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What is This?
N E I L J . M I TC H E L L
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen
This article investigates sexual violence committed by government security forces. It focuses on the issue
of delegation. It uses principalagent logic to understand sexual violence committed by these forces and
to set up a cross-national empirical analysis. The article provides an approach to measuring the amount
of agent discretion in a political system and an analysis of new cross-national data on the incidence of
rape and sexual violence committed by police and security forces. It is argued that sexual violence is a
category of human rights violation that is more likely to be attributable to the selfish motivations of
agents, and it is an act that is likely to be hidden. This article identifies the conditions under which
these acts are most likely to occur as conditions of conflict, system-wide slack bureaucratic control, and
where there are constraints on information and organization. The theoretical argument makes sense of
earlier findings in the human rights literature, such as the importance of democracy and conflict, while
directing attention to motivations, accountability, and, for the first time in systematic analyses of human
rights, to the particular issue of sexual violence. The use of cross-national data on the incidence of sexual
violence for the year 2003 provides preliminary support for the theoretical argument. After controlling
for factors likely to increase the incidence of sexual violence, such as military size and ethnic fraction-
alization, it is found that, where agents are more accountable and subject to tighter control, sexual vio-
lence is less likely. Finally, the article points to the importance of additional data collection over time,
consistent with other human rights and conflict datasets, and draws out some policy implications follow-
ing from the theoretical argument and analysis.
between principal and agent is a critical the United States (Brehm & Gates, 1997).
relationship.1 The article argues that agents With a comparative research design, this
seeking private goods influence the choice, article aims to show that the issue of delega-
level, and type of violence, and that the way tion is equally important to our understand-
principals and agents interact is central to our ing bureaucracies that supply violence and
understanding of political violence, including the choice among types of repression imposed
the perpetration of sexual violence by govern- by government forces. What should be clear
ment or security forces. and what gives impetus for this article is that
While the leader is formally in charge, not all security forces are alike, nor all con-
principalagent logic holds that the agents flicts, as Wood (2004, 2006) makes clear in
superior information and selfish natures her pioneering comparative work on sexual
loosen control. This logic draws attention to violence. They differ in the quality of recruits
the potential for conflicting goals between selected, in the degree of discipline and
principals and agents, and, although the prin- control exercised over agents, and in the
cipal is supposed to be in control, it draws frequency of sexual violence.
attention to the advantages that the agent If this logic applies as it does in other
enjoys over the principal (Arrow, 1985). policy areas, some of these agents will misuse
Entrusting the task to others creates an oppor- their operational knowledge, their uniform,
tunity for the agents own selfish and hidden and government resources for their own
actions it creates a moral hazard. The selfish private benefit. Specifically, what are the
agent prefers shirking to working for example likely private goods of the agents? What evi-
(Brehm & Gates, 1997). Additionally, the prin- dence is there that the independent selfish
cipal is likely to encounter adverse selection in activity of agents is contributing importantly
recruiting agents where individuals volunteer to levels of repression? How do we use this
for service with characteristics and tastes logic to combat violence? This article pro-
potentially harmful to the principals mission, vides evidence of the agents impact on the
comparable to an insurance company receiv- level of violence by developing an approach
ing applications from bad risks. In the rela- to collecting and analysing cross-national
tionship with the self-interested agent, the data on the incidence of sexual violence com-
principal is likely to be at an information dis- mitted by government forces. There is an
advantage about the policy area and about the accumulation of research on the use of sexual
extent of the agents selfish character and violence by government and security forces
actions. The size of the information disad- and on the broader issue of women and the
vantage affects the ability of the principal to military and womens rights (Apodaca, 2000;
control the agent. Economists and political Arat, 2002; Beevor, 2002; Brownmiller, 1975;
scientists have applied this logic and the Chang, 1997; Enloe, 1983, 2000; Goldstein,
assumptions of superior information and 2001; Henderson, 2004; Niarchos, 1995;
selfish actions on the part of agents to the Walzer, 1977; Wood, 2004). There is an
behavior of bureaucracies (Banks & empirical analysis of government responses
Weingast, 1992; Meier, 1993), including the to sexual violence (see Weldon, 2002), but,
use of unnecessary force by police officers in to our knowledge, there are no large-N cross-
1
national empirical analyses of sexual violence
See, for example, Bawn (1995) and Huber & McCarty
(2004) for formal arguments, and Brehm & Gates (1997) committed by governments security forces.
and Waterman, Rouse & Wright (2004) for empirical Finally, the article points to policy implica-
analysis of the principalagent relationship. See Mitchell
(2004) for this theoretical argument applied to human tions and priorities consistent with this
rights violations in three historical cases. theoretical approach.
sources for human rights violations data that three agency variables that are expected to
have been used in earlier research, and, at least lower levels of sexual violence if the theoreti-
since the end of the Cold War, they are quite cal focus on principalagent logic is to be sus-
consistent (Poe, Carey & Vazquez, 2001). As tained empirically. First, where organizations
the US Department of State reports provide can form to monitor human rights violations,
more detailed and comprehensive coverage, we where information critical of government
relied on these reports.3 We collected data for officials compensates for information asym-
163 countries for 2003 and developed a five- metries, and where elected officials may be
point ordinal scale to measure the level of rape held accountable for the activity of their
and sexual violence by government security agents, then we expect there to be a lower like-
forces, ranging from 0, indicating the lowest lihood of sexual violence by security forces.
incidence to 4, indicating the highest inci- The formation of advocacy and interest
dence. A 0 was assigned to countries where groups is stimulated by public policies, and
there was no mention of sexual violence by these organizations then assume the costs
government forces. This scale represents an of auditing and monitoring public policies.
ordinal scale where 0 represents the value These organizations form more or less easily
below 1, but not necessarily that there were no across different policy areas and political
actual cases of sexual violence. The Department systems, and, as Banks & Weingast (1992)
of State reports had substantially fewer zero observe, the cost of policy monitoring and
values than the Amnesty International reports. auditing varies. It is plausible that the costs of
As with ordinary crime data, we anticipate that establishing even private auditing mechanisms
the most likely error with these data is that they over agencies engaged in human rights vio-
undercount the frequency of sexual violence lations will tend to be higher. Those that care
and rape.4 Tables AI and AII in the appendix most about the use of violence may encounter
provide a description of the scale and the score an intimidating environment and severe prob-
coded for each country. lems in collective action and gathering and
Our argument is that the incidence of reporting information about repression. In
sexual violence by government forces is driven turn, repressive agencies can claim to be
by out-of-control agents. It is an undeniably working for the most vital interest of the state
challenging task to measure the degree of slack and safeguarding national security and sur-
given agents in bureaucracies. We develop vival, which makes those who raise questions
concerning these agencies activities highly
3 In order to collect the information for the Department of vulnerable to counter-questions about their
State, embassies monitor NGOs, media, government loyalties.
officials, jurists, armed forces sources, academics, and other
sources. Within the Department of State, the Bureau of Self-regulating mechanisms for auditing the
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor then corroborates bureaucracies of repression are most likely to
information with UN representatives, NGOs, and others.
Using this source, the United States is not included in the
develop where there are rights to free organiz-
analysis. When we compared the Department of State ation and association and free and critical
reports with the Amnesty International country reports for media, which provides a further agency-based
2003, we found that the widest discrepancies between the
two sources were for Myanmar and Colombia. theoretical foundation for the finding of a cor-
4 As we are analyzing just 2003 data, we examined that year
relation between lower human rights violations
in relation to other years on the Political Terror Scale (Gibney
& Dalton, 1996) to provide some context. The Department
and democracies in the quantitative analysis of
of State PTS scores for 2003 were lower than 2002 but higher human rights violations (Beer & Mitchell,
than the historical average (19802004). The correlation 2004; Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Poe &
between the PTS and the measure of sexual violence was 0.63
for 2003 strong enough to increase confidence in the sexual Tate, 1994; Zakaria, 2003). Repression gener-
violence index but not so strong as to diminish its uniqueness. ates at least latent interest communities and
networks. But we know, from the example of 2002: 154). As Montinola & Jackman state
the mothers of the disappeared during the dirty (2002: 150): If public officials are well paid,
war in Argentina, the extraordinary courage it they will value their positions more highly
takes to organize and become active (see Brysk, and will have fewer incentives to jeopardize
1994). In democracies, these latent interest those positions. We extend this argument
communities, by using democratic rights and to officials in security forces and expect that
ideas of democratic legitimacy, have a better better pay results in better control. Not only
chance of achieving organizational form. An will those in well-paid positions value the
example of this sort of organization would be positions more highly, but better pay repre-
BTselem, a major human rights organization sents a means to address the problem of
that monitors the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. adverse selection and minimize the recruit-
In contrast, a Russian court shut down the ment of bad risks.
RussianChechen Friendship Society, a human As with democracy, there are other theor-
rights monitoring organization (Amnesty Inter- etical arguments for a relationship between
national, 2006). As a result of the higher infor- economic development and low levels of
mation flows in democracy, the oversight and human rights violations generally. The exist-
accountability of agents increases, and we ence of these alternative theoretical arguments
expect that, where there is a high level of makes the empirical test of economic develop-
democracy, there will be a low level of sexual ment and democracy critical to, but not deci-
violence. This expectation conforms to the sive for, a principalagent argument. If we
findings of more general analyses of human found no relationship between these variables
rights violations (Davenport & Armstrong, and the dependent variable, it would be
2004; Hathaway, 2002; Henderson, 1991; evidence against our theoretical argument.
Moore, 2000; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate & Therefore, the variables are important to the
Keith, 1999) and alternative theoretical argu- analysis. Yet, in this rich theoretical context,
ments linking democracy to less repression, finding a relationship does not help sort bet-
perhaps pointing to the effect of democratic ween the various theoretical interpretations. In
institutions in lowering the level of opposition order to capture more directly the amount of
threat or in disseminating democratic values. discipline and control in a political system, for
Consistent with these studies, we use Polity IV our third agency variable we use the degree to
regime scores for 2003 (Marshall & Jaggers, which public officials are perceived to use their
2002) to measure the level of democracy in a offices for private financial gain.
political system. We also examine a categorical Financial corruption deals with the finan-
measure of democracy (Polity greater than 7) cial rewards that public officials extract from
to address the more recent claim (Davenport performing or not performing their duties.
& Armstrong, 2004) that only full democra- High levels of overall financial corruption
cies have a beneficial impact on human rights reflect a general absence of monitoring,
violations. accountability, and control in a political
Second, higher levels of economic system and a high degree of agent discretion
development, measured by GNI per capita to pursue hidden actions. It is plausible that
(in thousands) for 2003 (World Bank, 2004), this high degree of agent discretion applies to
permit better compensation of public officials security forces as it does to other public
and in the absence of reliable comparative bureaucracies. Where there is systemic finan-
data on wages and salaries this measure has cial corruption indicating slack bureaucratic
been used as the best available measure of control, members of security forces and
public sector wages (Montinola & Jackman, police forces will perceive increased opportu-
nities and a more favorable balance of incen- Nanking emphasizes the importance placed
tives to pursue hidden actions. For some of by Japanese soldiers on the inferiority of the
these agents, the expectation of increased Chinese. Therefore, as a community becomes
opportunities for hidden action will translate more fractionalized along ethnic lines, there
into an increased likelihood of committing is a greater likelihood of sexual violence.
sexual violence. Financial corruption is Finally, conflict likely increases the oppor-
measured by the World Banks Control of tunity for hidden actions and, therefore, the
Corruption index for 2002 (Kaufmann, likelihood of sexual violence by agents. Under
Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2005) and is based on conflict conditions, agents may be in close
surveys of business executives and country contact with the civilian population and
analysts perceptions.5 Perceived financial expect to hide their actions more easily and
corruption provides a general indicator of the victims may be even more disadvantaged in
degree of slack given to agents by principals, informing on the perpetrators. Civil conflict
and this indicator is independent of the and civil war may also increase recruitment
reported incidence of sexual violence by problems and the risk of adverse selection.
security forces. We therefore expect that Generally, empirical studies have identified a
political systems with higher levels of hidden positive relationship between civil war, mea-
activity in the form of financial corruption sured as at least 1,000 battle-deaths a year,
also will have a higher likelihood of sexual and state repression (Burkhart, 2002;
violence committed by security forces. Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Harrelson-
There are several other factors that are Stephens & Callaway, 2003; Poe & Tate,
likely to increase the incidence of sexual vio- 1994; Keith, 1999, 2002; Poe, Tate & Keith,
lence. These factors include the size of a 1999). Yet, recognizing that even lower levels
countrys military forces (in millions of troops of violence could prompt increased govern-
for 2001 the most recently available; see ment use of violence (Gartner & Regan, 1996;
Singer, Bremer & Stuckey, 1972), the degree Moore, 2000), we also examine the lower
of ethnic fractionalization (Fearon, 2003), threshold of conflict as provided by the
and the level of conflict as coded by the Uppsala/PRIO database to investigate the
Uppsala/PRIO data for 2003 (Gleditsch et relationship between conflict and rape by
al., 2002). As the size of military forces government security forces.
increases, it is plausible that the difficulties of
control increase. It is also plausible that vio- Empirical Analysis
lence, including sexual violence, is more likely
when the victim is perceived as ethni- We begin the empirical analysis with the cor-
cally distinct from the perpetrator. Changs relation matrix in Table I and draw attention
(1997) account of Japanese soldiers at to some important features.6 First, the
highest absolute pair-wise correlation with
5 The World Banks Control of Corruption measure is one
of six governance research indicators, available for 162
the dependent variable is with the World
countries from 1996 to 2002. Although a similar measure Bank Control of Corruption score. This neg-
of corruption is available from Transparency International ative correlation is consistent with our
for 2003, it is available for only 130 countries. In order to
increase the number of observations, we chose to employ argument. In political systems where there is
the World Banks corruption measure for 2002. The two little control over the selfish or hidden
measures are highly correlated at 0.97. Table AII in the
appendix provides a listing of cases with their Control of 6 The case of Iraq was dropped from all analyses, owing to
Corruption score and our coding of sexual violence. Three its status as an occupied country for much of 2003. The
countries do not have a Control of Corruption score but Department of State report describes rape as routine under
were coded for their level of sexual violence: Albania (0), the Saddam Hussein regime, but the discussion is not
Belize (1), and the Solomon Islands (2). limited to the year 2003.
1.000
0.743
Polity
score
matters, we also find those public officials
employed in security forces more likely to
GNI per commit sexual violence. Second, the other
1.000
0.395
0.501
capita
agency variables GNI per capita and
democracy are also related to the sexual
violence measure as expected. Third, it is
Corruption
Control of
0.435
1.000
0.856
0.537
lation between Control of Corruption and
GNI per capita, and both of these variables
are quite highly correlated with the level of
Civil war
0.143
0.353
0.379
0.190
0.295
ization
Ethnic
0.118
0.002
0.012
0.034
0.023
size
0.035
1.000
0.430
0.010
0.430
0.059
0.066
0.039
0.036
0.504
0.116
1.000
0.832
0.174
0.253
0.079
0.065
0.147
0.029
(2001)
0.431
0.230
0.259
0.214
0.225
0.221
0.196
0.373
0.409
0.253
index
Polity score
Table II. Combined Effects Reducing Sexual government places on agents. Countering
Violence civil violence also increases the demand for
Model 1 recruits, resulting in the mobilization of
poorer quality agents. Either of these effects
Military personnel (2001) 0.70 0.056 of civil violence thus increases the likelihood
(0.36) of uncontrolled violence, including sexual
Ethnic fractionalization 0.24 0.582
violence. We examine civil conflict (having
(0.44)
Civil conflict 0.85 0.012 25 to 999 battle-dead in the current year)
(0.34) and civil war (having more than 999 battle-
Civil war 1.33 0.055 dead in the current year) as separate dichoto-
(0.70) mous variables. Thus, the base category is
CGDhigh 1.83 0.000 the absence of either of these categories of
(0.48) violence.
CGDlow 0.72 0.015
The factors that are hypothesized to lower
(0.30)
Cut point 1 0.25
the prevalence of sexual violence are Control of
Cut point 2 0.67 Corruption, GNI per capita, and democracy.
Cut point 3 1.31 We argue that high levels of all three agency
Cut point 4 2.87 variables place high constraints on government
Number of observations 145 agents, while low levels of all three variables
LR 2 (6) 58.31 imply few constraints on government agents.
Prob. > 2 0.000 To this end, we constructed two dummy vari-
Pseudo R2 0.17 ables to capture these populations. CGDhigh
Log likelihood 146.85 represents those cases (N = 31) that are in the
Value entries are coefficients and p-values with standard highest 33rd percentile on Control of
errors in parentheses. Corruption ( 0.2142), GNI per capita (
Figure 1. Demonstrating Combined Effects
100
90
Probability of outcome categories (%)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Lowest third on Base Highest third on
agency variables agency variables
3.508), and the Polity index ( 8). CGDlow personnel is just insignificant, as is the civil
represents those cases (N = 16) that are in the war variable. Ethnic fractionalization is not
lowest 33rd percentile on Transparency ( significantly related to the level of sexual vio-
0.7300), GNI per capita ( 0.656), and the lence. Figure 1 presents some marginal effects
Polity index ( 1). The remaining 98 cases in regarding this estimation, setting military size
the estimation have some other combination and ethnic fractionalization at their means
of the three variables that makes it difficult to and the conflict variables to their modal cate-
say whether they are clearly at the high end or gory of zero. This figure shows more starkly
clearly at the low end. that being at the low end of Control of
Table II presents the ordinal probit Corruption, GNI per capita, and the Polity
estimation results using these two dummy index makes it much more likely that a
variables. The results show that being at one country will have a high level of sexual vio-
extreme on all three agency variables clearly lence (categories 2, 3, or 4), while being at the
produces an anticipated extreme effect in the high end of these three agency variables makes
level of sexual violence. Of the other factors, it almost certain that a country will have a low
consistent with expectations, civil conflict is level of sexual violence (categories 0 or 1).
positively and significantly related to the level Model 2 of Table III presents ordinal probit
of sexual violence. The number of military estimation results for only the factors hypoth-
Military personnel (2001) 0.85 0.017 0.74 0.041 0.74 0.043 0.65 0.083 0.83 0.023
(0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Ethnic fractionalization 1.01 0.011 0.42 0.325 0.36 0.411 0.67 0.113 0.70 0.099
(0.40) (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42)
Civil conflict 0.86 0.009 0.83 0.014 0.90 0.012 0.96 0.007 0.85 0.015
(0.33) (0.34) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35)
Civil war 1.27 0.065 1.32 0.062 1.53 0.043 1.57 0.083 1.51 0.089
(0.69) (0.71) (0.76) (0.90) (0.89)
Control of Corruption 0.73 0.000
(0.14)
GNI per capita 0.09 0.000
0.02
Polity score 0.07 0.000
(0.02)
High democracy 0.58 0.008
(0.22)
Cut point 1 0.82 0.68 0.11 0.43 0.45
Cut point 2 1.17 1.10 0.53 0.84 0.83
Cut point 3 1.74 1.74 1.15 1.49 1.44
Cut point 4 3.22 3.40 3.11 3.36 3.22
Number of observations 145 144 139 140 140
LR 2 (.) 26.44 56.89 47.96 41.22 30.35
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.09
Log likelihood 162.79 146.98 143.22 145.93 151.37
esized to increase the level of sexual violence. Democracy categorical variable does not reach
The results show that the size of the military, significance.
the degree of ethnic fractionalization, and the Overall, the results of these analyses are
presence of civil conflict are indeed positive supportive of the theoretical argument and
predictors of the level of sexual violence when the importance of including the contri-
not including agency variables. The presence butions of agents in explanations of the
of a civil war just fails to achieve statistical frequency of sexual violence by government
significance, but this is hardly surprising as security forces. A combination of electoral
there are only three instances of this in our accountability for those in charge of agents,
cross-national data for 2003. compensation levels for agents, and the
Models 3 through 6 show the results of monitoring and transparency of agents
ordinal probit estimations examining one actions is likely to provide leverage in address-
agency variable at a time. Each of these ing the problems of slack within public
three agency variables acts as predicted, sig- bureaucracies and notably within security
nificantly reducing the level of sexual vio- forces.
lence after controlling for the positive
predictors from Model 2. The one addi-
Discussion
tional consistent effect across these models
(and Model 1) is that ethnic fractionaliza- Earlier research in the comparative analysis
tion remains insignificant. of human rights violations identifies the eco-
The high pairwise correlations among the nomic and political conditions associated
three agency variables become apparent when with violations and the strategic motives that
two or more are included in a given estimation. might lie behind such violations (Burkhart,
Table AIII in the appendix examines all com- 2002; Cingranelli & Richards, 1999;
binations of our agency variables that include Gartner & Regan, 1996; Harrelson-Stephens
the Control of Corruption score. Control of & Callaway, 2003; Poe & Tate, 1994). But
Corruption fails to achieve statistical signifi- there has not been attention to those who
cance in just one of the five models tested and carry out the violence. It has been assumed
performs better than economic development. that violence has only strategic purposes (for
GNI per capita is not significant in any of the a notable exception, see Kalyvas, 2006). The
models for which it is included. This may well evidence presented in this article suggests
be indicative of a larger problem of high cor- that this assumption should itself be more
relations among the independent variables rigorously investigated, and its likely over-
in the human rights literature. While level simplification acknowledged, as we think
of economic development is invariably about ways to combat sexual violence.
included in models of human rights violations, Alternative measures of the control and disci-
a number of studies report no statistically sig- pline of security forces and more extended
nificant relationship between economic data on sexual violence will add confidence
development and human rights violations.7 to these findings.
Similarly, while the Polity index measure is While we note their preliminary nature, the
consistently negative and significant, the High findings suggest that women are vulnerable
during armed conflicts and wartime, but also
more vulnerable in countries where there is a
7 In Burkhart (2002), GNP per capita is significant in 8 of low level of control over public officials. Security
the 18 models tested. In Hathaway (2002), GNP per capita
is significant in 1 of the 8 models tested. In Richards, Gelleny forces are not all alike and differ in levels of disci-
& Sacko (2001), it is not significant in the model tested. pline and esprit de corps. To measure variation in
the overall tightness of discipline of public Yet, when we examine ethnic fractionaliza-
officials across political systems, we used a cor- tion as a general factor in explaining levels of
ruption measure, democracy, and level of eco- sexual violence, it is not significant when
nomic development. Higher corruption levels agency variables are included in the analysis.
likely raise expectations of opportunities for The policy implication is that ethnically
hidden action among public officials, including divided societies are not irretrievably locked
members of security forces. There is some into violent patterns of behavior. Focusing
normative ambivalence toward financial cor- on agents and the control issue shifts atten-
ruption in the social science literature, and some tion from ethnic, cultural, or even conflict
have argued that it may correct for or grease conditions to thinking about incentives and
bureaucratic interference with growth and effi- enforceable codes of conduct that are
ciency, and that there may be some tolerable shaping agents decisions, and suggests that
level of corruption (see Acemoglu & Verdier, the capacity for violence the definitional
2000; Bardhan, 1997: 1322). The finding that resource of government requires leadership
the level of financial corruption in a political and management like any other resource.
system is robustly associated with the extensive- Principalagent logic usually implies two
ness of sexual violence committed by policemen types of intervention to limit the hidden
and soldiers and the logic underlying this rela- actions of agents. First, the government must
tionship suggest the prioritization of agencies for reduce the amount of goal variance. The
increased monitoring and propitious recruit- general analysis of bureaucracies suggests
ment. The usefulness of this knowledge lies in that adequate compensation for officials is an
shifting attention away from economic or cul- important tool in combating goal variance
tural conditions that are not policy sensitive and the problem of corruption (we note that
within a meaningful time frame. our analysis did not measure actual compen-
Even warfare is not an equal hell, at least sation rates for security forces cross-nation-
for women (Wood, 2004, 2006). A few con- ally, but used GNI per capita as a proxy).
flicts, IsraelPalestine for example, or the Formal and empirical analyses of corruption
English Civil War (Mitchell, 2004), have a recognize the importance of agent compen-
low frequency of sexual violence. Some con- sation. Financial compensation is a direct
flicts, on the other hand, have very high levels response to bribery, the most general form of
of sexual violence, the Russian Civil War, for corruption, and is part of the response to the
example. We would note, in particular, that bureaucracy of repressions proclivity for
ethnic fractionalization is plausibly connected hidden violence. Better compensation
to high levels of sexual violence in some par- increases the value of the position, lowers the
ticular conflicts. In Burma/Myanmar, the incentive to extract payments from families
army is reported to use rape as a weapon of and victims with the threat of violence, and
war against particular ethnic groups: improves recruitment.
In May 2002, the SHRF and Shan Womens The second type of intervention is to redress
Action Network (SWAN) alleged that the the information asymmetry through moni-
Burmese Army used rape as a systematic toring. The particular difficulty with govern-
weapon of war against the ethnic populations ment use of violence is that in this area agents
in Shan State. The report described 173 inci-
dents of rape or sexual violence against 625 are particularly hard to monitor. In hard-to-
women and girls committed by soldiers from monitor policy areas, formal models of out-of-
52 military battalions between 1992 and control bureaucracies and corruption suggest,
2001. (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, again, that paying higher wages is the best choice
and Labor, 2004: Burma) (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000: 195). But, in the
use of violence, non-monetary rewards are at attend to the selection and value commit-
stake. In other words, there is no substitute ments of agents. Only some of the agents
for monitoring and accountability in this policy seek violent gratification, and encouraging,
area. While the expectation is that under recruiting, and training for the appropriate
democracy, in addition to internal government norms among the members of the security
systems of auditing and monitoring, other forces can isolate and contain these individ-
organizations and the media monitor public uals and increase the likelihood of self-moni-
policy delivery, including the delivery of repres- toring among agents. Returning to the Iraq
sion. The increasing engagement of the interna- rape case, the main defendant illustrates the
tional system, through NGO activity and importance of selection. Recruitment pres-
through international law, is a positive develop- sure increases the risks of adverse selection
ment in overcoming the inadequacies of and the odds of agents engaging in hidden
domestic monitoring and accountability and actions.
information asymmetries that increase the
Greens case has helped to spur a closer look at
opportunities for hidden action (Keck & the Armys standards for recruitment and
Sikkink, 1998). In our analysis, we used a training. Green enlisted and passed basic train-
measure of democracy as a measure for infor- ing at a time when the Army was under terrific
mation flow and accountability. Yet, we would pressure to bring in new soldiers and had
also note that an indicator of external moni- relaxed its entry requirements. In 2005, about
the time Green was accepted, the Army raised
toring, specifically whether the government the limit on the so-called Category 4 recruits
granted or restricted access to the International it would allow, the designation for soldiers
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to with the lowest scores on its aptitude test.
monitor prison conditions, is consistent with (Greens score is not known.) The Army has
the analysis the worst offenders were more also been handing out more waivers includ-
ing case-by-case exceptions for criminal
likely to deny access. Of the worst offenders offenses which increased by 3 percent last
(scores 2, 3, or 4), some 39% also denied access year. (Childress & Hirsh, 2006)
to the Red Cross. This percentage falls to 17%
for the better performers (scores of 0 and 1), and The argument presented in this article points
the difference is large enough to achieve statisti- to the costs of adverse selection and compro-
cal significance (2(1) = 9.14, p = 0.003).8 mising recruitment procedures. Discussing
Finally, while again noting the impor- these dimensions of the control problem in
tance of additional empirical data, to the the neutral language developed to under-
extent that we can attribute a substantial stand issues that insurance companies face is
amount of sexual violence to principalagent analytically helpful, yet it must not inure us
problems, then a third and softer instru- to the devastating consequences that the
ment (see Arrow, 1985: 50) follows from this choice and control of agents have for indi-
theoretical argument. This instrument is to vidual lives.
Appendix
Table AI. Measuring Sexual Violence by Security Forces
Level Description
0 No mention of rape, sexual assault or sexual abuse by security forces.
1 Isolated reports of rape, sexual assault or sexual abuse by security forces.
2 There were reports, there continued to be reports or some reports of rape, sexual assault or
sexual abuse by security forces, which occurred sometimes, or remained a problem.
3 There were numerous reports of rape, sexual assault or sexual abuse by security forces, which
were routine, common, widespread, systematic, reported repeatedly, or rape, sexual
assault, and the threat of rape against detainees and their family members was used as a tool
of torture to extract information, to intimidate and to punish.
4 Rape, sexual assault or sexual abuse by security forces was used as a tool of war or a systematic
weapon of war.
Source: US Department of State Country Reports.
The term security forces refers to both militaries and government-supported militia, police, and prison guards.
Inter-coder reliability: Two coders ranked each country. There were seven cases of disagreement resulting from
their different interpretation of the language used in the reports that were ultimately resolved. Where the
coders disagreed, it was by one scale point, and mostly between values of 2 and 3.
Military personnel (2001) 0.59 0.117 0.76 0.043 0.73 0.047 0.61 0.107 0.76 0.041
(0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.33 0.462 0.36 0.422 0.27 0.544 0.29 0.507 0.34 0.438
(0.46) (0.45) (0.41) (0.44) (0.44)
Civil conflict 0.91 0.016 0.81 0.031 0.93 0.010 0.92 0.010 0.83 0.020
(0.38) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
Civil war 1.56 0.092 1.40 0.123 1.59 0.041 1.61 0.082 1.47 0.109
(0.93) (0.91) (0.78) (0.93) (0.91)
Control of Corruption 0.42 0.081 0.50 0.036 0.54 0.022 0.60 0.000 0.67 0.000
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.15) (0.15)
GNI per capita 0.02 0.509 0.02 0.479 0.02 0.476
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Polity score 0.05 0.003 0.05 0.004
(0.02) (0.02)
High democracy 0.11 0.669 0.12 0.617
(0.25) (0.25)
Cut point 1 0.26 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.57
Cut point 2 0.73 0.86 0.88 0.87 1.00
Cut point 3 1.42 1.51 1.52 1.58 1.67
Cut point 4 3.41 3.42 3.59 3.59 3.60
Number of observations 134 134 138 139 139
LR 2(.) 57.24 48.72 53.17 59.40 51.45
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16
Log likelihood 133.15 137.42 140.03 136.26 140.24
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