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Collin Fleck
John Schaefer
11/18/15
Delta Air Lines Flight 1141, a Boing 727-232 was preparing for departure to
Salt Lake City International Airport. On board were 101 passengers, and a
crew of seven including flight attendants Dixie Dunn, 56; Rosilyn Marr, 43;
Mary ONeill, 57; Diana George, 40; Flight Engineer Steven Judd, 31; First
Officer Gary Kirkland, 37; and Captain Larry Davis, 48. With a total of 108
persons aboard, the nearly fully loaded aircraft received clearance to push
back from its gate at 8:30 AM local time. Ground control then instructed
Flight 1141 to taxi to runway 18L, one of Dallas Ft. Worths seven runways,
aircraft use to cross over a highway which runs through the airfield. During
the wait, one of the flight attendants on board entered the cockpit and began
a casual conversation with the pilots and flight engineer. After a fifteen to
twenty-minute wait, the aircraft was cleared to taxi the remainder of the way
American Airlines DC-10 was given clearance to take off from 18L. Flight
1141 was told to taxi into takeoff position behind the DC-10 and hold for one
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minute to allow time for the wake turbulence to dissipate. The crew then
made a request for a two-minute wait instead, which was granted by Air
Traffic Control.
During the wait for the wake turbulence to clear, the conversation
discussed the crash of Continental Airlines Flight 1713 which had taken place
the previous year in Denver. One of the causes of the accident was ruled by
takeoff. In the cockpit voice recordings of flight 1141, one of the pilots can be
heard explaining to the flight attendant that the crew of the Continental
Airlines flight were discussing the dating habits of one of their flight
attendants before they crashed. Another crew member on flight 1141 can
be heard making a joke that they should leave something for their wives
aircraft begins its takeoff roll down the runway. Up to this point, the takeoff
seemed routine. Call outs were made by one of the pilots that the engines
and airspeed looked good, but as the aircraft reached 80 knots and the
captain began to rotate, the crew realized something was wrong. What they
didnt realize was that their chat with the flight attendant during taxi and the
setting the slats and flaps to the correct configuration for takeoff.
As the main wheels left the ground, the plane reached critical angle of
attack without flaps and slats, and began to stall. The disrupted airflow over
the wings caused one or more of the engines to experience compressor stalls
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which deepened the severity of the situation. The lack of lift being produced
by the wings and the now insufficient thrust being produced by the engines
caused the aircraft to impact the ILS localizer antenna array, and then the
ground approximately 3200 feet from the end of the runway. The initial
impact and the subsequent fire resulted in a total of 14 deaths including two
Davis, First Officer Kirkland, and the remaining two flight attendants were
accident was the failure of the flight crew to extend the flaps and slats to
factor that may have lead to the failure of the crew to configure the aircraft
properly was improper checklist usage. The NTSB accident report states that
the first officer was recorded responding to the captains challenge of setting
the flaps, but that there is no way of knowing if he actually looked down to
confirm that this action had been performed. The report states that It is not
by rote with the normal response without actually observing the appropriate
indicator, light, or switch. The investigation also found that the aircrafts
takeoff configuration was inoperative. This may have been able to prevent
the accident, but it is no excuse for the flight crew to deviate from procedure
accident were the failure to comply with the Sterile Cockpit regulation, the
factors, I believe that the members of the crew in the cockpit during the
takeoff sequence missed the opportunity to realize the distractions that were
attendants was instated by the FAA in 1981, so it was nothing entirely new at
the time of the flight 1141 accident and should have been obeyed by the
entire crew. As time goes on, accidents such as this and the accident of
activities are prohibited during taxi, takeoff, landing, and non-cruise flight
below 10,000 feet. They should also remind crews of how important it is to
the flight.
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Works Cited
Kilroy, Chris. Axelsson, Per. Special Reports: Delta Air Lines Flight 1141.
Airdisaster.com, visited Nov. 18, 2015