Mario Deoferio vs.

Intel Technology Philippines

G.R. No. 202996, June 18, 2014

FACTS:
Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. (Intel)employed Deoferio as a product
quality and reliability engineer. Intel assigned him to the United States as a
validation engineer for an agreed period of two years. On January 27, 2002,
Deoferio was repatriated to the Philippines after being confined at Providence
St. Vincent Medical Center for major depression with psychosis. Deoferio
underwent a series of medical and psychiatric treatment at Intels expense
after his confinement in the United States. In 2002, Dr. Elizabeth Rondain
diagnosed him to be suffering from mood disorder, major depression, and
auditory hallucination. He was also referred to Dr. Norieta Balderrama, Intels
forensic psychologist, and to a certain Dr. Cynthia Leynes who both
confirmed his mental condition. A consultant psychiatrist of the Philippine
General Hospital, concluded that Deoferio was suffering from schizophrenia.
After several consultations, Dr. Lee issued a psychiatric report dated January
17,2006 concluding and stating that Deoferios psychotic symptoms are not
curable within a period of six months and "will negatively affect his work and
social relation with his co-worker[s]." Deoferio was issued the by Intel
Technology a notice of termination
ISSUE:
Whether or not the termination of Deoferio be valid due to his mental
health.
HELD:
Yes. Intel had an authorized cause to dismiss Deoferio from
employment. Concomitant to the employers right to freely select and
engage an employee is the employers right to discharge the employee for
just and/or authorized causes. To validly effect terminations of employment,
the discharge must be for a valid cause in the manner required by law. The
purpose of these two-pronged qualifications is to protect the working class
from the employers arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of its right to
dismiss. Thus, in termination cases, the law places the burden of proof upon
the employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination was for a
lawful cause and in the manner required by law.
The present case involves termination due to disease an authorized
cause for dismissal under Article 284 of the Labor Code. As substantive
requirements, the Labor Code and its IRR33 require the presence of the
following elements:(1) An employer has been found to be suffering from any
disease.(2) His continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to
his health, as well as to the health of his co-employees.(3) A competent
public health authority certifies that the disease is of such nature or at such
a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with
proper medical treatment. With respect to the first and second elements, the
Court liberally construed the phrase "prejudicial to his health as well as to
the health of his co-employees" to mean "prejudicial to his health or to the
health of his co-employees."
In the current case, the court agreed with the CA that Dr. Lees
psychiatric report substantially proves that Deoferio was suffering from
schizophrenia, that his disease was not curable within a period of six months
even with proper medical treatment, and that his continued employment
would be prejudicial to his mental health. This conclusion is further
substantiated by the unusual and bizarre acts that Deoferio committed while
at Intels employment.

Tan vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 116807, April 14, 1997

FACT:
Antonio Ibutnandi was employed by Tan as his driver and Romeo
Garrido as his delivery helper. Garrido alleged his right hand was injured
while he was lifting heavy boxes of concrete nails in the store of petitioner.
As a consequence, he had to stop working. Despite his injury however Emma
Tan, General Manager and wife of petitioner, ordered him to continue lifting
the heavy boxes. When he refused because his injured finger made the task
extremely difficult and painful, besides being risky, Emma Tan promptly
called up her lawyer. Atty. Roberto B. Arca arrived and demonstrated how
Garrido could continue lifting the heavy boxes by using only his four (4) other
fingers. When Garrido persistently refused as he wanted to have his injured
finger treated first, Atty. Arca then and there served him with a letter 4
directing him to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him for failing to obey a valid order of his employer. Upon his return three (3)
working days later, after his finger was already treated, Emma Tan told him
to "go to hell." The remark notwithstanding, he loitered around the store
premises for the next four (4) days but was treated like a leper. He was
eventually dismissed for alleged abandonment of work. Antonio Ibutnandi, on
the other hand, was dismissed because he failed to present a medical
certificate from a government doctor certifying that he was already cured of
pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB), hence, already fit to work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal is valid.
HELD:
No. Garrido's absences which were at first due to his job-related injury
and, subsequently, the hostile treatment given him by petitioner's wife ever
since the labor standards complaint was filed could hardly amount to
abandonment of his work. It would be the height of injustice to allow an
employer to claim as a ground for abandonment a situation which he himself
had brought about. In the case of respondent Antonio Ibutnandi, it cannot be
denied that he became afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB) and that
under Art. 284 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of
his employee found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued
employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to
that of his co-employees. However, the fact that an employee is suffering
from such a disease does not ipso facto make him a sure candidate for
dismissal as what petitioner did with respondent Ibutnandi. Consistent with
the Labor Code policy of affording protection to labor and of liberal
construction of labor laws in favor of the working class, Sec. 8, Rule I, Book
VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides Where
the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is
prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-
employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is
a certification by a competent public authority that the disease is of such
nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6)
months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be
cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but
shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate the
employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his
normal health.
Clearly, it is only where there is a prior certification from a competent public
authority that the disease afflicting the employee sought to be dismissed is
of such nature or at such stage that it cannot be cured within six (6) months
even with proper medical treatment that the latter could be validly
terminated from his job. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that
such a certification was ever obtained by petitioner, much less that one was
issued by a competent public authority, before respondent Antonio Ibutnandi
was dismissed.
Sevillana vs. IT
G.R. No. 99047, April 16, 2001

FACT:
Sevillana was contracted to work as a driver by private respondent I.T.
(International) Corporation in Jeda. After sometime, Sevillana was repatriated
back. I.T. argued that the petitioner continuously worked with Samir for more
than one (1) year until his blood pressure was considered critical. Thus,
Samir was forced to closely monitor the health condition of the petitioner.
When petitioner's blood pressure did not stabilize and begun affecting his
work as driver due to frequent headaches and dizziness, I.T. alleged that
Samir decided to repatriate the petitioner to avoid further injury and
complication to his health. I.T. claimed that after the petitioner had received
all the benefits accorded to an employee consisting of full salaries and
separation pay, the petitioner refused to be repatriated and instead decided
to run away. Since then, the whereabouts of the petitioner were unknown
and I.T. only heard about the petitioner when the latter reported to their
office in the Philippines and later on filed the subject complaint before the
POEA Adjudication Office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Sevillana be valid.

HELD:
No. Time and again the court has ruled that where there is no showing
of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law
considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. The burden is on the
employer to prove that the termination of employment was for a valid and
legal cause. For an employee's dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must
be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process. A
review of the record shows that neither of the two (2) conditions precedent
were shown to have been complied with by the private respondents. All that
private respondent I.T. did was to rely on its claim that petitioner was
repatriated by its foreign principal, respondent Samir Maddah, due to
hypertension with nary an evidence to support it. In all termination cases,
strict compliance by the employer with the demands of both procedural and
substantive due process is a condition sine qua non for the same to be
declared valid. Under Section 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Labor Code, for a disease to be a valid ground for the
dismissal of the employee, the continued employment of such employee is
prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or the health of his co-
employees, there must be a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot
be cured within a period of six (6) months, even with proper medical
treatment.
The defense of complainant's medical problems (alleged hypertension of
complainant) interposed by respondents to justify the dismissal of the former
is totally bereft of merit. The said defense of respondents is not only
uncorroborated by documentary evidence but is also not a just or valid cause
for termination of one's employment. While an employer (respondents in this
case) may validly terminate the services of an employee who has been found
to be suffering from any disease, it is authorized only if his continued
employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to
the health of his co-employees (Art. 284, Labor Code). This is not present in
the instant case, for there is no finding from a medical practitioner certifying
that complainant is really hypertensive."

Del Monte Philippines vs. Austria-Martinez

G.R. No. 153477, March 6, 2007

FACT:
Lolita M. Velasco (respondent) started working with Del Monte
Philippines (petitioner). Her latest assignment was as Field Laborer.
Respondent was warned in writing due to her absences. The petitioner
terminated the services of respondent due to excessive absences without
permission. Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal
against petitioner asserting that her dismissal was illegal because she was
on the family way suffering from urinary tract infection, a pregnancy-borne,
at the time she committed the alleged absences. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Velasco is illegal.

HELD:
Yes. The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
NLRC and the CA that the respondent was able to subsequently justify her
absences in accordance with company rules and policy; that the respondent
was pregnant at the time she incurred the absences; that this fact of
pregnancy and its related illnesses had been duly proven through substantial
evidence; that the respondent attempted to file leaves of absence but the
petitioners supervisor refused to receive them; that she could not have filed
prior leaves due to her continuing condition; and that the petitioner, in the
last analysis, dismissed the respondent on account of her pregnancy, a
prohibited act.
The undeniable fact is that during her complained absences in 1994,
respondent was pregnant and suffered related illnesses. Again, it must be
stressed that respondents discharge by reason of absences caused by her
pregnancy is covered by the prohibition under the Labor Code. Since her last
string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently explained, the
petitioner had no legal basis in considering these absences together with her
prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect.
The Court is convinced that the petitioner terminated the services of
respondent on account of her pregnancy which justified her absences and,
thus, committed a prohibited act rendering the dismissal illegal.

A.M. Oreta and Co., Inc. vs. NLRC

G.R. NO. 74004, AUGUST 10, 1989

FACT:
Private respondent Grulla was engaged by Engineering Construction
and Industrial Development Company (ENDECO) through A.M. Oreta and Co.,
Inc., as a carpenter in its projects in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Grulla met an
accident which fractured his lumbar vertebra while working at the jobsite. He
was confined to the New Jeddah Clinic for twelve(12) days. Grulla was
discharged from the hospital and was told that he could resume his normal
duties after undergoing physical therapy for two weeks. On September 18,
1980, respondent Grulla reported back to his Project Manager and presented
to the latter a medical certificate declaring the former already fit for work.
Since then, he started working again until he received a notice of termination
of his employment. Grulla filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, recovery of
medical benefits, unpaid wages for the unexpired ten (10) months of his
contract and the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of medical expenses
against A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc., and Engineering Construction and
Industrial Development Co. (ENDECO) with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). The petitioner A.M. Oreta and Company,
Inc and ENDECO filed their answer and alleged that the contract of
employment entered into between petitioners and Grulla provides, as one of
the grounds for termination, violations of the rules and regulations
promulgated by the contractor; and that Grulla was dismissed because he
has not performed his duties satisfactorily within the probationary period of
three months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged unsatisfactory performance be a valid
ground for dismissal.
HELD:
No. The alleged ground of unsatisfactory performance relied upon by
petitioner for dismissing respondent Grulla is not one of the just causes for
dismissal provided in the Labor Code. Neither is it included among the
grounds for termination of employment under Article VII of the contract of
employment executed by petitioner company and respondent Grulla.
Moreover, petitioner has failed to show proof of the particular acts or
omissions constituting the unsatisfactory performance of Grulla of his duties,
which was allegedly due to his poor physical state after the accident.
Contrary to petitioner's claims, records show that the medical certificate
issued by the hospital where respondent Grulla was confined as a result of
the accident, clearly and positively stated that Grulla was already physically
fit for work after he was released from the hospital.

Baby Bus Inc. vs. The hon. minister of labor and Jacinto Mangalino
G.R. No. L-54223 February 26, 1988

FACT:
Jacinto Mangalino worked with Baby Bus Inc. as an over-all
inspector earning P8.00 a day. Sometime in April l975, Mangalino suffered a
stroke due to high blood pressure for which he was confined at the hospital.
Mangalino subsequently, suffered several strokes which rendered him unfit
to report for work in May 1975. He was not granted emergency allowances.
He filed a complaint with Regional Office No. IV, Department of labor for
illegal dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illness of Mangalino is a valid ground for
termination.
HELD:
Yes. Article 285 of the labor code provides that an employer may
terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering
from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees;
Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month
salary or to one half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, whichever
is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1)
whole year. The petitioner, in effect, concedes the merits of its first argument
by adopting Art. 285 in its second argument. The findings in the second
argument determine the answer to the first. In the second argument, the
petitioner recognizes that a disease may be a ground for termination;
however, it contends that petitioner failed to show that his illness falls within
the scope of the said provision. The contention is without merit. Respondent
Mangalino's continued employment was clearly prejudicial to his health.
On the contrary, the record eloquently shows that the continued
employment of private respondent would be prejudicial to his health,
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that private respondent, despite suffering
a stroke and being hospitalized sometime in April, 1975, still returned to
work after his hospitalization only to suffer another stroke in May, 1975.
Obviously, while private respondent's desire to earn a living as an employee
of petitioner was there, he cannot pursue the same without risk to his life.

Pedro Solis vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 116175 October 28, 1996

FACT:
Pedro Solis was employed as an underground miner by Philex. Due to
constant exposure to the elements in the mining area, Solis became ill and
was medically diagnosed to be afflicted with "Koch's infection, exudative
type, minimal (R)". The examining physicians 2 recommended that Solis be
assigned to surface work to facilitate his speedy recovery from the illness.
This recommendation, including the intercession of petitioner's union, that
Solis be reassigned temporarily to surface work, were not heeded by Philex.
The illness of Solis was aggravated. In his medical check-up at the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center, Solis was diagnosed to be suffering
from tuberculosis, bronchial asthma and athraglia and was declared "unfit to
continue working for underground mine". Solis was accordingly dismissed by
Philex from service. After his dismissal from service, Solis submitted himself
for medical examination in another hospital, the Baguio Filipino Chinese
Hospital, which issued a medical certificate declaring him physically fit.
Armed with this new medical certificate, he went back to Philex demanding
reinstatement, but to no avail. Solis sued Philex for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Solis is illegally dismissed due to his illness.

HELD:
Yes. The implementing rule states: Where the employee suffers from a
disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to
his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not
terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent
public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage
that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper
medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period,
the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to
take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former
position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. (Book VI,
Rule 1, Sec. 8 of the Implementing Rules)
The above rule states several requirements before the dismissal of an
employee due to disease will be considered valid. Two of which are: (a) the
employee is afflicted with a disease that cannot be cured within six (6)
months, and (b) a certification to that effect must be issued by a competent
public health authority.
It found nothing in the medical certificate issued by the Baguio General
Hospital which states that Solis' ailment cannot be cured within six months.
The statement that Solis was "unfit to work underground" does not mean
that his ailment cannot be cured within six months. In fact, a subsequent
medical examination from another hospital less than six months from the
first medical check-up showed that Solis was still physically fit. This negates
Philex's assertion that the dismissal is valid. In dismissal cases, the employer
has the burden of proving that the termination from service of an employee
is for a valid or authorized cause. Philex failed to discharged that burden in
the case at bench.

Cathay pacific airways, ltd vs. NLRC

G.R. Nos. 141702-03. August 2, 2001

FACT:
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY), is an international airline
company engaged in providing international flight services while Martha Z.
Singson was a cabin attendant of CATHAY. Singson was scheduled on a five
(5)-day flight to London but was unable to take the flights as she was feeling
fatigued and exhausted from her transfer to a new apartment with her
husband. She visited the company doctor, Dr. Emer Fahy, who examined and
diagnosed her to be suffering from a moderately severe asthma attack. She
was advised to take a Ventolin nebulizer and increase the medication she
was currently taking, an oral Prednisone (steroid). Dr Fahy thereafter
conveyed to Dr. John G. Fowler, Principal Medical Officer, her findings
regarding Singsons medical condition as a result of which she was evaluated
as unfit for flying due to her medical condition. Cabin Crew Manager
informed Singson that CATHAY had decided to retire her on medical grounds.
Singson filed a complaint of illegal dismissal against CATHAY.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Singson is illegally dismissed.

HELD:
Yes. CATHAY summarily dismissed Singson from the service based only
on the recommendation of its medical officers, in effect, failing to observe
the provision of the Labor Code which requires a certification by a competent
public health authority. Notably, the decision to dismiss Singson was reached
after a single examination only. CATHAYs medical officers recommended
Singsons dismissal even after having diagnosed her condition to have vastly
improved. It did not make even a token offer for Singson to take a leave of
absence as what it provided in its Contract of Service. CATHAY is presumed
to know the law and the stipulation in its Contract of Service with Singson.
Granting without admitting that indeed respondent was suffering from
asthma, this alone would not be valid ground for CATHAY to dismiss her
summarily. Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code requires a certification by a competent public health authority
that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured
within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment.
In the instant case, no certification by competent public health
authority was presented by CATHAY. It dismissed Singson based only on the
recommendation of its company doctors who concluded that she was
afflicted with asthma. It did not likewise show proof that Singsons asthma
could not be cured in six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. On
the contrary, when Singson returned to the company clinic on 3 September
1991 or five (5) days after her initial examination on 29 August 1991, Dr.
Fahy diagnosed her condition to have vastly improved.

Manly Express Inc. vs. Romualdo Payong Jr.

G.R. No. 167462

FACT:
 Hercules Balena and Romualdo Payong, Jr. were employed by Manly
Express, Inc. and/or Siy Eng T. Ching on different dates, as tour coordinator
(dispatcher) and welder, respectively. Romualdo Payong, Jr. was complaining
of eyesight problems. Brought to an eye specialist by Ching, he was
diagnosed to be suffering from eye cataract. Despite having the cataract
removed in January of 2000, he was disallowed to return to his work by
Ching. Much later, on August 1, 2000, he was given a letter of termination of
employment. Thus, a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims was
filed against Manly.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Payong due to disease is valid.

HELD:
No. The rule is explicit. For a dismissal on the ground of disease to be
considered valid, two requisites must concur: (a) the employee suffers from a
disease which cannot be cured within six months and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health
of his co-employees, and (b) a certification to that effect must be issued by a
competent public health authority.
In the present case, there was no proof that Payongs continued
employment was prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health and that of his
co-employees. No medical certificate by a competent public health authority
was submitted that Payong was suffering from a disease that cannot be
cured within a period of six months. In the absence of such certification,
Payongs dismissal must necessarily be declared illegal.
The burden of proving the validity of the dismissal rests on the
employer. As such, the employer must prove that the requisites for a valid
dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the
required certification by a competent public health authority, the Court has
ruled against the validity of the employees dismissal.

Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998
FACT:
Osdana, a Filipino citizen, was recruited by Triple Eight for employment
with the latters principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The employment contract (originally as food
server but later changed to waitress) was executed in the Philippines but
was to be performed in Riyadh. Once in Riyadh, however, Osdana was made
to perform strenuous tasks (washing dishes, janitorial work), which were not
included in her designation as a waitress. Because of the long hours and
strenuous nature of her work, she suffered from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, for
which she had to undergo surgery. But during her weeks of confinement at
the hospital for her recovery, she was not given any salary. And after she was
discharged from the hospital, GCC suddenly dismissed her from work,
allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not given any separation pay nor
was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not allowed to work.
Thus, upon her return to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Triple
Eight, praying for unpaid and underpaid salaries, among others.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Osdana was illegally dismissed

HELD:
Yes. Under Article 284 of the Labor Code and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, for disease to be a valid ground for
termination, the following requisites must be present:
1.The disease must be such that employees continued employment is
prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-
employees
2.There must be a certification by competent public authority that the
disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a
period of 6 months with proper medical treatment
In the first place, Osdanas continued employment despite her illness
was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as
that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical report issued after her second
operation stated that she had very good improvement of the symptoms.
Besides, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome is not a contagious disease.
On the medical certificate requirement, petitioner erroneously argues
that private respondent was employed in Saudi Arabia and not here in the
Philippines. Hence, there was a physical impossibility to secure from a
Philippine public health authority the alluded medical certificate that public
respondents illness will not be cured within a period of six months.
Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private respondent
states in the Comment. The rule simply prescribes a certification by a
competent public health authority and not a Philippine public health
authority.
 Vicente Sy, Trinidad Paulino, 6bs Trucking Corporation vs. CA
G.R. No. 142293, February 27, 2003

FACT:
Jaime Sahot started working as a truck helper for petitioners family-
owned trucking business named Vicente Sy Trucking. Sahot was already 59
years old. He had been incurring absences as he was suffering from various
ailments. Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which greatly
affected the performance of his task as a driver. Sahot had filed a week-long
leave. On May 27th, he was medically examined and treated for EOR,
presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy G, HPM, UTI, Osteoarthritis and heart
enlargement. On said grounds, Belen Paulino of the SBT Trucking Service
management told him to file a formal request for extension of his leave. At
the end of his week-long absence, Sahot applied for extension of his leave
for the whole month of June, 1994. It was at this time when petitioners
allegedly threatened to terminate his employment should he refuse to go
back to work. He was then later dismissed from work

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sahot was illegally dismissed from work.

HELD:
Yes. Under Art. 284. An employer may terminate the services of an
employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose
continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well
as the health of his co-employees. However, in order to validly terminate
employment on this ground, Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code requires:Sec. 8. Disease as a ground
for dismissal- Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health
of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment
unless there is a certification by competent public health authority that the
disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a
period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease
or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate
the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall
reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the
restoration of his normal health.
As the Court stated in Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC,31
the requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code
cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and
arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the
employees illness and thus defeat the public policy in the protection of labor.
In the case at bar, the employer clearly did not comply with the
medical certificate requirement before Sahots dismissal was effected. Since
the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on
the employer, the latter should likewise bear the burden of showing that the
requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In
the absence of the required certification by a competent public health
authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employees
dismissal. It is therefore incumbent upon the private respondents to prove by
the quantum of evidence required by law that petitioner was not dismissed,
or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal
would be unjustified. This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on
mere conjectures and suspicions, the evidence must be substantial and not
arbitrary and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to
warrant his separation from work.

Soriano vs. PNR

G.R. No. L-43224 August 23, 1978

FACT:
Soriano, after rendering eighteen years of service with the Manila
Railroad Company, now the Philippine National Railways, found himself
separated from the service by his employer on account of an alleged ailment
contracted during and in the course of his employment. Believing that his
services were terminated without just cause, Alfredo Soriano filed a
complaint against the Philippine National Railways for separation pay under
R.A. 1787.

ISSUE:
Whether Soriano was illegally dismissed.

HELD:
Yes. The Court stress that it is the employer's failure to give advance
notice of termination for the required period that renders him liable to grant
separation pay to the discharged employee. In the absence of such prior
notice the employee is entitled to compensation from the date of termination
of his employment in an amount equivalent to his salaries or wages
corresponding to the required period of notice.
Thus, inasmuch as Alfredo Soriano had served 18 years with the PNR
he was entitled to an advance notice of termination of his services by reason
of his ill health for at least nine months prior to the effective date of his
discharge. What happened here was that Alfredo Soriano was informed that
he had to leave the service because of his health only on March 10, 1966
and his discharge was made effective on April 1, 1966 or even less than a
month thereafter, notwithstanding the fact that according to the findings of
Dr. Julieta B. Francisco the employee Alfredo Soriano had an "episode of
cerebral thrombosis" since August 12, 1965. Clearly, the employer had more
than ample time to comply with the law and give proper notice to the
employee that he could no longer be retained in the service due to his poor
state of health. For having failed to give that notice, the employer must now
suffer the legal consequences provided for in the law.
 Duterte vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 160325, October 4, 2007

FACT:
Duterte was hired as truck/trailer driver by Kingswood Trading
Company, Inc. (KTC). petitioner had his first heart attack and was confined
for two weeks at the Philippine Heart Center (PHC). This was confirmed by
respondent KTC which admitted that petitioner was declared on sick leave
with corresponding notification. Petitioner returned to work armed with a
medical certificate signed by his attending physician at the PHC, attesting to
petitioners fitness to work. However, said certificate was not honored by the
respondents who refused to allow petitioner to work. Peitioner suffered a
second heart attack and was again confined at the PHC. Upon release, he
stayed home and spent time to recuperate. In June 1999, petitioner
attempted to report back to work but was told to look for another job
because he was unfit. Respondents refused to declare petitioner fit to work
unless physically examined by the company physician. Petitioner filed
against his employer a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Duterte was illegally dismissed.

HELD:
Yes. Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of
the Labor Code requires that Where the employee suffers from a disease and
his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or
to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his
employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot
be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical
treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the
employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to
take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former
position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.
In a very real sense, both the NLRC and the appellate court placed on
the petitioner the burden of establishing, by a certification of a competent
public authority, that his ailment is such that it cannot be cured within a
period of six months even with proper medical treatment. And pursuing their
logic, petitioner could not claim having been illegally dismissed due to
disease, failing, as he did, to present such certification.
To be sure, the NLRCs above posture is, to say the least, without basis
in law and jurisprudence. And when the CA affirmed the NLRC, the appellate
court in effect placed on the petitioner the onus of proving his entitlement to
separation pay and thereby validated herein respondents act of dismissing
him from employment even without proof of existence of a legal ground for
dismissal.
The law is unequivocal: the employer, before it can legally dismiss its
employee on the ground of disease, must adduce a certification from a
competent public authority that the disease of which its employee is
suffering is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a
period of six months even with proper treatment.
Here, the record does not contain the required certification. And when
the respondents asked the petitioner to look for another job because he was
unfit to work, such unilateral declaration, even if backed up by the findings of
its company doctors, did not meet the quantum requirement mandated by
the law, i.e., there must be a certification by a competent public authority.
Cebu royal plant (san miguel corporation), vs.
The honorable deputy minister of labor and ramon pilones
G.r. no. L-58639 august 12, 1987

FACT:
Ramon Pilones, private respondent, was employed on February 16,
1978 on a probationary period of employment for six (6) months with
petitioner CRP. After said period, he underwent medical examination for
qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering
from PTB minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his
employment by respondent since his illness was not curable within 6 months.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pilones was illegally terminated.

HELD:
No. The dismissal was not proper. The petitioner claims it could not
have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-ray examination
was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately
available. That excuse is untenable. Note that when the petitioner had all of
six months during which to conduct such examination, it chose to wait until
exactly the last day of the probation period.
The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is
Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code which states that the employer shall not terminate his
employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot
be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical
treatment. The record does not contain the certification required by the
above rule. Hence, dismissal was illegal.
It is also worth noting that the petitioners application for clearance to
terminate the employment of the private respondent was filed with the
Ministry of Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven days after his
dismissal. As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior clearance
rule (which was in force at that time) was not a trivial technicality. It
required not just the mere filing of a petition or the mere attempt to procure
a clearance but that the said clearance be obtained prior to the operative
act of termination.

Crayons Processing Inc. Vs. Felipe Pula

G.R. No. 167727, July 30, 2007

FACT:
Crayons Processing, Inc. (Crayons) employed Felipe Pula (Pula) as a
Preparation Machine Operator. Pula, suffered a heart attack and was rushed
to the hospital, where he was confined for around a week. Pulas wife duly
notified Crayons of her husbands medical condition. Upon his discharge from
the hospital, Pula was advised by his attending physician to take a leave of
absence from work and rest for three (3) months. Subsequently, on 25
February 2000, Pula underwent an Angiogram Test at the Philippine Heart
Center under the supervision of a Dr. Recto, who advised him to take a two-
week leave from work. Following the angiogram procedure, respondent was
certified as fit to work by Dr. Recto. On 11 April 2000, Pula returned to work,
but 13 days later, he was taken to the company clinic after complaining of
dizziness. Diagnosed as having suffered a relapse, he was advised by his
physician to take a leave of absence from work for one (1) month. Pula
reported back for work, armed with a certification from his physician that he
was fit to work. However, Pula claimed that he was not given any post or
assignment, but instead, he was asked to resign.

ISSUE:
Whether Pula was illegally dismissed.

HELD:
Yes. For a dismissal on the ground of disease to be considered valid,
two requisites must concur: (a) the employee must be suffering from a
disease which cannot be cured within six months and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health
of his co-employees; and (b) a certification to that effect must be issued by a
competent public health authority. The burden falls upon the employer to
establish these requisites, and in the absence of such certification, the
dismissal must necessarily be declared illegal.
Without the required certification, the characterization or even
diagnosis of the disease would primarily be shaped according to the interests
of the parties rather than the studied analysis of the appropriate medical
professionals. The requirement of a medical certificate under Article 284
cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and
arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the
employee's illness and thus defeat the public policy in the protection of labor.
The NLRCs conclusion that no such certification was required since Pula
had effectively been absented due to illness for more than six (6) months is
unsupported by jurisprudence and plainly contrary to the language of the
Implementing Rules. The indefensibility of such conclusion is further
heightened by the fact that Pula was able to obtain two different medical
certifications attesting to his fitness to resume work. Assuming that the
burden did fall on Pula to establish that he was fit to return to work, those
two medical certifications stand as incontestable in the absence of contrary
evidence of similar nature from Crayons. Then again, the burden lies solely
on Crayons to prove that Pula was unfit to return to work. Even absent the
certifications favorable to Pula, Crayons would still be unable to justify his
dismissal on the ground of ill health or disease, without the necessary
certificate from a competent public health authority.