EDCA Issue on Absence of Senate Concurrence Not a Political Question

(Saguisag vs Exec, 2016 Brion DISSENT)

Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Case Digest GR 212426 Jan 12 2016
Dissent Opinion by Justice Brion
Full Text
Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the
constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement
entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014.
Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH
territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use
the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the
Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities;
humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be
agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement
with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA
involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the country should
be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate
Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1: W/N the SC may exercise its power of judicial review over the case
(Please note this is a digest of Brions Dissent Opinion)
Yes. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting that a public
right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of discretion.
The court may exercise its power of judicial review over the act of the Executive
Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate concurrence not because
of the transcendental importance of the issue, but because the petitioners satisfy the
requirements in invoking the courts expanded jurisdiction.
Issue 2: W/N the issue on the invalidity of EDCA for lacking Senate concurrence falls
under the political question doctrine
(Please note this is a digest of Brions Dissent Opinion)
No. The constitutional status of the EDCA as an executive agreement in light of the
mandate of Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution is not a political question outside
the judiciarys competence and authority to resolve. This is because there is a standard
set by the Constitution in delineating when an international agreement should be a
treaty subject to Senate concurrence an issue which is within the Courts authority to
settle in their role as the guardians of the Constitution.
Issue 3: W/N the EDCA is a valid agreement entered into by the President
No. The EDCA, as a mere executive agreement entered by the President with the US, is
constitutionally deficient. The EDCA should be in the form of a treaty as it brings back to
the Philippines the modern equivalent of the foreign military bases whose term expired
in 1991 and which Art XVIII, Sec 25 of the Constitution directly addresses; foreign troops
under arrangements outside of the contemplation of the visiting forces that the 1998
VFA allows; and military facilities that, under modern military strategy, likewise can be
brought in only through a treaty. ##
Page 1 of 25
 Full Text
SC Decision: EDCA is Merely an Executive Agreement Not Needing Senate
Concurrence (Full Text) (Digest)

EDCA is Entirely a New Treaty Requiring Senate Concurrence (Saguisag vs

Executive Secretary, 2016 De Castro DISSENT)

Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

Case Digest GR 212426 Jan 12 2016
Dissent Opinion by Justice Leonardo De Castro
Full Text
Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the
constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement
entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014.
Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH
territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use
the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the
Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities;
humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be
agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement
with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA
involves foreign military bases, troops or facilities whose entry into the country should
be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate
Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1: W/N EDCA is a valid agreement entered into by the President
No. EDCA is not a valid executive agreement entered into by the President because it
falls under those treaties and international agreements which need the concurrence of
the Philippine Senate.
Article XVIII, Sec 25 of the 1987 Constitution is a special provision that prohibits the
entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. As an exception,
such would be allowed only if: first, the stay of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
is allowed by a treaty; second, such treaty is with the concurrence of the Senate, and
when Congress so requires, such treaty should be ratified by majority of the votes cast
by the Filipino people in a national referendum held for the purpose; and third, such
treaty is recognized as a treaty by the other contracting party.
Whether the stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is
immaterial because the Constitution does not distinguish. In the case of EDCA, it clearly
involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the
absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty.
Issue 2: W/N the EDCA is merely an implementation of the VFA and the MDT
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT.
First, while the VFA allows only the presence of US military troops, the EDCA on the
other hand contemplates the presence of not just the troops but also
military bases and facilities in the so-called Agreed Locations.

Page 2 of 25
Second, the MDT covers defensive measures to counter an armed attack against either
of the parties territories or armed forces but there is nothing in the MDT that specifically
authorizes the presence, whether temporary or permanent, of a partys bases, troops, or
facilities in the other partys territory even during peace time or in mere anticipation of
an armed attack. The presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities provided
under the EDCA cannot be traced to the MDT. Moreover, the general provisions of the
MDT cannot prevail over the categorical and specific provision of Section 25, Article XVIII
of the Constitution.
Hence, the EDCA as an agreement creating new rights and obligations must satisfy the
requirements under Sec 25, Art XIII of the Constitution.
Full Text
SC Decision: EDCA is Merely an Executive Agreement Not Needing Senate
Concurrence (Full Text) (Digest)

EDCA is In the Form of an Executive Agreement Not Needing Senate

Concurrence (Saguisag vs Exec Secretary, 2016)

Full Text
Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
Case Digest: GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016
Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the
constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement
entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014.
Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH
territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use
the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the
Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities;
humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be
agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement
with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA
involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the country should
be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate
Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing
in assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens
may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they
show that the act affects a public right. But here, aside from general statements that
the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights
as citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a
particular public right that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their
failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens
suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.

Page 3 of 25
Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax
measure, nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves
the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging
the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they must
establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers.
A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither an
appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional
prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured
party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is the
Senates constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the
petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental
importance which justify setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The
challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec
25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military
bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public
interest that the Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of
legal standing in asserting that a public right has been violated through the commission
of an act with grave abuse of discretion. The court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the act of the Executive Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement
for Senate concurrence not because of the transcendental importance of the issue, but
because the petitioners satisfy the requirements in invoking the courts expanded
jurisdiction. Read more
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate
violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the
form of a mere executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the
President is empowered to enter into executive agreements on foreign military bases,
troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of
such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves adjustments in
detail in the implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties
between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already been concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Art
XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be
transmitted to the Senate.
De Castro Dissent
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT.
Whether the stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is
immaterial because the Constitution does not distinguish. The EDCA clearly involves the
Page 4 of 25
 entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of
Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty. Read more
Full Text
De Castro Dissent: EDCA is Entirely a New Treaty Needing Senate
Concurrence Full Text l Digest
Brion Dissent: EDCA Issue on Absence of Senate Concurrence Not a Political
Question Full Text l Digest

Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens (Grace Poe vs Comelec,

2016 Carpio DISSENT)

Full Text
Grace Poe vs COMELEC (Summary)
Carpio Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016
Emotional pleas invoking the sad plight of foundlings conveniently forgets the express
language of the Constitution reserving those high positions, particularly the Presidency,
exclusively to natural-born Filipino citizens. Even naturalized Filipino citizens, whose
numbers are far more than foundlings, are not qualified to run for President. The
natural-born citizenship requirement under the Constitution to qualify as a candidate for
President must be complied with strictly. To rule otherwise amounts to a patent violation
of the Constitution.
A Mockery of National Election Process
There is no majority of the Supreme Court that holds Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino
citizen since 7 5 justices voted that Grace Poe is a natural-born, while the three
others withheld their opinion.
1. Allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be
potentially elected to the Office of the President, an office expressly reserved by the
Constitution exclusively for natural-born Filipino citizens, will lead to absurd results.
2. This ruling implies that the majority of this Court wants to resolve the citizenship
status of petitioner after the elections, and only if petitioner wins the elections, despite
petitioner having already presented before the COMELEC all the evidence she wanted to
present to prove her citizenship status.
3. If petitioner wins the elections but is later disqualified by this Court (acting as PET)
for not possessing a basic qualification for the Office of the President that of being a
natural-born Filipino citizen those who voted for petitioner would have utterly wasted
their votes.
On Comelecs All-Encompassing Jurisdiction
The initial determination of who are qualified to file COC with the Comelec clearly
falls within the all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
1. The Constitution also empower the Comelec to decide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting elections. The power to decide all questions
affecting elections necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate
possesses the qualifications required by law for election to public office. This broad
constitutional power and function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid
any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal remedy.
If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold
Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not powerless to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after the
elections before such candidate may be disqualified.
Page 5 of 25
2. In fact, the COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel COCs of nuisance
candidates.
It cannot be disputed that a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, who files a
certificate of candidacy for President puts the election process in mockery and is
therefore a nuisance candidate. Such persons certificate of candidacy can motu proprio
be cancelled by the COMELEC under Section 69 of the OEC, which empowers the
COMELEC to cancel motu proprio the COC if it has been filed to put the election process
in mockery. (Timbol vs Comelec, 2015)
Who are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens
The following are deemed natural-born Filipino citizens: (1) those whose fathers or
mothers are Filipino citizens, and (2) those whose mothers are Filipino citizens and
were born before 17 January 1973 and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
1. The 1987 constitutional provision treating as natural-born Filipino citizens those
born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers and alien fathers, and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, has a retroactive effect. (Co
vs HRET, 1991)
The Court declared that this constitutional provision was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under earlier
laws, if one so elected, he was not conferred the status of a natural-born.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are neither Filipino citizens are not natural-born
Filipino citizens. If they are not natural-born Filipino citizens, they can acquire Philippine
citizenship only under Article IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution which refers to
Filipino citizens who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Intent of the Framers of 1935 Constitution
There is no silence of the Constitution on foundlings because the majority of the
delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention expressly rejected the proposed
amendment of Delegate Rafols to classify children of unknown parentage as
Filipino citizens.
1. Three delegates voiced their objections to Rafolss amendment, namely Delegates
Buslon, Montinola, and Roxas. Delegate Teofilo Buslon suggested that the subject matter
be left in the hands of the legislature, which meant that Congress would decide whether
to categorize as Filipinos ( 1) natural or illegitimate children of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers who do not recognize them; and (2) children of unknown parentage / foundlings.
If that were the case, foundlings were not and could not validly be considered as
natural-born Filipino citizens as defined in the Constitution since Congress would then
provide the enabling law for them to be regarded as Filipino citizens.
Foundlings would be naturalized citizens since they acquire Filipino citizenship in
accordance with law under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 193 5
Constitution.
Significantly, petitioner and the Solicitor General, conveniently left out Delegate
Buslons opinion.
2. None of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term natural-born in
relation to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution, only those
whose fathers were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still required to elect
Philippine citizenship, preventing them from being natural-born Filipino citizens.

Page 6 of 25
 If the framers intended that foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino citizens,
this would have created an absurd situation where a child with unknown parentage
would be placed in a better position than a child whose mother is actually known to be a
Filipino citizen. The framers of the 1935 Constitution could not have intended to create
such an absurdity.
3. Delegate Rafolss amendment, when put to a vote, was clearly rejected by the
majority of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention.
The rejection of the Rafols amendment not only meant the non-inclusion in the text of
the Constitution of a provision that children with unknown parentage are Filipino
citizens, but also signified the rejection by the delegates of the idea or proposition that
foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth just like natural-born citizens. While the framers
discussed the matter of foundlings because of Delegate Rafolss amendment, they not
only rejected the Rafols proposal but also clearly manifested that foundlings could not
be citizens of the Philippines at birth like children of Filipino fathers.
4. Only the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws, which articulated the presumption on the place of birth of foundlings,
existed during the deliberations on the 1935 Constitution. The 1930 Hague Convention
does not guarantee a nationality to a foundling at birth. Therefore, there was no
prevailing customary international law at that time, as there is still none today,
conferring automatically a nationality to foundlings at birth.
International Laws Applicable to Foundlings
1. There is no conventional or customary international law automatically conferring
nationality to foundlings at birth
2. There are only two general principles of international law applicable to foundlings.
First is that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the foundling is
found. A foundling is merely considered to have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at
birth. Stated otherwise, a foundling receives at birth a domicile of origin which is the
country in which the foundling is found.
Second, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a foundling is deemed born in the
country where the foundling is found. These two general principles of international law
have nothing to do with conferment of nationality.
3. There is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus soli, and
citizenship at birth because of jus sanguinis. The former may be granted to foundlings
under Philippine statutory law pursuant to Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution but
the Philippine citizenship thus granted is not that of a natural-born citizen but that of
a naturalized citizen. Only those citizens at birth because of jus sanguinis, which
requires blood relation to a parent, are natural-born Filipino citizens under the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
4. Any treaty, customary international law, or generally accepted international law
principle has the status of municipal statutory law. As such, it must conform to our
Constitution in order to be valid in the Philippines.
Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens
If a childs parents are neither Filipino citizens, the only way that the child may be
considered a Filipino citizen is through the process of naturalization in accordance
with statutory law under Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 193 5 Constitution.
If a childs parents are unknown, as in the case of a foundling, there is no basis to
consider the child as a natural-born Filipino citizen since there is no proof that either the
childs father or mother is a Filipino citizen. Thus, the only way that a foundling can be
considered a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution, as well as under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions, is for the foundling to be naturalized in accordance with law.
Page 7 of 25
 On the Ruling that Grace Poe Might be a Filipino Citizen
There is no law or jurisprudence which supports the contention that natural-born
citizenship can be conferred on a foundling based alone on statistical probability.
On Adoption Laws
Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption is simply not determinative of natural-
born citizenship.
On Burden of Proof
Since the Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines shall be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, it is imperative that petitioner prove that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen, despite the fact that she is a foundling. The burden of evidence
shifted to her when she admitted her status as a foundling with no known biological
parents. At that moment, it became her duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
Grace Poe is NOT a Natural-born Filipino Citizen
1. There is no Philippine law automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a
foundling at birth. Even if there were, such a law would only result in the foundling being
a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
2. Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether
natural-born or naturalized. Citizenship must be established as a matter of fact and any
doubt is resolved against the person claiming Philippine citizenship.
3. Third, the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded foundlings from
being considered natural-born Filipino citizens. The Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis
principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or
mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed to prove that either her father or mother is
a Filipino citizen.
4. Fourth, there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of
international law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth.
Petitioner failed to prove that there is such a customary international law. At best, there
exists a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in the country where the
foundling is found.
5. Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary international law presuming that a
foundling is a citizen of the country where the foundling is found, or is born to parents
possessing the nationality of that country, such presumption cannot prevail over our
Constitution since customary international law has the status merely of municipal
statutory law. This means that customary international law is inferior to the Constitution,
and must yield to the Constitution in case of conflict. Since the Constitution adopts the
jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose
fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, then petitioner must prove that either her father
or mother is a Filipino citizen for her to be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Any
international law which contravenes the jus sanguinis principle in the Constitution must
of course be rejected.
6. Sixth, petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Being a foundling, she admitted that she does not know her biological
parents, and therefore she cannot trace blood relation to a Filipino father or mother.
Without credible and convincing evidence that petitioners biological father or mother is
a Filipino citizen, petitioner cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen.
7. Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his or her status as a
foundling, to acquire Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be
deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because the foundling has to perform an act to
acquire Philippine citizenship. Since there is no Philippine law specifically governing the
Page 8 of 25
citizenship of foundlings, their citizenship is addressed by customary international law,
namely: the right of every human being to a nationality, and the States obligations to
avoid statelessness and to facilitate the naturalization of foundlings.
##
Full Text

COMELECs Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the Determination of a

Candidates Eligibility (Grace Poe vs COMELEC, 2016 Brion DISSENT)

Full Text
Grace Poe vs COMELEC
Brion Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016
Summary
On COMELECs Jurisdiction
COMELECs quasi-judicial power in resolving a Section 78 proceeding includes the
determination of whether a candidate has made a false material representation in
his CoC, and the determination of whether the eligibility he represented in his CoC
is true.
1. In Tecson v. COMELEC, the Court has recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction in a
Section 78 proceeding over a presidential candidate.
2. The Courts conclusion in this case would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence
recognizing the COMELECs jurisdiction to determine a candidates eligibility in the
course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it. The ponencia disregarded the
cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (when 2012 COMELEC Rules was
published) where it recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction to determine eligibility as
part of determining false material representation in a candidates CoC.
In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the Court affirmed the COMELECs cancellation of
Ongsiako-Reyes CoC and affirmed its determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is neither a
Philippine citizen nor a resident of Marinduque.
The Court even affirmed the COMELECs capability to liberally construe its own rules of
procedure in response to Ongsiako-Reyes allegation that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in admitting newly-discovered evidence that had not been testified on,
offered and admitted in evidence.
In Cerafica, the Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding
that Kimberly Cerafica (a candidate for councilor) did not file a valid CoC and
subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia Cerafica. Kimberlys CoC is considered
valid unless the contents therein (including her eligibility) is impugned through a Section
78 proceeding.
2. The ponencias reliance on Fermins is out of context.
Fermin clarified that Section 78 of the OEC is to be read in relation to the constitutional
and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC,
following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
A proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto proceeding under Section
253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate,
with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed before
Page 9 of 25
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate.
3. Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not limit the COMELECs
jurisdiction in determining the eligibility of a candidate in the course of ruling on a
Section 78 proceeding.
The second paragraph in Rule 23 delineates the distinction between a Section
78 cancellation proceeding and a Section 68 disqualification proceeding; to avoid the
muddling or mixing of the grounds for each remedy, the COMELEC opted to provide that
petitions that combine or substitute one remedy for the other shall be dismissed
summarily. Naturally, the text of this second paragraph also appears in Rule 25, which
provides for the grounds for a petition for disqualification.
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the
qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and
the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo
warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds (1)
ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated
within 10 days after the proclamation of the election results.
Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office,
and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.
4. If we were to follow the ponencias limitation on the COMELECs function to
determine Poes eligibility to become President in a Section 78 proceeding, the logical
result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule on Poes citizenship and residence
eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC ruling; any declaration
regarding these issues would be obiter dictum.
The effect would be that any pronouncements outside the COMELECs limited
jurisdiction in Section 78 would only be expressions of the COMELECs opinion and would
have no effect in the determination of the merits of the Section 78 case before it.
Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be resolved or even be
touched by this Court. Thus, in the present case, Poe can simply be a candidate for the
presidency, with her eligibilities open to post-election questions, if still necessary at that
point.
On the Citizenship of Foundlings
It was never the intent of the framers of 1935 Constitution to presume that foundlings
are natural born citizens.
1. Ironically, the ponencia s citation of Jose M. Aruegos recounting of the deliberations
even reinforces the position that the framers never intended to include foundlings within
the terms of the 1935 Constitutions parentage provisions.
Aruego said that the Rafols amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision
in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation.
2. The ponencias ruling thus does not only disregard the distinction of citizenship
based on the father or the mother under the 1935 Constitution; it also misreads what
the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the children of Filipino mothers under the
1935 Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage, must yield to the
higher categorization accorded to foundlings who .do not enjoy similar roots.
On Burden of Proof

Page 10 of 25
Procedural Aspect of the Burden of Proof
1. The original petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present
petitions) from the perspective of procedure carried the burden under its Section 78
cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that Poe made false material representations.
2. Since Poe could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine citizen,
the COMELEC concluded that the original petitioners are correct in their position that
they have discharged their original burden to prove that Poe is not a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC considered and relied on the
terms of the 1935 Constitution.
3. With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe to
prove that despite her admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a natural-born
Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA in character) and by legal
arguments supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is a natural-born
citizen.
Substantive Aspect: Citizenship Cannot be Presumed
4. From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to determine
who its citizens are.
5. The list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusive and
exhaustive.
In Paa v. Chan, this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the person who
claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a
Filipino. This should be true particularly after proof that the claimant has not proven
(and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage.
6. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and
any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
7. The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to Philippine
citizens is not conclusive proof that he or she is a Philippine citizen.
8. Based on these considerations, the Court majoritys ruling on burden of proof at the
COMELEC level appears to be misplaced. On both counts, procedural and substantive
(based on settled jurisprudence), the COMELEC closely hewed to the legal requirements.
Thus, the Court majoritys positions on where and how the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion are truly puzzling. With no grave abuse at the COMELEC level, the
present petitioners own burden of proof in the present certiorari proceedings before this
Court must necessarily fail. ##

HRETs Jurisdiction is Limited Only to Election Protests and Quo Warranto

Cases (Wigberto Tanada vs HRET, 2016 Perez CONCURRING)

Wigberto Tanada vs HRET

Perez Concurring: GR 217012 March 1, 2016
Full Text
Summary of Justice Perez Concurring Opinion
1. HRET lacks the authority to rule whether a candidate is indeed a nuisance candidate.

Page 11 of 25
2. Under the HRET Rules, the electoral tribunal only has jurisdiction over two types of
election contests: election protests and quo warranto cases.
3. An election protest is the proper remedy against acts or omissions constituting
electoral frauds or anomalies in contested polling precincts, and for the revision of
ballots.
4. On the other hand, the eligibility of a member representative is impugned in a quo
warranto case. But the HRET Rules do not prescribe procedural guidelines on how the
COC of a political aspirant can be cancelled on the ground that he or she is a nuisance
candidate. Rather, this remedial vehicle is instituted in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
particularly Rule 245 thereof, by virtue of Sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
5. HRET is not vested with appellate jurisdiction over rulings on cancellation cases
promulgated by the COMELEC en banc. It is the SC which has jurisdiction and the power
to review such rulings from the Commission.
6. The the jurisdiction of the HRET, as circumscribed under Article VI, Section 1 7 of the
Constitution, is limited to the election, returns, and qualification of the members of the
House of Representatives. Thus, it cannot rule over an election protest involving a non-
member.
7. To be considered a member of the Lower House, there must be a concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office. ##
HRET has No Jurisdiction over Disqualification Issues Involving a Non-Member
Candidate (Wigberto Tanada vs HRET, 2016)

Full Text
Wigberto Tanada vs HRET
Case Digest: GR 217012 March 1, 2016
Facts:
Wigberto Tanada filed twin petitions before the COMELEC to cancel the COC of Alvin John
Tanada for false representations and to declare him as a nuisance candidate. They were
both candidates for the position of Congress Representative. A COMELEC division
denied both his petitions, but on reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc on April 13,
2013 granted to cancel the COC of Alvin John for false representations. The petition to
declare him as nuisance candidate however was denied. Wigberto again
sought reconsideration of the denial of his petition on the basis of a newly discovered
evidence. Comes election day and the name of Alvin John remained in the ballots,
whichafter Angelica Tan was the winning candidate, and Wigberto only second.
Wigberto filed before the PBOC a petition to correct manifest mistakes concerning the
cancelled candidacy of Alvin John and a motion to consolidate Alvin Johns votes with the
votes he garnered. The PBOC denied the motion to consolidate the votes because Alvin
John was not a nuisance candidate. PBOC then proclaimed Angelica as the winner.
On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a supplemental petition before the COMELEC to annul
the proclamation of Tan, which was granted and affirmed by the COMELEC en banc.
However, Angelica had by then taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of
June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation moot.
On May 27, 2013, before the SC, Wigberto filed a certiorari assailing the April 25, 2013
COMELEC en bancs ruling declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate and an election
protest claiming that fraud has been perpetrated. The SC, noting that the proclaimed
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candidate has already assumed office, dismissed the election protest and directed
Wigberto to file the protest before the proper tribunal which is the HRET. The certiorari
was also dismissed for being filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period.
Before the HRET, the election protest was dismissed for being insufficient in form and
substance and for lack of jurisdiction over John Alvin who was not a member of the
House of Representatives.
Issue 1: W/N the votes for Alvin John should be credited in favor of Wigberto as a result
of the cancellation of Alvin Johns candidacy
Held:
No, the votes cast for Alvin John whose COC was cancelled are stray votes only. A COC
cancelled on ground of false representations under Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, unlike in being a nuisance candidate in Sec 69, does not have the effect of
crediting the votes in favor of another candidate.
Issue 2: W/N the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC en bancs ruling
is proper
Held:
No, the motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Rule 13 Sec 1(d) of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically prohibits the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election
offense cases. Consequently, when a COMELEC en banc ruling become final and
executory, it precludes a party from raising again in any other forum the nuisance
candidacy as an issue.
Issue 3: W/N Wigbertos petition for certiorari of the COMELEC en bancs ruling was
timely
Held:
No, the petition assailing the COMELECs en banc ruling was filed beyond the 5-day
period provided by COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Rule 37, Sec 3 thereof provides that
decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel COC,
to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to
postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of 5
days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the SC.
The COMELEC en banc promulgated its resolution on Alvin Johns alleged nuisance
candidacy on April 25 2013. When Wigberto filed his petition for certiorari before the SC
on May 27,2013, the COMELEC en bancs resolution was already final and executory.
Issue 4: W/N the SC has jurisdiction to resolve issues on the conduct of canvassing after
the proclamation of a winning candidate
Held:
No. The SC no longer has jurisdiction over questions involving the elections, returns and
qualifications of candidates who have already assumed their office as members of
House of Representatives. Issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the
resulting proclamation of candidates are matters which fall under the scope of the terms
election and returns and hence, properly fall under the HRETs sole jurisdiction.
Issue 5: W/N the HRET has jurisdiction over the election protest filed by Wigberto
regarding the cancelled candidacy of John Alvin
Held:
No. Article VI, Sec 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 15 of the 2011 HRET Rules
declare that HRETs power to judge election contests is limited to Members of the House
of Representatives. Alvin John is not a Member of the House of Representatives. ##

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Implementation of the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) or Issuance of
Vote Receipts is Mandatory (Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC, 2016)

Full Text
Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC
GR 222731, March 8 2016
Facts:
Bagumbayan-VNP and former Senator Gordon filed before the SC a petition for
mandamus to compel COMELEC to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT) which is a security feature provided under RA 8346, as amended by RA 9369, to
ensure the sanctity of the ballot. The VVPAT functionality is in the form of a printed
receipt and a touch screen reflecting the votes in the vote-counting machine. For the
2016 elections, the COMELEC opted to use vote-counting machines instead of PCOS.
The vote-counting machines are capable of providing the VVPAT functionality, and for
that the COMELEC is now being petitioned to have the vote-counting machines issue
receipts once the person has voted. The COMELEC, however, refused to enable this
feature for reasons that the receipts might be used by candidates in vote-buying and
that it might increase the voting time in election precincts.
Issue: W/N the COMELEC must activate the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting
machines
Held:
Yes. The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act
8436, as amended, are mandatory.
The law is clear that a voter verified paper audit trail requires the following: (a)
individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to count their votes;
and (b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based. Under the Constitution,
the COMELEC is empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of election, and one of the laws that it must implement is RA 8346 which
requires the automated election system to have the capability of providing a VVPAT. The
COMELECs act of not enabling this feature runs contrary to why the law requires this
feature in the first place. ##

Foundlings are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens (Grace Poe vs COMELEC, 2016)

Full Text
Grace Poe vs COMELEC
(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May
2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH
for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro
between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo,

Page 14 of 25
and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as
American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that
she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and
obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed
chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA
9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen
since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The
COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of
citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a
candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-
born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the
COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one
among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole
jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole
jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is
silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of
candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule,
and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of
the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the
qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she
satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run
for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical
features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a
municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such
that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a
Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That probability and
the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of
the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions

Page 15 of 25
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity
in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to
examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is
supported by treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the
Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule
to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus
revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18,
2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance
on cases which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she
acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without
merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe
presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her familys actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the
years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing
material misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts
as to her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in
which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior
authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or
the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on
ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified
as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in
her COC regarding her citizenship and residency. ##
Carpio Dissent (Highlights): Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens
Brion Dissent (Highlights): COMELECs Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the
Determination of a Candidates Eligibility

Endangered Species May Be Impleaded as the Real Parties-In-Interest in a

Citizens Suit (Resident vs DOE, 2015)

Full Text
Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of Energy
Case Digest GR 180771 April 21 2015
Facts:
In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract with JAPEX, a 100% Japanese corporation, which was later converted to a

Page 16 of 25
service contract, known as SC-46, for the exploration, development and utilization of
petroleum resources in an area that basically affects the Tanon Strait. The President at
that time was not a signatory to the SC-46 and such contract was not submitted to the
Congress for review.
Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of marine
life and is declared by laws as a protected seascape. When JAPEX started its seismic
surveys and drilling activities over the area, petitions were filed assailing the
constitutionality of SC-46. One petition protesting the activities for its ecological impact
was in the name of Resident Marine Mammals which are literally toothed whales,
turtles and such, joined in by human petitioners referred to as Stewards, in their
representative as well as personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo was also impleaded as an
unwilling co-petitioner, purportedly because of her express declaration and undertaking
under the ASEAN Charter to protect habitats and other environmental concerns.
FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the area, also
questioned the SC-46 on the ground that service contracts are no longer allowed under
the 1987 Constitution, and that if it were, SC-46 is still null and void because it did not
comply with the Constitution, most especially the safeguards that the Court laid down
in La Bugal Blaan case.
Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, have standing as
the real party-in-interests in this suit
Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens suit. A
citizens suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is
essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest
to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
Dissent

Issue 2: W/N the name of former President Arroyo impleaded in the petition as an
unwilling co-plaintiff is proper
No. The name of Pres Arroyo as an unwilling plaintiff impleaded in the petition should be
stricken from the title of the case.
First, under Rule 3, Sec 10 of the ROC, when the consent of a party who should be joined
as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant. This will put
the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the court, which may properly implead him
or her through its processes. The unwilling partys name cannot be simply included in
the petition without her knowledge or consent, as this would be a denial of due process.
Second, impleading the former President for an act she made in performance of the
functions of her office is contrary to the public policy against embroiling Presidents in
suits.
Political Law
Issue 3: W/N service contracts are no longer allowed by the 1987 Constitution
No. As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words service contracts in the
1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, the deliberations of
the members of the Constitutional Commission show that in deliberating on Art XII Sec
2(4), they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973
Constitution. The framers, in short, used the term service contracts in referring to
agreements involving technical or financial assistance.

Page 17 of 25
Issue 4: W/N SC-46 is valid
No. The SC-46 is not valid because it did not comply with the Art XII, Sec 2 (4) of the
Constitution. First, it was not crafted in accordance with a general law that provides
standards, terms and conditions; second, it was not signed by the President for and on
behalf of the Philippine government; and third, it was not reported by the President to
the Congress within 30 days of execution.
Illegally-Procured Government Projects Subject to A Taxpayers Suit (Jacomille
vs DOTC, 2015)

Full Text
Jacomille vs Secretary of DOTC
Case Digest: GR 212381 Apr 22 2015
Facts:
The LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) to
supply the new license plates for both old and new vehicle registrants. The DOTC, in its
invitation for bidders on Feb 20, 2013, announced that it intends to apply the sum of 3.8
billion for the contract. The award was granted to JKG Power Plates on July 22, 2013.
The contract signing, however, was halted. It was made only on February 2014 when
sufficient funds from the GAA 2014 were already made available for the project.
Jacomille instituted a taxpayer suit questioning the procurement process on the ground
that it did not comply with the requirements of RA 9184 and its implementing laws, and
that when DOTC commenced the MVPSP, there was no sufficient funding as reflected in
the GAA 2013. Jacomille saw this as a clear misrepresentation or even a deception by
the said DOTC against the government and the general public as a whole.
JKG Power Plates averred that the case was not a proper subject of taxpayer suit
because no taxes would be spent for this project. The money to be paid for the plates
would not come from taxes, but from payments of vehicle owners, who would pay
P450.00 for every pair of motor vehicle license plate, and P120.00 for every motorcycle
license plate. Out of the P450.00, the cost of the motor vehicle plate would only be
P380.00. In effect, the government would even earn P70.00 from every pair of plate.
Issue: W/N Jacomillo has legal standing to maintain the suit
Held:
Yes. Jacomillo as a taxpaying citzen is a proper party because the MVPSP involves the
expenditure of public funds. While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license
plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate that the government shall
bear the burden of paying for the project.
As a rule, a person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Jacomillo
satisfies this requirement when he alleges that public funds in the amount of P3 .851
billion shall be used in a project that has undergone an improper procurement process.
##
Note:
Because of irregularities in the procurement, the MVPSP was rendered null and void, but
was also made moot and academic by the appropriation for the full amount of the
project fund in GAA 2014. Said appropriation cured whatever defect the process had.

Page 18 of 25
Prohibition on Making Midnight Appointments Not Applicable to Local
Executives (Province vs Marco, 2015)

Province of Aurora vs Marco

Case Digest: GR 202331 Apr 22 2015
Facts:
Marco was permanently appointed as Corporate Development Specialist II by Gov. Ong 5
days before the end of her term in June 30, 2004. His appointment, along with 25 other
appointments, was accompanied by a certification stating that funds were available for
the position. When the new Gov took over, the appointments made by Gov Ong were
revoked based on the recall made by Budget Officer regarding the availability of funds
for the position. Marcos sought reconsideration from the CSC Regional Office but was
denied. On appeal, the CSC through a resolution dated Apr 14 held the validity of the
appointment on the ground that it complied with the CSC rules and that the recall of the
certification did not affect its validity because evidence was not presented.
Instead of filing an MR, the Province filed a petition for relief. It was denied by the CSC
because it was not allowed by the rules. Meanwhile, Marco filed a motion to implement
the Apr 14 Resolution, which was granted. The Province filed an MR of the Apr 14
Resolution but was again denied because it was not filed within the 15-day reglementary
period. Finally, the Province filed before the CA a petition for certiorari via Rule 43
against the CSCs second order implementing the Apr 14 resolution, invoking the
constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. The CA denied the petition
and upheld the CSC decision.
Political Law
Issue: W/N the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to appointments made by
local executives
No. The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential appointments,
and not to those made by local executives. In this case, the appointment is valid
because there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments
during the last days of his/her tenure.
Remedial Law
Issue: W/N the CA is correct in taking cognizance over the case
No. The court should have dismissed the petition outright because no appeal may be
taken over an order of execution.
Under Rule 50, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court, the CA is allowed to dismiss an appeal where
the order appealed from is not appealable. This rule is based on the doctrine of
immutability of judgment, which states that a final and executory removes from the
court which renders it the power and jurisdiction to further alter or amend it, much less
revoked it. Thus, even if a judgment is later on discovered to be erroneous, it remains
immutable. ##
Despite Lack of Proceedings, Compensation-Determined-at-the-Time-of-Taking
Rule Remains (DPWH vs Heracleo, 2015)

Full Text
Page 19 of 25
 Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo
Case Digest GR 179334 Apr 21 2015
Facts:
Spouses Heracleo are the co-owners of a land which is among the private properties
traversed by MacArthur Highway in Bulacan, a government project undertaken
sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the requisite expropriation proceedings
and without their consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market
value of the property. The DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as
recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a
complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Favorable decisions were rendered
by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest per annum
from the time of filing of the until full payment. The SC Division reversed the CA ruling
and held that computation should be based at the time the property was taken in 1940,
which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of the contrasting opinions of the members of the
Division and transcendental importance of the issue, the case was referred to the En
Banc for resolution.
Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should be nullified
No. The governments failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior
to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the States exercise of its eminent domain
power, given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public
use, and public policy imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its
services to the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due
process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the States inherent powers, the
ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.
Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of
the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation.
Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time of
taking
Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated
valuation, the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should be
computed not at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the
purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but
to compensate him for the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for
what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at the time
it is taken.
Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case
No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only
when such literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for computing
just compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open
varying interpretation of economic policies a matter which this Court has no
competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable principles only come into full
play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.
Velasco Dissent:
The States power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. As such,
failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings should lead to failure of
taking an individuals property. In this case, since the property was already taken, the
complainants must be equitably compensated for the loss thereof.

Page 20 of 25
For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should be determined from
the time the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest
therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the States act as one of expropriation in
spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on
its part. To continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government to continue
dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private property.

Just Compensation Should be Determined at the Time of Judicial Demand

When Property Was Illegally Taken (DPWH vs Heracleo, 2015 Velasco
DISSENT)

Full Text of Dissent Opinon

Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo
Velasco Dissent GR 179334 Apr 21 2015
Summary
The States power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. As such,
failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings should lead to failure of
taking an individuals property. In this case, since the property was already taken, the
complainants must be equitably compensated for the loss thereof.
For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should be determined from
the time the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest
therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the States act as one of expropriation in
spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on
its part. To continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government to continue
dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private property.
Full Text of Dissent Opinion
***
Full Text of SC Resolution: GR 179334 DPWH vs Heracleo, April 21 2015
Digest: Despite Lack of Proceedings, Compensation-Determined-at-the-Time-of-Taking
Rule Remains

COMELEC Cannot Regulate Acts of Ownership Exercised by PUVs and Transport

Terminal Owners (1 UTAK vs COMELEC, 2015)

1 Utak vs CoMELEC
Case Digest: GR 206020 April 14 2015
Full Text
Facts:
In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules that would
implement Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act. One of the provisions of the
Resolution provide that the posting of any election propaganda or materials during the
campaign period shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and within the
premises of public transport terminals. 1 UTAK, a party-list organization, questioned the
Page 21 of 25
prohibition as it impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and
transport terminals.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC may impose the prohibition on PUVs and public transport
terminals during the election pursuant to its regulatory powers delegated under Art IX-C,
Sec 4 of the Constitution
No. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and
not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. The posting of
election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on
transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act
of ownership it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the
PUV or transport terminal.
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Issue 2: W/N the regulation is justified by the captive audience doctrine
No. A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be
justified if the supposed captive audience may avoid exposure to the otherwise
intrusive speech. Here, the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials
since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.
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Issue 3: W/N the regulation constitutes prior restraints on free speech
Yes. It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech.
Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as the owners of PUVs and
private transport terminals to express their preference, through the posting of election
campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
Issue 4: W/N the regulation is a valid content-neutral regulation
No. The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are content-neutral
regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may
be posted, but the prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy
all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is not
necessary to a stated governmental interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was
promulgated by the COMELEC to implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the
prohibition on posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals
was not provided for therein. Second, there are more than sufficient provisions in our
present election laws that would ensure equal time, space, and opportunity to
candidates in elections. Hence, one of the requisites of a valid content-neutral
regulation was not satisfied.
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Relevant Laws

Distinction Between the Supreme Courts Expanded Jurisdiction and Power of

General Supervision Over the JBC (Villanueva vs JBC, 2015)

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 Villanueva vs JBC
GR 211833 April 7, 2015
Full Text
Facts:
After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied for
the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC however informed
him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position because the JBCs
long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first-level courts before one
can apply as judge for second-level courts. Before the SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and
Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction the policy of JBC on the ground
that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Allegedly, the
policy also violates procedural due process for lack of publication and non-submission to
the UP Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the
policy should have been published because it will affect all applying judges.
On the other hand, one of the JBCs arguments was that the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under
the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional
Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the
judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public
interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While
the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this
does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing
policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down such policy
No. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to
the JBCs principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in
the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay
down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject
only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of
flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
Issue 3: W/N the violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created by the
challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.
Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience
and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court,
which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the
qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial

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experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards
requiring that a member of the judiciary be of proven competence. In determining
competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications, experience and
performance.
Civil Law
Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published in the ONAR
No. The JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in
the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive
branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the
Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative
Code.
Issue 2: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published
Yes. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain
binding force and effect. Exempted from requirement of publication are interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, and the so-called letters of instructions issued
by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations
exempted from the publication requirement. It involves a qualification standard by which
the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal
regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC
and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the
qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to
these vacant positions. Thus, naturally it follows that potential applicants be informed of
the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and
comply with them.
Jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus, by
analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to
implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of the
judiciary.
Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are applicable to JBC (Remedial)
Yes. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach. Under Rule 65, Sec 1(par 1), the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Consequently, petitions for
certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Here, the JBC indeed does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening
applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed
unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the
formulation of guidelines and criteria is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the
JBCs constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has

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acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Issue 2: W/N the remedy of mandamus is proper in assailing the policy of the JBC
No. First, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by
the JBC. Second, petitioner has no clear legal right since there is no law that grants him
the right of promotion to second-level courts.
Issue 3: W/N the remedy of declaratory relief is proper
No. First, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather,
the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to
be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBCs five-year
requirement policy. Again, no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be
included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of
appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right
that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates,
which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.
Second, the SC does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief
even if only questions of law are involved. The special civil action of declaratory relief
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to BP 129, Sec 19,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691.
The SC assumes jurisdiction over the petition only because of the Courts supervisory
duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power. But in any event,
even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be
dismissed. ##
Issue 4: W/N the Court may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over the
JBC separate from the exercise of its expanded jurisdiction over acts of grave
abuse of discretion of government agencies
Brions Separate Concurring Opinion:

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