ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW | CALANTOC
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the
The Constitution provides that the President "shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices" and shall "exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law". Thus, in the exercise of his
executive power under the Constitution, the President may act through the heads
of the executive departments, the latter being his mere alter ego whose acts are
presumptively his acts as well. In accordance with this principle, the President may
order an investigation of the act or conduct of those subordinate to him to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed. (Planas v. Gil)
Under a system of government of delegated powers, under which delegation
legislative power vests in the Philippine Legislature and executive power vests in
the Governor-General, and under which delegation a general power of
appointment resides in the Governor-General and a specified power of
appointment resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or
indirectly perform functions of an executive nature through the designation of its
presiding officers as majority members of a body which has executive functions.
The Legislature may add to, but may not diminish, the power of appointment of the
Governor-General. (Government of the Philippines v. Springer)
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits
as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far
as a constitutional convention is concerned. (Occena v. COMELEC)
CREATION, REORGANIZATION AND ABOLITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
The elementary rule in administrative law and the law on public officers is that a
public office may be created through any of the following modes, to wit, either (1)
by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by
Congress), or (3) by authority of law. Verily, Congress can delegate the power to
create positions. This has been settled by decisions of the Court upholding the
validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President to create, abolish or
merge offices in the executive department. Thus, at various times, Congress has
vested power in the President to reorganize executive agencies and redistribute
functions, and particular transfers under such statutes have been held to be within
the authority of the President. (Secretary of DOTC v. Mabalot)
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this
1
legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient.
Necessarily, such offices created by the legislature is wholly within the power of
that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and
duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office. (Eugenio v. CSC)
Petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil
Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining
authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the
power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President
by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that
Memorandum Order No. 164, which created a committee to investigate the
administrative charge against petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power of
removal of the President. (Larin v. Executive Secretary)
POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only
if there exists a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules
so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must
involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the
details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as
to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the
doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power. (Republic v. Drugmakers
Laboratories)
The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of
procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the
effective and efficient implementation of its objectives ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an
election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication
of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need
of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And
the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its
command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. (Hayudini v.
COMELEC)
This Court recognizes that the CTAs findings can only be disturbed on appeal if
they are not supported by substantial evidence, or there is a showing of gross error
or abuse on the part of the Tax Court. In the absence of any clear and convincing
proof to the contrary, this Court must presume that the CTA rendered a decision
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW | CALANTOC
which is valid in every respect. It has been a long-standing policy and practice of
the Court to respect the conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies such as the CTA, a
highly specialized body specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax cases.
(CIR v. MERALCO)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies
is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by
the growing complexity of the modern society. More and more administrative
bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of societys ramified activities.
Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature
or the courts of justice. Furthermore, such administrative officers, like the Labor
Secretary, are given the power to restrict and regulate in accordance with the grant
of police power. (Philippine Associates of Service Exporters v. Torres)
Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving the illegal
dismissal of officers and employees of government-owned or controlled
corporations. Such cases must be brought before the Civil Service Commission
pursuant to the Civil Service Law, and final resolutions of the CSC are appealable
to the Court of Appeals. (Mateo v. CA)
As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty
but not a discretionary function. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and
specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On
the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise
of judgment. Since the authority to grant or deny a permit is a discretionary duty of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in accordance with the
IRR of BP 232, mandamus is not a proper remedy. (Cario v. Capulong)
The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency recognizes the establishment of a
single executive, an that all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Thus, and in short, the Presidents
power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who,
in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department. Such power includes the
power of to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
2
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
with that of the latter. (Carpio v. Executive Secretary)
The President can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify
any action, or decision, of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices under him. He can exercise this power motu proprio without need of any
appeal from any party. (Blaquera v. Alcala)
DELEGATION OF POWER
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing
he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice)
Although the power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for the LGUs
to whom the power must be delegated by Congress and must be exercised within
the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide. (City of Manila v. Colet)
Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may
be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered
by the legislature to the delegate. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)
The power of subordinate legislation is when the national legislature entrusts to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. With this power, administrative bodies may implement
the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details which the Congress
may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, which have the
force and effect of law. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the
only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests
are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW | CALANTOC
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative. (Tatad v. Secretary of the DOE)
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power
to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential that said law: (a) be complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fix a standardthe
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinableto which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. (Pelaez v. Auditor General)
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER OR RULE-MAKING POWER
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the
rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law.
The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for official action and
the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of this function.
On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, as
enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These requirements include prior
notice and hearing. On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within
the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain
powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior
notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not
required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be
established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct. (Abella, Jr. v. CSC)
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the
product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that
the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and not be in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order
for such rule or regulation to be valid. Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative
or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
3
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
(Smart v. NTC)
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. Action of an administrative
agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error
of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law. (Eastern Shipping Lines
v. CA)
An administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not so provided in the law
authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations. (Tayug Rural Bank v.
Central Bank of the Philippines)
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply
and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in
a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected it is elementary that
in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the
conduct of the proceedings. (Dole Philippines v. Esteva)
Cardinal primary requirements of procedural due process:
(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence
in support thereof;
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right,
it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW | CALANTOC
having something to support its decision;
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion
but the evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
(6) The court or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. x x x
(7) The court should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it. (Cuenca v. Atas)
Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in quasi-judicial proceedings;
only substantial compliance is required. (Scenarios v. Vinluan)
In quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules governing service of summons are
not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. Also, in labor
cases, punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the
interest of the working man; it should not defeat the complete and equitable
resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties. This Court is ever mindful of
the underlying spirit and intention of the Labor Code to ascertain the facts of each
case speedily and objectively without regard to technical rules of law and
procedure, all in the interest of due process. (Pison-Arceo Agricultural and
Development v. NLRC)
The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination extends to administrative
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect. The right against self-
incrimination extends not only to the right to refuse to answer questions put to the
accused while on the witness stand, but also to forego testimony, to remain silent
and refuse to take the witness stand when called as a witness by the prosecution.
(Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners)
The doctrine of res judicata applies to adversary administrative proceedings.
Specifically, to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers. (United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma)
The doctrine of res judicata is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the
same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such a trial
4
has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should
be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
(Delfin v. Inciong)
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW
The procedure for appeals to the Office of the President is governed by Section 1
of Administrative Order No. 18,14 Series of 1987 which provides that unless
otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall
be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the
decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from. Hence, it follows that a
decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the
Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different
mode of appeal. (Moran, Jr. v. Office of the President)
Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari lies to assail the Office of the Ombudsmans
decision when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr.)
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not to correct errors of
judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or
in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court or quasi-
judicial body in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings, and its conclusions of law. As long as the court acts
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion
will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal
or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. (Suyat, Jr. v. Torres)
Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal. Before seeking judicial redress, a party
must first exhaust the administrative remedies available. In this case, petitioner-
appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive
Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and
establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the
President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-
appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his
part to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Tan v. Director of Forestry)
In an administrative case, appeal to the President of the Philippines is the last step
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW | CALANTOC
that the aggrieved party should take. The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the
President is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal.
(Calo v. Fuertes)
DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
When the Office of the President issued the Order declaring the Decision of March
29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case,
more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President
has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary. the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the
case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already
become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. (Fortich v. Corona)
Factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials. Judicial
review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination. (SSSEA v.
Bathan-Velasco)
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-
equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same
time, allows it to cross the line of separation but only at a very limited and specific
point to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches
are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. (Imbiong
v. Ochoa)
It is well-settled that the Courts exercise of the power of judicial review requires
the concurrence of the following elements:
(1) There must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power;
(2) The person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity;
(4) The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
(Villafuerte, Jr. v. Robredo)
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Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review
or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various administrative
agencies. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary
remedies in the Rules of Court are still available, such as certiorari, prohibition
and/or mandamus. A review thereof cannot be done through an ordinary civil
action. (Macailing v. Andrada)
Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the
dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is
not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. We emphasize the well-
settled rule that a criminal case is different from an administrative case and each
must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case. In
administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence
and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Office of the Court Administrator v.
Lopez)
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
General Rule: The non-exhaustion of administrative remedies warrants the
dismissal of the petition.
Exceptions:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) where the application of the doctrines may cause great and irreparable
damage;
(h) where the controversial acts violate due process;
(i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot;
(j) where strong public interest is involved; and
(k) in quo warranto proceedings.
The rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the principle
that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the
matter again, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical
reasons for the rule. The administrative process is intended to provide less
expensive and speedier solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW | CALANTOC
a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative
appeal or reconsideration, therefore, the courts for reasons of law, comity and
convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
(Ejero v. Merto)
The general rule is that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law when filing a petition for mandamus. Moreover, the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that a party exhaust all
administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide
the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. (Buena
v. Benito)
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts
must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge
their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It
is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon
a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in
its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts
from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies.
Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of
action of the petitioner. (Gonzales v. CA)
The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative authorities to
determine, the Collector of Customs in the first instance and then the
Commissioner of Customs. This is a field where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A court
of first instance is thus devoid of competence to act on the matter. (Commissioner
of Customs v. Navarro)
As a rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an
administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after
exhausting all remedies provided. The rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions. (Bordallo v.
Professional Regulations Commission)
As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this
requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter,
unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency
ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then
to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could
be had immediately. (Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez)
6
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the
case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or
intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. CA)
Respondent DARs failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioners
landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over
petitioners application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-
agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving
applications for conversion is the DAR. (Roxas and Company v. CA)
When the issues presented do not require the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of respondent for their resolution, or when the issues are purely legal
questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not
an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve, then the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not apply. (Pimentel v. Senate)
Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Administrative Remedies
Failure to exhaust all administrative Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies warrants the dismissal of the remedies does not warrant the
case as the same is fatal to judicial dismissal of the case as the same can
review. be referred to administrative agencies.
Primary jurisdiction is vested with an The courts have jurisdiction over a
administrative agency. case, but merely refers the same to an
administrative agency.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is the proper mode of appeal. Rule 43
governs appeals to the CA from decisions or final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies. (Gupilan-Aguilar v. Office of the Ombudsman)
THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OFFICE
Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint,
there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW | CALANTOC

no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security

of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office. Furthermore, public office is
not property but a public trust or agency. While their right to due process may be
relied upon by public officials to protect their security of tenure which, in a limited
sense, is analogous to property, such fundamental right to security of tenure
cannot be invoked against a valid abolition of office effected by the legislature itself.
(CAAP-EU formerly ATEU v. CAAP)

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an

employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the
sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the
time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are
of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. (Laurel v. Desierto)

The power of control as the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former to that of the latter. The power of supervision,
on the other hand, means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. (Veterans Federation of the PH v. Reyes)

CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC OFFICE

Public office is a public trust. It is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee

thereto. In this sense, it is not property which passes to his heirs. None of the heirs
may replace him in that position, and they cannot substitute the deceased in
proceedings. In this case, however, since the court already acquired jurisdiction
even before the passing of the decedent, the Court shall allow the substitution.
(Santos v. Secretary of Labor)

Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to
his heirs, hence, the heirs in this case may no longer prosecute the deceased
protestees counter-claim for damages against the protestant for that was
extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy the contested office. This
is in accordance with the Latin expression actio personalis moritur cum persona
which means that the personal action dies with the person. (Abeja v. Taada)

There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an

absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary. (National LTD Registration Administration v. CSC)