Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Andreas Fahrmeir
QQ
~~7
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For information about this and other Yale University Press publications, please contact:
Fahrmeir, Andreas.
Citizenship: the risc and fall of a modern concept/Andrcas Fahrmcir.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-300-11848-3 (alk. paper)
1. Citizenship. 2. Citizenship History. I. Title.
JF801F34 2007
3.6 dc
2007012114
A catalogue record for this book is availablc from the British Library.
1 0987 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements VII
Introduction
Notes 233
Select Bibliography 286
Index 289
A CKN O W L E D GEM E N T S
This book has benefited from two favourable circumstances: time, which could
be dedicated almost exclusively to research and writing, and good advice. The
time was due to the generosity of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, which
allowed me to think about questions discussed in this book in the ideal circum-
stances of a Heisenberg Fellowship (FA 454/1-1) between late 2002 and early
2004. Marie-Luise Reeker and Ulrich Muhlack made that essential resource
always in particularly short supply at universities office space available at
the time.
Advice came from many sources. Klaus J. Bade, Stefan Berger, Tobias
Brinkmann, Francis Dernier, Nancy L. Green, Jochen Oltmer, Maiken Umbach
and Patrick %Veil allowed me to present ideas for discussion at research seminars
and conferences. Derek Beales and Peter AVende contributed more to the book's
development than they may suspect, while Anna Bremen, Annika Klein and
Thorsten Maa8en provided valuable help with individual questions of fact. My
colleagues in the history departments at the universities of Frankfurt am Main
and Cologne created an atmosphere where the concerns of administration and
the demands arising from the perennial reform of German higher education did
not displace historical debate.
Finally, I have been immensely fortunate in receiving more assistance than
could reasonably (or even unreasonably) be expected from Yale University
Press. Adam Freudenheim and the press's anonymous referees were crucial to
the project's initial stages. Robert Baldock, Hannah Godfrey and Rachael
Lonsdale then saw it through to completion.
It goes without saying that while others share much of the credit for its
possible merits, the book's faults are the author's responsibility alone.
I NTROD U C T IO N
nizcd, even in official contexts, and their significance may even bc growing as
the boundaries of citizenship begin to shift once again.
I propose a slight modification of Marshall's categories, in that I will discuss
political, economic and social citizenship. In this book, as in Marshall's essay,
political citizenship describes the ability of individuals to participate in poli-
tical decision-making processes, for instance by casting votes in clcctions or
standing as candidates. Economic citizenship refers to the right to earn an
income by accepting employment or opening a business. Economically liberal
but politically restrictive regimes show that economic citizenship can be sepa-
rated from the right to freedom of expression and action, which Marshall's
'civil citizenship' includes. Social citizenship, finally, I would restrict to a claim
to direct or indirect support from the state.
These three dimensions are not necessarily connected logically, but they
were linked to the concept of citizenship in practice. This emerged even from
debates on citizens' rights in the age of the eighteenth-century Atlantic revolu-
tion, as the French National Assembly's deliberations showed. When members
of parliamentary assemblies brought up in societies intensely conscious of
gradations of rank spoke of 'citizens', they had in mind economically inde-
pendent, male and, usually, Christian heads of households. These citizens were
to determine the laws and budget of a polity (as described in articles 6, 11 and
14 of the Declaration des droits de I'/~omme) charged with safeguarding
'sacred' property rights (article 17). Why these limitations on the ability to
become a citizen seemed so important has been documented in discussions of
the ideology of 'classical' liberalism: only those not subject to the commands
of employers, landlords, husbands or guardians or prey to religious prejudice
could speak their minds without fear in public debate. Only the owners of
property would restrict state access to private property; paupers and others in
economic difficulties might succumb all too easily to the temptation to
expropriate their neighbours.
Limiting political rights to citizens while insisting all men were equal of
course involved a contradiction. Either 'men' (as well as women and ethnic or
religious minorities) would remain only potential 'citizens', or all men would
have to bc able to become citizens. The latter aim could be advanced in two
ways: by increasing citizens' economic opportunities (perhaps by restricting
those of non-citizens), or by using public funds (to which no 'party' influence
would be attached) to provide all members of the state with a degree of eco-
nomic independence. Therefore, even the definition of formal citizenship in a
political context implied considerations of economic and political citizenship.
It is my contention that a historically nuanced view of citizenship is useful
for present-day debates on citizenship and immigration policies in a number of
C1T1ZENSH1P
with massive immigration in the post-war period; France, Britain and the
United States, apparently 'traditional'ignissoli states, were by all accounts more
successful.
From the 1970s, interest in the quantitative and qualitative history of migra-
tion also increased. This line of enquiry challenged the view of the population
of nineteenth-century European states as static. Concerned with economic
determinants of migration and with immigrants' social and cultural integration
into their adopted countries,8 migration history initially left the state out of the
picture. On the basis of contemporary quotations which linked the First World
War to the end of an age of unchecked movement, most migration historians
assumed that states did not intervene in migration, and that up to the twentieth
century immigration and citizenship laws were less significant than 'nationality'
determined by ethnicity or cultural heritage.9 The lack of interest of both
general historians and migration specialists in the subject ensured that citizen-
ship was mainly discussed by legal historians.' The professional predisposi-
tions oftrained lawyers ensured that the focus remained on legalnorms and
their internal consistency, and that continuity was often emphasized over
change.
A first combination of these research traditions was achieved by Rogers
Brubaker in his seminal book on citizenship in France and Germany." Drawing
on the research on migration, citizenship law and naturalization policy avail-
able to date, Brubaker provided a nuanced description of the evolution and the
practical effects of a voluntarist and an ethnic citizenship and immigration
policy in France and Germany respectively. His account considered citizenship
both as a result and an agent of social change.
Just as Brubaker's book was published, two factors encouraged a re-
examination of the history of citizenship and immigration policies. An inten-
sive debate on immigration, naturalization and refugee policy in the late 1980s
and early 1990s gave questions of citizenship and immigration an unprece-
dented degree of contemporary relevance, prompted the publication of books
and articles which drew attention to the contribution of foreigners to national
histories and the 'normality' o f m i g ration, and encouraged scholars to
conceive academic studies on aspects of the history of migration policies.'z
In Germany, the. existence of a ' dominant' concept of nationality was
increasingly questioned, as the experience of the quick re-construction of a
pan-German identity after 1989 demonstrated that seismic shifts in political
opinion left behind little trace of previous convictions. New studies docu-
mented that the intellectual construction of nationality was unstable. The
contrast between the voluntarist and ethnic views of nationality allegedly elab-
orated in France and Germany respectively turned out to be neither the sole
6 C I T I Z E N SH1P
nor ahvays the dominant tradition in either country. For example, until the
twentieth century the ethnic definition of German nationality contrasted with
the often very popular particularist policies of German states like Bavaria,
Wurttemberg, Hanover or Saxony.'
The results of research made the image of the steady rise of the bureaucratic
and interventionist state described by political history ever more difficult to
reconcile with the image of the passive, non-interventionist state described by
migration history for the nineteenth century. The question mark was confirmed
by re-examinations' of the history of citizenship law and immigration policies
on the basis of hitherto neglected archival evidence. Revisionist histories of the
topic now exist for most European countries and the United States,'" and show
that state management of the practical boundaries of citizenship did not follow
long after the invention of dominant concepts of nationality and citizenship,
but both were closely related from the eighteenth century at the latest. This also
changed perceptions of the twentieth-century story, as practices which simply
seemed to continue 'national' traditions increasingly came to be seen as the
outcomes of conscious political decision-making.
Research on individual countries has produced different narratives of
national policy-formation. In the United States, studies have tended to focus on
legal codification of citizenship, often presenting a problem which slowly
moved towards resolution in a (Supreme) court decision.' I n t h e U n ited
Kingdom, too, judicial rulings play an important role. In France, much more
a ttention seems to be paid to i ntellectual and parliamentary debate.' I n
Germany, finally, the bureaucracy looms largest, with much research seeking to
reconstruct its behaviour from quantitative data. These differences reSect the
logic of present-day political debates as well as the nature of the available
sources and, for the United States, the problem involved in trying to recon-
struct practice in up to 50 states, many of them with broad internal variations.
In Germany, where judicial files are not particularly well preserved, the admin-
istrative dimension tended to w i n , out w here administrative and judicial
competences overlapped, and the political independence of the judiciary was
limited. In Britain and the United States, judicial documents are more readily
available, and local administration often took judicial rather than administra-
tive forms. The availability of many more studies on the statistical profile of
citizens by naturalization in Germany and France compared to the United
States or the United Kingdom is one example.'
This book attempts to add two considerations to the state of research.
Histories of citizenship and nationality politics have often had little space to
deal with the change in the concept's relevance, which can be illustrated with
a few figures. In the eighteenth century, even the most 'democratic' countries
I NTRODUCT IO N 7
(such as the France of the 1789 Estates General, or Britain and her American
colonies) allowed scarcely more than half o f a d ult householders to vote;
expressed as a proportion of the population as a whole, this amounted to at
most 4 per cent. The number of aliens in the countries under study, even in the
United States, probably remained well below double percentage figures, with
many entitled to some type of local citizenship rights. The amount of public
funds spent on social services was modest. By the early twenty-first century, the
vast majority of the population of European states and North America was
theoretically entitled to vote, though practice was sometimes different. The
proportion of non-citizens in the population had risen, though many countries
admit non-citizens to naturalization on generous terms. Finally, expenditure on
social benefits had become one of the largest items on governments' balance
sheets, and the majority of the population depended on state or state-regulated
transfer payments at some point in their lives. These changes affected the
formulation and goals of citizenship policies, the groups at which citizenship
legislation was directed, and the relevance of citizenship rights for the general
population, and it is worthwhile trying to make this explicit.
The second point is the comparative dimension. The fact that this book
focuses on European states and on the United States as a former British colony
is largely due to the personal competence of the author, and does not mean to
imply that citizenship is primarily a European phenomenon, though that
hypothesis has been defended." The comparative and international dimension
is important because citizenship is a concept negotiated both nationally and
internationally. Formal citizenship tends to become relevant, and can be cast in
doubt, mainly when people move ignis soli and ins sangiiinis have identical
effects on a stationary population. The history of citizenship has been charac-
terized by phases of international cooperation in the search for universal rules,
just as it has experienced long periods of states using citizenship as a domestic
policy tool, regardless of the international implications of their actions.
Finally, it is necessary to emphasize what this book does not deal with. It is
concerned with the relationship between the state and citizens; it therefore
necessarily neglects the perspective of those affected by citizenship policies-
migrants, refugees, or those excluded from citizenship in their own countries-
as well as the actions of private agencies and agents in shaping individuals'
rights. Embracing the perspective from above in a broad overview in restricted
space creates an additional problem. It almost mandates a structural approach,
which tends to pass over differences of opinion between parties, interest
groups, layers of the bureaucracy or individuals much too briefly; complex
decision-making processes are summarized, often in the passive voice. My
hope is that, in spite of these restrictions, the perspective will still reflect a
8 C I T I Z E N SHIP
reality of citizenship policies: they tend to become effective only in the long
term, and are often shaped by legal and political continuity and structural
considerations.
The last limitation which requires some preliminary explanation is the focus
on citizenship in terms of rights rather than duties. The equivalence between
citizens' rights, such as voting, and citizens' duties, such as military service, is
often alleged. In practice, however, any such correlation emerged late and
disappeared relatively soon, and was far l ess absolute than is generally
supposed. Even after the, introduction of general conscription, political citi-
zens were not necessarily likely to be soldiers; indeed, the opposite was often
the case. In times of military crisis, considerations of citizenship generally
took second place to individuals' availability. Perhaps surprisingly, thercforc,
the citizen soldier is much less relevant to the history of citizenship than the
citizen voter or the citizen recipient of benefits.
CHAPTER I
BEFORE CITIZENSHIP.
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION
IN ANCIEN REGIME EUROPE
Phillip Il 'Augustus' ruled part of what is now France from 1180 to 1223. He is
known for administrative reforms which created a permanent royal bureau-
cracy. For a time, he figured in historiography as the first king to use the title
franciaerex, 'king of France',rather than francorwn> rex, 'king of the Franks',
emphasizing rule over territory rather than people. In fact, the shift, which
took place gradually, may actually have occurred first in English writs.'
Early medieval monarchs' titles emphasized their claim both to continuity
with the Roman Empire and to be head of a tribe. When monarchs began to
style themselves governors of a territory, they postulated a fundamental change
in the nature of rule. To control territory rather than a group of persons bound
to the king by personal loyalty, the 'crown' had to be recognized as the sole
giver of laws and arbiter of disputes rather than as a distant power behind
local grandees. This, in turn, required cash, to finance internal administration
and external war.
The crown gained control of taxation in peacetime with or without the
consent of representative assemblies only in the seventeenth'century, and this
provided the financial resources allowing the 'state' to extend its internal
control and external power.z Near-constant warfare in early modern Europe
created competition between systems of government: administrative ineffi-
ciency resulted in military defeat and p ossibly annexation; successful
modernization permitted further expansion. While competition between states
favoured centralization, it did not favour a particular type of government. In
France, Austria, Prussia and many of the principalities of the Holy Roman
Empire, power rested with the reigning king or queen and his or her advisers.
In Britain and i n t h e G erman principalities which retained functioning
'estates', such as Wiirttemberg, power was in the hands of a monarch acting
with the consent of an assembly which represented influential sections of the
IO CITIZENSHIP
requirements were eased from 1709 to 1712 (for 2,329 people). Unattractive
occupations, places of residence or investments conferred subject status auto-
matically: three years' activity in the northern whale fisheries allowed an indi-
vidual to qualify, as did five years' trading in the southern whale fisheries,
moving to Ireland with their families and possessions, or purchasing 580 of
Bank of Scotland stock. France offered exemption from the droit d'aubaine
as an inducement to work in factories, settle in any of four specific provinces
or in 12 cities, clear uncultivated land, join a guild, study in France, or serve in
French armies. ' Neither France nor Britain made the acquisition of indigenous
language skills a condition for naturalization.
Naturalization did not affect individuals' obligations towards their native
country. The British legal system assumed that releasing subjects from the
'natural and perpetual' allegiance acquired at birth was impossible. In a time
of volunteer armies, no one was likely to have to take up arms against his
country of birth on the orders of his country of residence, and fighting as a
volunteer was rarely considered treason.~
Britain's American colonies were established by private corporations under
royal charters which specified that British subjects and their children, as well
as children born in the colonies, retained or acquired subject status according
to the same rules that were followed in Britain. Aliens' rights were determined
by the corporation's proprietors. Many non-British immigrants obtained
letters of denization before crossing the Atlantic in the seventeenth century, but
naturalization in the colonies was equally possible. In Virginia, the Carolinas,
New York and Pennsylvania, naturalization required an oath of loyalty to the
proprietors, with or without a minimum period of residence. In New England
colonies, parishes admitted aliens to the 'freedom' of the colonial 'corpora-
tion'. Elsewhere, naturalization was granted to individuals by representative
assemblies in an act analogous to parliamentary naturalization in Britain,
particularly after 1700.
Colonial naturalization was valid in one colony, where it granted political
rights, but not the right to participate in foreign or intercolonial trade, which
was reserved to natural-born or naturalized Britisb subjects. Because of the
hIgh cost of naturalization in Britain, colonial proprietors, particularly in
Pennsylvania, which had many German immigrants, lobbied for reform. In
1740, parliament allowed residents of British colonies in North America who
had been present for seven years (with no absence greater than two months)
who were Protestants, Quakers or Jews, and who swore an oath of allegiance
before a judge and paid a fee of at most 2 shillings, to become naturalized
British subjects with political rights limited to the colonies. In1756 the residence
14 C 1T I Z ENSHIP
requirement was lowered to five years for officers and engineers serving in the
army, and in 1761 to two years for all soldiers.
there were 55Z l o cal n a t uralizations
Between 1700 an d 1 740,
Pennsylvania, 135 in Ncw York and 83 in Maryland. After the 1740 act was
passed, almost 7,000 people were naturalized in American colonies under its
terms up to 1773 (there were Z11 per average year, and 6,400 naturalizations
took place in Pennsylvania alone). In other colonies, local naturalization
Jews, who were refused naturaliza
remained the preferred option, except for
tion in some New England colonies. A 1773 ban on colonial naturalization
was thus a major caesura, which made naturalization policy an issue in the
imperial crisis of the later eighteenth century+
In the Holy Roman Empire 'of the German Nation', the right of escheat did
not exist. Long-term residence was considered sufficient evidence of subjection
to the local ruler; an Austrian decree of 1784 stated that all 'aliens, who have
been present for a full ten years, are to be considered natives'."-~ Admission to
residence was thus the functional equivalent of naturalization.
The law of escheat was relevant only to aliens with landed property worth
more than naturalization cost and to some overseas traders. The proportion of
individuals entirely without property was around 50 per cent in England and
Wales in 1688, 60 per cent in mid eighteenth-century Paris, and 50 to 80 per
cent in German states.+
The bulk of international long-distance migration in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries was motivated by religious differences. Peaks resulted
from political turning points or religious communities' emigration decisions:
tens of thousands left Ireland and the German territories in the late seven-
teenth and early eighteenth centuries, and hundreds of thousands left France
after the revocation of the edict of N a ntes.~ Religious emigrants usually
sought to resettle as communities, something encouraged by receiving govern
ments'. grants of corporate, cultural and religious autonomy, as well as through
the tax benefits that were available to new scttlcmcnts in ncw towns or ncw
quarters of old towns. This increased monarchs' ability to divide and rulc a
recognized immigrant groups' distinct status in thc society of orders"
The 1730 to 1731 'Salzburg transaction' of 30,000 cmigrants added about
1 per cent to Prussia's population; roughly every sixth Berliner was Hugucn
in 1700.1+ I n s e venteenth-century Britain, t o tal H u g uenot i m m igrat' "
amounted to less than 1 per cent of the population, and even the 'massive
influx o Palatine emigrants into London in 1709 was less than 3 pecn
ux of
the town's population.
The perm
manent or temporary migration of individual merchant a
n downers, or mercenaries for economic, personal e d u
craftsmen lando
BEFORE CIT I Z E N SHI P I5
reasons is hard to quantify. In the future United States, the proportion of long-
distance migrants in 1775 was probably around 10 per cent of the population,
or 220,000 individuals, with around 97,000 of these not British subjects, and
around 12,000 non-subjects free individuals making about 4 per cent of the
population non-subjects, and less than 1 per cent free aliens. Few aliens were
to bc found among the political and economic clitcs.~ Analysis of a tax on
'aliens' in 1697 France suggests that the proportion of non-citizens from
abroad (illegitimate children and anbairr's heirs' were also taxed) was below
1 per cent of the population. It never exceeded 4 per cent of the population in
Paris suburbs.
Aliens appeared highly desirable to the British and French governments.
They were seen as specialists in commerce or manufacture or as purchasers
of property. This was a biased perception, but impressionistic perceptions
were characteristic of eighteenth-century economic analysis. ' Less well-to-
do immigrants were classed as 'foreigners' not integrated into a local commu-
nity. Hence, the status of 'foreigner', foraitt or Frenider z was often morc
disadvantageous than being 'alien', anbain or Anslander.
Table 1.1: Individuals able to exercise national political rights, around 1780
excluded, though without much legal basis. Only two colonies convinced
British officials to accept statutes permanently excluding non-whites from the
franchise. Usually, they failed to see 'why one Freeman should be used worse
than another, merely upon account of his complexion', as attorney-general
Richard West put it in 1724. Aliens were not systematically excluded from the
franchise (and were explicitly admitted to it in Georgia), but were barred from
holding office or becoming members of representative assemblies." Between
50 and 80 percent of adult males qualified for the franchise on the basis of
property, but taking age, sex and race into account, it appears that the fran-
chise was available to less than 4 per cent of the population. Contested elec-
tions were more frequent than in England, with electoral turnout averaging
around 50 per cent, often as a result of difficulties in reaching polling places
and uncertainty about possible rejection there.~'
Where representative assemblies had ceased to meet, political decision-
making occurred in royal councils selected by the monarch. Even when it
became customary for the king to accept the recommendation of his council-
lors as in Louis XV's France- the monarch could choose to end proceedings
before a vote. Recent emphasis on the limitations of 'absolutist' power is no
doubt justified; nevertheless, even if it required cooperation from elites, the
crown could choose which sections of elites it wished to cooperate with."-'
Economic and political relations were linked in ancien regime European soci-
eties. Today, economic contracts involve the exchange of goods, services or
money between individuals, companies or institutions. While the relationship
may be asymmetrical, the two contracting parties are equal outside the work-
place. In early modern societies, however, superiors master craftsmen,
teachers, professors or landlords acquired power over subordinates; they
could impose a range of sanctions like beatings, detentions, fines, or expulsion
from the corporation either individually or through corporate courts. Where
land tenancies were involved, power relations created 'feudal' bonds between
lords and tenants, who assumed a variety of obligations to provide money,
goods or labour for various institutions. These included tithes to the Church,
corvees, robot (labour service, usually for road-building and maintenance) and
militia service to the crown, or goods or services to landlords. In return, land-
lords undertook to maintain order, represent the local population vis-a-vis
central authorities, and supply some emergency relief. In some regions, the'
extent of tenants' obligations could turn them into serfs or Leibeigene. In
18 C I T I Z E N SIR IP
towns, power tended to be shared between the full members of the urban
corporation with public duties imposed on a greater proportion of residents.'3
These power relations were reflected by the division of society into 'estates'
dedicated to specific occupations and social roles. The clergy mediated
be@veen the present and the afterlife and regulated family affairs. The nobility
dominated civilian and military state service. Burghers dominated crafts,
trade, long-distance commerce and the emerging financial services. Farmers
produced food. The large proportion of t h e p opulation which remained
outside estates was available for dependent, transitory work such as personal
service, soldiering, casual labour and mobile retail trade.
No estate was entirely closed or immune from competition. University-
educated sons of burghers or farmers could aspire to posts in crown service,
Jews
while wealthy merchants could purchase aristocratic estates. Aliens and
operating with privileges from the crown, as well as craftsmen in the guild-free
countryside, challenged town burghers' monopolies.~ Estate membership
required training, talent and personal choice for instance membership in a
country's established Church- in addition to honourable birth. Higher educa-
tion was a prerequisite for entry into the clergy or the legal profession, and
most guilds required the successful completion of a n a p p renticeship.
Nevertheless, career options were limited by family traditions and financial
realities. Being born an aristocrat was more likely than being ennobled as a
reward for exceptional deeds.
The order of estates was, in many ways, international. Manners and dress
that communicated social rank were recognized in much of Europe. This was
most obvious at the top of societies, for instance in rules of court etiquette
which took account only of rank and family relationships.~ Of the countri~~
studied here, only Britain banned the employment of aliens in g overnm
ent
Elsewhere, people of rank could seek to attract any monarch's notice to obtain
a post in the administration or military; a ban on non-nobles was me
common than a ban on aliens, particularly as senior military commanders
almost had to outrank their subordinates and sovereigns of smaller terrltorles
or their legitimate or illegitimate sons were thus particularly suitable
candidates."6
Membership of craft guilds, a community of burghers or land tenure by
contrast, accorded economic rights valid only in one place, though this Inlgl'
include exemption from duties or tolls in a larger area. Guilds and town
admitted aliens as well as natives.~7
The central state's ability to control economic migration focused on eco
nomic sectors 'below' the estates. Unskilled labour, domestic servic~
commissioned ranks of t h e m i l itary and some forms o f l o n g-distance
B EFORE CITIZ ENSHI P 19
In 1692, France suffered a disastrously bad harvest. The year was unusually wet
and cold even by standards of the short 'ice age' between 1687 and 1700. In a
good year, the country produced only enough crops for its population. In 1692,
it failed to do so, and the next year was no better. To make matters worse,
France was embroiled in the War of the Palatine Succession against a pan-
European coalition that had begun in 1688 and was to drag on until 1697. War
brought unburied bodies, unburied bodies brought disease, and disease spread
like wildfire in a population weakened by hunger. From 1692 to 1694, France
sufferedthe greatest demographic catastrophe in her modern history,a popu-
lation decline of almost 7 per cent. More than 1.3 million people died in those
two years. (During the First World War, France then a country twice as popu-
lous as it had been in the late seventeenth-century 'years of misery' lost 1.4
million men in four years.) Local authorities and the crown did what they
could, which amounted to very little. Some grain was distributed and there
were attempts to keep food prices stable through subsidies and legislation, but
spending for the military was the first priority, and food supplies were insuffi-
cient. An even greater crisis developed in the 'great winter' during the
Northern War of 1709 to 1710, when the population of Prussia's eastern
districts dropped by almost half.5s
Due to better climatic conditions, the introduction of new crops, more
intensive farming methods and improved transport links, no such crisis
recurred in the eighteenth century. Relief of extreme poverty became a real-
istic possibility. Again, European states faced similar problems, but adopted
slightly different solutions.
In any society, a proportion of the population lives at or below a 'poverty
lIne' defined with reference to an average state of economic wellbeing. Until
22 C I T I Z E N SHIP
favell into the nineteenth century, thc poverty linc was equal to subsistence.
Thc number of thc poor in thc early modern period fluctuated with the price
of foodstuffs and the availability of work. In most of Europe, beaveen 30 and
80 pcr cent of the population required support as soon as either they were out
of svork or the price of foodstuffs rose above average. Beoveen 5 and 10 per
rent of town dwellers the best documented group were 'paupers' requiring
pcrmancnt relief.~ In colonial America, poverty was less widespread. At most
onc third of the colonies' population was 'poor', less than 2 per cent of urban
inhabitants were paupcrs in New York. '
By the seventeenth century at tl>e latest, poverty had come to be regarded as
a problem rather than a sign of saintliness. Contemporaries distinguished
beovccn two groups: those 'deserving' charity because they were unablc to
cat'n their living, and the 'undeserving', who failed to do so. Thc very young,
the very old, thc ill and the infirm could not work; all others should fend for
themselves.62 Localities, individuals and foundations supported the 'deserving'
poor who passed a test of means and morals with gifts, licences to beg, appren-
ticeship contracts, or places in a ' h ospital', 'poorhouse' or ' a lmshouse'.
Deserving poor werc stigmatized, even though the New York practice of
forcing paupers to wear a brightly coloured badge and using one building as a
combined poorhouse, workhouse and prison benvcen 1736 and 1775 was
somewhat extreme.' Higher ranks of society had access to relief from their
'estate', which did not formally class them as paupers. Government employees
retained part of their salary in old age; merchants and master craftsmen could
cl u p p o rt or a sinecure from their guild or municipality~
'Undeserving' poverty was a crime. Travelling without cmploymcnt, ready
money or proof of status was 'vagrancy'. Low-income mobile occupations
such as pedlar, showman 'bear-baiter', or m u sician, were restricted
outlawed. Penalties included imprisonment, corporal punishment, publ"
humiliation, branding, forced labour, removal to colonies, or recruitmen~ Int
the army or navy. In some smaller German tcrritorics, gypsies' vagrancy could
theoretically be punished by death, though cxccutions were rare. While some
scholars assume that edicts referring to 'gypsies', bobentiens or Zi g <>IC"
targeted a distinct ethnic group, the balance of the evidence suggests tha
authoritics stigmatized mobile and poor people in general.
R elief was administered locally, with wide variations of practice. Po ' " '
was usually more generous in towns, with 'hospitals' offering semi-pcrman "
accommodation to the sick poor, cash relief with less social control and m
p rivate charity. Urban officials therefore lived in constant fear of paup g ' a
tion from the countryside. In sixteenth-century France and England, the o' "
responded by imposing countrywide rules. Individuals could only claim II
BEFORE CITIZ ENSHIP 23
The crownbbeganttooverhaul
over au the poor relief system in response focus,n
the construction o f hospitals
iospita s for the relief of the poor which provided accom
d '
modation,, ru imcntary medical treatment or outdoor relief for o r pliaiis
d'mentary
invalids, the aged and the sick who had lived in a town for at least a year
though neivcomcrs had little prospect of places often reserved years (cl,
advance. Some towns coordinated charity in birrenwx de dynritq
offices). In times of severe economic crisis, the crown initiated programmes o f
public ivorks; suchnteliers de cbnriti (charity vvorkshops) became a fixture o f
French poor relief policy from at least 1770. The crown also increased the
repression of 'undeserving' paupers by removing them to colonies, and, from
-'
rc lif!>r>r> tii wllicl,' ll sr>l>jccts oF thc crown werc required to conform. prussia
;>f>cl ltrif.>r'r>'stcilcr;>tie>>ic>f rclif>jr>crs disscntcrs had distinct limits for Catho]pcs
'f lic. kc y rr>crlic.rsl>rl> crrtcria irr thc society of estates were local membership,
rr>k, rc.lif!Ic>r>,cr>cl> ir> terr>c>tc cc>lonics, ethnicity linked to the economic status
>very,'I l>c>crt!l> icf!'rl (le%>>itic>rrs c>f citizenship cxistcd in some countries,
r>l sl>
Ilrcy werc lrr rrry w;>ys rctrrcitc from everyday cxpericncc.
CHAPTER 2
The period between thc outbreak of thc An)ric;))) ltcv))l))th))) i)) l775 ))))d il)
end of thc Napoleonic Wars in 1815 was;) turni))g 1)))i))t h) )I) I)l <)))))'y ))f
modern citizenship. Thc United States Dclartion ()f l))dcl)))d))c ))I' I, f))ly
1776 and the French Declaration of thc Rigl)ts of Mn ))tl ()f tl)v. ('i)lzc)) ol
26 August 1789 repudiated monarchical govrnn)cnt ()f ) s()ic)y ()f 'v<)[))(c!)'
and proposed to base government on the dcisions ()f 'l)v))ple' ))r 'cl)iz))!)',
Constitutions which translated abstract principles int)) c))))crete 1)rct)c)'il))i()))!i
were designed to answer thc question of who 'the pcopl' or 'th. itizc))!)' wcr<
and how they would participate in government.
Government was the main, but not thc only, area of change, 1',<'t;)l)libel)d I))
France in the early 1790s and soon adopted throughout I'.un)1)c,;) c)))))prvl)cn
sive passport regime created thc 'documented citizen',' whil thc n)ili);)ry
mobilization of the French citizenry in 1793 added the citizen-in-;)rn)s t)) tl)c
citizen-at-the-poll as an icon of republican citizenship. The Irn))st sinu)lt;)-
neous emergence of the 'citizen' as political actor, conscripted soldier ))d
passport holder is usually seen as marking the invention of 'modern' citizen-
ship as membership of a society of equals governed democratically The exclu-
sion of ivomen, ethnic minorities and the poor from citizen status in tl)e
revolutionary era therefore appears as a failure by revolutionaries to live up to
their principlca.z
European monarchies had to confront not just the idrolcv~>cal appeal of a
society of equal citizens but the military potential of the French republic. ln fe;s
than four years, th transition to rep&~lic~ go;erne.~n iud t ransformed
a
fu)anciaIIi and tnonlly bankru"-t co<~. i nto an in)perial pr"w +ter~)<ng from
Spa)nto~io~mc. Tb<ss ~ s o . ' ~ oI w m = ~ ' c )Jz~ i k : p t u ~ e h t ) nroan ob I
fo r tn- rela"..on cwp be:.~ ~ ~ e ~ 3. c~ ~ ~ o - s < '-e<-sL". ~ <r < ~:.e..
\
As even:s ~ve-. so cz;~ ~ " . "
<-
.. c~ a r a n ons oL~ e<: m) ,. ~~ ~ s o c ) ~ ~ an ' ~~e
Y'0 " t<o~~w ~ r~ < - a km pc~-.- o~ H ~ n l E 'K o - ~ o r t )"e U~ e <
26 C I T I Z ENSHIP
religion to which all subjects of the crown were required to conform pruss>a
and Britain's toleration of religious dissenters had distinct limits for CatholIc~
The key mcmbcrship criteria in the society of estates were local membershIp
rank, religion and, in remote colonies, ethnicity linked to the economic stats
of slavery. Though legal definitions of citizenship existed in some countries
they werc in many ways remote from everyday experience.
CHAPTER 2
THE REVOLUTIONARY
M OMENT AND T H E
INVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP
The period between the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 and the
end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 was a turning point in the history of
modern citizenship. The United States Declaration of Independence of 4 July
1776 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of
26 August 1789 repudiated monarchical government of a society of 'estates'
and proposed to base government on the decisions of 'people' or 'citizens'
Constitutions which translated abstract principles into concrete prescriptions
were designed to answer the question of who 'the people' or 'the citizens' were,
and how they would participate in government.
Government was the main, but not the only, area of change. Established in
France in the early 1790s and soon adopted throughout Europe, a comprehen-
sive passport regime created the 'documented citizen',' while the military
mobilization of the French citizenry in 1793 added the citizen-in-arms to the
citizen-at-the-poll as an icon of republican citizenship. The almost simulta-'
neous emergence of the 'citizen' as political actor, conscripted soldier and
passport holder is usually seen as marking the invention of 'modern' citizen-
ship as membership of a society of equals governed democratically. The exclu-
sion of women, ethnic minorities and the poor from citizen status in the
revolutionary era therefore appears as a failure by revolutionaries to live up to
their principles.z
European monarchies had to confront not just the ideological appeal of a
society of equal citizens but the military potential of the French republic. In less
than four years, the tnnsition to republican government had transformed a
financially and morally bankrupt country into an imperial power extending from
Pn to Moscow. This success of 'revolutionary'citizenship turned it into a model
r the relationship between the state and citizens or subjects in monarchies.3
As events were so dramatic, declarations of equality appear so clear, and the
revolutionary era remains a key point of reference in the histories of the United
)I' .li;i!!g is;ill too asily 'x; ggcratcd. On lo.
Ni;iles,ill I 1'I;i)ice, ill 0 1,!
)iisli c iiiii,1)i1't it it t) i)i;ii } I"ii 1 r ilou i lly niodifi d thc soci ty o f o d
;iiitl csi;iis tv) t lit!i'It s'i'tvc)I'ill), it aiv;i} coiupletel}'. )<Cvo)utio!iary citizenship did
;hi;6 this)i in'3} )lait Iit thc ICI,Ac} of cIitfe're!ice conditioned by social rank,
lii,0 'v!4 ) IAi',it 4ic'AIBA 'I shii'>, I!CI'!der, in arital stAtus, religious beliefs and ethnic
4)Atit}'. h'<itI s, 'IiA'ss')i!}rt-hAIdcrs A'Iid s<i)diers ivcre nor three dcscriptloiis o f a
sili).'1 lii l)c 'Dl I7I!1} I r)lc}' hk'CI'c t)il'ee x! !sr!net' gi'oilps.
rl'k)v'v7II)1))tritest!
I 1 1 'I 5"I I~c ) );+ 'I< 111'lit!' ""2i i '!! < X i'4>'11N:"!Uk<!~
" 'i' " I' " ' I ' l ' ' ( " )Q ui)I'))" i t a)) g'>iire~~qp ~ ' l r ( 1-:>!Cc~> -'!it!i!i~fr 'ti- illtr ' - -
i4 Vt!! IV!II.I));Iri>ilia'. biv t)ici s)! Iluucr qf r 1),r>,
! Il Jep<,'I4)eilce, i
Tlits Jcr,'ISLvti cuu)d.hei'".!qr.ii>ju~qIlI." J; v,! 'Ii rc>cr!:<1>is.',!!-1! i.; Ljtjti,!i-.p>4ttv -1:
Ir ir) tltuti; ii!I dely, read;i>utl>S,) t>i,JOLui Lrde)-r''S 7li <I-11i!icl)S S 0U" O'O'% L'! M <i<a:
JUJUcd.tli.I!Q)lti,u( s(IL>ic<.ts~ .UlJ -tIii Ir.c<)nw)u~!oii~.>veri cr >Ii(!ri!1e.l b~'; t)ie
;i!i!i- Quart,revu)utivti,u t I6~~~<, Ih< c<>)oiiists.pre>crr<J-'ti>-;IJore i
s,.II!-.ite[!Ia=-
tiuti'11 euli-htenc J:p ublic.
iiliicli.inc)u J J <potential ininiiga i i t i ;Ind:t)ie[ejore=
fu<,use J on 'thc rights,uf, iueii.
en
n the!
1! ! IIr,c')aratiou ut,lndep<;IIJciic<:girt>niiseJ a !!i'd' guyernn!e! It'- O'I~) .
on thc sc)f-deteriuinatio!I.of 'the pe<iplc'; it h;id in ruin J u!Ily t)!
i pse.in-fay ! '
of secession., The crime of treason against c<>lo!!I;I) governniciits.intruJuce<l un
J e 6 ..4 t r l ppe4 oy;llists. of tlieir p
olit
ic!i
apJ pruperty rig!its., Once
hostilities.endcJ, rthe pcupl' haJ tu b<. reddined for a-nun!bur-of-pra<-'tie!I)
reasons The 17S3: S3. T '
TrciItv off I aris xvhic)i. granted ind<.'1 1L'll d ellce t u .
A llleric;In cololllcs eiltl t lcJ British
es~ntit!cd B subjects.tu conipi!sation, tliuug I I}rita
!
anJ the United State reed
's aI d oil lunl))-su!ns.l
I I ye'1rs]ater. r Iior t)ie.future
17S3 treaty dcterinined in I'livid'iduals. a))cgiancc by thir p)ace of resi Jei icThis
ivas ill lllle ivltll tra J 'it!oil:
'o I: peace tratics gnerally handed ovr territones.ivI'h
their resideiits,and ivhueyer iv's
vished to retain their previous allegiance li'I"- "
<'nligi'ate. Ikesidclits of all Alnci
crican state at thc time' of inilepnJence
'
' '
' became-
L
THE REVOLUTIONAItY hlOhll'.N'I' ANI) INVI!N'I'Ii)N 1)I' I:I'I'IliNSI I)I' Jl)
fk!dill?<i?)HIIPdr'
W~ I I ZXI I I I r
Tao-'~~! 6 taeaztzu Jii =zioh 'a~ Iat) on'.". b 'rivecn" I , 6-Ur<'d- I "90 <"
States and France, the degree of change is all too easily exaggerated. On clos~~
inspection, thc revolutionary era profoundly modified the society of ord~~s
and estates svithout ssvecping it away completely. Revolutionary citizenship dId
asvay ivith only part of the legacy of difference conditioned by social rank
local corporate membership, gender, marital status, religious beliefs and ethnic
identity. Voters, passport-holders and soldiers were not three descriptions of a
single male citizenry; they were three distinct groups.
state citizens not duc to revolutionary generosity, but to the cstablishcd rules of
international law.
As the colonies seceded from Britain as 'free and independent states', they had
no common citizenship. However, the Articles of Confederation extended thc
reach of state citizenship for the reasonably well-off and respectable by granting
'citizens' of the individual states rights of 'citizens and inhabitants' in other
states if they were not 'paupers, vagabonds, criminals and fugitives from justice'
(article IV, the so-called 'privileges and immunities' clause).' The regulations on
formal citizenship, naturalization and political rights passed by the states and the
United States between 1776 and 1789 were shaped by contradictory needs. The
loose federation of newly independent republics in North America was insecure.
As France, which had effectively created the conditions for American independ-
ence, disappeared as a potential ally, and conflicts between the commercial and
landowning governing elite and popular movements mounted," the colonies
sought to attract money and manpower from Europe. At the same time, they
feared the effect of immigration on the composition of an electorate numbering
perhaps 600,000 men.'z
The automatic acquisition of citizenship through birth in a territory or
descent from a male citizen remained a universally accepted rule. By contrast,
there was no consensus on the admission of immigrants to citizenship (see Table
>.1). New England states continued to admit immigrants to the 'freemanship' of
a corporation.'
The most frequent solution of the property versus politics dilemma was a
tivo-tier naturalization procedure, which provided swift access to land owner-
ship, but delayed political rights, thus separating the right to property from
political citizenship. The right to own land was generally extended to aliens
soon after the revolution.'
Residence was proof and means of assimilation to thc republican way of life
Naturalization did not require a knowledge of English or significant wealth~'
and only Maryland imposed a religious test for naturalization. Many states did
I
however, impose religious tests on office-holders, denying office to Jews Most
of these restrictions were rescinded by the later 1820s, but religious limits on
office-holding remained on the statute books of North Carolina and New
Hampshire until 1868 and 1876 respectively.' While British naturalization law
had been colour
lour blind, Southern states explicitly prohibited the naturalization
of foreign-born non-whites immediately after independence. Naturalizatl "
involved a significant element of discretion in defining 'good conduct' ho'
was used is apparently not well known.
THE ItEVOLUTIONARY AIOAIENT AND INVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP
3I
That formal citizenship should affect political rights at all was far from
obvious: the phrase 'no taxation without representation' had suggested that
taxpayers alone were 'the people'. The Articles of Confederation had treated
'citizens' and 'citizens and inhabitants' a s s ynonymous. Though the
Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in 1811 that 'inhabitants' in law meant
'citizens' in practice, 'inhabitants' did refer to residents in Vermont, New
Jersey, Ohio, Illinois and territories.
Exclusions affected more than 'comparatively few white men'. The impact
of residence tests was far from trivial. Property requirements kept between
25 per cent (Pennsylvania) ' and 60 per cent (Maryland and New Jersey) of
adult white males from the polls. In South Carolina and New Jersey, property
requirements for election stabilized the rule of a wealth oligarchy. -' In practice,
participation was even more uneven. While only 5 per cent of registered voters
cast their votes in a 1793 election for the governor of Connecticut, franchise
restrictions could also be ignored. While all parties admitted unqualified
voters in districts they controlled, Republicans were more inclined to back an
expansion of the franchise. However, legislation to do away with property
requirements was passed only in Maryland (1802 to 1810) and South Carolina
(1810) and a one and two year residence test remained in place in these areas.
Defining political citizens as independent property owners automatically
dtsenfranchised the vast majority of Native Americans and African Americans,
wtth Native Americans also excluded as alien peoples not quite within, and not
Iutte tvithout, the United States' jurisdiction. Attitudes to Native Americans
re ambivalent; though denied naturalization as non-white, they became
symbolsfor the American insurgency in the Boston Tea Party'scostumes and
in caricatures.35
Blacks were increasingly presumed to fail the test of 'freedom' for political
ctti enship, even if there was no formal test of whiteness. Being 'free' was
ot just the opposite of 'enslaved' or 'imprisoned', but included freedom of
on rol by a master, employer or husband. A r t icle 1 of the United States'
36 CITIZENSHIP
' '
Constitution,
o I ' I speci'f'ied tI la t t h e 'free' population bc counted, 'including
, ivhich
'
those bound d to service for ta termrm of o years'(indentured servants or redemp-
d '
tioners), was dcsigncd to proviide e aa pr o x y for wealth, not population, with
'd d mo
more productive than slaves, who were valued
indentured servants consi cre
n '
at three fifths of a person, or tthe >e 'Indians not taxed', whose labour was irrcle-
bd
vant to state budgets. .~ ~ Tl
>em meaning
e aningoof ' 'black' continued to oscillate between
ethnicity a and an alien lower class (workers in general; Catholic Irish workers
I j , ' t doug
in particularj, I I> 'w 1iiitee i' i ncreasingly defined the racial rather than the
social or confessional limits of political citizenship.
After independencc, slavery was abolished only in states where hardly any
slaves lived (Vermont 1777, Massachusetts 1783, Ohio 1802, Indiana 1816,
Illinois 1818). Thc remainder of the North instituted a programme of very
gradual abolition because it wished to avoid expropriating slave owners. In
fact 25 pcr cent of blacks in the North (27,000 people) >vere still enslaved by
1810. In the South, the number of free blacks grew as well, though it never
exceeded 10 per cent of blacks in the Upper South and 4 per cent in the Lower
South.'~
Slavery, however, could hardly be legal in only one part of the United States,
because of the inccntivc that vvould then exist for slaves to escape to non-slave
states. The highly profitable institution~' was preserved most easily by tying it
to membership of a visible minority. Widening the gulf between blacks and
whites through largely immaterial wages of whiteness' (for example, deferen-
tial treatment in court emphasizing the social connection between white whit small
farmers, labourers, craftsmen and plantation owners), for small farmers, white
labourers and craftsmen, segregating prisons and almshouses from the he 1820s
prohibiting 'miscegenation' to preserve a clear dichotomy of 'black' and 'white',
limiting blacks' economic opportunities (including access to most federal jobs)
and making slavery a central punishment for blacks all reduced thc status of
free blacks to quasi-slaves of thc state in the South by the 1820s. Congress also
endorsed slavery by allowing individuals to claim blacks as fugitive slaves in any
state from 1793. Faced with what seemed like a southern attempt to export
poverty through thc expulsion of elderly slaves, northern legislative assemblies
responded with prohibitions on blacks' entry and a reduction in blacks' social
and political rights."'
-
The role of race in the definition of formal and political citizenship in the
Constitution and early republican years has been much dcbatcd because of its
implications for the moral assessment of the United States' founding fathers
The authors of the United States' Constitution have been criticised as racists
who considered it self-evident that only white people were 'men'," or described
as pragmatic politicians who recognized slavery temporarily only to save the
Union, and cxprcsscd their 'real' intentions in the anti-slavery 1787 Northwest
Ordinance. One assessmcnt argued'thc framers [of thc Constitution] werc half-
consciously trying to frame two constitutions, one for their own time and thc
other for the ages, with slavery viewed bifocally- that is, plainly visible at their
feet, but disappearing when they lifted their eyes'.~ While no amount of eye-
lifting disguised that United States citizenship was defined in racial terms, the
decision on cxtcnding or withholding formal and/or political citizenship"s on
ethnic grounds ultimately rested with the individual states, where different visions
of United States citizenship egalitarian or hierarchical, white supremacist or
anti-racist evolved in parallel.
On5 May 1789, the French monarchy assembled the Estates General to resolve
its financial crisis."6 The crown and its ministers were locked in a struggle with
18 parlenrents, superior law courts staffed by a wealthy hereditary service
nobility and the peers of the realm, who claimed to represent the country and
were keen to maintain their tax exemptions and other benefits. Dissolving the
parlentents had not worked. The attempt to get them to agree to innovative
economic policies had also failed."7By the later 1780s, the king and his advisers
saw no alternative to resurrecting the 'Estates General' to override the
parlentents' vetoes.
The Estates General were the only representative assembly in the Europe of
the day whose composition was unknown in advance. They had no appointed
or hereditary members."s Uncertainty increased when the crown invited four
representatives from each of the country's 48$ electoral districts, one each
from thc clergy and nobility, and two from the 'third estate', creating the-
unfoundcd expectation that voting in the assembly was to be by head, and
the third estate would be the first two estates' equal.
The Estates General were elected by adult French men, though some locali-
ties allowed residents who were not French subjects or who were younger than
2'i or female to participate." In the clergy, every parish and each monastery or
cathedral chapter cast one vote, privileging thc lower ranks of the secular
clergy over higher ranks and monastic orders. M ale noblemen voted in the
second estate. In the third estate, 200 heads of rural households selected one
representative for the district electoral assembly, which chose the men to go to
Versailles, while town guilds sent either one or two representatives.
38 C 1T I Z ENSH1P
n
Table 2.3: Elections of Frcndt Representative Asscmblics, 1789-1810
Thc Constitution of spring 1793 abandoned ins sangtrinis, but offered mor
generous terms for naturalization, It admitted the following people 'to excrcIse
the rights of French citizens': anyone born in France, after reaching the age of
21; any alien over 21 who had lived in France for one year 'of his own labour'
had adopted a child, nourished an aged person, acquired a property or married
a French woman or was considered worthy by the legislative assembly. A civic
oath was no longer required. The combined effect of the 1790 decree, the 1791
Constitution and the 1793 Constitution was to turn almost all alien residents
of France who did not wear uniform into French citizens as a matter of right,
regardless of whether they desired this to happen.
The year III (1795) Constitution, drafted svhen the Convention's social
experiments had proved a resounding failure, made naturalization morc exclu-
sive. It now rcquircd a declaration of intent to fix one's domicile in France,
which could be made at age 21. After seven years, naturalization followed auto-
matically for aliens who paid a direct contribution, had married a French wife
or owned an agricultural or commercial establishment thc restriction of
naturalization to 'independent' people had returned. French citizenship was now
attributed automatically only to individuals 'born and resident in France', 'acci-
dental' birth in French territory or descent from a French father was no longer
sufficient. The year Vill (1799) Constitution increased the residence period prior
to naturalization to 10 years, but did away with the social requirements to
incrcasc the pool of conscripts.~9
All these laws viewed the community of citizens as a political unit, though
admission by naturalization was often more resrrictive than admission to the
franchise, from which only servants and bankrupts remained excluded. Thc
expansion of political rights to the vast majority of settled males between
1789 and 1799 was remarkable, though democratization went hand in hand
with ballot-stuffing, and many electors refused the offer of active political
participation: this applied to 75 pcr cent of electors in the election of thc togisi~
tive, 90 per cent in the Convention, and at least 60 pcr cent in Napoleoc
plebiscites. The focus of political citizenship thus remained on a respectable
body of independent adult men, not a national community which include
ivomen, children, servants, criminals and bankrupts.
As formal citizenship depended on respectability, it could bc lost outside thc
country (by joining another political community or opposing the RcvoiutIon
ideas a well as inside the country by forfeiting one's honour permanen "
i eals) as
through a criminal conviction or temporarily through servitude or bankrup cy'
This sct citizens far apart from conscripts, who included all men in a spccifI
age group.
THE REVOLUTIONARY 510hlENT AND INVENTION OF CITIZENSIIIP 4l
only German state to pass laws on citizenship, in this case by adopting thc
Code civil, svhich remained valid in theBzstate until it w as replaced by the
-'
In Junc 1793, the French National Convention approved the most liberal natu-
ralization regulations ever in force in France. Tsvo months later, the tide had
turned. Thc Convention now considered ordering all aliens to wear red, white
and blue armbands inscribed with the word bospitatite" to p r o tect them
against assault by super-patriots. Even though this suggestion was not
implemented, on 16 October 1793 the Convention ordered the arrest of all
cncmy aliens other than women married to French men not suspcctcd of
counter-revolutionary activities."5
In retrospect, 1793 marked thc point at which the debate on controls versus
freedom of movement in revolutionary France, which had brought about a
series of abrupt legislative reversals, was definitively resolved in favour
control." Together with the 1793 British Alien Act and measures to control the
immigration and residence of French emigrants in German states,
October decree appears to mark the invention of a modern passport system
which imposed a ncw type of state control on travel and introduced a new
administrative distinction between citizens and aliens. In France, Britain and
the German states, the reason was an external military threat, whereas in the
United Statesin 1798, fear of subversion predominated. The response was
ahvays a combination of registration, documentation and deportation
Contemporary observers saw the measures of 1793 as thc 'monster bIrth
of a bureaucratic passport system. This view was still current around 190 ~
and most recent work on modern passports agrccs. 9 Scholars focusing
earlier periods, by contrast, have pointed out that passports were corn "
bcforc 1789, that their format hardly changed, and that attempts incrca
surveillance date back to the 1770s in Paris.~
THF REVOLUTIONARY MOAIENT AND INVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP 47
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50 C I T I Z E N SHIP
When cartes de secnrilc were introduced for non-Parisians in 1792 Paris, 2.8 pcr
cent of the city's population came from outside France. In thc United States, 13
per cent of the population was foreign-born in 1790 and 10 per cent in 1810; thc
failure of the 1798 aliens' registration scheme makes it impossible to detcrminc
how many of them'were citizens. In thc smaller German states, the number
of people born outside the state was higher, but thc decisive legal distinction
was between members and non-members of corporations, with students and
journeymen ableto access support networks throughout thc German lands."
The main obstacle to long-distance migration was low wages: travel over
longer distances required an i n t erruption of work f e w c o uld a f ford.
Economically motivated long-distance migration in Europe was therefore
largely made up of migration of the elite for educational and commercial
purposes, and seasonal migration linking specific employers and workers, often
over substantial distances. Stove builders from Craveggia near Milan conquered
a considerable part of the trade in eighteenth-century Paris, for instance.n"
In the pre-revolutionary period, migration from Europe to colonies in North
America had been coerced,with slave traders, convict traffickers or govern-
ments paying the passage, or transport financed by speculators seeking to
exploit wage disparities. This type of migration ended in the revolutionary era
with the rejection of convicts by the United States, the end of the slave trade to
the United States and court decisions challenging the trade in indentured
servants or 'redemptioners'. From the 1780s, immigrants to thc United States
required capital, which made them attractive would-be citizens."
Migration across state borders thus presented few economic threats. Even
the fact that one state's gain was another state's loss led only to half-hearted
attempts to stem the emigration of productive and/or wealthy citizens.'"
Overall, faith in free labour markets gained ground.
inmates thcrc werc from overseas. In response, thc city adopted new arrangc-
mcnts, which were quickly copied by Massachusetts and South Carolina. From
1788, Ncw York required ships' captains to present lists of passcngcrs for
inspection within 24 hours of arrival, to remove any passengers likely to
become paupers within onc month or to provide a bond for relief. Loopholes,
such as setting passengers ashore in New Jersey, werc quickly closed. From
1797, bonds had to be posted before passengers were sct ashore, and from 1799
the maximum bond was fixed at 300 dollars, or about six years' relief. Ships'
captains could also pay a few dollars into what amounted to a social insurance
fund for immigrants, to which a 1 per cent tax on auctions in New York State,
levied from 1798, also contributed. Carriers' preliminary screening of migrants
for likely paupers on embarkation was followed by qualitative migration
controls by local officials at ports of entry and in parishes.'+
In all the countries under study, social rights continued to remain local rights
linked to formal settlement or less formal integration.
Throughout the revolutionary era, dramatic change existed side by side with
continuity. Decades of political turmoil brought relatively little upheaval in
the social order. By and large, the same individuals or families held impor-
tant positions and owned extensive property before, during and after thc
revolution.'z~
What changed was the justification of their role, which no longer relied on
the divine order or tradition,'~ but on election by fellow citizens. The new
republics did not assume that all residents were citizens, or that all citizens
were equal. Citizenship was a political category which presupposed autonomy,
property, rcspcctability, masculinity and immobility. Servants, minors, women
(particularly wives), bankrupts, criminals, paupers and 'unsettled' migrants
' werc either non-citizens or not admitted to political rights because of their
moral failings, lack of local connection or lack of economic independence.
Political citizenship remained an attribute exercised in and for geographical
dIstricts, in contrast to the ancien reginte practice of representing localities and
social groups, This concept of the state has been aptly described as a joint
stock corporation with p roperty as shares,'-" and political participation
weighted by property.
This social closure of political citizenship corresponded to an elitist strain of
the enlightenment project of social and governmental reform. It focused on
people who could communicate in international languages (French, English or
LatIn), argue fluently and elegantly, and base their political, scientific and reli-
gtous principles on rational thought and public deliberation'-' people likely
to be (re-)elected by constituents who endowed their representatives with
high degree of autonomy, which permitted programmes of economic, political
and social reform beyond the capabilities of consent-oriented absolutist states.
The programme of economic liberalization was enacted most thoroughly In
the new republics, but divas taken up by monarchical states impressed by French
popover. In German states, reforms emanated from 'above' in a political system
which continued to assume the existence of estates. In Britain, unsystematic
political representation went hand in hand with gradual economic reform
driven by forces from 'below' at locally variable speeds.
In France, many revolutionary reforms had been foreshadowed in blueprints
for modernization developed by enlightened theorists or ministers of the
crown. Critical, usually aristocratic and conservative observers of the
Revolution were the first to take note of this. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that
the Revolution had tended 'to increase the popover andthe rights of the public
authority' and had produced 'a power more extensive, more detailed, more
absolute than that exercised by any one of our kings'. AVhile Tocqueville and
others noted the progress the Revolution brought, they viewed the abolition of
estates, their social obligations and religious inspiration as the dismantlement
of the last barriers which had prevented enlightened despotism from becoming
despotism pure and simple.'~
Conservative cntics highlighted a contradiction in revolutionary ideology.
The break with the past was justified with the argument that the state
derived its power from the consent of 'the people'. However, 'the people'
was silently redefined as a group of 'citizens' distinguished by wealth, status
and political loyalty, though revolutionaries and reformers hoped that wealth
would become easier to acquire as limitations on economic activity w e
reduced. Even increased wealth would not, however, admit women'~ or ethnic
minorities to citizenship automatically, because arguments for their exclu-
sion from citizenship focused increasingly on factors other than prop'y
and independence.
The discussion on citizenship's ethnic limits was loosely connected to the
scientific debate about the causes and degree of difference between human
'races'. Discussion of ethnic differences between blacks and whites still focu
on the Biblical account of a single creation and the absence of sub-Saharan
regions from accounts of ancient history. Edward Gibbon was far from alone '"
suggesting that Africans seemed to lack characteristics that other peoples ha"'
This v)ew was con )r
confirmed by contrasting European experiences in Africa a"
Asia.' '
IVhen it came to accounting
ac for the difference between Africans,Asian an
Europeans, opinions
' s dive
diverged. In view of the American experience, the cl'ma
n w 0 th Ch
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A A A tn V
CHAPTER 3
E XPERIMENTING WI T H
CITIZENSHIP IN A LIBERAL
ERA (1815 1870s)
On D> July 1830, the French king Charles X dissolved the Cbanrbre des deputes
(House of Representatives) before its inaugural meeting. Elections on 3 July
had increased the opposition's majority in parliament's lower house; this time
around, a new franchise, censorship of the press and the presence of 12,000
troops in Paris were to prevent similar disappointment for the Conservative
government. But opposition politicians continued to meet, journalists defied
censors,and residents of Paris's eastern districts procured arms and fought
troops reluctant to engage in civil war. By the time the King gave up his cause
and abdicated in favour of his infant son on 2 August, leading politicians had
decided on a return to the 1814 Constitution with Duke Louis Philippe of
Orleans as roi citoyen citizen king.'
Though the 1830 revolution was more moderate than the Revolution
1789, its immediate impact was much wider. News of revolution in Par
contributed to the creation of a Belgian state, upheavals in Italy, Gcrmany
i and
Poland, and coincided with agitation for electoral reform in Britain. A similar
chainreaction occurred in 1848.
This was partly due to international political networks the 'Holy Allian
for reactionary monarchists, Mazzini's 'Young Europe' for liberal revolution
aries, and working-class movements for proto-socialists. Greek, Polish and
Italian indcpendencc movements and revolutionary hcrocs like Lajos
ssu'h
and Giuseppe Garibaldi were admired or feared throughout Europe and North
America, while European liberals and democrats looked to thc United Sta
and Switzerlandd for
for m
models of republican government. International p e
ation was driven byb fearof, or desirc for,revolution; most wars between 181
and the First World
rid War which involved the countries under study in this b
were'interventions'' by
b i international coalitions or expeditions against
c'native
though the picture changed markedly after the Franco-Prussian Wat
to 1871." 1
EXPERIAIENTING 'iVITH CI T I Z ENSHIP IN A L I BERAL ERA
57
Domestic politics werc morc turbulent than international relations. There
were uprisings in around 1820, throughout thc 1830s, and bctwcen 1848 and
1850; military conflicts within federations erupted from 1848 to 1850, in
1864, and in 1866 in the German Confederation, and from 1861 to 1865 in the
United States. The origins of the Franco-Prussian %Var lay in part in Prussia's
German agenda, and its main result was 'Prussia's Germany',
thc second
German Empire proclaimed at Versailles in 1871. Domestic politics also put
monarchs and ministersat far greater personal risk. Defeat in war brought
honourable exile in l u x urious surroundings; defeat by revolution could
mean death. This climate of i nternational cooperation and the focus on
domestic politics formed the background to experiments with liberal concepts
of citizenship.
State ~
18w 1835 1850 1875
France 0.3 0.5
Britain 26 g77
-4 5 -5
Bavaria -10
-5 -5 -17
Prussia 0 0 10
German Empire
USe Ip
-10 -18 -19
I~crtveen the end of the Napoleonic KVars and the 1870s, political citizenship
expanded to something often (misleadingly) described as 'universal adult
male suffrage'. The vast majority of women (some could vote in France by
Pxy between 1830 and 1848) and minors remained excluded from thc right
vote. Hut the same applied to men who were paupers, short-term residents
and convicts. In the German Empire, the gap between thc number of males
v ottng agc and the number of potential voters remained in the order of 15
per centcvcn at the cnd of the period.'
Thc expansion ofthe franchise occurred as a resultof revolution in France
and matly of the German states, and of reform by parliamentary assemblies in
~rttain and United States states, This history is generally described as one of
'all p g ress; more recently, however, a revisionist account centred on
' 'sl' polttical history argued that it marginalized illiterates, women, and
unsettled people who had previously exerted prcssure in public election
rttuals. The number of adult mcn unablc to write down their political choice
5S C I T I Z ENSHIP
unassisted divas indeed significant: it included 25 per cent of white army recruits
in the Ullited States in tile 1850s,90per cent of blacks in Southern United States
states in the 1890s, around 20 Per cent of French bridegrooms in the 1880s and
1890s, and 14 per cent of Prussians in 1871." Nevertheless, an expandin
franchise gave broader social groups potential political bargaining power in
electoral systems aptly described as establishing 'directed universal voting'.I~
When new constitutions were enacted in France and five southern German
states that had experienced too much upheaval between 1792 and 1815 to effect
a simple 'restoration' Prussia, by contrast, dropped plans in 1820 the aitn
was to increase political stability through elite participation without restricting
the monarchical executive's freedom of action. Elected chambers, appointed
c hambers and the monarch all had to agree on legislation for i t t o b e
approved.'~ The choice of elected representatives was limited to 50 candidates
per constituency in France, roughly O.D> per cent of the population in Hesse-
Darmstadt, 0.5 per cent (plus anybody with a vintner's licence) in Baden, and
roughly 0.75 per cent in Bavaria.
Property and, in German states, religious tests limited the number of poten-
tial voters (see Table 3.1). Electoral participation was, however, respectable: it
was around 77 per cent in France in 1815 and again after 1830, and over 85
per cent in 1819 in Baden and Bavaria. In central German states, which estab-
lished elected assemblies after 1830, political tensions resulted in boycotts. In
Marburg, for example, turnout remained well below 30 per cent in the early
1830s.'s
The constitutions failed to anticipate, however, a structural divergence of
interests between deputies used to public recognirion in their local districts and
keen tolower taxes and monarchs' desire for expensive armies and subjects'
acclamation. In France, this provided the background for revolution, while
Germany, political crisis was postponed by pressure from Austria and Prussia~
tao non-constitutional states thar dominated the German Confederation
established in 1815.'
In Britain, where governments were closer to parliament than to the increas
ingly impotent crown, inequalities in representation came in for increilsing
criticism from popular groups and the Whig aristocracy, an exclusive network
of families committed to subjects' 'liberty' and remaining in government fro
1830,after losing
osin power in the eighteenth century. Religious discrimina ' "
towards potential voters ended with the extension of political citizenship
Protestant dissenters in 1826 and Catholics in 1829 (with around 20 >
poorer Irish voters disc
'senfranchised in compensation). A reform of the el
system was finall yapproved by a reluctant House of Lords when tha en
with the creation of new peers in 1832.'7
EXPERIAIENTING W IT H C I T I Z E NSHIP IN A L I IIERAL ERA
59
The 1832 Great Reform Act redistributed seats to make them conform more
closely to national wealth, ended plural votes based on the same property, and
added a uniform electoral qttalification the occupation of premises valued at
10 pounds in rent annually in towns. More decisive than the increase in the
number ofelectors,which rose by 60 per cent, was the rise in contested elec-
tions, which brought the number of votes cast to 482,000 (from at most
152,000) and increased 'party' allegiance.'"
In the United States, state franchise reform proceeded unevenly. Though the
admission of new voters was usually driven by partisan calculations, this did
not prevent conflicts of principle: the debate on the admission of free blacks to
Northernstates'franchise, forexample, usually concerned lessthan 2 per cent
of the population. By around 1850, most states had implemented a 'universal'
franchise for settled, respectable white men similar to the one residents of
France and German states had demanded in the revolutions of 1848. In 1855,
only nine of 31 states retained explicit property or tax requirements. Residence
tests, however, disappeared only in North Carolina. Twenty-three states barred
criminals, and 16 states explicitly excluded paupers or the insane. All but five
states (Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont)
excluded black voters (while New York subjected them to inflated property
requirements), and only five states allowed Native Americans who paid taxes
and had left their tribes to vote. What emerged in the United States was a
franchise increasingly open to adult, settled, respectable white men, closed to
adult, respectable blacks, and largely closed to adult, respectable Native
Americans.'9
The European revolutions of 1848 challenged the definition of political
citizenship as propertied citizenship. In France, the February revolution
created a republic; in German states, March April and May brought liberal
ministries, representative assemblies with broader franchises,-' black-red-gold
as official German colours and a n a t ional parliamentary assembly in
' Frankfurt In Britain, the Chartist demonstration on 10 April collapsed in the
face of a c ombined show of f o rce by the government and middle-class
Londoners.-"
This alliance between the middle classes and the government foreshadowed
the courseof events in Germany and France. The middle-class entrepreneurs
and professionals who dominated parliamentary assemblies' opposition were
aken aback by the demands for economic equality that were articulated in
p pular uprisings in the summer and autumn of 1848, while rural support for
democratic radicals was limited. In France, Louis Napoleon, a nephew of
Napoleon I and one of the 10 April special constables, proved that election to
the presidency on a conservative law and order progmmme and the conversion
gp g ) T / Z E NSHIV
D- 0 0 0 n cn
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62 C I T I Z E N SHIP
Native Jets in other French colonies could remain 'indigenous Israelites' with
natives' rather than French citizens' rights even after 1871.~~
Unlike the United States, Britain and France, the majority of German states
had no written rules on formal citizenship or subject status after 1815. Their
definition of formal citizenship is difficult to reconstruct, and assessments
diverge, particularly when it comes to the importance of descent." This is due
to the number of possible sources. In addition to constitutions, statements on
formal citizenship also occur in Genieirrdeordnungen (local governance acts),
and in Prussia's 1842 law on 'the acquisition and loss of the rights of a Prussian
subject'." Residence rights were defined in i nternational conventions on
deserters and agrccments between German states on t h e r e moval of
'vagabonds' which predated domestic citizenship laws in all states other than
Austria, Baden and Bavaria. The question is how these rules fit together.
Constitutions stated that 'the right of a native' was acquired by children of
male citizens or unmarried female citizens; female aliens who married male
citizens; appointment to a civil service position; and explicit or implicit natu-
ralization. As marriage or employment could not apply to children, the only
mechanism for the automatic attribution of formal citizenship at birth was
descent."7
Thc hypothesis that this made descent the guiding principle of nineteenth-
century German citizenship laws is contradicted by provisions on citizenship's
loss. German states' constitutions and related laws specified that formal
citizenship was lost absolutely by women who married aliens and by men who
emigrated officially, were absent for 10 years or more, or left the country
without planning to return. German laws on formal citizenship were thus
'internally inconsistent'." By the 1850s, only six out of over 30 states attrib-
uted citizenship by 'independent' residence of between three and 15 yearsI
elsewhere in Germany, citizenship was acquired by family ties and lost by
geography.~'
Local corporation acts assigned a domicile (Heiniat) to every citizen. As a
rule, domicile was acquired by birth and confirmed by 'reception' in a locality
usually at majority. In the former French dcpartenients now part of Bavaria~
Hcsse-Darmstadt and Prussia, as well as in post-1842 Prussia as a whole~
the law guaranteed freedom of movement by obliging localities to admit
honourable citizens able to support themselves for one year. In other Ge n
states, localities imposed additional wealth requirements on incomers
Conventions on the extradition of deserters defined natives by their plac
birth
irth, an
and prohibited their extradition to foreign armies. ' Conventions on th
extradition of 'vagabonds' and 'paupers', finally, specified that states had
accept people on the basis of (in declining order of importance): 1) writ
EXPERIMENTIN G W IT H C I T I Z E NSHIP IN A L I BERAL ERA
65
confirmation of citizenship (for example, a valid passport); 2) explicit natu-
ralization; 3) 10 years' independent residence or marriage with permission; 4)
descent from a citizen; 5) 'accidental' birth in a country; 6) factual presence. ' -
achieved in 1861, when all German states acceded to the so-called Gotha treaty
first concluded in 1851, though its effects on automatic naturalization through
rcsidcncc varied from state to state.~
Differentiating between formal citizenship and protection against' dcporta
tion, as Eli Nathans has done recently, ' thus seems anachronistic. In prussia,
the state at the core of Nathans's argument, no citizenship went beyond resi-
dence rights prior to 1848, as local or provincial political participation was by
'estates', statewide political participation was a thing of t h c f u ture, and
administrative discretion in deportation, residence and passport matters made
legal niceties largely irrelevant in practice.
Jews and members of Christian denominations other than Catholicism,
Lutheranism and Calvinism faced restrictions on residence and occupation,
and could not be Staatsbiirger. In 1 848, the revolutionary constitution's
proposal to end religious discrimination was a major step in the direction of
granting full citizenship rights to Jews, but thc decisive reforms did not occur
until thc 1860s; they were completed in the North German Federation by 1869,
with practical equality still a very different matter.
The unification of German states in the North German Federation in 1866
and the German Empire in 1871 did not bring about major changes to citizen-
ship law. German states retained their distinct citizenships. The North German
Federation's 1870 framework law on citizenship merely stated that citizenship
in the Federation resulted from citizenship in one of its member states. (After
1871, 'imperial' citizenship without state citizenship was introduced for Alsace
Lorraine and German colonies.) State citizenship was acquired by descent,
through the marriage of a woman to a citizen or through naturalization in a
state. Citizenship was still lost by emigration or 10 years of residence abroad~
unless emigrants registered with a German consulate and met military servi
requirements.
State citizenship continued to appear on passports and identity cards
Citizens of any German state not receiving poor relief and without a criminal
record could, howcvcr, now move to any German state and demand 'rcceptton
(At(f iialsnre) into the local citizenship after one year's rcsidcnce. The acqu's'
tion of a new state citizenship did not imply loss of the old one(s); dual and
multiple state citizcnships were possible.~
What emeremerges from this account is that no republican law of th e so'
contrasted with a monarchical law of descent, though differences in mona
chical and re u i
epublican visions of citizenship existed. The German monarcle
'g
assigned formal citizens
al citizenshipi broadly by not distinguishing very clearly between
nationality (Staatsangeborigkeit) and settlement (Heintat); both the German
states and Britain ke keptt oformal citizenship separate from political rights. The
EXPERIAIENTIN G W IT H C I T I Z E NSHIP IN A I.IIIEItAL ERA
67
was no general rule that would have allowed a British subject or German
citizen of a particular age to vote in elections. In France and the United States,
formal citizenship was more closely linked to potential political rights; groups
excluded from political citizenship were also defined as something other than
formal citizens.
Changing formal citizenship after birth raised questions of international
compatibility. In Britain, the high price of naturalization initially kept the
number of applications at around 22 per year between 1801 and 1843, with the
vast majority a p proved. German b usinessmen based in
north-eastern
constituencies, who had become stateless by emigration, complained of the
high expense, and pointed to the naturalization of
Queen Victoria'
s husband-
to-be by parliament in 1840 as evidence that there was no need to treat much
less potentially powerful aliens as a political threat. '
After a Select Committee report favourable to facilitating naturalization,
parliament agreed in 1844. Fees were reduced to 14 to 15 shillings plus legal
expenses pocket change for middle-class households, but still prohibitive for
some labourers. Naturalization by Home Office certificate, which did not
allow beneficiaries to become members of parliament, was henceforth granted
at the discretion of the home secretary. Parliament could admit aliens to full
citizenship with all rights by private act nine were passed before 1870.
Naturalization by certificate was valid only in the United Kingdom; Britain' s
colonies set their own naturalization rules from 1847. The reduction of fees
and thereform of procedure caused the number of naturalizations to increase
to around >>0 per year ' -
competent for any Person to divest himself of the allegiance under which he
was born'.~ Naturalization was never valid in the country of birth, and even
natural-born British subjects who acquired their status by descent were only
British subjects outside their country of birth." Between 1850 and 1854, no
British passports were issued to naturalized subjects; from 1854, passports
were again issued, though with much shorter validity than to natural-borg
subjects, as naturalizations conferred after 1854 lapsed after six months spent
abroad. British passports always stated whether their bearers were British or
naturalized British subjects.+
In German states, naturalization offered complete equality, but required
admission to a locality and to the state. Admission to a locality required certi-
fied proof of personal details, past good conduct, and sufficient wealth to
remain off poor relief in the foreseeable future between 200 Gulden in a rural
village and 5,000 Gulden (up to 25 times the annual income of a master
artisan) in Frankfurt am Main. Payments to communal funds and fees could
amount to another 130 Gulden. No prior residence was required, though, like
citizenship acquired at birth, citizenship acquired by naturalization was lost
automatically on emigration. Grants of citizenship were discretionary, and
records of applications declined were routinely destroyed. All that can be said,
therefore, is that approved applications usually conformed to requirements.
Administrative correspondence strongly suggests that members of religious
minorities, particularly Jews and pacifist Christian denominations, had to bc
remarkably wealthy to obtain naturalization."
No German state counted 'implicit' naturalizations through residence, and
practice with regard to naturalization by marriage or appointment as a civil
servant was uneven. At a minimum, Prussia naturalized over 3,500 people per
year around mid-century, and Bavaria a thousand, with 80 to 90 per cen f
those naturalized coming from other German states. These naturalizations
ceased after German unification, but th e number of n a t uralizations in
Germany continued to remain well ahead of France or Britain, with around
2,300 per year in the German Empire in the 1870s. '
In restoration France, naturalization continued to bc granted by thc head o
state on the basis of reports from the locality, departentcnt and justice mis'ry~
after a 10-year residence period following admission to domicile at ot after
majority. The p'rocedure cost 205 francs, which was about one third of a
worker's annual income. Up to 1848, it was sought mainly by veterans born m
areas of the Napoleonic Empire no longer part of France, whose pension claims
depended on citizenship. Most other cases originated in two departetn<<
where only citizenship granted access to communal property. Between 1814
o
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70 C I T I Z ENSHIP
Texas (1876). In parts of thc United States, declarant alien status thus brougl,t
7Z
with it most of thc privileges of citizenship.'-
Naturalized citizens svere usually dual citizens. France, Britain and the
United States did not provide for (complete) dcnationalization, even though
the United States pushed for dcnationalization abroad from 1849. The German
states assumed that emigration led to the loss of citizenship rights, but not
necessarily of citizens' duties.73
There divas a growing divide between legal theory and practice. In German
states, emigrants were obliged to apply for release from subject status. Initially,
the point had been to discourage propertied subjects from leaving, and to force
people to meet responsibilities (such as tax payment, providing for destitute
relatives, scholarship repayment) before departure. Increasingly, the focus
shifted to ensuring emigrants' future welfare. But emigration checks were
costly and easy to avoid. Local officials generally issued passports for 'travel'
to America, and border controls in states with shipping interests focused on
cash. Many German emigrants left illegally and possibly as deserters. In
France, thc 1811 requircmcnt to seek permission from the head of state before
naturalization abroad remained on the statute books. Permission cost 675
francs, and was hardly ever acquired; the quasi-totality of French citizens
naturalized abroad thus committed an offence.'~
That matters came to a head over military service in thc United States
was nevertheless surprising. Military service in the country of immigration
was rarely relevant to naturalized citizens. Nineteenth-century conscription was
limited to part of an age cohort generally selected at 21. At this age, natural-
ization was impossible in France and highly unlikely elsewhere. Britain and the
antebellutn United States relied on volunteer armies coupled with l ocal
militias. After briefly experimenting with a volunteer army, France opted f
selective conscription from 1817, selecting up to 20 pcr cent of young me at
21 for active and reserve service lasting up to nine years. Those selected could
supply a replacement before 1855 and purchase exemption afterwards (f
2,500 francs). In all German states, noblemen and burghers of major ws
were effectively exempt from compulsory military service. Placemen could be
supplied in southern Germany, but not in Prussia, where high school graduas
able to purchase their own equipment could serve an abbreviated tour of du y
of one year.7~
The prosecution of returning emigrants for desertion in German states le
to American protests in which American diplomats began to argue that na "
ralization severed ties to the native state. "With the Civil War, military sv'
became
ccame an issue in America itself. When conscription was introduced
Union and the Confederation in 1862, natural-born citizens, naturalI
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D-
(:ITIZI:NSHIP
travel proved incompatible with one another, as the distinction was hard to
make. While the passport system appears to have succeeded in curbing fhe
inflow of louver-class travellers to capitals surrounded by a single or double rIng
of checkpoints, it did not prevent travel by well-known opposition figures.9>
This was because passports transcribed a plausible identification made by
the applicant, a local official or notable onto an officially certified document.
Personal descriptions in prose were sufficiently general to apply to several
individuals. The drastic punishments provided for repeated transgression of
borders which ranged up to imprisonment for life were hardly ever
imposed; a single instance of illegal border crossing brought no more than a
reprimand, brief imprisonment or a beating, depending on what officials felt
like on a particular day.
The focus of passport documents remained the text of recommendation.
The coat of arms at the top or bottom of the page became slightly more promi-
nent, partly in an attempt to make reprints more difficult, while the personal
description linking the passport to its bearer remained consigned to the
margins. Yet, passports were no longer intended to be read. Travel accounts'
assertions that police officers were illiterate were probably exaggerated, but
police officers were unlikely to be multilingual. From 1851, when Britain
became the last country to stop issuing international passports in French, the
text on passports was always in the language of the country of issue, though
consular visas could provide translations. Passports fulfilled their function
adequately if their format conveyed what sort of traveller officials were dealing
with: a labourer like Starkle, or a respectable personage like Duthie. ' In Fran
and German states, passports were issued by officials who respected the rules
of social deference by adding physical descriptions only for lower- or middle-
ranking travellers. Similarly, upper-class travellers were officially exempted
from visa requirements in Prussia.
In Britain and the United States, where passports were not mandatory, they
remained closer to personal recommendations. In th e U n ited Kingdom~
Foreign Office passports were issued by the Foreign Secretary in his own na
(for example, Palmerston or Castlereagh) without an expiry date, but at hig"
prices: at two pounds, seven shillings and six pence, Foreign Office passp '"
cost more than a first-class ticket from Britain to A ntwerp in the I +
Moreover,they were granted only to acquaintances of the Foreign Secretary
to customers of a London bank. In the United States, the State Departme"
issued passports only to 'respectable' whites. In these circumstances, a go "
ment monopoly on passports was unthinkable. In the United States, therefo
individual states issued passports to both black and white citizens, Scot ' '
towns also issued passports to their residents, and the 23 French consula
EXPERIhIENTING W IT H C I T I Z E NSHIP IN A L I BERAL ERA
75
owners saw only limited benefit in dependent wage labour, but preferred
economic independence or submission.'
The experience of emancipation in the Caribbean had important reper-
cussions for the postbellum United States. Slave emancipation in the United
States was partly an unintended outcome of military conflict in a society
inured to institutionalized racial inequality. Unlike their Caribbean counter-
parts, southern plantation owners faced an undecided government keen on a
swift return to agricultural productivity. This caused white tutelage and the
plantation economy to remain in place along with a pass system targeting
mainly black freedom of movement, regulations barring blacks from skilled
occupations, and measures against 'idle' blacks who moved into cities.
Economic control soon came close to creating a black 'slavery of debt'."
German states restricted the economic activity of Jews, who were obliged
to settle and work in particular locations and occupations. As the society of
orders transformed itself into the society of citizens, ghettoization was increas-
ingly criticized by liberals and government officials as an infringement of
citizens' rights and an obstacle to administrative standardization. If standard-
ization was the goal, then emancipation required use of t h e G erman
language and settled occupations in crafts, agriculture or the professions.
Public assimilation and private religious practice offered significant educational
and economic opportunities as reward for integration into an enlightened
public sphere influenced by the values of state bureaucracies.'"
State control tended to increase in regulating access to the professions and
state administration. The appointment of non-citizens to positions of public
trust and authority, which had been common in the German states and pre-
volutionaryFrance, became exceptional. Preference for native-born subjects
mained in place in Britain and, to a lesser extent, in the United States, and
as confirmed by the introduction of new exams designed to provide citizens
with a fair opportunity to compete for attractive jobs.
In Britain and the United States, the main function of universities was to
provide general education and professional training for lecturers, clergymen
and physicians. Legal competence was mainly certified by members of the bar
an individual jurisdicrion. Bar exams were open to both aliens and citizens,
pvided they were prepared to swear an oath of loyalty, although aliens could
not hope for judicial appointments. This model of professionalization through
dacto monopolies for private organizations was typical of the British and
erican experience. It left the decision on the admission of non-citizens
a gely to professional organizations. In Britian, physicians outside public
hospitals or asylums required no formal qualification prior to 1858; aliens
could sit British examinations. In most United States states, non-citizens were
7S C IT Z
I EN S Id IP
only barred from skilled occupations with the increase in anti-immigrant sentI
ment in thc 1880s. University teaching posts were restricted to Anglicans at
Oxford and Cambridge before 1871, but open to subjects and aliens alike.
Posts at schools >vere also open to aliens, unless the school operated unde
royal charter, When the British government introduced competitive examina
tions for civil service posts in 1855, it barred naturalized citizens from
competing; when the United States federal govcrnmcnt followed in 1883,
however, it did not.nz
On the European continent, universities were state-sponsored institutions
whose main function was to train civil servants. In German states, where
universities retained a greater degree of autonomy than France's 'national
schools', civil service examinations (Staatsevnnien) continue to be conducted
by state-run exam boards. In German states, aliens were ineligible for state
cxams; certificates of achievement were not validated even by subsequent natu-
ralization. The same rule applied in France, even though foreign physicians
could receive exceptional permission to practise." The impact of such restric-
tions was limited by the fact that higher learning remained extremely exclusive.
At most, 0.5 per cent of a male age cohort studied at university."~
The power of local officials to turn back newcomers for economic reasons
did not disappear. In most German states, newcomers had to find employmcnt
within three days, and aliens >vere unable to challenge removals from any
country." Therequirement to procure 'papers' in German states and France
imposed costs on migrants who crosse'd borders, as did the entry fees, which
were sometimes required prior to the 1850s or 1860s, with the obligation
purchase an overpriced official fire bucket in some Westphalian cities in thc
1840s a particularly curious example."
Fees were significant as international migration was price sensitive A e
1815, assisted or coerced emigration became less important in European coun
tries. Thc British government provided some funds for emigration and
continued to deport convicts to Australia until 1868. Australia or United States
states beckoned with easy access to political participation, while landlords
shipped tenants overseas during the Irish famine, German localities ga'c
paupers onc-way tickets abroad, and British, French, Swiss and Belgian
governments subsidized political refugees' dcparturc. But i n q u antitati
terms, the vastt majority
ma'or' of European emigrants financed their joncys '"
' on f d
viduallyor relied on funds provided by families, relatives or friends A
or prepaid
p emi ' rati
g ation appeared on other routes and included Ind " "
service for Indian work rkers in other parts of the British EmpI~~ or
' to the United States.u7
Iabour migration
'
ates
E XPEL limni ENTING KVITH CIT IIZENSHIP
Z IN A L I B ERAL ERA
79
ost came from Belgium um (43 per cent of aliens in 1881), Ital ta y(94 per
cent) and Germany (8 per cent). '
). Ali e ns were most} o
}y found in industrial centres
o t e o r e rs, and tended to work as nskilled un " or semi-skilled workers
s menia workers during Haussmann's s 1860
6 0s remodelling of Paris. French
ers concernsfocused on aliens' eff ect
e ect onon wages
wa es and their role as str e-
s. n , anti-alien riots drove thousa usands of non-French workers out
e country. '- ' The effect of alien imm migration on conscription added to
sions 'p
sions ecause departeIIIent I recruitment numbers were calcu}ated accor ding
to the number 'd
er of r esidents. As aliens i ve re notconscripted, Frenchmen in
ricts wit I large
b numbers o immigrants
ers of ' bore a higher burden. It was alleged
t iat employers pre erred aliens, who were not liable to be drafted a
1 d
c ii
r e n o a iens were accused of seeking to maximize
a
' thiIS
ad ping t ieir nationality indeterminate until they drew a bad
r In the conscri tion }otter y; if they drew an exemption, they could
emain' French citizens. Concern about the effects of immigration also
rom newspaper accounts, which doubted that the number of aliens
80 C I T I Z ENSHIP
in Paris declined in 1848, and accused the government of trying to pass 150 000
aliensoff as 15,000 in thc census.'~
In German states, thc proportion of aliens (most of whom were citizen' of
other German states) was mainly influenced by state size and the distance from
t he nearest border. Almost half o f t h c p opulation of t h c c i t y-state f
Frankfurt, for example, did not hold Frankfurt citizenship in the second half
of thc nineteenth century; by contrast, the proportion of aliens in Hesse
Darmstadt rose from 1.2 per cent in 1834 to 3.8 per cent in 1864 (the last year
of independence). In thc 1871 census, the proportion of non-Germans in thc
German Empire was 0.6 per cent.
Aliens in German states clustered in the Iow-wage occupations open to non-
members of guilds. Of servants, artisans and labourers, 5 to 8 per cent were
aliensin 1830s and 1840s Hesse-Darmstadt, 15 per cent in 1840s Munich, and
over 20 per cent in some factory towns. Bureaucrats assumed that aliens in
casual employment had a significant impact on the labour market and could
be expelled in order to reduce unemployment in times of economic crisis.'~
German workers were less certain about anti-alien measures. Given the
minute size of many German states, accentuated by numerous en- and exclaves,
and the traditional requirement that journeymen spend a few years on the
road, labourers, journeymen and servants had experienced alien status at
first hand and were usually hostile to migration restrictions; in 1848 the
representatives of German workers gathered in Frankfurt demanded the
abolition of passport laws.L'~
In spite of some restrictions, non-citizens had access to large sectors
labour markets on almost equal terms. Economic citizenship was not linked
formal citizenship except for positions involving political authority
requiring higher education tested in national examinations. The main problem
of people who moved abroad was not their admission to employment or self
employment, but their position if employment ceased or t heir business
collapsed.
A n M A
M A
CD A A G M D1
n G 0 A 'U 0
0 C CD I/J C
A A 0
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M
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n C n
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n
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0
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n
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n A A A n C
0 0
0 A A Q 0 n 0 O M
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S2 C I T I Z E NSHIP
the French rule that an official residence of one year amounted to a change of
domicile. For aliens, however, the threat of removal Persisted, even thoug}
from the 1860s international conventions guaranteed short-term relief for sick
t fave}1crs.
In Britain, subjects could be removed to their domicile, but aliens could not.
Official reports found that aliens hardly used poor relief facilities. Able-bodied
single or married men in skilled occupations from distant localities lvere
usually not removed by poor law guardians either, because temporary relief
was less costly than recruiting skilled workers after a slump. By 1846, a new
settlemcnt in England could be acquired by five years' residence. This was
reduced to three years in 1861 and one year in 1865. For migrants who crossed
thc borders between England, Scotland and Ireland, it r emained at five
years.'3'
In thc United States, aliens accounted for a considerable proportion of
those maintained at the public expense, particularly in the major ports: up to
26 per cent of almshouse inmates were aliens in early nineteenth-century
Manhattan, as were around one third of pensioners in mid nineteenth-century
Philadelphia, for example.' Settlement legislation did not become obsolete,
'but east-coast northern states focused on controlling poor relief expenditure
by refusing entry to alien paupcrs or likely paupers, and by collecting contri-
butions to thc cost of relief from immigrants. Southern states attracted fclver
immigrants from abroad, and exempted white paupers from the harsher side
of poor relief as part of the 'wages of whiteness'. In 1859, in response to a
British enquiry about the removal of alien poor, Georgia and North Caroli
claimed to have neither poor laws nor paupcrs.'~
Northern states, as well as Virginia, Louisiana and Texas, continued to
require bonds or commutation payments from immigrants or their carriers~
and sometimes ordered removals, particularly to Ireland and England Bond >
payments or the obligation to remove paupers within a year of arrival werc
initially imposed on shipowners and raihvay lines regardless of whether thc
immigrants were United States citizens or aliens, and whether they aI" "
from other states or foreign countries. In 1849, the Supreme Court ruled tl'a
the Massachusetts fee of 2 dollars per head for all alien cntrics was an lllcga
interference with the federal regulation of international trade, but this merely
restricted those liable to pay commutation charges to those immigrants lvh
w ere deemed at particular risk of poverty. Thc general tax of 1 dollar pcn" y
in New York was renamed, and higher bonds were demanded of higher ' "
immigrants. Until such payments disappeared in 1872 in Massachusetts an
1876in Ncw York k, tthe
e 'financial burden on immigrants was significant' In 1
Massachusetts for cx example, the average commutation payment of 20 do}la
EXPERIAIENTING W IT H C I T I Z E NSHIP IN A L I BERAL ERA
85
was just one dollar below the average ticket price for a transatlantic stccragc
passage oftwenty-one dollars.'"'
Social citizenship was still an alien concept to the ninctcenth century, given
thc stigmatization that public relief brought, particularly for 'undeserving'
applIcants. As a basic social safety net, it remained tied to localities, although
thc importance of formal citizenship increased as it became more difficult to
acquire social rights in a locality abroad, while adapting settlcmcnt to thc place
of rcsidcnce within a country became easier. In Britain and the United States,
aliens continued to acquire claims to social support upon arrival subject to
payment of a fee in the United States.
Rclicf remained a significant local dimension in the definition of boundaries
between insidersand outsiders.The same was true of rank: the higher indi-
viduals' status in society, thc lower the probability that they would come to rely
on relief designated as public.
What justifies calling the period between the end of the Napoleonic Wars
and the 1880s a 'liberal era'? In party-political terms, many governments
were anything but liberal. With regard to migration policy, the argument that
the absence of systematic frontier controls made the nineteenth century a time
of unrestricted migration'"-' appears overstated,given the documentary
requirements and charges detailed above. What did set the period between
1815 and the late 1870s apart from what came before and after was the
emphasis on individual characteristics and local decision-making. A liberal
creed concerning the structure of society gained ground in the political and
economic organization of t h e states under study. It was based on two
premisscs: free markets with freedom of contract between individuals, and the
participation of respectable (male) heads of propertied households in locally-
based political decision-making. The liberal approach to citizenship rights
assumed that i n dividuals could meet these conditions of w ealth and
respectability of their own volition.
LIberal autonomy was not absolute. It did not apply inside the family, where
hc head of the household alone gave voice to political opinions, determined
natIonality and controlled or owned property.'' Likewise, the liberal era had
dIstInct limitations when it came to minority rights. The liberal view of society
as a collection of autonomous households whose potential could be liberated
by granting formal legal equality was never uncontested. In many ways, slavery
p oded a key to the conservative counter-argument to the liberal creed.
"'bals assumed that humans chose whether to be poor or successful,
86 CITIZENSHIP
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CHAPTER 4
In March 1885, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck ordered the head officials of
Prussia's four eastern provinces to deport Russian subjects without residence
, permits, and to begin consultations with local authorities on terminating the
residence of Russian subjects with permits. In July 1885, the order was
extended to Austrians. Bismarck's aim was to curtail the immigration of Poles
from the Russian and Austrian territories which bordered on Prussia as
labourers, craftsmen, artisans or students. His orders were put into effect with
considerable zeal. By 1887, around 30,000 Polish aliens including around
10,000 Jews had been removed from Prussia.
The measure was part of Bismarck's more general plan to create a German
Empire in which German was the sole language, and Protestantism the main
religion, at a t i m e when migration and demographics were making the
Chancellor's native Prussia increasingly Polish and Catholic. Between 1870 and
1880, the proportion of residents classed as Poles by government enumerators
had grown from 3 4 per cent to 8 per cent in the Mariemverder district, and
from 1.9 per cent to 10.9 per cent in Posen.'
Although anti-Polis)i sentiments were widely shared in German political
circles, Bismarck's deportation order was controversial. Catholics, Social
Democrats and left-wing liberals opposed arbirrary state action against
Catholics and workers. Conservatives were concerned about the deportations'
. impact on rural wage levels. The Prussian measure was sharply criticized in the
p"ess and parliaments of Austria, France, Britain and Switzerland, As other
German states refused to follow suit, poles living in prussian border towns like
"rankfurt could move to neighbouring Hesse-Darmstadt Offenbach.z
Though no European country except Britain doubted that governments
could remove aliens at will in the later nineteenth century,3 the right was
'" oked primarily against aliens who broke laws or cost money. Prussia's 1885