning charged particle beam weapons.[9] Tesla described his
device as a "superweapon that would put an end to all war."

In March 1940, the FrischPeierls memorandum anticipated deterrence as the principal means of
combating an enemy with nuclear weapons.

Early Cold War[edit]

Atomic bomb explosions over Hiroshima, Japan, 6 August 1945 (left) and over Nagasaki, Japan, 9 August 1945

In August 1945, the United States accepted the surrender of Japan after the nuclear attacks on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Four years later, on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its own
nuclear device. At the time, both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against

each other. However, with the development of aircraft like the American Convair B-36 and the
Soviet Tupolev Tu-95, both sides were gaining a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the
interior of the opposing country. The official nuclear policy of the United States became one of
"massive retaliation", as coined by President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles, which called for massive attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe,
regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.

By the time of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, both the United States and the Soviet Union had
developed the capability of launching a nuclear-tipped missile from a submerged submarine, which
completed the third leg of the nuclear triad weapons strategy necessary to fully implement the MAD
doctrine. Having a three-branched nuclear capability eliminated the possibility that an enemy could
destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a first-strike attack; this, in turn, ensured the credible threat
of a devastating retaliatory strike against the aggressor, increasing a nation's nuclear deterrence

The strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction and the acronym MAD are due to John von
Neumann (19031957)[13] and his taste for humorous acronyms, another example being
his MANIAC computer. He was, among other things, an inventor of game theory, a cold war
strategist, and chairman of the Intercontinental ballistic missile Committee until his death in 1957.

The RAND corporation futurist and cold war strategist Herman Kahn (19221982) believed that
although MAD was useful as a metaphor, when pushed to its logical conclusion it became absurd. In
his 1960 book On Thermonuclear War he advocated a more reasoned approach to nuclear warfare
and was misunderstood by some of his critics to be a nuclear war hawk in his writings. (He did
however hold a profound belief in the possibility of success in the event of a nuclear war.) He used
the concept of the Doomsday Machine as an "idealized (almost caricaturized) device"[14] to illustrate
the danger of taking MAD to its extreme. He writes, "I used to be wary of discussing the concept for
fear that some colonel would get out a General Operating Requirement or Development Planning
Objective for the device".[15]

The 1964 film Dr. Strangelove parodies some of Kahn's work, and the titular character makes parodic
references to Kahn's research, as in this quote from the film (after the United States mistakenly
launched a nuclear attack on the USSR): "Under the authority granted me as director of weapons
research and development, I commissioned last year a study of this project [of a doomsday machine]
by the Bland Corporation. Based on the findings of the report, my conclusion was that this idea was
not a practical deterrent, for reasons which, at this moment, must be all too obvious."

Sometime in the 1980s, a second, but real, doomsday device, called The Dead Hand, entered the
picture in the Soviet Union. Unlike Kahn's device, it was not based on radioactive cobalt, but it was
self-activated and could not be stopped.[16]

Strategic Air Command[edit]

See also: Operation Chrome Dome

Boeing B-47B Stratojet rocket-assisted take off (RATO) on April 15, 1954

B-52D Stratofortress being refueled by a KC-135 Stratotanker, 1965

Beginning in 1955, the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC) kept one-third of its bombers on
alert, with crews ready to take off within fifteen minutes and fly to designated targets inside the Soviet
Union and destroy them with nuclear bombs in the event of a Soviet first-strike attack on the United
States. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy increased funding for this program and raised the
commitment to 50 percent of SAC aircraft.

During periods of increased tension in the early 1960s, SAC kept part of its B-52 fleet airborne at all
times, to allow an extremely fast retaliatory strike against the Soviet Union in the event of a surprise
attack on the United States. This program continued until 1990 when the bomber wings were placed
on quick reaction ground alert and were able to take off within a few minutes. SAC also maintained
the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP, pronounced "kneecap"), also known as
"Looking Glass," which consisted of several EC-135s, one of which was airborne at all times from
1961 through 1990. During the Cuban missile crisis the bombers were dispersed to several different
airfields, and also were sometimes airborne. For example, some were sent to Wright Patterson,
which normally didn't have B-52s.

During the height of the tensions between the US and the USSR in the 1960s, two popular films were
made dealing with what could go terribly wrong with the policy of keeping nuclear-bomb carrying
airplanes at the ready: Dr. Strangelove (1964) and Fail Safe (1964).

Operation Chrome Dome

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1964 Operation Chrome Dome Map from Sheppard Air Force Base, TX

1966 overview of Operation Chrome Dome related or derivative flights

Operation Chrome Dome was a United States Air Force Cold-War era mission from 1960 to 1968 in
which B-52 Stratofortress strategic bomber aircraft armed with thermonuclear weapons remained on
continuous airborne alert, flying routes to points on the Soviet Union border.[1]



2Primary mission

3Military units




7External links

During the Cold War, General Thomas S. Power initiated a program whereby B-52s performed
airborne alert duty under code names such as Head Start, Chrome Dome, Hard Head, Round Robin,
and Operation Giant Lance. Bombers loitered near points outside the Soviet Union to provide rapid
first strike or retaliation capability in case of nuclear war.[3][4]

Primary mission[edit]
The missions in 1964 involved a B-52D that left Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas and flew across
the United States to New England and headed out to the Atlantic Ocean. The aircraft refueled over
the Atlantic heading north to and around Newfoundland. The bomber changed course and flew
northwesterly over Baffin Bay towards Thule Air Base, Greenland. At this point it flew west
across Queen Elizabeth Islands of Canada. Continuing to Alaska, it refueled over the Pacific
Ocean again heading south-east and returned to Sheppard AFB. [5]

By 1966, three separate missions were being flown - one East over the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean, another north to Baffin Bay, and a third over Alaska.

Military units[edit]
The following military units were involved:

Strategic Air Command Divisions:

306th Bombardment Wing

494th Bombardment Wing, Sheppard Air Force Base

821st Strategic Aerospace Division

822d Air Division

Homestead Air Force Base

Strategic Air Command in the United Kingdom

2nd Bomb Wing, 62nd Bomb Squadron Barksdale AFB, Shreveport, LA

Strategic Air Command 42 Bomb Wing Loring AFB, Limestone, Maine


B-52 Airborne Nuclear Alert route from Homestead AFB, FL to Italy.

The program was involved in the following nuclear-weapons accidents:

1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash[6]

1961 Yuba City B-52 crash

1964 Savage Mountain B-52 crash[Notes 1]

1966 Palomares B-52 crash

1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash. The Thule accident signaled the end of the program on
January 22, 1968.

1. Jump up^ Accident happened while the aircraft was returning to its home base, having
already completed its alert mission.

1. Jump up^ Croddy, Eric; Wirtz, James J. (2005). Weapons of Mass Destruction. ABC-
CLIO. ISBN 1-85109-490-3. The U.S. alert operation, code-named Chrome Dome, was a realistic
training mission

2. Jump up^ USAF: Lakenheath AFB Libery Wing

3. Jump up^ "SAC AIRBORNE ALERT". National Museum of the United States Air Force. 14
January 2009. Archived from the original on 2009-01-14. Retrieved 19 February 2013.

4. Jump up^ US Nuclear Weapons Deployments Disclosed, Nautilus Institute
History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: July 1945 to September 1977

5. Jump up^ Nautilus.org: Chrome Dome Route Map

6. Jump up^ The Goldsboro Broken Arrow, 2011, ISBN 978-1-257-86952-7

Retaliation capability (second strike)[edit]

Main article: Second strike

Robert McNamara

The strategy of MAD was fully declared in the early 1960s, primarily by United States Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara. In McNamara's formulation there was the very real danger that a nation
with nuclear weapons could attempt to eliminate another nation's retaliatory forces with a surprise,
devastating first strike and theoretically "win" a nuclear war relatively unharmed. True second-strike
capability could be achieved only when a nation had a guaranteed ability to fully retaliate after a first-
strike attack.

The United States had achieved an early form of second-strike capability by fielding continual patrols
of strategic nuclear bombers, with a large number of planes always in the air, on their way to or
from fail-safe points close to the borders of the Soviet Union. This meant the United States could still
retaliate, even after a devastating first-strike attack. The tactic was expensive and problematic
because of the high cost of keeping enough planes in the air at all times and the possibility they
would be shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft missiles before reaching their targets. In addition, as the
idea of a missile gap existing between the US and the Soviet Union developed, there was increasing
priority being given to ICBMs over bombers.

The USS George Washington (SSBN-598), the lead ship of the US Navy's first class of Fleet Ballistic Missile
Submarines, Nuclear (SSBN)

It was only with the advent of ballistic missile submarines, starting with the George
Washington class in 1959, that a genuine survivable nuclear force became possible and a retaliatory
second strike capability guaranteed.

The deployment of fleets of ballistic missile submarines established a guaranteed second-strike

capability because of their stealth and by the number fielded by each Cold War adversaryit was
highly unlikely that all of them could be targeted and preemptively destroyed (in contrast to, for
example, a missile silo with a fixed location that could be targeted during a first strike). Given their
long range, high survivability and ability to carry many medium- and long-range nuclear missiles,
submarines were credible and effective means for full-scale retaliation even after a massive first

This deterrence strategy and program has continued into the 21st century, with nuclear submarines
carrying Trident II ballistic missiles as one leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent and as the sole
deterrent of the United Kingdom. The USA's other such deterrent comprises the intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM)s on alert in the continental United States. Ballistic missile submarines are
also operated by the navies of China, France, India and Russia.

The U.S. Department of Defense anticipates a continued need for a sea-based strategic nuclear
force.[17] The first of the current Ohio-class SSBNs are expected to be retired by 2029,[17] meaning that
a platform must already be seaworthy by that time. A replacement may cost over $4 billion per unit
compared to the USS Ohio's $2 billion.[18] The U.S. Navy is exploring two options. The first is a variant
of the Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines. The second is a dedicated SSBN, either with a new
hull or based on an overhaul of the current Ohio.[citation needed]

Anti-ballistic missile
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A Ground-Based Interceptor of the United States' Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, loaded into a silo
at Fort Greely, Alaska, in July 2004

An anti-ballistic missile (ABM) is a surface-to-air missile designed to counter ballistic

missiles (see missile defense). Ballistic missiles are used to deliver nuclear, chemical, biological or
conventional warheads in a ballistic flight trajectory. The term "anti-ballistic missile" is a generic term
conveying a system designed to intercept and destroy any type of ballistic threat, however it is
commonly used for systems specifically designed to counter intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs).

Current counter-ICBM systems[edit]

There are only two systems in the world that can intercept ICBMs. Besides them, many smaller
systems exist (tactical ABMs), that generally cannot intercept intercontinental strategic missiles, even
if within rangean incoming ICBM simply moves too fast for these systems.

The Russian A-35 anti-ballistic missile system, used for the defense of Moscow, whose development
started in 1971. The currently active system is called A-135. The system uses Gorgon
and Gazelle missiles with nuclear warheads to intercept incoming ICBMs.

The U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD; previously known as National Missile Defense
NMD) system has reached initial operational capability. Instead of using an explosive charge, it
launches a kinetic projectile. The George W. Bush administration accelerated development and
deployment of a system proposed in 1998 by the Clinton administration. The system is a dual
purpose test and interception facility in Alaska, and in 2006 was operational with a few interceptor
missiles. The Alaska site provides more protection against the Nuclear threat from North Korean
missiles or launches from Russia or China, but is likely less effective against missiles launched from
the Middle East. President Bush referenced the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of

ballistic missiles as reasons for missile defense. The current GMD system has the more limited goal
of shielding against a limited attack by a rogue state such as North Korea.

American plans for Central European site[edit]

Further information: National missile defense Recent developments

During 1993, a symposium was held by western European nations to discuss potential future ballistic
missile defence programs. In the end, the council recommended deployment of early warning and
surveillance systems as well as regionally controlled defence systems.[1] During spring 2006 reports
about negotiations between the United States and Poland as well as the Czech Republic were
published. The plans propose the installation of a latest generation ABM system with a radar site in
the Czech Republic and the launch site in Poland. The system was announced to be aimed against
ICBMs from Iran and North Korea. This caused harsh comments by Russia's then-President Vladimir
Putin at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) security conference during
spring 2007 in Munich. Other European ministers commented that any change of strategic weapons
should be negotiated on NATO level and not 'unilaterally' between the U.S. and other states
(although most strategic arms reduction treaties were between the Soviet Union and U.S., not
NATO). German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed severe concerns about the way
in which the U.S. had conveyed its plans to its European partners and criticised the U.S.
administration for not having consulted Russia prior to announcing its endeavours to deploy a new
missile defence system in Central Europe.[2] As of July 2007, a majority of Poles were opposed to
hosting a component of the system in Poland.[3]

Current tactical systems[edit]

United States of America[edit]
See also: Safeguard Program

United States Navy RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 anti-ballistic missile.

In several tests, the U.S. military have demonstrated the feasibility of destroying long and short range
ballistic missiles. Combat effectiveness of newer systems against 1950s tactical ballistic missiles
seems very high, as the MIM-104 Patriot (PAC-1 and PAC-2) had a 100% success rate in Operation
Iraqi Freedom.[4]

The U.S. Navy Aegis combat system uses RIM-161 Standard Missile 3, which hit a target going
faster than ICBM warheads.[5]

These systems, as opposed to U.S. GMD system, are not capable of a mid-course intercept of an

A new system, scheduled for deployment during 2009, is U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system. It has a longer range, but it is not known if it will be able to intercept

Russian Federation[edit]

S-300PMU-2 vehicles. From left to right: 64N6E2 detection radar, 54K6E2 command post and 5P85 TEL.

The Moscow ABM defense system was designed with the aim of being able to intercept the ICBM
warheads, and is based on:

ABM-1 Galosh[6][7] (decommissioned)[citation needed]

ABM-3 Gazelle[8]

ABM-4 Gorgon[9]

Apart from the main Moscow deployment, Russia has striven actively for intrinsic ABM capabilities of
its SAM systems.

S-300P (SA-10)

S-300V/V4 (SA-12)

S-300PMU-1/2 (SA-20)

S-400 (SA-21)

S-500 (In development )

India [edit]

India's Advanced Air Defense (AAD) interceptor missile

Main article: Indian Ballistic Missile Defense Program

India has an active ABM development effort using indigenously developed and integrated radars, and
indigenous missiles.[10] In November 2006, India successfully conducted the PADE (Prithvi Air
Defence Exercise) in which an anti-ballistic missile, called the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD),
an exoatmospheric (outside the atmosphere) interceptor system, intercepted a Prithvi-II ballistic
missile. The PAD missile has the secondary stage of the Prithvi missile and can reach altitude of
80 km (50 mi). During the test, the target missile was intercepted at a 50 km (31 mi) altitude.[11] India
became the fourth nation in the world after United States, Russia, and Israel to acquire such a
capability and the third nation to acquire it using in-house research and development. [12] On 6
December 2007, the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile system was tested successfully.[13] This
missile is an Endoatmospheric interceptor with an altitude of 30 km (19 mi). In 2009, reports emerged
of a new missile named the PDV. The DRDO is developing a new Prithvi interceptor missile
codenamed PDV. The PDV is designed to take out the target missile at altitudes above 150 km
(93 mi).[14] The first PDV was successfully test fired on 27 April 2014.[15] According to scientist V K
Saraswat of DRDO, the missiles will work in tandem to ensure a hit probability of 99.8 percent. [16] On
15 May 2016 India successfully launched advanced Defense interceptor missile named Ashvin
interceptor missile from Abdul Kalam Island from Orissa coast.[17]

People's Republic of China[edit]
Historical Project 640[edit]

Project 640 had been the PRC's indigenous effort to develop ABM capability.[18] The Academy of Anti-
Ballistic Missile & Anti-Satellite was established from 1969 for the purpose of developing Project 640.
The project was to involve at least three elements, including the necessary sensors and
guidance/command systems, the Fan Ji (FJ) missile interceptor, and the XianFeng missile-
intercepting cannon.[18] The FJ-1 had completed two successful flight tests during 1979, while the low-
altitude interceptor FJ-2 completed some successful flight tests using scaled prototypes. [18] A high
altitude FJ-3 interceptor was also proposed. Despite the development of missiles, the programme
was slowed down due to financial and political reasons. It was finally closed down during 1980 under
a new leadership of Deng Xiaoping as it was seemingly deemed unnecessary after the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States and the closure of the US
Safeguard ABM system.[18]

Operational P.R.Chinese system[edit]

In March 2006, China tested an interceptor system comparable to the U.S. Patriot missiles. [19][20][21]

China has acquired and is license-producing the S-300PMU-2/S-300PMU-1 series of terminal ABM-
capable SAMs. China-produced HQ-9 SAM system[22] may possess terminal ABM capabilities. PRC
Navy's operating modern air-defense destroyers known as the Type 052C Destroyer and Type 051C
Destroyer are armed with naval HHQ-9 missiles.

The HQ-19, similar to the THAAD, was first tested in 2003, and subsequently a few more times,
including in November 2015.[23] The HQ-29, a counterpart to the MIM-104F PAC-3, was first tested in

Surface-to-air missiles that supposedly have some terminal ABM capability (as opposed to
midcourse capability):









Development of midcourse ABM in P.R.China[edit]

The technology and experience from the successful anti-satellite test using a ground-launched
interceptor during January 2007 was immediately applied to current ABM efforts and development. [29]

China carried out a land-based anti-ballistic missile test on 11 January 2010. The test was
exoatmospheric and done in midcourse[31] phase and with a kinetic kill vehicle. China is the second
country after US that demonstrated intercepting ballistic missile with a kinetic kill vehicle, the
interceptor missile was a SC-19.[31][32] The sources suggest the system is not operationally deployed
as of 2010.[31][33]

On 27 January 2013, China did another anti ballistic missile test. According to the Chinese Defence
Ministry, the missile launch is defensive in character and is not aimed against any countries. Experts
hailed China's technological breakthrough because it is difficult to intercept ballistic missiles that have
reached the highest point and speed in the middle of their course. Only 2 countries, including the US,
have successfully conducted such a test in the past decade. [34]

Rumored midcourse missiles:






France, United Kingdom and Italy[edit]

Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers, and French Navy and Italian Navy Horizon -class frigates operate Aster 30

Main article: Aster (missile family)

Italy and France have developed a missile family called Aster (Aster 15 and Aster 30). Aster 30 is
capable of ballistic missile defense. On 18 October 2010, France announced a successful tactical
ABM test of the Aster 30 missile[36] and on 1 December 2011 a successful interception of a Black
Sparrow ballistic target missile.[37][38] Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers and French Navy and Italian
Navy Horizon -class frigates are armed with PAAMS, using Aster 15 and Aster 30 missiles. France is
developing another version, the Aster 30 block II, which can destroy ballistic missiles at a maximum
range of 3000 km. It will have a Kill Vehicle warhead.


Japanese guided missile destroyer JDS Kong (DDG-173) firing a Standard Missile 3 anti-ballistic missile.

Main article: RIM-161 Standard Missile 3

Since 1998, when North Korea launched a Taepodong-1 missile over northern Japan, the Japanese
have been jointly developing a new surface-to-air interceptor known as the Patriot Advanced
Capability 3 (PAC-3) with the US. So far tests have been successful, and there are planned 11
locations that the PAC-3 will be installed. A military spokesman[39] said that tests had been done on
two sites, one of them a business park in central Tokyo, and Ichigaya a site not far from the
Imperial Palace. Along with the PAC-3, Japan has installed a US-developed ship-based anti-ballistic
missile system, which was tested successfully on 18 December 2007. The missile was launched
from a Japanese warship, in partnership with the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and destroyed a mock
target launched from the coast.

Anti-ballistic missile systems[edit]

Arrow 2[edit]

Main article: Arrow (Israeli missile)

An Arrow anti-ballistic missile interceptor

The Arrow project was begun after the U.S. and Israel agreed to co-fund it on 6 May 1986. [40]

The Arrow ABM system was designed and constructed in Israel with financial support by the United
States by a multibillion-dollar development program called "Minhelet Homa" with the participation of
companies like Israel Military Industries, Tadiran and Israel Aerospace Industries.

During 1998 the Israeli military conducted a successful test of their Arrow missile. Designed to
intercept incoming missiles travelling at up to 2 mile/s (3 km/s), the Arrow is expected to perform
much better than the Patriot did in the Gulf War. On 29 July 2004 Israel and the United States carried
out joint experiment in the USA, in which the Arrow was launched against a real Scud missile. The
experiment was a success, as the Arrow destroyed the Scud with a direct hit. During December 2005
the system was deployed successfully in a test against a replicated Shahab-3 missile. This feat was
repeated on 11 February 2007.[41]

Arrow 3[edit]

Main article: Arrow 3

Arrow 3 launch in January 2014.

The Arrow 3 system is currently being developed, and, if successful, will be capable of exo-
atmosphere interception of ballistic missiles, including of ICBMs.[42] It will also act as an anti-satellite

Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly, Director of the US Missile Defense Agency, said: "The design
of Arrow 3 promises to be an extremely capable system, more advanced than what we have ever
attempted in the U.S. with our programs."

On December 10, 2015 Arrow 3 scored its first intercept in a complex test designed to validate how
the system can detect, identify, track and then discriminate real from decoy targets delivered into
space by an improved Silver Sparrow target missile.[43] According to officials, the milestone test paves
the way toward low-rate initial production of the Arrow 3.[43]

Davids sling[edit]

Main article: David's Sling

David's Sling (Hebrew: ) , also sometimes called Magic Wand (Hebrew: ) , is an

Israel Defense Forces military system being jointly developed by the Israeli defense contractor
Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and the American defense contractor Raytheon, designed to
intercept tactical ballistic missiles, as well as medium- to long-range rockets and slower-flying cruise
missiles, such as those possessed by Hezbollah, fired at ranges from 40 km to 300 km. It is designed
with the aim of intercepting the newest generation of tactical ballistic missiles, such as Iskander.

Republic of China[edit]
MIM-104 Patriot[edit]
Sky Bow / Tien Kung[edit]

History of ABMs[edit]
1940s and 1950s[edit]

Launch of an US Army Nike Zeus missile, the first ABM system to enter widespread testing.

The idea of destroying rockets before they can hit their target dates from the first use of modern
missiles in warfare, the German V-1 and V-2 program of World War II.

British fighters attempted to destroy V-1 "buzz bombs" in flight prior to impact, with some success,
although concentrated barrages of heavy anti-aircraft artillery had greater success. Under the lend-
lease program, 200 US 90 mm AA guns with SCR-584 radars and Western Electric/Bell
Labs computers were sent to the UK. These demonstrated a 95% success rate against V-1s that flew
into their range.[44]

The V-2, the first true ballistic missile, was impossible to destroy in the air. SCR-584's could be used
to plot the trajectories of the missiles and provide some warning, but were more useful in
backtracking their ballistic trajectory and determining the rough launch locations. The Allies
launched Operation Crossbow to find and destroy V-2s before launch, but these operations were
largely ineffective. In one instance a Spitfire happened upon a V-2 rising through the trees, and fired
on it with no effect.[44] This led to allied efforts to advance over their launching sites in Belgium and the

A wartime study by Bell Labs into the task of shooting down ballistic missiles in flight concluded it
was not possible. In order to intercept a missile, one needs to be able to steer the attack onto the
missile before it hits. At the speeds the V-2 flew at, this required guns of effectively infinite reaction
time, or some sort of weapon with ranges on the order of dozens of miles, neither of which appeared

possible. This was, however, just prior to the emergence of high-speed computing systems in the
1950s. By the mid-1950s things had changed considerably, and many forces worldwide were
considering ABM systems.

The American armed forces began experimenting with anti-missile missiles soon after World War II,
as the extent of German research into rocketry became clear. But defences against Soviet long-
range bombers took priority until 1957, when the Soviet Union demonstrated its advances in
intercontinental ballistic missile technology with the launch of Sputnik, the Earth's first artificial
satellite. The US Army accelerated development of their LIM-49 Nike Zeus system in response. Zeus
was subject to criticism throughout its development program, especially from those within the US Air
Force and nuclear weapons establishments who suggested it would be much simpler to build more
nuclear warheads and guarantee mutually assured destruction. Zeus was eventually cancelled in

In 1958, a topic of research by the U.S. was the test explosions of several low yield nuclear
weapons at very high altitudes over the southern Atlantic Ocean, launched from ships. The devices
used were the 1.7 kt boosted fission W25 warhead.[45] When such an explosion takes place a burst
of X-rays are released that strike the Earth's atmosphere, causing secondary showers of charged
particles over an area hundreds of miles across. These can become trapped in the Earth' magnetic
field, creating an artificial radiation belt. It was believed that this might be strong enough to damage
warheads travelling through the layer. This proved not to be the case, but Argus returned key data
about a related effect, the Nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP).


Other countries were also involved in early ABM research. A more advanced project was
at CARDE in Canada, which researched the main problems of ABM systems. A key problem with any
radar system is that the signal is in the form of a cone, which spreads with distance from the
transmitter. For long-distance interceptions like ABM systems, the inherent inaccuracy of the radar
makes an interception difficult. CARDE considered using a terminal guidance system to address the
accuracy concerns, and developed several advanced infrared detectors for this role. They also
studied a number of missile airframe designs, a new and much more powerful solid rocket fuel, and
numerous systems for testing it all. After a series of drastic budget reductions during the late 1950s
the research ended. One offshoot of the project was Gerald Bull's system for inexpensive high-speed
testing, consisting of missile airframes shot from a sabot round, which would later be the basis
of Project HARP. Another was the CRV7 and Black Brant rockets, which used the new solid rocket

Soviet Union[edit]

The Soviet military had requested funding for ABM research as early as 1953, but were only given
the go-ahead to begin deployment of such a system on 17 August 1956. Their test system, known
simply as System A, was based on the V-1000 missile, which was similar to the early US efforts. The
first successful test interception was carried out on 24 November 1960, and the first with a live
warhead on 4 March 1961. In this test, a dummy warhead was released by a R-12ballistic
missile launched from the Kapustin Yar,[46] and intercepted by a V-1000 launched from Sary-Shagan.

The dummy warhead was destroyed by the impact of 16,000 tungsten-
carbide spherical impactors 140 seconds after launch, at an altitude of 25 km (82,000 ft).[47]

The V-1000 missile system was nonetheless considered not reliable enough and abandoned in
favour of nuclear-armed ABMs. A much larger missile, the Fakel 5V61 (known in the west as Galosh),
was developed to carry the larger warhead and carry it much further from the launch site. Further
development continued, and the A-35 anti-ballistic missile system, designed to protect Moscow,
became operational in 1971. A-35 was designed for exoatmospheric interceptions, and would have
been highly susceptible to a well-arranged attack using multiple warheads and radar black-out

A-35 was upgraded during the 1980s to a two-layer system, the A-135. The Gorgon (SH-11/ABM-4)
long-range missile was designed to handle intercepts outside the atmosphere, and the Gazelle (SH-
08/ABM-3) short-range missile endoatmospheric intercepts that eluded Gorgon. The A-135 system is
considered to be technologically equivalent to the United States Safeguard system of 1975. [48]

American Nike-X and Sentinel[edit]

Nike Zeus failed to be a credible defence in an era of rapidly increasing ICBM counts due to its ability
to attack only one target at a time. Additionally, significant concerns about its ability to successfully
intercept warheads in the presence of high-altitude nuclear explosions, including its own, lead to the
conclusion that the system would simply be too costly for the very low amount of protection it could

By the time it was cancelled in 1963, potential upgrades had been explored for some time. Among
these were radars capable of scanning much greater volumes of space and able to track many
warheads and launch several missiles at once. These, however, did not address the problems
identified with radar blackouts caused by high-altitude explosions. To address this need, a new
missile with extreme performance was designed to attack incoming warheads at much lower
altitudes, as low as 20 km. The new project encompassing all of these upgrades was launched
as Nike-X.

The main missile was LIM-49 Spartana Nike Zeus upgraded for longer range and a much larger 5
megaton warhead intended to destroy enemy's warheads with a burst of x-rays outside the
atmosphere. A second shorter-range missile called Sprint with very high acceleration was added to
handle warheads that evaded longer-ranged Spartan. Sprint was a very fast missile (some
sources[who?] claimed it accelerated to 8,000 mph (13 000 km/h) within 4 seconds of flightan average
acceleration of 90 g) and had a smaller W66 enhanced radiation warhead in the 13 kiloton range for
in-atmosphere interceptions.

The experimental success of Nike X persuaded the Lyndon B. Johnson administration to propose a
thin ABM defense, that could provide almost complete coverage of the United States. In a September
1967 speech, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara referred to it as "Sentinel". McNamara, a private
ABM opponent because of cost and feasibility (see cost-exchange ratio), claimed that Sentinel would
be directed not against the Soviet Union's missiles (since the USSR had more than enough missiles

to overwhelm any American defense), but rather against the potential nuclear threat of the People's
Republic of China.

In the meantime, a public debate over the merit of ABMs began. Difficulties that had already made an
ABM system questionable for defending against an all-out attack. One problem was the Fractional
Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) that would give little warning to the defense. Another problem
was high altitude EMP (whether from offensive or defensive nuclear warheads) which could degrade
defensive radar systems.

When this proved infeasible for economic reasons, a much smaller deployment using the same
systems was proposed, namely Safeguard (described later).

The problem of defense against MIRVs[edit]

Testing of the LGM-118A Peacekeeper re-entry vehicles, all eight shot from only one missile. Each line
represents the path of a warhead which, were it live, would detonate with the explosive power of twenty-
five Hiroshima-style weapons.

ABM systems were developed initially to counter single warheads launched from
large Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The economics seemed simple enough; since rocket
costs increase rapidly with size, the price of the ICBM launching a large warhead should always be
greater than the much smaller interceptor missile needed to destroy it. In an arms race the defense
would always win.[citation needed]

In practice, the price of the interceptor missile was considerable, due to its sophistication. The
system had to be guided all the way to an interception, which demanded guidance and control
systems that worked within and outside the atmosphere. The Nike Zeus was expected to cost about
$1 million[citation needed], about the same as an ICBM[citation needed]. However, due to their relatively short ranges,
an ABM missile would be needed to counter an ICBM wherever it might be aimed. That implies that
dozens of interceptors are needed for every ICBM.[citation needed] This led to intense debates about the
"cost-exchange ratio" between interceptors and warheads.

Conditions changed dramatically in 1970 with the introduction of Multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. Suddenly, each launcher was throwing not one warhead, but
several. These would spread out in space, ensuring that a single interceptor would be needed for
each warhead. This simply added to the need to have several interceptors for each warhead in order

to provide geographical coverage. Now it was clear that an ABM system would always be many
times more expensive than the ICBMs they defended against[citation needed].

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972[edit]

Main article: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

Technical, economic and political problems described resulted in the ABM treaty of 1972, which
restricted the deployment of strategic (not tactical) anti-ballistic missiles.

By the ABM treaty and a 1974 revision, each country was allowed to deploy a mere 100 ABMs to
protect a single, small area. The Soviets retained their Moscow defences. The U.S. designated their
ICBM sites near Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, where Safeguard was already under
advanced development. The radar systems and anti-ballistic missiles were approximately 90 miles
north/northwest of Grand Forks AFB, near Concrete, North Dakota. The missiles were deactivated in
1975. The main radar site (PARCS) is still used as an early warning ICBM radar, facing relative north.
It is located at Cavalier Air Force Station, North Dakota.

Brief use of Safeguard in 1975/1976[edit]

The U.S. Safeguard system, which utilized the nuclear-tipped LIM-49A Spartan and Sprint missiles,
in the short operational period of 1975/1976, was the second counter-ICBMs system in the world.
Safeguard protected only the main fields of US ICBMs from attack, theoretically ensuring that an
attack could be responded to with a US launch, enforcing the mutually assured destruction principle.

SDI experiments in the 1980s[edit]

Main article: Strategic Defense Initiative

The Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative (often referred to as "Star Wars"), along with research
into various energy-beam weaponry, brought new interest in the area of ABM technologies.

SDI was an extremely ambitious program to provide a total shield against a massive Soviet ICBM
attack. The initial concept envisioned large sophisticated orbiting laser battle stations, space-based
relay mirrors, and nuclear-pumped X-ray laser satellites. Later research indicated that some planned
technologies such as X-ray lasers were not feasible with then-current technology. As research
continued, SDI evolved through various concepts as designers struggled with the difficulty of such a
large complex defense system. SDI remained a research program and was never deployed. Several
post-SDI technologies are used by the present Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

Lasers originally developed for the SDI plan are in use for astronomical observations. Used to ionize
gas in the upper atmosphere, they provide telescope operators with a target to calibrate their
instruments.[citation needed]

Tactical ABMs deployed in 1990s[edit]

The Israeli Arrow missile system was tested initially during 1990, before the first Gulf War. The Arrow
was supported by the United States throughout the 1990s.

The Patriot was the first deployed tactical ABM system, although it was not designed from the outset
for that task and consequently had limitations. It was used during the 1991 Gulf War to attempt to
intercept Iraqi Scud missiles. Post-war analyses show that the Patriot was much less effective than
initially thought because of its radar and control system's inability to discriminate warheads from
other objects when the Scud missiles broke up during reentry.

Testing ABM technology continued during the 1990s with mixed success. After the Gulf War,
improvements were made to several U.S. air defense systems. A new Patriot, PAC-3, was developed
and testeda complete redesign of the PAC-2 deployed during the war, including a totally new
missile. The improved guidance, radar and missile performance improves the probability of kill over
the earlier PAC-2. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Patriot PAC-3s had a nearly 100% success rate
against Iraqi TBMs fired. However, since no longer range Iraqi Scud missiles were used, PAC-3
effectiveness against those was untested. Patriot was involved in three friendly fire incidents: two
incidents of Patriot shootings at coalition aircraft and one of U.S. aircraft shooting at a Patriot battery.

A new version of the Hawk missile was tested during the early to mid-1990s and by the end of 1998
the majority of US Marine Corps Hawk systems were modified to support basic theater anti-ballistic
missile capabilities.[50] MIM-23 Hawk missile is not operational in the U.S. service since 2002, but is
used by many other countries.

Developed in the late 1990s, the Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile attaches to a modified SM-2 Block IV
missile used by the U.S. Navy

Soon after the Gulf war, the Aegis combat system was expanded to include ABM capabilities.
The Standard missile system was also enhanced and tested for ballistic missile interception. During
the late 1990s, SM-2 block IVA missiles were tested in a theater ballistic missile defense function.
Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) systems have also been tested for an ABM role. In 2008, an SM-3
missile launched from a Ticonderoga-class cruiser, the USS Lake Erie, successfully intercepted a
non-functioning satellite.[52][53]

From 1992 to 2000, a demonstration system for the US Army Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense was deployed at White Sands Missile Range. Tests were conducted on a regular basis and
resulted in early failures, but successful intercepts occurred from 1999 onward. The US Army is in
the process of fielding THAAD line batteries.

Brilliant Pebbles concept[edit]

Approved for acquisition by the Pentagon during 1991 but never realized, Brilliant Pebbles was a
proposed space-based anti-ballistic system that was meant to avoid some of the problems of the
earlier SDI concepts. Rather than use sophisticated large laser battle stations and nuclear-pumped
X-ray laser satellites, Brilliant Pebbles consisted of a thousand very small, intelligent orbiting
satellites with kinetic warheads. The system relied on improvements of computer technology, avoided
problems with overly centralized command and control and risky, expensive development of large,
complicated space defense satellites. It promised to be much less expensive to develop and have
less technical development risk.

The name Brilliant Pebbles comes from the small size of the satellite interceptors and great
computational power enabling more autonomous targeting. Rather than rely exclusively on ground-
based control, the many small interceptors would cooperatively communicate among themselves and
target a large swarm of ICBM warheads in space or in the late boost phase. Development was
discontinued later in favor of a limited ground-based defense.

Transformation of SDI into MDA, development of NMD/GMD[edit]

While the Reagan era Strategic Defense Initiative was intended to shield against a massive Soviet
attack, during the early 1990s, President George H. W. Bush called for a more limited version using
rocket-launched interceptors based on the ground at a single site. Such system was developed since
1992, was expected to become operational in 2010[54] and capable of intercepting small number of
incoming ICBMs. First called the National Missile Defense (NMD), since 2002 it was
renamed Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD). It was planned to protect all 50 states from a
rogue missile attack. The Alaska site provides more protection against North Korean missiles or
accidental launches from Russia or China, but is likely less effective against missiles launched from
the Middle East. The Alaska interceptors may be augmented later by the naval Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense System, by ground-based missiles in other locations, or by the Boeing Airborne Laser.

During 1998, Defense secretary William Cohen proposed spending an additional $6.6 billion on
intercontinental ballistic missile defense programs to build a system to protect against attacks from
North Korea or accidental launches from Russia or China.[55]

In terms of organization, during 1993 SDI was reorganized as the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO). In 2002, it was renamed to Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

U.S withdrawal from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002[edit]

On 13 June 2002, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and recommenced
developing missile defense systems that would have formerly been prohibited by the bilateral treaty.
The action was stated as needed to defend against the possibility of a missile attack conducted by
a rogue state.

The next day, the Russian Federation promptly dropped the START II agreement, intended to
completely ban MIRVs.

ABM test targets[edit]

On 15 December 2016, the US Army SMDC had a successful test of a U.S. Army Zombie Pathfinder
rocket, to be used as a target for exercising various anti-ballistic missile scenarios. The rocket was
launched as part of NASA's sounding rocket program, at White Sands Missile Range.[56]

Strategic nuclear weapon

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Fat Man was a strategic nuclear weapon dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki during the final stages
of World War II. It was the second and last nuclear weapon to be used in combat. This nuclear strike killed an
estimated 35,000-40,000 people outright, including 23,200-28,200 Japanese factory workers, 2,000 Korean
slave laborers, and 150 Japanese combatants.

A strategic nuclear weapon refers to a nuclear weapon which is designed to be used on targets
often in settled territory far from the battlefield as part of a strategic plan, such as military
bases, military command centers, arms industries, transportation, economic,
and energy infrastructure, and heavily populated areas such as cities and towns, many which often
contains such targets.[1] It is contrast to a tactical nuclear weapon, which is designed for use in battle,
as part of an attack with and often in close proximity to friendly conventional forces possibly on
contested friendly territory.


Strategic nuclear weapons generally have significantly larger yields, and typically starting from
100 kilotons up to destructive yields in the low megaton range for use especially in the enemy
nations interior far from friendly forces to maximize damage especially to buried hard targets like a
missile silo or wide area targets like a large bomber or naval base. However, yields can overlap, and
many weapons such as the variable yield B61 nuclear bomb which could be used at low power by a
fighter-bomber in an interdiction strike or at high yield dropped by a strategic bomber against an

enemy submarine pen. The W89 200 kiloton (1/5Mt) warhead which armed both the tactical Sea
Lance area effect anti-submarine weapon for use far out at sea and the strategic
bomber launched SRAM II stand off missile designed for use in the Soviet Union's interior. Indeed,
the strategic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki utilized weapons of between 10 and 20 kilotons,
though this was because the "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" bombs were the most destructive (and
indeed only) nuclear weapons available at the time. There is no precise definition of the "strategic"
category, neither considering range nor yield of the nuclear weapon.[2][3] The yield of tactical nuclear
weapons is generally lower than that of strategic nuclear weapons, but larger ones are still very
powerful, and some variable-yield warheads serve in both roles, Modern tactical nuclear warheads
have yields up to the tens of kilotons, or potentially hundreds, several times that of the weapons used
in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Strategic thinking under the Eisenhower administration and Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles was that of massive retaliation in the face of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal during this
period when the many of the most destructive deployed thermonuclear weapons were developed by
both superpowers, every bit of destructive power which could be delivered to the enemy's interior
was considered advantageous in maintaining deterrence and would become the basis of the US
strategic arsenal.[4] Flexible response was a defense strategy first implemented by John F.
Kennedy in 1961 to address the Kennedy administration's skepticism of the policy of Massive
Retaliation in the face of strike options limited to total war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. [5] This
along with cost, increasingly accurate targeting, multiple warheads per delivery vehicle, and a desire
for greater flexibility in targeting especially with respect to increasing sensitivity to collateral
damage in some scenarios began the trend to reducing individual warhead yields in strategic weapon

Strategic missiles and bombers are assigned preplanned targets including enemy airfields, radars,
and surface to air defenses; but this strategic mission was to eliminate the enemy nation's national
defenses to allow following strategic bombers and missiles to more realistically penetrate and
threaten in force the enemy nation's strategic forces, command, population, and economy rather than
purely targeting military assets in near real time using tactical weapons with range and yield
optimized for this type of time sensitive attack mission often in close proximity to friendly forces. [7]

Early ICBMs had an unfavorable circular error probable (CEP); meaning the strategic missiles, and in
some conditions bombers; had low targeting accuracy. Additionally much early cold war strategic
asset construction was above ground soft targets or minimally hardened such as airfields, pre-
nuclear command and control installations, defensive infrastructure, even ICBM bases. When every
missile carried only one poorly guided warhead designing systems with massive warhead yields in
order to cause a huge damage footprint, with the possibility of potentially destroying several nearby
soft targets of opportunity, while also increasing the likelihood that the primary target was within the
overlap of CEP and destruction circle the highest possible yield warhead for the missile was
considered an advantage.[8] The enemy being targeted a continent away there was a low ratio of side
effects to friendly areas when contrasted to potential damage to enemy assets. As navigation
technology improved accuracy or CEP and many missiles and nearly all bombers were equipped
with multiple nuclear warheads the trend was to reduce warhead yield both for weight as well as to
give more flexibility in targeting with respect to collateral damage, target hardening also created a

situation where even a very large warhead with excellent targeting would still only destroy one target
gaining no advantage to its large weight and expense vs several smaller MIRVs.[9]

A feature of strategic nuclear weapons, especially in the transcontinental nature of the U.S.-USSR
cold war with continent spanning superpower enemies that are oceans apart, is the greater range of
their delivery apparatus (e.g. ICBMs), giving them the ability to threaten the enemy's command and
control structure and national infrastructure, even though they are based many thousands of miles
away in friendly territory. Intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads are the primary
strategic nuclear weapons, while short-range missiles are tactical. In addition, while tactical weapons
are designed to meet battlefield objectives without destroying nearby friendly forces, one main
purpose of strategic weapons is in the deterrence role, under the theory of mutually assured
destruction. In the case of two small bordering nations, a strategic weapon could have a quite short
range and still be designed or intended for strategic targeting.

After the Cold War, the tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles of NATO and Russia were greatly reduced.
Highly accurate strategic missiles like the Trident II can also be used in substrategic, tactical strikes.

De-escalation Strikes[edit]

According to several reports including by the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists quote Russian sources that as a result of the
effectiveness and acceptability of USAF use of precision munitions with little collateral damage in
the Kosovo conflict in what amounted to strategic destruction once only possible with nuclear
weapons or massive bombing against fellow Slavic Serbians. Vladimir Putin, then Russian defense
minister formulated a concept of using both tactical and strategic nuclear threats and strikes to de-
escalate or cause an enemy to disengage from a conventional conflict threatening what Russia
considered a strategic interest. This concept was formalized when Putin took power in Russia in the
following year.[10][11][12]

Massive retaliation
Massive retaliation, also known as a massive response or massive deterrence, is a military
doctrine and nuclear strategy in which a state commits itself to retaliate in much greater force in the
event of an attack.

Main article: Assured destruction

In the event of an attack from an aggressor, a state would massively retaliate by using a force
disproportionate to the size of the attack.

The aim of massive retaliation is to deter another state from initially attacking. For such a strategy to
work, it must be made public knowledge to all possible aggressors. The aggressor also must believe
that the state announcing the policy has the ability to maintain second-strike capability in the event of

an attack. It must also believe that the defending state is willing to go through with the deterrent
threat, which would likely involve the use of nuclear weapons on a massive scale.

Massive retaliation works on the same principles as mutual assured destruction (MAD), with the
important caveat that even a minor conventional attack on a nuclear state could conceivably result in
all-out nuclear retaliation. However at the time when massive retaliation became policy, there was no
MAD, because the Soviet Union lacked a second strike capability throughout the 1950s.


In August 1945, towards the end of the Pacific theater of World War II, the United
States delivered nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Four years later, on August 9,
1949, the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear weapons. At the time, both sides lacked the means
to effectively use nuclear devices against each other. Eventually with nuclear triads being
established, both countries were quickly increasing their ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the
interior of the opposing country.

The term "massive retaliation" was coined by Eisenhower administration Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles in a speech on January 12, 1954.

Dulles stated:

We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more effective, less
costly. This can be done by placing more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on local
defensive power... Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone
will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the
further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always
prescribe battle conditions that suit him.[1]

Dulles also said that the U.S. would respond to military provocation "at places and with means of our
own choosing." This speech and quotes appear to form the basis for the term massive retaliation,
which would back up any conventional defense against conventional attacks with a possible massive
retaliatory attack involving nuclear weapons.

The doctrine of massive retaliation was based on the West's increasing fear at the
perceived imbalance of power in conventional forces, a corresponding inability to defend itself or
prevail in conventional conflicts. By relying on a large nuclear arsenal for deterrence,
President Eisenhower believed that conventional forces could be reduced while still maintaining
military prestige and power and the capability to defend the western bloc.

Upon a conventional attack on Berlin, for instance, the United States would undertake a massive
retaliation on the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. The massive response doctrine was thus an
extension of mutually assured destruction to conventional attacks, conceivably deterring the Soviet
Union from attacking any part of the United States' sphere of influence even with conventional


Two members of the RAND Corporation criticized the doctrine as too aggressive and identical to the
first strike. Herman Kahn stressed that many military planners adhering to the splendid first strike
believe that if the Soviets did provoke us we should then hit them with all our power and at a time
and place of our choosing. This is the massive retaliation theory as enunciated by Dulles. [2]

Similarly, Bernard Brodie noted that Dulles doctrine reflected a characteristically military
dissatisfaction, one made familiar previously in the MacArthur hearings. It represented nothing new
about the defense of America or Europe but it was startling because it seemed to reject restraint
symbolized by Korea for areas of not vital interests. In the event of a similar Korean incident, the
Dulless doctrine implied much more than bombing the North Korean armies with thermonuclear
weapons. We seem to be resolved to launch a full-fledged strategic nuclear bombing attack on
China! And we should probably have to include the Soviet Union as well. [3]The Dulless doctrine,
Brodie concludes, of course, is a preventive war, save that we have waited for an excuse, a
provocation, and hence of time not entirely of our choosing. [4]


In theory, as the U.S.S.R. had no desire to provoke an all-out nuclear attack, the policy of massive
response likely deterred any ambitions it would have had on Western Europe. Although the United
States and NATO bloc would be hard-pressed in a conventional conflict with the Warsaw Pact forces
if a conventional war were to occur, the massive response doctrine prevented the Soviets from
advancing for fear that a nuclear attack would have been made upon the Soviet Union in response to
a conventional attack.

It can be argued[by whom?], however, that aside from raising tensions in an already strained relationship
with the Soviet bloc, massive retaliation had few practical effects at that time. Before the
development of the US nuclear triad, the threat of massive retaliation was hard to make credible, and
was inflexible in response to foreign policy issues, as everyday challenges of foreign policy could not
have been dealt with using a massive nuclear strike. In fact, the Soviet Union took many minor
military actions that would have necessitated the use of nuclear weapons under a strict reading of the
massive retaliation doctrine.

A massive retaliation doctrine, as with any nuclear strategy based on the principle of mutually
assured destruction and as an extension the second-strike capability needed to form a retaliatory
attack, encouraged the opponent to perform a massive counterforce first strike. This, if successful,
would cripple the defending state's retaliatory capacity and render a massive retaliation strategy
useless. Subsequent developments such as thermonuclear warhead miniaturization, accurate silo-
based ICBMs, accurate submarine-launched ballistic missiles, stealth technology applied to cruise
missiles, and GPS munitions guidance have resulted in a much more credible second-strike
capability for some technologically advanced nations.

Still, if both sides of a conflict adopt the same stance of massive response, it may result in
unlimited escalation (a "nuclear spasm"), each believing that the other will back down after the first

round of retaliation. Both problems are not unique to massive retaliation, but to nuclear deterrence as
a whole.

Policy shift[edit]
Main articles: Second strike and Mutual assured destruction

In 1957, three years after his announcement of massive retaliation, Dulles compromised his doctrine.
In recent years, he wrote in Foreign Affaris, there has been no alternative to massive retaliation. But
now the response can be confined to limited targets. [5] Historian of the Cold War, Marc Trachtenberg,
finds that since the very announcement, Dulles was moving toward the flexible response.
Nevertheless, Eisenhower until the end of his term continued to dismiss out of hand the very idea
of restraint in general war. In 1959, he said: Once we become involved in a nuclear exchange with
the Soviet Union, we could not stop until we had finished off the enemy. There was no point to
talking about negotiating a settlement in the midst of the war, no alternative, therefore, to hitting the
Russians as hard as we could.[7]

President John F. Kennedy abandoned the policy of massive retaliation during the Cuban Missile
Crisis in favor of flexible response. The Soviet nuclear MRBMs in Cuba had very short flight time to
their US targets and could have crippled the SAC bomber bases before the aircraft could take off and
launch massive retaliation against the Soviet Union. Under the Kennedy Administration, the United
States adopted a more flexible policy in an attempt to avert nuclear war if the Soviets did not
cooperate with American demands. If the United States' only announced military reaction to any
Soviet incursion (no matter how small) was a massive nuclear strike, and the U.S. didn't follow
through, then the Soviets would assume that the United States would never attack. This would have
made the Soviet Union far more bold in its military ventures against U.S. allies and would probably
have resulted in a full-scale nuclear war.[according to whom?] Thomas Shelling's deterrence theory discusses
this more sharply: "signalling", or the use of threats internationally to deter an enemy from an attack
or to make demands. If signals weren't being properly addressed by the Soviet Union, if the threats
were not intimidating or coercing them to remove the missiles from Cuba, then the Soviet Union
would simply not have believed that the U.S.'s policy of massive retaliation held any water. By having
other, more flexible policies to deal with aggressive Soviet actions, the U.S. could opt out of a nuclear
strike and take less damaging actions to rectify the problem without losing face in the international

Another reason for this was the development of a Soviet second strike capability, in the form of silo-
based ICBMs and later SLBMs.

Madman theory
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The madman theory was an important part of Richard Nixon's foreign policy

The madman theory was a feature of Richard Nixon's foreign policy. He and his administration tried
to make the leaders of hostile Communist Bloc nations think Nixon was irrational and volatile.
According to the theory, those leaders would then avoid provoking the United States, fearing an
unpredictable American response.
Nixon's Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, wrote that Nixon had confided to him:
I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point
where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, "for God's sake, you
know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can't restrain him when he's angryand he has his
hand on the nuclear button" and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.[1]

In October 1969, the Nixon administration indicated to the Soviet Union that "the madman was loose"
when the United States military was ordered to full global war readiness alert (unbeknownst to the
majority of the American population), and bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons flew patterns
near the Soviet border for three consecutive days.[2]
The administration employed the "madman strategy" to force the North Vietnamese government to
negotiate an end to the Vietnam War.[3] Along the same lines, American diplomats, especially Henry
Kissinger, portrayed the 1970 incursion into Cambodia as a symptom of Nixon's supposed instability.

In 1517, Machiavelli had argued that sometimes it is "a very wise thing to simulate madness"
(Discourses on Livy, book 3, chapter 2). In Nixon's Vietnam War, Kimball argues that Nixon arrived at
the strategy independently, as a result of practical experience and observation of Dwight D.
Eisenhower's handling of the Korean War.[5]
The Madman strategy was also used by Vladimir Putin [6][7]

Pre-emptive nuclear strike

In nuclear strategy, a first strike is a preemptive surprise attack employing overwhelming
force. First strike capability is a country's ability to defeat another nuclear power by destroying its
arsenal to the point where the attacking country can survive the weakened retaliation while the
opposing side is left unable to continue war. The preferred methodology is to attack the
opponent's strategic nuclear weapon facilities (missile silos, submarine bases, bomber airfields),
command and control sites, and storage depots first. The strategy is called counterforce.

During the Cold War period, both superpowers, NATO and the Eastern Bloc, built massive nuclear
arsenals, aimed, to a large extent, at each other. However, they were never used, as after a time,
leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain realized that global thermonuclear war would not be in
either power's interest, as it would probably lead to the destruction of both sides, and
possibly nuclear winter or other extinction level events.[citation needed] Therefore, at times, both sides
refrained from deploying systems capable of unanswerable nuclear strikes against either side.
However, in both nations, there were interests that benefited from the development and maintenance
of first-strike weapons systems: what U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower termed the military-industrial
complex; these forces encouraged the constant development of weapons systems of greater
accuracy, power, and destruction. In addition, each side doubted the other side's commitment to not
deploy first-strike weapons, or even in the event of their deployment, to not strike first. Some first-
strike weapons were deployed; however like most nuclear weapons, they were never used.

Of the nuclear powers, only the People's Republic of China and India have declarative, unqualified,
unconditional no-first-use policies. In 1982, at a special session of the General Assembly of United
Nations, the USSR pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, regardless of whether its opponents
possessed nuclear weapons or not. This pledge was later abandoned by post-Soviet Russia to
compensate the overwhelming conventional weapon superiority enjoyed by NATO. The United States
has a partial, qualified no-first-use policy, stating that they will not use nuclear weapons against
states that do not possess nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

Large-scale missile defense systems are not first-strike weapons, but certain critics view them as
first-strike enabling weapons. U.S. President Ronald Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative,
if it had ever been deployed (and proven successful), would have undermined the fundamental
premise of mutual assured destruction (the inevitable outcome of equal and unacceptable destruction
for both sides in the event of nuclear war), removing the incentive for the US not to strike first.

These proposed defense systems, intended to lessen the risk of devastating nuclear war, would lead
to it, according to these critics. Indeed, according to game theory, the side not building large-scale
missile defenses would have an incentive to launch a pre-emptive first strike while such a strike could
still get through.

Historical background[edit]
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First-strike attack, the use of a nuclear first strike capability, was greatly feared during the Cold War
between NATO and the Soviet Bloc. At various points, fear of a first strike attack existed on both
sides. Misunderstood changes in posture and well understood changes in technology used by either
side often led to speculation regarding the enemy's intentions.


In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the leadership of the Soviet Union feared the United
States would use its nuclear superiority to its advantage, as from 1945 to 1948 the U.S. was the only
state possessing nuclear weapons. The USSR countered by rapidly developing their own nuclear
weapons, surprising the US with their first test in 1949. In turn, the U.S. countered by developing the
vastly more powerful thermonuclear weapon, testing their first hydrogen bomb in 1952 at Ivy Mike,
but the USSR quickly countered by testing their own thermonuclear weapons, with a test in 1953 of a
semi-thermonuclear weapon of the Sloika design, and in 1956, with the testing of Sakharov's Third
Idea equivalent to the Castle Bravo device. Meanwhile, tensions between the two nations rose as
1956 saw the suppression of Hungary by the Soviets; the U.S. and European nations drew certain
conclusions from that event, while in the U.S., a powerful social backlash was afoot, prompted by
Senator Joseph McCarthy, the House Un-American Activities Committee, and Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg, two atomic spies. This atmosphere was further inflamed by the 1957 launch of Sputnik,
which led to fears of Communists attacking from space, as well as concerns that if the Soviets could
launch a device into orbit, they could equally cause a device to re-enter the atmosphere and impact
any part of the planet. John F. Kennedy capitalized on this situation by emphasizing the Bomber
gap and the Missile gap, areas in which the Soviets were (inaccurately) perceived as leading the
United States, while heated Soviet rhetoric, including Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's famous
threat that "We will bury you!" to Western ambassadors added to political pressure. The 1960 U-2
incident, involving Francis Gary Powers, as well as the Berlin Crisis, along with the test of the Tsar
Bomba, escalated tensions still further.

Cuban Missile Crisis[edit]

This escalating situation came to a head with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The arrival of Soviet
missiles in Cuba was conducted by the Soviets on the rationale that the US already had nuclear
missiles stationed in Turkey, as well as the desire by Fidel Castro to increase his power, his freedom
of action, and to protect his government from US-initiated prejudicial resolution of ideological
disputes through the use of military force, such as had been attempted during the Bay of Pigs
Invasion in April 1961. During the crisis, Fidel Castro wrote Khrushchev a letter about the prospect
that the "imperialists" would be "extremely dangerous" if they responded militarily to the Soviet
stationing of nuclear missiles aimed at US territory, less than 90 miles away in Cuba. The following
quotation from the letter suggests that Castro was calling for a Soviet first strike against the US if it
responded militarily to the placement of nuclear missiles aimed at the US in Cuba:

"If the second variant takes place and the imperialists invade Cuba with the aim of occupying
it, the dangers of their aggressive policy are so great that after such an invasion the Soviet
Union must never allow circumstances in which the imperialists could carry out a nuclear first
strike against it. I tell you this because I believe that the imperialists' aggressiveness makes
them extremely dangerous, and that if they manage to carry out an invasion of Cubaa

brutal act in violation of universal and moral lawthen that would be the moment to eliminate
this danger forever, in an act of the most legitimate self-defense. However harsh and terrible
the solution, there would be no other."[1]

The Cuban Missile Crisis resulted in Khrushchev publicly agreeing to remove the missiles from
Cuba, while Kennedy secretly agreed to remove his country's missiles from Turkey. Both sides in
the Cold War realized how close they came to nuclear war over Cuba, and decided to seek a
reduction of tensions, resulting in US-Soviet dtente for most of the 1960s and 1970s.

Nonetheless, this reduction of tensions only applied to the US and the USSR. Recently
declassified interviews with high level former Soviet nuclear and military-industrial planners
reveal that Fidel Castro continued to favour nuclear options, even during the later Cold War
according to former Soviet General Danilevich, "(...in the early 1980s...) Cuban leader Fidel
Castro pressed the USSR to take a tougher line against the United States, including possible
nuclear strikes. The Soviet Union, in response, sent experts to spell out for Castro the ecological
consequences for Cuba of nuclear strikes on the United States. Castro, according to the
General, quickly became convinced of the undesirability of such outcomes." [2]


However, tensions were inflamed again in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 Saber and the SS-18 Satan, and
the decision of NATO to deploy the new Pershing II IRBM as well as the Tomahawk Ground
Launched Cruise Missile, along with U.S. President Ronald Reagan's talk of 'limited' nuclear war.
This increased Soviet fears that NATO was planning an attack. NATO's deployment of these
missiles was a response to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 Saber, which could hit most
European NATO bases within minutes of launch. These mutual deployments led to a
destabilizing strategic situation, which was exacerbated by malfunctioning U.S. and Soviet
missile launch early warning systems, a Soviet intelligence gap that prevented the Soviets from
getting a "read" on the strategic intentions of U.S. leaders, as well as inflammatory U.S. rhetoric
combined with classical Soviet mistrust of the NATO powers. This culminated in a war scare that
occurred during 1983 due to the inopportune timing of a NATO exercise called Able Archer,
which was a simulation of a NATO nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; this exercise happened to
occur during a massive Soviet intelligence mobilization called VRYAN, that was designed to
discover intentions of NATO to initiate a nuclear first-strike. This poor timing drove the world very
close to nuclear war, possibly even closer than the Cuban Missile Crisis over 20 years before.

Post-Cold War[edit]

Subsequent events caused the fears of nuclear attack on both sides to diminish significantly, as
the tensions between the superpowers decreased, and have remainedat least in nuclear terms
comparatively low. However, the present indicates that this might be changing. Relations
between the two have recently fallen to new postCold War lows, and events have illustrated that
the world may be heading back towards a more tense situation in terms of nuclear armament
and use, possibly even to a first strike. Certain U.S. politicians favor the development of new
nuclear weapons (such as through the Complex 2030 program) or new uses for old weapons,

such as by using them as nuclear bunker busters, even against non-nuclear states. The military
invasion of Iraq was seen by the Russian leadership as indicating potential U.S. disrespect for
what the Russian leadership views as international law. The U.S. missile defense program has
proven to be the primary persistent obstacle to better relations with Russia, which views the
placement of U.S. missile defense systems in Eastern Europe for defense against "the Iranian
threat" similarly to how the U.S. would view placement of Russian missile defense systems in, for
example, Cuba, for Russian defense against "the insidious Asian". The assassination of a British
citizen by alleged operatives of the Russian government using Polonium-210, a radioactive
poison, as well as the alleged dioxin poisoning of the President of the Ukraine, has raised
tensions between Russia and the West, with some commentators in Western nations regarding
the poisonings as an indicator of the character and true intentions of the Kremlin. Western
nations view Russian belligerence as having markedly increased as of late, with tests of new
nuclear-capable missiles occurring on a regular basis, military conflicts with neighboring states,
claims of a Russian "sphere of influence" on the perimeter of the old Soviet Union, the rise of
ultra-nationalist "Putin Youth" groups, aggressive politicization of and threats of withdrawal of
natural gas supplies to Europe should the Europeans not make certain policy concessions, and
even threats of a nuclear first strike against Poland have been heard to be made by certain
Russian generals.

Even with these developments, recent events in both nations have served to restrain rhetoric and
action in the direction of strategic destabilization, and have encouraged the possibility of
stabilizing developments. Both the US and Russia have suffered economic problems as a result
of the recent economic crisis and both are seeking to retrench policies that are viewed as
potentially costly or reckless between the two. Russia's military development is no longer backed
and inflated by the record-high natural gas and oil prices that formerly allowed massive sums to
be poured into military spending while US arms buildups are no longer encouraged by the
previous Administration. Indeed, the correlation of forces and means between the two suggests
the possibility of a potential reciprocal nuclear weapon drawdown to low levels consistent with
minimum credible deterrence and, beyond that to ultimate levels comparable with the nuclear
force levels of the other great powers achievable within the next decade. Both nations have
begun to realize the core truth of the postCold War era that, if the strategic reality, as described
by the words of Ronald Reagan, is that "Nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought",
then large nuclear weapons stockpiles have no positive use, are expensive, and can lead to
dangerous destabilization. The possibility of a peace with honor of strategic equals between
Russia and the US may now be possible.

Still, strategic problems remain in other areas. Other nations have engaged in policies that are
regarded as potentially destabilizing. Officials in the People's Republic of China recently tested
an anti-satellite missile, leading to widespread international concern, as anti-satellite missiles are
viewed as threats to nuclear-launch warning systems, which could facilitate a first strike; further,
tensions amid the Chinese governments over Taiwan have been rife in recent years; in addition,
the PRC is reportedly pursuing modernization of their nuclear forces. Israel has made threats of
the use of weapons, including those of a non-conventional character, while the former
administration in the U.S. has refused to "take options off the table" (including the "nuclear
option"), in the nuclear dispute with Iran, who is suspected of pursuing a clandestine nuclear
weapons program. The North Korean government has tested a nuclear device, and has

historically threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire", or most recently, "ashes", in response to
unspecified, but always imminent, U.S. or South Korean "aggression" against it. The foreign
relations of Pakistan and India remain unstable, and are exacerbated by Pakistan's poor history
of nuclear proliferation, as well as the rise of radical Al-Qaeda Islamism in Pakistan. Pakistan's
development of tactical nuclear missiles for use against possible Indian aggression, and the
subsequent Indian response, has lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons deployment and
created an even more tenseful situation.[3]

Historical analysis[edit]

Neither side sought nuclear conflict, even though it threatened to break out on multiple
occasions. What both sides had, however, was a deep and continuing fear that the other nation
was seeking to start a nuclear conflict, or, at least, thought such a conflict was "winnable" and
would not be deterred by the threat of nuclear war. This led to both sides adopting aggressive,
confrontational military and nuclear strategies that were misinterpreted and countered by the
other side, furthering distrust. These strategies led to destabilization of the strategic situation to
the point where the two major war scares of the Cold War occurred: the Cuban Missile Crisis and
the Able Archer/VRYAN crisis. Though neither side intended to start a nuclear war, and, in fact,
were extremely concerned about the possibility of it, neither side adopted strategies to slow
down the proliferation of nuclear capabilities.

U.S. military strategy in the European theater was confined to responses to potential Soviet
aggression against NATO countries. Soviet military theory was dominated by the theory of the
"deep operation" a large-scale combined-arms offensive into enemy-held territory rather than
a nuclear offensive. Soviet conventional superiority, shown by the fact that the Soviet Union
certainly was prepared for war in Europe, having massed armored, mechanized, artillery, and air
forces poised along the Inner German and Czech borders, led by the dreaded Third Shock Army
of the Soviet Union, caused NATO to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons to stop the
"steamroller" of the Red Army if they decided to take a drive through the Fulda Gap or an amble
through the North German Plain. NATO's position changed in the 1970s and 1980s, in favor of
trying to stop a Soviet offensive through the employment, at least initially, of a doctrine involving
non-nuclear AirLand Battle to try to buy time to either throw back the invader or work out the
issues at hand through diplomacy. Both sides, however, were willing to use nuclear weapons, if
necessary, to not lose the war at hand. Although neither side was actively pursuing a first-strike
policysince the time of Khrushchev, the leaders of orthodox communism believed that
"peaceful coexistence" with the "imperialist" powers was possibleboth sides relied on military
strategies that could have still caused a general nuclear war.

Ideological determinism also played a role. President Ronald Reagan of the United States, at
least before the Able Archer/VRYAN crisis, believed that everybody, including the Soviet Union,
was completely aware of the United States' good intentions, even when he bellicosely declared
that the USSR was an "evil empire" and (more jokingly) that the "bombing begins in 5 minutes"
while encouraging the military to conduct threatening exercises, such as sneaking a Carrier
Battle Group through the GIUK Gap and sending nuclear-capable bombers towards the territory
of the USSR. Chairman Yuri Andropov of the Soviet Union had similar, distorted views; he
believed that the Western Allies, and the U.S., in particular, were fascist states, whose leaders

had territorial designs against the Soviet Motherland on the scale of Napoleon, at the least,
and Adolf Hitler, at the worst; in addition, to counter the "fascists", he incited his military-industrial
complex to build weapons such as the SS-20 MIRV IRBM and the SS-18 Satan MIRV ICBM,
which the NATO powers viewed as an aggressive move towards nuclear armament and caused
reaction through development of equivalent or superior weapons systems.

When the superpowers drew close to the edge of the nuclear abyss during both the Cuban
Missile Crisis and the Able Archer/VRYAN Crisis, they learned and grew from their mistakes and
miscalculations that led them to be within view of mutual assured destruction. Andropov was
followed as Soviet leader by Konstantin Chernenko, who in turn was followed by Mikhail
Gorbachev, and Gorbachev brought a far less hostile, ideological, and reflexively skeptical
approach to the relations between the superpowers, helping to build an atmosphere of trust
between the two. Reagan had a figurative conversion on the road to Damascus regarding
nuclear weapons and ICBMs following this crisis, discarding his preconceived notions of general
Soviet bad faith, leading him to come full circle and famously declare that "Nuclear war cannot be
won and must not be fought". These new attitudes on both sides nearly brought about the
disarmament and destruction of ICBMs, long-range SLBMs, and, possibly even nuclear weapons
themselves at a groundbreaking disarmament summit between Gorbachev and Reagan
at Reykjavk in 1986. (The sticking point causing agreement to be unreachable was the SDI
Program, just as missile defense continues to be a thorn in the side of the Russians today.)
However, progress was made; the INF Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and
the START Treaty could be said to be the result of the change in leaders and leaders' attitudes
that the Able Archer/VRYAN crisis facilitated, just as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Partial
Test Ban Treaty, as well as U.S.-Soviet dtente, were the result of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Terms used[edit]

CEP circular error probable; the radius within which a weapon aimed at a given point will
land with a 50% confidence; for example, a CEP of 150 m indicates that 50% of the time, the
weapon will impact within 150 m of the target. This measure of accuracy assumes that
everything up to the point of impact works correctly.

Range the maximum distance from a target a weapon can be fired to successfully hit the
point where it is targeted at. (When range is used without qualifiers, like maximum or
minimum, it is assumed that it refers to maximum; however, many of these described
weapons have minimum ranges as well, though they are not mentioned, or, in all likelihood,
even known to the public.)

kt/Mt This is an approximate measure of how much energy is released by the detonation of
a nuclear weapon; kt stands for kilotons TNT, Mt stands for megatons TNT. Conventional
science of the period contemporary to the Manhattan project came up with these measures
so as to reasonably analogize the incredible energy of a nuclear detonation in a form that
would be understandable to the military, politicians, or civilians. Trinitrotoluene (TNT) was
and is a high explosive with industrial and military uses, and is around 40% more powerfully
explosive than an equivalent weight of gunpowder. A ton is equivalent to 1000 kg or
approximately 2200 pounds. A 20 kt nuclear device, therefore, liberates as much energy as
does the explosion of 20,000 tons of TNT (this is the origin of the term, for the exact
definition see TNT equivalent). This is a large quantity of energy. In addition, unlike TNT, the

detonation of a nuclear device also emits ionizing radiation that can harm living organisms,
including humans; the prompt radiation from the blast itself and the fallout can persist for a
long period of time, though within hours to weeks, the radiation from a single nuclear
detonation will drop enough to permit humans to remain at the site of the blast indefinitely
without incurring acute fatal exposure to radiation.

Likely first strike weapons systems[edit]

Because of the low accuracy (circular error probable) of early generation intercontinental ballistic
missiles (and especially submarine-launched ballistic missiles), counterforce strikes were initially
only possible against very large, undefended targets like bomber airfields and naval bases. Later
generation missiles with much improved accuracy made counterforce attacks against the
opponent's hardened military facilities (like missile silos and command and control centers)
possible. This is due to the inverse-square law, which predicts that the amount of energy
dispersed from a single point release of energy (such as a thermonuclear blast) dissipates by the
inverse of the square of distance from the single point of release. The result is that the power of a
nuclear explosion to rupture hardened structures is greatly decreased by the distance from the
impact point of the nuclear weapon. So a near-direct hit is generally necessary, as only
diminishing returns are gained by increasing bomb power.

Pershing II IRBM. Single warhead, variable yield 5-50 kt, CEP 50 m with active radar terminal
guidance. Short, 7-minute flight-time and range of 1,800 km, designed to
strike C4ISTAR installations, bunkers, air fields, air defense sites, and ICBM silos in the
European part of the Soviet Union. Decommissioned.

SS-18 "Satan" NATO designation, MIRV. Believed to be a first-strike weapon by some in the
West, due to high accuracy of 220 m CEP, and high throw-weight of 8,800 kg; could deploy
40 penetration aids and deliver at least 10 warheads of at least 500 kt through independent,
separate targets. Each warhead could probably take out even hardened nuclear silos, such
as those used by the Minuteman III. Deployed in 1976, aimed at CONUS. Still in service.

LGM-118 Peacekeeper. Similar in capability to the SS-18 Satan, the Peacekeeper had a
throw-weight of 4,000 kg, and could carry only 10 MIRVed warheads of 300 kt each, as well
as a CEP of 120 meters. Deployed in the mid-1980s. Decommissioned; however, guidance
systems and re-entry vehicles moved to Minuteman III missiles.

SS-20 Saber MIRV IRBM. Deployed by the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, this MIRVed IRBM
could hide out behind the Urals in Asian Russia and strike NATO C4ISTAR facilities in Europe
with scarcely any warning, due to very short flight time, high accuracy, and MIRV payload
(rare on an intermediate-range missile). Decommissioned.

First-strike enabling weapons systems[edit]

Any missile defense system capable of wide-area (e.g. continental) coverage, and especially
those enabling destruction of missiles in the boost phase, are first-strike-enabling weapons
because they allow for a nuclear strike to be launched with reduced fear of mutual assured
destruction. Such a system has never been deployed, although a limited continental missile
defense capability has been deployed by the U.S., but is capable of defending against only a
handful of missiles.

This does not apply, in general, to terminal missile defense systems, such as the
former U.S. Safeguard Program or the Russian A-35/A-135 systems. Limited-area
terminal missile defense systems, defending such targets as ICBM fields, or C 4ISTAR
facilities may, in fact, be stabilizing, because they ensure survivable retaliatory capacity,
and/or survivable de-escalation capacity.

This also might not apply to a "non-discriminatory" space-based missile defense

system, even if it isactually, precisely because it isof global reach. Such a system
would be designed to destroy all weapons launched by any nation in a ballistic trajectory,
negating any nation's capability to launch any strike with ballistic missiles, assuming the
system was sufficiently robust to repel attacks from all potential threats, and built to open
standards openly agreed upon and adhered to. No such system has yet been seriously

Other possible first-strike weapons systems[edit]

UGM-133 Trident II. Trident missiles may carry up to 8, 100kt W76 (C4) or 12 (START-limited
8, SORT-limited 5) W76 or 475kt W88 MIRVed warheads (D5), The circular error probability
of these weapons is classified, but is believed to be less than 120m (C4) and 100m (D5).
The missile attains a temporary low altitude orbit only a few minutes after launch. The
Guidance System for the missile is an Inertial Guidance System with an additional Star-
Sighting system, which is used to correct small positional errors that have accrued during the
flight. GPS has been used on some test flights but is assumed not to be available for a real
mission. Trident I-C4 has a range of over 4,000 nmi while the Trident II-D5 can surpass
6,000 nmi; however, the absolute ranges of these missiles are classified and withheld from
public domain for reasons of national security.

SS-18 Satan Mod I/II 25 megaton variant. Although it is widely accepted that USSR never
had a first-strike strategy (due to its conventional arms superiority in Europe), some
experts[who?] believed that the single-warhead 25 megaton version of R36-M (SS-18, CEP 250
m.) was a first-strike weapon, targeted against Minuteman III silos. However, a much more
logical explanation comes from retired Soviet military officers who report that the 25 megaton
SS-18 was targeted against heavily fortified command and control facilities. The reason for
this is that a single 25 megaton warhead could take out only one hardened missile silo if the
silos are sufficiently separatedprobably by only 24 km, depending on the amount of
hardening. This is due to the inverse square law, which predicts that the amount of energy
dispersed from a single point release of energy (such as a thermonuclear blast) dissipates
by the inverse of the square of distance from the single point of release. The result is that the
power of a nuclear explosion to rupture hardened structures is greatly decreased by the
distance from the impact point of the nuclear weapon. So a near-direct hit is generally
necessary, as only diminishing returns are gained by increasing bomb power. The only
purpose for gigantic nuclear weapons, like the SS-18 25 megaton variant, is to take out
extremely hardened targets, like command and control facilities, such as NORAD, located at
the Cheyenne Mountain Complex; Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
located at Mount Weather; or Site R, located at Raven Rock. (It should be noted that the
amount of energy needed to rupture missile silos is orders of magnitude greater than the
amount necessary to destroy cities, making the SS-18 25 megaton variant effective for the
destruction of large urban centers, as well.) This could be a useful weapon for a decapitation
strikehowever, a decapitation strike is a very risky move, and both the U.S. and Russia
have extensive countermeasures against such methods.

Anti-first-strike countermeasures[edit]

According to the theory of nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction,

full countervalue retaliation would be the likely fate for anyone who unleashed a first strike. So as
to maintain credible deterrence, the nuclear-weapons states have taken measures to give their
enemies reason to believe that a first strike would lead to unacceptable results.

The main strategy here relies on creating doubt among enemy strategists regarding nuclear
capacity, weapons characteristics, facility and infrastructure vulnerability, early warning systems,
intelligence penetration, strategic plans, and political will. In terms of military capabilities, the aim
is to create the impression of the maximum possible force and survivability, leading the enemy to
make increased estimates of the probability of a disabling counterstrike; while in terms of
strategy and politics, the aim is to cause the enemy to believe that such a second strike would be
forthcoming in the event of a nuclear attack.

Second strike[edit]
Main article: Second strike

One of the main reasons to deter first-strike, is the possibility that the victim of the first-strike will
launch a retaliatory second-strike on the attacker.

Increasing SSBN deployment[edit]

Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) carrying submarine-launched ballistic

missiles (SLBMs), commonly known as "boomers" in the US and "bombers" in the UK, are widely
considered the most survivable component of the nuclear triad. The depths of the ocean are
extremely large, and nuclear submarines are highly mobile, very quiet, have virtually unlimited
range, and can generate their own oxygen and potable water; in essence, their undersea
endurance is limited only by food supply. It is unlikely that any conceivable opponent of any
nuclear power deploying ballistic missile submarines could locate and neutralize every ballistic
missile submarine before it could launch a retaliatory strike, in the event of war. Therefore, to
increase the percentage of nuclear forces surviving a first strike, a nation can simply increase
SSBN deployment, as well as deployment of reliable communications links with SSBNs.

Hardening or mobilizing land-based nuclear assets[edit]

In addition, land-based ICBM silos can be hardened. No missile launch facility can really defend
against a direct nuclear hit, but a sufficiently hardened silo could defend against a near miss,
especially if the detonation is not from a multimegaton thermonuclear weapon. In addition,
ICBMs can be placed on road or rail-mobile launchers (RT-23 Molodets, RT-2PM2 Topol-M, DF-
31, MGM-134 Midgetman), which can then be moved around; as an enemy has nothing fixed to
aim at, this increases their survivability.

Increasing alert state and readiness[edit]

See also: Launch on warning, Fail-safe, and Fail-deadly

The effectiveness of a first strike is contingent upon the aggressor's ability to immediately deplete
its enemy's retaliatory capacity to a level that would make a second strike impossible, mitigable,
or strategically undesirable. Intelligence and early warning systems increase the probability that
the enemy will have the time to launch its own strike before its warmaking capacity has been
significantly reduced, thus rendering a first strike pointless. Alert states such
as DEFCON conditions, apart from serving a purpose in the internal management of a country's
military, can have the effect of advising a potential aggressor that an escalation towards first
strike has been detected, and therefore that effective retaliatory strikes could be made in the
event of an attack.

Maintaining survivable C ISTAR links[edit]


Looking Glass, Nightwatch, and TACAMO are U.S. airborne nuclear command posts, and
represent survivable communication links with U.S. nuclear forces. In the event of significant
political-military tensions between the nuclear powers, they would take to the skies, and provide
survivable communications in the event of enemy attack. They are capable of the full exercise of
all available MAOs (Major Attack Options), as well as the full SIOP, in the event of a first strike,
or the destruction of the NCA. They can directly initiate launch of all U.S. ICBMs via radio and
satellite communication, signal SLBMs to launch, and send bombers on their strike missions. In
addition to these airborne assets, the U.S. government has several command and
control bunkers, the most famous of which is NORAD, tunneled a few thousand feet into
the granite of Cheyenne Mountain Complex, outside of Colorado Springs, Colorado, which is
believed to be capable of withstanding and continuing to operate after a nuclear direct hit. Other
U.S. C4ISTAR bunkers include an installation called Site R, located at Raven
Rock, Pennsylvania, which is believed to be the Pentagon's relocation site if Washington, D.C. is
destroyed, as well as Mount Weather, in Virginia, which is believed to be the relocation site for
top Executive Branch officials. The Greenbrier in West Virginia was once the site of the Supreme
Court of the United States and Congress' relocation bunker; however, it is no longer a secret and
is now a tourist attraction.

The Russians also have equivalent or superior capabilities in this area; they have a system
called SPRN (), which is capable of detecting nuclear launches and providing early
warning, so that any such strike would not be undetected until it is too late. But their unique and
special capability can be found with their Dead Hand fail-deadly computerized nuclear release
system,[4] based at Mount Yamantaw in the Urals. Apparently, Dead Hand, named for either
the Dead Man's Hand in poker, or the Dead Man's Switch in dangerous or deadly machinery, can
be turned on in the event that the Russian leadership fears a nuclear attack. Allegedly, once
Dead Hand is activated, if it detects a loss of communications with Moscow as well as nuclear
detonations inside of Russian territory, it can give final authority for the release of nuclear
weapons to military officers in a bunker under Mt. Yamantaw, who can then, if they so determine,
launch Russia's arsenal. Mt. Yamantaw is believed to be able to withstand multiple direct nuclear

Decreasing tensions by mutual adoption of a minimum credible
deterrent posture[edit]

Instead of relying on sophisticated communications links and launch-on-warning postures, the

French, British, and Chinese have chosen to assume different nuclear postures more suited to
minimum credible deterrence, or the capability to inflict unacceptable losses so as to prevent the
use of nuclear weapons against them, rather than pursuing types of nuclear weapons suitable to
first-strike use.

The People's Republic of China is believed to pursue a minimum credible deterrent/second

strike strategy with regards to the United States. This may or may not be true with regards to the
PRC's stance vis a vis Russia, as the majority of Chinese nuclear platforms are non-
intercontinental, and are deployed on the Russian-Chinese border. Unlike the relations of the
United States and the PRC, the PRC and Russia have had military conflicts in the past. In recent
years, the PRC has improved its early-warning systems and renovated certain of its platforms for
intercontinental strike; this may be due to the U.S. missile defense system (it may not be,
however). In general, it appears that the PRC's leaders do not greatly fear a first strike (due to
their posture of merely inflicting unacceptable losses upon an adversary as opposed to the
U.S./Russian policy of trying to "win" a nuclear war); in any event, the Chinese arsenal is
considered sufficient to ensure that such a first strike would not go unavenged.

The United Kingdom and France possess sophisticated nuclear weapons platforms; however
their nuclear strategies are minimum credible deterrent-based. Each possesses ballistic missile
submarines armed with intercontinental submarine-launched ballistic missiles to ensure a
devastating second strike retaliation anywhere in the world. France also possesses a number of
nuclear capable fighter aircraft. Both countries' nuclear policies are believed to be that of
effective deterrence towards a would be nuclear strike against themselves, NATO, European
Union members and other allies.

Destabilizing role of land-based MIRVed ICBMs[edit]

MIRVed land-based ICBMs are generally considered suitable for a first strike or a counterforce
strike, due to:

1. Their high accuracy (Circular error probable), compared to submarine-launched ballistic

missiles which used to be less accurate, and more prone to defects;

2. Their fast response time, compared to bombers which are considered too slow;

3. Their ability to carry multiple MIRV warheads at once, useful for destroying a whole
missile field with one missile.

Unlike a decapitation strike or a countervalue strike, a counterforce strike might result in a

potentially more constrained retaliation. Though the Minuteman III of the mid-1960s was MIRVed
with 3 warheads, heavily MIRVed vehicles threatened to upset the balance; these included
the SS-18 Satan which was deployed in 1976, and was considered to threaten Minuteman

III silos, which led some neoconservatives to conclude a Soviet first strike was being prepared
for. This led to the development of the aforementioned Pershing II, the Trident I and Trident II, as
well as the MX missile, and the B-1 Lancer.

MIRVed land-based ICBMs are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on
striking first. When a missile is MIRVed, it is able to carry many warheads (up to 8 in existing
U.S. missiles, limited by New START, though Trident II is capable of carrying up to 12[5]) and
deliver them to separate targets. If it is assumed that each side has 100 missiles, with 5
warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the
opponent's missiles in their silos by firing 2 warheads at each silo, then the attacking side can
reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about 5 by firing 40 missiles with 200
warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. As such, this type of weapon was
intended to be banned under the START II agreement, however the START II agreement was
never activated, and neither Russia nor the USA has adhered to the agreement.

Destabilizing role of missile defense[edit]

Any defense system against nuclear missiles such as SDI will be more effective against limited
numbers of missiles launched. At very small numbers of targets, each defensive asset will be
able to take multiple shots at each warhead, and a high kill ratio could be achieved easily. As the
number of targets increases, the defensive network becomes "saturated" as each asset must
target and destroy more and more warheads in the same window of time. Eventually the system
will reach a maximum number of targets destroyed and after this point all additional warheads
will penetrate the defenses. This leads to several destabilizing effects.

First, a state that is not building similar defenses may be encouraged to attack before the system
is in place, essentially starting the war while there is no clear advantage instead of waiting until
they will be at a distinct disadvantage after the defenses are completed. Second, one of the
easiest ways to counter any proposed defenses is to simply build more warheads and missiles,
reaching that saturation point sooner and hitting targets through a strategy of attrition. Third, and
most importantly, since defenses are more effective against small numbers of warheads, a nation
with a defense system is actually encouraged to engage in a counterforce first strike. The smaller
retaliatory strike is then more easily destroyed by the defense system than a full attack would be.
This undermines the doctrine of MAD by discrediting a nation's ability to punish any aggressor
with a lethal retaliatory second strike.

Movies about first strike[edit]

Dr. Strangelove by Stanley Kubrick

Miracle Mile


First Strike


The Day After (1983 television movie)


By Dawn's Early Light

The movie and the book The Hunt for Red October involves the fear of a Russian submarine
nuclear delivery system that is so ideal for a first strike that its captain and others plan to
defect with the submarine rather than allow it to continue under Russian control.

See also[edit]

Dead Hand (nuclear war)

Counterforce nuclear weapon

Decapitation strike

Second strike

Cuban missile crisis

Preemptive war

Mutually assured destruction

No first use


1. Jump up^ Castro, Fidel (1962-10-26). "Letter to Nikita Khrushchev from Fidel Castro
regarding defending Cuban air space" (Orig. paper, converted to HTML). The World On the Brink: John
F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.
Retrieved 2008-07-10.

2. Jump up^ Hines, John; Mishulovich, Ellis M.; Shulle, John F. (1995-09-22). "An Analytical
Comparison of U.S.-Soviet Assessments During the Cold War" (PDF). Soviet Intentions 1965
1985, Volume I. The National Security Archive, George Washington University: BDM Federal,
Inc., contractor to Federal Government, United States of America. p. 24. Retrieved 2009-09-23.

3. Jump up^ "Pakistan Will Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons Against India". 2015-10-22.
Retrieved 2016-06-25.

4. Jump up^ , (translit. Zheleznyakov, Alexander) (2004-10-

01). " " (Assumed orig. paper, converted to HTML on website `
` (trans. Space Encyclopedia?)). " 22(149)" (trans. Secret
Materials?). (trans. Russian Federation of Cosmonautics?).
pp. 1617. Retrieved 2008-07-19.

5. Jump up^ http://missilethreat.com/missiles/ugm-133-trident-d-5/

No first use
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
No first use (NFU) refers to a pledge or a policy by a nuclear power not to use nuclear weapons as
a means of warfare unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons. Earlier, the concept
had also been applied to chemical and biological warfare.
China declared its NFU policy in 1964, and has since maintained this policy. India articulated its
policy of no first use of nuclear weapons in 2003. [1]
NATO has repeatedly rejected calls for adopting NFU policy,[2] arguing that pre-emptive nuclear
strike is a key option, in order to have a credible deterrent that could compensate for the
overwhelming conventional weapon superiority enjoyed by the Soviet Army in the Eurasian land
mass.[citation needed] In 1993, Russia dropped a pledge against first use of nuclear weapons made in 1982
by Leonid Brezhnev.[3] In 2000, a Russian military doctrine stated that Russia reserves the right to
use nuclear weapons "in response to a large-scale conventional aggression".[4] This is because the
balance of forces was reversed NATO is now enjoying a clear superiority in conventional
weapons.[citation needed]

Countries pledging no-first-use[edit]

Main articles: China and weapons of mass destruction and People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

China[5] became the first nation to propose and pledge NFU policy when it first gained nuclear
capabilities in 1964, stating "not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any
circumstances". During the Cold War, China decided to keep the size of its nuclear arsenal small
rather than compete in an international arms race with the United States and the Soviet Union.[6]
China has repeatedly re-affirmed its no-first-use policy in recent years, doing so in 2005, 2008,
2009 and again in 2011. China has also consistently called on the United States to adopt a no-first-
use policy, to reach a NFU agreement bilaterally with China, and to conclude an NFU agreement
among the five nuclear weapon states. The United States has repeatedly refused these calls. [8][9][10][11]

Main articles: India and weapons of mass destruction and Nuclear Command Authority (India)

India first adopted a "No first use" policy after its second nuclear tests, Pokhran-II, in 1998. In August
1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine [12] which asserts that nuclear weapons
are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of "retaliation only". The document also
maintains that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive
retaliation should deterrence fail" and that decisions to authorise the use of nuclear weapons would
be made by the Prime Minister or his 'designated successor(s)'.[12] According to the National
Research Development Corporation, despite the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan
in 20012002, India remained committed to its nuclear no-first-use policy.[13] India is in the process of
developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence".

In a speech at the National Defence College on October 21, 2010 by India's then National Security
Advisor, Shivshankar Menon, the wording was changed from "no first use" to "no first use against
non-nuclear weapon states",[14] although some argued that this was not a substantive change but "an
innocent typographical or lexical error in the text of the speech." [15] Indias current PM Modi has in the
run up to the recent general elections reiterated commitment to no first use policy.[16] In April
2013, Shyam Saran, convener of the National Security Advisory Board, affirmed that regardless of
the size of a nuclear attack against India, be it a tactical nuclear weapon or a strategic nuclear
weapon, India will retaliate massively.[17] This was in response to reports that Pakistan had developed
a tactical battlefield nuclear weapon, in an attempt to nullify an Indian "no first use" retaliatory

North Korea[edit]
Main article: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction

During the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in 2016, supreme leader Kim Jong-un stated
that North Korea would "not use nuclear weapons first unless aggressive hostile forces use nuclear
weapons to invade on our sovereignty".[19] However, just two months prior, North Korea threatened a
pre-emptive attack against the United States using nuclear weapons. [20]

Countries pledging to use nuclear weapons only defensively [edit]

See also: Mutual assured destruction

Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States,[21] and France[citation needed] say they will use
nuclear weapons against either nuclear or non-nuclear states only in the case of invasion or other
attack against their territory or against one of their allies. Historically, NATO military strategy, taking
into account the numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces, assumed that the use
of tactical nuclear weapons would have been required in defeating a Soviet invasion. [22][23]

At the 16th NATO summit in April 1999, Germany proposed that NATO adopt a no-first-use policy, but
the proposal was rejected.[24]


Russia describes its entire military doctrine as defensive (see Military doctrine of 2010). With regard
to nuclear weapons specifically, Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons

in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it
or its allies, and also

in case of aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons when the very
existence of the state is threatened.[25]

The new military doctrine of 2014 does not depart from this stance. [26]

United Kingdom[edit]

In March 2002, British defence secretary Geoff Hoon stated that the UK was prepared to use nuclear
weapons against "rogue states" such as Iraq if they ever used "weapons of mass destruction" against
British troops in the field.[27] This policy was restated in February 2003.[28]

United States[edit]

The United States has refused to adopt a no-first-use policy, saying that it "reserves the right to use"
nuclear weapons first in the case of conflict. The U.S. doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons was
revised most recently in the Nuclear Posture Review, released April 6, 2010.[29] The 2010 Nuclear
Posture review reduces the role of U.S. nuclear weapons, stating that, "The fundamental role of U.S.
nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on
the United States, our allies, and partners." The U.S. doctrine also includes the following assurance
to other states: "The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations."[29]

For states eligible for this assurance, the United States would not use nuclear weapons in response
to a chemical or biological attack, but states that those responsible for such an attack would be held
accountable and would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response. Even for
states not eligible for this assurance, the United States would consider the use of nuclear weapons
only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and
partners. The Nuclear Posture Review also notes, "It is in the U.S. interest and that of all other
nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever." [29]

This supersedes the doctrine of the Bush administration set forth in "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear
Operations" and written under the direction of Air Force General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The new doctrine envisions commanders requesting presidential approval to use
nuclear weapons to preempt an attack by a nation or a terrorist group using weapons of mass
destruction.[30] The draft also includes the option of using nuclear weapons to destroy known enemy
stockpiles of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

See also: N-deterrence

Pakistan has a no first attack policy in place since 1971. This policy was reiterated after the nuclear
tests in 1998. Pakistan has vowed never to invade or attack another country under any
circumstances. Pakistan's foreign minister Shamshad Ahmad had warned that if Pakistan is ever
invaded or attacked, it will use "any weapon in its arsenal" to defend itself. [31]

Pakistan refuses to adopt a "no-first-use" doctrine, indicating that it would launch nuclear weapons
even if the other side did not use such weapons first. Pakistan's asymmetric nuclear posture has
significant influence on India's decision ability to retaliate, as shown in 2001 and 2008 crises,
when non-state actors carried out deadly terrorist attacks on India, only to be met with a relatively

subdued response from India. A military spokesperson stated that "Pakistan's threat of nuclear first-
use deterred India from seriously considering conventional military strikes." [32]

Pakistan's National Security Advisor Sartaj Aziz defended the policy of first use.[33] Aziz stated that
Pakistan's first use doctrine is entirely deterrent in nature. He explained that it was effective after
the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and argued that if Pakistan had a no-first use policy, there would
have been a major war between the two countries.[33]


Although Israel does not officially confirm or deny having nuclear weapons, the country is widely
believed to be in possession of them. Its continued ambiguous stance puts it in a difficult position
since to issue a statement pledging 'no first use' would confirm their possession of nuclear weapons.

Israel has said that it "would not be the first country in the Middle East to formally introduce nuclear
weapons into the region."[34]

If Israel's very existence is threatened, some speculate that Israel would use a "Samson Option," a
"last resort" deterrence strategy of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons, should the State of
Israel be substantially damaged and/or near destruction. [35][36][37]

See also[edit]

International relations portal

War portal

Nuclear disarmament


1. Jump up^ "PIB Press Releases". Retrieved 2014-07-04.

2. Jump up^ NATO's Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for 'No First Use' | Arms Control
Association - July/August 1999 - Jack Mendelsohn

3. Jump up^ Schmemann, Serge (November 4, 1993). "Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of
Atom Arms". The New York Times. Retrieved 2 January 2012.

4. Jump up^ No First Use of Nuclear Weapons meeting: paper by Yuri Fedorov, 'Russia's
Doctrine on the Use of Nuclear Weapons' - Pugwash Meeting no. 279 London, UK, 1517 November

5. Jump up^ "Key Issues: Nuclear Weapons: Issues: Policies: No First Use Policy".
Nuclearfiles.org. Retrieved 2013-04-30.

6. Jump up^ "No-First-Use (NFU)". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Archived from the original on 2010-

7. Jump up^ "Statement on security assurances issued on 5 April 1995 by the People's
Republic of China" (PDF). United Nations. 6 April 1995. S/1995/265. Retrieved 20 September 2012.

8. Jump up^ Chinese nuclear forces, 2010. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

9. Jump up^ Tim Johnson, McClatchy Newspapers (2009-01-20). "China renews pledge of 'no
first use' of nukes | McClatchy". Mcclatchydc.com. Retrieved 2013-04-30.

10. Jump up^ "China states 'no first use' nuke policy". UPI.com. 2009-01-20. Retrieved 2013-04-

11. Jump up^ "China Security". Chinasecurity.us. Retrieved 2013-04-30.

12. ^ Jump up to:a b "Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine".
Indianembassy.org. Archived from the original on December 5, 2009. Retrieved 30 April 2013.

13. Jump up^ [shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/.../08_chapter%204.pdf A Rani


14. Jump up^ http://indiablooms.com/NewsDetailsPage/2010/newsDetails211010n.php

15. Jump up^ [1]

16. Jump up^ http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/16/uk-india-election-nuclear-


17. Jump up^ Bagchi, Indrani. "Even a midget nuke strike will lead to massive retaliation, India
warns Pak The Economic Times". Economictimes.indiatimes.com. Retrieved 2013-04-30.

18. Jump up^ "Analysis: New Pakistani Tactical Nuclear Weapons Implications And
Ramifications". Space Daily. 2013-02-16.

19. Jump up^ "Kim Jong Un Says Pyongyang Won't Use Nukes First; Associated
Press". http://abcnews.go.com/. 2016-05-07. Retrieved 2016-05-07. External link in |
publisher= (help)

20. Jump up^ "North Korea threatens nuclear strike over U.S.-South
Korean". http://www.cnn.com/. 2016-03-07. Retrieved 2016-05-22. External link in |
publisher= (help)

21. Jump up^ d'Ancona, Matthew (26 October 2003). "Pentagon wants 'mini-nukes' to fight
terrorists Telegraph". London: Julian Coman in Washington. Retrieved 2007-09-14.

22. Jump up^ The East-West Strategic Balance. 1982.

23. Jump up^ Healy, Melissa (October 3, 1987). "Senate Permits Study for New Tactical Nuclear
Missile". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2012-08-08.

24. Jump up^ "Germany Raises No-First-Use Issue at NATO Meeting | Arms Control
Association". Armscontrol.org. Retrieved 2013-04-30.

25. Jump up^ "Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii"
[Military doctrine of the Russian Federation]. scrf.gov.ru (in Russian). Moscow: Security
Council of the Russian Federation. 2010-06-25 [presidential decree 2010-06-25]. Archived from the
original on 2011-05-04. Note: the same URL is used for various revisions with different presidential
decree dates.

26. Jump up^ Military doctrine of the Russian Federation of 2014 [2] paragraph 27

27. Jump up^ "BBC News UK 'prepared to use nuclear weapons'". 20 March 2002. Archived
from the original on 2002-10-20. Retrieved 2007-09-14.

28. Jump up^ "BBC NEWS UK restates nuclear threat". BBC News. 2 February 2003.
Retrieved 2007-09-14.

29. ^ Jump up to:a b c Nuclear Posture Review Report, U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010.

30. Jump up^ "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations" (PDF).

31. Jump up^ "India-Pakistan in War and Peace J. N. Dixit Google Books".

32. Jump up^ Narang, Vipin (January 2010). "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Implications for South
Asian Stability" (PDF). Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Policy Brief. Retrieved 4 January 2013.

33. ^ Jump up to:a b Boies,, Mary McInnis. "Promoting U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Future Challenges
and Opportunities". Council of Foreign Relations. Retrieved 6 October 2014.

34. Jump up^ "Israel's Nuclear Program and Middle East Peace". Lionel Beehner. February 10,
2006. Retrieved 2007-11-03.

35. Jump up^ Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign
Policy, Random House, 1991, pp. 42, 136-137, 288-289.

36. Jump up^ Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 2, 7, 341.

37. Jump up^ Avner Cohen, Israel's Nuclear Opacity: a Political Genealogy, published in The
Dynamics of Middle East Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 187-212, edited by Steven L. Spiegel, Jennifer D.
Kibbe and Elizabeth G. Matthews. Symposium Series, Volume 66, The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001.

Further reading[edit]

Rhona MacDonald: Nuclear Weapons 60 Years On: Still a Global Public Health
Threat. In: PLoS Medicine. 2(11)/2005. Public Library of Science, e301, ISSN 1549-1277

Harold A. Feiveson, Ernst Jan Hogendoorn: No First Use of Nuclear Weapons. In: The
Nonproliferation Review. 10(2)/2003. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ISSN 1073-6700

Second strike

In nuclear strategy, a second-strike capability is a country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear
attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker. To have such an ability (and to convince
an opponent of its viability) is considered vital in nuclear deterrence, as otherwise the other side
might attempt to try to win a nuclear war in one massive first strike against its opponent's own
nuclear forces.


The possession of second-strike capabilities counters a first-strike nuclear threat and can support
a no first use nuclear strategy. Reciprocal second-strike capabilities usually cause a mutual assured
destruction defence strategy, though one side may have a lower level minimal deterrence response.

Second-strike capabilities can be further strengthened by implementing fail-deadly mechanisms.

These mechanisms create a threshold and guaranteed consequences if that threshold is breached.
For instance, a threshold may be for an allied nation not to be attacked. If a rival nation then
breaches this threshold by attacking the allied nation, then the predetermined consequences for this
action go into effect. These predetermined consequences could include a wide range of responses,
including a retaliatory nuclear second strike.


A Trident II missile launched from a Royal Navy Vanguard class ballistic missile submarine

The crucial goal in maintaining second-strike capabilities is preventing first-strike attacks from taking
out a nation's nuclear arsenal. In this manner, a country can carry out nuclear retaliation even after
absorbing a nuclear attack. The United States and other countries have diversified their nuclear
arsenals through the nuclear triad in order to better ensure second-strike capability.[1]

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles are the traditional, but very expensive, method of providing a
second strike capability, though they need to be supported by a reliable method of identifying who the
attacker is. Using SLBMs as a second-strike capability has a serious problem, because in retaliation

for a submarine-launched ICBM, the wrong country could be targeted, and can cause a conflict to
escalate. However, implementation of second strikes is crucial to deter a first strike. Countries with
nuclear weapons make it their primary purpose to convince their opponents that a first strike is not
worth facing a second strike. Such countries have many diverse launch mechanisms, prepared
responses to various nuclear attack scenarios, launch mechanisms in many different areas of the
country, and underground launch facilities that are specifically designed to withstand a nuclear
attack.[citation needed]

Launch on warning is a strategy of nuclear weapon retaliation that gained recognition during the Cold
War between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc. In addition to the nuclear triad, nations deploy
an early warning system that detects incoming nuclear missiles. This gives that nation the capability
and option to launch a retaliatory second strike before the incoming nuclear first strike hits any of its
targets. This is another method of solidifying second-strike capabilities and deterring a first strike
from another nuclear power.[2]

Because of the low accuracy (circular error probable) of early-generation intercontinental ballistic
missiles (and especially submarine-launched ballistic missiles), second strike was initially only
possible against very large, undefended countervalue targets like cities. Later-generation missiles
with much improved accuracy made second-strike counterforce attacks against the opponent's
hardened military facilities possible.[citation needed]


Perimetr-PTS, otherwise known as (the dead hand) within Russia, is a Russian

nuclear deterrence developed to automatically launch ballistic missiles as a retaliatory attack in the
event that the Russian command and control system is destroyed in a surprise decapitation strike.

Perimetr PTS dates back to 1974, in response to Soviet fears of devastating nuclear strikes from US
Ballistic Missile submarines. It became operational in January 1985, with SS-17 launch silos in
Vypolzovo (Yedrovo) and Kostroma, each 100 and 150 miles north-west of Moscow respectively. The
system was built with multiple layers of redundancy, in case multiple layers of communications were
destroyed in the initial strike. Launch authorisation would be transmitted by UHF radio, by
transmitters buried deep underground. Development continued over the years with the system
incorporating the new SS-27 ICBM's in December 1990, and further refinements in 1996.

Russian leadership was concerned that the system could trigger an accidental launch, so
incorporated numerous safeguards into its design.

1. Initially, both the Vyuga nuclear command link to Russian leadership and the
secure Kazbek communications system must be interrupted. The simultaneous loss of both
systems would indicate that the national command post has been destroyed and the political
leadership killed.

2. Secondly, the General Staff would have had to escalate the threat level sufficiently high so
that a preauthorisation for launch had already been attained prior to loss of communications.
If this hadn't been received, it was up to the missile operators within the silos to abort the
automated launch.

3. Third, the collective input of data from a variety of sensors fed into a central server. This
included ground and infrared sensors designed to detect explosions around early-warning
radar stations, command posts, and silos; missile signatures from radar stations, and data
from the Oko early warning satellite system. Perimetr-PTS was deliberately designed not to
launch in the event of a smaller strike from US allies or an Asian nuclear power, given their
inability to wage 'total war'. It was also designed to discount the possibility of an earthquake
or natural disaster, by referencing data from seismograph stations.

Despite the automated launch capabilities, Russian nuclear command and control could order
missiles to self-destruct mid-flight in the event of an accidental launch. Russian Ballistic Missile
submarines were reportedly never incorporated into Perimetr-PTS, given the inherent communication
issues which could ensue.


As early as 1940, science fiction writer Robert A. Heinlein wrote Solution Unsatisfactory in which he
described a nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. In one episode, the
US cabinet discusses the scenario of a Soviet surprise attack in which American cities would be
destroyed, but the US armed forces would survive and launch a counter-attack.

Minimal deterrence
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

(Redirected from Minimum deterrence)

In nuclear strategy, minimal deterrence (also called minimum deterrence) is an application

of deterrence theory in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to deter
an adversary from attacking.[1] Pure minimal deterrence is a doctrine of no first use, holding that the
only mission of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear adversary by making the cost of a first
strike unacceptably high.[1] To present a credible deterrent, there must be the assurance that any
attack would trigger a retaliatory strike.[2] In other words, minimal deterrence requires rejecting
a counterforce strategy in favor of pursuing survivable force that can be used in
a countervalue second strike.

While the United States and the Soviet Union each developed robust first- and second-strike
capabilities during the Cold War, the People's Republic of China pursued a doctrine of minimal
nuclear deterrence. Assuming that decision-makers make cost-benefit analyses when deciding to
use force, China's doctrine calls for acquiring a nuclear arsenal only large enough to destroy an
adversarys "strategic points" in such a way that the expected costs of a first strike outweigh the
anticipated benefits.[3] Both India and Pakistan have also adopted this strategy, which they
term Minimum Credible Deterrence.[4]

Minimal deterrence represents one way of solving the security dilemma and avoiding an arms race.
Decision-makers often feel pressured to expand their arsenals when they perceive them to be
vulnerable to an adversarys first strike, especially when both sides seek to achieve the advantage.
Eliminating this perceived vulnerability reduces the incentive to produce more and advanced
weapons. For example, the United States nuclear force exceeds the requirements of minimal
deterrence, and is structured to strike numerous targets in multiple countries and to have the ability
to conduct successful counterforce strikes with high confidence.[6] In response to this, China
continues to modernize its nuclear forces because its leaders are concerned about the survivability of
their arsenal in the face of the United States advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision strike,
and missile defense.[7]

One disadvantage of minimal deterrence is that it requires an accurate understanding of the level of
damage an adversary finds unacceptable, especially if that understanding changes over time so that
a previously credible deterrent is no longer credible.[8] A minimal deterrence strategy must also
account for the nuclear firepower that would be "lost" or "neutralized" during an adversarys
counterforce strike.[9] Additionally, a minimal deterrence capability may embolden a state when it
confronts a superior nuclear power, as has been observed in the relationship between China and the
United States.[10] Finally, while pursuing minimal deterrence during arms negotiations allows states to
make reductions without becoming vulnerable, further reductions may be undesirable once minimal
deterrence is reached because they will increase a states vulnerability and provide an incentive for
an adversary to secretly expand its nuclear arsenal.[11]

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear


Participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Recognized nuclear Recognized nuclear
weapon state ratifiers weapon state acceders

Other ratifiers Other acceders or

Withdrawn (North Korea)
Non-signatory (India,
Unrecognized state, Israel, Pakistan, South
abiding by treaty (Taiwan) Sudan)

Signed 1 July 1968

Locatio New York, United States

Effectiv 5 March 1970

Conditi Ratification by the Soviet Union, the United

on Kingdom, the United States, and 40 other

signatory states.

Parties 190 (complete list)

non-parties: India, Israel, North

Korea, Pakistan and South Sudan

Deposit Governments of the United States of America,

ary the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics

Langua English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese


Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at Wikisource

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-
Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete

Opened for signature in 1968, the treaty entered into force in 1970. As required by the text, after
twenty-five years, NPT Parties met in May 1995 and agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely.[2] More
countries have adhered to the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a
testament to the treaty's significance.[1] As of August 2016, 191 states have adhered to the treaty,
though North Korea, which acceded in 1985 but never came into compliance, announced its
withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, following detonation of nuclear devices in violation of core
obligations.[3] Four UN member states have never accepted the NPT, three of which are thought to
possess nuclear weapons: India, Israel, and Pakistan. In addition, South Sudan, founded in 2011,
has not joined.

The treaty recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states: the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, France, and China (these are also the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council). Four other states are known or believed to possess nuclear
weapons: India, Pakistan, and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess
nuclear weapons, while Israel is deliberately ambiguous regarding its nuclear weapons status.

The NPT is often seen to be based on a central bargain:

the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-
weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue
nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. [4]

The treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings called Review Conferences of the Parties to the
Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Even though the treaty was originally conceived with
a limited duration of 25 years, the signing parties decided, by consensus, to unconditionally extend
the treaty indefinitely during the Review Conference in New York City on 11 May 1995, culminating
successful U.S. government efforts led by Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr.

At the time the NPT was proposed, there were predictions of 2530 nuclear weapon states within 20
years. Instead, over forty years later, five states are not parties to the NPT, and they include the only
four additional states believed to possess nuclear weapons.[4] Several additional measures have been

adopted to strengthen the NPT and the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime and make it difficult
for states to acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons, including the export controls of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the enhanced verification measures of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol.

Critics argue that the NPT cannot stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the motivation to
acquire them. They express disappointment with the limited progress on nuclear disarmament, where
the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have 22,000 warheads in their combined stockpile
and have shown a reluctance to disarm further.[dubious discuss] Several high-ranking officials within the
United Nations have said that they can do little to stop states using nuclear reactors to produce
nuclear weapons.[dubious discuss][5][6]


1Treaty structure

o 1.1First pillar: non-proliferation

o 1.2Second pillar: disarmament

o 1.3Third pillar: peaceful use of nuclear energy

2Key articles


o 3.1United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing

o 3.2Non-signatories




o 3.3North Korea

o 3.4Iran

o 3.5South Africa

o 3.6Libya

o 3.7Syria

4Leaving the treaty

5Recent and coming events

6Criticism and responses

7See also


9External links

Treaty structure[edit]
The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Although the concept of "pillars" is not
expressed anywhere in the NPT, the treaty is nevertheless sometimes interpreted as a three-
pillar system,[7] with an implicit balance among them:

1. non-proliferation,

2. disarmament, and

3. the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.[8]

These pillars are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. An effective nonproliferation regime whose
members comply with their obligations provides and essential foundation for progress on
disarmament and makes possible greater cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. With
the right to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology comes the responsibility of
nonproliferation. Progress on disarmament reinforces efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation
regime and to enforce compliance with obligations, thereby also facilitating peaceful nuclear
cooperation.[9] The "pillars" concept has been questioned by some who believe that the NPT is, as its
name suggests, principally about nonproliferation, and who worry that "three pillars" language
misleadingly implies that the three elements have equivalent importance. [10]

First pillar: non-proliferation[edit]

Under Article I of the NPT, nuclear-weapon states pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices to any recipient or in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-
nuclear-weapon state in the manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Under Article II of the
NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states pledge not to acquire or exercise control over nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of such
devices. Under Article III of the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states pledge to accept IAEA safeguards
to verify that their nuclear activities serve only peaceful purposes.[11]

Five states are recognized by NPT as nuclear weapon states (NWS): China (signed 1992), France
(1992), the Soviet Union (1968; obligations and rights now assumed by the Russian Federation), the
United Kingdom (1968), and the United States (1968). (The United States, UK, and the Soviet Union
the World War II's "Big Three" were the only states openly possessing such weapons among the

original ratifiers of the treaty, which entered into force in 1970). These five nations are also the five
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

These five NWS agree not to transfer "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and "not
in any way to assist, encourage, or induce" a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) to acquire nuclear
weapons (Article I). NNWS parties to the NPT agree not to "receive", "manufacture", or "acquire"
nuclear weapons or to "seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons"
(Article II). NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices (Article III).

The five NWS parties have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-NWS
party except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in alliance with a Nuclear
Weapons State. However, these undertakings have not been incorporated formally into the treaty,
and the exact details have varied over time. The U.S. also had nuclear warheads targeted at North
Korea, a non-NWS, from 1959 until 1991. The previous United Kingdom Secretary of State for
Defence, Geoff Hoon, has also explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of the country's nuclear
weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states".[12] In January 2006,
President Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism on
France could trigger a small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the "rogue state's" power

Second pillar: disarmament[edit]

Under Article VI of the NPT, all Parties undertake to pursue good-faith negotiations on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament, and to general and
complete disarmament.[15]

Article VI of the NPT represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of
disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states. The NPT's preamble contains language affirming the
desire of treaty signatories to ease international tension and strengthen international trust so as to
create someday the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons, and treaty on general
and complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles
from national arsenals.

The wording of the NPT's Article VI arguably imposes only a vague obligation on all NPT signatories
to move in the general direction of nuclear and total disarmament, saying, "Each of the Parties to the
Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
complete disarmament."[16] Under this interpretation, Article VI does not strictly require all signatories
to actually conclude a disarmament treaty. Rather, it only requires them "to negotiate in good faith." [17]

On the other hand, some governments, especially non-nuclear-weapon states belonging to the Non-
Aligned Movement, have interpreted Article VI's language as being anything but vague. In their view,
Article VI constitutes a formal and specific obligation on the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states
to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, and argue that these states have failed to meet their

obligation.[citation needed] The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its advisory opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued 8 July 1996, unanimously interprets the text of Article
VI as implying that

"There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

The ICJ opinion notes that this obligation involves all NPT parties (not just the nuclear weapon
states) and does not suggest a specific time frame for nuclear disarmament. [18]

Critics of the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russia, China, France, and
the United Kingdom) sometimes argue that what they view as the failure of the NPT-recognized
nuclear weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, especially in the postCold
War era, has angered some non-nuclear-weapon NPT signatories of the NPT. Such failure, these
critics add, provides justification for the non-nuclear-weapon signatories to quit the NPT and develop
their own nuclear arsenals.[19]

Other observers have suggested that the linkage between proliferation and disarmament may also
work the other way, i.e., that the failure to resolve proliferation threats in Iran and North Korea, for
instance, will cripple the prospects for disarmament.[citation needed] No current nuclear weapons state, the
argument goes, would seriously consider eliminating its last nuclear weapons without high
confidence that other countries would not acquire them. Some observers have even suggested that
the very progress of disarmament by the superpowerswhich has led to the elimination of
thousands of weapons and delivery systems[20]could eventually make the possession of nuclear
weapons more attractive by increasing the perceived strategic value of a small arsenal. As one U.S.
official and NPT expert warned in 2007, "logic suggests that as the number of nuclear weapons
decreases, the 'marginal utility' of a nuclear weapon as an instrument of military power increases. At
the extreme, which it is precisely disarmament's hope to create, the strategic utility of even one or
two nuclear weapons would be huge."[21]

Third pillar: peaceful use of nuclear energy[edit]

NPT Article IV acknowledges the right of all Parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
and to benefit from international cooperation in this area, in conformity with their nonproliferation
obligations. Article IV also encourages such cooperation. [22]

The third pillar allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to NPT
signatory countries for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs in those countries, as
long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not being used for the development of
nuclear weapons.[23]

Since very few of the states with nuclear energy programs are willing to abandon the use of nuclear
energy, the third pillar of the NPT under Article IV provides other states with the possibility to do the
same, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons. [24]

The treaty recognizes the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, but restricts this right for NPT parties to be exercised "in conformity with Articles I and II"
(the basic nonproliferation obligations that constitute the "first pillar" of the treaty). As the
commercially popular light water reactornuclear power station uses enriched uranium fuel, it follows
that states must be able either to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market. Mohamed
ElBaradei, then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has called the spread of
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities the "Achilles' heel" of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
As of 2007 13 states have an enrichment capability.[25]

Because the availability of fissile material has long been considered the principal obstacle to, and
"pacing element" for, a country's nuclear weapons development effort, it was declared a major
emphasis of U.S. policy in 2004 to prevent the further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing (a.k.a. "ENR") technology.[26] Countries possessing ENR capabilities, it is feared, have
what is in effect the option of using this capability to produce fissile material for weapons use on
demand, thus giving them what has been termed a "virtual" nuclear weapons program. [27] The degree
to which NPT members have a "right" to ENR technology notwithstanding its potentially grave
proliferation implications, therefore, is at the cutting edge of policy and legal debates surrounding the
meaning of Article IV and its relation to Articles I, II, and III of the treaty.

Countries that have signed the treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States and maintained that status
have an unbroken record of not building nuclear weapons. However, Iraq was cited by the IAEA with
punitive sanctions enacted against it by the UN Security Council for violating its NPT safeguards
obligations; North Korea never came into compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and was
cited repeatedly for these violations,[28] and later withdrew from the NPT and tested multiple nuclear
devices; Iran was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in an unusual non-
consensus decision because it "failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time" to
report aspects of its enrichment program;[29][30] and Libya pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons
program before abandoning it in December 2003.

In 1991, Romania reported previously undeclared nuclear activities by the former regime and the
IAEA reported this non-compliance to the Security Council for information only. In some regions, the
fact that all neighbors are verifiably free of nuclear weapons reduces any pressure individual states
might feel to build those weapons themselves, even if neighbors are known to have peaceful nuclear
energy programs that might otherwise be suspicious. In this, the treaty works as designed.

In 2004, Mohamed ElBaradei said that by some estimates thirty-five to forty states could have the
knowledge to develop nuclear weapons.[31]

Key articles[edit]
Article I:[32] Each nuclear-weapons state (NWS) undertakes not to transfer, to any recipient, nuclear
weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state to
manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices.

Article II: Each non-NWS party undertakes not to receive, from any source, nuclear weapons, or
other nuclear explosive devices; not to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices; and not to
receive any assistance in their manufacture.

Article III: Each non-NWS party undertakes to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the
application of its safeguards to all nuclear material in all of the state's peaceful nuclear activities and
to prevent diversion of such material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article IV: 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in
contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further
development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories
of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the
developing areas of the world.

Article VI: Each party "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

Article X. Establishes the right to withdraw from the Treaty giving 3 months' notice. It also establishes
the duration of the Treaty (25 years before 1995 Extension Initiative).


Date NPT first effective (including USSR, YU, CS of that time)

1st decade: ratified or acceded 19681977
2nd decade: ratified or acceded 19781987
3rd decade: ratified or acceded since 1988
Never signed (India, Israel, Pakistan, South Sudan)

See also: Nuclear proliferation

The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapon states.
It was recognized that the cold war deterrent relationship between just the United States and Soviet
Union was fragile. Having more nuclear-weapon states would reduce security for all, multiplying the
risks of miscalculation, accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, or from escalation in tensions,
nuclear conflict. Moreover, the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it has
been apparent that the development of nuclear capabilities by States could enable them to divert
technology and materials for weapons purposes. Thus, the problem of preventing such diversions
became a central issue in discussions on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Initial efforts, which began in 1946, to create an international system enabling all States to have
access to nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards, were terminated in 1949 without the
achievement of this objective, due to serious political differences between the major Powers. By
then, both the United State and the former Soviet Union had tested nuclear weapons, and were
beginning to build their stockpiles.

In December 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his "Atoms for Peace" proposal,
presented to the eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, and urged that an
international organization be established to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while guarding
against development of weapons capabilities in additional countries. His proposal resulted in 1957 in
the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was charged with the
dual responsibility of promotion and control of nuclear technology. IAEA technical activities began in
1958. An interim safeguards system for small nuclear reactors, put in place in 1961, was replaced in
1964 by a system covering larger installations and, over the following years, was expanded to
include additional nuclear facilities. In recent years, efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and
improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system culminated in the approval of the Model
Additional Protocol by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997.

Within the framework of the United Nations, the principle of nuclear non-proliferation was addressed
in negotiations as early as 1957. The NPT process was launched by Frank Aiken, Irish Minister for
External Affairs, in 1958. The NPT gained significant momentum in the early 1960s. The structure of
a treaty to uphold nuclear non-proliferation as a norm of international behaviour had become clear by
the mid-1960s, and by 1968 final agreement had been reached on a Treaty that would prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, enable cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and
further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. It was opened for signature in 1968, with Finland
the first State to sign. Accession became nearly universal after the end of the Cold War and of South
African apartheid. In 1992, China and France acceded to the NPT, the last of the five nuclear powers
recognized by the treaty to do so.

The Treaty provided, in article X, for a conference to be convened 25 years after its entry into force to
decided whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional
fixed period of periods. Accordingly, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995,
States parties to the Treaty agreed-without a vote-on the Treaty's indefinited extension, and decided
that review conferences should continue to be held every five years. After Brazil acceded to the NPT
in 1998, the only remaining non-nuclear-weapons state which had not signed was Cuba, which
joined NPT (and the Treaty of Tlatelolco NWFZ) in 2002.

Several NPT signatories have given up nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs. South Africa
undertook a nuclear weapons program, but has since renounced it and signed the treaty in 1991
after destroying its small nuclear arsenal; after this, the remaining African countries signed the treaty.
The former Soviet Republics where nuclear weapons had been based, namely Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan, transferred those weapons to Russia and joined NPT by 1994 following the signature of
the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.[citation needed]

Successor states from the breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia also joined the treaty soon
after their independence. Montenegro and East Timor were the last countries to sign the treaty on
their independence in 2006 and 2003; the only other country to sign in the 21st century was Cuba in
2002. The three Micronesian countries in Compact of Free Association with the USA joined NPT in
1995, along with Vanuatu.

Major South American countries Argentina, Chile, and Brazil joined in 1995 and 1998. Arabian
Peninsula countries included Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 1988, Qatar and Kuwait in 1989, UAE in
1995, and Oman in 1997. The tiny European states of Monaco and Andorra joined in 1995-6. Also
signing in the 1990s were Myanmar in 1992 and Guyana in 1993.

United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing[edit]

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
Nuclear weapons states
Nuclear sharing
Neither, but NPT

Main article: Nuclear sharing

At the time the treaty was being negotiated, NATO had in place secret nuclear weapons
sharing agreements whereby the United States provided nuclear weapons to be deployed by, and
stored in, other NATO states. Some argue this is an act of proliferation violating Articles I and II of the
treaty. A counter-argument is that the U.S. controlled the weapons in storage within the NATO states,
and that no transfer of the weapons or control over them was intended "unless and until a decision
were made to go to war, at which the treaty would no longer be controlling", so there is no breach of
the NPT.[33] These agreements were disclosed to a few of the states, including the Soviet Union,
negotiating the treaty, but most of the states that signed the NPT in 1968 would not have known
about these agreements and interpretations at that time. [34]

As of 2005, it is estimated that the United States still provides about 180 tactical B61 nuclear
bombs for use by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey under these NATO
agreements.[35] Many states, and the Non-Aligned Movement, now argue this violates Articles I and II
of the treaty, and are applying diplomatic pressure to terminate these agreements. They point out that
the pilots and other staff of the "non-nuclear" NATO states practice handling and delivering the U.S.
nuclear bombs, and non-U.S. warplanes have been adapted to deliver U.S. nuclear bombs which
must have involved the transfer of some technical nuclear weapons information. NATO believes its
"nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in war prevention, but their role is now more
fundamentally political".[36]

U.S. nuclear sharing policies were originally designed to help prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weaponsnot least by persuading the then West Germany not to develop an independent nuclear
capability by assuring it that West Germany would be able, in the event of war with the Warsaw Pact,
to wield (U.S.) nuclear weapons in self-defense. (Until that point of all-out war, however, the weapons
themselves would remain in U.S. hands.) The point was to limit the spread of countries having their
own nuclear weapons programs, helping ensure that NATO allies would not choose to go down the
proliferation route.[37] (West Germany was discussed in U.S. intelligence estimates for a number of
years as being a country with the potential to develop nuclear weapons capabilities of its own if
officials in Bonn were not convinced that their defense against the Soviet Union and its allies could
otherwise be met.[38])


Four statesIndia, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudanhave never signed the treaty. India and
Pakistan have publicly disclosed their nuclear weapon programs, and Israel has a long-
standing policy of deliberate ambiguity with regards to its nuclear program (see List of countries with
nuclear weapons).

See also: India and weapons of mass destruction

India has detonated nuclear devices, first in 1974 and again in 1998.[39] India is estimated to have
enough fissile material for more than 150 warheads.[40] India was among the few countries to have
a no first use policy, a pledge not to use nuclear weapons unless first attacked by an adversary using
nuclear weapons, however India's former NSA Shivshankar Menon signaled a significant shift from
"no first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of
Golden Jubilee celebrations of the National Defence College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a
doctrine Menon said reflected India's "strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence". [41][42]

India argues that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots"
by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967,
but the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid. India's then External
Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said during a visit to Tokyo in 2007: "If India did not sign the NPT, it
is not because of its lack of commitment for non-proliferation, but because we consider NPT as a
flawed treaty and it did not recognize the need for universal, non-discriminatory verification and
treatment."[43] Although there have been unofficial discussions on creating a South Asian nuclear

weapons free zone, including India and Pakistan, this is considered to be highly unlikely for the
foreseeable future.[44]

In early March 2006, India and the United States finalized an agreement, in the face of criticism in
both countries, to restart cooperation on civilian nuclear technology. Under the deal India has
committed to classify 14 of its 22 nuclear power plants as being for civilian use and to place them
under IAEA safeguards. Mohamed ElBaradei, then Director General of the IAEA, welcomed the deal
by calling India "an important partner in the non-proliferation regime."[45]

In December 2006, United States Congress approved the United States-India Peaceful Atomic
Energy Cooperation Act, endorsing a deal that was forged during Prime Minister Singh's visit to the
United States in July 2005 and cemented during President Bush's visit to India earlier in 2006. The
legislation allows for the transfer of civilian nuclear material to India. Despite its status outside the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear cooperation with India was permitted on the basis of its
clean non-proliferation record, and India's need for energy fueled by its rapid industrialization and a
billion-plus population.[46]

On 1 August 2008, the IAEA approved the India Safeguards Agreement[47] and on 6 September 2008,
India was granted the waiver at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting held in Vienna, Austria.
The consensus was arrived after overcoming misgivings expressed by Austria, Ireland and New
Zealand and is an unprecedented step in giving exemption to a country, which has not signed the
NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).[48][49] While India could commence nuclear trade
with other willing countries.[clarification needed][50] The U.S. Congress approved this agreement and President
Bush signed it on 8 October 2008.[51]

When China announced expanded nuclear cooperation with Pakistan in 2010, proponents of arms
control denounced both the deals, claiming that they weakened the NPT by facilitating nuclear
programmes in states which are not parties to the NPT.[52]

As of January 2011, Australia, a top three producer and home to worlds largest known reserves, had
continued its refusal to export Uranium to India despite diplomatic pressure from India. [53] In
November 2011 the Australian Prime Minister announced a desire to allow exports to India, [54] a policy
change which was authorized by her party's national conference in December.[55] On 4 December
2011, Prime Minister Julia Gillard overturned Australia's long-standing ban on exporting uranium to
India.[56] She further said "We should take a decision in the national interest, a decision about
strengthening our strategic partnership with India in this the Asian century," and said that any
agreement to sell uranium to India would include strict safeguards to ensure it would only be used for
civilian purposes, and not end up in nuclear weapons.[56] On Sep 5, 2014; Australian Prime
Minister Tony Abbott sealed a civil nuclear deal to sell uranium to India. "We signed a nuclear
cooperation agreement because Australia trusts India to do the right thing in this area, as it has been
doing in other areas," Abbott told reporters after he and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed
a pact to sell uranium for peaceful power generation.[57]

See also: Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction

In May 1998, following India's nuclear tests earlier that month, Pakistan conducted two sets of
nuclear tests, the Chagai-I and Chagai-II. Although there is little confirmed information in public, as of
2015, Pakistan was estimated as many as 120 warheads. [40][58] According to analyses of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Center, Pakistan has enough fissile material for
350 warheads.[59]

Like India, Pakistani officials argue that the NPT is discriminatory. When asked at a briefing in 2015
whether Islamabad would sign the NPT if Washington requested it, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad
Chaudhry was quoted as responding "It is a discriminatory treaty. Pakistan has the right to defend
itself, so Pakistan will not sign the NPT. Why should we?." [60] Until 2010, Pakistan had always
maintained the position that it would sign the NPT if India did so. In 2010, Pakistan abandoned this
historic position and stated that it would join the NPT only as a recognized nuclear-weapon state. [61]

The NSG Guidelines currently rule out nuclear exports by all major suppliers to Pakistan, with very
narrow exceptions, since it does not have full-scope IAEA safeguards (i.e. safeguards on all its
nuclear activities). Pakistan has sought to reach an agreement similar to that with India, [62] but these
efforts have been rebuffed by the United States and other NSG members, on the grounds that
Pakistan's track record as a nuclear proliferator makes it impossible for it to have any sort of nuclear
deal in the near future.[citation needed]

By 2010, China reportedly signed a civil nuclear agreement with Pakistan, using the justification that
the deal was "peaceful."[63] The British government criticized this, on the grounds that 'the time is not
yet right for a civil nuclear deal with Pakistan'.[52] China did not seek formal approval from the nuclear
suppliers group, and claimed instead that its cooperation with Pakistan was "grandfathered" when
China joined the NSG, a claim that was disputed by other NSG members. [64] Pakistan applied for
membership on May 19, 2016,[65] supported by Turkey and China.[66][67] However, many NSG members
opposed Pakistans membership bid due to its track record, including the illicit procurement network
of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, which aided the nuclear programs of Iran, Libya and North Korea. [68]
Pakistani officials reiterated the request in August 2016.[70]

See also: Israel and weapons of mass destruction

Israel has a long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity with regards to its nuclear program (see List
of countries with nuclear weapons). Israel has been developing nuclear technology at its Dimona site
in the Negev since 1958, and some nonproliferation analysts estimate that Israel may have
stockpiled between 100 and 200 warheads using reprocessed plutonium. The position on the NPT is
explained in terms of "Israeli exceptionality", a term coined by Professor Gerald M. Steinberg, in
reference to the perception that the country's small size, overall vulnerability, as well as the history of
deep hostility and large-scale attacks by neighboring states, require a deterrent capability.[71][72]

The Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny possession of nuclear weapons, although this is
now regarded as an open secret after Israeli low level nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu
subsequently arrested and sentenced for treason by Israelpublished evidence about the program
to the British Sunday Times in 1986.

On 18 September 2009 the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency called on
Israel to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection and adhere to the non-proliferation treaty as
part of a resolution on "Israeli nuclear capabilities," which passed by a narrow margin of 4945 with
16 abstentions. The chief Israeli delegate stated that "Israel will not co-operate in any matter with this
resolution."[73] However, similar resolutions were defeated in 2010, 2013 and 2014. [citation needed] As with
Pakistan, the NSG Guidelines currently rule out nuclear exports by all major suppliers to Israel.

North Korea[edit]
See also: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction, 2006 North Korean nuclear test, and Six-
party talks

North Korea ratified the treaty on 12 December 1985, but gave notice of withdrawal from the treaty
on 10 January 2003 following U.S. allegations that it had started an illegal enriched
uranium weapons program, and the U.S. subsequently stopping fuel oil shipments under the Agreed
Framework[74] which had resolved plutonium weapons issues in 1994. [75] The withdrawal became
effective 10 April 2003 making North Korea the first state ever to withdraw from the treaty.[76] North
Korea had once before announced withdrawal, on 12 March 1993, but suspended that notice before
it came into effect.[77]

On 10 February 2005, North Korea publicly declared that it possessed nuclear weapons and pulled
out of the six-party talks hosted by China to find a diplomatic solution to the issue. "We had already
taken the resolute action of pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and have
manufactured nuclear arms for self-defence to cope with the Bush administration's evermore
undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]," a North
Korean Foreign Ministry statement said regarding the issue. [78] Six-party talks resumed in July 2005.

On 19 September 2005, North Korea announced that it would agree to a preliminary accord. Under
the accord, North Korea would scrap all of its existing nuclear weapons and nuclear production
facilities, rejoin the NPT, and readmit IAEA inspectors. The difficult issue of the supply of light water
reactors to replace North Korea's indigenous nuclear power plant program, as per the 1994 Agreed
Framework, was left to be resolved in future discussions.[79] On the next day North Korea reiterated its
known view that until it is supplied with a light water reactor it will not dismantle its nuclear arsenal or
rejoin the NPT.[80]

On 2 October 2006, the North Korean foreign minister announced that his country was planning to
conduct a nuclear test "in the future", although it did not state when. [81] On Monday, 9 October 2006 at
01:35:28 (UTC) the United States Geological Survey detected a magnitude 4.3 seismic event 70 km
(43 mi) north of Kimchaek, North Korea indicating a nuclear test. [82] The North Korean government
announced shortly afterward that they had completed a successful underground test of a nuclear
fission device.

In 2007, reports from Washington suggested that the 2002 CIA reports stating that North Korea was
developing an enriched uranium weapons program, which led to North Korea leaving the NPT, had
overstated or misread the intelligence.[83][84][85][86] On the other hand, even apart from these press
allegationswhich some critics[by whom?] worry could have been planted in order to justify the United
States giving up trying to verify the dismantlement of Pyongyang's uranium program in the face of

North Korean intransigencethere remains some information in the public record indicating the
existence of a uranium effort. Quite apart from the fact that North Korean First Vice Minister Kang
Sok Ju at one point admitted the existence of a uranium enrichment program, Pakistan's then-
President Musharraf revealed that the A.Q. Khan proliferation network had provided North Korea with
a number of gas centrifuges designed for uranium enrichment. Additionally, press reports have cited
U.S. officials to the effect that evidence obtained in dismantling Libya's WMD programs points toward
North Korea as the source for Libya's uranium hexafluoride (UF6) which, if true, would mean that
North Korea has a uranium conversion facility for producing feedstock for centrifuge enrichment. [87]

Main articles: Iran and weapons of mass destruction and Nuclear program of Iran

See also: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

This section needs to be updated. Please update this article to reflect recent
events or newly available information.(April 2015)

Part of a series on the

Nuclear program of Iran





Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

Oghab 2
International Atomic Energy Agency

International agreements

Non-Proliferation Treaty
Additional Protocol
2013 interim agreement, Geneva
2015 preliminary agreement, Lausanne
2015 final agreement, Vienna

Domestic laws

Iran Nuclear Achievements Protection Act

Iranian act implementing the JCPOA
Majlis commission

US Congress review


Iranian nuclear negotiators




Views on the nuclear program of Iran

Iran and weapons of mass destruction
Sanctions against Iran
UN resolutions
Khamenei's fatwa against nuclear weapons
Assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists
IranUnited States relations


Iran is a party to the NPT but was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and
the status of its nuclear program remains in dispute. In November 2003 IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that Iran had repeatedly and over an extended period failed to
meet its safeguards obligations, including by failing to declare its uranium enrichment program.
After about two years of EU3-led diplomatic efforts and Iran temporarily suspending its enrichment
program,[88] the IAEA Board of Governors, acting under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, found in a
rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions that these failures constituted non-compliance with
the IAEA safeguards agreement.[30] This was reported to the UN Security Council in 2006,[89] after
which the Security Council passed a resolution demanding that Iran suspend its enrichment.
Instead, Iran resumed its enrichment program.[91]

The IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, and is
continuing its work on verifying the absence of undeclared activities. [92] In February 2008, the IAEA
also reported that it was working to address "alleged studies" of weaponization, based on documents
provided by certain Member States, which those states claimed originated from Iran. Iran rejected the
allegations as "baseless" and the documents as "fabrications." [93]In June 2009, the IAEA reported that
Iran had not cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues ... which need to
be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program. [94]

The United States concluded that Iran violated its Article III NPT safeguards obligations, and further
argued based on circumstantial evidence that Iran's enrichment program was for weapons purposes
and therefore violated Iran's Article II nonproliferation obligations.[95] The November 2007 US National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) later concluded that Iran had halted an active nuclear weapons program
in the fall of 2003 and that it had remained halted as of mid-2007. The NIE's "Key Judgments,"
however, also made clear that what Iran had actually stopped in 2003 was only "nuclear weapon
design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-
related work"-namely, those aspects of Iran's nuclear weapons effort that had not by that point
already been leaked to the press and become the subject of IAEA investigations. [96]

Since Iran's uranium enrichment program at Natanzand its continuing work on a heavy water
reactor at Arak that would be ideal for plutonium productionbegan secretly years before in
conjunction with the very weaponization work the NIE discussed and for the purpose of developing
nuclear weapons, many observers find Iran's continued development of fissile material production
capabilities distinctly worrying. Particularly because fissile material availability has long been
understood to be the principal obstacle to nuclear weapons development and the primary "pacing
element" for a weapons program, the fact that Iran has reportedly suspended weaponization work
may not mean very much.[97] As U.S. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell has put it, the
aspects of its work that Iran allegedly suspended were thus "probably the least significant part of the

Iran states it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, and further
says that it "has constantly complied with its obligations under the NPT and the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency".[99] Iran also states that its enrichment program is part of its

civilian nuclear energy program, which is allowed under Article IV of the NPT. The Non-Aligned
Movement has welcomed the continuing cooperation of Iran with the IAEA and reaffirmed Iran's right
to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.[100] UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has welcomed the
continued dialogue between Iran and the IAEA, and has called for a peaceful resolution to the issue.

In April 2010, during the signing of the U.S.-Russia New START Treaty, President Obama said that
the United States, Russia, and other nations are demanding that Iran face consequences for failing
to fulfill their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that "we will not tolerate
actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the
international community and our collective security."[102]

South Africa[edit]
See also: South Africa and weapons of mass destruction

South Africa is the only country that developed nuclear weapons by itself and later dismantled them
unlike the former Soviet states Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which inherited nuclear weapons
from the former USSR and also acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

During the days of apartheid, the South African government developed a deep fear of both a black
uprising and the threat of communism. This led to the development of a secret nuclear weapons
program as an ultimate deterrent. South Africa has a large supply of uranium, which is mined in the
country's gold mines. The government built a nuclear research facility at Pelindaba near Pretoria
where uranium was enriched to fuel grade for the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station as well as weapon
grade for bomb production.

In 1991, after international pressure and when a change of government was imminent, South African
Ambassador to the United States Harry Schwarz signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In
1993, the then president Frederik Willem de Klerk openly admitted that the country had developed a
limited nuclear weapon capability. These weapons were subsequently dismantled before South Africa
acceded to the NPT and opened itself up to IAEA inspection. In 1994, the IAEA completed its work
and declared that the country had fully dismantled its nuclear weapons program.

See also: Libya and weapons of mass destruction

Libya had signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and was subject to IAEA nuclear
safeguards inspections, but undertook a secret nuclear weapons development program in violation of
its NPT obligations, using material and technology provided by the A.Q. Khan proliferation network[103]
including actual nuclear weapons designs allegedly originating in China. Libya began secret
negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom in March 2003 over potentially
eliminating its WMD programs. In October 2003, Libya was embarrassed by the interdiction of a
shipment of Pakistani-designed centrifuge parts sent from Malaysia, also as part of A. Q. Khan's
proliferation ring.[104]

In December 2003, Libya announced that it had agreed to eliminate all its WMD programs, and
permitted U.S. and British teams (as well as IAEA inspectors) into the country to assist this process
and verify its completion. The nuclear weapons designs, gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, and
other equipmentincluding prototypes for improved SCUD ballistic missileswere removed from
Libya by the United States. (Libyan chemical weapons stocks and chemical bombs were also
destroyed on site with international verification, with Libya joining the Chemical Weapons
Convention.) Libya's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards was reported to the U.N. Security
Council, but with no action taken, as Libya's return to compliance with safeguards and Article II of the
NPT was welcomed.[105]

In 2011 the Libyan government was overthrown in the Libyan Civil War with the assistance of
a military intervention by NATO forces acting under the auspices of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1973.[106][107] It was speculated in the media (especially in the Middle Eastern media) that
NATO's intervention in Libya shortly after the nation agreed to nuclear and chemical weapons
disarmament would make other countries such as North Korea more reluctant to give up nuclear
programs due to the risk of being weakened as a result.[108]

See also: Syria and weapons of mass destruction

Syria is a signatory to the NPT and has a limited civil nuclear program. Before the advent of
the Syrian Civil War it was known to operate only one small Chinese-built research reactor, SRR-1.
Despite being a proponent of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East the
country was accused of pursuing a military nuclear program with a reported nuclear facility in a
desert Syrian region of Deir ez-Zor. The reactor's components had likely been designed and
manufactured in North Korea, with the reactor's striking similarity in shape and size to the North
Korean Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. That information alarmed Israeli military and
intelligence to such a degree that the idea of a targeted airstrike was conceived. It resulted
in Operation Orchard, that took place on September 6, 2007 and saw as many as eight Israeli aircraft
taking part. Israeli government is said to have bounced the idea of the operation off the US Bush
administration, although the latter disagreed to participate. The nuclear reactor was destroyed in the
attack, which also killed about ten North Korean workers. The attack didn't cause an international
outcry or any serious Syrian retaliatory moves as both parties tried to keep it secret: Israel didn't want
publicity as regards its breach of international law while Syria wasn't willing to acknowledge its
clandestine nuclear program.[citation needed]

Leaving the treaty[edit]

Article X allows a state to leave the treaty if "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country", giving three months' (ninety days')
notice. The state is required to give reasons for leaving the NPT in this notice.

NATO states argue that when there is a state of "general war" the treaty no longer applies, effectively
allowing the states involved to leave the treaty with no notice. This is a necessary argument to
support the NATO nuclear weapons sharing policy, but a troubling one for the logic of the treaty.
NATO's argument is based on the phrase "the consequent need to make every effort to avert the

danger of such a war" in the treaty preamble, inserted at the behest of U.S. diplomats, arguing that
the treaty would at that point have failed to fulfill its function of prohibiting a general war and thus no
longer be binding.[34] Many states do not accept this argument. See United States-NATO nuclear
weapons sharing above.

North Korea has also caused an uproar by its use of this provision of the treaty. Article X.1 only
requires a state to give three months' notice in total, and does not provide for other states to question
a state's interpretation of "supreme interests of its country". In 1993, North Korea gave notice to
withdraw from the NPT. However, after 89 days, North Korea reached agreement with the United
States to freeze its nuclear program under the Agreed Framework and "suspended" its withdrawal
notice. In October 2002, the United States accused North Korea of violating the Agreed Framework
by pursuing a secret uranium enrichment program, and suspended shipments of heavy fuel oil under
that agreement. In response, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors, disabled IAEA equipment, and,
on 10 January 2003, announced that it was ending the suspension of its previous NPT withdrawal
notification. North Korea said that only one more day's notice was sufficient for withdrawal from the
NPT, as it had given 89 days before.[109]

The IAEA Board of Governors rejected this interpretation. [110] Most countries held that a new three-
months withdrawal notice was required, and some questioned whether North Korea's notification met
the "extraordinary events" and "supreme interests" requirements of the treaty. The Joint Statement of
19 September 2005 at the end of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks called for North Korea to
"return" to the NPT, implicitly acknowledging that it had withdrawn.

Recent and coming events[edit]

This section needs to be updated. Please update this article to reflect recent
events or newly available information.(April 2015)

The main outcome of the 2000 Conference was the adoption by consensus of a comprehensive Final
Document,[111] which included among other things "practical steps for the systematic and progressive
efforts" to implement the disarmament provisions of the NPT, commonly referred to as the Thirteen

On 18 July 2005, US President George W. Bush met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
declared that he would work to change US law and international rules to permit trade in US civilian
nuclear technology with India.[112] Some, such as British columnist George Monbiot, argue that the
U.S.-India nuclear deal, in combination with US attempts to deny Iran (an NPT signatory) civilian
nuclear fuel-making technology, may destroy the NPT regime,[113] while others[who?] contend that such a
move will likely bring India, an NPT non-signatory, under closer international scrutiny.

In the first half of 2010, it was strongly believed that China had signed a civilian nuclear deal with
Pakistan claiming that the deal was "peaceful".[63]

Arms control advocates criticised the reported China-Pakistan deal as they did in case of U.S.-India
deal claiming that both the deals violate the NPT by facilitating nuclear programmes in states which

are not parties to the NPT.[52] Some reports asserted that the deal was a strategic move by China to
balance US influence in South-Asia.[64]

According to a report published by U.S. Department of Defense in 2001, China had provided
Pakistan with nuclear materials and has given critical technological assistance in the construction of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons development facilities, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, of which China even then was a signatory.[114][115]

At the Seventh Review Conference in May 2005, there were stark differences between the United
States, which wanted the conference to focus on non-proliferation, especially on its allegations
against Iran, and most other countries, who emphasized the lack of serious nuclear disarmament by
the nuclear powers. The non-aligned countries reiterated their position emphasizing the need for
nuclear disarmament.[116]

The 2010 Review Conference was held in May 2010 in New York City, and adopted a final document
that included a summary by the Review Conference President, Ambassador Libran Capactulan of the
Philippines, and an Action Plan that was adopted by consensus.[117][118] The 2010 conference was
generally considered a success because it reached consensus where the previous Review
Conference in 2005 ended in disarray, a fact that many attributed to the U.S. President Barack
Obama's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Some have warned that this
success raised unrealistically high expectations that could lead to failure at the next Review
Conference in 2015.[119]

The "Global Summit on Nuclear Security" took place 1213 April 2010. The summit was proposed
by President Obama in Prague and was intended to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
in conjunction with the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism.[120] Forty seven states and three international organizations took part in the summit,
which issued a communiqu[122] and a work plan.[123] For further information see 2010 Nuclear
Security Summit.

In a major policy speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on 19 June 2013, United States
President Barack Obama outlined plans to further reduce the number of warheads in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal.[124] According to Foreign Policy, Obama proposed a "one-third reduction in strategic
nuclear warheads - on top of the cuts already required by the New START treaty - bringing the
number of deployed warheads to about 1,000."[124] Obama is seeking to "negotiate these reductions
with Russia to continue to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures," according to briefing
documents provided to Foreign Policy.[124] In the same speech, Obama emphasized his
administration's efforts to isolate any nuclear weapons capabilities emanating from Iran and North
Korea. He also called for a renewed bipartisan effort in the United States Congress to ratify
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and called on countries to negotiate a new treaty to end
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

On 24 April 2014, it was announced that the nation of the Marshall Islands has brought suit in The
Hague against the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China, India,
Pakistan, North Korea and Israel seeking to have the disarmament provisions of the NNPT enforced.

The 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) was held at the United Nations in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2015 and
presided over by Ambassador Taous Feroukhi of Algeria. The Treaty, particularly article VIII,
paragraph 3, envisages a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which
was reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the
2000 NPT Review Conference. At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, States parties examined the
implementation of the Treatys provisions since 2010. Despite intensive consultations, the
Conference was not able to reach agreement on the substantive part of the draft Final Document.

Criticism and responses[edit]

This article's Criticism or Controversy section may compromise the
article's neutral point of view of the subject. Please integrate the
section's contents into the article as a whole, or rewrite the
material. (February 2012)

Over the years the NPT has come to be seen by many Third World states as a conspiracy of the
nuclear 'haves' to keep the nuclear have-nots in their place.[126]This argument has roots in Article VI
of the treaty which obligates the nuclear weapons states to liquidate their nuclear stockpiles and
pursue complete disarmament. The non-nuclear states see no signs of this happening. [4][6] Some
argue that the NWS have not fully complied with their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the
NPT.[127] Some countries such as India have criticized the NPT, because it "discriminated against
states not possessing nuclear weapons on January 1, 1967," while Iran and numerous Arab states
have criticized Israel for not signing the NPT.[128][129] There has been disappointment with the limited
progress on nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have
22,000 warheads among them and have shown a reluctance to disarm further.[5]

As noted above, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, stated that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring
to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control.[18] Such an obligation requires that states actively pursue measures to
reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and the importance of their role in military force structures.
[according to whom?]
Some critics of the nuclear-weapons states contend that they have failed to comply with
Article VI by failing to make disarmament the driving force in national planning and policy with
respect to nuclear weapons, even while they ask other states to plan for their security without nuclear

The United States responds to criticism of its disarmament record by pointing out that since the end
of the Cold War it has eliminated over 13,000 nuclear weapons and eliminated over 80% of its
deployed strategic warheads and 90% of non-strategic warheads deployed to NATO, in the process
eliminating whole categories of warheads and delivery systems and reducing its reliance on nuclear
weapons.[citation needed] U.S. officials have also pointed out the ongoing U.S. work to dismantle nuclear
warheads. When current accelerated dismantlement efforts ordered by President George W. Bush
have been completed, the U.S. arsenal will be less than a quarter of its size at the end of the Cold
War, and smaller than it has been at any point since the Eisenhower administration, well before the
drafting of the NPT.[131]

The United States has also purchased many thousands of weapons' worth of uranium formerly in
Soviet nuclear weapons for conversion into reactor fuel.[132] As a consequence of this latter effort, it
has been estimated that the equivalent of one lightbulb in every ten in the United States is powered
by nuclear fuel removed from warheads previously targeted at the United States and its allies during
the Cold War.[133]

The U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation agreed that nonproliferation and
disarmament are linked, noting that they can be mutually reinforcing but also that growing
proliferation risks create an environment that makes disarmament more difficult. [134] The United
Kingdom,[135] France[136] and Russia[137]likewise defend their nuclear disarmament records, and the five
NPT NWS issued a joint statement in 2008 reaffirming their Article VI disarmament commitments. [138]

According to Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman, the NPT has one giant loophole: Article IV gives
each non-nuclear weapon state the 'inalienable right' to pursue nuclear energy for the generation of
power.[6] A "number of high-ranking officials, even within the United Nations, have argued that they
can do little to stop states using nuclear reactors to produce nuclear weapons".[5] A 2009 United
Nations report said that:

The revival of interest in nuclear power could result in the worldwide dissemination of uranium
enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies, which present obvious risks of proliferation as
these technologies can produce fissile materials that are directly usable in nuclear weapons. [5]

According to critics, those[which?] states which possess nuclear weapons, but are not authorized to do
so under the NPT, have not paid a significant price for their pursuit of weapons capabilities. Also, the
NPT has been explicitly weakened by a number of bilateral deals made by NPT signatories, notably
the United States.[5]

See also[edit]
13 steps (an important section in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Humanitarian Initiative

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

List of countries with nuclear weapons

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

New Agenda Coalition (NAC)

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)

Nuclear armament

Nuclear warfare

Nuclear-weapon-free zone

Nuclear terrorism

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Renovation of the nuclear weapon arsenal of the United States

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)

Weapon of mass destruction (WMD)

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of

1. ^ Jump up to:a b "UNODA - Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)". un.org.
Retrieved 2016-02-20.

2. Jump up^ [1]

3. Jump up^ "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)" (PDF). Defense Treaty Inspection
Readiness Program - United States Department of Defense. Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness
Program. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 March 2013. Retrieved 19 June 2013.

4. ^ Jump up to:a b c Graham, Jr., Thomas (November 2004). "Avoiding the Tipping Point". Arms
Control Association.

5. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e Benjamin K. Sovacool (2011). Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power: A
Critical Global Assessment of Atomic Energy, World Scientific, pp. 187190.

6. ^ Jump up to:a b c Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman (2009). The Nuclear Express: A
Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation, Zenith Press, p. 144.

7. Jump up^ See, for example, the Canadian government's NPT web site The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.

8. Jump up^ Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat, 26 April 2004, United Nations, New
York, Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, furnished by the Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations (indonesiamission-ny.org) Archived 20 November 2005 at
the Wayback Machine.

9. Jump up^ (PDF) http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141503.pdf. Missing or empty |
title= (help)

10. Jump up^ This view was expressed by Christopher Ford, the U.S. NPT representative at the
end of the Bush Administration. See "The 2010 Review Cycle So Far: A View from the United States of
America," presented at Wilton Park, United Kingdom, 20 December 2007.

11. Jump up^ (PDF) http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141503.pdf. Missing or empty |

title= (help)

12. Jump up^ UK 'prepared to use nuclear weapons' BBC article dated 20 March 2002

13. Jump up^ France 'would use nuclear arms', BBC article dated 19 January 2006

14. Jump up^ Chirac: Nuclear Response to Terrorism Is Possible, Washington Post article dated
20 January 2006

15. Jump up^ (PDF) http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141503.pdf. Missing or empty |

title= (help)

16. Jump up^ "Information Circulars" (PDF). iaea.org. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 August

17. Jump up^ "U.S. Compliance With Article VI of the NPT". Acronym.org.uk. Retrieved 25
November 2010.

18. ^ Jump up to:a b The ICJ (8 July 1996). "Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons".
Retrieved 6 July 2011.

19. Jump up^ Mishra, J. "NPT and the Developing Countries", (Concept Publishing Company,

20. Jump up^ See, e.g., Disarmament, the United States, and the NPT, Christopher Ford, U.S.
Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, delivered at the Conference on "Preparing for
2010: Getting the Process Right," Annecy, France, 17 March 2007; Nuclear Disarmament Progress
and Challenges in the Post-Cold War World, U.S. statement to the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Geneva (30 April 2008) Archived 26 June 2008 at
the Wayback Machine.

21. Jump up^ U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Christopher Ford,
"Disarmament and Non-Nuclear Stability in Tomorrow's World," remarks to the Conference on
Disarmament and Nonproliferation Issues, Nagasaki, Japan (31 August 2007).

22. Jump up^ (PDF) http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141503.pdf. Missing or empty |

title= (help)

23. Jump up^ Zaki, Mohammed M. (2011-05-24). American Global Challenges: The Obama Era.
Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780230119116.

24. Jump up^ "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (PDF). Retrieved 8
October 2015.

25. Jump up^ Daniel Dombey (19 February 2007). "Director General's Interview on Iran and
DPRK". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 22 February 2007. Retrieved 4 May 2006.

26. Jump up^ See Remarks by President Bush at the National Defense University (11 February
2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-
4.html (announcing initiative to stop spread of ENR technology).

27. Jump up^ "IAEA predicts more nuclear states". BBC. 16 October 2006. Retrieved 12
March 2016.

28. Jump
up^ (PDF)https://web.archive.org/web/20070607003906/http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaD
prk/dprk.pdf. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 June 2007. Retrieved 28 March 2007. Missing or
empty |title= (help) and http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2003/med-

29. ^ Jump up to:a b "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran" (PDF). IAEA. 10 November 2003. GOV/2003/75. Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 October
2007. Retrieved 25 October 2007.

30. ^ Jump up to:a b "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
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False Alarms in the Nuclear Age
By Dr. Geoffrey Forden

Posted 11.06.01


Since the late 1970s, Russian and American missileers have each come close twice to launching
nuclear missiles in response to a perceived attack under way from the other side. Here, MIT's
Geoffrey Forden supplies the details of those harrowing events.


The Cuban missile crisis is the best-known example of narrowly avoiding nuclear war. However, there are
at least four other less well-known incidents in which the superpowers geared up for nuclear annihilation.
Those incidents differed from the Cuban missile crisis in a significant way: They occurred when either the
U.S. or Soviet or Russian leaders had to respond to false alarms from nuclear warning systems that
malfunctioned or misinterpreted benign events.

In the past quarter century, Russia and the U.S. each have come close twice to launching nuclear missiles like this
Russian ICBM to counter a perceived attack. EnlargePhoto credit: WGBH Educational Foundation

All four incidents were very brief, probably lasting less than 10 minutes each. Professional military officers
managed most of them. Those officers had to decide whether or not to recommend launching a
"retaliatory" strike before possibly losing their own nuclear first strikes. In three of the four incidents, the

decision not to respond to the alarm was made when space-based early-warning sensors failed to show
signs of massive nuclear attacks. The fourth incident was caused by an inadequate early-warning satellite
system that was fooled into thinking that reflected sunlight was the flames from a handful of ICBMs.

Russia was poised, for a few moments at least, to launch

a full-scale nuclear attack on the United States.
As the following brief history of those four incidents makes clear, space-based early-warning systems
played a major role in avoiding nuclear war. During the 1980s, a few specialized articles in the media
hinted at the presence of those systems. However, it was only during the Gulf War that the American
public truly became aware of U.S. capability to detect missile launches using space-based assets. During
that crisis, U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, first orbited in 1970, detected the launch of
every Iraqi Scud missile. The satellites made the detections from their orbits by "seeing" the infrared light
that the missiles' motors gave off during powered flight. The warning of launches was transmitted to
Patriot air defense missile batteries in Israel and Saudi Arabia to support attempts to shoot down the
incoming warheads.

The association with the fighting of conventional war has obscured the more important strategic role those
systems have played: reassuring leaders of the United States and Russia that they were not under
nuclear attack. A review of the four nuclear crises will better highlight that role.


Shortly before 9 a.m. on November 9, 1979, the computers at North American Aerospace Defense
Command's Cheyenne Mountain site, the Pentagon's National Military Command Center, and the
Alternate National Military Command Center in Fort Ritchie, Maryland, all showed what the United States
feared mosta massive Soviet nuclear strike aimed at destroying the U.S. command system and nuclear
forces. A threat assessment conference, involving senior officers at all three command posts, was
convened immediately. Launch control centers for Minuteman missiles, buried deep below the prairie
grass in the American West, received preliminary warning that the United States was under a massive
nuclear attack.

Minuteman missiles similar to this one, shown in a test firing from Cape Kennedy, Florida, could deliver a nuclear
payload as far as 8,000 miles away.EnlargePhoto credit: AP Photo/Jim Kerlin

The alert did not stop with the U.S. ICBM force. The entire continental air defense interceptor force was
put on alert, and at least 10 fighters took off. Furthermore, the National Emergency Airborne Command
Post, the president's "doomsday plane," was also launched, but without the president on board. It was
later determined that a realistic training tape had been inadvertently inserted into the computer running the
nation's early-warning programs.

However, within minutes of the original alert, the officers had reviewed the raw data from the DSP
satellites and checked with the early-warning radars ringing the country. The radars were capable of
spotting missiles launched from submarines close to the U.S. shores and ICBM warheads that had
traveled far enough along their trajectories to rise above the curvature of the Earth. The DSP satellites
were capable of detecting the launches of Soviet missiles almost anywhere on the Earth's surface. Neither
system showed any signs that the country was under attack, so the alert was canceled.

In the "training tape" incident, Defense Support Program early-warning satellites saved the day. Pictured is a DSP
satellite going aloft in April 2003. EnlargePhoto credit: Courtesy Lockheed Martin


On June 3, 1980, less than a year after the incident involving the training tape, U.S. command posts
received another warning that the Soviet Union had launched a nuclear strike. As in the earlier episode,
launch crews for Minuteman missiles were given preliminary launch warnings, and bomber crews manned
their aircraft. This time, however, the displays did not present a recognizable or even a consistent attack
pattern as they had during the training tape episode. Instead, the displays showed a seemingly random
number of attacking missiles. The displays would show that two missiles had been launched, then zero
missiles, and then 200 missiles. Furthermore, the numbers of attacking missiles displayed in the different
command posts did not always agree.

Although many officers did not take this event as seriously as the incident of the previous November, the
threat assessment conference still convened to evaluate the possibility that the attack was real. Again the
committee reviewed the raw data from the early-warning systems and found that no missiles had been
launched. Later investigations showed that a single computer chip failure had caused random numbers of
attacking missiles to be displayed.


On September 26, 1983, the newly inaugurated Soviet early-warning satellite system caused a nuclear
false alarm. Like the United States, the Soviet Union realized the importance of monitoring the actual
launch of ICBMs. However, the Soviets chose a different method of spotting missile launches. Instead of
looking down on the entire Earth's surface the way U.S. DSP satellites do, Soviet satellites looked at the
edge of the Earththus reducing the chance that naturally occurring phenomena would look like missile
launches. Missiles, when they had risen five or ten miles, would appear silhouetted against the black
background of space. Furthermore, when the edge of the Earth is viewed, light reflected from clouds or
snow banks has to pass through a considerable amount of the atmosphere. That view reduces the
chances that clouds and snow may cause false alarms.

A satellite has to be in a unique position to view a recently launched missile silhouetted against the black
of space. To get that view, the Soviet Union picked a special type of orbit that it had used for its
communications satellites. Those orbits, known as Molnyia orbits, come very close to the Earth in the
Southern Hemisphere but extend nearly a tenth of the distance to the moon as the satellite passes over
the Northern Hemisphere. From that position high above northern Europe, the Soviet Union's Oko ("Eye")
early-warning satellites spend a large fraction of their time viewing the continental U.S. missile fields at
just the right glancing angle. However, shortly after midnight Moscow time on September 26, 1983, the
sun, the satellite, and U.S. missile fields all lined up in such a way as to maximize the sunlight reflected
from high-altitude clouds.

A Russian Oko early-warning satellite's hypothesized view of U.S. missile fields at the time of the so-called "autumn
equinox" incident EnlargePhoto credit: Geoffrey Forden, MIT

Whether that effect was a totally unexpected phenomenon is hard to know. That may have been the first
time this rare alignment had occurred since the system became operational the previous year. Press
interviews with Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, the officer in charge of Serpukhov-15, the secret bunker from
which the Soviet Union monitored its early-warning satellites, indicated that the new system reported the
launch of several missiles from the U.S. continental missile fields. Petrov had been told repeatedly that the
United States would launch a massive nuclear strike designed to overwhelm Soviet forces in a single

Why did that false alarm fail to trigger a nuclear war? Perhaps the Russian command did not want to start
a war on the basis of data from a new and unique system. On the other hand, if the sun glint had caused
the system to report hundreds of missile launches, then the Soviet Union might have mistakenly launched
its missiles. Petrov said that he refused to pass the alert to his superiors because "when people start a
war, they don't start it with only five missiles. You can do little damage with just five missiles."


Early on the morning of January 25, 1995, Norwegian scientists and their American colleagues launched
the largest sounding rocket ever from Andoya Island off the coast of Norway. [Sounding rockets collect
data on atmospheric conditions from various altitudes.] Designed to study the northern lights, the rocket
followed a trajectory to nearly 930 miles altitude but away from the Russian Federation. To Russian radar
technicians, the flight appeared similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile would take to blind Russian
radars by detonating a nuclear warhead high in the atmosphere.

The trajectory of the Black Brant XII sounding rocket, which triggered the "Norwegian rocket" incident EnlargePhoto
credit: Geoffrey Forden, MIT

That scientific rocket caused a dangerous moment in the nuclear age. Russia was poised, for a few
moments at least, to launch a full-scale nuclear attack on the United States. In fact, President Boris Yeltsin
stated the next day that he had activated his "nuclear football"a device that allows the Russian president
to communicate with his top military advisers and review the situation onlinefor the first time.

However, we can be fairly confident that Yeltsin's football showed that Russia was not under attack and
that the Russian early-warning system was functioning perfectly. In addition to the string of radars
surrounding the border of the former Soviet Union, Russia had inherited a complete fleet of early-warning
satellites that, even by 1995, still maintained continuous 24-hour coverage of the U.S. continental missile
fields. In the early 1990s Russia had still managed to launch replacement satellites for its early-warning
system as the previous ones died outthereby retaining continuous coverage. Because of those
satellites, Yeltsin's display must have shown that no massive attack was lurking just below the horizon.


The danger posed by those incidents was not the unauthorized or accidental launch of a handful of
nuclear-tipped missiles but the possibility that either country might misinterpret a benign eventa
computer training tape mistakenly inserted into an operational computer or sunlight glinting off clouds
during a rare lineup of the sun, Earth, and satelliteand decide to launch a full-scale nuclear attack.

Each incident caused officials to take steps to solve a specific problem. After the training tape incident, the
U.S. Department of Defense constructed a separate facility to train operators so that a training tape could
not again be inserted into the computer running the nation's early-warning system. Apparently, the Soviet
Union launched a new fleet of early-warning satellites into geostationary orbit simply to provide a second
angle from which to view U.S. missile fields. That expensive and redundant system ensured that at least
one satellite could search for missile launches free from sun glint.

Despite measures taken to prevent them, such accidents

are inevitable.
After three of the four incidents, the U.S. government maintained that steps were taken that would prevent
any future false alarms. However, it had to wait only seven months after the first incident (the computer
tape incident) to see that complex organizations, relying on even more complex machinery, can find new
and unexpected ways to fail. In fact, a comprehensive study of nuclear accidents has shown convincing
historical evidence that, despite measures taken to prevent them, such accidents are inevitable.

The most recent example of solving the "last problem" was the Clinton administration's initiative to share
early-warning data with Russia. The jointly manned center has been presented by the American side as a
solution to the decline of Russia's early-warning facilities. Russians familiar with the negotiations, however,
maintain that the center has no military significance. That view is underscored by the choice of the site for
the center: an old schoolhouse nearly an hour away from downtown Moscow. In fact, U.S. Department of
Defense officials familiar with the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) admit that, even if the center had
been active during the Norwegian rocket incident, its only effect would have been to facilitate the launch
notification issued before the NASA launch.

Any assistance the United States provides must increase Russia's confidence in the validity of its own
early-warning systems. The JDEC fails that test. Russia would never believe that the United States would
pass along launch indications if a U.S. nuclear attack had been launched.

Tactical nuclear weapon

A tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) or non-strategic nuclear weapon[1] is a nuclear weapon which is
designed to be used on a battlefield in military situations, mostly with friendly forces in proximity and
perhaps even on contested friendly territory. This is opposed to strategic nuclear weapons which are
designed to be mostly targeted in the enemy interior away from the war front against military bases,
cities, towns, arms industries, and other hardened or larger-area targets to damage the enemy's
ability to wage war. Tactical nuclear weapons were a large part of the peak nuclear
weapons stockpile levels during the Cold War.


US scientists with a full-scale cut-away model of the W48 155-millimeter nuclear artillery shell, a very small
tactical nuclear weapon with an explosive yield equivalent to 72 tons of TNT (0.072 kiloton). It could be fired
from any standard 155 mm (6.1 inch) howitzer (e.g., the M114 or M198)

Russian 2S3 Akatsiya 152mm self-propelled artillery, capable of firing a 'ZBV3' (designated RFYAC-VNIITF) 1
kiloton nuclear artillery shell a distance of 17.4 km

An American eight-inch W33 nuclear artillery shell. This warhead had a number of different yield options (e.g.,
five kilotons). It could be fired from any standard eight-inch (203mm) howitzer (e.g., the M110 or M115)

Tactical nuclear weapons include gravity bombs, short-range missiles, artillery shells, land
mines, depth charges, and torpedoes which are equipped with nuclear warheads. Also in this
category are nuclear armed ground-based or shipborne surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air-to-air
missiles. Kinetic bombardment weapons are non-nuclear weapons that can yield equivalent power.

Small, two-man portable, or truck-portable, tactical weapons (sometimes misleadingly referred to

as suitcase nukes), such as the Special Atomic Demolition Munition and the Davy Crockett recoilless
rifle (recoilless smoothbore gun), have been developed, although the difficulty of combining sufficient
yield with portability could limit their military utility. In wartime, such explosives could be used for
demolishing "choke-points" to enemy offensives, such as at tunnels, narrow mountain passes, and
long viaducts.

Other new tactical weapons undergoing research include earth penetrating weapons which are
designed to target enemy-held caves or deep-underground bunkers.

There is no precise definition of the "tactical" category, neither considering range nor yield of the
nuclear weapon.[2][3] The yield of tactical nuclear weapons is generally lower than that of strategic
nuclear weapons, but larger ones are still very powerful, and some variable-yield warheads serve in
both roles, for example the W89 200 kiloton (1/5Mt) warhead armed both the tactical Sea Lance anti-
submarine rocket propelled depth charge and the strategic bomber launched SRAM II stand off
missile. Modern tactical nuclear warheads have yields up to the tens of kilotons, or potentially
hundreds, several times that of the weapons used in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and

Some tactical nuclear weapons have specific features meant to enhance their battlefield
characteristics, such as variable yield which allow their explosive power to be varied over a wide
range for different situations, or enhanced radiation weapons (the so-called "neutron bombs") which
are meant to maximize ionizing radiation exposure while minimizing blast effects.

Strategic missiles and bombers are assigned preplanned targets including enemy airfields, radars,
and surface to air defenses, not only counterforce strikes on hardened or wide area bomber,
submarine, and missile bases. This strategic mission is to eliminate the enemy nation's national
defenses to enable following bombers and missiles to more realistically threaten the enemy nation's
strategic forces, command, and economy rather than targeting mobile military assets in near real
time using tactical weapons optimized for time sensitive strike mission often in close proximity to
friendly forces.[4]

Risk of escalating a conflict[edit]

Use of tactical nuclear weapons against similarly-armed opponents carries a significant danger of
quickly escalating the conflict beyond anticipated boundaries, from the tactical to the strategic.[5][6][7][8][9]
The existence and deployment of small, low-yield tactical nuclear warheads could be a dangerous
encouragement to forward-basing and pre-emptive nuclear warfare,[11][12] as nuclear weapons with
destructive yields of 10 tons of TNT (e.g., the W54 warhead design) might be used more willingly at
times of crisis than warheads with yields of 100 kilotons.

Russian OTR-21 Tochka missile. Capable of firing a 100 kiloton nuclear warhead a distance of 185 km

American MGR-3 Little John missile, measuring 4.4. meters long with a diameter of 32 cm and a weight of
350 kg. Capable of firing a W45 warhead (10 kiloton yield) a distance of 19 km

French Pluton missile circa 1970s. Capable of firing a 15 kiloton nuclear warhead a distance of 120 km

Red Beard, a British gravity bomb of the early 1960s with a destructive yield of 25 kilotons

For example, firing a low-yield nuclear artillery shell similar to the W48 (with a yield equivalent to 72
tons of TNT) at the enemy invites retaliation. It may provoke the enemy into responding with several
nuclear artillery shells similar to the W79, which had a 1 kiloton yield. The response to these 1 kiloton
nuclear artillery shells may be to retaliate by firing a tactical nuclear missile similar to
a French Pluton (15 kiloton yield), Russian OTR-21 Tochka (100 kiloton yield) or the American MGM-
52 Lance, fitted with a W70 variable yield warhead ranging between 1 and 100 kilotons. By using
tactical nuclear weapons there is a high risk of escalating the conflict until it reaches a tipping point

which provokes the use of strategic nuclear weapons such as ICBMs. Additionally, the tactical
nuclear weapons most likely to be used first (i.e., the smallest, low-yield weapons such as nuclear
artillery dating from the 1960s) have usually been under less stringent political control at times of
military combat crises than strategic weapons.[13] Early Permissive Action Links could be as simple as
a mechanical combination lock.[14] If a relatively junior officer in control of a small tactical nuclear
weapon (e.g., the M29 Davy Crockett) were in imminent danger of being overwhelmed by enemy
forces, he could request permission to fire it and due to decentralised control of warhead
authorization, his request might quickly be granted during a crisis.

For these reasons, stockpiles of tactical nuclear warheads in most countries' arsenals have been
dramatically reduced c. 2010, and the smallest types have been completely eliminated.
Additionally, the increased sophistication of "Category F" PAL mechanisms and their associated
communications infrastructure mean that centralised control of tactical nuclear warheads (by the
country's most senior political leaders) can now be retained, even during combat.

Some variable yield nuclear warheads such as the B61 nuclear bomb have been produced in both
tactical and strategic versions. Whereas the lowest selectable yield of a tactical B61 (Mod 3 and Mod
4) is 0.3 kilotons (300 tons),[16] modern PAL mechanisms ensure that centralised political control is
maintained over each weapon, including their destructive yields.

With the introduction of the B61 Mod 12, the United States will have four hundred identical nuclear
bombs whose strategic or tactical nature will be set purely by the mission and target as well as type
of aircraft on which they are carried.[17]

According to several reports including by the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists quote Russian sources that as a result of the
acceptability of USAF use of precision munitions with little collateral damage in the Kosovo conflict in
what amounted to quick mass destruction of military assets once only possible with nuclear weapons
or massive bombing against fellow Slavic Serbians. Vladimir Putin, then secretary of the Security
Council of Russian Federation formulated a concept of using both tactical and strategic nuclear
threats and strikes to de-escalate or cause an enemy to disengage from a conventional conflict
threatening what Russia considered a strategic interest. This concept was formalized when Putin
took power in Russia in the following year.[18][19][20]

Treaty control[edit]

Ten NATO member countries have advanced a confidence-building plan for NATO and Russia that
could lead to treaties to reduce the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. [21]

However in the meantime, NATO is moving forwards with a plan to upgrade its tactical nuclear
weapons with precision guidance that would make them equivalent to strategic weapons in effects
against hardened targets, and to carry them on stealth aircraft that are much more survivable against
current air defenses.[22]

Strategic bombing
Strategic bombing is a military strategy used in a total war with the goal of defeating the enemy by
destroying its morale or its economic ability to produce and transport materiel to the theatres of
military operations, or both. It is a systematically organized and executed attack from the air which
can utilize strategic bombers, long- or medium-range missiles, or nuclear-armed fighter-
bomber aircraft to attack targets deemed vital to the enemy's war-making capability.

One of the aims of war is to demoralize the enemy, so that peace or surrender becomes preferable
to continuing the conflict. Strategic bombing has been used to this end. The phrase "terror bombing"
entered the English lexicon towards the end of World War II and many strategic bombing campaigns
and individual raids have been described as terror bombing by commentators and historians.
Because the term has pejorative connotations, some, including the Allies of World War II, have
preferred to use euphemisms such as "will to resist" and "morale bombings".[1][2]

The theoretical distinction between tactical and strategic air warfare was developed between the two
world wars. Some leading theorists of strategic air warfare during this period were the Italian Giulio
Douhet, the Trenchard school in the United Kingdom, and General Billy Mitchell in the United States.
These theorists were highly influential, both on the military justification for an independent air force
(such as the Royal Air Force) and in influencing political thoughts on a future war as exemplified
by Stanley Baldwin's 1932 comment that the bomber will always get through.

Enemy morale and terror bombing [edit]

One of the aims of war is to demoralise the enemy; facing continual death and destruction may make
the prospect of peace or surrender preferable. The proponents of strategic bombing between the
world wars, such as General Douhet, expected that direct attacks upon an enemy country's cities by
strategic bombers would lead to rapid collapse of civilian morale, so that political pressure to sue for
peace would lead to a rapid conclusion. When such attacks were tried in the 1930sin the Spanish
Civil War and the Second Sino-Japanese Warthey were ineffective. Commentators observed the
failures and some air forces, such as the Luftwaffe, concentrated their efforts upon direct support of
the troops.[3][4]

Terror bombing is an emotive term used for aerial attacks planned to weaken or break enemy morale.
Use of the term to refer to aerial attacks implies the attacks are criminal according to the law of war,
or if within the laws of war are nevertheless a moral crime.[7] According to John Algeo in Fifty Years
among the New Words: A Dictionary of Neologisms 19411991, the first recorded usage of "Terror
bombing" in a United States publication was in a Reader's Digest article dated June 1941, a finding
confirmed by the Oxford English Dictionary.[8][9]

Aerial attacks described as terror bombing are often long range strategic bombing raids, although
attacks which result in the deaths of civilians may also be described as such, or if the attacks involve
fighters strafing they may be labelled "terror attacks."[10]

Development of the term "terror bombing"[edit]

German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels and other high-ranking officials of the Third
Reich[11] frequently described attacks made on Germany by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the United

States Army Air Forces (USAAF) during their strategic bombing campaigns as Terrorangriffe - terror
attacks.[nb 1][nb 2] The Allied governments usually described their bombing of cities with other
euphemisms such as area bombing (RAF) or precision bombing (USAAF), and for most of World War
II the Allied news media did the same. However, at a SHAEF press conference on 16 February 1945,
two days after the bombing of Dresden, British Air Commodore Colin McKay Grierson replied to a
question by one of the journalists that the primary target of the bombing had been on
communications to prevent the Germans from moving military supplies and to stop movement in all
directions if possible. He then added in an offhand remark that the raid also helped destroy "what is
left of German morale." Howard Cowan, an Associated Press war correspondent, filed a story about
the Dresden raid. The military press censor at SHAEF made a mistake and allowed the Cowan cable
to go out starting with "Allied air bosses have made the long awaited decision to adopt deliberate
terror bombing of great German population centres as a ruthless expedient to hasten Hitler's doom."
There were followup newspaper editorials on the issue and a longtime opponent of strategic
bombing, Richard Stokes, MP, asked questions in the House of Commons on 6 March. [12]

The controversy stirred up by the Cowan news report reached the highest levels of the British
Government when on 28 March 1945 the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, sent a memo by
telegram to General Ismay for the British Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff in which he
started with the sentence "It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing
of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be
reviewed...."[13][14] Under pressure from the Chiefs of Staff and in response to the views expressed
by Chief of the Air Staff Sir Charles Portal, and the head of Bomber Command, Arthur "Bomber"
Harris, among others, Churchill withdrew his memo and issued a new one. [14] This was completed on
1 April 1945 and started instead with the usual British euphemism for attacks on cities: "It seems to
me that the moment has come when the question of the so called 'area-bombing' of German cities
should be reviewed from the point of view of our own interests....".[15]

Many strategic bombing campaigns and individual raids of aerial warfare have been described as
"terror bombing" by commentators and historians since the end of World War II, but because the term
has pejorative connotations, others have denied that such bombing campaigns and raids are
examples of "terror bombing".

Defensive measures[edit]

Defensive measures against air raids include:

attempting to shoot down attackers using fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns or surface-to-
air missiles

the use of air raid shelters to protect the population

air raid sirens

employment of Air Raid Wardens

setting up organizations like the British ARP (Air Raid Precautions)

Blackouts - extinguishing all lights at night to make bombing less accurate

History and origins[edit]

World War I[edit]
Main article: Strategic bombing during World War I

A 1918 Air Raid rehearsal, evacuating children from a hospital.

Strategic bombing was used in World War I, though it was not understood in its present form. The
first bombing of a city was on the night of 2425 August 1914, when eight bombs were dropped from
a German airship onto the Belgian city of Antwerp.[16]

The first effective strategic bombing was pioneered by the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) in 1914.[17]
The mission was to attack the Zeppelin production lines and
their sheds at Cologne and Dsseldorf. Led by Charles Rumney Samson the force of four aircraft
inflicted minor damage on the sheds. The raid was repeated a month later with slightly more
success. Within a year or so, specialized aircraft and dedicated bomber squadrons were in service
on both sides. These were generally used for tactical bombing; the aim was that of directly harming
enemy troops, strongpoints, or equipment, usually within a relatively small distance of the front line.
Eventually, attention turned to the possibility of causing indirect harm to the enemy by systematically
attacking vital rear-area resources.

The most well known attacks were those done by Zeppelins over England through the course of the
war. The first aerial bombardment of English civilians was on January 19, 1915, when two
German Zeppelins dropped 24 fifty-kilogram (110 pound) high-explosive bombs and ineffective three-
kilogram incendiaries on the Eastern England towns of Great Yarmouth, Sheringham, King's Lynn,
and the surrounding villages. In all, four people were killed and sixteen injured, and monetary
damage was estimated at 7,740 (about US$36,000 at the time). German airships also bombed on
other fronts, for example in January 1915 on Liepja in Latvia.

German airship bombing Calais on the night of 2122 February 1915

In 1915 there were 19 more raids, in which 37 tons of bombs were dropped, killing 181 people and
injuring 455. Raids continued in 1916. London was accidentally bombed in May, and in July the
Kaiser allowed directed raids against urban centers. There were 23 airship raids in 1916, in which
125 tons of ordnance were dropped, killing 293 people and injuring 691. Gradually British air
defenses improved. In 1917 and 1918, there were only 11 Zeppelin raids against England, and the
final raid occurred on August 5, 1918, which resulted in the death of KK Peter Strasser, commander
of the German Naval Airship Department.

By the end of the war, 51 raids had been undertaken, in which 5,806 bombs were dropped, killing
557 people and injuring 1,358. These raids caused only minor hampering of wartime production, by
later standards. A much greater impact was the diversion of twelve aircraft squadrons, many guns,
and over 10,000 men to air defenses. Initially the raids generated a wave of hysteria, partially caused
by media. This revealed the tactic's potential as a weapon that was of use for propagandists on both
sides. The late Zeppelin raids were complemented by the Gotha bomber, which was the first[citation
heavier-than-air bomber to be used for strategic bombing.

The French army on June 15, 1915, attacked the German town of Karlsruhe, killing 29 civilians and
wounding 58. Further raids followed until the Armistice in 1918. In a raid in the afternoon of June 22,
1916, the pilots used outdated maps and bombed the location of the abandoned railway station,
where a circus tent was placed, killing 120 persons, most of them children.

The British also stepped up their strategic bombing campaign. In late 1915, the order was given for
attacks on German industrial targets and the 41st Wing was formed from units of the RNAS
and Royal Flying Corps. The RNAS took to strategic bombing in a bigger way than the RFC, who
were focused on supporting the infantry actions of the Western Front. At first the RNAS attacked the
German submarines in their moorings and then steelworks further in targeting the origin of the
submarines themselves.

In early 1918 they operated their "round the clock" bombing raid, with lighter bombers attacking the
town of Trier by day and large HP O/400s attacking by night. The Independent Force, an expanded
bombing group, and the first independent strategic bombing force, was created in April 1918. By the
end of the war, the force had aircraft that could reach Berlin, but these were never used.


Following the war, the concept of strategic bombing developed. The calculations which were
performed on the number of dead to the weight of bombs dropped would have a profound effect on
the attitudes of the British authorities and population in the interwar years because as bombers
became larger it was fully expected that deaths from aerial bombardment would approach those
anticipated in the Cold War from the use of nuclear weapons. The fear of aerial attack on such a
scale was one of the fundamental driving forces of British appeasement in the 1930s.[19]

These early developments of aerial warfare led to two distinct branches in the writings of air warfare
theorists: tactical air warfare and strategic air warfare. Tactical air warfare was developed as part of a
combined-arms attack which would be developed to a significant degree by Germany, and which
contributed much to the success of the Wehrmacht during the first four years (193942) of World War
II. The Luftwaffe became a major element of the German blitzkrieg.

Some leading theorists of strategic air warfare, namely strategic bombing during this period were the
Italian Giulio Douhet, the Trenchard school in Great Britain, and General Billy Mitchell in the United
States. These theorists thought that aerial bombardment of the enemy's homeland would be an
important part of future wars. Not only would such attacks weaken the enemy by destroying
important military infrastructure, they would also break the morale of the civilian population, forcing
their government to capitulate. Although area bombing theorists acknowledged that measures could
be taken to defend against bombers using fighter planes and anti-aircraft artillery - the maxim of the
times remained "the bomber will always get through". These theorists for strategic bombing argued
that it would be necessary to develop a fleet of strategic bombers during peacetime, both to deter
any potential enemy, and also in the case of a war, to be able to deliver devastating attacks on the
enemy industries and cities while suffering from relatively few friendly casualties before victory was

In the period between the two world wars, military thinkers from several nations advocated strategic
bombing as the logical and obvious way to employ aircraft. Domestic political considerations saw to it
that the British worked harder on the concept than most. The British Royal Flying Corps and Royal
Naval Air Service of the Great War had been merged in 1918 to create a separate air force, which
spent much of the following two decades fighting for survival in an environment of severe
government spending constraints.

In Italy, the air power prophet General Giulio Douhet asserted the basic principle of strategic bombing
was the offensive, and there was no defence against carpet bombing and poison gas attacks.
Douhet's apocalyptic predictions found fertile soil in France, Germany, and the United States, where
excerpts from his book The Command of the Air (1921) were published. These visions of cities laid
waste by bombing also gripped the popular imagination and found expression in novels such as

Douhet's The War of 19-- (1930) and H.G. Wells's The Shape of Things to Come (1933) (filmed
by Alexander Korda as Things to Come (1936)).[21]

Douhet's proposals were hugely influential amongst airforce enthusiasts, arguing as they did that the
bombing air arm was the most important, powerful, and invulnerable part of any military. He
envisaged future wars as lasting a matter of a few weeks. While each opposing Army and Navy
fought an inglorious holding campaign, the respective Air Forces would dismantle their enemies'
country, and if one side did not rapidly surrender, both would be so weak after the first few days that
the war would effectively cease. Fighter aircraft would be relegated to spotting patrols, but would be
essentially powerless to resist the mighty bombers. In support of this theory, he argued for targeting
of the civilian population as much as any military target, since a nation's morale was as important a
resource as its weapons. Paradoxically, he suggested that this would actually reduce total casualties,
since "The time would soon come when, to put an end to horror and suffering, the people
themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, would rise up and demand an end to the
war...".[22] As a result of Douhet's proposals, air forces allocated greater resources to their bomber
squadrons than to their fighters, and the 'dashing young pilots' promoted in propaganda of the time
were invariably bomber pilots.

Royal Air Force leaders, in particular Air Chief Marshal Hugh Trenchard, believed the key to retaining
their independence from the senior services was to lay stress on what they saw as the unique ability
of a modern air force to win wars by unaided strategic bombing. As the speed and altitude of
bombers increased in proportion to fighter aircraft, the prevailing strategic understanding became
"the bomber will always get through". Although anti-aircraft guns and fighter aircraft had proved
effective in the Great War, it was accepted there was little warring nations could do to prevent
massive civilian casualties from strategic bombing. High civilian morale and retaliation in kind were
seen as the only answers a later generation would revisit this, as Mutual Assured Destruction.[23]

During the interwar period (19191939), the use of aerial bombing was developed as part of British
colonial policy, with Hugh Trenchard as its leading proponent, Sir Charles Portal, Sir Arthur Harris,
and Sidney Bufton. The Trenchard School theories were successfully put into action
in Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq) where RAF bombers used high-explosive bombs, gas bombs,
and strafing against guerrilla forces. The techniques of so-called "Air Control" included also target
marking and locating, as well as formation flying. Arthur Harris, a young RAF squadron commander
(later nicknamed "Bomber"), reported after a mission in 1924, "The Arab and Kurd now know what
real bombing means, in casualties and damage. They know that within 45 minutes a full-sized village
can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured". [24]

Despite such statements, in reality RAF forces took great care when striking at targets. RAF
directives stressed:

In these attacks, endeavour should be made to spare the women and children as far as possible, and
for this purpose a warning should be given, whenever practicable. It would be wrong even at this
stage to think that air power was simply seen as a tool for rapid retribution. [25]

A statement clearly pointed out that the ability of aircraft to inflict punishment could be open to abuse:

Their power to cover great distances at high speed, their instant readiness for action, their
independence (within the detachment radius) of communications, their indifference to obstacles and
the unlikelihood of casualties to air personnel combine to encourage their use offensively more often
than the occasion warrants.[25]

In strikes over Yemen in over a six-month period, sixty tons of bombs were dropped in over 1,200
hours of flying. By August 1928, total losses in ground fighting and air attack, on the Yemeni side,
were 65 killed or wounded (one RAF pilot was killed and one airman wounded). [26] Between the wars
the RAF conducted 26 separate air operations within the Aden Protectorate. The majority were
conducted in response to persistent banditry or to restore the Government's authority. Excluding
operations against Yemeni forces which had effectively ceased by 1934 a total of twelve deaths
were attributed to air attacks conducted between 1919 and 1939.[27] Bombing as a military strategy
proved to be an effective and efficient way for the British to police their Middle East protectorates in
the 1920s. Fewer men were required as compared to ground forces.[28]

Pre-war planners, on the whole, vastly overestimated the damage bombers could do, and
underestimated the resilience of civilian populations. Jingoistic national pride played a major role: for
example, at a time when Germany was still disarmed and France was Britain's only European rival,
Trenchard boasted, "the French in a bombing duel would probably squeal before we did". [29] At the
time, the expectation was any new war would be brief and very savage. A British Cabinet planning
document in 1938 predicted that, if war with Germany broke out, 35% of British homes would be hit
by bombs in the first three weeks. This type of expectation might justify the appeasement of Hitler in
the late 1930s.[29]

Ruins of Guernica (1937)

During the Spanish Civil War, the bombing of Guernica by German aviators including the Condor
Legion, under Nationalist command, resulted in the near destruction of that Spanish town, and
casualties estimated to be between 500 and 1500 people. Though this figure was relatively small,
aerial bombers and their weaponry were continually improving already suggesting the devastation
what was to come in the near future.

Yet, during the Spanish civil war, "the bomber will always get through" theory started to appear
doubtful, as quoted by the U.S. Attach in 1937, The peacetime theory of the complete
invulnerability of the modern type of bombardment airplane no longer holds. The increased speeds of
both the bombardment and pursuit plane have worked in favor of the pursuit The flying fortress
died in Spain.

Large scale bombing of the civilian population, thought to be demoralizing to the enemy, seemed to
have the opposite effect. Dr. E. B. Strauss surmised, Observers state that one of the most
remarkable effects of the bombing of open towns in Government Spain had been the welding
together into a formidable fighting force of groups of political factions who were previously at each
other's throats, to which Hitlers Luftwaffe, supporting the Spanish Nationalists, generally agreed.

World War II[edit]

Main articles: Strategic bombing during World War II and Air warfare of World War II

The strategic bombing conducted in World War II was unlike anything the world had seen before. The
campaigns conducted in Europe and Asia could involve thousands of aircraft dropping tens of
thousands of tons of munitions over a single city.

The practice of area bombardment came to prominence during World War II with the use of large
numbers of unguided gravity bombs, often with a high proportion of incendiary bombs, to effect
indiscriminate bombing of the target region either to destroy personnel and/or materiel, or as a
means to demoralize the enemy. This, in high enough concentration was capable of producing
a firestorm effect.[31] The high explosive bombs were often on timers and used to intimidate or kill
firemen putting out the fires caused by the incendiaries. [32]:329

Destroyed townhouses in Warsaw after the German Luftwaffe bombing of the city, September 1939

Initially, this was effected by multiple aircraft, often returning to the target in waves. Nowadays, a
large bomber or missile can be used to create the same effect on a small area (an airfield, for
example) by releasing a relatively large number of smaller bombs.

Strategic bombing campaigns were conducted in Europe and Asia. The Germans and Japanese
made use of mostly twin-engined bombers with a payload generally less than 5000 pounds
(2268 kg), and never produced larger craft to any great extent. By comparison, the British and
Americans (who started the war with predominantly similarly sized bombers) developed their
strategic force based upon much larger four-engined bombers for their strategic campaigns. The
payload carried by these planes ranged from 4,000 lb (1,800 kg) for the B-17 Flying Fortress on long-
range missions,[33] to 8,000 lb (3,600 kg) for the B-24 Liberator,[34]14,000 lb (6,400 kg) for the Avro
Lancaster,[35] and 20,000 lb (9,000 kg) B-29 Superfortress,[36] with some specialized aircraft, such as
the 'Special B' Avro Lancaster carrying (22,000 lb (10,000 kg)) Grand Slam.[37]

During the first year of the war in Europe, strategic bombing was developed through trial and error.
The Luftwaffe had been attacking both civilian and military targets from the very first day of the war,
when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. A strategic-bombing campaign was launched
by the Germans as a precursor to the invasion of the United Kingdom to force the RAF to engage the
Luftwaffe and so be destroyed either on the ground or in the air. That tactic failed, and the RAF
began bombing German cities on 11 May 1940.[38] After the Battle of Britain, the Germans launched
their night time Blitz hoping to break British morale and to have the British be cowed into making

Initially, the Luftwaffe raids took place in daylight, then changed to night bombing attacks when
losses became unsustainable. The RAF, initially espousing a precision-bombing doctrine, also
switched to night bombing, also due to excessive losses. [citation needed] Before the Rotterdam Blitz on 14
May 1940 the British restricted themselves to tactical bombing west of the Rhine and naval
installations. The day after the Rotterdam Blitz a new directive was issued to the RAF to attack
targets in the Ruhr, including oil plants and other civilian industrial targets which aided the German
war effort, such as blast furnaces that at night were self-illuminating. After the Butt Report (released
in September 1941) proved the inadequacy of RAF Bomber Command training methods and
equipment, the RAF adopted an area-attack strategy, by which it hoped to detrimentally affect
Germany's war production, her powers of resistance (by destroying resources and forcing Germany
to divert resources from her front lines to defend her air space), and her morale. [39] The RAF
dramatically improved its navigation so that on average its bombs hit closer to target. [40] Accuracy
never exceeded a 3 mi (4.8 km) radius from point of aim in any case.[41][page needed]

1943 USAAF raid on ball bearing works at Schweinfurt, Germany

The United States Army Air Forces adopted a policy of daylight precision bombing for greater
accuracy as, for example, during the Schweinfurt raids. That doctrine, based on the erroneous
supposition that bombers could adequately defend themselves against air attack, entailed much
higher American losses until long-range fighter escorts (e.g. the Mustang) became available.
Conditions in the European theatre made it very difficult to achieve the accuracy that had been
possible using the exceptional and top-secret Norden optical bombsight in the clear skies over the
desert bombing ranges of Nevada and California. Raids over Europe commonly took place in
conditions of very poor visibility, with targets partly or wholly obscured by thick cloud, smokescreens
or smoke from fires started by previous raids. As a result, bomb loads were regularly dropped "blind"
using dead-reckoning methods little different from those used by the RAF night bombers. In addition,
only the leading bomber in a formation actually utilized the Norden sight, the rest of the formation
dropping their bombs only when they saw the lead aircraft's bombload falling away. Since even a
very tight bomber formation could cover a vast area, the scatter of bombs was likely to be
considerable. Add to these difficulties the disruptive effects of increasingly accurate anti-aircraft fire
and head-on attacks by fighter aircraft and the theoretical accuracy of daylight bombing was often
hard to achieve.[42][43] Accuracy, described as "pinpoint", never exceeded the best British average of
about a 3 mi (4.8 km) radius from point of aim in any case.[41][page needed] Postwar, German engineers
considered bombing of railways, trains, canals, and roads was more harmful to production than
attacks on factories themselves, Sir Roy Fedden (in his report on a postwar British scientific
intelligence mission) calling it "fatal" and saying it reduced aeroengine production by two thirds (from
a high of 5,000 to 7,000 a month).[44]

Strategic bombing was initially a way of taking the war into Europe while Allied ground forces were no
closer to fighting Germans there than North Africa. Between them, Allied air forces claimed to be able
to bomb "around the clock". In fact, few targets were ever hit by British and American forces the
same day, the strategic isolation of Normandy on D-Day and the bombing of Dresden in February,

1945, being exceptions rather than the rule. There were generally no coordinated plans for around-
the-clock bombing of any target.

In some cases, single missions have been considered to constitute strategic bombing. The
British bombing of Peenemnde was such an event, as was the bombing of the Ruhr dams. The
Peenemnde mission delayed Nazi Germany's V-2 program enough that it did not become a major
factor in the outcome of the war.[45]

Strategic bombing in Europe never reached the decisive completeness the American campaign
against Japan achieved, helped in part by the fragility of Japanese housing, which was particularly
vulnerable to firebombing through the use of incendiary bombs. The destruction of German
infrastructure became apparent, but the Allied campaign against Germany only really succeeded
when the Allies began targeting oil refineries and transportation in the last year of the war. At the
same time, strategic bombing of Germany was used as a morale booster for the Allies in the period
before the land war resumed in Western Europe in June 1944.

Child amid ruins following German aerial bombing of London, 1945

In the Pacific theatre, if the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service and the Imperial Japanese Army Air
Service frequently used strategic bombing over large Chinese cities such
as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Chongqing, organized strategic bombing on a large scale by
the Japanese seldom occurred. The Japanese military in most places advanced quickly enough that
a strategic bombing campaign was unnecessary, and the Japanese aircraft industry was incapable of
producing truly strategic bombers in any event. In those places where it was required, the smaller
Japanese bombers (in comparison to British and American types) did not carry a bombload sufficient
to inflict the sort of damage regularly occurring at that point in the war in Europe, or later in Japan.

The development of the B-29 gave the United States a bomber with sufficient range to reach the
Japanese Home Islands from the safety of American bases in the Pacific or Western China. The
capture of the Japanese island of Iwo Jima further enhanced the capabilities that the Americans
possessed in their strategic bombing campaign. High-explosive and incendiary bombs were used
against Japan to devastating effect, with greater indiscriminate loss of life in the firebombing of
Tokyo on March 9/10, 1945 than was caused either by the Dresden mission, or the atomic bombs
dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Unlike the USAAF's strategic bombing campaign in Europe, with
its avowed (if unachievable) objective of precision bombing of strategic targets, the bombing of
Japanese cities involved the deliberate targeting of residential zones from the outset. Bomb loads

included very high proportions of incendiaries, with the intention of igniting the highly combustible
wooden houses common in Japanese cities and thereby generating firestorms. [citation needed]

The final development of strategic bombing in World War II was the use of nuclear weapons. On
August 6 and 9, 1945, the United States conducted the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Both cities were destroyed with enormous loss of life and psychological shock. On August
15, Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender of Japan, stating:

"Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do
damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, it
would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would
lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the
millions of Our subjects; or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors?
This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of
the Powers."

Cold War[edit]
See also: nuclear triad

U.S. Navy A-6A Intruder all-weather bombers in Vietnam, in 1968

Nuclear weapons defined strategic bombing during the Cold War. The age of the massive strategic
bombing campaign had come to an end. It was replaced by more devastating attacks using improved
sighting and weapons technology. Strategic bombing by the Great Powers also became politically
indefensible. The political fallout resulting from the destruction being broadcast on the evening news
ended more than one strategic bombing campaign.

In the Korean War, the United States Air Force (USAF) at first conducted only tactical attacks against
strategic targets in Korea. Because the Korean War was widely considered a "limited war",
the Truman Administration prohibited the USAF to bomb near the borders of China and the Soviet
Union in fear of provoking the countries to enter into the Korean conflict. The Chinese intervention in
the conflict in November 1950 changed the aerial bombing policy dramatically. In response to the
Chinese intervention, the USAF carried out an intensive bombing campaign against North Korea to
demoralize the North Koreans and inflict as much economic cost to North Korea in order to reduce
their ability to wage war. The extensive bombing raids on North Korea continued until the armistice
agreement was signed between communist and UN forces in July 27, 1953. [citation needed]

In the Vietnam War, the strategic bombing of North Vietnam in Operation Rolling Thunder could have
been more extensive, but fear by the Johnson Administration of the entry of China into the war led to
restrictions on the selection of targets, as well as only a gradual escalation of intensity.

The aim of the bombing campaign was to demoralize the North Vietnamese, damage their economy,
and reduce their capacity to support the war in the hope that they would negotiate for peace, but it
failed to have those effects. The Nixon Administration continued this sort of limited strategic bombing
during the two Operation Linebacker campaigns. Images such as that of Kim Phuc Phan
Thi (although this incident was the result of close air support rather than strategic bombing) disturbed
the American public enough to demand a stop to the campaign.

Due to this, and the ineffectiveness of carpet bombing (partly because of a lack of identifiable
targets), new precision weapons were developed. The new weapons allowed more effective and
efficient bombing with reduced civilian casualties. High civilian casualties had always been
the hallmark of strategic bombing, but later in the Cold War, this began to change.

Strategic bombing was entering a new phase of high-intensity attacks, specifically

targeting factories taking years and millions of dollars to build.

PostCold War[edit]
See also: 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia Strategy

Smoke in Novi Sad, Serbia after NATO bombardment

Strategic bombing in the postCold War era is defined by American advances in and the use of smart
munitions. The developments in guided munitions meant that the Coalition forces in the First Gulf
War were able to use them, although the majority 93%[46] of bombs dropped in that conflict were
still conventional, unguided bombs. More frequently in the Kosovo War, and the initial phases
of Operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003, strategic bombing campaigns were notable for the heavy use of
precision weaponry by those countries that possessed them. Although bombing campaigns were still
strategic in their aims, the widespread area bombing tactics of World War II had mostly disappeared.
This led to significantly fewer civilian casualties associated with previous bombing campaigns,
though it has not brought about a complete end to civilian deaths or collateral property damage.

Additionally, strategic bombing via smart munitions is now possible through the use of aircraft that
have been considered traditionally tactical in nature such as the F-16 Fighting Falcon or F-15E Strike
Eagle, which had been used during Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to destroy targets that would have required large formations
of strategic bombers during World War II.

Some people refer to such pinpoint destruction of strategic, logistical or communications/command

targets as "strategic interdiction" in order to distinguish from the large concentrated bombing of
highly concentrated population centers or industrial targets, which is what "strategic bombing" had
traditionally connoted during World War II and the Cold War. That said, such bombing still may have
a place, as evidenced during the 2008 South Ossetia war when Russian aircraft attacked the
shipbuilding center of Poti.[47]

Technological advances[edit]

A further question[clarification needed] is raised when some[who?] see the blurring of strategic and tactical targets
and missions, particularly when tactical aircraft are frequently used to carry out strikes on targets with
significant strategic importance as a result of technological advances in aircraft design and munition
guidance and penetration. For example, tactical strike aircraft such as F-16s were frequently used to
destroy command and communications bunkers during Operation Iraqi Freedom while large
"strategic" bombers such as the B-1 and B-52 were frequently used to provide sustained close air
support at high altitude during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Aerial bombardment and international law[edit]

Main article: Aerial bombardment and international law

Air warfare must comply with laws and customs of war, including international humanitarian law by
protecting the victims of the conflict and refraining from attacks on protected persons. [46]

These restraints on aerial warfare are covered by the general laws of war, because unlike war on
land and at seawhich are specifically covered by rules such as the 1907 Hague
Convention and Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions, which contain pertinent restrictions,
prohibitions and guidelinesthere are no treaties specific to aerial warfare. [46]

To be legal, aerial operations must comply with the principles of humanitarian law: military
necessity, distinction, and proportionality:[46] An attack or action must be intended to help in the defeat
of the enemy; it must be an attack on a legitimate military objective, and the harm caused to civilians
or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.[48][49]

In nuclear strategy, a counterforce target is one that has a military value, such as a launch silo
for intercontinental ballistic missiles, an airbase at which nuclear-armed bombers are stationed, a
homeport for ballistic missile submarines, or a command and control installation.[1] The intent of a
counterforce strategy (i.e., attacking counterforce targets with nuclear weapons) is to disarm an
adversary by destroying its nuclear weapons before they can be launched, thereby minimizing the
impact of a retaliatory second strike.[2] However, counterforce attacks are also possible in a second
strike, especially with weapons like UGM-133 Trident II. A counterforce target is distinguished from
a countervalue target, which includes an adversary's population, knowledge, economic, or political
resources.[1] In other words, a counterforce strike is against an adversary's military while a
countervalue strike is against an adversary's cities. A closely related tactic is the decapitation strike,
which by destroying an enemy's nuclear command and control facilities similarly intends to eliminate
or reduce their ability to launch a second strike.


Possible radioactive fallout pattern from a nuclear counterforce strike against US missile silos - Minuteman
missile and Titan missile sites.

In nuclear warfare, enemy targets are divided into two types: counterforce and countervalue. A
counterforce target is an element of the military infrastructure, usually either specific weapons or the
bases which support them. A counterforce strike is an attack which targets these elements whilst
leaving the civilian infrastructure the countervalue targets as undamaged as possible.
Countervalue refers to the targeting of an opponent's cities and civilian populations.

An ideal counterforce attack would kill no civilians. Military attacks are prone to causing collateral
damage however, and this is especially true when nuclear weapons are employed. In nuclear terms
many military targets are located in proximity to civilian centres, and a major counterforce strike
employing even relatively small nuclear warheads against a nation would certainly inflict numerous
civilian casualties. Further, the requirement to use ground burst strikes to destroy hardened targets
would produce enormously more fallout than the air bursts used to strike countervalue targets;
introducing the possibility that a counterforce strike would cause more civilian casualtiesover a
medium-term viewthan a countervalue strike.[3]

Counterforce weapons could be seen to provide more credible deterrence in future conflict by
providing options for leaders.[4] One of those options considered by the Soviet Union in the 1970s is
basing missiles in orbit.

Cold War[edit]
Main articles: Pre-emptive nuclear strike, Second strike, and Launch on warning

Counterforce is a type of attack which was originally proposed during the Cold War.

Because of the low accuracy (Circular error probable) of early generation Intercontinental ballistic
missiles (and especially Submarine-launched ballistic missiles), counterforce strikes were initially
only possible against very large, undefended targets like bomber airfields and naval bases. Later
generation missiles with much improved accuracy made counterforce attacks against the opponent's
hardened military facilities (like missile silos and command and control centers) possible.

Both sides in the Cold War took steps to protect at least some of their nuclear forces from counter-
force attacks. At one point the US kept B-52 Stratofortress bombers permanently in flight; these
would remain operational after any counter-force strike. Other bombers were kept ready for launch
on short notice, allowing them to escape their bases before intercontinental ballistic
missiles (launched from land) could destroy them. The deployment of nuclear weapons on ballistic
missile submarines changed this equation considerably submarines launching from positions off
the coast would likely destroy airfields before bombers could launch, reducing their ability to survive
an attack. Submarines themselves, however, are largely immune from counter-force strikes (unless
they are moored at their naval bases) and both sides fielded many such weapons during the Cold

U.S. DoD map of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces ICBM silos and bases in the 1980s.

A counter-force exchange was one scenario mooted for a possible limited nuclear war. The concept
was that one side might launch a counter-force strike against the other; the victim would recognize
the limited nature of the attack and respond in kind, leaving the military capability of both sides
largely destroyed. The war might then come to an end because both sides would recognize that any
further action would lead to attacks on the civilian population from the remaining nuclear forces a
counter-value strike. Critics of this idea claimed that since even a counter-force strike would kill
millions of civilians (because some strategic military facilities like bomber airbases were often located
near large cities) it is unlikely that escalation to a full-scale counter-value war could be prevented.

MIRVed land-based ICBMs are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium
on striking first. For example, suppose that each side has 100 missiles, with 5 warheads each, and
each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing 2
warheads at each silo. In this case, the side that strikes first can reduce the enemy ICBM force from
100 missiles to about 5 by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles
in reserve. For such an attack to be successful, the warheads would have to strike their targets prior
to the enemy launching a counter-attack (see second strike and launch on warning). It is because of
this that this type of weapon was banned under the START II agreement.

Counterforce disarming first-strike weapons[edit]

R-36M (SS-18 Satan). Deployed in 1976, this counterforce MIRV ICBM had single (20 Mt) or
10 MIRV (550-750 kt each) warheads, CEP 250 m. Targeted against Minuteman III silos as well

as CONUS command, control, and communications facilities. Has sufficient throw-weight to carry
up to 10 RVs and 40 penaids. Still in service.

RSD-10 (SS-20 Saber). Deployed in 1978, this counterforce MIRV IRBM could hide behind
the Urals in Asian Russia, and launch its highly accurate 3 warhead payload (150 kt each, with a
150 m CEP) against NATO command, control, and communications installations, bunkers, air
fields, air defense sites, and nuclear facilities in Europe. Extremely short flight time ensured
NATO would be unable to respond prior to weapon impact. Triggered development and
deployment of the Pershing II by NATO in 1983.

Peacekeeper (MX Missile). Deployed in 1986, this missile boasted 10 MIRV warheads each
with a 300 kt yield, CEP 120 m. Decommissioned.

Pershing II. Deployed in 1983, this single warhead IRBM boasted 50 m CEP with
terminal active radar homing/DSMAC guidance. Short, 7-minute flight-time (which makes launch
on warning much harder), variable yield warhead of 5-50 kt, and range of 1,800 km, allowed this
weapon to strike command, control, and communications installations, bunkers, air fields, air
defense sites, and ICBM silos in the European part of the Soviet Union with scarcely any
warning. Decommissioned.

RT-23 Molodets (SS-24 Scalpel). Deployed in 1987, this MIRV ICBM carried 10 warheads,
each with 300-550 kt yield and a CEP of 150250 m.

UGM-133 Trident II[citation needed]. Deployed in 1990, this intercontinental-range SLBM carries 8
RVs with CEP of 80120 m and yield of 100/475 kt. Main purpose is second strike countervalue
retaliation, but the excellent CEP and much shorter flight-time due to submarine launch (reducing
the possibility of launch on warning) makes it an excellent first-strike weapon. However, that any
nuclear power would be willing to place its nuclear submarines close to enemy shores during
times of strategic tension is highly questionable. Has sufficient throw-weight to deploy up to 12
warheads, but 8 are deployed in current practice.

In military doctrine, countervalue is the targeting of an opponent's assets which are of value but not
actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations. Counterforce is the targeting of an
opponent's military forces and facilities.[1][2] The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., records the first
use of the word in 1660 and the first use in the modern sense in 1965, where it is described as a
"euphemism for attacking cities".

In warfare, and in particular nuclear warfare, enemy targets can be divided into two general types:
counterforce military targets and countervalue civilian targets. These terms were not used during
the Second World War bombing of civilian populations and targets not directly military.

The rationale behind countervalue targeting is that when two sides have both achieved assured
destruction capabilitythat is, when the nuclear arsenals of each side have the apparent ability to
survive a wide range of counterforce attacks, and carry out a second strike in responsethen, in an
all-out nuclear war, the value of targeting the opponent's nuclear arsenal diminishes, and the value of
targeting the opponent's cities and civilians increases. This line of reasoning, however, assumes that
the opponent values its civilians over its military forces.

One view argues that countervalue targeting upholds nuclear deterrence because both sides are
more likely to believe in each other's no first use policy. The line of reasoning is that if an
aggressor strikes first with nuclear weapons against an opponent's countervalue targets, then, by
definition, such an attack does not degrade the opponent's military capacity to retaliate.

The opposing view, however, counters that countervalue targeting is neither moral nor credible
because if an aggressor should strike first with nuclear weapons against only a limited number of a
defender's counterforce military targets, the defender should not retaliate in this situation against the
aggressor's civilian populace.

However, another position is that because they are the aggressor, and therefore are starting the
conflict, they should not be treated with a "gloves-on" approach, as that would give further incentive
to be an aggressor.

International law[edit]
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The intentional targeting of civilians with military force, including nuclear weapons, is prohibited
by international law. In particular, the Fourth Geneva Convention prevents attacks on certain types of
civilian targets and the Protocol I states that civilian objects are not acceptable military targets. (Not
all states are party to Protocol I.) Nonetheless, "proportional" collateral damage is allowed, which
could justify attacks on military objectives in cities. Many strategic military facilities like bomber
airfields were located near cities. Command and control centers were located in Moscow,
Washington D.C., and other cities.

Flexible response was a defense strategy implemented by John F. Kennedy in 1961 to address the
Kennedy administration's skepticism of Dwight Eisenhower's New Look and its policy of massive
retaliation. Flexible response calls for mutual deterrence at strategic, tactical, and conventional
levels, giving the United States the capability to respond to aggression across the spectrum of
warfare, not limited only to nuclear arms.


The New Look policy, though initially useful, quickly became obsolete with the introduction of inter-
continental delivery systems that undermined the credibility of a deterrence threat. The cornerstone
of U.S. and European defense strategy was then threatened as the U.S. could no longer rely on
nuclear threats to provide security for it and its allies.

John F. Kennedy won the presidency by claiming that the Republican Party had allowed the U.S. to
fall behind the Soviets into a missile gap. Upon entering office Kennedy cited General Maxwell
Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet to Congress for its conclusion that massive retaliation left the
U.S. with only two choices: defeat on the ground or the resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

Technology had improved since massive retaliation was adopted. Improvements in communication
and transportation meant U.S. forces could be deployed more effectively, quickly, and flexibly than
before. Advisers persuaded Kennedy that having multiple options would allow the president to apply
the appropriate amount of force at the right place without risking escalation or losing alternatives.
This would improve credibility for deterrence as the U.S. would now have low-intensity options and
therefore would be more likely to use them, rather than massive retaliation's all-or-nothing options.

Flexible Response was implemented to develop several options across the spectrum of warfare,
other than the nuclear option, for quickly dealing with enemy aggression. In addition, the survivability
of the retaliatory capability was stressed, leading to the diversification of the strategic force,
development of the strategic triad, and half the Strategic Air Command force being put on permanent
alert status.

The Kennedy doctrine did not include the ability to fight nuclear wars because of the idea that it
would undermine deterrence, was technologically unworkable, would fuel the arms race, and was not
politically feasible.

Importance was also placed on counterinsurgency and the development of unconventional military
forces, unconventional tactics, and civic action programs.

Stages in the Flexible response[edit]

A staged plan was devised to counter any Soviet military action other than a first strike. It consisted
of three stages:

Direct defense: In case of a conventional Soviet attack (meaning non-nuclear or this would be
considered a first strike) initial efforts would be to try and stop the Soviet advance with conventional
weapons. This meant that the foreseen Soviet attack on West-Germany would be tried to be forced
to a halt by NATO's European forces, Allied Command Europe.

Deliberate Escalation: This phase would be entered when conventional NATO forces were
succumbing under the Soviet attack. This was actually expected as intelligence indicated Soviet
divisions outnumbered NATO divisions by far. In this phase NATO forces would switch to a limited
use of nuclear weapons, such as recently developed tactical nuclear weapons (like nuclear artillery).

General Nuclear Response: This was the last phase or stage which more or less corresponded to
the mutual assured destruction scenario, meaning the total nuclear attack on the Communist world. If
the Soviets had not already done so, this would make them switch to all-out attack as well.

Development of the strategic triad[edit]

By 1960, the United States had three means of strategic forces: ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic
bombers. This triad made it possible for the United States to impose unacceptable damage to the
Soviet Union with one strategic force independent of the other two forces. These different forces had
their advantages and disadvantages. Bombers could deliver large payloads and strike with great
accuracy, but were slow, vulnerable while on the ground, and could be shot down. ICBMs are safe in

their underground silos while on the ground, but were less accurate than bombers and could not be
called back when launched. Submarines were least vulnerable but were also least accurate and
communication could be poor at times. Each of these forces provided the United States with different
options to tailor their response to the situation.

Two-and-a-half war doctrine[edit]

Part of Flexible response was the strategy of being able to fight over the entire spectrum of violence
by developing diverse forces for different types of warfare. This meant being able to fight multiple
wars simultaneously; specifically, the US should have the peacetime capability to fight two large
regional wars and a small brushfire war at the same time. The consequence of this was to increase
recruiting, investment, and research for the US force posture.

Assured destruction[edit]

The strategic doctrine for Kennedys Flexible response was Assured destruction. Flexible response
made second strike capability its guiding principle of deterrence. In the event of Soviet nuclear
aggression, the Soviets would know that enough U.S. nuclear capability would survive their strike to
destroy their cities and industry. Robert McNamara argued for the definition of what was
unacceptable to the enemy as the destruction of 50% of industry and 25% of the population.
Deterrence depended on influence to show that violence and aggression did not pay, and being
explicit about the level of destruction the US was willing to inflict on the enemy was one way to
illustrate this point. Assured Destruction relied on deterrence by punishment, precision, and

No-cities doctrine[edit]

Defense Secretary McNamara sought to limit damage to the U.S. by developing a separate strategy
for offense and defense. The offensive strategy was one of Counterforce, seeking to destroy Soviet
military installations and hardware and thus disable this hardware before it could be used. In a 1962
speech to the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, McNamara announced that the U.S. would refrain
from striking countervalue targets (cities) early in nuclear war, reserving such force later in war
should the Soviets not show similar restraint. This would not only induce the Soviets to spare
American cities, but would secure the United States bargaining advantage by holding hostage
something that the Soviets might want to keep.

The defensive strategy involved developing a system to intercept incoming Soviet missiles. Bombers
could be easily shot down, but missiles still remained a credible threat. The United States began
developing anti-ballistic missile program, modifying its Nike missiles to intercept incoming missiles.
Ultimately this program was abandoned by the adoption of the anti-ballistic missile treaty.

Marshal of the Empire

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Napoleon and several of his Marshals (recognisable due to their white-feathered bicornes) at the Battle of
Borodino in 1812. Painting by Vasily Vereshchagin.

Marshal of the Empire (French: Marchal d'Empire) was a civil dignity during the First French
Empire. It was created by Snatus-consulte on 18 May 1804 and to a large extent resurrected the
formerly abolished title of Marshal of France. According to the Snatus-consulte, a Marshal was a
grand officer of the Empire, entitled to a high-standing position at the Court and to the presidency of
an electoral college.

Although in theory reserved "to the most distinguished generals", in practice Emperor Napoleon
I granted the title according to his own wishes and convictions and made at least a few controversial
choices. Although not a military rank, a Marshal displayed four silver stars, while the top military
rank, General of Division, displayed three stars. Furthermore, the Marshalate quickly became the
prestigious sign of the supreme military attainment and it became customary that the most significant
commands be given to a Marshal. Each Marshal held his own coat of arms, was entitled to special
honours and several of them held top functions within the army. They wore distinctive uniforms and
were entitled to carry a cylinder-shaped baton, which was a symbol of their authority.

Throughout his 18041815 reign, Napoleon appointed a total of 26 Marshals, although their number
never exceeded 20 at any one moment. The initial list of 1804 included 14 names of active generals
and four names of retired generals, who were given the "honorary" title of Marshal. Six other
promotions ensued, with eight other generals elevated to the Marshalate. The title often ensured a
highly privileged social status four Marshals were created Counts of the Empire and 17 received
either the title of Duke or Prince. With two exceptions Jean-Baptiste Bessires and Jean-Mathieu-
Philibert Srurier the Marshals led a sumptuous lifestyle and left behind significant, at times
immense, fortunes. Several of them received significant annuities; in addition, a few
received financial endowments from the Emperor, with two of them Louis-Alexandre
Berthier and Andr Massna receiving more than one million Francs each. Two Marshals
Joachim Murat and Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte went on to become Kings, with the latter being the
direct ancestor of the current Swedish Royal Family. A single commander, Louis-Vincent-Joseph Le
Blond de Saint-Hilaire, was publicly named as a Marshal-to-be by Napoleon, but he died of battle
wounds before the next promotions were made.[citation needed]

Most of the Marshals held significant commands during the Napoleonic Wars, winning some of the
most brilliant victories of the entire Napoleonic Wars. Three of them Jean Lannes, Louis-Nicolas

Davout and Louis-Gabriel Suchet were virtually never defeated in pitched battle, despite fighting in
dozens of engagements. While they were not normally expected to lead from the front, they often
exposed themselves to great dangers on the battlefields of Europe; three Marshals Jean Lannes,
Jean-Baptiste Bessires and Jzef Poniatowski were killed in action or died as a result of battle
wounds. During his five years as a Marshal of the Empire (18091814), Nicolas-Charles
Oudinot received seven of a total of 27 battle wounds suffered throughout his career, but went on to
live to the then venerable age of 80. Often formidable when serving under the direct command of
Napoleon, the Marshals proved to be less effective when having to cooperate, in the Emperor's
absence. Some repeatedly acted in ill-faith when placed under the command of another Marshal,
with conflicts sometimes leading to fatal military consequences. After Napoleon's downfall, most of
them swore allegiance to the Bourbon Restoration and several went on to hold significant commands
and positions. The boulevards of the marshals in Paris are a collection of thoroughfares that encircle
the city near its outermost margins. Most bear the name of marshals who served under Napoleon I.


Official uniform of a Marshal of the Empire. It was designed by painter Jean-Baptiste Isabey and
designer Charles Percier.

The French word Marchal traces its origins back to the Carolingians, from the Ancient German
word marascahl, a stable supervisor who took care of the king's horses. With the growing importance
of the battle horse during the early Middle Age, the role came to acquire some prestige and began to
be known as Marshal of France. Albric Clment, who led King Philippe-Auguste's vanguard during
the victory over the English at Bouvines in 1214, was the first recorded incumbent. At first, the role
was granted to a single person, but three decades after Bouvines, Louis IX of France set sail for
the 1248 Crusade with two Marshals. As early as the 15th century, the Marshals no longer cared for
the King's horses and stables, and were simply military leaders, a role that they would retain through
to modern times. Although the position remained highly prestigious, their number grew throughout
the centuries, with Louis XIV naming as many as 51 Marshals during his 72-year reign. In the years
leading to the French Revolution, there were constantly 1516 Marshals, but a law of 4 March 1791
reduced their number to six and a decree of 21 February 1793 abolished the dignity altogether.[1]

Eleven years later, Napoleon Bonaparte became Emperor of the French and wanted to institute a
military elite for the new French Empire. Article 48 of Title of the 19 May 1804 snatus-consulte set
up the grand officers of the Empire, among which the highest-standing were the Marshals. [2] In the
Imperial Court hierarchy, they came in the fifth rank, behind the Emperor and Empress, the Imperial
family, the great dignitaries and the ministers.[3] They were entitled to a special etiquette: whenever
the Emperor would write to them, he would call them Mon Cousin ("Cousin"), when a third party
would write to them, they would be called Monsieur le Marchal; and when spoken to, they would be
called Monseigneur ("My Liege"). They were greeted with 13 cannon shots when at their
headquarters and 11 when away. They were also entitled to their own personal coat of arms.[4]

A graphic representation of a Marshal's baton during the French Empire.

Although a purely civil dignity reserved to distinguished generals and not a military rank, a Marshal
displayed four stars, while the top military rank of the time, the General of Division displayed three.
Contrary to a well-established idea and to the representation on most paintings of the time, the
Marshal's four stars were silvered, not gilded. A Marshal was required to wear a standard uniform,
which was established through decree on 18 July 1804 and designed by painter Jean-Baptiste
Isabey and designer Charles Percier. Nevertheless, the Marshals often chose to wear either variants
of the official uniform or costumes of totally different design. The ultimate distinctive sign of a Marshal
was his baton. It was cylinder-shaped, 50 centimetres long and 4 centimetres and a half in diameter,
made of wood and covered in dark blue velvet, decorated with golden eagles or honey bees, both
Imperial symbols.[5]


The creation of the new civil dignity allowed Emperor Napoleon I to strengthen his newly
created regime by rewarding the most valuable of the generals who had served under his command
during his campaigns in Italy and Egypt or soldiers who had held significant commands during
the French Revolutionary Wars. Subsequently, other senior generals were promoted on six different
occasions, mainly following major battlefield victories. With hindsight, Napoleon's choices for the
Marshalate were not always well inspired.[6]

First promotion (1804)[edit]

The first promotion created eighteen new Marshalls of the Empire and coincided with the
proclamation of the First French Empire, used as an opportunity for the new Emperor to strengthen
the new regime. The list included 14 names of generals who had served in the armies of the
Republic during the French Revolutionary Wars: seven of them were generals who had served
directly under General Bonaparte during his campaigns in Italy and Egypt during the French
Revolutionary Wars. Moreover, he was also careful to reward several general officers who had
acquired considerable fame and political influence while commanding the armies of the Republic, as
well as several highly-promising generals who had held significant divisional commands in the Army
of the Rhine. The latter were well known for their largely Republican sentiments and had never
served under Bonaparte's command. By rewarding them for their military accomplishments,
Napoleon sought to gain their loyalty and make sure that they would be supporters, rather than
opponents of the new Imperial regime.[3][6]

Overall, the first promotion included 14 names of generals, seven of whom had served under
Bonaparte's command and seven who had served in the Revolutionary armies on the Rhine or on
other theatres. An initial list was drafted by State Secretary Henri Jacques Guillaume Clarke and later
altered by the Emperor. Interestingly, Napoleon added in his own handwriting Murat's name, which
was conspicuously absent from Clarke's draft. This was possibly an omission, but there seems to be
no evidence to that effect. The final list included the following names, in an order which to this day
remains unclear:

Louis Alexandre Berthier, an experienced soldier of the Ancien Rgime, a part of the
French Expeditionary Corps during the American War of Independence, who had become
Napoleon's indispensable chief of staff,

Joachim Murat had married Napoleon's sister, Caroline, and subsequently made a name for
himself under the command of his brother-in-law as a dashing cavalry commander,

Bon Adrien Jeannot de Moncey, a competent if unexceptional soldier, who had been the
commander-in-chief of the French army that defeated Spain and forced it out of the First

Jean-Baptiste Jourdan, the hero of Fleurus, a staunch Republican, who had held significant
commands and campaigned on the Rhine,

Andr Massna, a dogged and tenacious soldier, one of Napoleon's former senior divisional
commanders from the First Italian Campaign and who subsequently acquired considerable
reputation as an independent commander of armies,

Pierre Franois Charles Augereau, a skilled tactician, another of Napoleon's senior

divisional commanders of the First Italian Campaign,

Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, one of Jourdan's divisional commanders during the operations
on the Rhine and himself a Republican,

Guillaume Marie Anne Brune, a fierce Republican, he had been friends with the
journalist Jean-Paul Marat and risen to become an influential soldier and diplomat,

Jean de Dieu Soult, an able soldier who had served under Jourdan and Jean Victor Marie
Moreau and became Massna right-hand man during the 17991800 campaigns,

Jean Lannes,

douard Adolphe Casimir Joseph Mortier,

Michel Ney,

Louis Nicolas Davout,

Jean-Baptiste Bessires.

Four additional names were mentioned on the list: these were former senior generals who had held
commands of armies and had been elected senators of the Republic. Their status was honorary in
that due to their age, they weren't set to be given field commands.

Franois Christophe de Kellermann,

Franois Joseph Lefebvre,

Dominique Catherine de Prignon,

Jean-Mathieu-Philibert Srurier.
Second promotion (1807)[edit]

Claude Victor, Duke of Bellune (17641841).

Third promotion (1809)[edit]

Jacques MacDonald, Duke of Taranto (17651840),

Nicolas Charles Oudinot, Duke of Reggio (17671847),

Auguste Frdric Louis Viesse de Marmont, Duke of Ragusa (17741852).

Fourth promotion (1811)[edit]

Louis Gabriel Suchet, Duke of Albufera (17701826).

Fifth promotion (1812)[edit]

Laurent de Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Marquis of Gouvion-Saint-Cyr (17641830).

Sixth promotion (1813)[edit]

Jzef Antoni Poniatowski, Prince Poniatowski (17631813).

Seventh promotion (1815)[edit]

Emmanuel de Grouchy, marquis de Grouchy, (17661847).


Among the men who were offered the Marshalate, there was a mix of famous generals, who had
commanded in chief the armies of the Republic (Moncey, Jourdan, Massna, Brune, Kellermann,
Lefebvre), as well as more junior generals, whose command never exceeded division-sized forces
(Soult, Mortier, Ney). It even included relatively obscure generals from Bonaparte's Italian or Egyptian
expedition, who had recently secured their promotion to the top military rank of General of Division,
but had never held significant commands (Lannes, Davout, Bessires). Unsurprisingly, this created a
certain degree of discontentment among the more senior commanders; Andr Massna was noted
for his sardonic remark "There's fourteen of us...", which he muttered when his friends came to
congratulate him for his nomination. Auguste Frdric Louis Viesse de Marmont, then a young
general, possibly bitter that he had not been nominated also observed that: "If Bessires is a
Marshal, then anyone can be one."

The Marshal of France (French: Marchal de France, plural Marchaux de France) is a military
distinction, rather than a military rank, in contemporary France, that is awarded to generals for
exceptional achievements. The title has been awarded since 1185, though briefly abolished (1793
1804) and briefly dormant (18701916) during its millennium of existence. It was one of the Great
Officers of the Crown of France during the Ancien Rgime and Bourbon Restoration and one of
the Great Dignitaries of the Empire during the First French Empire (when the title was not "Marshal of
France" but "Marshal of the Empire").

A Marshal of France displays seven stars. The marshal also receives a baton, a blue cylinder with
stars, formerly fleurs-de-lis during the monarchy and eagles during the First French Empire. It has
the Latin inscription: Terror belli, decus pacis, which means "terror in war, ornament in peace".

Between the end of the 16th century and the middle of the 19th century, six Marshals of France were
given the even more exalted rank of Marshal General of
France: Biron, Lesdiguires, Turenne, Villars, Saxe, and Soult.


The title derived from the office of marescallus Franciae created by King Philip II Augustus of
France for Albric Clment (circa 1190).

The title was abolished by the National Convention in 1793. It was restored during the First French
Empire by Napoleon I as Marshal of the Empire, and then the title was given to Jean Baptiste Jules

Bernadotte, sovereign Prince of Pontecorvo and later King of Sweden. Under the Bourbon
Restoration, the title reverted to Marshal of France and Napolon III kept that designation.

After the fall of Napoleon III and the Second French Empire, the Third Republic did not use the title
until the First World War, when it was recreated as a military distinction and not a rank.

Philippe Ptain, awarded the distinction of Marshal of France for his generalship in World War I,
retained his title even after his trial and imprisonment and after he was stripped of other positions and

The last living Marshal of France was Alphonse Juin, promoted in 1952, who died in 1967. The latest
Marshal of France was Marie Pierre Knig, who was made a Marshal posthumously in 1984.

Today, the title of Marshal of France can only be granted to a general officer who fought victoriously
in war-time.

Direct Capetians[edit]
Philip II, 11801223[edit]

Albric Clment (died 1191), Marshal of France in 1185

Guillaume de Bournel, (died 1195), Marshal of France in 1192

Nivelon d'Arras (died 1204), Marshal of France in 1202

Henry I Clment, called the "Little Marshal", Lord of Le Mez and of Argentan (11701214),
Marshal of France in 1204

Jean III Clment, Lord of Le Mez and of Argentan (died 1262), Marshal of France in 1214

Guillaume de la Tournelle (dates unknown), Marshal of France in 1220

Louis IX, 12261270[edit]

Ferry Past, Lord of Challeranges (died 1247), Marshal of France in 1240

Jean Guillaume de Beaumont (died 1257), Marshal of France in 1250

Gauthier III, Lord of Nemours (died 1270), Marshal of France in 1257

Henri II Clment, Lord of Le Mez and Argentan (died 1265), Marshal of France in 1262

Hric de Beaujeu (died 1270), Marshal of France in 1265

Renaud de Prcigny (died 1270), Marshal of France in 1265

Hugh of Mirepoix, Marshal of France in 1266[1]

Raoul II Sores (died 1282), Marshal of France in 1270

Lancelot de Saint-Maard (died 1278), Marshal of France in 1270

Philip III, 12701285[edit]

Ferry de Verneuil (died 1283), Marshal of France in 1272

Guillaume V du Bec Crespin (died 1283), Marshal of France in 1283

Jean II d'Harcourt, Viscount of Chtellerault, Lord of Harcourt (died 1302), Marshal of France
in 1283

Raoul V Le Flamenc (died 1287), Marshal of France in 1285

Philip IV, 12851314[edit]

Jean de Varennes (died 1292), Marshal of France in 1288

Simon de Melun, Lord of La Loupe and of Marcheville (died 1302), Marshal of France in 1290

Guy Ier de Clermont de Nesle (died 1302), Marshal of France in 1292

Foulques du Merle (died 1314), Marshal of France in 1302

Miles VI de Noyers (died 1350), Marshal of France in 1302

Jean de Corbeil, Lord of Grez (died 1318), Marshal of France in 1308

Louis X, 13141316[edit]

Jean IV de Beaumont (died 1318), Marshal of France in 1315

Philip V, 13161322[edit]

Mathieu de Trie (died 1344), Marshal of France in 1318

Jean des Barres (dates unknown), Marshal of France in 1318

Bernard VI de Moreuil, Lord of Moreuil (died 1350), Marshal of France in 1322

Charles IV, 13221328[edit]

Robert-Jean Bertran de Briquebec, Baron of Briquebec, Viscount of Roncheville (1285

1348), Marshal of France in 1325

Philip VI, 13281350[edit]

Anseau de Joinville (12651343), Marshal of France in 1339

Charles de Montmorency, Lord of Montmorency (13251381), Marshal of France in 1344

Robert de Waurin, Lord of Saint-Venant (died 1360), Marshal of France in 1344

Guy II de Nesle, Lord of Offmont and of Mello (died 1352), Marshal of France in 1345

douard de Beaujeu, Lord of Chteauneuf (13161351), Marshal of France in 1347

John II 13501364[edit]

Arnoul d'Audrehem, Lord of Audrehem (died 1370), Marshal of France in 1351

Rogues de Hangest, Lord of Avesnecourt (died 1352), Marshal of France in 1352

Jean de Clermont, Lord of Chantilly and of Beaumont (died 1356), Marshal of France in 1352

Jean I Le Maingre (13101367), Marshal of France in 1356

Charles V, 13641380[edit]

Jean IV de Mauquenchy, Lord of Blainville (died 1391), Marshal of France in 1368

Louis de Sancerre, Count of Sancerre (13421402), Marshal of France in 1369

Charles VI, 13801422[edit]

Jean II Le Meingre (13641421), Marshal of France in 1391

Jean II de Rieux, Lord of Rochefort and of Rieux (13421417), Marshal of France in 1397

Pierre de Rieux, Lord of Rochefort and of Rieux (13891439), Marshal of France in 1417

Claude de Beauvoir, Lord of Chastellux and Viscount of Avallon (13851453), Marshal of

France in 1418

Jean de Villiers de L'Isle-Adam (13841437), Marshal of France in 1418

Jacques de Montberon, Lord of Engoumois (died 1422), Marshal of France in 1418

Gilbert Motier de La Fayette (13961464), Marshal of France in 1421

Antoine de Vergy (died 1439), Marshal of France in 1422

Jean de La Baume, Count of Montrevel-en-Bresse (died 1435), Marshal of France in 1422
Charles VII, 14221461[edit]

Amaury de Sverac, Lord of Beaucaire and of Chaude-Aigues (died 1427), Marshal of

France in 1424

Jean de Brosse, Baron of Boussac and of Sainte-Svre (13751433), Marshal of France in


Gilles de Rais, Lord of Ingrande and of Champtoc (14041440), Marshal of France in 1429

Andr de Laval-Montmorency, Lord of Lohac and of Retz (14081486), Marshal of France

in 1439

Philippe de Culant, Lord of Jaloignes, of La Croisette, of Saint-Armand and of Chalais (died

1454), Marshal of France in 1441

Jean Poton de Xaintrailles, Seneschal de Limousin (13901461), Marshal of France in 1454

Louis XI, 14611483[edit]

Joachim Rouhault de Gamaches, Lord of Boismenard (died 1478), Marshal of France in 1461

Jean de Lescun, Count of Comminges (died 1473), Marshal of France in 1461

Wolfart VI Van Borselleen, Lord of Veere in Zeeland and Earl of Buchan in Scotland (died
1487), Marshal of France in 1464

Pierre de Rohan de Gi, Lord of Rohan (14501514), Marshal of France in 1476

Charles VIII, 14831498[edit]

Philippe de Crvecur d'Esquerdes (14181494), Marshal of France in 1486

Jean de Baudricourt, Lord of Choiseul and Bailiff of Chaumont (died 1499), Marshal of
France in 1486

Louis XII, 14981515[edit]

Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, Marquis of Vigevano (14481518), Marshal of France in 1499

Charles II d'Amboise, Lord of Chaumont, of Meillan and of Charenton (14731511), Marshal

of France in 1506

Odet de Foix, Vicomte de Lautrec, Viscount of Lautrec (14851528), Marshal of France in


Robert Stewart, Lord of Aubigny, Count of Lennox (14701544), Marshal of France in 1514

Francis I 15151547[edit]

Jacques II de Chabannes, Lord of La Palice (died 1525), Marshal of France in 1515

Gaspard I de Coligny, Lord of Chtillon-sur-Loing (died 1522), Marshal of France in 1516

Thomas de Foix-Lescun (died 1525), Marshal of France in 1518

Anne I de Montmorency, Duke of Montmorency and of Damville, Count of Beaumont-sur-

Oise and of Dammartin, Viscount of Melun, first Baron of France and Grand Master, Constable of
France etc. (14921567), Marshal of France in 1522

Thodor Trivulce (14581531), Marshal of France in 1526

Robert III de La Marck, Duke of Bouillon, Lord of Sedan (14911537), Marshal of France in

Claude d'Annebaut (15001552), Marshal of France in 1538

Ren de Montjean (died 1538), Lord of Montjean, Marshal of France in 1538

Oudard du Biez, Seigneur of Le Biez (died 1553), Marshal of France in 1542

Antoine de Lettes-Desprez, Lord of Montpezat (14901544), Marshal of France in 1544

Jean Caraccioli, Prince of Melphes (14801550), Marshal of France in 1544

Henry II 1547-1559[edit]

Jacques d'Albon de Saint-Andr, Marquis of Fronsac (died 1562), Marshal of France 1547

Robert IV de La Marck, Duke of Bouillon and Prince of Sedan (15201556), Marshal of

France in 1547[2]

Charles I de Coss, Count of Brissac (15051563), Marshal of France in 1550

Pietro Strozzi (15001558), Marshal of France in 1554

Paul de La Barthe, Lord of Thermes (14821558), Marshal of France in 1558

Francis II 15591560[edit]

Franois de Montmorency, Duke of Montmorency (15201563), Marshal of France in 1559

Charles IX, 15601574[edit]

Franois de Scpeaux, Lord of Vieilleville (15091571), Marshal of France in 1562

Imbert de La Pltrire, Lord of Bourdillon (15241567), Marshal of France in 1564

Henri I de Montmorency, Lord of Damville, Duke of Montmorency, Count of Dammartin and

Alais, Baron of Chateaubriant, Lord of Chantilly and Ecouen (15341614), Marshal of France in

Artus de Coss-Brissac, Lord of Gonnor and Count of Secondigny (died 1582), Marshal of
France in 1567

Reinhold von Krockow, (15361599) commander of the German Huguenot contingent at


Gaspard de Saulx, Lord of Tavannes (15091575), Marshal of France in 1570

Honorat II de Savoye, Marquis of Villars (died 1580), Marshal of France in 1571

Albert de Gondi, Duke of Retz (15221602), Marshal of France in 1573

Henry III 15741589[edit]

Roger I de Saint Larry, Lord of Bellegarde (died 1579), Marshal of France in 1574

Blaise de Lasseran-Massencme, Seigneur de Montluc (15001577), Marshal of France in


Louis Prvost de Sansac, Baron de Sansac (14961576), Marshal of France

Armand de Gontaut, Baron de Biron (15241592), Marshal of France in 1577

Jacques de Goyon, Lord of Matignon and of Lesparre, Count of Thorigny, Prince of Mortagne
sur Gironde (15251597), Marshal of France in 1579

Jean VI d'Aumont, Baron of Estrabonne, Count of Chteauroux (died 1580), Marshal of

France in 1571

Guillaume de Joyeuse, Viscount of Joyeuse, Lord of Saint-Didier, of Laudun, of Puyvert and

of Arques (15201592), Marshal of France in 1582

Charles II de Coss, Duke of Brissac (15621621), Marshal of France


Marshal baton during the monarchy

Henry IV 15891610[edit]

Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne, Duc de Bouillon (15551623), Marshal of

France in 1592.

Charles de Gontaut, Duc de Biron (15621602), Marshal of France in 1594.

Claude de La Chatre, Baron de la Maisonfort (15361614), Marshal of France in 1594.

Jean de Montluc de Balagny (15601603), Marshal of France in 1594.

Jean III de Baumanoir, Marquis of Lavardin and Count of Ngrepelisse (15511614), Marshal
of France in 1595.

Henri, Duke of Joyeuse (15671608), Marshal of France in 1595.

Urbain de Montmorency-Laval, Marquis of Sabl (15571629), Marshal of France in 1595.

Alphonse d'Ornano (15481610), Marshal of France in 1597.

Guillaume de Hautemer, Count of Grancey (15371613), Marshal of France in 1597.

Franois de Bonne, Duke of Lesdiguires (15431626), Marshal of France in 1608.

Louis XIII, 16101643[edit]

Marchal de Schomberg

Concino Concini, Marquis of Ancre (15751617), Marshal of France in 1613.

Gilles de Courtenvaux, Marquis of Souvr (15401626), Marshal of France in 1614.

Antoine, Baron de Roquelaure (15601625), Marshal of France in 1614.

Louis de La Chtre, Baron de Maisonfort (died 1630), Marshal of France in 1616.

Pons de Lauzires-Thmines-Cardaillac, Marquis of Thmines (15531627), Marshal of

France in 1616.

Franois de La Grange d'Arquien, Lord of Montigny and of Sry in Brry (15541617),

Marshal of France in 1616

Nicolas de L'Hpital, Duke of Vitry (15811644), Marshal of France in 1617

Charles de Choiseul-Praslin, Marquis of Praslin (15631626), Marshal of France in 1619

Jean Franois de La Guiche, Count of La Palice (15691632), Marshal of France in 1619.

Honor d'Albert d'Ailly, Duke of Chaulnes (15811649), Marshal of France in 1620.

Franois d'Esparbes de Lussan, Viscount of Aubeterre (died 1628), Marshal of France in

Charles de Crquy, Prince of Poix, Duke of Lesdiguires (15801638), Marshal of France in


Jacques Nompar de Caumont, Duke of La Force(15581652), Marshal of France in 1621.

Franois, Marquis of Bassompierre (15791646), Marshal of France in 1622.

Gaspard de Coligny, Duke of Chtillon (15841646), Marshal of France in 1622.

Henri de Schomberg (15741632), Marshal of France in 1625.

Jean-Baptiste d'Ornano (15811626), Marshal of France in 1626

Franois Annibal, Duc d'Estres (15731670), Marshal of France in 1626.

Timolon d'Epinay de Saint-Luc (15801644), Marshal of France in 1627.

Louis de Marillac, Count of Beaumont-le-Roger (15721632), Marshal of France in 1629.

Henri II, Duke of Montmorency and of Damville, also Admiral of France (15951632),
Marshal of France in 1630.

Jean Caylar d'Anduze de Saint-Bonnet, Marquis of Toiras (15851636), Marshal of France in


Antoine Coffier de Ruz d'Effiat (15811632), Marshal of France in 1631.

Urbain de Maill, Marquis of Brz (15971650), Marshal of France in 1633.

Maximilien de Bthune, Duke of Sully (15601641), Marshal of France in 1634.

Charles de Schomberg, Duke of Halluin (16011656), Marshal of France in 1637.

Charles de La Porte, Marquis of Meilleraye (16021664), Marshal of France in 1639.

Antoine III, Duke of Gramont (16041678), Marshal of France in 1641.

Jean-Baptiste Budes, Count of Gubriant (16021643), Marshal of France in 1642.

Philippe de La Mothe-Houdancourt, Duke of Cardona (16051657), Marshal of France in


Franois de L'Hpital, Count of Rosnay (15831660), Marshal of France in 1643.

Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne (16111675), Marshal of France in
1643, Marshal General of France in 1660.

Jean, Count of Gassion, (16091647), Marshal of France in 1643.

Louis XIV, 16431715[edit]

Marchal Vauban

Csar, Duke of Choiseul (15981675), Marshal of France in 1645

Josias, Count of Rantzau (16091650), Marshal of France in 1645

Nicolas de Neufville, Duke of Villeroi (15971685), Marshal of France in 1646

Antoine d'Aumont de Rochebaron, Duc d'Aumont (16011669), Marshal of France in 1651

Jacques d'tampes, Marquis of la Fert-Imbert (15901663), Marshal of France in 1651

Henri, Duke of la Fert-Senneterre (16001681), Marshal of France in 1651

Charles de Mouchy, Marquis d'Hocquincourt (15991658), Marshal of France in 1651

Jacques Rouxel, Count of Grancey (16031680), Marshal of France in 1651

Armand Nompar de Caumont, Duke of La Force (15821672), Marshal of France in 1652

Philippe de Clrambault, Count of la Palluau (16061665), Marshal of France in 1652

Csar Phoebus d'Albret, Count of Miossens (16141676), Marshal of France in 1653

Louis de Foucault de Saint-Germain Beaupr Count of Le Daugnon (16161659), Marshal of

France in 1653

Jean de Schulemberg, Count of Montejeu (15971671), Marshal of France in 1658

Abraham de Fabert, Marquis of Esternay (15991662), Marshal of France in 1658

Jacques de Mauvisire, Marquis of Castelnau (16201658), Marshal of France in 1658

Bernardin Gigault, Marquis of Bellefonds (16301694), Marshal of France in 1668

Franois de Crquy, Marquis of Marines (16201687), Marshal of France in 1668

Louis de Crevant, Duke of Humires (16281694), Marshal of France in 1668

Godefroy d'Estrades, Count of Estrades (16071686), Marshal of France in 1675

Philippe de Montaut-Bnac, Duke of Navailles (16191684), Marshal of France in 1675

Frdric Armand, Duke of Schomberg (16161690), Marshal of France in 1675

Jacques Henri de Durfort, Duke of Duras (16261704), Marshal of France in 1675

Franois d'Aubusson, Duke of la Feuillade (16251691), Marshal of France in 1675

Louis Victor de Rochechouart, Duke of Mortemart le Marchal de Vivonne (16361688),

Marshal of France in 1675

Franois-Henri de Montmorency, duc de Luxembourg (16281695), Marshal of France in


Henri Louis d'Aloigny, Marquis of Rochefort (16361676), Marshal of France in 1675

Guy de Durfort, Duke of Lorges (16301702), Marshal of France in 1676

Jean II, Count of Estres 1624 - 1707), Marshal of France in 1681

Claude de Choiseul, Marquis of Francires (16321711), Marshal of France in 1693

Jean Armand de Joyeuse, Marquis of Grandpr (16321710), Marshal of France in 1693

Franois de Neufville, Duke of Villeroi (16441730), Marshal of France in 1693

Louis Franois, duc de Boufflers, comte de Cagny (16441711), Marshal of France in 1693

Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Count of Tourville (16421701), Marshal of France in 1693

Anne-Jules, 2nd duc de Noailles (16501708), Marshal of France in 1693

Nicolas Catinat (16371712), Marshal of France in 1693

Louis Joseph de Bourbon, duc de Vendme (16541712), Marshal of France in 1695

Claude Louis Hector, Duke of Villars (16531734), Marshal of France in 1702, Marshal
General of France in 1733

Nol Bouton, Marquis of Chamilly (16361715), Marshal of France in 1703

Victor Marie, Duc d'Estres (16601737), Marshal of France in 1703

Franois Louis Rousselet, Marquis of Chteau-Renault (16371716), Marshal of France in


Sbastien Le Prestre, Marquis of Vauban (16331707), Marshal of France in 1703

Conrad, Marquis of Rosen (16281715), Marshal of France in 1703

Nicolas Chalon du Bl, Marquis of Huxelles (16521730), Marshal of France in 1703

Ren de Froulay, Count of Tess (16511725), Marshal of France in 1703

Camille d'Hostun, duc de Tallard (16521728), Marshal of France in 1703

Nicolas Auguste de La Baume, Marquis of Montrevel (16361716), Marshal of France in


Henry, duc d'Harcourt (16541718), Marshal of France in 1703

Ferdinand, Count of Marsin (16561706), Marshal of France in 1703

James FitzJames, 1st Duke of Berwick (16701734), Marshal of France in 1706

Charles Auguste Goyon, Count of Matignon (16471729), Marshal of France in 1708

Jacques de Bazin, Marquis of Bezons (16451733), Marshal of France in 1709

Pierre de Montesquiou, Count of Artagnan (16451725), Marshal of France in 1709 N.B. : not
the famous D'Artagnan, but a relative

Alberico III Cybo-Malaspina, Duke of Massa (16741715), Marshal of France in 1703.[3]

Louis XV, 17151774[edit]

Marchal de Saxe

Victor-Maurice, comte de Broglie (16461727), Marshal of France in 1724

Antoine Gaston Jean Baptiste, Duke of Roquelaure (16561738), Marshal of France in 1724[4]

Jacques Rouxel, Count of Grancey and of Mdavy (16551725), Marshal of France in 1724

lonor du Maine, Count of Le Bourg (16551739), Marshal of France in 1724

Yves, marquis d'Algre (16531733), Marshal of France in 1724

Louis d'Aubusson, Duke of la Feuillade (16731725), Marshal of France in 1724

Antoine V, Duke of Gramont (16711725), Marshal of France in 1724

Alain Emmanuel, Marquis of Cotlogon (16461730), Marshal of France in 1730

Charles de Gontaut, Duke of Biron (16631756), Marshal of France in 1734

Jacques de Chastenet, Marquis of Puysgur (16651743), Marshal of France in 1734

Claude Bidal, Marquis of Asfeld (16651743), Marshal of France in 1734

Adrien-Maurice, 3rd duc de Noailles (16781766), Marshal of France in 1734

Christian Louis de Montmorency-Luxembourg, Prince de Tingry (17131787), Marshal of

France in 1734

Franois Marie II, Duke of Broglie (16711745), Marshal of France in 1734

Franois de Franquetot, Duke of Coigny (16701759), Marshal of France in 1734

Charles, Duke of Lvis-Charlus (16691734), Marshal of France in 1734

Louis de Brancas de Forcalquier, Marquis of Creste (16711750), Marshal of France in


Louis Auguste d'Albert d'Ailly, Duke of Chaulnes (16761744), Marshal of France in 1741

Louis Armand de Brichanteau, Duke of Nangis (16821742), Marshal of France in 1741

Louis de Gand de Mrode de Montmorency, prince d'Isenghien (16781762), Marshal of

France in 1741

Jean-Baptiste de Durfort, Duke of Duras (16841778), Marshal of France in 1741

Jean-Baptiste Desmarets, Marquis of Maillebois (16821762), Marshal of France in 1741

Charles Fouquet, Duke of Belle-Isle, called the Marshal of Belle-Isle (16841762), Marshal of
France in 1741

Maurice, comte de Saxe, (16961750), Marshal of France in 1741, Marshal General of

France in 1747

Jean-Baptiste Andrault, Marquis of Maulvrier (16771754), Marshal of France in 1745

Claude Testu, Marquis of Balincourt (16801770), Marshal of France in 1746

Philippe Charles, Marquis of la Fare (16871752), Marshal of France in 1746

Franois, duc d'Harcourt (16891750), Marshal of France in 1746

Guy, Count of Montmorency-Laval (16771751), Marshal of France in 1747

Gaspard, Duke of Clermont-Tonnerre 1688 - 1781, Marshal of France in 1747

Louis Claude, Marquis of La Mothe-Houdancourt (16871755), Marshal of France in 1747

Ulrich, Count of Lwendahl (17001755), Marshal of France in 1747

Louis Franois Armand du Plessis, duc de Richelieu (16961788), Marshal of France in 1748

Jean de Fay, Marquis of la Tour-Maubourg (16841764), Marshal of France in 1757

Louis Antoine de Gontaut, (17011788), Count (afterwards Duke) of Biron, Marshal of France
in 1757

Daniel Franois de Glas de Voisons d'Ambres, Viscount of Lautrec (16861762), Marshal of
France in 1757

Charles Franois Frdric de Montmorency, Duke of Piney-Luxembourg (17021764),

Marshal of France in 1757

Louis Le Tellier, Duc d'Estres (16951771), Marshal of France in 1757

Jean Charles de la Fert, Marquis of La Fert Senneterre (16851770), Marshal of France in


Charles O'Brien de Thomond, Count of Thomond and of Clare (16991761), Marshal of

France in 1757

Gaston de Lvis, Duke of Mirepoix (16991758), Marshal of France in 1757

Ladislas Ignace de Bercheny, (16891778), Marshal of France in 1758

Hubert de Brienne, Count of Conflans (16901777), Marshal of France in 1758

Louis Georges, Marquis of Contades, (17041793), Marshal of France in 1758

Charles de Rohan, Prince of Soubise (17151787), Marshal of France in 1758

Victor Franois, Duke de Broglie (17181804), Marshal of France in 1759

Guy Michel de Durfort de Lorge, Duke of Randan (17041773), Marshal of France in 1768

Louis de Brienne de Conflans, Marquis of Armentires (17111774), Marshal of France in


Jean de Coss, Duke of Brissac (16981780), Marshal of France in 1768

Louis XVI, 17741792[edit]

Marchal de Sgur

Anne Pierre, Duke of Harcourt (17011783), Marshal of France since 24.3.1775

Louis, 4th duc de Noailles (17131793), Marshal of France since 24.3.1775

Antoine, Count of Nicola (17121787), Marshal of France since 24.3.1775

Charles, Duke of Fitz-James (17121787), Marshal of France since 24.3.1775

Philippe, Duke of Mouchy (17151794), Marshal of France since 24.3.1775

Emmanuel de Durfort, Duke of Duras (17151789), Marshal of France since 24.3.1775

Louis Nicolas, Duc du Muy (17021775), Marshal of France since 24.3.1775

Claude, Count of Saint-Germain (17071778), Marshal of France since 24.3.1775

Guy de Montmorency, Duke of Laval (17231798), Marshal of France since 13.6.1783

Augustin, Count of Mailly (17081794), Marshal of France since 13.6.1783

Henri Bouchard de Lussan, Marquis of Aubeterre (17141788), Marshal of France since


Charles de Beauvau, Prince of Beauvau-Craon (17201793), Marshal of France since


Nol Jourda, Count of Vaux (17051788), Marshal of France since 13.6.1783

Philippe Henri, marquis de Sgur (17241801), Marshal of France since 13.6.1783

Jacques de Choiseul-Stainville, Count of Choiseul (17271789), Marshal of France since


Charles de La Croix, Marquis of Castries (17271801), Marshal of France since 13.6.1783

Emmanuel de Cro-Solre, Duke of Cro (17181784), Marshal of France since 13.6.1783

Franois Gaston de Lvis, Duc de Lvis (17191787), Marshal of France since 13.6.1783

Nicolas Luckner, Comte Luckner (17221794), Marshal of France since 28.12.1791

Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau (17251807), Marshal of France

since 28.12.1791

First Empire[edit]
Main article: Marshal of the Empire

Baton of the Napoleonic Marshals

Napoleon I, 18041814/1815[edit]

Napoleon created twenty-six Marshals of the Empire:[5]

Marchal Ney

Louis Alexandre Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel and of Wagram, Duke of Valengin. (1753
1815), Marshal of the Empire in 1804

Joachim Murat, Prince d'Empire, Grand Duke of Berg, King of Naples (17671815), Marshal
of the Empire in 1804

Bon Adrien Jeannot de Moncey, Duke of Congliano (17541842), Marshal of the Empire in

Jean-Baptiste Jourdan, Count Jourdan (17621833), Marshal of the Empire in 1804

Andr Massna, Duke of Rivoli, Prince of Essling (17581817), Marshal of the Empire in

Pierre Franois Charles Augereau, Duke of Castiglione (17571816), Marshal of the Empire
in 1804

Jean Baptiste Jules Bernadotte (17631844), Prince of Ponte Corvo, King of Sweden and
Norway under the name Charles XIV John (18181844), Marshal of the Empire in 1804

Guillaume Marie Anne Brune, Count Brune (17631815), Marshal of the Empire in 1804

Jean de Dieu Soult, Duke of Dalmatie (17691851), Marshal of the Empire in 1804, Marshal
General of France in 1847

Jean Lannes, Duke of Montebello (17691809), Marshal of the Empire in 1804

douard Adolphe Casimir Joseph Mortier, Duke of Trvise (17681835), Marshal of the
Empire in 1804

Michel Ney, Duke of Elchingen, Prince of la Moscowa (17691815), Marshal of the Empire in

Louis Nicolas Davout, Duke of Auerstaedt, Prince of Eckmhl (17701823), Marshal of the
Empire in 1804

Jean-Baptiste Bessires, Duke of Istria (17681813), Marshal of the Empire in 1804

Franois Christophe de Kellermann, Duke of Valmy (17371820), Marshal of the Empire in

1804 (Honorary)

Franois Joseph Lefebvre, Duke of Danzig (17551820), Marshal of the Empire in 1804

Dominique Catherine de Prignon, Marquis of Grenade (17541818), Marshal of the Empire

in 1804 (Honorary)

Jean-Mathieu-Philibert Srurier, Count Srurier (17421819), Marshal of the Empire in 1804


Claude Victor, Duke of Bellune (17641841), Marshal of the Empire in 1807

Jacques MacDonald, Duke of Tarento (17651840), Marshal of the Empire in 1809

Nicolas Charles Oudinot, Duke of Reggio (17671847), Marshal of the Empire in 1809

Auguste Frdric Louis Viesse de Marmont, Duke of Ragusa (17741852), Marshal of the
Empire in 1809

Louis Gabriel Suchet, Duke of Albufera (17701826), Marshal of the Empire in 1811

Laurent de Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Marquis of Gouvion-Saint-Cyr (17641830), Marshal of the

Empire in 1812

Jzef Antoni Poniatowski, Prince Poniatowski (17631813), Marshal of the Empire in 1813

Emmanuel de Grouchy, marquis de Grouchy, (17661847), Marshal of the Empire in 1815

The names of many of these have been given to successive stretches of an avenue encircling Paris,
which has thus been nicknamed the Boulevards des Marchaux (Boulevards of the Marshals).

Louis XVIII, 18151824[edit]

Georges Cadoudal (17711804), Marshal of France in 1814 (posthumous)

Jean Victor Marie Moreau (17631813), Marshal of France in 1814 (posthumous)

Franois-Henri de Franquetot de Coigny, Duke of Coigny (17371821), Marshal of France in

Henri Jacques Guillaume Clarke, Duke of Feltre (17651818), Marshal of France in 1816

Pierre Riel de Beurnonville, Marquis of Beurnonville (17521821), Marshal of France in 1816

Charles Joseph Hyacinthe du Houx de Viomesnil, Marquis of Viomesnil (17341827),

Marshal of France in 1816

Jacques Alexandre Law, Marquis of Lauriston (17681828), Marshal of France in 1823

Gabriel Jean Joseph Molitor, Count Molitor (17701849), Marshal of France in 1823
Charles X, 18241830[edit]

Louis Aloy de Hohenlohe-Waldenburg-Bartenstein, (17651829), Marshal of France in 1827

Nicolas Joseph Maison, Marquis Maison (17711840), Marshal of France in 1829

Louis Auguste Victor de Ghaisne de Bourmont, Count of Bourmont (17731846), Marshal of

France in 1830

July Monarchy[edit]
Louis-Philippe 18301848[edit]

tienne Maurice, comte Grard, (17731852), Marshal of France in 1830

Bertrand, comte Clauzel, (17721842), Marshal of France in 1831

Emmanuel, marquis de Grouchy, (17661847), Marshal of France in 1831

Georges Mouton, comte de Lobau, (17701838), Marshal of France in 1831

Sylvain Charles, comte Vale, (17731846), Marshal of France in 1837

Franois Horace, comte Sbastiani, (17721851), Marshal of France in 1840

Jean-Baptiste Drouet, Comte d'Erlon, (17651844), Marshal of France in 1843

Thomas Robert Bugeaud, Duke of Isly, (17841849), Marshal of France in 1843

Honor, comte Reille, (17751860), Marshal of France in 1847

Guillaume Dode, vicomte de la Brunerie, (17751851), Marshal of France in 1847

Second Republic[edit]
Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, 18481852[edit]

Jrme Bonaparte, former King of Westphalia (17841860), Marshal of France in 1850

Rmi Joseph Isidore Exelmans,Count Exelmans (17751852), Marshal of France in 1851

Jean Isidore Harispe, Count Harispe (17681855), Marshal of France in 1851

Jean-Baptiste Philibert Vaillant, Count Vaillant (17901872), Marshal of France in 1851

Jacques Leroy de Saint Arnaud (17981854), Marshal of France in 1852

Bernard Pierre Magnan (17911865), Marshal of France in 1852

Boniface de Castellane, Marquis of Castellane (17881862), Marshal of France in 1852

Second Empire[edit]
Napoleon III, 18521870[edit]

Marchal Randon

Achille Baraguey d'Hilliers, Count Baraguey d'Hilliers (17951878), Marshal of France in


Aimable Plissier, Duke of Malakoff (17941864), Marshal of France in 1855

Jacques Louis Randon, Count Randon (17951871), Marshal of France in 1856

Franois Certain Canrobert (18091895), Marshal of France in 1856

Pierre Bosquet (18101861), Marshal of France in 1856

Patrice de Mac-Mahon, Duke of Magenta (18091893), Marshal of France in 1859

Auguste Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angly (17941870), Marshal of France in 1859

Adolphe Niel (18021869), Marshal of France in 1859

Philippe Antoine d'Ornano, Count of Ornano (17841863), Marshal of France in 1861

Elie Frdric Forey (18041872), Marshal of France in 1863

Franois Achille Bazaine (18111888), Marshal of France in 1864

Edmond Leboeuf (18091888), Marshal of France in 1870

Third Republic[edit]

Marchal Foch

Raymond Poincar, 19131920[edit]

Joseph Joffre, (18521931), Marshal of France in 1916

Ferdinand Foch, (18511929), Marshal of France in 1918

Philippe Ptain, (18561951), Marshal of France in 1918
Alexandre Millerand, 19201924[edit]

Joseph Gallieni, (18491916), Marshal of France in 1921 (posthumous)

Hubert Lyautey, (18541934), Marshal of France in 1921

Louis Franchet d'Esperey, (18561942), Marshal of France in 1921

Marie mile Fayolle, (18521928), Marshal of France in 1921

Michel-Joseph Maunoury, (18471923), Marshal of France in 1923 (posthumous)

Fourth Republic[edit]
Vincent Auriol, 19471954[edit]

Jean de Lattre de Tassigny (18891952), Marshal of France in 1952 (posthumous)

Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque (19021947), Marshal of France in 1952 (posthumous)

Alphonse Juin (18881967), Marshal of France in 1952

Fifth Republic[edit]
Franois Mitterrand, 19811995[edit]

Marie-Pierre Knig (18981970) Marshal of France in 1984 (posthumous)

Mikhail Miloradovich
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

(Redirected from Mikhail Andreyevich Miloradovich)

This name uses Eastern Slavic naming customs; the patronymic is Andreyevich and the family
name is Miloradovich.

Mikhail Andreyevich Miloradovich

Portrait by George Dawe in the Military Gallery of

the Winter Palace

Born October 12 [O.S. October

1] 1771

Saint Petersburg

Died 27 December 1825 (aged 54)

Saint Petersburg

Buried at Alexander Nevsky Lavra

Allegiance Russian Empire

Service/branc Army

Years of 17871825


Rank General of the Infantry

Awards Order of St. George 2nd class,

Order of St. Andrew,

Order of St. Vladimir 1st class,

Order of St. Anna 1st class,

Order of St. John of Jerusalem,

Order of St. Alexander Nevsky

Count Mikhail Andreyevich Miloradovich (Russian: ),

spelled Miloradovitch in contemporary English sources (October 12 [O.S. October 1] 1771
December 27 [O.S. December 15] 1825[1]) was a Russian general of Serbian origin, prominent during
the Napoleonic Wars. He entered military service on the eve of the Russo-Swedish War of 1788
1790 and his career advanced rapidly during the reign of Paul I. He served under Alexander
Suvorov during Italian and Swiss campaigns of 1799.

Miloradovich served in wars against France and Turkey, earning distinction in the Battle of Amstetten,
the capture of Bucharest, the Battle of Borodino, the Battle of Tarutino and the Battle of Vyazma. He
led the reserves into the Battle of Kulm, the Battle of Leipzig and the Battle of Paris (1814).
Miloradovich attained the rank of General of the Infantry in 1809 and the title of count in 1813. His
reputation as a daring battlefield commander (referred to as "the Russian Murat" and "the
Russian Bayard"[2]) rivalled that of his bitter personal enemy Pyotr Bagration, but Miloradovich also
had a reputation for being lucky. He boasted that he had fought fifty battles but had never been
wounded nor even scratched by the enemy.[3]

By 1818, when Miloradovich was appointed Governor General of Saint Petersburg, the retirement or
death of other senior generals made him the most highly decorated active officer of the Russian
Army, holding the Order of St. George 2nd class, the Order of St. Andrew, the Order of St.
Vladimir 1st class, the Order of St. Anna 1st class, the Order of St. John of Jerusalem and the Order
of St. Alexander Nevsky with diamonds.[4] A chivalrous man of boastful and flamboyant character,
Miloradovich was a poor fit for the governorship. Vladimir Nabokov called him "a gallant soldier, bon
vivant and a somewhat bizarre administrator";[5] Alexander Herzen wrote that he was "one of those
military men who occupied the most senior positions in civilian life with not the slightest idea about
public affairs".[6]

When news of the death of Alexander I reached Saint Petersburg, Miloradovich prevented the heir,
future tsar Nicholas I, from acceding to the throne. From December 9 [O.S. November 27] to
December 25 [O.S. December 13] 1825, Miloradovich exercised de facto dictatorial authority, but he
ultimately recognised Nicholas as his sovereign after the Romanovs sorted out the succession crisis.
Miloradovich had sufficient evidence of the mounting Decembrist revolt, but did not take any action
until the rebels took over the Senate Square on December 26 [O.S. December 14] 1825. He rode
into the rows of rebel troops and tried to talk them into obedience, but was fatally shot by Pyotr
Kakhovsky and stabbed by Yevgeny Obolensky.

Early years[edit]

Coat of arms of Miloradovich family

Mikhail Miloradovich was the son of Major General Andrey Miloradovich (17261798). The Russian
branch of the Serbian Miloradovich family was established in 1715, when Mikhail Miloradovich (the
first) (Serbian Cyrillic: ), one of three brothers recruited by Peter I to
incite rebellion against the Turks four years earlier, fled from Herzegovina to Russia and joined
Peter's service as a colonel.[7][8] He was a commander of the Hadiach Regiment. Towards the end of
Peter's reign he was imprisoned in connection with Pavlo Polubotok's treason case, but was spared
from further misfortune by Peter's death. His grandson Andrey served thirty years in the Russian
Army and later moved into civil administration as the Governor of Little Russia and the Chernigov
governorate.[7] The family owned lands in the Poltava Governorate;[9]Mikhail inherited up to fifteen
hundred serfs.[10]

Mikhail's father "enrolled" him in the military in his infancy, and later sent teenage Mikhail to study
military sciences in the universities of Knigsberg and Gttingen, and in Strasbourg and Metz.
According to Nikolai Leskov, the education was superficial: Leskov described Mikhail as a boy of
"charming ignorance" who did not even master the French language properly, and said that his
French was littered with the "most grave and curious mistakes"[11] (an anecdote credited him with
blending pittoresque and synagogue into "pittagogue").[12] Sixteen-year-old Mikhail returned to Russia
in 1787, joined the army as a praporshchik (a junior commissioned officer rank) in the Izmaylovsky
Regiment and was soon sent into action in the Russo-Swedish War of 17881790.[9]

Italian and Swiss campaigns[edit]

Further information: The Italian and Swiss expedition (1799-1800)

Miloradovich did not earn any distinction in the war of 17881790, but he advanced rapidly in
peacetime. A captain of the Guards in 1796, Paul I regarded him favourably and he was promoted to
the rank of colonel in 1797 and major general and chief of the Apsheron Regiment in 1798.[11] In the
same year, he departed to join Alexander Suvorov's troops in Italy. He won Suvorov's unconditional
trust for taking Lecco on the eve of the Battle of Cassano and for commanding the rearguard in the
crossing of the Gotthard Pass.[13] At Bassignana he changed three horses killed by the enemy but
was not even scratched; at Altdorf he led assault infantry over a burning bridge.[13][14] These and

similar episodes, true or anecdotal, forged public opinion of Miloradovich as a daring and lucky field
commander, an opinion that he himself cultivated for the rest of his life. [13] Miloradovich was adored at
home, but the French held a different opinion: Adolphe Thiers described Miloradovich as "a Servian
[sic], of brilliant valour, but absolutely destitute of military knowledge, dissolute in manners, uniting all
the vices of civilization with all the vices of barbarism".[15]

Paul rewarded Miloradovich with the Order of St. Anne 1st class, the Order of St. John of
Jerusalem and the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky. Suvorov, in violation of military codes, transferred
Miloradovich from field troops to his staff as a "general in waiting"; Paul later cited this fact as a
pretext to dismiss Suvorov.[16] Friendship between Miloradovich and Paul's second
son Constantine also dated back to the Swiss campaign. Constantine awarded Miloradovich a gilded
sword with an inscription To my friend Miloradovich, which Miloradovich had with him on the day of
his death.[17]

Amstetten and Austerlitz[edit]

Further information: War of the Third Coalition

Miloradovich played a key role in the Battle of Amstetten, where Mikhail Kutuzov ordered his three
regiments to take a stand and provide relief for Pyotr Bagration's troops.[18] "Above all, skillful
maneuvering of the Russian force, including timely arrival of Miloradovich and his intelligent
application of the reserve forces at his disposal, prevented the collapse of the rear guard". [18] The
action at Amstetten allowed Kutuzov to break contact with the French and prevented an all-out battle
that would have been disastrous for the Russians.[19] Reports of the battle by Miloradovich himself
contradict the French accounts and are not corroborated by Bagration's laconic report: each side
presented their own perspective,[18] and Miloradovich had a particular penchant for glorifying his own
actions. His action at Amstetten was rewarded with the Order of St. George 3rd class and promotion
to lieutenant general.[20] On November 11, 1805 Miloradovich attacked the French in the Battle of
Drenstein (referred to as the Battle of Krems in Russian sources), but the French withdrew before
his corps could inflict significant damage.[21]

The Battle of Austerlitz saw Miloradovich in charge of the Russian part of a Russian-Austrian infantry
column (2,875 out of 11,795 men),[22] one of the four columns placed on Pratzen Heights, which had
been abandoned by the French.[23] Another, larger part of the column was under Austrian command;
the close presence of Kutuzov somewhat mitigated the perils of divided command. [23] Tsar Alexander
ordered this column to move before others were deployed; Kutuzov, unable to oppose the tsar,
ordered Miloradovich to advance across the Goldbach Stream to Kobylnice, disregarding enemy
action and difficult terrain.[25] Hills and fog obstructed the view, and the column marched straight into
the bulk of the French armies.[26] Soult's troops mauled the mixed column and Miloradovich retreated.
Alexander summoned his brother Constantine for help (although an alternative account
by Bowden and Duffy asserts that Miloradovich contacted Constantine himself). [27] Contrary to the
popular view that "he was almost the only Russian general who obtained any advantage over the
French" at Austerlitz,[28] General Karl Wilhelm von Toll contested Miloradovich's actions, asserting that
his column was the first to fall back and that it was Bagration, not Miloradovich, who saved the allied
troops from annihilation.[29]

Russian-Turkish War[edit]
Further information: Russo-Turkish War (18061812)

The war of 18061812 began with Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia. After the Turks
responded by taking Bucharest, Russian commander-in-chief Johann von Michelsohn dispatched
Miloradovich to intervene. Miloradovich captured Bucharest on December 13 without significant
resistance from the Turks and was rewarded with a golden sword with diamonds "For the taking of
Bucharest". The Turks, manipulated by the French envoy Sbastiani, did not declare war until five
days later. No large-scale action followed. In May 1807 Miloradovich tried to capture Giurgiu, but
failed and fell back to Bucharest. On June 2, 1807 he redeemed himself by checking the Turkish
advance at Obilesti.

The years 1808 and 1809 did not see any remarkable action either, but were marked by a dual
intrigue among top Russian generals; at the top level, Mikhail Kutuzov was in conflict with Alexander
Prozorovsky, while below them burned a feud between Miloradovich and Pyotr Bagration. Bagration
temporarily succeeded Prozorovsky as commander-in-chief, but later both Miloradovich and
Bagration lost their commands. At the beginning of 1810 Alexander recalled Miloradovich from front-
line duty and tasked him with assembling a new army in Belarus.[13] In April 1810 Miloradovich was
appointed Governor of Kiev but soon tended his resignation.[13] He was officially discharged in
September 1810 but was called up for service in November, again, as Governor of Kiev.[13]

Napoleon's invasion of Russia[edit]

Further information: French invasion of Russia

Battle of Vyazma

At the beginning of the 1812 campaign, Miloradovich was tasked with assembling and training
volunteer militia troops in the hinterland; he returned to action on the eve of the Battle of
Borodino with 14,600 militiamen.[30] Kutuzov appointed Miloradovich commander of front-line forces of
the right (northern) flank, comprising Baggovut's Second Infantry Corps and Ostermann-Tolstoy's
Fourth Infantry Corps.[31] The battle plan required Miloradovich to protect the old Smolensk-Moscow
road.[31] On the day of the battle, September 7 [O.S. August 26], Kutuzov realised that enemy action
was concentrated against his center and left flank and, at about 9 a.m., he ordered Miloradovich to
march to the south and attack the French left flank.[32] Riding in advance of his troops, Miloradovich
was caught up in the heat of the battle for Semyonovskoe and, together with Barclay de
Tolly, Yermolov and Rayevsky, sought refuge in the defences of the Fourth Division. [33] Between 10
a.m. and 12 noon his troops took a stand in the center of the Russian line and held off French

attacks, with Baggovut's corps seeing critical action around noon,[34] and Ostermann's corps around 4
p.m.[35] By the end of the battle, the French succeeded in forcing the Russians from their defences,
and Miloradovich's troops fell back to the same Smolensk road from where they had started.
Baggovut took a stand there and held the road until nightfall against ferocious attacks by Polish

After the battle, Miloradovich took command of the rearguard, sheltering Kutuzov's army from the
advancing French. Enemy pressure prevented him from attending the Council in Fili that decided to
surrender Moscow. Miloradovich, acting on behalf of Kutuzov, made a deal with Murat: if the French
wanted Moscow intact, they had to allow Miloradovich free passage to the east, or face
stubborn urban warfare. Hereford George wrote that "Murat apparently deemed it beneath his dignity
to confer with a mere general" and that he left the talks to Sbastiani. [37] According to Fyodor Glinka,
however, Murat and Miloradovich negotiated directly with each other prior to the surrender of
Moscow; Miloradovich contacted Sbastiani only after the French took Moscow and their cavalry
engaged the Russian rear. Sbastiani honoured the accord, called back the cavalry and allowed the
safe retreat of two Russian regiments trapped between advancing French columns. [38][39]Temporary
loss of contact between Murat and the Russian rearguard allowed Kutuzov to make a westward turn:
Murat kept on advancing south-east towards Bronnitsy while Kutuzov marched in the opposite

On September 20 [O.S. September 8], Kutuzov took defensive positions at Podolsk and dispatched
Miloradovich to take position in front of the advancing French, 12 kilometers to the east. [41] Four days
later, Murat engaged Miloradovich and forced him to fall back to Krasnaya Pakhra[42] (deliberately
setting a trap, according to Glinka[43]). Miloradovich barely escaped death or captivity when his
headquarters were raided by French cavalry scouts on September 27 [O.S. September 15].[44] On
September 29 [O.S. September 17], Miloradovich successfully counterattacked Murat's corps at
Chirikovo, taking one general de brigade prisoner.[42][45]At this point, Kutuzov preferred to retreat
further south; the main army marched to Tarutino, while Miloradovich, now having Ostermann-
Tolstoy's corps under his command, retreated to a fallback position on the Chernishnya River, 8
kilometers north of Tarutino.[42] Glinka wrote that from September 9 [O.S. August 28] to October 5
[O.S. September 23] Miloradovich was continuously fighting the French, including four significant
battles, and lamented that few of his deeds reached the public eye: "He is not a hero of
the Vedomosti, but a hero of history and of the future."[46] During the standoff on the Chernishnya,
Miloradovich had another person-to-person negotiation with Murat, while his own camp was filled
with masses of French stragglers taken prisoner.[47] Modern Russian historians criticised as indecisive
his actions in the Battle of Tarutino (October 18 [O.S. October 6]), when poor coordination of Russian
columns met its match in poor discipline of the French camp,[48] but to contemporaries like Glinka
and William Cathcart the battle was a clear success.[49][50]

After the Battle of Maloyaroslavets, Russian troops split into three pursuit columns, led by
Miloradovich, Matvey Platov and Kutuzov himself.[51] Miloradovich marched directly on Vyazma,
occupied by four French corps (Beauharnais, Davout, Ney, Poniatowski), while Platov closed in on it
from the north. On October 31 [O.S. October 19] Miloradovich and Platov agreed to storm Vyazma.
The Battle of Vyazma began at dawn of November 3 [O.S. October 22].[52] Miloradovich quickly
deployed front-line artillery that withstood Beauharnais's counterstrike and forced Davout's troops to
take cover in the forest. Davout lost two hours taking a detour to reunite with Ney in Vyazma; at 2

p.m., when Miloradovich ordered a general assault, the French were already unable to resist. [52] By 5
p.m. Miloradovich took control of the city, capturing French supply trains (but only three cannons). [52]

On November 15 [O.S. November 3] Miloradovich's three corps, marching ahead of the retreating
French, took position to the French rear near Krasny.[53]Miloradovich began the three-day Battle of
Krasnoi by capturing a large supply train and cutting Ney and Beauharnais off from Napoleon's army.
The next day, Beauharnais exhausted his troops in a breakthrough and refused Miloradovich's
invitation to surrender; at night the decimated remains of his corps escaped through the woods. [53]
On November 18 [O.S. November 6] Ney made his own unsuccessful attempt to break through
Miloradovich's defences. Miloradovich again offered honorable surrender, but Ney arrested the
messenger and expended his 10th and 11th divisions in a frontal assault. [53] At night his forces of
3,000 men escaped over the frozen Dnieper, but only 800 made it to Orsha.[55][56] Miloradovich missed
the opportunity to intercept the French crossing of Berezina by two days.[57]

In December 1812, Alexander awarded Miloradovich the Order of St. George, 2nd class. In line with
Kutuzov's December Plan, Miloradovich led a Russian vanguard due west and took Warsaw on
February 8 [O.S. January 27] 1813.[58]

Campaign of 1813-1814[edit]
Further information: War of the Sixth Coalition

The appointment of Peter Wittgenstein as commander-in-chief of the united Russian and Prussian
armies provoked open hostility from his new subordinates and, at the same time, from his seniors:
Miloradovich, Barclay de Tolly, Langeron, Platov and Tormasov.[59] Tormasov refused to obey
Wittgenstein altogether and left the army, while Miloradovich stayed and became the "official
speaker" for the opposition.[59] The conflict burned until the failures at Lutzen and Bautzen compelled
Wittgenstein to resign his command.[59][60]

Miloradovich's own record in May 1813 was mixed: at Lutzen his corps of 12,000 men arrived too late
to influence the outcome.[61][62] In the following week he covered the retreat to the Elbe. Thiers wrote
that the French "made him pay dearly for his useless boast" (his resolve to defend a certain position).
Cathcart praised his skillful rearguard action[64] but noted that by May 12 his corps had shrunk to
about 10,000.[65] At Bautzen, Miloradovich managed to push Oudinot out of Tronberg, but the battle as
a whole remained a French victory.[66][67]

Miloradovich and Constantine spent the remainder of the war, almost a year, in close cooperation
and proximity as chiefs of infantry and cavalry reserves. In August 1813, after expiry of the Truce of
Plswitz, Miloradovich led the reserve force of 24,000 Guards and Grenadiers into Bohemia and
Constantine followed him with 11,000 "splendid cavalry" [68] and artillery.[69] Together with Barclay's
headquarters, they formed one of four allied columns that converged on Dresden but had not been
brought into the action of the Battle of Dresden.[68] Three days later they were employed
against Vandamme in the Battle of Kulm, a "fortunate victory that conferred advantages beyond all
calculations".[70] On the eve of the Battle of Leipzig the forces of Miloradovich and Constantine,
stationed near Margeborn, formed the reserve of the coalition army.[71] In December 1813 they
crossed the Rhine and headed into France.[72]

Miloradovich's actions in 1813 were rewarded with the Order of St. Andrew, the title of count and the
right to wear Alexander's insignia on his shoulder, the first such honor ever granted in Russia.
Miloradovich concluded the campaign of 1814, his last one, in Paris. After General Gorchakov's
infantry overran the French defensive artillery, Miloradovich was the one to bring in
twenty howitzers and open fire at the city.[73]

Governor of Saint Petersburg[edit]

Bolshoi Kamenny Theatre during the flood of 1824. Handling flood damage and managing theatre were two
best known sides of Miloradovich's administration.

After the Treaty of Fontainebleau Alexander appointed Miloradovich commander of the Russian
Imperial Guard;[74] in 1818 Miloradovich became Governor of Saint Petersburg, assuming command
of all the troops, police and civil administration of the imperial capital.[75] He had the unconditional trust
of Alexander, who could hardly have found a worse candidate for the job. As chief of police,
Miloradovich controlled political surveillance and investigation in Saint Petersburg, but the events of
1825 demonstrated that he ultimately failed to respond to the real threat: he dismissed the evidence
against the Decembrists, saying "It's all stuff; leave these young blockheads alone to read to each
other their trash of miserable verses."[76]

His affection for the arts and his ex officio duty as a censor at the peak of the Golden Age of Russian
Poetry resulted in frequent contacts with authors and actors, and, apart from his death and his
actions during the disastrous flood of 1824, his administration was remembered largely through
anecdotes and artists' memoirs of varying reliability. This was not uncommon for Russian
commanders; Nikolay Raevsky said "They [the writers of his time] turned me into a Roman,
Miloradovich into a great man, Wittgenstein into the saviour of the fatherland, and Kutuzov
into Fabius. I am not a Roman, and neither are these gentlemen."[77]

Alexander Herzen who met Miloradovich in early childhood and fondly remembered him as a
storyteller "with the greatest vivacity, with lively mimicry, with roars of laughter"[78] ridiculed
Miloradovich as an administrator yet called him "a warrior poet who understood poetry ... grand
things are done by great means."[79] Herzen's memoirs provide a number of anecdotes about
Miloradovich the administrator (none of which could have been witnessed by the narrator). [80]

In 1820 Miloradovich interrogated Alexander Pushkin on suspicion of political propaganda.

Pushkin's name had already become a blanket cover for all kinds of incendiary pamphlets and he
was desperate to clear himself of dangerous misattributions.[81] Pushkin said that he burned his
"contraband poems" and recited some from memory.[81] Miloradovich said "Ah, c'est chevaleresque",
dismissed the charges and sent Pushkin on a well-paid tour of the south. [81] Vladimir Nabokov noted
that all of Pushkin's influential friends could not have saved him had it not been for Miloradovich's
"amiable conduct of the whole affair".[5] There was a rumor that Pushkin was flogged on orders of
Miloradovich, who fought a duel with at least one person who repeated it. [82]

Author and publisher Nikolai Grech recounted another, less inspiring episode: in 1824 Miloradovich
vigorously investigated an alleged breach of censorship rules at a printshop owned by Grech and
Bezacque. Fifteen years earlier, when Miloradovich and Pyotr Bagration had a feud, Bezacque was

Bagration's secretary and apparently became a lifelong enemy of Miloradovich. Grech easily refuted
"factual evidence" and could have escaped unharmed, but Miloradovich brought his belated revenge
down on Grech, inflicting on him a full police and court inquiry that dragged on until 1828.
Miloradovich probably did not realise that the whole case was set up by Aleksey
Arakcheyev and Mikhail Magnitsky to unseat Alexander Golitsyn (ru).[83]

The lifestyle of the "bizarre administrator"[5] was just as bizarre. Miloradovich lived alone in a luxurious
apartment "in complete disarray coupled with the most exquisite taste", [84] without a single bedroom; "I
spend the night where I feel like", he used to say.[84] Family fortune and rewards from the tsar could
not match his spending, and he sold off most of his lands and serfs.[10] Posthumous sale of his
remaining estate barely covered his debts.[85]

Theatre and sexuality[edit]

Theatre manager Alexander Shakhovskoy allegedly provided female company to Miloradovich.

In 1821, theatre managers Apollon Maikov and Prince Alexander Shakhovskoy allegedly tried to
manipulate Miloradovich to overthrow the stern and frugal director of imperial theatres, Prince
Tyufyakin.[86] Miloradovich lent them support and then himself "grabbed both the power and the purse
strings";[86] Miloradovich, Maikov and Shakhovskoy became a "committee of three formidable officials"
that governed the everyday life of the imperial theatres.[87] The change coincided with rumours of
Shakhovskoy's trafficking in actresses;[86] the death of Miloradovich and the ascension of Nicholas
I ended Shakhovskoy's career.[88]

The private life of Miloradovich, who never married and had no offspring, has been a controversial
subject. Contemporaries[89] condemned him for a desire "to create his own harem in the theatre
school"[90] that allegedly became a reality with the aid of Shakhovskoy and Maikov. According to these
sources, Miloradovich "had a weakness for women" and regularly spent evenings in the company of
Shakhovskoy and female trainees of his theatre school; the chosen favorites then enjoyed the
general's benevolence after graduation.[89][90] Catherine Shuler noted that the appetites of Miloradovich
and other dignitaries could be the cause of high "traffic in women" on stage and that "the

resemblance between serf actresses and imperial actresses is surely not coincidental". [90] Alexandra
Kolosova, in 1822, was the first actress to break the ring and flee to Paris;[87] upon return to Saint
Petersburg she sought protection from Alexander, but Miloradovich had her arrested for twenty-four
hours for turning down "the most insignificant role" offered to her.[91] Miloradovich had lead
actor Vasily Karatygin arrested for similar insubordination; when the prisoner's mother pleaded for
mercy, Miloradovich responded: "I only like comedy onstage. I've seen blood, madam, tears don't
move me".[92]

Vladimir Bryukhanov suggested that Miloradovich was homosexual, [93] disregarding or dismissing
evidence to the contrary, such as the memoirs of Nadezhda Durova. (Durova, disguised as a young
man, was aide to Miloradovich in 1810 and later wrote about his affairs with women and their
influence on the general's demeanor and on his relationships with subordinate officers.) [94] The
standard version of events holds that his last passion was ballerina Yekaterina Teleshova, who earlier
had an affair with Alexander Griboyedov, a diplomat "too short of money to be a long-term rival to the
general"[95] (In 1825, Griboyedov wrote "... Miloradovich, that boastful idiot whom Shakhovskoy
grovels to and idolises. They are both cattle."[95]).

Further information: Russian interregnum of 1825

The death of Alexander I in Taganrog was followed with an interregnum that culminated in the Decembrist

In the summer of 1823, Alexander I issued a secret manifest excluding Constantine from the order of
succession and making Nicholas heir presumptive to the throne.[96][97] Historians argue as to whether
or not Miloradovich had been formally made aware of Alexander's decision. Only three men
Aleksey Arakcheyev, Alexander Golitsyn, and Archbishop Filaret definitely knew the contents and
whereabouts of the manifest; neither Constantine nor Nicholas knew the whole story.[98]

On December 9 [O.S. November 27] 1825, when news of Alexander's death in Taganrog reached
Saint Petersburg, Miloradovich bullied Nicholas into pledging allegiance to Constantine, who was
then living in Warsaw as viceroy of Poland.[99]Golitsyn arrived at the palace later and announced the
terms of Alexander's manifest, but Miloradovich persuaded the State Council that Nicholas was
aware of it and that his pledge of allegiance to Constantine was effectively an act of abdication.[100][101]
Miloradovich then sent a messenger to Moscow with two instructions: to pledge allegiance to
Constantin and to keep the original of Alexander's manifest secret and locked away.[103] Faced with

the question, "What if Constantine holds to his resignation?", Miloradovich allegedly responded,
"When one has one hundred thousand bayonets in one's pocket, it is easy to speak with boldness".

Correspondence between Saint Petersburg and Warsaw took two weeks, during which Miloradovich
acted as de facto interrex and regularly assured Nicholas that "everything is quiet". [105][106] Constantine
firmly refused to reign and blessed his brother's accession to the throne, [107]but for a while the hesitant
Nicholas took no action. On the morning[108] of December 24 [O.S. December 12], Nicholas received
detailed reports of the brewing Decembrist revolt from Diebitsch and Chernyshov,[109] and discussed
the matter with Miloradovich and Golitsyn.[110][111] According to Nicholas himself, the evidence was
overwhelming. Miloradovich promised to mobilise all police resources but did nothing [112][113] or,
according to Korf, his "investigations remained completely fruitless. His researches had not
discovered one person on whom suspicion could reasonably fall".[114]

The actions of Miloradovich during the interregnum were highly controversial and provoked fringe
conspiracy theories placing him at the top of the Decembrist rebel ring. [115] Mainstream historians
provide different explanations of his motives, none of which supports the theory of "Decembrist

Mikhail Safonov suggested that there were three contenders for the throne: Constantin,
Nicholas and their mother Maria Fyodorovna. Miloradovich supported Maria but in public he
aligned with Constantine and later with Nicholas.[96] A similar version has been fictionalised
by Igor Bunich.[116]

Yakov Gordin suggested that Miloradovich acted as an independent dictator, using

Constantine merely as a front.[96]

Andreeva supports a toned-down variation of Gordin's suggestion: that, regardless of

Alexander's manifest, Miloradovich acted in good faith, supporting what he though was the
legitimate solution to a crisis.[117]

Revolt and death[edit]

Main article: Decembrist revolt

Rebellion on Senate Square, December 26 [O.S. December 14] 1825

At 8 p.m.[118] on December 25 [O.S. December 13], Nicholas declared himself emperor; at 7 a.m. the
next morning, along with all senior statesmen present in Saint Petersburg, Miloradovich pledged his
loyalty to Nicholas[119] (Korf suggested that Miloradovich recognised Nicholas as early as December

24 [O.S. December 12][120]). Once again Miloradovich assured Nicholas that the city was "perfectly
tranquil";[110][121] Alexander von Benckendorff other witnesses wrote that he was in his usual boastful,
optimistic mood.[122] Three hours later, when Miloradovich enjoyed a breakfast with Teleshova, general
Neidhardt reported to Nicholas that the troops were marching towards the palace "in absolute

At about noon on December 26 [O.S. December 14] Miloradovich, whom nobody had seen since the
morning,[124] reported to Nicholas on Palace Square.[125] Witnesses disagree on whether he was
mounted or on foot, but all accounts point to his extraordinary excitement and loss of self-control.
According to Nicholas, Miloradovich told him: "l v ml; ils marchent au Senat, mais j vis
leur rlr"[110] (French: "That is bad; they are marching toward the Senate, but I will talk to them").
Nicholas coldly responded that Miloradovich must do his duty as the military governor and calm
his troops down.[125] Miloradovich saluted, turned around, and headed to the barracks of the Mounted
Guards.[127] General Orlov of the Mounted Guards pleaded with Miloradovich to stay with the loyal
troops but Miloradovich refused to take cover, mounted a horse and rode out to the rows of rebel
troops, accompanied either by two aides[128] or only by Bashutsky on foot.[129] Miloradovich harangued
the soldiers for obedience, showing Constantine's sword "to prove that he would have been
incapable of betraying him".[130]Safonov pointed out that, instead of executing the tsar's order to lead
the Mounted Guards against the rebels, Miloradovich "disobeyed it in a most incredible way ... by
going into the action alone."[131]

Between 12:20 and 12:30 Pyotr Kakhovsky shot Miloradovich point-blank in the back;[128] "the bullet
travelling up from below, from the back to the chest, tore the diaphragm, broke through all the parts
and stopped beneath the right nipple".[132] When Miloradovich slumped from his horse to the
ground, Yevgeny Obolensky stabbed him with a bayonet.[128] Miloradovich was taken to a nearby
house, but by the time the surgeons arrived on the scene the marauders had stripped Miloradovich of
his clothes, medals and jewellery.[128] Medics removed the bullet (it was later delivered to Nicholas);
Miloradovich remained conscious and dictated his last will in a letter to the tsar. There were three
requests: to send His Majesty's regards to his relatives, to grant liberty to his serfs, and to "not forget
the old Maikov".[134] Miloradovich died around 3 a.m. on December 27 [O.S. December 15].[1] After six
days of lying in state, he was buried with honours at the Alexander Nevsky Lavra.[134]

The investigation of the Decembrist revolt led to the hanging of Kakhovsky and four of his
ringleaders; it did not reveal any illicit connection between the Decembrists and Miloradovich. The
second killer, Obolensky, was stripped of his princely title and exiled to Siberia for thirty years.

See also[edit]

Matija Zmajevi

Semyon Zorich

Peter Tekeli

Georgi Emmanuel

Simeon Pievi

Jovan Albanez

Jovan evi

Anto Gvozdenovi

Battle of Austerlitz
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Battle of Austerlitz

Part of the War of the Third Coalition

Napolon at the Battle of Austerlitz, by Franois

Grard (Galerie des Batailles, Versailles).

Date 2 December 1805

Locati Austerlitz, Moravia, Austrian Empire

on (now Slavkov u Brna, Czech Republic)
498N 1646ECoordinates: 498
N 1646E

Result Decisive French victory

Treaty of Pressburg

Effective end of the Third


Dissolution of the Holy Roman


Creation of the Confederation

of the Rhine


France Russian Empire

Holy Roman Empire

Commanders and leaders

Napoleon I Alexander I

Mikhail Kutuzov

Francis II


66,800[1] 85,400[2]

Casualties and losses

1,305 dead, 16,000 dead or

6,940 wounded, wounded,

(8,245 total), 20,000 captured,

573 captured, 186 guns lost,

1 standard lost[3] 45 standards lost[4]

Total: 9,000 Total: 36,000


War of the Third Coalition

The Battle of Austerlitz (2 December 1805/11 Frimaire An XIV FRC), also known as the Battle of
the Three Emperors, was one of the most important and decisive engagements of the Napoleonic
Wars. In what is widely regarded as the greatest victory achieved by Napoleon, the Grande
Arme of France defeated a larger Russian and Austrian army led by Tsar Alexander I and Holy
Roman Emperor Francis II. The battle occurred near the village of Austerlitz in the Austrian
Empire (modern-day Slavkov u Brna in the Czech Republic). Austerlitz brought the War of the Third
Coalition to a rapid end, with the Treaty of Pressburg signed by the Austrians later in the month. The

battle is often cited as a tactical masterpiece, in the same league as other historic engagements
like Cannae or Arbela.[5][6]

After eliminating an Austrian army during the Ulm Campaign, French forces managed to
capture Vienna in November 1805. The Austrians avoided further conflict until the arrival of the
Russians bolstered Allied numbers. Napoleon sent his army north in pursuit of the Allies, but then
ordered his forces to retreat so he could feign a grave weakness. Desperate to lure the Allies into
battle, Napoleon gave every indication in the days preceding the engagement that the French army
was in a pitiful state, even abandoning the dominant Pratzen Heights near Austerlitz. He deployed
the French army below the Pratzen Heights and deliberately weakened his right flank, enticing the
Allies to launch a major assault there in the hopes of rolling up the whole French line. A forced march
from Vienna by Marshal Davout and his III Corps plugged the gap left by Napoleon just in time.
Meanwhile, the heavy Allied deployment against the French right weakened the allied center on the
Pratzen Heights, which was viciously attacked by the IV Corps of Marshal Soult. With the Allied
center demolished, the French swept through both enemy flanks and sent the Allies fleeing
chaotically, capturing thousands of prisoners in the process.

The Allied disaster significantly shook the faith of Emperor Francis in the British-led war effort. France
and Austria agreed to an armistice immediately and the Treaty of Pressburg followed shortly after, on
26 December. Pressburg took Austria out of both the war and the Coalition while reinforcing the
earlier treaties of Campo Formio and of Lunville between the two powers. The treaty confirmed the
Austrian loss of lands in Italy and Bavaria to France, and in Germany to Napoleon's German allies. It
also imposed an indemnity of 40 million francs on the defeated Habsburgs and allowed the fleeing
Russian troops free passage through hostile territories and back to their home soil. Critically, victory
at Austerlitz permitted the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, a collection of German states
intended as a buffer zone between France and Central Europe. The Confederation rendered the Holy
Roman Empire virtually useless, so the latter collapsed in 1806 after Francis abdicated the imperial
throne, keeping Francis I of Austria as his only official title. These achievements, however, did not
establish a lasting peace on the continent. Prussian worries about growing French influence in
Central Europe sparked the War of the Fourth Coalition in 1806.


Europe had been in turmoil since the start of the French Revolutionary Wars in 1792. In 1797, after
five years of war, the French Republic subdued the First Coalition, an alliance of Austria, Prussia,
Great Britain, Spain, and various Italian states. A Second Coalition, led by Britain, Austria and
Russia, and including the Ottoman Empire, Portugal and Naples, was formed in 1798, but by 1801,
this too had been defeated, leaving Britain the only opponent of the new French Consulate. In March
1802, France and Britain agreed to end hostilities under the Treaty of Amiens. For the first time in ten
years, all of Europe was at peace.

But many problems persisted between the two sides, making implementation of the treaty
increasingly difficult. The British government resented having to return the Cape Colony and most of
the Dutch West Indian islands to the Batavian Republic. Napoleon was angry that British troops had
not evacuated the island of Malta.[7]The tense situation only worsened when Napoleon sent an
expeditionary force to crush the Haitian Revolution.[8] In May 1803, Britain declared war on France.

Third Coalition[edit]

In December 1804, an Anglo-Swedish agreement led to the creation of the Third Coalition. British
Prime Minister William Pitt spent 1804 and 1805 in a flurry of diplomatic activity geared towards
forming a new coalition against France, and by April 1805, Britain and Russia had signed an alliance.
Having been defeated twice in recent memory by France, and being keen on revenge, Austria
joined the coalition a few months later.[10]

See also: Order of Battle at the Austerlitz campaign

French Imperial army[edit]

Before the formation of the Third Coalition, Napoleon had assembled an invasion force, called
the Arme d'Angleterre (Army of England) around six camps at Boulogne in Northern France. He
intended to use this invasion force to strike at England, and was so confident of success that he had
commemorative medals struck to celebrate the conquest of the English. [11] Although they never
invaded, Napoleon's troops received careful and invaluable training for any possible military
operation. Boredom among the troops occasionally set in, but Napoleon paid many visits and
conducted lavish parades in order to boost morale. [12]

The men at Boulogne formed the core for what Napoleon would later call La Grande Arme. At the
start, this French army had about 200,000 men organized into seven corps, which were large field
units that contained 36 to 40 cannon each and were capable of independent action until other corps
could come to the rescue.[13] A single corps (properly situated in a strong defensive position) could
survive at least a day without support, giving the Grande Arme countless strategic and tactical
options on every campaign.

In addition to these forces, Napoleon created a cavalry reserve of 22,000 organized into
two cuirassier divisions, four mounted dragoon divisions, one division of dismounted dragoons and
one of light cavalry, all supported by 24 artillery pieces.[13] By 1805, the Grande Arme had grown to a
force of 350,000 men,[14] who were well equipped, well trained, and led by competent officers.

Russian Imperial army[edit]

The Russian army in 1805 had many characteristics of Ancien Rgime organization. There was no
permanent formation above the regimental level, and senior officers were mostly recruited from
aristocratic circles; commissions were generally given to the highest bidder, regardless of
competence. The Russian infantry was considered one of the most hardy in Europe, however, and
there was fine Russian artillery, manned by trained professional soldiers, who regularly fought hard to
prevent their pieces from falling into enemy hands.[15]

Austrian Imperial army[edit]

Archduke Charles, brother of the Austrian Emperor, had started to reform the Austrian army in 1801
by taking away power from the Hofkriegsrat, the military-political council responsible for the armed
forces.[16] Charles was Austria's best field commander,[17] but he was unpopular at court and lost much
influence when, against his advice, Austria decided to go to war with France. Karl Mack became the
new main commander in Austria's army, instituting reforms on the eve of the war that called for a
regiment to be composed of four battalions of four companies, rather than three battalions of six
companies.[18][19] Austrian cavalry was considered the best in Europe, and one of the best of the time

Preliminary moves[edit]

Napoleon takes the surrender of General Mack and the Austrian army at Ulm. Painting by Charles Thvenin.

In August 1805, Napoleon, Emperor of the French since December of the previous year, turned his
sights from the English Channel to the Rhine in order to deal with the new Austrian and Russian
threats. On 25 September after a feverish march in great secrecy, 200,000 French troops began to
cross the Rhine on a front of 260 km (160 mi).[20][21] Mack had gathered the greater part of the Austrian
army at the fortress of Ulm in Swabia (modern day southern Germany).

Napoleon swung his forces southward in a wheeling movement that put the French at the Austrian
rear. The Ulm Maneuver was well-executed and on 20 October Mack and 23,000 Austrian troops
surrendered at Ulm, bringing the number of Austrian prisoners of the campaign to 60,000. [21] Although
this spectacular victory was soured by the defeat of the Franco-Spanish fleet at the Battle of
Trafalgar the following day, French success on land continued as Vienna fell in November. The
French gained 100,000 muskets, 500 cannons, and intact bridges across the Danube.[22]

Meanwhile, Russian delays prevented them from saving the Austrian armies; the Russians then
withdrew to the northeast, to await reinforcements and link up with surviving Austrian units.
Tsar Alexander I appointed general Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov commander-in-chief of the
combined Russo-Austrian force. On 9 September 1805, Kutuzov arrived at the battlefield, quickly
contacting Francis I of Austria and his courtiers to discuss strategy and logistics. Under pressure

from Kutuzov, the Austrians agreed to supply munitions and weapons in a timely manner. Kutuzov
also spotted shortcomings in the Austrian defense plan, which he called "very dogmatic." He objected
to Austrian annexation of the land recently under Napoleon's control, because this would make the
local people distrust the allied force.[23]

The French followed after Kutuzov, but soon found themselves in a difficult position. Prussian
intentions were unknown and could be hostile, the Russian and Austrian armies had converged, and
French lines of communication were extremely long, requiring strong garrisons to keep them open.
Napoleon realized that to capitalize on the success at Ulm, he had to force the Allies to battle and
defeat them.[24]

On the Russian side, Kutuzov also realized Napoleon needed to do battle; so instead of clinging to
the "suicidal" Austrian defense plan, Kutuzov decided to retreat. He ordered Pyotr Bagration to
contain the French at Vienna with 600 soldiers, and instructed Bagration to accept Murat's ceasefire
proposal so that the Allied Army could have more time to retreat. It was later discovered that the
proposal was false and had been used in order to launch a surprise attack on Vienna. Nonetheless,
Bagration was able to hold off the French assault for a time by negotiating an armistice with Murat,
thereby providing Kutuzov time to position himself with the Russian rearguard near Hollabrunn.

Murat initially refrained from an attack, believing the entire Russian army stood before him. Napoleon
soon realized Murat's mistakes and ordered him to pursue quickly; but the allied army had already
retreated to Olmutz.[23] According to Kutuzov's plan, the Allies would retreat further to
the Carpathian region[25] and "at Galicia, I will bury the French."[23]

Napoleon did not stay still. The French Emperor decided to set a psychological trap in order to lure
the Allies out. Days before any fighting, Napoleon had been giving the impression that his army was
weak and that he desired a negotiated peace.[26] About 53,000 French troopsincluding Soult,
Lannes and Murat's forceswere assigned to take Austerlitz and the Olmutz road, occupying the
enemy's attention. The Allied forces, numbering about 89,000, seemed far superior and would be
tempted to attack the outnumbered French army. However, the Allies did not know that Bernadotte,
Mortier and Davout were already within the supported distance, and could be called in by forced
marches from Iglau and Vienna respectively, raising the French number to 75,000 troops. [27]

Napoleon's lure did not stop at that. On 25 November, General Savary was sent to the Allied
headquarters at Olmutz to deliver Napoleon's message expressing his desire to avoid a battle, while
secretly examining the Allied forces' situation. As expected, the overture was seen as a sign of
weakness. When Francis I offered an armistice on the 27th, Napoleon accepted enthusiastically. On
the same day, Napoleon ordered Soult to abandon both Austerlitz and the Pratzen Heights and, while
doing so, to create an impression of chaos during the retreat that would induce the enemy to occupy
the Heights.

The next day (28 November), the French Emperor requested a personal interview with Alexander I
and received a visit from the Tsar's most impetuous aide, Count Dolgorouki. The meeting was
another part of the trap, as Napoleon intentionally expressed anxiety and hesitation to his opponents.
Dolgorouki reported to the Tsar an additional indication of French weakness. [27][28]

The plan was successful. Many of the Allied officers, including the Tsar's aides and the Austrian Chief
of Staff Franz von Weyrother, strongly supported an immediate attack and appeared to sway Tsar
Alexander.[28] Kutuzov's plan to retreat further to the Carpathian region was rejected, and the Allied
forces soon fell into Napoleon's trap.


Napoleon with his troops on the eve of battle. Painting by Louis-Franois, Baron Lejeune

The battle began with the French army outnumbered. Napoleon had some 72,000 men and 157 guns
for the impending battle, with about 7,000 troops under Davout still far to the south in the direction of
Vienna.[29][30] The Allies had about 85,000 soldiers, seventy percent of them Russian, and 318 guns. [29]

At first, Napoleon was not totally confident of victory. In a letter written to Minister of Foreign
Affairs Talleyrand, Napoleon requested Talleyrand not tell anyone about the upcoming battle because
he did not want to disturb Empress Josphine. According to Frederick C. Schneid, the French
Emperor's chief worry was how he could explain to Josphine a French defeat. [31]


The battle took place about six miles (ten kilometers) southeast of the town of Brno, between that
town and Austerlitz (Czech: Slavkov u Brna) in what is now the Czech Republic. The northern part of
the battlefield was dominated by the 700-foot (210-meter) Santon Hill and the 880-foot (270-
meter) Zuran (ur) Hill, both overlooking the vital Olomouc/Brno road, which was on an east/west
axis. To the west of these two hills was the village of Bellowitz (Bedichovice), and between them the
Bosenitz (Roketnice) stream went south to link up with the Goldbach (ka) stream, the latter
flowing by the villages of Kobelnitz (Kobylnice), Sokolnitz (Sokolnice), and Telnitz (Telnice).

The centerpiece of the entire area was the Pratzen (Prace) Heights, a gently sloping hill about 35 to
40 feet (10 to 12 meters) in height. An aide noted that Napoleon repeatedly told his marshals,
"Gentlemen, examine this ground carefully, it is going to be a battlefield; you will have a part to play
upon it."[32]

Allied plans and dispositions[edit]

Allied (red) and French (blue) deployments at 1800 hours on 1 December 1805.

An Allied council met on 1 December to discuss proposals for the battle. Most of the Allied strategists
had two fundamental ideas in mind: making contact with the enemy and securing the southern flank
that held the communication line to Vienna. Although the Tsar and his immediate entourage pushed
hard for a battle, Emperor Francis of Austria was more cautious and, as mentioned, he was
seconded by Kutuzov, the Commander-in-chief of the Russians and the Allied troops. [33] The pressure
to fight from the Russian nobles and the Austrian commanders, however, was too strong, and the
Allies adopted the plan of the Austrian Chief-of-Staff, Franz von Weyrother.[33] This called for a main
drive against the French right flank, which the Allies noticed was lightly guarded, and diversionary
attacks against the French left. The Allies deployed most of their troops into four columns that would
attack the French right. The Russian Imperial Guard was held in reserve while Russian troops
under Bagration guarded the Allied right. The Russian Tsar rudely stripped the authority of
Commander-in-chief M. I. Kutuzov and gave it to Franz von Weyrother. In the battle, Kutuzov could
only command the IV Corps of the Allied army, although he was still the de facto commander
because the Tsar was afraid to take over in case his favoured plan failed. [23]

French plans and dispositions[edit]

French cuirassiers taking position

Napoleon was hoping that the Allied forces would attack, and to encourage them, he deliberately
weakened his right flank.[34] On 28 November Napoleon met with his marshals at Imperial
Headquarters, who informed him of their qualms about the forthcoming battle. He shrugged off their
suggestion of retreat.[35]

Napoleon's plan envisioned that the Allies would throw many troops to envelop his right flank in order
to cut the French communication line from Vienna.[23] As a result, the Allies' center and left flank would
be exposed and become vulnerable.[36] To encourage them to do so, Napoleon abandoned the
strategic position on the Pratzen Heights, faking the weakness of his forces and his own caution. [35]
Meanwhile, Napoleon's main force was to be concealed in a dead ground opposite the Heights.
According to the plan, the French troops would attack and recapture the Pratzen Heights, then
from the Heights they would launch a decisive assault to the center of the Allied army, cripple them,
and encircle them from the rear.[23][36]

If the Russian force leaves the Pratzen Heights in order to go to the right side, they will certainly be


The massive thrust through the Allied center was conducted by 16,000 troops of Soult's IV Corps. IV
Corps' position was cloaked by dense mist during the early stage of the battle; in fact how long the
mist lasted was vital to Napoleon's plan: Soult's troops would become uncovered if the mist
dissipated too soon, but if it lingered too long, Napoleon would be unable to determine when the
Allied troops had evacuated Pratzen Heights, preventing him from timing his attack properly.[38]

Meanwhile, to support his weak right flank, Napoleon ordered Davout's III Corps to force march all
the way from Vienna and join General Legrand's men, who held the extreme southern flank that
would bear the heaviest part of the Allied attack. Davout's soldiers had 48 hours to march 110 km
(68 mi). Their arrival was crucial in determining the success of the French plan. Indeed, the
arrangement of Napoleon on the right flank was very risky as the French had only minimal troops
garrisoning there. However, Napoleon was able to use such a risky plan because Davoutthe
commander of III Corpswas one of Napoleon's best marshals, because the right flank's position

was protected by a complicated system of streams and lakes,[23] and because the French had already
settled upon a secondary line of retreat through Brunn.[39] The Imperial Guard and Bernadotte's I
Corps were held in reserve while the V Corps under Lannes guarded the northern sector of the
battlefield, where the new communication line was located.[23]

By 1 December 1805, the French troops had been shifted in accordance with the Allied movement
southward, as Napoleon expected.[36]

Battle is joined[edit]

The battle began at about 8 a.m. with the first allied column attacking the village of Telnitz, which was
defended by the 3rd Line Regiment. This sector of the battlefield witnessed heavy fighting in this
early action as several ferocious Allied charges evicted the French from the town and forced them
onto the other side of the Goldbach. The first men of Davout's corps arrived at this time and threw the
Allies out of Telnitz before they too were attacked by hussars and reabandoned the town. Additional
Allied attacks out of Telnitz were checked by French artillery.[40]

Capture of a French regiment's eagle by the cavalry of the Russian guard, by Bogdan Willewalde (1884)

Allied columns started pouring against the French right, but not at the desired speed, so the French
were mostly successful in curbing the attacks. Actually, the Allied deployments were mistaken and
poorly timed: cavalry detachments under Liechtenstein on the Allied left flank had to be placed in the
right flank and in the process they ran into and slowed down part of the second column of infantry
that was advancing towards the French right.[35] At the time, the planners thought this slowing was
disastrous, but later on it helped the Allies. Meanwhile, the leading elements of the second column
were attacking the village of Sokolnitz, which was defended by the 26th Light Regiment and
the Tirailleurs, French skirmishers. Initial Allied assaults proved unsuccessful and General
Langeron ordered the bombardment of the village. This deadly barrage forced the French out, and at
about the same time, the third column attacked the castle of Sokolnitz. The French, however,
counterattacked and regained the village, only to be thrown out again. Conflict in this area ended
temporarily when Friant's division (part of III Corps) retook the village. Sokolnitz was perhaps the
most fought over area in the battlefield and would change hands several times as the day

While the allied troops attacked the French right flank, Kutuzov's IV Corp stopped at the Pratzen
Heights and stayed still. Just like Napoleon, Kutuzov realized the importance of Pratzen and decided
to protect the position. But the young Tsar did not, so he expelled the IV Corp from the Heights. This
act quickly pushed the Allied army into her grave.[23]

"One sharp blow and the war is over"[edit]

The decisive attacks on the Allied center by St. Hilaire and Vandamme split the Allied army in two and left the
French in a golden strategic position to win the battle.

At about 8:45 a.m., satisfied at the weakness in the enemy center, Napoleon asked Soult how long it
would take for his men to reach the Pratzen Heights, to which the Marshal replied, "Less than twenty
minutes, sire." About 15 minutes later, Napoleon ordered the attack, adding, "One sharp blow and the
war is over."[42]

A dense fog helped to cloud the advance of St. Hilaire's French division, but as they went up the
slope the legendary 'Sun of Austerlitz' ripped the mist apart and encouraged them forward. [41] Russian
soldiers and commanders on top of the heights were stunned to see so many French troops coming
towards them.[43] Allied commanders moved some of the delayed detachments of the fourth column
into this bitter struggle. Over an hour of fighting destroyed much of this unit. The other men from the
second column, mostly inexperienced Austrians, also participated in the struggle and swung the
numbers against one of the best fighting forces in the French army, eventually forcing them to
withdraw down the slopes. However, gripped by desperation, St. Hilaire's men struck hard once more
and bayoneted the Allies out of the heights. To the north, General Vandamme's division attacked an
area called Star Vinohrady ("Old Vineyards") and, through talented skirmishing and deadly volleys,
broke several Allied battalions.[44]

The battle had firmly turned in France's favour, but it was far from over. Napoleon ordered
Bernadotte's I Corps to support Vandamme's left and moved his own command center from ur
Hill to St. Anthony's Chapel on the Pratzen Heights. The difficult position of the Allies was confirmed
by the decision to send in the Russian Imperial Guard; Grand Duke Constantine, Tsar Alexander's
brother, commanded the Guard and counterattacked in Vandamme's section of the field, forcing a
bloody effort and the only loss of a French standard in the battle (a battalion of the 4th Line Regiment

was defeated). Sensing trouble, Napoleon ordered his own heavy Guard cavalry forward. These men
pulverized their Russian counterparts, but with both sides pouring in large masses of cavalry, no
victory was clear.

The Russians had a numerical advantage but soon the tide swung as Drouet's Division, the 2nd of
Bernadotte's I Corps, deployed on the flank of the action and allowed French cavalry to seek refuge
behind their lines. The horse artillery of the Guard also inflicted heavy casualties on the Russian
cavalry and fusiliers. The Russians broke and many died as they were pursued by the reinvigorated
French cavalry for about a quarter of a mile.[45] The casualties of the Russians in Pratzen included
Kutuzov (severely wounded) and his son-in-law Ferdinand von Tiesenhausen (KIA).[23]


I was... under fierce and continuous canister fire... Many soldiers, now incessantly engaged in battle
from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m., had no cartridges left. I could do nothing but retreat...

Lieutenant General Przhebishevsky[46]

By 1400 hours, the Allied army had been dangerously separated. Napoleon now had the option to strike at one
of the wings, and he chose the Allied left since other enemy sectors had already been cleared or were
conducting fighting retreats.

Meanwhile, the northernmost part of the battlefield was also witnessing heavy fighting. Prince
Liechtenstein's heavy cavalry began to assault Kellerman's lighter cavalry forces after eventually
arriving at the correct position in the field. The fighting initially went well for the French, but
Kellerman's forces took cover behind General Caffarelli's infantry division once it became clear
Russian numbers were too great. Caffarelli's men halted the Russian assaults and permitted Murat to
send two cuirassier divisions (one commanded by d'Hautpoul and the other one by Nansouty) into
the fray to finish off the Russian cavalry for good. The ensuing mle was bitter and long, but the
French ultimately prevailed. Lannes then led his V Corps against Bagration's men and after hard
fighting managed to drive the skilled Russian commander off the field. He wanted to pursue, but
Murat, who was in control of this sector in the battlefield, was against the idea. [47]

Napoleon's focus now shifted towards the southern end of the battlefield where the French and the
Allies were still fighting over Sokolnitz and Telnitz. In an effective double-pronged assault, St. Hilaire's
division and part of Davout's III Corps smashed through the enemy at Sokolnitz and persuaded the
commanders of the first two columns, Generals Kienmayer and Langeron, to flee as fast as they
could. Buxhowden, the commander of the Allied left and the man responsible for leading the attack,
was completely drunk and fled as well. Kienmayer covered his withdrawal with the O'Reilly light
cavalry, who gallantly managed to defeat five of six French cavalry regiments before they too had to

General panic now seized the Allied army and it abandoned the field in all possible directions. A
famous episode occurred during this retreat: Russian forces that had been defeated by the French
right withdrew south towards Vienna via the Satschan frozen ponds. French artillery pounded
towards the men, and the ice was broken due to the bombardment. The men drowned in the cold
ponds, dozens of Russian artillery pieces going down with them. Estimates of how many guns were
captured differ: there may have been as few as 38 or more than 100. Sources also differ about
casualties, with figures ranging between 200 and 2,000 dead. Many drowning Russians were saved
by their victorious foes.[3][48] However, local evidence, only later made public, suggests that Napoleon's
account of the catastrophe may have been totally invented; on his instructions the lakes were drained
a few days after the battle and the corpses of only two or three men, with some 150 horses, were

Military and political results[edit]

Allied casualties stood at about 36,000 out of an army of 85,000, which represented about 40% of
their effective forces. The French lost around 9,000 out of an army of 73,000, or about 12% of their
forces. The Allies also lost some 180 guns and about 50 standards. The great victory was met by
sheer amazement and delirium in Paris, where just days earlier the nation had been teetering on the
brink of financial collapse. Napoleon wrote to Josephine, "I have beaten the Austro-Russian army
commanded by the two emperors. I am a little weary....I embrace you."[50] Tsar Alexander perhaps
best summed up the harsh times for the Allies by stating, "We are babies in the hands of a
giant."[51] The Holy Roman Emperor Francis II is remembered to have said after the allied defeat in
the Battle of Austerlitz: "The British are dealers of human flesh. They pay others to fight in their
place."[this quote needs a citation] After hearing the news of Austerlitz William Pitt referred to a map of Europe,
"Roll up that map; it will not be wanted these ten years."[52]

France and Austria signed a truce on 4 December and the Treaty of Pressburg 22 days later took the
latter out of the war. Austria agreed to recognize French territory captured by the treaties of Campo
Formio (1797) and Lunville (1801), cede land to Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden, which were
Napoleon's German allies, and pay 40 million francs in war indemnities, and Venice was given to
the Kingdom of Italy. It was a harsh end for Austria, but certainly not a catastrophic peace. The
Russian army was allowed to withdraw to home territory and the French ensconced themselves in
Southern Germany. The Holy Roman Empire was effectively wiped out, 1806 being seen as its final
year. Napoleon created the Confederation of the Rhine, a string of German states meant to serve as
a buffer between France and Prussia. Prussia saw these and other moves as an affront to its status
as the main power of Central Europe and it went to war with France in 1806.


Napoleon's words to his troops after the battle were full of praise: Soldats! Je suis content de
vous (English: Soldiers! I am pleased with you).[53] The Emperor provided two million golden francs to
the higher officers and 200 francs to each soldier, with large pensions for the widows of the fallen.
Orphaned children were adopted by Napoleon personally and were allowed to add "Napoleon" to
their baptismal and family names.[54] This battle is one of four for which Napoleon never awarded
a victory title, the others being Marengo, Jena, and Friedland.[55]

Popular conceptions[edit]

The Battle of Austerlitz, 2 December 1805 by Joseph Swebach-Desfontaines.

Artists and musicians on the side of France and her conquests expressed their sentiment in populist
and elite art of the time. Prussian music critic E.T.A. Hoffmann, in his famous review of Beethoven's
5th Symphony, "singles out for special abuse a certain Bataille des trois Empereurs, a French battle
symphony by Louis Jadin celebrating Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz." [56]

Historical views[edit]

Napoleon and Francis II after the Battle of Austerlitz

Napoleon did not succeed in defeating the Allied army as thoroughly as he wanted, [57] but historians
and enthusiasts alike recognize that the original plan provided a significant victory, comparable to
other great tactical battles such as Cannae.[58] Some historians suggest that Napoleon was so
successful at Austerlitz that he lost touch with reality, and what used to be French foreign policy
became a "personal Napoleonic one" after the battle. [59] In French history, Austerlitz is acknowledged
as an impressive military victory, and in the 19th century, when fascination with the First Empire was
at its height, the battle was revered by the likes of Victor Hugo, who "in the depth of [his] thoughts"
was hearing the "noise of the heavy cannon rolling towards Austerlitz."[60] In the 2005 bicentennial,
however, controversy erupted when neither French President Jacques Chirac nor Prime

Minister Dominique de Villepin attended any functions commemorating the battle.[61] On the other
hand, some residents of France's overseas departments protested against what they viewed as the
"official commemoration of Napoleon," arguing that Austerlitz should not be celebrated since they
believed that Napoleon committed genocide against colonial people.[61]

After the battle, Tsar Alexander I laid all the blame on M. I. Kutuzov, Commander-in-chief of the Allied
Army.[62] However, it is clear that Kutuzov's plan was to retreat farther to the rear where the Allied
Army had a sharp advantage in logistics. Had the Allied Army retreated further, they might have been
reinforced by Archduke Charles's troops from Italy, and the Prussians might have joined the coalition
against Napoleon. A French army at the end of her supply lines, in a place which had no food
supplies, might have faced a very different ending from the one they achieved at the real battle of
Austerlitz.[63] This essentially was Kutuzov's successful strategy in 1812, after the Battle of Borodino.

See also[edit]

Gare d'Austerlitz


1. Jump up^ French numbers at the battle vary depending on the account; 65,000, 67,000,
73,000, or 75,000 are other figures often present in the literature. The discrepancy arises because
about 7,000 men of Davout's III Corps were not at the battle right when it started. Including or not
including these troops is a matter of preference (in this article, they will be included as separate from
the 67,000 French soldiers originally on the field). David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p.
416 gives 67,000 (without Davout's III Corps)

2. Jump up^ Allied numbers at the battle vary depending on the account; 73,000, 84,000, or
85,000 are other figures often present in the literature. Andrew Uffindell, Great Generals of the
Napoleonic Wars. p. 25 gives 73,000. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p. 417 gives
85,000. In Napoleon and Austerlitz (1997), Scott Bowden writes that the traditional number given for
the Allies, 85,000, reflects their theoretical strength, and not the true numbers present on the

3. ^ Jump up to:a b David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p. 432

4. Jump up^ Andrew Roberts, Napoleon, A Life. p. 390

5. Jump up^ Farwell p. 64. Austerlitz is generally regarded as one of Napoleon's tactical
masterpieces and has been ranked as the equal of Arbela, Cannae, and Leuthen.

6. Jump up^ Dupuy p. 102

7. Jump up^ Chandler p. 304

8. Jump up^ Chandler p. 320

9. Jump up^ Chandler p. 328. The Baltic was dominated by Russia, something Britain was not
comfortable with, as it provided valuable commodities like timber, tar, and hemp, crucial supplies to
the British Empire. Additionally, Britain supported the Ottoman Empire against Russian incursions
towards the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, French territorial rearrangements in Germany occurred

without Russian consultation and Napoleon's annexations in the Po valley increasingly strained
relations between the two.

10. Jump up^ Chandler p. 331

11. Jump up^ Channel4 Time Traveller series

12. Jump up^ Chandler p. 323

13. ^ Jump up to:a b Chandler p. 332

14. Jump up^ Chandler p. 333

15. Jump up^ Todd Fisher & Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall
of an Empire, p. 33

16. Jump up^ Fisher & Fremont-Barnes p. 31

17. Jump up^ Andrew Uffindell, Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars. p. 155

18. ^ Jump up to:a b Todd Fisher & Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and
Fall of an Empire. p. 32

19. Jump up^ Stutterheim, Karl (1807). A Detailed Account of The Battle of Austerlitz. Pine-
Coffin, John (trans.). London: Thomas Goddard. p. 46.

20. Jump up^ Richard Brooks (editor), Atlas of World Military History. p. 108

21. ^ Jump up to:a b Andrew Uffindell, Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars. p. 15

22. Jump up^ David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p. 407

23. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g h i j k L Vinh Quc, Nguyn Th Th, L Phng Hong, pp. 154160

24. Jump up^ Chandler p. 409

25. Jump up^ Eric Dorn Brose, German history, 17891871: from the Holy Roman Empire to the
Bismarckian Reich, p.46

26. Jump up^ Frank McLynn, Napoleon: A Biography. p. 342

27. ^ Jump up to:a b David Chandler, p.410

28. ^ Jump up to:a b David Chandler, p.411

29. ^ Jump up to:a b Andrew Uffindell, Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars. p. 19

30. Jump up^ David Nicholls, Napoleon: a biographical companion pp. 910.

31. Jump up^ Frederick C. Schneid, Napoleon's conquest of Europe: the War of the Third
Coalition, p/ 137

32. Jump up^ David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p. 412413

33. ^ Jump up to:a b Chandler p. 416

34. Jump up^ Richard Brooks (editor), Atlas of World Military History. p. 109

35. ^ Jump up to:a b c Todd Fisher & Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and
Fall of an Empire. p. 48

36. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Gregory Fremont-Barnes, Napoleon Bonaparte: leadership, strategy,

conflict, p. 19

37. Jump up^ David G. Chandler, p. 413

38. Jump up^ Gregory Fremont-Barnes (2010). Napoleon Bonaparte: leadership, strategy,
conflict. Great Britain: Osprey Publishing. p. 21. ISBN 978-1-84603-458-9.

39. Jump up^ David G. Chandler, p. 412

40. Jump up^ Fisher & Fremont-Barnes p. 4849

41. ^ Jump up to:a b Todd Fisher & Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and
Fall of an Empire. p. 49

42. Jump up^ Andrew Uffindell, Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars. p. 21

43. Jump up^ David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p. 425

44. Jump up^ Todd Fisher & Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall
of an Empire. p. 4950

45. Jump up^ Fisher & Fremont-Barnes p. 51

46. Jump up^ Grant, p. 203

47. ^ Jump up to:a b Fisher & Fremont-Barnes p. 52

48. Jump up^ Rose, John Holland (1910). "XXIII. Austerlitz". The Life of Napoleon I. 2 (third ed.).
London: G Bell and Sons. p. 38. Retrieved 10 December 2008.

49. Jump up^ Rose (1910:46)

50. Jump up^ Chandler p. 432433. Napoleon's comments in this letter led to the battle's other
famous designation, "Battle of the Three Emperors." However, Emperor Francis of Austria was not
present at the battlefield.

51. Jump up^ Todd Fisher & Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall
of an Empire. p. 54

52. Jump up^ Stanhope's Life of the Rt Hon. William Pitt (1862), vol. iv, p.369

53. Jump up^ Napoleon's Proclamation following Austerlitz. Dated 3 December 1805. Translated
by Markham, J. David.

54. Jump up^ David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. p. 439

55. Jump up^ Andrew Uffindell, Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars. p. 25

56. Jump up^ Stephen Rumph, "A Kingdom Not of This World: The Political Context of E.T.A.
Hoffmann's Beethoven Criticism," 19th Century Music, 1995.

57. Jump up^ Andrew Uffindell, Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars. p. 25

58. Jump up^ Adrian Gilbert (2000). The Encyclopedia of Warfare: From Earliest Time to the
Present Day. Taylor & Francis. p. 133. ISBN 978-1-57958-216-6. Retrieved 11 July 2014.

59. Jump up^ Frank McLynn, Napoleon: A Biography. p. 350

60. Jump up^ France's history wars, Accessed 20 March 2006

61. ^ Jump up to:a b BBC Furore over Austerlitz ceremony, Accessed 20 March 2006

62. Jump up^ David Nicholls, Napoleon: a biographical companion, p. 138

63. Jump up^ Ian Castle, Christa Hook, Austerlitz 1805: the fate of empires, pp 8990.


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Brooks, Richard (editor). Atlas of World Military History. London: HarperCollins, 2000. ISBN

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Castle, Ian. Austerlitz Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe. Pen & Sword Books,
2005. ISBN 1-84415-171-9

Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. ISBN

Dupuy, Trevor N. Understanding Defeat: How to Recover from Loss in Battle to Gain Victory
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Farwell, Byron The Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-century Land Warfare: An Illustrated World

View New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001 ISBN 0-393-04770-9

Fisher, Todd & Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Napoleonic Wars: The Rise and Fall of an
Empire. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2004. ISBN 1-84176-831-6

Goetz, Robert. 1805: Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third
Coalition (Greenhill Books, 2005). ISBN 1-85367-644-6

Tolstoy, Leo. War and Peace. London: Penguin Group, 1982. ISBN 0-14-044417-3

Marbot, Jean-Baptiste-Antoine-Marcelin. "The Battle of Austerlitz," Napoleon: Symbol for an

Age, A Brief History with Documents, ed. Rafe Blaufarb (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2008),

McLynn, Frank. Napoleon: A Biography. New York: Arcade Publishing Inc., 1997. ISBN 1-

Uffindell, Andrew. Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars. Kent: Spellmount Ltd., 2003. ISBN

L Vinh Quc (chief editor); L Phng Hong; Nguyn Th Th (2001). Cc nhn vt lch s
cn i. Tp II: Nga (in Vietnamese). Vietnam: Nh xut bn Gio dc.

Izbor teme

Tema seminarskog rada treba da bude to konkretnija, fokusirana na jedan problem. Od studenta se
ne oekuje da obradi pet razliitih tema u jednom radu. Naprotiv, poeljno je to dublje usmeravanje
na jedno konkretno pitanje.


- Odgovaranje na pitanje (npr. Zato parlament Srbije ne vri efikasno nadzor nad radom vlade?)

- Dokazivanje hipoteze (npr. Odnos meu elitama doprinosi konsolidaciji demokratije; Civilno
drutvo je jako i uticajno samo u razvijenim demokratskim dravama)

- Komparacija teorija, pristupa, argumenata (npr. Komparacija pluralistikog i elitistikog shvatanja

drave; Doprinos liberalizma shvatanju drave kritika drave blagostanja)

Primeri loeg izbora teme: Agencija za borbu protiv korupcije, Ombudsman, Problem korupcije,
Nevladine organizacije...

Struktura rada

1. naslovna strana na kojoj se obavezno nalaze naziv predmeta na kom se pie seminarski rad, tema
seminarskog rada, ime i prezime i broj indeksa autora i rok za predaju i datum predaje rada.

2. sadraj

3. uvod u kom se predstavlja tema rada, osnovne hipoteze i struktura rada.

4. deskriptivni i pregledni deo koji sadri pregled prelevantne literature, poreenje i sueljavanje
polazita razliitih autora. Argumentacija mora da bude jasno predstavljena

5. analitiki i zakljuni deo koji sadri analizu i zakljue koji se izvode iz deskriptivnog dela.

6. literatura odnosno spisak koriene i citirane literature

itaocu nakon itanja rada mora da bude jasno koju temu je autor obradio (jednu, nikako vie tema),
stanje ranijih istraivanja na istu temu i pozicija autora seminarskog rada odnosno njegovo miljenje
o datoj temi.

Opremljenost rada / tehnike odlike

Rad treba da bude duine oko 20.000 karaktera odnosno 10-ak strana, font Times New Roman,
veliina fonta 12, prored 1.5.

Radovi treba da budu na latinici i u .doc ili .docx formatu.

Citati i parafraziranja moraju biti uredno obeleeni i citati se uvek stavljaju pod znake navoda.


Kada citiramo:

- Direktni navodi

- Parafraziranja koja ne spadaju u opte znanje

- Dodatne informacije

Citati i parafraziranja moraju jasno da budu obeleeni. Direktan citat mora da ima znake navoda () i
referencu (ukljuujui i stranicu koja je citirana). Parafraziranja moraju uvek biti obeleena
referencom, bez znakova navoda.

Harvardski stil se koristi za citiranja unutar teksta (in-text citati) tako to se u zagradi navodi prezime
autora i godina izdanja i eventualno stranica, na primer (Stojiljkovi, 2012) ili (Stojiljkovi, 2012, str.
14), dok se ostale informacije o referenci mogu pronai u literaturi na kraju teksta.

Na primer:

Kako istie Karen Bird u svojoj analizi predstavljenosti vidljivih manjina mogue je identifikovati set
politikih pitanja koja potencijalno imaju veliki znaaj za veinu vidljivih manjina. Ona ukljuuju pitanja
rasne diskriminacije, multikulturalizma, imigracije i socijalno-ekonomskog statusa etnikih manjina.
Razumno je oekivati da e poslanici koji predstavljaju izborne jedinice sa velikom populacijom
vidljivih manjina biti obazriviji prema ovim pitanjima (Bird, 2011, str. 215).

U literaturi:

Bird, K. (2011). Patterns of substantive representation among visible minority MPs: Evidence from
Canadas House of Commons. U K. Bird, T. Saalfeld i A. M. Wst eds. The Political Representation
of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies. New York,
Routledge/ ECRP Studies in European Political Science. 207-230.

Kako se koriste sekundarne reference?

Ako citirate ili parafrazirate tekst koji niste sami proitali nego ste do njega doli preko nekog drugog
teksta, potrebno je da to jasno navedete. Poeljno je ne koristiti sekundarne reference, kad god
moete pronaite i proitajte sam izborni tekst, ali ako on nije dostupan, jasno obeleite da citirate
izvore prema drugom autoru. Na primer, ako citirate Petrovia prema neemu to ste proitali u
tekstu Jankovia iz 2008, staviete sledeu referencu: (Petrovi, prema Jankovi, 2008, str. 14). U
literaturi se navodi samo ona referenca koju ste stvarno itali (u ovom sluaju Jankovi, 2008)

Citiranje veeg broja refrenci

Ako u istom citatu citirate vei broj referenci, koristite ; kako biste razdvojili reference i poreajte ih
po abecednom/azbunom redu, npr: (Jovi, 2003; Petrovi, 2006; Stojiljkovi, 2007)

Primeri za korienje harvardskog stila

Knjiga (jedan autor):

U tekstu: (Stojiljkovi, 2008)

Literatura: Stojiljkovi, Z. (2008). Partijski sistem Srbije. Beograd: Slubeni glasnik.

Knjiga (dva ili tri autora):

U tekstu: (Brito-Vieira i Runciman, 2008)

Literatura: Brito Vieira, M. i Runciman, D. (2008). Representation, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Knjiga (etiri ili vie autora):

U tekstu: (Meneguello et al., 2012)

Literatura: Meneguello, R., et al. (2012). Mulheres e Negrosna Poltica: estudo exploratrio sobre
o desempenho eleitoral em quatro estados brasileiros. Campinas: Centro de Estudos de Opinio
Pblica, Universidade Estadual de Campinas.

Poglavlje u zborniku:

U tekstu: (Bird, 2011)

Literatura: Bird, K. (2011). Patterns of substantive representation among visible minority MPs:
Evidence from Canadas House of Commons. U K. Bird, T. Saalfeld i A. M. Wst eds. The
Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, parties and parliaments in liberal
democracies. New York, Routledge/ ECRP Studies in European Political Science. 207-230.

Tekst u asopisu:

U tekstu: (Spasojevi, 2011)

Literatura: Spasojevi, D. (2011). Monitoring demokratije - duvai u pitaljku i kontrolni veb-

sajtovi. Politiki ivot, 2, 91-98.

Novinski lanak (poznat autor):

U tekstu: (Anoji, 2013)

Literatura: Anoji, I. (2013). Oslukuju li politiari glas naroda. Politika, 29. septembar 2013, str.

Novinski lanak (bez autora):

U tekstu: (Blic, 2013)

Literatura: Blic. (2013). DSHV obeleila 23 godine postojanja, 12. jul 2013, str. 6.

Internet stranica (poznat autor):

U tekstu: (Anoji, 2013)

Literatura: Anoji, I. (2013). Oslukuju li politiari glas naroda. Dostupno

nahttp://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Osluskuju-li-politicari-glas-naroda.sr.html [Pristupljeno 30.
septembra 2013].

Internet stranica bez autora:

U tekstu: (RTV, 2012)

Literatura: RTV (2012). Ljaji i Ugljanin ulaze u Vladu [online]. Dostupno

na:http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/politika/ljajic-i-ugljanin-ulaze-u-vladu_331773.html [Pristupljeno 16. jula

Akademsko potenje

Podrazumeva se da e studenti poteno izvravati svoje obaveze, bez varanja i korienja tueg rada
kao svog (plagijat). U cilju zatite autorskih prava, seminarski radovi e biti proveravani kroz program
za proveru plagijata.