Exconde v.

Capuno
G.R. No. L-10134. June 29, 1957

FACTS:
1. Dante Capuno was a 15-year old student of the Balintawak
Elementary School. He attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal
upon instruction of the city school supervisor.
2. Together with other students, he boarded a jeep and he took drove
such while the driver sat on the left. The jeep turned turtle and two
passengers (Amado Ticzon and Isidro Caperia) died as a
consequence.
3. Delfin Capuno, Dantes father, was not with is son at the time and
he did not know that Dante was attending the parade.
4. Dante was accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence in the CFI of Laguna. Sabina Exconde, Isidros mother,
reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages.
Dantes was found guilty of the crime charged.
5. Exconde filed an action for damages against Delfin and Dante.
Defendants set up the defense that only Dante should be held liable
because at the time of the accident, he was not under the control,
supervision and custody of his father. Lower court ruled against
Exconde.
6. Exconde argued that Delfin is liable jointly and severally with his
son because at the time of the negligent act, Dante was a minor
and was then living with his father pursuant to Art. 1903 of the
Spanish Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether Delfin can be held solidarily liable with his son for
damages resulting from the death of Caperia caused by the
negligent act of Dante.

Ruling:

1. NO. With respect to the part of the abovestated law mentioning the
liability of teachers or directors of arts and trades for damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody, the Court ruled that such is inapplicable because it only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
institution. In this case, it was clear

That Dante was not a student of an institute of arts and trades

as provided by law.
The SC applied the solidary liability of the father, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for the negligent acts of their
 minor child living with them. This is necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them
in their company, educating them and instructing them in
proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation. 1"
The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this
liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage 2. This, the
defendants failed to prove.

PROVISION/s: ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next

preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with
them.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.

Cuadra v. Monfort
G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970

Facts:
1. Maria Teresa Cuadra (12y/o) and Maria Teresa Monfort (13y/o) were
classmates in grade 6. One day, their teacher assigned them to
weed the grass in the school premises.
2. While weeding, Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly, she said
aloud that she found an earthworm, and to frighten Cuadra, tossed
the headband at her. At that precise moment, Cuadra turned to face
Monfort and the object hit her right eye.
3. The next day, the eye became swollen. Cuadras parents took her to
a doctor and she underwent two surgical operations. Despite efforts,
she completely lost the sight of her right eye.
4. Hence, the parents of Cuadra filed an action for damages based on
quasi-delict against Monforts father, and he was ordered to pay
damages to the Cuadras.

1
2
Issue:

Whether Monforts father is liable for the act of his minor child
which caused damage to another

Ruling: NO, Monforts father is not liable.

When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another
is responsible, the latter becomes himself liable under Art.2180,
such as that of a father or mother. The basis of this vicarious,
although primary, liability is, as in Art.2176, fault or negligence
which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative
act or omission.
The presumption is merely prima facie and may be rebutted. This
is clear from the last par. of Art.2180. As a matter of defense, the
burden of proof rests on the defendant.
But as to what exact degree of diligence or as to how a parent
proves it, especially when the act takes place in his absence,
there is no meticulously calibrated measure applicable. When
the law says all the diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent damage, it implies a consideration of
the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to
determine whether or not by the exercise of such
diligence, the damage could have been prevented.

In this case, there is nothing from which it may be inferred that

the defendant could have prevented the damage by the
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee the
damage, or the act.
The child was at school, where it was his duty to send her, and
where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under
the care and supervision of the teacher.

Moreover, the act was an innocent prank, not unusual among

children at play, and which no parent, however careful, would
have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against.
Nor did it have any mischievous propensity or any trait in the
childs character, which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her
parents.
If the defendant is at all obligated to compensate Cuadra, the
obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only a
moral compulsion of good conscience.
YHT Realty Corp. v. CA
G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005

Facts:

1. Private respondent Maurice McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-

philanthropist, used to stay at Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the
Philippines prior to 1984 when he met Brunhilda Mata-Tan.
2. Tan convinced McLoughlin to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to
Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel, owned and operated by
YHT Realty Corp., where Erlinda Lainez, Anicia Payam and Danilo
Lopez were employed. Lopez served as manager of the hotel while
Lainez and Payam had custody of the keys for the safety deposit
boxes of Tropicana.

3. Oct. 30, 1987: McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with
Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as it was his practice to
rent a safety deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in
previous trips.
4. Procedure as to safety deposit boxes:
o The safety deposit box could only be opened through the
use of two keys, one of which is given to the registered
guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the
management of the hotel.
o When a registered guest wished to open his safety deposit
box, he alone could personally request the management
who then would assign one of its employees to accompany
the guest and assist him in opening the safety deposit box
with the two keys.
5. McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box:
US$15,000.00, which he placed in two envelopes, one envelope
containing US$10,000.00 and the other envelope US$5,000.00;
AUS$10,000.00 which he also placed in another envelope; two (2)
other envelopes containing letters and credit cards; two (2)
bankbooks; and a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the
safety deposit box.
6. Dec. 12, 1987: before leaving for Hongkong, McLoughlin opened his
safety deposit box and took therefrom the envelope containing
US$5,000.00, the envelope containing AUS$10,000.00, his
passports and his credit cards. McLoughlin left the other items in the
box as he did not check out of his room at the Tropicana during his
visit to Hongkong. When he arrived in Hongkong, he opened the
envelope which contained US$5,000.00 and discovered upon
counting that only US$3,000.00 were enclosed therein.
7. Dec. 18, 1987: After returning to Manila, McLoughlin checked out of
Tropicana and left for Australia. In Australia, he discovered that the
 envelope with US$10,000.00 was short of US$5,000. He also noticed
that the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and stored in the
safety deposit box upon his return to Tropicana was likewise
missing, except for a diamond bracelet.
8. April 4, 1988: He again registered at Tropicana and rented a safety
deposit box. He placed therein one (1) envelope containing
US$15,000.00, another envelope containing AUS$10,000.00 and
other envelopes containing his traveling papers/documents.
9. April 16, 1988: McLoughlin requested Lainez and Payam to open his
safety deposit box. He noticed that in the envelope containing
US$15,000.00, US$2,000.00 were missing and in the envelope
previously containing AUS$10,000.00, AUS$4,500.00 were missing.
10. He immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that
Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to him.
McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and
confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLoughlins key
and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of
Lopez, Payam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole
the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asleep.
11. McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of
the incident. Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note
dated 21 April 1988, reading: I promise to pay Mr. Maurice
McLoughlin the amount of AUS$4,000.00 and US$2,000.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine currency on or before May 5, 1988. Lopez
requested Tan to sign the promissory note which the latter did and
Lopez also signed as a witness.
12. Despite the execution of promissory note by Tan, McLoughlin
insisted that it must be the hotel who must assume responsibility
for the loss he suffered. However, Lopez refused to accept the
responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit
box entitled Undertaking For the Use Of Safety Deposit Box,
specifically paragraphs (2) and (4) thereof: 2.To release and hold
free and blameless TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL from any liability
arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the said deposit
box for any cause whatsoever, including but not limited to the
presentation or use thereof by any other person should the key be
lost; 4. To return the key and execute the RELEASE in favor of
TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL upon giving up the use of the box.
13. McLoughlin filed a complaint for damages against YHT Realty
Corp., Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan (defendants).

Issue: Whether the CAs conclusion on the alleged prior existence and
subsequent loss of the money and jewelry is supported by the
evidence on record Yes.

Petitioners point out that the evidence on record is insufficient to

 prove the fact of prior existence of the dollars and the jewelry
which had been lost while deposited in the safety deposit boxes
of Tropicana, the basis of the trial court and the appellate court
being the sole testimony of McLoughlin as to the contents
thereof. The Court is not persuaded.
We adhere to the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the
appellate court that the fact of loss was established by the
credible testimony in open court by McLoughlin. Such findings
are factual and therefore beyond the ambit of the present
petition. The trial court had the occasion to observe the
demeanor of McLoughlin while testifying which reflected the
veracity of the facts testified to by him.

Issue: Whether the finding of gross negligence on the part of

petitioners in the performance of their duties as innkeepers is
supported by the evidence on record Yes.

Petitioners dispute the finding of gross negligence on their part

as not supported by the evidence on record. Court is not
impressed.
The evidence reveals that two keys are required to open the
safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. One key is assigned to the
guest while the other remains in the possession of the
management. If the guest desires to open his safety deposit box,
he must request the management for the other key to open the
same. In other words, the guest alone cannot open the safety
deposit box without the assistance of the management or its
employees. In case of loss of any item deposited in the safety
deposit box, it is inevitable to conclude that the management
had at least a hand in the consummation of the taking, unless
the reason for the loss is force majeure.
Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who were
employees of Tropicana, had custody of the master key of the
management when the loss took place. In fact, they even
admitted that they assisted Tan on three separate occasions in
opening McLoughlins safety deposit box. This only proves that
Tropicana had prior knowledge that a person aside from the
registered guest had access to the safety deposit box. Yet the
management failed to notify McLoughlin of the incident and
waited for him to discover the taking before it disclosed the
matter to him.
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin, by his
act, made its employees believe that Tan was his spouse for she
was always with him most of the time. The evidence on record,
however, is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan
 to the management as his wife.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the
performance of their obligations, are guilty of negligence, are
liable for damages. As to who shall bear the burden of paying
damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides
that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
on the occasion of their functions.
The responsibility of securing the safety deposit box was shared
not only by the guest himself but also by the management since
two keys are necessary to open the safety deposit box. Without
the assistance of hotel employees, the loss would not have
occurred. Thus, Tropicana was guilty of concurrent negligence in
allowing Tan, who was not the registered guest, to open the
safety deposit box of McLoughlin, even assuming that the latter
was also guilty of negligence in allowing another person to use
his key.

Mercury Drug v. Huang

G.R. No. 172122. June 22, 2007

Facts:

1. A Mitsubishi truck owned by Mercury Drug and driven by Del

Rosario collided with the Toyota Corolla Sedan driven by owned
by Spouses Huang and driven by their son, Stephen Huang.
a. As a result, Stephen Huang was paralyzed from his chest
down.
2. The trial court found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario
jointly and severally liable to pay respondents actual,
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and litigation expenses.
a. P4M worth of moral damages was awarded.
3. CA affirmed the trial court but reduced the award of moral
damages to P1M.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents are entitled to moral damages

Ruling:

YES, respondents are entitled to moral damages.

 The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the
limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante.
The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the
wealth or means of the offender.
In this case, Stephen Huang and the Spouses Huang testified to
the immense suffering they continue to experience as a result of
the accident.
o Stephen recounted the nightmares and traumas he suffers
almost every night when he relives the accident. He also
gets depression when he thinks of his bleak future. He feels
frustration and embarrassment in needing to be helped in
almost everything.
o The spouses and the rest of the family undergo with the
day-to-day uncertainty of Stephens condition. They have
to make themselves available for Stephen 24hrs a day.
Carmen Huangs brother testified on the insensitivity of Mercury
Drug towards the plight of Stephen. He testified that Mercury
Drug did not provide for any help when it had all the resources to
help Stephen.

Meritt v. Government
G.R. No. L-11154. March 21, 1916

Facts:

1. It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when

the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, when an ambulance of the
General Hospital struck the plaintiff in an intersection.
By reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff was so severely
injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a
depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place
and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose
and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the
skull and that the grey matter and brain had suffered material
injury.

2. Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiffs leg showed
a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his
leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture.
Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the
functions of the brain and nerves.
The damages that the plaintiff got from the collision disabled him
to do this work as a contractor and forced him to give up
contracts he recently had.
 3. As the negligence which causes the collision is a tort committed
by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once
arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages
resulting therefrom.

The Philippine Legislature made an Act (Act No. 2457) that

authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and
authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit.

Issue:
Whether the Government is legally liable for the damages incurred by
the plaintiff.

Ruling:

No, the Government is not legally liable for the damages incurred
by the plaintiff. For, by consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit.

Quezon City Government v. Dacara

G.R. No. 150304. June 15, 2005

Facts:

1. Fulgencio Dacara Jr., while driving a Corolla, rammed into a pile of

earth/street diggings at Matahimik St. which was then being
repaired by the Quezon City Govt. The car was extensivelely
damaged when it turned turtle (and he alleged to have
sustained some injuries but focus on case was damage to
property).
In behalf of his minor son, Fulgencio Dacara Sr. filed a complaint for
damages against Quezon City and Engr. Tiamzon. They prayed for:
o Actual/compensatory - not less than 20k
o Moral damages - 150k
o Exemplary - 30k
o Attys fees - 20k
o Costs of suit

2. Defendant QC claimed to have exercised due care with measures

to avoid accidents like having barricated the mound with
reflectorized traffic paint and sticks to serve as warning.
 3. RTC found QC negligent under 21893 and ordered them to pay:
o Actual/compensatory - 20k
o Moral damages - 10k
o Exemplary - 5k
o Attys fees - 10k
o Costs of suit

4. On appeal, QC claimed it was plaintiff who was negligent for driving

too fast to avoid the diggings and argued that 2189 only applies to
liability for death/injuries and not for damage of property.

5. CA agreed with RTC noting that QC failed to present evidence to

support the claim and ruled that 2189 applies even where there is no
death or physical injury.

Issues:
a.) Whether CA acted contrary to law when it affirmed the award of
moral damages
b.) Whether CA erred when it refused to hold Fulgencio Dacara Jr.
Negligent
c.) Whether CA acted contrary to law when it affirmed the award of
exemplary damages

Ruling:

Petition is partially meritorious.

On Negligence
Contrary to the defendants claim, policemen found no signs at the
scene of the accident. Furthermore, they belatedly pointed out that
Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60kph (max limit at 30 kph) -
assertions not raised during the trial (arguments/theories not brought
out in original proceeding cannot be considered on appeal). The
findings of the lower court clearly point out that QCs negligence was
the proximate cause of damages suffered by the car.

On Moral Damages
QC argues that moral damages are not recoverable because no
evidence of physical injury were presented. SC agrees. Article 2219(2)
allows moral damages to be recovered for QD provided that
act/omission caused physical injuries. No evidence such as medical
certificates or proof of medical expenses were ever presented during
the course of a trial. For the court to award moral damages, there

3
must be clear and convincing proof. Moral damages deleted.

On Exemplary Damages
QC argues that exemplary damages and attorneys fees are not
recoverable because there was no finding that they were guilty of
gross negligence in the performance of their duty and
responsibilities. SC disagrees; there is sufficient factual basis for a
finding of gross negligence.

Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. They

can be awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages. It was clearly proven
that QCs negligence was the proximate cause of the incident, thereby
establishing the right for actual or compensatory damages (there was
sufficient evidence of damages caused to the car). The question that
remains is whether exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to
compensatory damages. (YES...)

Article 2331 mandates that in cases of QD, exemplary damages may

be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Gross
negligence means utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the
presons at fault must have been conscious of the probable
consequences of their carelessness and that they were nevertheless
indifferent to the danger of injury to persons or property.

In the present case, a finding of gross negligence can be discerned

from the findings of both lower courts. Considering that the street was
dimly lit, there was a greater need for adequate precautionary
measures. By carrying on road diggings without any warning or
barricade whatsoever, they demonstrated wanton disregard for public
safety.

Further Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be

imposed by way of example or correction for the public good as a
deterrant to socially deleterious actions. Public policy requires
imposition to suppress wanton acts of an offender. Local governments
and their e,ployees should be responsible not only for the maintenance
of roads and streets but also for the safety of the public. Thus they
must secure construction areas with adequate precautionary
measures.

Just additional notes: Not only is their work impressed with public
interest, their very existence is justified only by public service. Hence,
local governments have the p[aramount responsibility of keeping the
interests of the public foremost in their agenda.
Municipality of San Juan v. CA
G.R. No. 125183. September 29, 1997

Facts:

1. Under a "Contract For Water Service Connections entered into by

and between the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of K.C. Waterworks
System Construction (KC, for short), the former engaged the
services of the latter to install water service connections.
2. On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector
Office of MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of
M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a national
road, for the laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the
respective houses of water concessionaires.
3. That same day, KC dispatched five (5) of its workers under Project
Engineer Ernesto Battad, Jr. to conduct the digging operations in the
specified place. The workers were there from 9:00am-3:00pm.
4. On May 31, 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car at
a speed of 30kph along Santolan Road towards Pinaglabanan,
Manila. Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa was in the front
passengers seat. It was flooded because of the rain so the left tire
of the car fell into one of the manholes KC had earlier dug. As a
result, the humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was
fractured.
5. Pfc. Ramos of the Traffic Division went to the scene less than an
hour later and noted that there was no barricade placed by the
manhole. This was among his observations in the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report.
6. Biglang-awas arm suffered no deformity but the cast that was given
to her was only permitted to be removed after 4-6 weeks. Moreover,
she could not sleep on her right side anymore since there was still
pain.
7. She instituted a case at the RTC for damages against MWSS, the
Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal
officials. She later amended her complaint to include KC.

RTC held both the Municipality of San Juan and MWSS solidarily liable
for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees to
Biglang-awa.

CA held the Municipality, MWSS and KC solidarily liable for increased

moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Issue:
Whether CA erred in holding the Municipality of San Juan liable No.
They still had control and supervision over the project.

Ruling:
Ps argument: Since Santolan Road is concededly a national and
not a municipal road, it cannot be held liable for the injuries
suffered by Biglang-awa on account of the accident that occurred
on said road. Under Section 8, Ordinance No. 82-01, of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, only the Project Commissioner
KC and MWSS should be held liable. This is incorrect.
Under Article 21898 of the Civil Code, ownership of the
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a
province, city or municipality has control or supervision
thereof.
Sec. 149 of the LGC states: Section 149. Powers and Duties. - (1)
The sangguniang bayan shall:
(bb) Regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the
laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes; the building and
repair of tunnels, sewers, drains and other similar structures;
erecting of poles and the use of crosswalks, curbs and gutters
therein, and adopt measures to ensure public safety against
open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to
life and property, and provide just compensation or relief for
persons suffering from them;

Clear it is from the above that the Municipality of San Juan
can "regulate" the drilling and excavation of the ground
for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes within
its territorial jurisdiction. Doubtless, the term "regulate"
found in the aforequoted provision of Section 149 can
only mean that petitioner municipality exercises the
power of control, or, at the very least, supervision over all
excavations for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other
pipes within its territory.
Neither is the petitioner relieved of liability based on its
purported lack of knowledge of the excavation and the condition
of the road during the period from May 20, 1988 up to May 30,
1988 when the accident occurred.
To our mind, the municipality's liability for injuries caused
by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of the
ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other
pipes, attaches regardless of whether the drilling or
excavation is made on a national or municipal road, for as
long as the same is within its territorial jurisdiction.
 It must be borne in mind that the obligation of the petitioner to
maintain the safe condition of the road within its territory is a
continuing one. In the present recourse, Santolan Road and the
Greenhills area coming from Ortigas Avenue going to
Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila is a busy thoroughfare.
The gaping hole in the middle of the road of Santolan Road could
not have been missed by the authorities concerned. After all, the
petitioner San Juan is mandated to effect a constant and
unabated monitoring of the conditions of the roads to insure the
safety of motorists.
Significantly, however, nowhere can it be found in said Ordinance
82-01, Sec. 8 any provision exempting municipalities in Metro
Manila from liabilities caused by their own negligent acts.
It is the duty of the municipal authorities to exercise an
active vigilance over the streets; to see that they are
kept in a reasonably safe condition for public travel. They
cannot fold their arms and shut their eyes and say they
have no notice.

Mercado v. CA
G.R. No. L-14342. May 30, 1960

Facts:

1. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of Ana Pineda and Manuel

Quisumbing. Augusto Mercado (9 years old) is the son of Ciriaco
Mercado. Manuel Jr. and Augusto were classmates in Lourdes
Catholic School.
2. Augusto lent a pitogo to Lim, and Lim then lent it to Legaspi. When
Augusto attempted to get the pitogo from Legaspi, Manuel, Jr. told
him not to do so because Legaspi was better at putting the chain
into the hole of the pitogo.
3. Augusto pushed Manuel, Jr. and a fight ensued. After Augusto gave
successive blows to Manuel, Jr. and the latter was clutching his
stomach which bore the brunt of Augustos anger, Augusto then cut
Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.
4. The Quisumbings filed a complaint for damages against Ciriaco
Mercado.
Issues:
1. Whether the teacher or the head of the school should be liable.
(Main Issue)
2. Whether Moral damages should be awarded to Quisumbing, Jr.

Ruling:

1. No.
a. The SC cited Exconde v Capuno wherein it was stated that,
under 2180, the teacher or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices
while in their custody, but the provision only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution.
b. Furthermore, it would seem that the clause so long as they
remain in their custody, contemplates a situation where the
pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that control,
direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over
the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the
father and mother to the teacher; and so would the
responsibility for torts of the pupil.
c. The situation does not appear in this case. Pupils go to school
during school hours and go back home after school is over.
The situation in the last paragraph of Art. 2180 does not
apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes the
father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their
minor children. The claim of petitioner that responsibility
should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be
without merit.

2. No. While moral damages include physical suffering, which must

have been caused to the wounded boy Quisumbing, the decision of
the CA does not declare any of the cases mentioned in Article 2219
of the Civil Code which moral damages may be recovered, has
attended or occasioned the physical injury. The only possible
circumstance in the case at bar in which moral damages are
recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been
committed.
a. No criminal complaint filed.
b. It is possible that the CA considered Augusto guilty of a quasi-
delict causing physical injuries, within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Art. 2219. Even if we consider that he was
guilty of such, the facts show that the proximate cause of the
injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or
 negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to
get the pitogo from another boy.
c. Imposition of moral damages is not justified.

Palisoc v. Brilliantes
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971

Facts:

1. Dominador Palisoc was an automotive mechanics student at Manila

Technical Institute (MIT).
2. Dominador Palisoc, Virgilio Daffon, and Desiderio Cruz were
classmates and were in the laboratory room between 2 and 3
oclock, when the classes were in recess.
3. Daffon and Cruz were working on a machine while Palisoc was
merely looking at them.
4. Daffon made a remark to the effect that PALISOC was acting like a
foreman.
5. Due to this, Palisoc slapped Daffon slightly.
6. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc fist blows on the face and on the
stomach.
7. Palisoc tried to retreat but Daffon followed him, and BOTH
exchanged blows until PALISOC stumbled upon an engine block,
which caused him to fall face downward.
8. Palisoc was administered with first aid and was brought to the
hospital, but he eventually DIED.
9. Parents of PALISOC filed an action for damages against:
a. Antonio C. BRILLANTES, at the time of the incident a member
of the Board of Directors of MIT4
b. Teodosio V. VALENTON, the president of MIT
c. Santiago M. QUIBULUE, instructor of the class to which
PALISOC belonged
d. DAFFON
Issue:

Whether the head (VALENTON) and the teacher in charge (QUIBULUE)

should be held solidarily liable with DAFFON

Ruling:

1. YES, VALENTON, head (Presdent), and QUIBULUE, teacher-

in-charge are liable jointly and severally with DAFFON for
damages to the parents of PALISOC for the death of the latters

4
 minor soon at the hands of DAFFON.
a. The rationale for liability of school heads and teachers
for the tortious acts of their pupils and students as long as
they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a
certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in
loco parentis, and are called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
child.5
i. The governing principle is that the protective
custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the
parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as
well as that of the school itself to provide proper
supervision of the students activities during
the whole time that they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time.
b. Dissenting opinion of J. J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde: the basis
of the presumption of negligence of Art 2180 is some
culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are
supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority, and where the parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the
parent should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody.
c. Therefore, the lower court erred in absolving
Defendants-school officials on the ground that they
could be held liable under Article 2180 only if the
student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate lived and boarded with his teacher or
other defendants officials of the school.
d. The phrase so long as they remain in their custody
means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school, and its heads and teachers exercise over pupils
and students for as long as they are AT ATTENDANCE IN
THE SCHOOL, INCLUDING RECESS TIME.
i. There is nothing in the law which requires that for
such liability to attach, the pupil or student who
commits the tort must live and board in the school.
e. Therefore, VALENTON and QUIBULUE as president and
teacher-in-charge are jointly and severally liable with
DAFFON for the quasi-delict of DAFFON.
i. The death resulting from the fight could have been
avoided had VALENTON and QUIBULUE complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the

5
 activities of the students in the school premises to
protect their students from harm, whether at the
hands of fellow students or other parties.
ii. VALENTON and QUIBULUE failed to prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.

Ylarde v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-33722. July 29, 1988

Facts:

1. 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of

the Gabaldon Primary School, in Tayug, Pangasinan. Edgardo
Aquino was a teacher
2. At that time, the school was littered with several concrete blocks
which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed
in World War II.
3. Sergio Banez (no relation to LegBib) decided to bury these
blocks, and Aquino gathered 18 of his male pupils [10-11 years
old] to help him.
4. The next day, only 4 of the pupils [Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco
Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde] resumed the
digging.
5. The hole was 1m 40cm deep, and all 4 students got out of the
hold. Aquino left the children to level the loose soil around the
hole, ,while he went to borrow the key to the workroom from
Banez. [Banez was 30 meters or around 100 feet away]. Aquino
allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone
6. When Aquino left, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde jumped into the
pit. Then, Abaga jumped on top of the concrete blocks (that are
still outside the hole) which caused blocks to slide to the
opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to get out but Ylarde
was not. He sustained injuries and later died
7. Ylardes parents filed a suit for damages.

Issues:

1. Whether Principal Soriano is liable for damages

2. Whether Teacher Aquino is liable for damages YES
3. Whether Ylardes death was caused by his own reckless
imprudence NO

Ruling:
 1. NO . He cannot be made responsible for the death of the child
Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a
school of arts and trades. This is in line with Amadora v. CA: only
the teacher and not the head of an academic school should be
answerable for torts committed by their students.
2. YES. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he:

(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and

instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an
excavation near the oneton concrete stone which he knew to
be a very hazardous task
(2) ) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they
had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying
nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any
pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it
was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of
falling
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the
children's safety and
(5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously
attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in

such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of
Ylarde
o Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to
play around.
o It was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall
into the hole beside it
o Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe
situation created by private respondent Aquino which
exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.

3. NO. He was only ten years old at the time of the incident . As
such he is expected to be playful and daring.

o His actuations were natural to a boy his age. It was

not only him but the three of them who jumped into the
hole
The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the
capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor
should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but
his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct
of persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to
 which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree
of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age,
capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same
or similar circumstances.

Salvosa v. IAC
G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988

Facts:

1. Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution.

However, it is also an institution of arts and trade.
a. Its brochure shows that BCF has a full-fledged technical-
vocational department offering Communication, Broadcast,
and Telytype Technician courses as well as Electronics
Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics
2. Within BCFs premises is an ROTC Unit (UNIT) under the full
control of the AFP.
3. The ROTC Unit is provided by the BCF an office and an armory
located at the basement of its building.
4. Jimmy ABON (ABON) was appointed by the AFP as the UNITs
armor.
a. He was therefore NOT an employee of the BCF but rather
of AFP.
b. He also received his salary from AFP, and he received
orders from the Commandant of the UNIT.
c. Note that ABON was a commerce student of the BCF.
5. Around 8pm one day, in the parking space of BCF, ABON shot
Napoleon CASTRO (a student of University of Baguio) with an
unlicensed firearm. The firearm was taken from the armory of the
UNIT.
6. CASTRO died, and ABON was convicted for Homicide.

Issue:

Whether SALVOSA and BCF could be held solidarily liable with

ABON under Article 2180

Ruling:

NO. Under the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180, teachers

OR heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
o The rationale for this is that so long as the student remains
 in the custody of a teacher, the latter stands, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis and is called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision.
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not at attendance in
the school cannot be in recess thereat.
o A recess contemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the student still
remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to
leave the school premises, or the area within which the
school activity is conducted.
o Recess by its nature does not include dismissal
o The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of
a school without more does not constitute attending
school
In the case at bar, ABON cannot be considered to have been at
attendance in the school, or in the custody of BCF when he
shot CASTRO.
Hence, it follows that BCF and SALVOSA cannot be held solidarily
liable with ABON under Article 2180
Moreover, records show that prior to the shooting incident,
UNGOS has instructed ABON not to leave the office and to keep
the armory well guarded.
o This shows that ABON was supposed to be working in the
armory with definite instructions from his superior when he
shot CASTRO.

Amadora v. CA
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

Facts:

1. Alfredo Amadora, son of the petitioner, was a 4 th year high school

student at respondent school, Colegio de San Juan-Recoletos. He
was set to graduate on April 16, 1972.
2. On April 13, after the semester had ended, Alfredo went to
school to turn in a physics project. While in the auditorium, he
was shot to death by a classmate, Pablito Daffon. It was also
alleged by Amadoras parents that the firearm used to kill their
son was an unlicensed pistol, which had previously been
confiscated by the dean from one of Daffons companions, but
returned to him after.
3. This case then centers on a discussion about the liability imposed
 by Article 2180 on the school, the dean, and the physics teacher
to whom Alfredo was turning in his project.
Issue:

Who is vicariously liable for the shooting of Alfredo Amadora

applying Article 2180?

Ruling:

No one is liable. The Supreme Court here ruled that the coverage of
paragraph 7 of Article 2180 has been expanded to now include all
schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is
academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of
arts and trades, it is the head thereof.

The initial reason for the distinction between a teacher and a head
of an establishment of arts and trades was that the latter had a
closer relationship to his pupils, who were more like his apprentices.
By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved
with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the
teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students.
The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious
relationship with the students.

As to when the liability of the teacher or head of establishments of

arts and trades attaches, the Supreme Court said as long as it can
be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of
a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege,
the responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more
than relaxing in the

St. Marys v. CA
G.R. No. 157788. March 08, 2005

Facts:

1. Donelo started teaching on a contractual basis at St Marys

University(SMU) in 1992.
2. He was issued an appointment as Assistant Professor I then
again he was then promoted to Assistant Professor III. He taught
 until 1st Sem of school year 1999-2000 when school discontinued
giving him teaching assignments.
3. Donelo filed case of Illegal Dismissal.
4. SMU showed that Donelo was merely a part time instructor and
except for 3 semesters he carried a load of less than 18 units.

Issue:

1. Whether DONELO is a full time teacher? NO

2. Whether Donelo was illegally dismissed? NO

Ruling:

The following requisites must concur before a private school

teacher acquires permanent status:
o the teacher is a full-time teacher;
o the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of
service; and
o such service must have been satisfactory.
SMU claims that private respondent lacked the requisite years of
service and also the appropriate quality of his service.
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that full-time
academic personnel are those meeting all the following
requirements:
o Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications
prescribed by the Department under this Manual for all
academic personnel;
o Who are paid monthly or hourly, based on the regular
teaching loads as provided for in the policies, rules and
standards of the Department and the school;
o Whose total working day of not more than eight hours a
day is devoted to the school;
o Who have no other remunerative occupation elsewhere
requiring regular hours of work that will conflict with the
working hours in the school; and
o Who are not teaching full-time in any other educational
institution.
o All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing
qualifications are considered part-time.

A part-time employee does not attain permanent status no matter

how long he has served the school. And as a part-timer, his services
could be terminated by the school without being held liable for illegal
dismissal. Moreover, the requirement of twin-notice applicable only to
regular or permanent employees could not be invoked by respondent.
St. Francis High School v. CA
G.R. No. 82465. February 25, 1991

Facts:

1 Ferdinand Castillo was a student at St. Francis High School. He

wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Quezon. Ferdinand's
parents, respondent SPS, because of short notice, did not allow
Castillo to join but allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the
picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing
so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand
stayed.
2 One of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the
students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but then
Ferdinand himself drowned.
3 Respondent spouses then filed this case against St. Francis High
School, as well as the teachers, contending that the death of their
son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's
drowning, RTC ruled for respondents, saying that the teachers were
liable, but not the school, as it was not a school-sanctioned event.
4 Both parties appealed to CA. CA still ruled for respondents, but this
time took out some teachers because of the fact that they arrived
after the drowning occurred, thus they shouldnt be held liable. Thus
this case.

Issue:
Whether negligence could be attributable to the school
Whether negligence could be attributable to the teachers

Ruling;

1. No
Art 2180 par. 4 states: Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer
may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the
act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must
have occurred while an employee was in the performance
of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the
 actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened not within the school premises, not on a school
day and most importantly while the teachers and students
were holding a purely private affair, a picnic.
2. No
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the teachers.
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, did her
best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the
students who joined the picnic.

PSBA v. CA
G.R. No. 84698. February 4, 1992

Facts:

1. PSBA student Carlito Bautista was stabbed while on the second floor
of the school. The stabber was not a member of the academic
community but came from outside the school.
2. Bautistas parents filed a suit against PSBA to hold it liable for
Carlitos death, due to alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of
security precautions, means, and methods.
3. PSBA sought to have the suit dismissed for stating no cause of
action, alleging that since the suit is under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code, based on jurisprudence, it doesnt apply to academic
institutions and therefore PSBA. Trial court dismissed PSBAs Motion
to Dismiss.
4. The CA dismissed PSBAs appeal, stating that the original meaning
of Art. 2180 as established by Manresa, et. al., should give way to
present-day changes. It should apply to all kinds of educational
institutions, academic or vocational.
5. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether PSBA can be held liable for Carlitos death.

Ruling:

YESBUT NOT UNDER ART. 2180

1. Art. 2180, in conjunction w/ Art. 2176, establishes the in loco

parentis rule. But this applies only when the damage/injury is
inflicted by a fellow pupil or student. This is not the case with
PSBA.
 2. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a
contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the
rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.
a. When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are
bound to comply with.
b. Can tort and breach of contract occur at the same time?
Yes, if the same act which constitutes a breach of the
contract would have constituted the source of an extra-
contractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad). it can be concluded
that should the act which breaches a contract be done in
bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a
cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. In
short, tort may exist even if there is a contract.
c. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however,
there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the
school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security measures And,
even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could
give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation
only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the
school would not be relevant absent a contract The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the
contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Philippine Rabbit Lines Inc vs Phil Am Forwarders

GR L-25142. March 25, 1975.

Facts:

1. Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders]

along the national highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL bus
driven by Pangalangan.
2. As a result, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not
be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of earnings amounting to P8,665.51.
Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders.
3. PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American
Forwarders, Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pinedas
employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the
ground that PRBL and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI
dismissed the complaint against Balingit, on the ground that he is not the manager
of an establishment as contemplated in NCC 2180.
Issue:
 Whether or not the terms employers and owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise embrace the manager of a corporation owning a
truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident
from which the damage arose. NO.

Ruling:

Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from
the context of NCC 2180 that the term manager (director in the Spanish version)
is used in the sense of employer. Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can
be imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, in connection
with the vehicular accident in question, because he himself may be regarded as
an employee or dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders.

Pleyto vs Lomboy
G.R. No. 148737. June 16, 2004

Facts:
1. Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBL), with principal office at
Tarlac City, Tarlac, is a public carrier, engaged in carrying passengers and
goods for a fare. It serviced various routes in Central and Northern Luzon.
Petitioner Ernesto Pleyto was a bus driver employed by PRBL at the time of
the incident in question.
2. Respondent Maria D. Lomboy of Calasiao, Pangasinan, is the surviving
spouse of the late Ricardo Lomboy, who died in Pasolingan, Gerona, Tarlac,
in a vehicular accident at around 11:30 a.m. of May 16, 1995. The accident
was a head-on collision between the PRBL bus driven by petitioner Pleyto and
the car where Ricardo was a passenger. Respondent Carmela Lomboy is the
eldest daughter of Ricardo and Maria Lomboy. Carmela suffered injuries
requiring hospitalization in the same accident, which resulted in her fathers
death.
3. On November 29, 1995, herein respondents, as pauper-litigants, filed an
action for damages against PRBL and its driver, Pleyto, with the RTC of
Dagupan City. In their complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-
00724-D, the Lomboys prayed that they be indemnified for the untimely death
of Ricardo Lomboy, his lost earnings, the medical and hospitalization
expenses of Carmela, and moral damages.

Issue:
Whether documentary evidence is necessary for claim of loss of earnings.

Ruling:
 Failure to present documentary evidence to support a claim for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased need not be fatal to its cause. Testimonial evidence
suffices to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and reasonable
estimate of the loss earning capacity. Factors considered are:
1. Life Expectancy - # of years victim would have lived
2. Total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings and less
living and other incidental expenses. Rate of loss sustained by heirs of the deceased

NET EARNING CAPACITY =

=LIFE EXPECTANCY x [GROSS ANNUAL INCOME (GAI) LIVING
EXPENSES]
= [2/3 (80-age at the time of death)] x [GAI (50% of GAI)]
= [2/3(80-44)] x [96k (50% of 96k)
= P 1,152,000

ACTUAL damages must be competent proof of the actual amount of

loss, must be duly supported by receipts. But thought incapable of pecuniary
estimation, it is in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant
for actual injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense of the
defendant.
- Awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions, or amusements
that will serve to alleviate moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the
defendants culpable action. It is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante; thus is must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted.

Macalinao vs Ong
G.R. No. 146635. December 14, 2005

Facts:

1. Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver, respectively, at the
Genetron International Marketing (Genetron), a single proprietorship owned and
operated by Sebastian. On 25 April 1992, Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong
and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of machinerya reactor/motor for
mixing chemicals, to Sebastians manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan.
2. While in the process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong,
Genetrons Isuzu Elf truck with plate no. PMP-106 hit and bumped the front
portion of a private jeepney with plate no. DAF-922 along Caypombo, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan at around 11:20 in the morning.
3. Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained physical
injuries as a consequence of the collision. Macalinao incurred the most serious
injuries.
 4. Macalinaos body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down as a result
of the accident and per doctors advice, his foot was amputated. He also suffered
from bed sores and infection. His immedicable condition, coupled with the
doctors recommendation, led his family to bring him home where he died on 7
November 1992.
5. Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against both
Ong and Sebastian before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
After his death, Macalinao was substituted by his parents in the action . A criminal
case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries had also been
instituted earlier against Ong but for reasons, which do not appear in the records
of this case, trial thereon did not ensue.

Issue:

Whether Ong may be held liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.

Ruling:

YES.

Photographs clearly shows that the road where the mishap occurred is marked by
a line at the center separating the right from the left lane
While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile
collisions, the position of the two vehicles gives rise to the conclusion that it was
the Isuzu truck which hit the private jeepney rather than the other way around.
Based on the angle at which it stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to
the right in an unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck.
Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police blotter, the statement
therein that the Isuzu truck hit the private jeepney and not the other way around is
deemed established.
While not constituting direct proof of Ongs negligence, the foregoing pieces of
evidence justify the application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally
means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself
Res ipsa loquitur
recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct
proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of
negligence
permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of
the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or
presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden
of proving that there was no negligence on his part
based on the theory that defendant in charge of the instrumentality which
causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
 opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge,
and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely
upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish
negligence
can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available
grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether
culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but
inaccessible to the injured person
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur:

(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones
negligence; - No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of
course unless someone is negligent

(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or

defendants - Driving the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it

(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated
(4) defendant fails to offer any explanation tending to show that the
injury was caused by his or her want of due care (Based on
American Jurisprudence) - defendant fails to offer any explanation
tending to show that the injury was caused by his or her want of due
care
Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead.
Petitioners, while substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual
knowledge about the event since they were not present at the crucial moment
evidence as to the true cause of the accident is, for all intents and purposes,
accessible to respondents but not to petitioners
two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong,
who is not only Sebastians previous employee but his co-respondent in
this case as well

National Irrigation Administration vs Fontanilla

G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989

Facts:

1. It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and
operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government
agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an
employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by
Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at
Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway.
 2. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were
injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment.
Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where
he died.

3. Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation

Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional
driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent
after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and
maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration
authorities.

Issue:

Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's
fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict, which
resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners.

Ruling:

Art. 2176 thus provides: Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines;
Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by
the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.
Pasco vs CFI
G.R. No. L-54357 April 25, 1988

Facts:

1. On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, together
with two companions, while walking inside the campus of the private respondent
Araneta University, after attending classes in said university, was accosted and
mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng."
Said Muslim group were also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was
subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was hospitalized at the
Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save
his life.
2. On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a
complaint for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private
respondent Gregorio Araneta University, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
SM-1027. Said school was impleaded as a party defendant based on the
aforementioned provision of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not, under the article, the school or the university
itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable.
Ruling:
On October 26, 1979, respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the following grounds:
a. The penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code under which it was sued applies only to vocational schools
and not to academic institutions;
b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the
civil liability in this case arises from a criminal action, which the
defendant university has not committed;
c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by
the plaintiff, hence, it would be premature to bring an action for
damages against defendant University. (Rollo, p. 96)
On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order ** granting
said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order
of Dismissal but the motion was likewise denied on the ground
that there is no sufficient justification to disturb its ruling. Hence,
this instant Petition for Certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440,
praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned
order of May 12, 1980 dismissing the complaint as against
respondent school and the order of July 17, 1980 denying the
reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal,

We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article

to educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and
 trades) for the issue in this petition is actually whether or not,
under the article, the school or the university itself (as
distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable. We find the
answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned
speaks only of "teachers or heads."cralaw virtua1aw library.
Child Learning Center Inc., vs Tagario
G.R. No. 150920. November 25, 2005

Facts:

1. During the school year 1990-1991, Timothy was a Grade IV student at

Marymount School, an academic institution operated and maintained by Child
Learning Center, Inc. (CLC).
2. In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the
boys comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the
call of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out.
Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several
times for help.
3. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In the
process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three
stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious
multiple physical injuries.
4. An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by respondents against
the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors, namely Spouses Edgardo and
Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and the
Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao.
5. CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of
the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC
further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father
of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.

Issue:

Whether CLC is liable.

Ruling:

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred.

Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the right
of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to repair such damage.
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances justly demand.
Fault requires the execution of a positive act which causes damage to another while
negligence consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to another.

In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures
to avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door
knob despite having been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on
the window where Timothy fell from.

The trial court found that the lock was defective on March 5, 1991:

The doorknob was defective. After the incident of March 5, 1991, said doorknob was
taken off the door of the toilet where Timothy was in. The architect who testified during
the trial declared that although there were standard specifications for doorknobs for
comfort room[s], and he designed them according to that requirement, he did not
investigate whether the doorknob specified in his plans during the construction [was]
actually put in place. This is so because he did not verify whether the door knob he
specified w[as] actually put in place at the particular comfort room where Timothy was
barred from getting outside. (TSN, pp. 19-20, December 8, 1994).

Saludaga vs CA
G.R. No. 179337. April 30, 2008

Facts:

1. Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern

University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the
security guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Petitioner was
rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the
wound he sustained.6Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where
he explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released
considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.
2. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against
respondents on the ground that they breached their obligation to
provide students with a safe and secure environment and an
atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a
Third-Party Complaint7 against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by
respondent FEU to provide security services within its premises
and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's President, to
indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of
petitioner, if any; and to pay attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party
Complaint against AFP General Insurance.
Issue:

Whether or not respondents exercised due diligence in selecting

Galaxy as the agency which would provide security services
within the premises of respondent FEU.

Whether or not respondent is liable for damages.

Ruling:

It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law

student in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a
contractual obligation between the two parties. On petitioner's
part, he was obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of
the school. On the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning
institution is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its
students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take
adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the
existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify,
prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. In the instant case,
we find that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no
less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and
secure the premises, there is a prima facie showing that
respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe
and secure environment to its students.
In order to avoid liability, however, respondents aver that the
shooting incident was a fortuitous event because they could not
have reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by
Rosete as he was not their employee; and that they complied
with their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for
their students by having exercised due diligence in selecting the
security services of Galaxy.

Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are
negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for
damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence
in providing a safe learning environment, respondent FEU is
liable to petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award of
damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven
during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages
and its causal connection to defendant's acts.
Soliman v. Tuason
G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992

Facts:

1. Plaintiff Maximino Soliman was enrolled at defendant Republic

Central Colleges as a regular student. The defendant, Jimmy Solomon,
was the schools security guard.

3. On August 13, 1982, while Soliman was taking his morning

classes within the schools premises, Solomon, without any
provocation, shot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber
Revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound
sustained would have caused plaintiff's death were it not for the
timely medical assistance given to him.
4. The plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center,
Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may not
be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated
in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three
to four months
before his wounds would be completely healed.

5. P filed a civil complaint for damages against Republic Central

Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and one
Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as defendants.
6. Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss: there was
no cause of action as it was not the employer of the security
guard. Further, CC 2180 holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard
7. Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the
school. Therefore, it has no liability.
8. Respondent judge granted MD. Ps filed MR but to no avail.

Issue:

Whether the school may be liable for Solomons action YES, but
based on a breach of contract and not on 2180

Ruling:

Article 2180 provides:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils, their students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
xxx xxx xxx

Under the first paragraph, the Colleges would still not be liable
because it was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of
Jimmy Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was
the client or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is settled that
where the security agency, as here,
recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards,
the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for
illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to
the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such
agency.

As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no

hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe
the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary
course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or
property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client
company may give instructions or directions to the security guards
assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful
acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no
more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services
entered into with the security agency. There being no employer-
employee relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon,
petitioner student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges
for the acts of security guard Solomon.

Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or

student or an apprentice of the Colleges, the other above-quoted
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for
imposing liability upon the Colleges. Neither could it be under CC 349,
as Solomon, not being a student, was not under the schools parental
authority.

Clearly, the school had no responsibility under 2180. BUT does it have
any liability hinged upon any other basis in law? YES
The Court used PSBA vs CA (which was a very recent case at that time)
where the Court pronounced that an implied contract may be held to
be established between a school which accepts students for
enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the
other hand, which contract results in obligations for both parties.
However, the Court said that the ruling in PSBA vs CA was careful to
point out the necessity of proving the schools negligence which
resulted in the breach of contract. The school may still avoid liability by
proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students
was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the
omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person, time and
place.

As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious

in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual,
or other legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error
when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other
than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial
judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should
have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts
constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part
of respondent Colleges.

Gutierrez vs CA
G.R. No. L-31611 November 29, 1976

Facts:

1. Respondents-spouses Eliseo G. Baloyo and Soledad Ramos de

Baloyo filed a suit for actual, moral and exemplary damages
arising from the death on March 21, 1964 of their daughter Edna
Baloyo inside the school grounds of the A. Mabini Elementary
School on Severino Street, Manila.
2. They named as defendants petitioners Benigno C. Gutierrez and
Domingo N. Balisalisa as contractor and project engineer,
respectively, of the contract executed by the former with the
Bureau of Public Works, undertaking the construction of the N.
Reyes-Severino Drainage Main, Manila Flood Control and
Drainage Project, Manila.
3. From the partial stipulation of facts at the pre-trial and evidence
adduced at the trial, it is established that the workers of
petitioner Gutierrez, under the supervision of co-petitioner
Balisalisa whom he had engaged as project engineer of the
construction job, started digging up Severino Street, at first by
 manual labor and later by means of a crane to speed up the
excavation.
4. The earth and mud dug up were scooped by the crane and
dumped against the exterior side of the adobe stone fence of the
A. Mabini Elementary School along the street. When the pile of
earth and mud reached the height of the fence, the crane's steel
scooper was used to press them down. Because of heavy stress
thus placed on the fence, a portion of it gave way and collapsed
on March 21, 1964 between 2:30 and 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon.
5. Respondents' daughter Edna was then playing with other
children inside the school grounds. When the adobe wall
collapsed, she was hit and pinned down by the falling debris of
the adobe stone wall and was buried underneath the piled up
earth and mud which caved in. While she was rushed to the
hospital, it was in vain for she died moments after the tragic
mishap.
Issue:

Whether the employer is liable.

Ruling:

On appeal, respondent appellate court in effect affirmed the

appealed judgment, breaking down the damages award, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment, insofar as it orders the

defendants to pay, jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the sum of
P6,000.00 for actual damages and another P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, apart from judicial costs, is hereby
affirmed, but the said judgment is modified as follows: defendants are
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of
P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Edna Baloyo, another sum of
P12,000.00 for the mental anguish suffered by the plaintiffs by reason
of the death of their daughter, and the sum of P6,000.00 for the
physical pains suffered by the child Edna Baloyo before she died; and
said defendants are also ordered to pay P10,000.00 each to the
plaintiffs as exemplary damages, or in the aggregate sum of
P61,000.00. The costs in this instance shall be taxed against the
defendants-appellants in equal shares.
In their petition, petitioners would assign as error the appellate court's
rejection of their defense of the non-existence of employer-employee
relationship between them and the crane operators.
The contention has no merit. Respondent court correctly held that the
defense of alleged non-existence of employer-employee relationship
was never raised in the lower court and could not be raised or
entertained for the first time on appeal. 1 Withal, respondent court
nevertheless found that the evidence sufficiently established the
existence of such employer-employee relationship between petitioners
and the negligent crane operators, stressing that "the contract Exhibit
B-8 between the Republic of the Philippines and defendant (petitioner)
Gutierrez specifically stipulated 'That the party of the second part
(referring to Gutierrez) hereby agrees to undertake complete
construction of the N. Reyes-Severino Drainage Main, Manila Flood
Control and Drainage Project, Manila furnishing himself his own
funds, labor plant, equipments, materials and supplies needed
therefor, ... (emphasis supplied). The evidence indisputably shows that
the crane operator was actually operating and managing that heavy
equipment in the construction site of the defendants in connection with
their construction job. No amount of reasoning therefore can deny the
naked truth that said operator was necessarily and actually working for
the defendants. This is not to mention that under the contract it is the
defendants who are supposed to supply themselves with labor."