The case of public violence is paramount to the effect that it provokes questions as to what

constitutes public violence or rather the behaviour that manifest public violence, so as to
cause harm to another persons property. The relevance of this case, however, is in
accordance to the case of S v Mie, of which one will make use of for the purpose of this case
note1. In addition, the case of public violence belongs to the area of Criminal Law under the
umbrella of the Law. In essence, the initial question in this case is when it can be said that a
protest action is violent for purposes of the crime of public violence. In so doing this case
note seeks to critically analyse the case of S v Mie 2. But for this to be of clarity one has to
firstly pick out the relevant facts of the case. Secondly, stipulate the rule of the Law set out in
the case and how the court reached that decision. Finally, analyse and discuss the legal
principles and findings of the court.

Facts

1. Appellant was charged with and found guilty of public violence in the Bloemfontein
Magistrates Court.
2. He was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment.
3. The charge arose from an incident in one of Bloemfontein's Black townships. On 25
May 1980 three Black members of the S.A. Police drove into the township with a
woman passenger whom they dropped off at her destination. On their way back along
the same road they found it obstructed by stones and a group of people present whose
number was variously estimated at between 15 and 30
4. Appellant was, according to the State case, part of this group and all three State
witnesses say that they saw him throwing a stone which struck and dented the vehicle
in which they were travelling. The vehicle was stopped, the witnesses gave chase and
apprehended appellant
5. Appellant, who was unrepresented at the trial, was the only witness for the defence.
He told the trial court that he had been walking along a street when he came upon a
group of people playing with a ball.
6. He kicked the ball, which struck a vehicle which had just arrived at the scene at a high
speed. The vehicle stopped, its occupants approached him and, without asking any
questions, began to assault him.

Rule of Law
1 1982 (1) SA 299 (O).

2 1982 (1) SA 299 (O).

The court in accordance to the case of S v Mie did in ones view follow some, if not, all
relevant information concerning the case surrounding public violence3. This is because when
one looks at the cases used by the court, they did take into consideration the case of Rv
Kashion4. In which the court stipulates that the crime of public violence, particularly when it
takes the form of stoning vehicles, is a very serious matter. In this crime the question of the
interests and the security of the public must out-weigh considerations purely personal to the
accused. Where a magistrate had convicted the accused, aged 20 years, of public violence
which consisted of stone throwing at vehicles B and had sentenced him to six months'
imprisonment, half of which was suspended for three years, the Appellate Division, in an
appeal by the Attorney-General leave having been granted, set the sentence aside and
imposed a sentence of two years and, as the accused had already served three months of this
sentence and had been released, it suspended on year and nine months of the sentence for
three years subject to certain conditions; otherwise it would have suspended one year.
Similarly, they also used the case of S v Mavundla much of the time where people confer
open savagery they will in the meantime submit different offenses, for example, ambush,
vindictive harm to property, pyro-crime, robbery and so on. The typical practice is to respect
all demonstrations of rebellion carried out amid the unsettling influence as constituent
components of the wrongdoing of open savagery and along these lines to charge open
brutality just, setting out each one of those constituent demonstrations in the arraignment5.

As a consequence the decision of the court was, therefore, as follows Notwithstanding, in the
present case, as guidance for the State brought up, while the charge sheet says that stones
were tossed at the vehicle of one of the police witnesses, there is no claim that that was
finished with the goal to harm it nor, in reality, that it was in actuality harmed. Likewise
litigant can't, on the charges surrounded, be discovered blameworthy of noxious damage to
property. In the conditions approbation for late recording of the notice of offer is conceded.
The interest itself succeeds and the conviction and sentence are put aside. I concur with the
judgment of my Colleague but to the degree to which it might be comprehended to take the
view that stoning a vehicle will essentially give the imperative "savagery" or that resting in a

3 1982 (1) SA 299 (O).

4 1963 (1) SA 723 (SR)

5 1980 (4) SA 187 (T)

road is never equipped for adding up to a risk of savagery (if a danger of viciousness can
lawfully be sufficient for the reasons of the wrongdoing).

Legal principles and findings

Judgment
Ratio decidendi is the legal principle upon which the decision in a specific case is founded.
The ratio decidendi is also known as the rationale for a decision. Appealing party was, as
indicated by the State case, some portion of this gathering and each of the three State
witnesses say that they saw him tossing a stone which struck and imprinted the vehicle in
which they were travelling6.

Obiter dicta remarks of a judge which are not necessary to reaching a decision, but are made
as comments, illustrations or thought this is seen when judge Flemming in his judgment I
agree with the judgment of my Colleague except to the extent to which it may be understood
to take the view that stoning a vehicle will necessarily provide the requisite "violence" or that
lying down in a street is never capable of amounting to a threat of violence (if a threat of
violence can legally be adequate for the purposes of the crime). As at present advised, I can
imagine circumstances wherein such generalizations would prove to be inaccurate. For the
purposes of this case it is not necessary to decide whether my prima facie is correct. I
accordingly refrain from deciding that question.

According to the case of S v Cele it was common cause that the events which took place after
the second arrival of Sergeant Vermaak when 18 persons were arrested (referred to, in
argument, as the third phase) did not constitute the crime of public violence. The magistrate,
apparently, was of the same opinion. The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants
may be summarized as follows:

(1)That the crime of public violence is not committed unless the acts complained of go
beyond mere threats into the realm of actual physical violence and that there was no such
physical violence in respect of the first phase, namely, when the accused were alleged to have
driven off the factory hands who were loading the lorry.

(2)That there was insufficient proof that the factory hands who were loading the vans had run
away as a result of being threatened with violence7.

6 1982 (1) SA 299 (O).

And due the above case one sees it relevant to quote Mr. Khumalo who says various famous
criminal law researchers concur that the wrongdoing of open brutality is just carried out when
there is viciousness or a risk of savagery; the insignificant utilization of drive is lacking. In
building up the importance of the ideas of compel, viciousness and dangers of brutality,
respect must be had to the statute of the wrongdoing of attack as it sets out obviously how
these ideas can be translated for motivations behind all violations of savagery, for example,
bury alia, theft and open savagery8.

On the whole, this case note or rather paper looked carefully at the case of s v mie. It also
made pointed out some facts surrounding the case, rule of law and the legal principle applied
in the case. Even so, one would like to openly express that the court was ultimately correct
with the verdict which it produced because all factors pointed to the exoneration of the
appellant. It is also ones view that the court should make clear sense between the distinction
between force violence and when does a commit a violence and that public violence cannot
be committed by merely being in the community of wrong doers.

7 1958 (1) SA 157 (N

8 Mr. khulekani khumalo