FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4354. April 22, 2002]

LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO,

respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the
suspension from the practice of law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of six
(6) months, with a stern warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent allegedly represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.i
By way of a Motion for Reconsideration,ii respondent now comes before this Court to
challenge the basis of the IBPs resolution, and prays for its reversal.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the early morning of
December 24, 1992, Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H. Abellana
St., Mandaue City. At the time of the accident, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car owned by
a Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the name of his brother-in-
law, Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita
Artezuela.iii
The destruction of the complainants carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her
small business, resulting to her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and
due to financial constraints, stopped sending her two children to college.iv
Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia,
Villapez and one Bernardo Sia.v Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was assigned to
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An Amended Complaint was thereafter filed,
impleading Echavia, Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-defendant. vi For his
services, complainant paid the respondent the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10, 000.00) as
attorneys fees and Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as filing fee.vii However, the case was
dismissed on March 22, 1994, allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her husband.viii
Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil case for
damages against the respondent. It was docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2001.ix
On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for
disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a
lawyer and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when
Civil Case No. 13666 was scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, respondent
asked for its postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainants
persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He
withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainants consent.x
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests.
While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint.
The said document was even printed in respondents office. Complainant further averred that it
was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that
the dismissal was with her consent.xi
Respondent denied the complainants allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his
part as the complainants lawyer in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the
complainant was uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave several notices to
the complainant and made known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to withdraw as
counsel. Because of the severed relationship, the lower court, after holding a conference, decided
to grant respondents manifestation and advised the complainant to secure the services of a new
lawyer. Complainant, however, refused and instead, sought the dismissal of the case.xii
Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled
on August 20, 1993 so that he could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavias
Answer to the Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the
document and having acted as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested him to
prepare Echavias Answer but he declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office and asked
respondents secretary to print the document. Respondent intimated that the complainant and
Echavia have fabricated the accusations against him to compel him to pay the amount of
P500,000.00.xiii
This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP-
Visayas Regional Committee on Bar Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the
disbarment complaint.
On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding the respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. He
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year.xiv Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the other issues.
As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upheld the
findings of the Committee with modification only as to the penalty.
Seeking reconsideration of the IBPs resolution, respondent contends that the Investigating
Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was not able to confront and examine the witnesses
against him. He argues that the Investigating Committees finding that he represented Echavia is
contrary to court records and the complainants own testimony in CEB-18552. He also casts
doubt on the credibility of the Investigating Committee to render just and fair recommendations
considering that the Investigating Commissioner and the respondent are counsel-adversaries in
another case, Civil Case No. R-33277. Finally, he questions the imposition of a six-month
suspension, which he claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is his only source of
income.xv
After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence on
the matter, this Court is inclined to uphold the IBPs resolution.
In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full
adversarial proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give
vague testimonies.xvi Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.xvii
In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of the
hearings, prompting the Investigating Commissioner to receive complainants evidence ex parte
and to set the case for resolution after the parties have submitted their respective memorandum.
Hence:
The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by respondent namely
December 12, 1996 (sic), January 3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.
The Commission for the last time, will cancel todays hearing and can no longer tolerate
any further postponement. Notify respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22,
1996 at 2:00 P.M. Said hearing is intransferable in character.
In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her witness, Allan
Echavia, also affirmed the contents of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed the
same and understood the contents thereof.xviii
It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to
cross-examine the complainant and her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new
trial after he has squandered his opportunity to exercise his right.
Respondents contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was contrary to the
records and the complainants own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that Atty.
Aviola was Echavias counsel-of-record in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the certification
from the clerk of court,xix and as admitted by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz:
ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)
Q: Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case was the counsel of Allan Echavia as
early as August 20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time of this fact when you say he is
counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean he is the counsel of record of Allan Echavia in the Civil
Case before Judge Dacudao? Is that what you mean?
A: What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan Echavia in the case before Judge
Dacudao but I heard Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to admit that Atty. Maderazo is
appearing for me because he will be the one to coordinate with Allans case.
Q: So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel of record of Allan Echavia. It was
Atty. Alviola stated by you now?
A: Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavias counsel but it was Atty. Alviola who was the counsel of
record of Allan Echavia.xx
Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted as the counsel-
of-record of Echavia. Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the preparation of
Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not
also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the
counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse partys conflicting
interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of
the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the
pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original
client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the
most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the
circumstances of his relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with the
controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of the counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his duty to contend
for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. (emphasis supplied)
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of
the attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from
representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that
of his present or former client. Indeed, good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring
lawyer does not make this rule inoperative.xxi The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions
are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics. Thus:
The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste.
The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Ceasars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. xxii
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