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Ideas, Networks, and Islamist Movements:

Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucasus
Kathleen Collins
World Politics / Volume 60 / Issue 01 / October 2007, pp 64 - 96

DOI: 10.1353/wp.0.0002, Published online: 13 June 2011
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Kathleen Collins (2007). Ideas, Networks, and Islamist Movements: Evidence
from Central Asia and the Caucasus. World Politics, 60, pp 64-96 doi:10.1353/
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IDEAS, NETWORKS,
AND ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS
Evidence from Central Asia and
the Caucasus
By KATHLEEN COLLINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
"1 Jl THAT explains the relative success or failure of Islamist groups

V V in mobilizing a social base? What role do Islamist ideas play in
attracting support? Few questions are of greater importance to global
politics today, yet far too little research addresses this issue theoretically
or empirically. Islamism, a phenomenon developing primarily since
the 1950s, involves the politicization of Islam.1 Just as Islam is not a
monolithic culture or religion, neither are Islamist movements. They
vary significantly in their origins, leadership, ideas, and strategies. In
fact, many movements directly or indirectly compete with each other
for popular support, even while they often mutually oppose the state.
Among the vast array of Islamist movementsmany with competing
agendaswhy do some succeed and others fail?2 To answer this question,
we need to examine the origins, rise, and stagnation or dissipation of Isla-
mist movements. By comparing different movements, we can highlight
those variables that have led to their relative success or failure.
* The author is grateful for funding from the Carnegie Endowment of New York, the United
States Institute of Peace, the University of Notre Dame, and the International Research and Ex-
changes Board. The research was also supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the
National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds that were made available by the
U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act
of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author. The
author also thanks the following individuals for commenting on various drafts of the article: Teri Cara-
way, Azizullah Ghazi, Elise Giuliano, Dmitry Gorenburg, Lisa Hilbink, Erin Jenne, Adeeb Khalid,
and Lisa Mclntosh-Sundstrom.
1
"Islamist" and "Islamism" should be distinguished from the apolitical terms "Islam" and "Islamic,"
which refer to the religion. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., Political Islam: Essays from Middle East
Report (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997); 4. John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 6.
2
Two notable recent studies that move in this direction are Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing
Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002);
and Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2004).
World Politics 60 (October 2007), 64-96
IDEAS, NETWORKS, ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS 65
Within the growing literature on Islamism, area specialists and his-

torians have typically addressed the rise of Islamism in terms of socio-
economic, cultural, and historical variables.3 Political scientists, focus-
ing on the causes of "Islamist terrorism," typically treat Islamism as a
rational strategy to achieve material endsnot as an idea with intrinsic
appeal.4 Islamism is often understood as a global phenomenon, with all
groups sharing similar origins and ends. Furthermore, most research
has focused on the Middle East, where only a small percentage of the
world's Muslims live. Yet large regions of the Muslim world lie outside
the Middle East, and Islamism must be studied in that broader context
as well. Muslims are the majority population or a significant minority
in seven former Soviet republics, six of which have experienced some
form of Islamist activism.
To address some of these gaps in our understanding of Islamism, I
offer a comparative examination of three Islamist groups active in the
Central Asian and south Caucasus regions of the former Soviet Union
(FSU): Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT), the Islamic Renaissance Party of
Tajikistan (IRP), and the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA). (See Table
1.) These organizations reflect the broad resurgence in Islamic identity
and Islamist activism since the perestroika period. Islamism in those re-
gions is still less developed than in the Middle East and North Africa,
where its history is much longer. Yet the rapid emergence of various
Islamist opposition movements demands study.
Drawing on these cases, I offer three main propositions. First, un-
der certain conditionssecular authoritarianism and sociopolitical
uncertaintyIslamism can emerge as a powerful idea that generates
social appeal. Second, I hypothesize that to be successful, movement
organizations must adapt their ideas and agendas to the target popula-
tion and local contexts in which they recruit; that is, the key factors are
the particular Islamist ideas or ideology an organization sets forth and
the degree of ideational fit. Rather than tie themselves to a global Isla-
mist agenda, organizations must develop a local Islamist ideology that
3
Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel stress socioeconomic grievances; see Roy, The Failure of'Politi-
calIslam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); and Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). Esposito (fn. 1) offers a more nuanced historical per-
spective. Policy-oriented studies similarly look at Islamism writ large; Graham Fuller, The Future of
Political Islam (New York: Palgrave, 2003). For the culruralist view, see Samuel Huntington, The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Bernard
Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2001).
4
Michael Doran, "The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in the
Middle East," Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 2 (2002); Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic
Logic ofSuicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: WhyJihad
Went Global (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
66 WORLD P O L I T I C S
TABLE 1
CASES OF ISLAMIST MOBILIZATION IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA
AND AZERBAIJAN
Dependent Variable:
Success/Failure of
Independent Social Mobilization
Estimates of Measured by
Membership; 1. Recruitment of Activists
Direction of and Followers
Place, Date Growth 2. Sustaining Itself
Case Location of Origin (2007) over Time
Hizb ut-Tahrir Uzbekistan, Middle East, from 16,000
al-Islami (HT) Kyrgyzstan, 1953; to over 1. high
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 35,000; 2. high
Kazakhstan 1992-95 still growing
Islamic Tajikistan Tajikistan, from 3,000 to 1. moderate then

Renaissance 1990 20,000; declining
Party (IRP) declining 2. moderate
Islamic Party of Azerbaijan Azerbaijan, several 1. low

Azerbaijan (IPA) 1992 hundred; 2. low
declining
suits the local social base. Third, in authoritarian contexts, especially

where open mobilization is forbidden, informal social networks are an
essential mechanism for spreading Islamist ideas and protecting group
members; however, inclusive rather than exclusive networks are critical
for organizational growth. Finally, I discuss certain limitations to an
Islamist movement's ability to grow and bring about political change.
The hypotheses here contribute to our understanding of Islamism and,
more broadly, to our understanding of why and how opposition move-
ments emerge and mobilize under authoritarian regimes. 5 1 do not ar-
gue that only ideational fit and networks matter but rather that they are
key variables in explaining why some movements are more successful
than others in recruiting and sustaining a following.
5
For example, Jason M. K. Lyall, "Pocket Protests: Rhetorical Coercion and the Micropolitics of
Collective Action in Semiauthoritarian Regimes," World Politics 58 (April 2006); Valerie Bunce and
Sharon Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions," Journal ofDemocracy 17 (October
2006); Joshua Tucker, "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist
Colored Revolutions" 5 (September 2007); Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and
Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," World Politics 54 (January
2002).
Section II discusses definitions, research design, and method. Sec-

tion III reviews the literature. Section IV further develops my theoretical
framework and hypotheses. Sections VVII explore how these proposi-
tions apply in three cases of varying success/failure. Section VIII dis-
cusses potential political change. Section IX concludes.
II. DEFINITIONS AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Islamism is a modern political ideology that calls for Islam to be linked

in some way to the state.6 Where it is mobilized as a form of con-
tentious politics, Islamism constitutes a type of social movement,7 a
"collective challenge, based on common purposes and social solidari-
ties, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities."8
A movement encompasses a loose collection of activists and followers
who adhere to a certain set of rules or an ideology, identity, or platform
that defines their group or organization.9
I do not define "success" as the achievement of the organization's ul-
timate goals. In some cases, that would mean the creation of an Islamic
caliphate or state, a rare empirical phenomenon and futile for study.
Rather, I define the dependent variable as the relative success or fail-
ure of these movements in (1) attracting recruits and growing a social
base and (2) surviving or sustaining themselves, even under repressive
political and religious conditions. I examine Islamist movements with-
in the context of secular authoritarian states. Under the authoritarian
(for example, Uzbekistan) or even the "competitive authoritarian" or
"semiauthoritarian" regimes (for example, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan) of the former Soviet republics,10 Islamist movements of-
ten operate underground. Because of state repression or harassment,
membership in Islamist organizations is not clearly defined or fixed.
However, we can observe certain trajectories and measure success/fail-
ure along these dimensions according to the best estimates available
from local and international experts.
6
Esposito (fn. 1); Beinin and Stork (fn. 1).
7
Wickham (fn. 2); Jenny White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey (Seattle: University of Washing-
ton Press, 2005); Wiktorowicz (fn. 2).
8
Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4-5.
9
Ronald Aminzade and Elizabeth Perry, "The Sacred, Religious, and Secular in Contentious Poli-
tics," in Ronald Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth Perry, William Sewell, Jr.,
Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, eds., Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 158.
10
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of De-
mocracy 13 (April 2002); Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy 13
(April 2002); Lyall (fn. 5).
68 WORLD POLITICS
Adopting a comparative case study approach covering the period

from the late 1980s/early 1990s to the present, I examine three Islamist
organizations that have engaged in political activism to promote some
form of political Islam. All three define themselves as Islamic parties.
The IRP, a previously illegal party that is now legal, developed in Tajiki-
stan. HT is an underground party that is banned in the region but oper-
ates actively in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser
degree in Kazakhstan.11 The IPA is a previously legal but now banned
party operating in Azerbaijan. All three parties have sought to mobilize
a social base, with the goal of attaining political power.
These are the major Islamist organizations in the post-Soviet re-
gions of Central Asia and the south Caucasus that do not act as terror-
ist groups.12 None has achieved its ultimate political goals. Only HT has
been relatively successful in attracting large numbers of followers and in
sustaining itself and expanding over time. The IRP was moderately suc-
cessful in the early 1990s but subsequently declined. The IPA has had
very limited appeal since it was organized in 1992. All three emerge
from similar Soviet conditions, allowing a comparison controlling for
political, sodoeconomic, and transnational variance throughout most of
the twentieth century. Variation in post-1991 factors allows me to explore
my own hypotheses about ideational and network factors, as well as alter-
native hypotheses about political repression and transnational factors.
III. EXISTING APPROACHES AND ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
The varied literature on Islamism highlights multiple causal variables

to explain Islamist mobilization: culture, historical grievances, socio-
economic grievances, rational entrepreneurs, political repression/op-
portunity, and transnational networks and resources.
Culturalist approaches have been widely discredited as essentialist
in their view of Islam.13 More nuanced arguments highlight cultural-
11
Kazakhstan has a large Russian/European population and has had little Islamist mobilization.
HT activity has been mainly in southern, ethnically Kazakh and Uzbek areas. In Turkmenistan the
state's elimination of all opposition explains the lack of mobilization there.
12
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a fourth Islamist organization. It began as the so-
cial movement Adolat in 1992 but by 1999 had become the IMU, a terrorist organization. It is thus less
comparable than the groups included here. The existence of several other groups (Islamic Jihad and
Bayat) is debated, so I do not include them here. Various IslamzV movements (for example, Akromiya
in Uzbekistan or the Salafis in Azerbaijan) are predominantly apolitical and thus do not fit the defini-
tion of Islamist movements. For overviews, see Edward Walker, "Islam, Islamism, and Political Order
in Central Asia," Journal of International Affairs 56 (Spring 2003); and Eric McGlinchey, "Autocrats,
Islamists, and the Rise of Radicalism in Central Asia," Current History 104 (October 2005).
13
Huntington (fn. 3); Lewis (fn. 3). See Esposito's critique (fn. 1).
historical grievances against the West: the Crusades, twentieth-century

Western colonization of Muslim lands, the establishment of Israel, and
U.S. support of Israeli policy.14 However, even the latter views suffer
from implicit determinism, assuming that formerly colonized Muslims
will inevitably turn to anti-American Islamism. They overwhelmingly
focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which does not resonate with
most Central Asian or Azeri Muslims. An alternative grievance-based
approach views socioeconomic factors as the instigators of Islamism.
The postcolonial period has witnessed a boom in educated but unem-
ployed youths, living in poverty and frustration. In this view, alienated
youth inevitably turn to Islamism.15 However, socioeconomic griev-
ances are prevalent throughout the Muslim world, yet in many cases
Islamist mobilization is absent.
A more nuanced hypothesis argues that state repression in the con-
text of bad governance (especially failure to deal with socioeconomic
crises) triggers Islamism.16 A related hypothesis expects liberalization
and inclusion to cause Islamist decline or moderation. As several schol-
ars have argued, however, there is no clear demonstrated relationship
between state repression and mobilization.17 Likewise, I find that the
IRP has faced the least repression since 1997, but as repression has de-
clined so too has its popularity. The IPA never attracted a sustained social
base, either when it was legal or since being banned. HT meanwhile has
grown slowly but steadily, in the contexts both of increasingly repres-
sive and illegitimate states and of some economic improvement across
the region since 1999.18 Moreover, the political economy/statecentric
approaches do not explain why people seeking to challenge the state
join particular Islamist movements or Islamist movements instead of
democratic ones. And if movements share a similar political-economic
context, why are some more successful than others?
14
Esposito (fn. 1), 10-11.
ls
Kepel (fn. 3); Saodat Olimova, "Sotsial'nyi kontekst: otchuzhdenie," in OSCE, ed., Religioznyi eks-
tremizm v tsentral'nei Azii:problemy iperspeitivy [Religious Extremism in Central Asia: Problems and
Perspectives] (Dushanbe: Sharq, 2002), 93-108.
16
Mark Tessler, "The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A Political Economy
Analysis," in John Entelis, ed., Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1997). See also Human Rights Watch, Creating Enemies of the State (New York: Hu-
man Rights Watch, 2004); International Crisis Group (ICG), Asia Report no. 51, Central Asia: Islam
and the State, July 10,2003 (accessed October 2003).
17
Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006); Lyall (fn. 5).
18
ICG, "Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir," Asia Report no. 58, June
30, 2003, www.cnsisweb.org (accessed October 2003); Richard Pomfret, The Central Asian Economies
since Independence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 8-12.
70 WORLD POLITICS
The recent application of social movement theory (SMT)19 to Islamist

activism offers a more dynamic hypothesis.20 Charles Tilly and Sidney
Tarrow have posited that Islamist activism can be considered a social
movement and that it can be explained by SMT'S key variables: political
opportunity structure, resources, and framing.21 Rational Islamist elites
seizing opportunities and resources are seen as the critical variable.22
In contrast to the state repression hypothesis, SMT suggests that those
organizations with more resources and operating in a more open envi-
ronment are likely to have greater success, SMT helps explain the timing
of a rise in Islamist mobilization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan during
the 1990-92 period, as the Soviet regime collapsed. Yet SMT cannot ac-
count for the sustained activism under the subsequent period of repres-
sion. Nor do the greater transnational financial resources of the IPA and
IRP necessarily translate into a wider social base.
More recently SMT has emphasized "framing" in social mobilization
(the use of symbols, rhetoric, and "repertoires of contention"). While
some view framing as the purely strategic use of symbols, others empha-
size cultural framinga welcome move toward studying the ideas and
identities behind various movements.23 Carrie Wickham's study of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, stresses the importance of
"ideational framing," especially in "high-risk" environments.24 Tarrow also
highlights framing and networks in transnational social movements.25
IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: IDEAS, FIT, AND NETWORKS
Building on this literature, this article argues that ideational and net-
work variables are critical for explaining support for Islamist groups,
especially under repressive secular authoritarian regimes. I argue that
19
Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Move-
ments: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996); Tarrow (fn. 8); and Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dy-
namics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
20
Wickham (fn. 2); Wiktorowicz (fn. 2); Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
21
Tarrow (fn. 8), 7; Tilly, "Forward," in Wiktorowicz (fn. 2).
22
Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl Kaltenthaler, "The Rationality of Radicalism," Political Science
Quarterly 121 (Summer 2006), 296.
23
John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilization, Social
Control and Tactics (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1979), 161; David Snow and Robert
Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization," in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter
Kriese, and Sidney Tarrow, eds., From Structure to Action (Greenwich: JA1 Press, 1988); Doug
McAdam, "Culture and Social Movements," in Enrique Larana and Hank Johnston, eds., New Social
Movements: From Ideology to Identity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994). Recent theoretical
work focuses more on identity framing. See Tarrow (fn. 20).
24
Wickham (fn. 2), 13.
25
Tarrow (fn. 20).
what differentiates more successful Islamist movements from those

that fail are (1) their ideas and how they adapt those ideas to their
local context and (2) whether Islamist activists strategically use local
networks as mechanisms through which to convey their message, give
it legitimacy, and draw in a target population.
The hypotheses here contribute to a growing body of ideational
scholarship. Political science has seen only limited study of ideational
variables, especially religious ideas,26 and the literature generally focuses
on ideas and the institutionalization of state norms27 or on the effect
of ideas on economic policy.281 ask instead why and how ideas interact
with societyhow ideational organizations mobilize well before they
have any opportunity to impact state institutions. I examine the role
of noninstitutionalized ideas, whether rooted in society or in political
opposition groups. Such ideas include Marxism-Leninism in the early
twentieth century, Islamism from the postcolonial period through to-
day, and the evangelicalism of recent decades. These ideas may not be
institutionalized at the outset, but they can still be powerful.
The following propositions explain the logic of why, how, and under
what conditions Islamist ideas matter for successful mobilization.
Proposition 1. Islamism is an idea that has social appeal and can
become the basis for oppositional social mobilization under secular au-
thoritarian regimes.
As a political ideology or set of ideas, Islamism can appeal to an ardent

group of leaders and activists, as well as to society more generally.29
26
Exceptions include Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001). Comparative politics generally subsumes religion under ethnicity, but the ethnic politics
literature devotes little attention to religion.
27
See Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and
Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 9. Constructivist-oriented scholars of
international relations have demonstrated the powerful effects of ideas when they become institution-
alized within particular international organizations or state institutions: Kathryn Sikkink, "The Power
of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe," in Goldstein
and Keohane, 160-69; Robert Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization," in Goldstein and
Keohane, 133-34; Jeffrey Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and
the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); and Margaret Keck and Kathryn
Sikkink, Transnational Advocacy Networks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 74-76. On
norms, see Peter Katzenstein, ed., Culture, Norms, and Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1996); and Lisa Mclntosh Sundstrom, "Foreign Assistance, International Norms, and Civil Society
Development: Lessons from the Russian Campaign," International Organization 59 (Spring 2005).
28
Peter Hall, The Power ofEconomic Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Kathryn
Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Craig Parsons,^ Cer-
tain Idea ofEurope (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006); Mark Blyth, Great Transformations:
Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002); Hilary Appel, "The Ideological Determinants of Liberal Economic Reform: The Case of
Privatization," WorldPolitics 52 (July 2000), 543.
29
Several scholars stress the importance of Islamist ideas: Sheri Berman, "Islamism, Revolution,
and Civil Society," Political Science and Politics 1 (June 2003), 11; and Lisa Anderson, "Prospects for
72 WORLD POLITICS
Some become activists or committed followers, while others support

the movement at the margins. The ideational center creates the basis
for mobilization. In secular authoritarian states the cost of participat-
ing in any opposition, much less a religious one, is usually very high. That
Islamism can mobilize some social support even under such conditions
suggests that the ideational content of its message inspires some people to
assume great risks, including imprisonment, torture, and death.
The cases discussed here suggest that Islamism is likely to emerge
as a major source of opposition when two conditions are present: when
a state is characterized by significant political and economic uncer-
tainty and when Islamist ideologues offer a counterideology to failed
democracy and nationalism. Such conditions are often met in periods
of postimperial collapse or state failure, for example. In this respect, Is-
lamism shares significant similarities with other nineteenth- and twen-
tieth-century ideologies.30 Revolutionary ideas tend to emerge and gain
traction when the existing order is breaking down or when exogenous
shocks, such as war, have thrown the prevailing system into turmoil,
transition, or collapse.31 It is not surprising that in the context of com-
munism's collapse, of failed or failing democratization, and of the dele-
gitimized nationalist-authoritarianism of the 1990s, Islamist activists
would emerge as a significant if still marginal ideological movement in
the FSU. As Mark Blyth has argued, ideas shape popular understand-
ing of a "crisis" and offer a "blueprint" that reduces uncertainty.32
Islamism is not the only type of opposition in Muslim societies, but
it has become a predominant one. In both its moderate and its radi-
cal variants, Islamism offers a new paradigm for reordering society. It
calls for a new political order based on social justice. The simple idea
that "Islam is the solution" can resonate with many segments of society
looking for an alternative to the existing, illegitimate system.33 Ideas
Liberalism in North Africa: Identities and Interests in Preindustrial Welfare States," in John Entelis,
ed., Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 132.
On the distinction between ideas and ideology, see Stephen Hanson, "Postimperial Democracies: Ide-
ology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia," East
European Politics and Society 20, no. 2 (2006), 357. The former are more diffuse; the latter systematizes
ideas in a comprehensive way and sets the boundaries of membership in a community.
30
On the institutionalization and role of democratic and fascist ideas and ideologies, see Sheri
Berman, The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making oflnterwar Europe (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1998); and Hanson (fn. 29).
31
Sheri Berman, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth
Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10; Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 27), 26;
Sikkink (fn. 27), 145.
32
Blyth (fn. 28), 38-41.
33
Robert Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993);
Wickham (fn. 2).
about Islamism, like ideas about social democracy or liberalism, can

and do motivate political opposition, even absent significant resources
and opportunities for public protest. While religious ideas rarely bring
about revolution, they can still have a powerful effect on individual
and collective political behavior.34 Ideas form a discourse that links ide-
ational entrepreneurs and society. While it is impossible to assess the
extent to which leaders are genuinely committed to their ideas, we can
observe whether they attract activists and followers or remain a small
clique with no social support.
How then do ideas mobilize an opposition? Elite entrepreneurs set
forth ideas as a religious, philosophical, or political program, such as
liberalism, Marxism, Christian evangelicalism, or Islamism. Move-
ments driven by ideas, rather than just by political or economic gain,
invest in their ideology and in the indoctrination and identity trans-
formation or "conversion" of their recruits.35 The ideas and interests
of activists become mutually constitutive.36 The ideas become almost
synonymous with one's identity and mission, thus shaping one's prefer-
ences, worldview, and political behavior. An Islamist activist adopts a
new identity that shapes his political preferences. When Islamist move-
ments develop a compelling ideational message, they can attract activ-
ists and followers, even in high-risk environments that call for personal
sacrifice.37
Proposition 2. Ideational fit between Islamist ideas and a target
population is critical for generating and sustaining a social base.
If all Islamist movements lay claim to religious ideas, then why are they
not uniformly more successful (or unsuccessful) under similar condi-
tions? Perhaps surprisingly to the many policymakers around the world
who often paint Islamist movements with one broad stroke, not all
Islamist organizations hold well-developed and well-articulated ideas
about Islam and politics. Nor do they all share the same ideological
interpretation of Islamism. Different Islamist movements imbue Is-
lamism with different content. Some focus more on issues of Islamic
purity, others on social justice, and others on policy issues such as Pales-
tine. Some advocate nonviolence; others, violent jihad.38 Islamism has
34
Daniel Philpott, "The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations," World Politics 52
(January 2000), 207-8.
35
Ibid., 217.
36
Alexander Wendt, A Social Theory ofInternational Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
37
Wickham(fn.2).
38
Gerges (fn. 4) similarly argues that there is great diversity among jihadist groups (p. 31).
74 WORLD POLITICS
many forms and has been adopted by many different groupsfrom the
Muslim Brotherhood to the IRP and al-Qaedagiving different con-
tent and sometimes even little content to the Islamist banner. Likewise,
Muslim societies vary significantlyfrom region to region, within re-
gions, and across timein their own interpretation of Islam and sym-
pathy for political Islam.
Those movements that are more successful in recruiting activists
and supporters and in sustaining themselves under repressive condi-
tions over the long term are those that develop powerful ideas that
find resonance in the particular cultural and historical context they face.
Although Islamism is a supranational or transnational idea, Islamist
movements must adapt to the local contexts in which they recruit, and
then use their ideas to shape the identities of activists and followers.
More successful Islamist elites skillfully give salience to local issues and
draw on local norms that fit with and reinforce their own ideological
agenda and mission.39 They thereby attract followers and further influ-
ence and shape followers' identities and political views. At the same
time, as ideational movements, they are inherently constrained by their
ideology. They cannot simply and easily jettison their core ideas and
mission in order to make strategic decisions that might increase their
membership or likelihood of political success. Nonetheless, the Islamist
ideas and the identity these movements foster are what motivate some
people to assume the high risks of joining an antiregime movement,
even when there is little likelihood of achieving even partial political
success, much less a more total goal, such as regime change.
Proposition 3. In authoritarian contexts spreading Islamist ideas
through informal but inclusive social networks will garner greater mobili-
zational success.
Movements need mechanisms and "carriers"40 of ideas who transmit

ideas to society through texts, leaflets, pamphlets, and, increasingly, in-
ternet Web sites. Adapting to the local context also demands effective-
ly identifying and using legitimate local mechanisms of mobilization.
I argue that domestic social networks are essential to sustaining the
movement, as they provide the movement's local roots. Where open
mobilization is forbidden, networks are the mechanisms that facilitate
39
In a similar vein, Gerges (fn. 4) finds that al-Qaeda had difficulty convincing national jihadists
to adopt a global agenda (pp. 29-34).
* Keck and Sikkink (fn. 27), 119; Berman (fn. 30), 25. On networks as pathways of diffusion,
see Tarrow (fn. 20), 104. On terrorist networks, see Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). On Islamic networks, see Janine Clark, "Social
Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism," Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 8 (2004), 941-68.
the movement's growth and survival. In fact, even in cases of less re-
pressive authoritarian regimes, where some open protest is allowed,
informal networks are critical means of spreading the organization's
message and recruiting followers.41 Within the context of authoritarian
or even semiauthoritarian/hybrid regimes, however, informal networks
of activists are more likely to be the primary mechanism by which op-
position ideas are spread.
Informal networks are also particularly important in highly person-
alistic societies.42 Personal ties and small numbers facilitate trust and
cohesion within the group.43 Carriers effectively transmit ideas through
face-to-face contact that builds personal ties and educates and converts
recruits. In Central Asia and Azerbaijan mobilization occurs through
various informal networksincluding unofficial Islamic circles and
mahalla (neighborhood), village, clan, region, student, and business ties.44
To achieve more effective mobilization, however, Islamists need to tran-
scend the narrow, exclusivist network of a particular clan, tribe, region,
and ethnicity; they must penetrate a number of such networks so that
they do not become identified with exclusivist identity groups. Effec-
tively using such informal social networks can significantly improve the
potential of a movement to mobilize broadly while evading exposure.
The following sections develop empirical support for these prop-
ositions in explaining three Islamist movements in Central Asia and
Azerbaijan.
V. HIZB UT-TAHRIR: RELATIVELY SUCCESSFUL MOBILIZATION
Sheikh Taqiuddin An-Nabhani Filastiyni, a Palestinian, founded Hizb

ut-Tahrir al-Islami (the Party of Islamic Liberation, hereafter HT) in
Jordan in 1953, in response to the brewing Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
An-Nabhani's writings have become the core of HT'S program and ide-
ology, proclaiming as a goal the liberation of Muslims worldwide. A
transnational Islamist organization, HT operates (mostly underground)
within both Western and Muslim countries and is believed to be based
in London.
41
Lyall (fn. 5).
42
Diane Singerman, "The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements," in Wiktorowicz (fn.
2), 149; Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002),
39-52; Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 23-53.
43
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971);
Mark Granovetter, "The Strength ofWeak Ties," American Journal ofSociology 78 (May 1973).
44
On the Aksy protest, see Scott Radnitz, "Networks, Localism, and Mobilization in Aksy, Kyr-
gyzstan," Central Asia Survey 24 (December 2005).
76 WORLD POLITICS
In keeping with proposition 1, HT took advantage of the weakened
states and greater political opportunity following the Soviet collapse.
HT first penetrated Central Asia sometime between 1992 and 199545:
and was actively circulating its literature by the late 1990s.46 Just as
importantly, HT'S ideas began to take hold following the collapse of the
Soviet empire and the fall of communism, in the context of the wide-
spread delegitimization of both post-Soviet secular nationalism and the
virtual or failed democratization of the 1990s.47 Under these condi-
tions of political and socioeconomic uncertainty, HT'S message offered
a compelling alternative.
Given the absence of open membership lists or mass protestsfeatures
characteristic of social movements in more liberal environmentsit is
extremely difficult to estimate the numbers of HT adherents. The few
members who communicate with the press claim numbers in the tens of
thousands in Uzbekistan and several more thousand in both Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, where HT has recruited since 1998.48 Independent experts
agree that the numbers are high and have been rising since 1999. They
more realistically put HT membership in the range of 10,000-20,000
in Uzbekistan; 3,000-10,000 in Tajikistan; and 3,000-5,000 in Kyr-
gyzstan.49 HT began recruiting in Kazakhstan around 1999 and is
believed to have several hundred members there.50 In Uzbekistan
more than 4,700 HT members are believed to be in prison on charg-
es of extremism and terrorism; they constitute the majority of politi-
cal and religious prisoners.51 Since 2001 there have been reports of
protests in Tashkent, Andijan, Osh, Jalalabad, Kara-Su, Dushanbe,
and Khodjentoften by mothers or wives who are HT members or
45
Alisher Khamidov, "Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Challenges for Central Asian Security," Brookings
paper (May 2002); and Bakhtiyor Babajanov, "0 religiozno-politicheskoifartii 'hizb ut-takhrir" (Manu-
script, Tashkent, January 2003).
46
Author interview with members, branch of Ezgulik, Namangan, Uzbekistan, January 2003.
47
Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2005).
48
Author interview with HT spokesman, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, August 2004.
49
Estimates are based on independent sources with an on-the-ground presence and knowledge
of regions, neighborhoods, and villages where HT has activists and significant support. Similar assess-
ments come from ICG (fn. 18), 17; journalists in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan; author inter-
view with Alisher Sobirov, MP (committee on religious extremism and terrorism), Kyrgyzstan, January
2003; Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise ofMilitant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2002), 131; Gulnoza Saidzaimova, "Central Asia: Hizb ut-Tahrir's Calls for Islamic State Find
Support," RFE/RI., January 17,2006; and Farangis Najibullah, "Central Asia: Hizb ut-Tahrir Gains Sup-
port from Women," RFE/RL, July 11, 2007. For example, journalists in Osh and Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan,
and Soghd, Tajikistan, pointed out areas in those regions where several thousand subscribe to HT.
50
Zeyno Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Washington, D.C.: Nixon Center, 2004), 78.
51
Author interviews with Mikhail Ardzinov, director, Independent Human Rights Organization
of Uzbekistan (IHROU), Tashkent, Uzbekistan, January 2003; and Abdusalim Ergashev, IHROU, Andi-
jan, Uzbekistan, January 2003, and Freedom House representatives, Tashkent, January 2003.
sympathizers.52 In 2006 hundreds protested when a popular imam who

had welcomed HT members into his mosque was slain by the Kyrgyz secu-
rity services. An HT spokesman called the event an "extrajudicial killing."53
Even taking the lower figures, HT is the most numerous opposition
Islamist group in Central Asia.54 In a recent survey in Kyrgyzstan, 7.8
percent of the population reported having a positive view of HT.S5 This
seemingly low figure is not particularly surprising, given the group's
banned status, the Central Asian governments' widespread campaigns
to portray its members as fanatics and terrorists,56 and popular fear of
identifying with HT. Nevertheless, the HT membership surpasses that
of the main democratic parties in Uzbekistan (Birlik, Erk, and the Sun-
shine Coalition) and Tajikistan (the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the
Social Democratic Party), which were unable to mobilize protests after
the last wave of rigged parliamentary elections. Even in Kyrgyzstan,
where the democracy movement has made greater strides, the 2005
Tulip Revolution mobilized only some 10,000-15,000 demonstrators
against the regime, and many of those were mafia members and paid
thugs who exploited the events as an opportunity to loot the capital.
Widespread disillusionment with Kyrgyzstan's second "democratic rev-
olution" has followed the 2005 events.57
HT spread steadily between 1992 and 2007.58 According to Fergha-
na-based human rights activist Abdulsalim Ergashev, in its early years
people were wary of HT, but "now the population is helping them."59 HT
members are a mix of well-educated city dwellers and rural villagers.
Those arrested include students, lawyers, doctors, and occasionally for-
mer government bureaucrats or policemen, most under forty years old.60
They belong to the post-Soviet generation searching for a new identity.
52
Eurasia Insight, "Religious Discontent Evident in the Ferghana Valley," January 17, 2007, (ac-
cessed January 2007); Najibullah (fn. 49); ICG (fn. 18), 23; author interview with Rajab Mirzo, journal-
ist, Tajikistan, August 2005.
53
Alisher Khamidov and Alisher Saipov, "Antiterrorism Crackdown Fuels Discontent in Kyrgyz-
stan," August 8,2006 (accessed January 2007).
54
Analysts agree on HT'S sustained growth: Alisher Khamidov (fn. 45); Vitaly Naumkin, Radical
Islam in Central Asia (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 194; and Adeeb Khalid, Islam after
Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 161.
s5
Author, Kyrgyzstan survey, 2006. Kyrgyzstan has a population of over five million.
56
Kurbonali Mukhabbanov, "Re/igiozno-oppozitsionnye gruppy v Tadjikistane: Hizb ut-Tabrir," in
OSCE (fn. 15), 83-84.
57
Erica Marat, The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After (Jamestown Foundation, 2006),
117-19 (accessed May 2006).
58
Mukhabbanov (fn. 56), 75-76; Muhiddin Kabiri, "Islamskii radikalizm:faktory vozniknoveniia,"
in OSCE (fn. 15), 126; Saniya Sagnaeva,"Re/igiozno-oppozitsionnyegruppy v Kyrgyzstane: Hizb ut-Tab-
nr," in OSCE (fn. 15); and Bakhtior Babadjanov,"Rehgiozno-oppozitsionnyegruppy v Uzbekistane" in
OSCE (fn. 15).
59
Author interview with Ergashev (fn. 51).
60
Author interview with HT spokesman (fn. 48); ICG (fn.18), 19.
78 WORLD POLITICS
HT does not provide social services, compete in elections (and thus have
a chance of taking power), or challenge the regime militarily. Local
governments charge that HT members are paid $l-$2 for distributing
leaflets, and some HT members report that destitute members receive
some material assistance.61 Still, this is a paltry compensation for the
enormous risktorture and imprisonment for ten to twenty years in
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and three to five in Kyrgyzstan. In fact, some
HT members contribute dues to finance the organization.62 Hence, ra-
tional-materialist explanations do not explain HT activism.
Why then has HT had such relative success in mobilizing a social base
in Central Asia? SMTs focus on political opportunity helps explain the
timing of HT'S entrance on to the scene and spread in the early 1990s,
just after the Soviet collapse. Those emphasizing state repression might
argue that thousands of arrests have created popular sympathy for the
organization, but that does not explain why it has been able to draw on
repression to mobilize social support, whereas other repressed groups
did not manage to do so. Further, since most sources think the trans-
national HT movement has given very little financing to the Central
Asian HT organization, we cannot credit its growth and sustainability
since the early 1990s to transnational ties.63 Even HT members on trial
in Uzbekistan gave court statements that suggested little contact with
the transnational movement. The primary contribution of the transna-
tional organization, with its extensive Web sites and literature in mul-
tiple languages, has been an ideational framework for the worldwide
network.
As proposition 2 suggests, HT'S ideology and its adaptation to the
local context were critical elements for its sustained growth, HT'S da^wa
(call) is for a return to Islamfor all Muslims to make Islam their iden-
tity and the focus of their social and political views. HT says its "ideol-
ogy is Islam"; its goal is "changing] the situation of the corrupt society
so that it is transformed into an Islamic one."64 The three stages of its
program involve (1) recruiting activists and inculcating them with the
movement's ideas; (2) reaching out to the ummah (the Muslim commu-
nity) to Islamicize society; and (3) taking power and creating an Islamic
government.65 HT seeks "social justice" in the name of Islam and rejects
" Author interview with Sevara, HT member, Osh, October 2007.

62
Author interview with HT spokesman (fn. 48).
63
In interviews with journalists across the region, most agreed that HT operated with little funding;
substantial resources were not necessary to fund its propaganda activities.
64
www.hizbuttahnr.org (accessed March 2003).
65
Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Methodology ofHizb ut-Tahrirfor Change (London: Al-Khilafah Publica-
tions, 1999), 24-25.
the secular, Western ideologies of nationalism and democracy. Nation-

alism, in HT'S view, is a threat to an Islamic society because it creates an
alternative identity and defines political boundaries. HT seeks instead
to establish a transnational caliphate. Although the message may seem
irrational and Utopian, some are attracted by its clarity and simplic-
ity. Noteworthy in this group are Central Asian youth alienated from
the secular-nationalist policies and democratic facade of the Central
Asian regimes and increasingly skeptical of the often incompetent and
corrupt democratic opposition.66 One journalist acquainted with HT
activists observed the popularity of the organization among youth. He
explained: "The reason youth have supported these parties is t h a t . . . in
this period of the resurrection and revival of our religion they were in a
state of euphoria. . . . And they [youth] have no knowledge in Shari'a
law. But they have among the youth those who can speak well; they
pressure them psychologically; they direct them."67
HT also calls upon Central Asian Muslims to accept its identity, to
convert to its cause, to be "true" Muslims. Their identity is expected
to shape their political interests. Unlike the IMU or IPA, HT distributes
literature and organizes study circles that focus first on religious educa-
tionand conversion back to Islam after the Soviet period.68 This is an
appealing way of drawing in the many youth whose interest in learning
about Islam and reidentifying as Muslims has surged in the post-Soviet
era, after decades of religious repression.69
From education, HT shifts to political indoctrination, which centers on
the appealing message of justice under Islam. For example, one mem-
ber stated, "'Not only is the number of people who join the group grow-
ing, so is the number of those who support its ideas.... Because people
want to live in a just and fair society... nowadays there is no justice....
there was a caliphate for fourteen centuries. It was a just system. I also
believe that if people learn these things they will become more just.'"70
Several woman stated that they joined HT because "we want justice.
. . . All that the government does is against religion and justice."71
66
Freedom House, Nations in Transit, World Bank, and Polity scores all rate the Central Asian
regimes as highly corrupt and generally more repressive of civil and political liberties since 1992.
67
Author interview with journalist, Karshi newspaper, March 2005.
68
Author interview with HT members, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, August 2004.
69
In Kyrgyzstan, for example, 86 percent of those 18-24 and 89.6 percent of those 25-34 claim
to be a "strong" or "moderate believer"; 17.4 percent of the total sample claim to have become more
religious in the past five years. Author, Kyrgyzstan survey (2006). A strong majority of focus group
participants were also interested in religious education.
70
Gulnoza Saidazimova, "Hizb ut-Tahrir's Calls for Islamic State Find Support," January 17,2006
(accessed January 2006).
71
Author interview with HT women members, Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan, August 2004.
80 WORLD POLITICS
One young adherent declared, "There is no justice, not in Kyrgyzstan,

not in Uzbekistan."72 Those on trial for being members of HT repeat-
edly declared devotion to their ideology and typically refused to repent
and seek amnesty.73 One "nonrepentant" defendant in a Syrdarya trial
"declared 'our weapons are our ideas. . . . We want a new society.'"74
Human rights advocates have been surprised by the resiliency shown by
members.75 In Tajikistan, one expert said, "more than 100 Hizb activ-
ists sit in prison for an idea."76
A second key factor in HT'S growth is thatalthough it is a transna-
tional organization with a global agendait pursues a local agenda in
Central Asia and configures its ideas to fit the local context. The central
theme of most HT leaflets in Central Asia is the overthrow of President
Karimov of Uzbekistan,77 whom it scorns as "a dictator"78 and "oppres-
sor of Muslims"79one reason ethnic Uzbeks more than others across j
Central Asia support the organization. In Kyrgyzstan alone 17 percent I
of the population "agreed" or "completely agreed" with HT'S call to over- ]
throw Karimov.80 After the 2005 Andijan protests, in which as many as
750 peoplemostly unarmedare believed to have been killed,81 HT
leaflets titled, "the butcher of Andijan" and "Karimov's lies," spread the
news of the massacre through its networks.82 HT also targets neighbor-
ing regimes. In 2005 HT's Kyrgyz spokesman called on members not
to vote in the elections because Akaev was corrupt and democracy was
un-Islamic.83 HT members and sympathizers joined protests against the
Kyrgyz elections.84
72
Author interview with Erkin, HT member, Ak-Artu, Osh oblast, Kyrgyzstan, October 2007.
73
Author interview with U.S. government official/trial observer, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, July 2004.
Although we must be extremely circumspect of statements made under pressure in Uzbek courts, most
international observers generally believe HT members freely declare their devotion to its cause.
74
Author interview with OSCE trial observer, Tashkent, January 2003.
75
Author interview with Freedom House representatives, Tashkent, November 2004; Bishkek,
August 12,2004.
76
Author interview with Ravshana Makhtamova, Khujand, Tajikistan, January 10, 2003.
77
Ibid.
78
HT leaflets, Uzbekistan, 2003.
79
HT leaflet, "7000 Muslims Languishing in Uzbek Prisons," December 30,2002.; this information is
referenced at www.muslimuzbekistan.net.
80
Author, Kyrgyzstan survey, 2006. Another 48.9 percent were uncertain ("don't know"), while
26.5 percent "disagreed" and 7.5 percent "completely disagreed."
81
ICG, Asia Briefing no. 38, "Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising," May 25, 2005; Human Rights
Watch, "Bullets Were Falling Like Rain," hrw.Org/reports/2005/Uzbekistan0605/2 (accessed January
2006).
82
HT leaflet, Uzbekistan, "How the Butcher of Andijan Executed His Plan," www.hizbuttahrir.org
(accessed December 2005).
83
Author interview with Osh journalist, June 2, 2005; the journalist shared leaflet content for
January-March 2005.
84
Gulnoza Saidzaimova, "Kyrgyzstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir Rallies in South, Urges Election Boycott,"
www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/2/2FF7FDEF-DAE8-4323-8F61-346A404F3EE9.html (accessed
April 2005).
HT'S call for social, economic, and political justice also resonates with
many Central Asians who express nostalgia for the era of better gov-
ernance under the Soviets. Survey data and focus groups show that
corruption is a common complaint of ordinary people.85 In forty-five
of fifty-two (86.5 percent) focus group discussions (FGDS), participants
identified corruption as a major problem, for themselves personally and
for society. Respondents were mixed or less negative about corruption
in only five FGDS. Respondents in Kyrgyzstan, where criticizing the re-
gime is less dangerous, frequently linked corruption to those in power.
Likewise, the corruption of the ruling clanswith references not only
to Karimov but also to Kyrgyzstan's president Akaevhas been a re-
curring topic in HT propaganda.86
HT has further adapted to the local context by not privileging Arab
Muslims.87 It calls Central Asians to an "Eastern Islamic identity."88
The Central Asian HT cells call first for a caliphate in Central Asia,
arguing that a caliphate will rectify the false division of Central Asia
by the Soviets. This message plays with a population that since the So-
viet breakup in 1991 has resented government barriers to crossing the
borders. Although Palestine is central to HT'S message elsewhere, the
Central Asian branches give it less emphasis, as it is an issue in which
their populations have little interest.89 Instead, HT plays on latent anti-
Semitism, calling Karimov "a Jew."90 Other HT themes similarly reflect
local concerns, for example, the venomous attacks on the United States
for supporting Karimov. Leaflets criticize police abuse, unjust taxes,
and restrictions on bazaar traders (the causes of several protests in Uz-
bekistan in 2004 and 2005).91 HT frequently condemns Christian mis-
sionaries, who are generally unpopular among Central Asian Muslims,
as a threat to Islam.92 In thirty-four FGDS (70.8 percent), participants
discussed missionaries in very negative terms. Leaflets and HT study
groups further decry the social dissolution of society, another issue that
resonates in Central Asia, where alcoholism, prostitution, and narcotics
85
In Kyrgyzstan, 94.1 percent replied that corruption was a "very serious" or "serious" problem.
Author, Kyrgyzstan survey.
86
Author interview with Dastan, independent journalist, Jalalabad, August 2004. Akaev was over-
thrown in March 2005.
87
Taqiuddin Al-Nabhani, The Khalifa, www.hizbuttahrir.org.
88
Author interview with Ravshana Mahtamova, Khujand, January 10, 2003.
89
Only 13.7 percent of Kyrgyzstani respondents rated the Palestinian jihad as "just." Author, Kyr-
gyzstan survey.
90
HT leaflet, "Karimov's decisions are another group of weapons to trample on the Muslim popula-
tion of Uzbekistan," October 4,2002. In Kyrgyzstan, 27.6 percent of respondents reported a "negative"
or "very negative" opinion ofJews. Author, Kyrgyzstan survey.
91
HT leaflet, Uzbekistan, October 2002.
92
42.4 percent reported a negative view of Christian missionaries. Author, Kyrgyzstan survey.
82 WORLD POLITICS
have spread rapidly since 1991.93 HT'S ideology of Islam is offered as:
the solution.
Having broken from its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood of thej
1950s and from Sayyid Qutb's teachings, which emphasized violent!
revolution, part of HT'S core ideology is "revolution without violence"
and the creation of the caliphate by spreading the Islamic way of life.94;
This is a message that resonates with the predominant cultural norms
of Central Asian Islam.95 Although views on violence are hardly uni-
form, in forty-three (87.8 percent) FGDs, participants agreed that jihad
should be an internal struggle and that the only justified war is a war of
self-defense for religion and homeland. In only three FGDs did partici-
pants advocate a more aggressive and strictly militant use of jihad, as
does the IMU.
HT in Central Asia has adeptly exploited the internal, spiritual, and
defensive interpretation ofjihad that historically prevails in the region,
whereas in the Middle East its message is more violent. Its Central
Asian message emphasizes jihad of an internal nature and proselytizing
to the umma. This interpretation of jihada controversial but central
concept in Islamic thoughtis not just a strategy; it is a core part of
its ideology. According to one activist, HT "calls everyone . . . it wakes
up Muslims. . . . It is a political and ideological struggle."96 As one ac-
tivist in Kyrgyzstan stated: "We can only create the caliphate through
propaganda.. . .We hate the IMU. They use guns."97 Another member
explained that it is just to fight "for one's country . . . and only then are
jihad or shahids just. But suicide is never just."98 Nonviolent revolution
is probably naive, given the Central Asian governments' hostility to
Islamism. Yet the message of justice and gradual Islamicization targets
a large body of Central Asians who are searching for truth in Islam and
a better government but who reject militant Islamic revolution. For ex-
ample, one prominent businessman and active contributor to a mosque
said: "Yes, under a Muslim government there may be a more just life or
less corruption.... But not the Wahhabi way. If people themselves little
by little come to choose the path of Islam, if the mass of society does,
then only under these conditions can we and must we create a Muslim
93
Participants in forty-nine FGDs were asked about value change since 1991. In forty-eight (98
percent) of those groups participants were very concerned about negative social changes and moral
decline. In one group (2 percent) participants expressed neutral to favorable views.
94
OSCE, unpublished memo, courtesy of OSCE representative, Dushanbe, July 2002.
95
Khalid (fn. 54).
96
Author interview with HT spokesman (fn. 48).
97
Author interview with Tursunbai Bakir uluu, Kyrgyzstan's parliamentary ombudsman, Bishkek,
January 2003, who is quoting an HT activist.
98
Author interview with HT member, Shukrat, Osh, October 2007.
state."99 Having also witnessed the civil war in Tajikistan and the Tal-
iban's rise in Afghanistan, Central Asians generally fear that violent
movements will undermine their already limited social and economic
stability.
HT's ideology, although consistent since it entered Central Asia,
should not be seen as static. Like that of any movement, it may evolve
in response to political circumstances. Thus, HT may be shifting its
attitude toward violence, drawing on the widespread disapproval in
Central Asia of United States policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Leaflets
praise the jihads in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya, and HT feeds
on and also fuels growing anti-Americanism and anger at the violent
Uzbek regime.100
As proposition 3 argues, movements need more than ideas to suc-
ceed. They need carriers and a mechanism for spreading their ideas.
Most likely, HT's ideas were brought to Central Asia by missionaries
and benefactors of new mosques and Islamic schools that were rapidly
spreading across Central Asia in the early 1990s, before the new gov-
ernments began to control such private financing or contacts.101 The
literature has emphasized the global Islamist movement, but limited
internet access to and blocks on HT Web sites (especially in Uzbeki-
stan and Tajikistan) make HT's locally produced literature and networks
more important than its global network. There have been numerous re-
ports of the Tajik and Kyrgyz authorities finding underground printing
presses producing HT educational materials and thousands of leaflets.102
Carriers distribute this literature. In Central Asia HT has been able to
maintain a secretive organization through a cell-based structure that
relies on established, trust-based relationships.103 HT found local con-
verts who became davatchi (missionaries) and set out to recruit for the
movementfirst in the Ferghana Valley region and then throughout
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Eventually they moved into
southern Kazakhstan, spreading the message through traditional social
networks of kinship, gap (male discussion circles), village ties, and even
bazaar networks.104 Although HT has had greater success among ethnic
" Author interview, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, June 2005.
100
"Lying Is the Weapon of the Tyrant of Uzbekistan," HT leaflet, May 14, 2005.
101
Author interview with Omurzak Mamayusupov, head of State Committee on Religious Affairs,
Kyrgyzstan, August 2004.
102
For example, Daniel Kimmage, "Kyrgyz Police Stop Hizb ut-Tahrir Printing Press," RFE/RL,
8/2/2007.
103
Communications with local experts and journalists, Osh, Jalalabad, Tashkent, and Dushanbe,
2002-4.
104
ICG (fn.18), 20. HT members interviewed also responded that a personal connection or davatchx
had introduced them to HT.
84 WORLD POLITICS
Uzbeks in all three countries, it has not become associated with the
exclusivist identity of one region or clan. It has also penetrated more
inclusive networks not defined by identity groups, such as student and
professional networks in the capitals and other cities, including Tash-
kent, Andijan, and Kashkadarya in Uzbekistan; Jalalabad and Osh in
Kyrgyzstan; and Khodjent, Dushanbe, and Kulyab in Tajikistan.105 In
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where HT was initially less repressed, ma-
hallas in towns such as Kara-su and Isfara became open adherents or
sympathizers.106 Members imprisoned in Uzbekistan have developed
active prison networks for proselytizing among those abused by the
regime.107
HT'S ideology and efforts to adapt its ideas to the Central Asian con-
textespecially by focusing on Islam as the solution to injustice, cor-
ruption, and moral decline and by preaching nonviolence as the path to
a Central Asian (not Arab-centered) Islamic statehas resonated with
a large percentage of the population. Second, its strategic use of mostly
inclusive local networks has contributed to its relative social success in
a region where it barely had a foothold fifteen years ago. However, the
continued commitment to the "caliphate"one of the organization's
core ideashas also undercut its popularity among Central Asians,
who generally have little historical connection with the theocratic ca-
liphates of the Middle East. Central Asians are more likely to support
the less stringent ideas of "sharia," "Islamic state," or "Islamic democ-
racy."108 Further, HT'S overwhelming focus on Uzbekistan's regime has
to some extent limited its appeal to ethnic Uzbeks. HT has thus spread
less quickly among ethnic Kyrgyz or Tajik networks.109
VI. T H E ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN:

LESS SUCCESSFUL MOBILIZATION
The IRP shares similarities with HT7 even as there are also differences.
In the early 1990s the IRP enjoyed some limited mobilizational success,
but less than a decade later it appeared to have failed. It could no longer
105
Author interview with HT members, Jalalabad, August 2004; Naumkin (fn. 54), 147; Rashid
(fn. 49), 127-28.
106
Author interview with Alexander Rahmanov, Bureau on Human Rights and Law, Khujand,
January 2003. Conversations with Kyrgyz journalists, 2002-5.
107
ICG (fn. 18), 23; author interview with HT spokesman (fn. 48); author interview with Freedom
House representative, Tashkent, November 2004.
i8 While only 10.5 percent in Kyrgyzstan believe that "Muslims should live in a caliphate," 28.1
percent supported some form of "sharia" and 15.6 percent supported "Islamic democracy." Author,
Kyrgyzstan survey.
109
ICG (fn. 18), 18.
mobilize protests or turn out much electoral support. The rise and de-
cline of the IRP reflects the importance of achieving ideational fit and
making strategic use of inclusive local networks.
The IRP traces its roots to the Tajik republic's "parallel," or under-
ground, Islamic clergy in the 1970s. Said Abdullo Nuri, a young and
charismatic mullah active in the informal Islamic sector, emerged as a
prominent leader of the nascent Islamic organization in the 1980s. In
1989 Nuri took advantage of glasnost's openness and organized the
Tajik branch of the recently formed all-Union Islamic party. The IRP
advocated religious, cultural, and political reforms supporting Islam-
ic revival.110 By 1991 it had become a major player in the sovereignty
movement and the anticommunist opposition in Tajikistan. It claimed
twenty thousand members when it received legal registration in De-
cember 1991. m Its core was the densely populated Gharm and Karate-
gin Valley regionthe base of Nuri's regional and kinship network and
of Sufi brotherhoodsand "Gharmis" or "Karateginis" living in other
regions.112 In 1991 the official Islamic clergy threw its patronage net-
work behind the IRP. And from March to May 1992 the IRP succeeded
in mobilizing several thousand followers in sustained popular protests
against the communist regime of Rahmon Nabiyev.
In mid-1992 armed conflict erupted between government and op-
position militias. The IRP emerged as the leader of the newly formed
United Tajik Opposition (UTO)a loose coalition of opposition groups
advocating nationalism, democracy, and Islamism and fighting for a
share of political and economic power. With the victory of the (re-
named) communists, the UTO went into exile in Afghanistan. IRP lead-
ers were harbored and aided by the Afghani Islamists Rabbani and
Masoud, and Afghan mujahidin trained the IRP'S militia.113 Iran also
provided a safe haven for IRP leaders.
On June 27, 1997, Nuri led the UTO in signing a peace accord. It
agreed to renounce force, share power, and compete with the former
communists within a democratic system. The IRP received legal recog-
nition but subsequently lost significant support. A 1999 survey found
that only 6 percent of the populace trusted Nuri, and 0.6 percent trusted
110
Author interview with Seid Abdullo Nuri, chairman of the IRP, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, August
14,2002.
111
"Tajikistan Votes 2005," www.RFERL.org (accessed August 2006).
112
Saodat Olimova, "Political Islam and Conflict in Tajikistan," Central Asia and the Caucasus
(1999), 5, www.ca-c.org (accessed June 2002); Igor Rotar, "Under the Green Banner: Islamic Radicals
in Russia and the Former Soviet Union," Religion, State and Society 30, no. 2 (2002), 123; V. Bushkov
and D. Mikul'sky, Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v tadzhikistane [The History of the Civil War in Tajiki-
stan] (Moscow: AN, 1996), 110.
113
Naumkin (fa. 54), 224-25.
86 WORLD POLITICS
the deputy chairman, Himmatzoda, even though 27 percent supported

the inclusion of Muslim clerics in the government.114 Many still favored
a political role for Islam but no longer trusted the IRP. By 2004 it had
about three thousand members and some latent support.115 Party lead-
ers themselves acknowledge that they have far fewer members than in
the early 1990s, as former IRP members have left to join HT.116 Electoral
results reflect the decline. In the presidential election of 1999 the IRP
fielded the only opposition candidate but garnered only 2 percent of the
vote.117 In both the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections the IRP won
only two seats, a small number even given electoral irregularities. It did
not even compete in the 2006 presidential election.
What explains the IRP'S initial success but subsequent failure? In part,
political opportunity plays a role. As proposition 1 suggests, increased
political opportunity, in the context of the political and socioeconomic
uncertainty of the Soviet decline, created the ideational conditions that
made Islamism attractive. Yet when the party was legalized after the
peace accord, why did it not grow once again? One could argue that
its electoral failures have been caused by corruption, political pressure,
and lack of media freedom, but in 1990-92, government repression
had spurred support. Moreover, since the peace accord the IRP has en-
joyed comparatively better prospects because most opposition parties
were newer and less organized, and the OSCE reported improvements in
the conduct of the 2005-6 elections. Political opportunity alone does
not explain the IRPS trajectory. Others might attribute the IRP'S rise to
transnational support from Afghanistan and Iran. Its popularity surged
before these factors came into play, however, and declined while they
continued. Neither political opportunity/repression nor resources offer
a satisfactory explanation.
In line with proposition 2, ideational variables were critical factors
in the IRP'S rise and fall. In 1990 the IRP stood for moderate Islamist
ideas. Its statute set out several objectives: the spiritual revival of Tajik
citizens, economic and political sovereignty for Tajikistan, legal rights
that would support Islamic norms in the lives of the republic s Mus-
lims, the expansion of Islam through the mass media, and the inclusion
114
Olimova (fn. 15), 95-96. The national survey was carried out by Sharq center (N=1000).
115
Author interview with Vadim Nazarov, OSCE, Dushanbe, August 16, 2004. RFE'S Web site cites
the IRP claim of twenty thousand.
116
Author interviews with Muhiddin Kabiri, IRP deputy chairman, Dushanbe, March 2001 and
January 2003.
117
The OSCE deemed the election better butflawed.A fully free election may have resulted in more
votes for the IRP, but it would likely have been a small minority. A 1999 survey showed only 5 percent
support for the IRP; Olimova (fn. 110), 6.
of Muslims in the economic, political, and spiritual life of the repub-

lic.118 The IRP hoped to achieve these goals in the near term. Although
inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, Nuri and his IRP leadership had
adapted their agenda in the 1970s to reflect the "traditional Islam" of
the Tajik population, with its preference for a secular nation-state with
laws influenced by Islam.119 Nuri advocated a nationalist Islam, empha-
sizing the need for an independent Tajikistana goal that played well
with the Tajik population and the broader nationalist and democratic
opposition in 1989-91. 120 In 1990-91 they strongly disavowed violent
or radical versions of Islamism.121
In 1992, however, as part of the short-lived coalition, the Government
of National Reconciliation, some IRP leaders sought to remove the word
"secular" from Tajikistan's constitution.122 Then, when civil war erupted,
the IRP resorted to violence, a dramatic turn for the party. More radical
elements, influenced by the Deobandis in Afghanistan, assumed great-
er influence and called for an Islamic state, although without defining
what that meant in concrete terms.123 In this way the IRP used Islam to
justify its actions without having a core religious ideology.
However, as the war dragged on into 1996-97, Nuri became more
moderate. His new deputy chairman, Muhiddin Kabiria scholar
and IRP newcomeradvocated a liberal, nonviolent Islamism that was
compatible with democracy. Upon signing the peace accord, the IRP
agreed to become a democratic Islamic party, pursuing an Islamic state
in the long term. Since then the party's platform has moderated even
more; it is now limited to calling for "social justice," the "eventual" Is-
lamicization of society, and the ultimate creation of a state based on
Islamic norms.124 The IRP now sees itself as a religious party similar to
Christian democratic parties in Europe.125 Nuri and Kabiri explicitly
rejected an Iranian-style Islamic republic, Taliban-style sharia, and a
caliphate.126 According to Kabiri, the IRP'S chairman since Nuri's death
in 2006, the party has an "Islamic ideology" but recognizes that due to
pre-Soviet and Soviet traditions, "it is impossible to set up an Islamic
118
Naumkin(fn. 54), 209.
119
AkbarTurajonzoda, "Religion: The Pillar of Society," in Roald Sagdeevand Susan Eisenhower,
eds., Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change (Chevy Chase, Md.: CPSS Press, 1995), 269.
120
Barnett Rubin, "Radical Islam in Central Asia," ASIP, May 7, 2003, www.asiasource.org/asip/
rubinxfrn (accessed July 2007).
m
Naumkin(fn. 54), 215.
122
Olimova (fn. 110), 4.
123
Ibid., 7.
124
Author interview with Kabiri, 2003 (fn. 116); author interview with Seid Ibrahim Muham-
madnazar, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, August 2005.
U!
Author interview with Kabiri, 2003 (fn. 116); Khalid (fn. 54), 187.
126
Author interview with Kabiri, 2003 (fn. 116); author interview with Muhhamadzazar (fn. 124).
88 WORLD POLITICS
state or republic in Tajikistan in the foreseeable future.... Our ultimate

goal is to create a free, democratic, and secular state."127
Although now appealing to the West, the IRP'S ideational wavering
and inability to reconcile its message over time with its activists' views
and its target population has cost it dearly. On the one hand, its deci-
sion in 1992 to use violence to promote Islam was a radical break with
its initial platform and the nature ofTajik Islam in the twentieth centu-
ry. Many Tajiks blamed the IRP for the bloodshed that followedesti-
mated at fifty thousand to one hundred thousand deaths. On the other
hand, the IRP'S subsequent rejection of violence and its deal with the
government lost it support from its radical wing. Despite government
reneging on the accord, the IRP leadership refused to resume the war.
Hard-liners saw the peace deal as a sellout. Many abandoned the IRP
for the IMU. Others, disavowing violence but remaining committed to
an Islamic state, joined HT.128 "Moderates" also split among themselves,
with some advocating conservative social positions, such as legalized
polygamy.129 Himmatzoda called for an "Islamic state" that excluded
women from politics.130 Akbar Turajonzoda, head of the official Islamic
hierarchy, meanwhile, split with the IRP and joined the regime.131 In
short, since the early 1990s the IRP has offered no coherent ideological
program and identity to retain or mobilize activists.
Furthermore, the IRP'S platform puts it out of touch with the postwar
social base in Tajikistan. Its adherence to nationalist Islam and democ-
racy since 1997, for example, has not played well with a population now
disillusioned by Tajikistan's experience of independence and democracy.
Many Tajiks suffer severe familial and economic hardships from bor-
der restrictions and have come to sympathize with either pan-Islamic or
neo-Soviet ideas of reuniting the region. With democracy widely viewed
as ineffective, the democratic parties together gained even fewer votes
than the IRP in the past three elections.132 Nuri and Kabiri advocated
pro-American positions in the war on terror, even as the population has
become increasingly wary of U.S. involvement in the region.133 In sum,
127
"Party Leader Denies Aim to Create Islamic State in Tajikistan," Tojikiston, Dushanbe, BBC,
June 30, 2005.
128
Author interview with Kabiri, 2001 (fn. 116); author interview with Muhammednazar (fh.
124).
129
Author interview with Muhammednazar (fn. 124).
130
Olimova (fh. 110), 7.
131
Author interview with Kabiri, 2001 (fn. 116).
132
Unlike the IRP, the three secular democratic parties competing did not pass the 5 percent thresh-
old. Republic of Tajikistan Parliamentary Elections: Election Observation Mission Final Report (Warsaw:
OSCE/ODIHR, May 2005), 21.
133
Author interview with Nuri (fn. 110); author interview with Kabiri, 2003 (fn. 116).
r IDEAS, NETWORKS, ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS
the IRP'S wavering and poorly articulated ideology since the mid-1990s
89
has lost it the support of many activists and much of its social base.
As proposition 3 argues, networks played a role in limiting the IRP's
mobilizational power. Although it remains the only legal religious party
and has established organizational branches in each region of the coun-
try, it still lacks "carriers" with national legitimacy. In the 1980s and
early 1990s it based its organization on Nuri's personalistic identity
network; in Tajikistan's clan-oriented and regionally divided society,
the IRP quickly became associated with this exclusivist network that
like most narrow identity networkslacked national legitimacy.134 Its
temporary alliance with the official Islamic hierarchy during the war
had allowed it to mobilize more broadly. However, when they split after
the peace accord, the IRP lost its ability to utilize these broader network
ties. Although it had established regional offices, it still encountered
huge barriers in drawing support outside its home base.135 Unlike HT,
whose pan-Islamist ideology has cut across regional, clan, and ethnic
networks from the beginning of its activities in Central Asia, the IRP
lacks the legitimacy of broader, inclusive networks.
VII. ISLAMIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN: FAILED MOBILIZATION
The IPA also formed during the political uncertainty of the post-So-
viet transition, when a range of opposition movements developed in
Azerbaijan, although disillusionment with democracy and the state's
nationalist ideology has occurred somewhat more gradually there. Na-
tionalism in particular surged as a consequence of the conflict with Ar-
menia. Unlike the IRP and HT, the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA)
never developed a mass following. Taking advantage of Azerbaijan's
brief opening under the new Elchibey government, the IPA was given
legal registration by the Ministry of Justice in 1992. The IPA'S leader,
Hoji Alikram Aliyev, was self-educated in Islamic teachings but, like
Mullah Nuri, a charismatic personality.136 Most local experts agree that
the IPA was formed with financing and assistance from Iran, probably
as a means of increasing Iranian influence in Azerbaijan.137
In the early 1990s the IPA found limited support in the more pro-
Iranian and strongly Shia regions of Lenkoran and Nardaran. Today the
134
Interviw with Rajab Mirzo, journalist, Dushanbe, August 15,2002; Rotar (fn. 112).
135
Author interview with IRP activist, Soghd, Tajikistan, January 2003.
136
Bayram Balci, "Between Sunnism and Shiism: Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan," Central Asian
Survey 23 (June 2004), 208.
137
Svante Cornell, "The Politicization of Islam in Azerbaijan" (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2006), 60.
90 WORLD POLITICS
IPA claims ten thousand members,138 far fewer than in the early 1990s,
when leaders claimed fifty thousand members.139 Because the party was
banned in 1996, verifying membership is difficult. However, the IPA'S
own count is likely exaggerated to draw support. It has engaged in little
mobilizing activity since its inception. Experts estimate no more than a
handful of IPA activists.140 There are a number of reasons for this.
First, state repression has inhibited the IPA'S growth. The Azeri gov-
ernment stripped it of its registration on the grounds that it violated
the constitutional separation of religion and state. Several members
were arrested and imprisoned on charges of spying for Iran. Although
they were pardoned by President Aliev, the party never again received
legal registration. Nonetheless, repression of the IPA, unlike repression
of HT, has been limited to surveillance and a handful of arrests. In gen-
eral, the Azeri government has been more tolerant than the Uzbek or
Tajik regimes of both religious and secular opposition. There have also
been fewer arrests of IPA members than of other active Islamic groups,
such as the Juma mosque community or, more recently, the Abu Bakr
mosque community.141 Transnational ties and resources continue to play
a major role in keeping the IPA alive. Iran is believed to have assisted
in financing numerous IPA members as independent candidates in the
2005 parliamentary election, since the party remains banned; however,
none were elected.142 But unlike HT, which gained in popularity despite
repression, IPA membership plummeted after it was outlawed.
As proposition 2 anticipates, the IPA failed to adapt its ideas to the
Azeri context. In contrast to HT, which reached out to all Muslims, IPA
propounded an exclusivist Islamist ideology and identity, endorsing a
solely Shia Islam and Shia identity that de facto alienates much of the
population. Although over 60 percent of Azerbaijan's population is Shia
and a large number have ethnic ties with Iran, most only weakly iden-
tify with Shiism. In large part due to Soviet policies that deemphasized
the Shia-Sunni division in Azerbaijan, most people see themselves
simply as "Muslims."143 This author's survey found that when asked to
identify their religious affiliation, 82.7 percent of respondents identified
138
Jahan Aliyeva, "Religion Emerges as an Issue for Some Parliamentary Candidates in Azerbai-
jan," November 2,2005, www.eurasianet.org (accessed November 2005).
139
Arif Yunusov, Islam in Azerbaijan (Baku: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2004), 185; Raoul Mo-
tika, "Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan," Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 115 (JulySeptember
2001), 6.
140
Communications with journalists and U.S. embassy officials, Baku, June 2005, May 2007.
141
Author interviews with Rafiq Aliev, head of state committee on religious affairs, Baku, Azerbai-
jan, January 2005, and Robin Seaward, OSCE representative, Baku, January 2006.
142
Communication with member of Azeri human rights NGO, Baku, January 2006.
143
Balci (fn. 136), 214-15.
themselves as "Muslim," and 11.3 percent as "Shia Muslim."144 Focus

groups throughout Azerbaijan found very little Shia-Sunni tension, as
well as a resistance to reifying sectarian differences.
Second, the IPA advocates an Islamic state, based solely on Islamic
principles and law and not on secular law, it also praises the Iranian
model as a pure Islamic state.145 While in 2006, 10.3 percent of Azer-
baijanis favored adopting a sharia constitution146suggesting that the
idea of an Islamic state and sharia, in some undefined form, are in-
creasingly populara plurality (40.3 percent) of Azerbaijanis favored
secular democracy. Furthermore, the IPA'S endorsement of an Iranian-
style state is not popular. Only 4.3 percent agreed that the Iranian gov-
ernment was a good model for Azerbaijan.147 Far more (42.3 percent)
preferred the Turkish model.148
Moreover, the IPA has done little to advance a theological or politi-
cal ideology to justify an Islamic state. Indeed, after being banned in
1996, the IPA advocated cooperation with democratic opposition par-
ties, a position inconsistent with its program. Then it refused to join the
democratic opposition bloc in 2003 or 2005. In 2007 its leadership re-
fused cooperation with "pro-Western" parties.149 The IPA'S message was
also virulently anti-Western.150 This did not generally resonate with a
largely Western-oriented populace, especially before the Iraq war. Its
ideational message, never well developed, became muddled over time.
Third, the IPA'S promotion of pro-Iranian policies did not resonate
with the population, even with the Azeri Shia. Its stance instead alien-
ated most Azeris, since Iran's assistance to Armenia in the Nagorno-
Karabakh war is widely known. Although Azerbaijan's Shia popula-
tion welcomes Iranian financing of mosques, it remains suspicious of
Iran's politics. In a 2005 poll only 0.7 percent rated Iran's Ayatollah
Khameini as a respected leader.151 Further, anti-Semitism and anti-
Israeli politicsideas spearheaded by Iranbecame pillars of the IPA
platform,152 although they conflicted with a long-standing Azeri norm
of positive Muslim-Jewish relations and interconfessional peace.153 The
IPA has held several anti-Israeli protests; a July 2006 protest drew fewer
144
Author, Azerbaijan survey, 2006.
145
Author interview with group of IPA activists, Ganja, Azerbaijan, June 2005.
146
Ibid.
147
Ibid.
148
Ibid.
149
Trendaz, July 26, 2007, www.trendaz.com/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=9633548dang
=EN (accessed July 2007).
150
Author interview with IPA activists (fn. 145).
151
"Polls Show Azerbaijan as a Tolerant Country," Zerkalo, Baku, BBC, February 12, 2005,12.
ls2
Rotar(fn. 112), 119.
153
Communication with activist, human rights NGO, Baku, August 2005.
92 WORLD POLITICS
than eighty supporters.154 Unlike HT, and to a lesser extent the IRP, the;
IPA does not disseminate religious literature or invest in a religious-political
ideology. Nor does it address issues that matter to most people
whether justice, corruption, or police abuse.
Finally, as proposition 3 expects, the IPAlike the IRPfailed to
establish a broad network that could transcend its regional groupings
around the pro-Iranian strongholds of Lenkoran and Nardaran, where
some people openly hung portraits of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The IPA
opened affiliate branches in other areas of the country but met with
only limited success. It appears to have only a handful of followers in
Ganja, the second largest city in Azerbaijan.153 Despite propaganda and
financing for mosques in Khachmaz and other northern Sunni regions
of Azerbaijan, the IPA has made few inroads there.156
Contrasting the IPAS failure with the growth of other Islamic groups
in Azerbaijan demonstrates that Islamic ideas do have a potential social
base, despite state repression. The Juma Mosque community, for ex-
ample, although disavowing any political status or the "Islamist" label,
has staged rallies of several hundred to several thousand against corrupt
elections, government control of religion, and the Danish cartoons.
The Abu Bakr community, which likewise claims to be apolitical, at-
tracts between ten thousand and fifteen thousand members to prayers
each week, despite government surveillance and occasional arrests of its
members. Like the Juma Mosque, Abu Bakr preaches against parties
but criticizes the government for corruption and injustice and calls for
a return to a just Islamic society. Both demonstrate the potential mo-
bilizing power in Azerbaijan of Islamic ideas that are used to create an
identity and a message that resonate with the population.
VIII. ISLAMIST IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Islamist ideas, however powerful, are no guarantee of political change.
Islamist revolutionsand revolutions in generalare rare, and I do
not attempt to predict them here. I do argue that a regime's reaction
sets limits on the political potential of even the most successful Isla-
mist social movements. Ideas lead to political change when there is
a "match between idea and moment . . . because opportune political
154
"Azerbaijan Islamic Party Vows to Expand Anti-Israeli Demonstrations," www.rferl.org/
newsline/2006/08/070806.asp; and author communication with Nariman Qasimoglu, Islamic scholar
and vice-chairman for religious affairs, Popular Front, Baku, Azerbaijan, January 2006.
155
Author interview with Rovshan, activist in the religious organization, Ahli Beit, Ganja, August
2005; author interview with IPA activists (fn. 145).
156
Author interview with NGO member/human rights worker, Khachmaz, Azerbaijan, August 2005.
circumstances favor it."157 While difficult to predict, we should expect

such circumstances to be more likely in a democratic or even semiau-
thoritarian regime than in an authoritarian one. The very possibility
for open protest can allow opposition groups to "entrap" the regime;
Jason Lyall, for example, finds that the oppositional antiwar movement
in Russia, driven largely by ideas about human rights, caused a policy
change under Yeltsin.158 Or as the collective action literature teaches us,
mass open protest can lower the costs of protest, leading to escalating
participation.159 Prodemocracy organizations and protests can also trig-
ger international support that further pressures a regime to change.160
Yet much depends on the regime's reaction,161 and the latter depends
partly on the scope and nature of the opposition movement's ideas. A
secular authoritarian regime will likely perceive Islamism (of any variant)
as a revolutionary idea and react aggressively. When regimes use their
power to repress an Islamist movement and prevent open protest, they
drive it underground. The state still retains the power to keep even ide-
ationally appealing and well-networked Islamist organizations from re-
alizing their movement goals. Determined and skillful security agencies
can keep an authoritarian regime in power, however illegitimate and
unconsolidated it may be. They can suppress or resist open mobiliza-
tion of opposition forcesdemocratic, Islamist, or otherwise.162 Such
conditions inhibit these groups' potential for greater mobilization, by
increasing the risk or cost of activism, protest, and even membership.163
In such circumstances, a continued focus on ideology, symbolism, and
group identity may sustain underground activism, but it is unlikely to
bring about policy change.164
In fact, we find that although HT has successfully grown and sus-
tained a social base, the secular authoritarian states in Central Asia
have sharply curtailed its ability to achieve institutional change. Despite
their only modest success in destroying HT's ideas or eradicating its
networks, these states have been successful in arresting or intimidating
thousands of members and sympathizers, closing unofficial mosques,
and confiscating literature.165 Moreover, the governmentthrough
157
On ideas and the Civil Rights Act, see Robert Lieberman, "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Or-
der: Explaining Political Change," American Political Science Review 96, no. 4 (December 2002), 709.
158
Lyall (fn. 5), 382-88.
159
Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution
of 1989," World Politics 44 (October 1991).
160
Bunce and Wolchik (fn. 5), 14-15.
161
Ibid., 283-304.
ia
Tucker (fn. 5), 23.
163
Wiktorowicz (fn. 2); Wickham (fn. 2).
164
Lyall (fn. 5) refers to this as a problem of "organizational culture" (p. 382).
165
ICG (fn. 16).
94 WORLD POLITICS
state media and the use of the official Islamic hierarchyhas created
extensive counterpropaganda that labels HT as "Wahhabis" and "terror-
ists" and lumps it together with all other Islamist opposition groups,
such as the IMU and al-Qaeda, both terrorist organizations advocating
violence. Most ordinary Central Asians have too little information to
distinguish among the different Islamist groups, unless HT reaches them
through personal networking. Thus, the organization's ability to win mass
appeal and change political institutions will likely remain limited.
Furthermore, HT'S ideology of nonviolence and its strategy of under-
ground networking and conversion are unlikely to bring institutional
change or mass mobilization against an authoritarian regime willing to
use force. The IRP achieved its greatest institutional success, legalization
as a party, only after open protest and five years of civil war. And it did
so at the cost of losing its ideological coherence. And with that it lost
its social support.
Nevertheless, the cases here suggest the following hypothesis for
further exploration: repression will not likely eradicate Islamists' ideas
or eliminate their ideologically committed followers. Unlike those who
participate in the short-term collective action protests that often take
place in response to rigged elections, opposition organizations such as
Hizb ut-Tahrir, formed around religio-political ideas, have created an
identity and ideology for their members. They are unlikely simply to
dissipate. By contrast, those Islamist groups that do not develop a co-
herent sense of identity and ideology, such as the IPA, are more likely to
disintegrate under repression.
IX. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The majority of Central Asians and Azerbaijanis still disavow any form
of political Islam, as they seek only religious revival.166 Studying these
three cases is also a powerful reminder that not all Islamist movements
espouse violence. I do, however, highlight the somewhat surprising
and growing importance of some Islamist ideas in the FSU, a marked
change since 1991.
This article has contributed to the discussion of Islamism and its
relative success/failure in mobilization, by comparing Islamist groups
espousing different ideologies under similar political conditions. Draw-
ing on insights from social movement theory and ideational scholarship,
166
On societal views about religion and politics, see Kathleen Collins, "Islamic Revivalism and
Societal Views on Democracy and Political Islam in Central Asia" (Paper presented at the Association
for the Study of Nationalities Convention, New York, March 23-25,2006).
I have argued that domestic and transnational Islamists took advantage

of the widened political opportunity structure following the Soviet col-
lapse. Yet HT continued to grow even as political repression escalated,
whereas the IRP and IPA did not. Transnational ties and resources helped
establish these groups but were not sufficient to sustain them.
I argue instead that we need to look at the independent role of ide-
ational and network variables. In Central Asia, HT developed a compel-
ling opposition ideology and adapted its message to fit the local con-
text, without abandoning the core ideas of the transnational movement,
and it used inclusive local networks to recruit. The IRP initially set forth
a compelling ideational message but lost its coherence over time. The
IPA'S message barely resonated with the population at all. Neither the
IRP nor the IPA could overcome their association with particular, exclu-
sive identity networks. Finally, I argue that ideational and network fac-
tors may contribute to a movement's sustainability over time, but they
alone are not likely to bring success under an authoritarian regime with
the capacity and will to use force to preserve itself. The will of a secular
authoritarian regime appears to be particularly motivated against a re-
ligious opposition. This factor, together with the movement's inherent
internal limitations, makes it unlikely that an organization such as HT
will bring about change in political institutions in the short term. These
propositions should be tested in other cases.
This article also points to important questions for future research.
We need to better understand why some people are attracted to Islamist
ideas and others are not, whether and how Islamist movements can
bring political change under secular authoritarianism without either sac-
rificing their ideas or resorting to violence, and under what conditions
Islamist opposition movements under authoritarianism may or may
not eclipse democratic ones, especially in the wake of failed democratic
transitions across regions of the FSU and elsewhere.
APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY
In this article, which is part of a larger project, I use comparative histori-

cal analysis of three Islamist movements, informed by qualitative inter-
views, ethnographic data, and textual sources. Although inherently an
imperfect approach that does not readily lend itself to quantitative con-
clusions about individual motivations, this approach can generate richer
and more accurate knowledge about how these movements spread or
fail, what both activists and ordinary people think about Islamist groups,
and what (if anything) about their message or organization is attrac-
96 WORLD POLITICS
tive. Here, I incorporate research based on participant observation and

dozens of informal elite interviews I conducted in Uzbekistan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan between 2000 and 2007. Between
November 2004 and March 2006 my research assistants and I further
conducted semistructured in-depth interviews in selected regions of jj
each country (with official and unofficial Muslim clergy, societal elites,
party members, government officials, police, among others) in which these
movements operate (fifty in Uzbekistan, fifty in Kyrgyzstan, fifty in Tajiki-
stan, and forty in Azerbaijan). To better asses popular opinion about key is-
sues (for example, jihad, violence, corruption, moral decline) in the absence ;
of good-quality cross-national survey data, we conducted semistructured
focus-group discussions (FGDS) in selected regions of the four countries
(a total of fourteen in Kyrgyzstan, twenty-four in Uzbekistan, fourteen in
Tajikistan, and ten in Azerbaijan). Regions were selected to be representa-
tive of each country, although the qualitative information presented from
the FGDS should not be considered a statistically representative or random
sample. FGDs were organized by age and gender, and among blue-collar
workers and migrant laborers, small entrepreneurs, white-collar workers,
and students. Interviews and FGDs were two to three hours each; all ques-
tions were open-ended. To protect respondents, we did not ask whether
they were members or supporters of illegal Islamist movements. Al-
though good survey data would be an ideal way to assess why some in-
dividuals are attracted to various Islamist organizations and why others
are not, identifying the members of underground or illegal groups and
surveying them is virtually impossible in these regions. Ethical consid- 1
erations prevent asking sensitive questions in authoritarian states where 1
admitting affiliation with such a group puts one at serious personal risk. J
Moreover, respondents are likely either to lie or to claim lack of knowl- 1
edge if directly asked about their support or membership. I was, how- I
ever, able to assess popular opinion on religious-political issues more
generally by conducting my own national survey in Azerbaijan in spring
2006 (N=1200, a national, proportionate stratified probability sample, ex-
cluding the Nakhchievan and Nagorno-Karabakh regions, due to the on-
going conflict) and in Kyrgyzstan in summer 2006 (N=1100, a national,
proportionate stratified probability sample). Respondents were not asked
about membership or support for the IPA and HT but were asked to evalu-
ate key ideas associated with these organizations. Given the challenges
of doing highly sensitive research in authoritarian environments, this
multimethod strategy attempts to provide the best data possible while
also recognizing its inherent limitations.

Collins 2007

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Ideas, Networks, and Islamist Movements:

World Politics / Volume 60 / Issue 01 / October 2007, pp 64 - 96

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"1 Jl THAT explains the relative success or failure of Islamist groups

Within the growing literature on Islamism, area specialists and his-

Islamic Tajikistan Tajikistan, from 3,000 to 1. moderate then

Islamic Party of Azerbaijan Azerbaijan, several 1. low

suits the local social base. Third, in authoritarian contexts, especially

Section II discusses definitions, research design, and method. Sec-

II. DEFINITIONS AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Islamism is a modern political ideology that calls for Islam to be linked

Adopting a comparative case study approach covering the period

III. EXISTING APPROACHES AND ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

The varied literature on Islamism highlights multiple causal variables

historical grievances against the West: the Crusades, twentieth-century

The recent application of social movement theory (SMT)19 to Islamist

IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: IDEAS, FIT, AND NETWORKS

what differentiates more successful Islamist movements from those

As a political ideology or set of ideas, Islamism can appeal to an ardent

Some become activists or committed followers, while others support

about Islamism, like ideas about social democracy or liberalism, can

Movements need mechanisms and "carriers"40 of ideas who transmit

V. HIZB UT-TAHRIR: RELATIVELY SUCCESSFUL MOBILIZATION

Sheikh Taqiuddin An-Nabhani Filastiyni, a Palestinian, founded Hizb

sympathizers.52 In 2006 hundreds protested when a popular imam who

" Author interview with Sevara, HT member, Osh, October 2007.

the secular, Western ideologies of nationalism and democracy. Nation-

One young adherent declared, "There is no justice, not in Kyrgyzstan,

VI. T H E ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN:

the deputy chairman, Himmatzoda, even though 27 percent supported

of Muslims in the economic, political, and spiritual life of the repub-

state or republic in Tajikistan in the foreseeable future.... Our ultimate

VII. ISLAMIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN: FAILED MOBILIZATION

themselves as "Muslim," and 11.3 percent as "Shia Muslim."144 Focus

VIII. ISLAMIST IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

circumstances favor it."157 While difficult to predict, we should expect

IX. THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

I have argued that domestic and transnational Islamists took advantage

In this article, which is part of a larger project, I use comparative histori-

tive. Here, I incorporate research based on participant observation and

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