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Applicants for master academic studies in Conference, Specialised and

Audio-visual Interpreting and Translation are required to have achieved
bachelor academic studies at the Faculty of Philology or any other affiliate
faculty with the minimum of 180 ECTS or to have acquired adequate higher
education in accordance with the regulations valid before the adoption of the
Higher Education Law.

The minimum of 15 applicants is required in order to organise entrance exam,

establish applicants ranking, enroll the applicants and carry out the study
programme in Conference, Specialised and Audio-visual Interpreting and
Translation. The applicants are ranked based on the GPA achieved in the
course of their bachelor studies and points earned at the entrance exam.
The prerequisite for the organisation of the entrance exam, ranking and
enrollment will be that a sufficient number of applicants have applied for the
programme (at least 15).

The entrance exam for the study programme in Conference, Specialised and
Audio-visual Interpreting and Translation includes testing of the following:
knowledge of the Serbian language, knowledge of foreign culture and language
(English, German or French), possession of cognitive competences necessary for
translation and interpreting, general education, being acquainted with current
affairs.

Entrance exam consists of two parts (written and oral) and is taken in two days.
The maximum number of points that an applicant can earn at the entrance
exam is 100. The points are divided in the following way: Serbian (20), foreign
language A (50), foreign language B (30). Each part of the entrance exam is
eliminatory and applicants are selected for admission based on their
achievement at the entrance exam only those who earn more than 50% of the
points at each part can be enrolled.

Na tri nedelje pred izbore

Utisak je da domaa kandidatkinja na takmienju za Pesmu Evrovizije

zakazanom za prvu nedelju maja ve sada ima vei publicitet od kandidata za
predsednika Srbije na izborima (protivpravno) zakazanim za 2. april. Tako bar
izgleda ako se prate vesti na sajtu nacionalnog javnog servisa. Nije mnogo
drugaije ni ako se gleda program istog servisa (jueranje gostovanje u
poslepodnevnom terminu kandidata Sae Jankovia ne menja bitno na stvari,
pogotovo ako se uporedi sa gostovanjem smog predsednika vlade u
udarnom veernjem terminu na sm dan objave njegove kandidature). Stvara
se slika da su izbori ili ve odlueni ili da nisu previe vani da bi im se
posvetila puna panja (na javnom servisu). I jedno i drugo oito ima za cilj da
demotivie birae i smanji njihov broj na biralitima na dan izbora. U vezi sa
tim, evo nekih zapaanja na tri nedelje pred izbore.

1. Jedan od kandidata za predsednika republike (nezakonito) uzurpira mesto

predsednika vlade, zajedno sa ostalim lanovima vlade, kako bi smanjio
vidljivost drugih kandidata. Na njega kao predsednika vlade skrenuta je sva
medijska panja, dok se drugi kandidati kao i sami izbori dosledno dre u
medijskom drugom planu. U duim kampanjama, na tri nedelje pred izbore
svedoili bismo kulminaciji predizbornih aktivnosti. Danas i ovde, pak, pojedini
kandidati jo prikupljaju potpise za kandidaturu, a tek dve nedelje pred izbore
(17. marta) znae se njihov redosled na glasakom listu.

2. Na tri nedelje pred izbore, u pristojinim okolnostima, na nacionalnom

javnom servisu gledali bismo intervjue sa kandidatima ili lanovima njihovog
tima, te direktnu razmenu argumenata izmeu samih kandidata. Ovako
gledamo samo jednog kandidata i lanove njegovog tima u svojstvu
predsednika vlade i ministara koji razgovaraju sami sa sobom i odgovaraju na
pitanja koja im niko nije postavio i koja nikoga ne zanimaju. Dok oni vode
takozvanu funkcionersku (a prava je re: uzurpatorsku) kampanju, izvan
pogleda javnosti tek se dogovaraju (a zapravo kre i nametaju)
izborna pravila (za krau glasova).

3. Na tri nedelje pred izbore, uestalo bi objavljivanje rezultata istraivanja

javnog mnjenja. Pratili bi se trendovi i potencijalne promene raspoloenja
biraa. Ali Srbija kao da je ostala bez agencija za istraivanje javnog mnjenja,
a do javnosti cure iskljuivo podeeni rezultati ija je svrha ponovo dvojaka:
da obeshrabre opoziciono i demokratski nastrojene birae te pripreme teren
za izbornu krau (tu ulogu igrao je CeSID na dan izbora od 2016). Istina,
istraivai javnog mnjenja imaju dobro opravdanje za to to se ne oglaavaju.
Na tri nedelje pred izbore jo se ne zna ko su sve kandidati ni po kojim e se
tano pravilima birati novi predsednik.

4. Ako ostanu na snazi netom donesena pravila (recimo to da birai u prvom i

drugom krugu izbora moraju glasati na istom birakom mestu), mogue je da
desetine hiljada ljudi izmeu dva kruga praktino izgubi pravo glasa (recimo,
studenti ili ljudi koji ive u inostranstvu, a obino putuju oko Uskrsa). Ali, na to
krenje demokratskih prava graana na tri nedelje pred izbore nema ko da
reaguje: parlament je rasputen a da nije izabran nadzorni odbor za
nadgledanje izbora. Kao to je skuptina odbacila svoje ustavne i zakonske
obaveze, i telo zadueno za kontrolu medija (REM) u vreme izbora takoe ne
koristi svoje kapacitete da stvori uslove za fer i potene izbore.

5. Na tri nedelje pred izbore, u takvim (ne)prilikama na kandidatima

demokratskih snaga, kao i na demokratski nastrojenim biraima lei
odgovornost neto vea nego to bi inae trebalo da bude. Kandidati moraju
mnogo vie da rade na takozvanom terenu, a birai treba da uloe neto vie
truda kako bi se kvalitetno informisali. Kandidati takoe treba da daju vrsta
jemstva da su u stanju da kontroliu izbore uprkos svim preprekama: prvo
tako to e ukazivati na krenja zakona i zloupotrebu tela zaduenih za izbore
(to ve ine); a onda i tako to e obezbediti oko 15.000 kontrolora jer
toliko je potrebno za kontrolu neto preko 8.000 birakih mesta.

6. Na tri nedelje pred izbore, birai treba da se podsete i na sledee: od 2000.

naovamo, nijedan kandidat na izborima za predsednika republike nije pobedio
u prvom krugu. Nema verodostojnih podataka koji govore da bi to sada moglo
da se dogodi. Dalje, broj glasova na prethodnim parlamentarnim izborima,
recimo onim iz 2016, moe biti tek neprecizan orijentir, jer rezultati na
predsednikim izborima ne preslikavaju rezultate na parlamentarnim izborima.
Jedan od kandidata za predsednika republike nije odstupio sa mesta
predsednika vlade i zato to kao predsednik vlade moe efikasno da ucenjuje
glasae u iju se lojalnost oigledno sumnja. Sa mesta predsednika republike,
pak, takve ucene (kao ni obeanja)1 nije mogue realizovati, pa birai i to
treba da imaju u vidu na tri nedelje pred izbore.

Peanik.net, 10.03.2017.

It feels like our candidate for the Eurosong contest scheduled for the first
week of May already has more publicity than the presidential candidates
taking part in the elections scheduled (illegally) for April 2nd. At least thats the
feeling you get if you get your news from the RTS website. The TV program of
the national public service is no different (Sasa Jankovics appearance
yesterday afternoon doesnt change this, especially if you compare this to the
appearance of the prime minister in primetime on the day of his candidacy
announcement). This creates an impression that either the elections are
already decided or that theyre not news-worthy. Both possibilities clearly aim
to demoralize the voters and decrease voter turnout. In relation to this, here
are some of my findings three weeks before the elections.
1. The prime ministers position is (illegally) usurped by one of the presidential
candidates, together with other members of the government, in order to
reduce visibility of other candidates. As prime minister, he gets the full
attention of the media, while other candidates and the election itself are
pushed aside. If this campaign were longer, three weeks before the elections
would mean that election activities are culminating. Here and now, however,
some candidates are still collecting signatures for their candidacies and their
order on a ballot will be known only two weeks before the elections (on March
17th).

2. Under normal circumstances, three weeks before the elections, the national
public broadcaster would organize interviews with candidates or members of
their teams and direct exchange of arguments between the candidates
themselves. But now, we see only one candidate and the members of his
team in his capacity as prime minister and the ministers who talk to
themselves and respond to questions that no one asked them and that
nobody cares about. While they are in a so-called officials (and the real word
would be usurpers) campaign, election rules (the stealing of votes) are being
agreed far from public view.

3. Three weeks before the elections should mean frequent publications of the
results of public opinion polls. We would follow the trends and potential
changes of voters mood. But now, its as if Serbia had lost all public opinion
research agencies and the public receives only fine-tuned results with twofold
purpose: to discourage opposition and democratic-minded voters and prepare
the ground for electoral fraud (this role was played by CeSID on election day
2016). True, public opinion researchers have good reason to keep quiet: three
weeks before the elections, we still dont know the candidates, or the exact
rules of the elections.

4. If the new rules remain in effect (for example, that voters must vote in the
same polling station in both rounds of elections), it is possible that tens of
thousands of people will practically lose the right to vote between the two
rounds (for example, students or people who live abroad, usually traveling on
Easter). But theres no one to complain to about this violation of the
democratic rights of citizens three weeks before the election: Parliament was
dismissed without electing the Supervisory Board to oversee the elections.
Just like the assembly rejected its constitutional and legal obligations, the
agency responsible for media control (REM) also fails to use its capacity to
create conditions for fair and honest elections.

5. Three weeks before the elections, in such (severe) conditions, the

responsibility of the democratic candidates, as well as democratically minded
voters, is slightly greater than usual. Candidates have to do much more so-
called field work, and voters need to make a little more effort to be well
informed. Applicants should also provide solid guarantees that they are able to
control the elections despite all the obstacles: first, by pointing out violations of
the law and abuse of the bodies in charge of the elections (which they are
already doing); and then by providing about 15,000 controllers because
thats how much is necessary to control just over 8,000 polling stations.

6. Three weeks before the election, voters need to be reminded of the

following: from 2000 onwards, no candidate in the elections for president of
the republic won in the first round. There is no credible information suggesting
that this could happen now. Furthermore, the number of votes in the previous
parliamentary elections, for example those from 2016, can only be an
imprecise landmark, because the results of the presidential election dont
reflect the parliamentary election results. One of the presidential candidates
has not resigned from the position of prime minister because, as prime
minister, he can effectively blackmail the voters whose loyalty he obviously
suspects. As president of the republic, however, such blackmail (as well as
promises)1 cant be enforced, so the voters should remember this, three
weeks before the election.

Translated by Marijana Simic

Peanik.net, 11.03.2017.

Always on the womens side

On Monday, KRIK website published an interview with Marija Mali, ex-wife of
the Mayor of Belgrade. In that interview, Marija Mali made serious accusations
against her ex-husband, including the one about him being responsible for the
demolition at Savamala on the night after the 2016 election. However, if you
dont use social networks, dont watch N1 or read Danas, you could easily
have missed that. The public broadcasting service, our right to know
everything, thought that we shouldnt know this. What was happening is no
secret. The media were waiting for prime minister Aleksandar Vucics reaction.

On Tuesday, in TV show Upitnik, Aleksandar Vucic told us everything we have

the right to know regarding Savamala. He repeated the well-known
statements that the case of Savamala is not important and that the media
keep insisting on it because they have nothing else to talk about, that the
demolition should have been done during the day and not at night, that the
demolished buildings were illegal. When he was asked to comment on Sinisa
Malis role in the demolition, Vucic first reminded us of all the successes of the
current Mayor of Belgrade and then stressed that he can no longer stay on
that position. However, he didnt say if that means that the Mayor wont serve
the entire term (the city elections are scheduled for 2018), although he did say
that political consequences will be quicker than the verdict. He also reminded
us that it was him who said right away that someone from the city government
was responsible for it.

The problem is the fact that the prosecutors office is having troubles with the
investigation. The case of Savamala is still in preliminary proceedings
because the police refuse to cooperate. If we are to understand that this
statement of the prime minister has finally confirmed that the only person
responsible for the demolition on the night of the 2016 elections is Sinisa Mali,
it makes sense to conclude that the police was following his orders that night
and that theyre now protecting him by not publishing the necessary
documents. This implies that Sinisa Mali is the most influential person in
Serbian politics, able to organize city and national authorities and influence
their willingness to cooperate with the public prosecutor. This, however, is
hard to believe.
We could say a lot of things about Savamala, including the question of who
was actually controlling the police on the night of the demolition, but a few
things should also be said about Marija Mali. As she said in the KRIK
interview, these public statements are her last line of defense. After filing
criminal charges for domestic violence, she claims that Sinisa Mali has
threatened her:

I didnt want to be a victim of violence, so I addressed the Center for welfare

and they told me that I need to file criminal charges against the violator. Even
then, he continued to threaten me, saying: Dont do that. If you do that, I will
destroy you, I will take your children. After I filed the charges, he did
everything in his power to get custody over the children To get back at me.

She claims that her ex-husband is still sending her threatening text messages.
He got custody over their children, her complaint was thrown out and Sinisa
Malis charge against her for false reporting is still in progress.

Besides not having said anything against Sinisa Mali (other than the fact that
he should have demolished by day), Vucic didnt say anything against Marija
Mali either. First he said that he only met Marija Mali once or twice, on a
childs birthday and that hes not friends with the Mali family. Then he
defended her openly:

About my friend Sinisa, I have to say that Im always on the side of the
woman. Although I shouldnt interfere and the judges know that way better
than me, I will say something against him I think that children should always
be with their mother. Thats all I have to say to him. About this other thing,
about the people who used and misused a woman who is fighting a custody
battle with her ex-husband for political statements thats never been done in
Serbia before. No one has ever done that in Serbia. Thats not humane.

When I say that he defended her, I should mention that that defense was
limited to the issue of custody. Children should be with their mother is a
patriarchal attitude, just like Vucics whole statement. He, as a knight in
shining armor, worries about a woman, a mother whose children were taken
away from her and who was abused by some villains. Vucic doesnt care
about Marija Malis complaint about domestic violence. By saying nice things
about Sinisa Mali as a mayor, a friend, and a person, and by not mentioning
the accusation, he said a lot. Vucic, the knight in shining armor, will defend a
mother whose children were taken away until his last breath, but wont
mention a woman as the victim of domestic violence.

The courts decision about custody over the Mali children cant be considered
outside the context of Sinisa Malis position. He may not be the most powerful
person in Serbia, but the power is on his side. Marija Malis claims should be
verified, but it sounds plausible that Sinisa Mali has used his political power to
secure custody over his children and pressure his ex-wife. The prime minister
didnt mention this possibility, although he said that the courts decision was
strange.

Vucic has found a way to avoid attacking both Sinisa and Marija Mali; he even
expressed understanding for KRIK journalists, while simultaneously reminding
the public that hes the great protector of women and someone who is always
on the side of the woman. The knight said these things, but did something
completely different. During the entire interview, he interrupted RTS journalist
Olivera Jovicevic. He attacked her and didnt allow her to ask questions. He
even questioned her. That is the knight who cant stand when his or his
colleagues actions are questioned. The knight who, only minutes after having
said that hes always on the side of the woman, says that you can beat
whoever you want in your own home. Maybe this violence that happens
inside the home, stays in the home was part of the answer to all the letters
Marija Mali had sent him asking for help, which the prime minister didnt want
to comment on.

Translated by Marijana Simic

Peanik.net, 23.02.2017.

Uvek na enskoj strani

U ponedeljak je na sajtu KRIK-a objavljen intervju sa bivom suprugom
gradonaelnika Beograda, Marijom Mali. U tom intervjuu Marija Mali je iznela
ozbiljne optube na raun svog biveg supruga, ukljuujui i to da je on
organizovao ruenje u Savamali u noi izbora 2016. godine. Meutim, ukoliko
ne pratite drutvene mree, N1 televiziju, ili ne itate Danas, mogli ste da
ostanete bez te informacije. Javni servis, nae pravo da znamo sve, smatrao
je da ovo ne treba da znamo. Nije velika tajna ta se desilo. Mediji su ekali
reakciju predsednika Vlade Aleksandra Vuia.

U utorak, gostujui u emisiji Upitnik na javnom servisu, Aleksandar Vui nam

je rekao sve to imamo pravo da znamo o sluaju Savamala. Ponovio je ve
dobro poznate stavove da sluaj Savamala nije bitan i da mediji na tome
insistiraju jer nemaju o emu drugome da priaju, da nije trebalo ruiti nou
ve usred dana, da su rueni ilegalni objekti. Komentariui uee Sinie
Malog u organizovanju ruenja, Vui je prvo podsetio na sve uspehe koje je
trenutni gradonaelnik Beograda postigao, ali je i podvukao da je njegov
ostanak na toj poziciji nemogu. Nije dodue jasno rekao da li to znai da
gradonaelnik nee odsluiti ceo mandat (gradski izbori su 2018), mada je
rekao da e politikih posledica biti i pre nego to bude pravosnane presude.
Takoe je podsetio da je on odmah rekao da je odgovoran neko iz vrha
gradskih vlasti.

Problem je u tome to tuilatvo ima problema sa sprovoenjem istrage.

Sluaj Savamala se jo uvek nalazi u predistranom postupku jer policija
odbija saradnju. Ako prihvatimo da je predsednik Vlade ovim nastupom
konano potvrdio da je jedina osoba odgovorna za ruenje u izbornoj noi
2016. godine Sinia Mali, logino je zakljuiti da je i policija te noi delovala po
njegovom nalogu i da ga sada titi ne obelodanjujui neophodna dokumenta.
Iz toga sledi da je Sinia Mali najuticajnija linost na srpskoj politikoj sceni
koja je u stanju da organizuje gradske i dravne slube i da utie na njihovu
spremnost da sarauju sa tuilatvom. U ovo je ipak teko poverovati.

Na temu Savamale bi se moglo rei mnogo toga, ukljuujui i pitanje ko je

zaista kontrolisao slube u noi ruenja, ali trebalo bi rei i neto o Mariji Mali.
Kako je navela u intervjuu za KRIK, izlazak u javnost je za nju poslednja linija
odbrane. Nakon to je podnela krivinu prijavu za nasilje u porodici, ona
navodi da joj je Sinia Mali pretio:

Ne elim da trpim nasilje i obratila sam se Centru za socijalni rad, gde su mi

rekli da protiv nasilnika moram da podnesem krivinu prijavu. I tad je nastavio
da preti, da govori: Nemoj to da radi. Ako uradi, ja u da te unitim, uzeu ti
decu. Poto sam ipak podnela krivinu prjavu, on je uradio sve, na sve
mogue naine, i dobio starateljstvo nad decom Da mi se osveti.

Bivi suprug joj, kako tvrdi, jo uvek alje pretee poruke. Deca su dodeljena
njemu, njena krivina prijava je odbaena, a prijava Sinie Malog protiv nje za
lano prijavljivanje jo uvek nije reena.

Aleksandar Vui, osim to nije rekao nita protiv Sinie Malog (sem da je
trebalo da rui danju), nije rekao nita ni protiv Marije Mali. Prvo se ogradio
navodei da je Mariju Mali sreo jednom, dva puta u ivotu na nekom dejem
roendanu i da on sa porodicom Mali nije kuni prijatelj. Zatim je otvoreno
stao u njenu odbranu:

Za mog druga Siniu moram da kaem, ja sam uvek na enskoj strani, i ono
to, iako ne smem u to da se meam, iako sudije to znaju bolje nego ja, rei
u neto to je protiv njega ja uvek mislim da deca treba da budu uz majku,
eto to je sve to mogu da mu kaem. Ali za ovo drugo, ko su ljudi koji su
upotrebili i koji su zloupotrebili enu, bivu enu neiju, koja je u sukobu oko
starateljstva sa svojim bivim muem, za politike izjave to se nikada u Srbiji
nije radilo. To nikada niko u Srbiji nije radio. To nisu ljudi.

Kada kaem da je stao u njenu odbranu valja napomenuti da je to odbrana

samo po stavki roditeljstva. Deca treba da budu uz majku je patrijarhalni
stav, kao i celokupna Vuieva izjava. On, kao vitez-zatitnik, brine za jednu
enu, jednu majku kojoj su oduzeli decu, brine jer su njenu patnju zloupotrebili
neki ne-ljudi. Vui se ne obazire neposredno na krivinu prijavu Marije Mali
za nasilje u porodici. Posredno, hvalei Siniu Malog kao gradonaelnika,
druga i oveka, a i samim time to tu tubu ne pominje, on je rekao dosta
toga. Vui, vitez-zatitnik, branie do poslednjeg daha majku kojoj su oduzeli
decu, ali nee pomenuti enu rtvu nasilja.
Odluku suda o tome kome u brakorazvodnoj parnici Mali treba da pripadne
starateljstvo ne moemo posmatrati mimo toga ko je Sinia Mali. On moda
nije najmonija osoba u Srbiji, ali mo je na njegovoj strani. Navode Marije
Mali treba proveriti, ali zvui realistino da je Sinia Mali iskoristio politiku
mo koju ima kako bi obezbedio starateljstvo nad decom, a kao vid pritiska na
svoju bivu suprugu. Predsednik Vlade nije pomenuo tu mogunost, iako je
odluku suda ocenio kao udnu.

Vui je pronaao nain da u utorak ne napadne ni Siniu ni Mariju Mali; ak

je naao razumevanja i za novinare KRIK-a, a u isto vreme je jo jednom
javnost podsetio da je veliki zatitnik ena, neko ko je uvek na enskoj
strani. Vitez-zatitnik to govori, ali ini neto drugo. Sve vreme intervjua
je prekidao novinarku RTS-a Oliveru Jovievi. Napadao ju je i nije joj
dozvoljavao da postavi pitanja, ak je on nju ispitivao. To je vitez-zatitnik koji
ne podnosi da se bilo koji njegov potez, ili potez njegovih saradnika i
saradnica, dovede u pitanje. Vitez-zatitnik koji, svega nekoliko minuta nakon
to se stavio na ensku stranu, izgovara tuci koga ti hoe u svojoj kui.
Moda se to nasilje koje se desi u kui, ostaje u kui nalo u odgovoru
Mariji Mali na neko od pisama koje mu je poslala traei pomo, a koja
predsednik Vlade nije eleo da komentarie.

Peanik.net, 15.02.2017.

Plemenska pravila

Upravni odbor Advokatske komore Beograda prole nedelje je odbio da u

imenik advokata upie donedavnog tuioca za ratne zloine Vladimira
Vukevia. Da e se to dogoditi moglo se naslutiti kada mu je 2016. prijava
vraena na dopunu dokumentacije. lan UO Komore Vladimir Petrovi tada
je rekao da je Vukevi radio selektivno i gonio iskljuivo Srbe i da zato u
Komori imaju jedinstven stav da on nije dostojan kandidature. Javnost i
Vukevi su se nadali da su to samo line zablude i pogreno tumaenje
prava jednog od lanova UO. Ali nedostatak patriotizma kao razlog za odluku
o nedostojnosti Vukevia nedavno je potvrdilo ak 11 od 12 lanova UO
Advokatske komore Beograda.

Na prvi pogled je jasno da profesionalno obavljanje tuilakog posla i

patriotska oseanja nisu jedno isto (izuzev ako profesionalnost ne shvatimo
kao patriotski in, a mogli bismo, to pak nije sluaj s predstavnicima
Komore). Pa ipak, izgleda da notornu injenicu o tome da profesionalnost ne
treba podreivati patriotizmu treba dokazivati, iako se u pravu optepoznate
injenice ne dokazuju. Prvo emo razjasniti ta podrazumeva kriterijum
dostojnosti kandidata za advokatski status. Zakon o advokaturi dostojnost
kandidata definie na dva naina. Prvo, kao neosuivanost kandidata za
krivino delo koje bi ga inilo nedostojnim poverenja za bavljenje
advokaturom. Drugo, kao zahtev da ivot i rad kandidata budu u skladu sa
opteprihvaenim moralnim normama i (advokatskim) kodeksom, iz ega e
onda moi da se zakljui da e kandidat savesno raditi u advokaturi i uvati
njen ugled.

Znamo da Vukevi nije osuivan i da nesumnjivo ispunjava prvi kriterijum

dostojnosti. Zamerka veine u Advokatskoj komori da je za ratne zloine gonio
iskljuivo Srbe onda moe biti samo krenje moralnih normi i/ili advokatskog
kodeksa. Meutim, advokatski kodeks advokate obavezuje na profesionalni
rad, posveenost Ustavu, zakonitosti, pravdi, kao i naelima poput
nezavisnosti, strunosti, savesnosti, potenja, odgovornosti i odmerenosti.
Drugim reima, advokatski kodeks jo uvek u vrednosti postupanja advokata
ili advokatskih kandidata nije uvrstio merenje patriotskih oseanja i odnos
prema etnikoj pripadnosti uesnika u postupcima koji se vode.
Nepodudarnost zamerki i stvarnih zahteva dostojnosti je, ispostavlja se
naivno, Vukevi ve komentarisao. On je rekao da se u radu drao principa
da nije vano koje su nacionalnosti rtve ili okrivljeni, ve da li ima dokaza ili
ne. To je sutina posla javnog tuioca, objasnio je Vukevi.

Ali lanove UO Advokatske komore ne zanimaju te triarije. Vukevi nije

osuivan, a nije dao ni osnova verovanju da e postupati protivno
advokatskom kodeksu (koji ne prepoznaje kategoriju patriotskih oseanja).
Ostaje tako jo samo jedna opcija da je prekrio opteprihvaene moralne
norme. I tu stiemo do kljunih shvatanja onih koji su procenjivali Vukevia.
Opteprihvaena moralna norma u naem drutvu, kako nam pokazuju
advokati iz Komore, jeste opravdavanje zloina uinjenih od strane naih i u
nae ime. Ta norma polazi od nesrene i primitivne premise da je ispravno
sve to uini etniki Srbin, i obrnuto: to ne vai za one koji u svojoj krvi
nemaju dovoljno srpskih krvnih zrnaca. Meutim, ovdanji pravnici i advokati
zaboravljaju da se u sreditu moralnog mora nai univerzalni, na sve
podjednako primenjivi ideal dobra i ovenosti. Ako pogledamo s tog gledita,
odmah postaje jasno da moralni problem nije u bivem tuiocu Vukeviu;
problem s merilima imaju oni koji sude o njegovom moralnom statusu.

Odluka da Vukevi ne bude primljen u Advokatsku komoru sramna je ba

kao i odugovlaenje sa izborom njegovog naslednika na elu Tuilatva za
ratne zloine. Ona je posebno sramna jer su je doneli pravnici na osnovu,
kako to sami demonstriraju, obiajnog prava zajednice ogrezle u zloinu.
Advokati sebe vole da vide kao elitni, nezavisni i uticajni deo drutva.
Meutim, ispostavlja se da nezavisnost vrha advokatskih komora dobacuje
tek do elja izvrne vlasti, a svest o dostojnosti do plemenskih pravila. Kada
smo kod izvrne vlasti, treba rei da su se o sluaju Vukevi izjasnile i
udarne pesnice: Milovan Drecun, predsednik skuptinskog odbora za Kosovo
i Metohiju, kao i poslanik Marjan Ristievi. Prvi je na Happy TV rekao da je
Vukevi sakrivao dokaze protiv Albanaca, dok je drugi protiv nekoliko ljudi iz
tuilatva za ratne zloine, ukljuujui i Vukevia, podneo krivinu prijavu
zbog pijunae.

Ako sluaj pogledamo iz tog (stranakog/plemenskog) ugla, jasno vidimo ko

moe biti upisan u imenik advokata, te ta su vrhovne moralne norme. Marjan
Ristievi poznat je po prostakim ispadima jednim od poslednjih je uinio i
krivino delo odavanja zdravstvenih podataka maloletne korisnice fonda za
zdravstveno osiguranje. Protiv Milovana Drecuna, pak, tuilatvo za ratne
zloine vodilo je postupak zbog ratnohukakog izvetavanja. Od tog
postupka je, gle uda, nakon penzionisanja Vukevia, tuilatvo odustalo.

Vladimir Vukevi je potovao univerzalnu normu o moralnoj jednakosti ljudi i

tako po svemu sudei uinio neto to se u domaem plemenu ne oprata.
On nije uestvovao u zloinima svojih saplemenika (a vidimo da je to
uestvovanje danas prednost), nije podsticao na zloin, niti je injenje zloina
politiki podravao a kasnije zatakavao. Da stvar bude gora, Vukevi je one
koji su to inili krivino gonio i to punih 12 godina. Kako se politika mo
danas nalazi na strani izvrilaca, raspirivaa i politikih poklonika ratnih
zloina, drugaiji ishod postupka pred toboe nezavisnom Advokatskom
komorom bio bi iznenaenje. Neoekivan bi bio i drugaiji tretman samog
tuilatva. Meutim, stvari bi makar trebalo nazvati pravim imenom: nije
problem u nedostojnosti advokatskog kandidata, ve u (etnikom)
opravdavanju zloina od strane onih koji odluuju o statusu kandidata za upis.
A ako misle da njihova pozicija nije moralno problematina, neka je izgovore
jasno i glasno bez uvijanja.

Peanik.net, 24.01.2017.

Tribal rules
Last week, the management board of the Bar association of Belgrade refused
to register Vladimir Vukcevic, former war crimes prosecutor, into the attorneys
registry. We could have anticipated this when his application was returned
with additional questions in September last year. A member of the Bars board
Vladimir Petrovic then said that Vukcevic performed his duties selectively,
prosecuting exclusively Serbs, and that, therefore, it is the unanimous position
of the Chamber that he is not worthy of the nomination. The public and
Vukcevic were hoping that these were just personal misconceptions and
erroneous interpretation of one of the Board members. But a lack of patriotism
as a valid reason for the decision on Vukcevics unworthiness was recently
confirmed by as many as 11 of the 12 Board members of the Bar Association
of Belgrade.

It is clear that professional prosecutorial work and patriotic feelings are not the
same thing (unless professionalism is understood as an act of patriotism,
which we could do, but this was not the case with representatives of the
Chamber). Still, it seems that the commonly known and accepted fact that
professionalism should not be subordinate to patriotism needs to be proven,
although the law doesnt require attestation of common knowledge. First, we
will clarify the meaning of the criterion of worthiness of candidates for the
status of lawyer. The Law on advocacy defines the worthiness of candidates
in two ways. First, a candidate cant have been convicted of an offense which
would make him untrustworthy to practice law. Second, the candidates life
and work need to be in conformity with generally accepted moral standards
and (attorney) code, from which it will then be possible to conclude that the
candidate will conscientiously work in the legal profession and safeguard its
reputation.

We know that Vukcevi has never been convicted, and that he undoubtedly
meets the first criterion of worthiness. The objection of the majority of the Bar
association members that he prosecuted exclusively Serbs for war crimes
could then only be a violation of moral standards and / or lawyers code.
However, the lawyers code obliges lawyers to perform their duties
professionally, be committed to the Constitution, laws, justice, as well as the
principles of independence, competence, conscientiousness, honesty,
responsibility and restraint. In other words, the lawyers code still doesnt say
anything about patriotic feelings and relation to the ethnicity of the participants
in the proceedings. Vukcevic, as it turns out rather naively, has already
commented on the incompatibility of objections and the actual demands of
worthiness. He said that the guiding principle of his work was that the
nationality of the victims or the accused didnt matter; what mattered was
whether there was sufficient evidence. This is the essence of the work of the
public prosecutor, explained Vukcevic.

But the Board members werent interested in these trifles. Vukcevic was never
convicted, nor did he present a reason for the belief that he will act in
contravention of the Bar code (which does not recognize the category of
patriotic feelings). So, only one option remains that he has violated generally
accepted moral norms. And here we come to the core beliefs of those who
evaluated Vukcevic. Generally accepted moral standards in our society, as
demonstrated by the lawyers from the Chamber, include justifying crimes
committed by ours and on our behalf. This standard is based on the
unfortunate and primitive premise that everything done by ethnic Serbs is
right, and vice versa: that this does not apply to those who do not have
enough Serbian blood cells in their veins. However, the lawyers seem to
forget that the core of the moral norms should be based on a universal
principle of goodness and humanity applicable to all. If viewed from this
perspective, it immediately becomes clear that it is not former prosecutor
Vukcevic who is guilty of a moral failure, but the very ones who evaluated his
moral status.

The decision to deny Vukcevic admission to the Bar association is just as

shameful as the procrastination with the choice of his successor at the head of
the war crimes prosecution. It is particularly shameful because it was made by
lawyers, and apparently based on the customary law of a community steeped
in crime. Lawyers like to see themselves as an elite, independent, and
influential part of society. However, it turns out that the independence of the
Bar associations leaders is limited by the desires of the executive
government, and their awareness of worthiness by tribal rules. Speaking of
the executive government, we should stress that its bloodhounds have also
addressed the Vukcevic case: Milovan Drecun, chairman of the
parliamentary committee for Kosovo and Metohija, and MP Marjan Risticevic.
Milovan Drecun went on television and said that Vukcevic was hiding
evidence against Albanians, while Risticevic filed charges of espionage
against several people from the Prosecutors office, including Vukcevic.

If we look at this from the party/tribal point of view, we clearly see what it takes
to qualify for the Bar association and what is considered as supreme moral
norms. Marjan Risticevic is known for vulgar outbursts one of his most
recent ended with him committing the criminal offense of disclosing medical
information about an underage beneficiary of the health insurance fund.
Milovan Drecun, on the other hand, was prosecuted for warmongering
reporting. But, lo and behold, the prosecution dropped these charges after
Vukcevic retired.

Vladimir Vukcevic respected the universal norm of moral equality of all people
and thus, apparently, did something unforgivable to the tribe. He did not
participate in the crimes of his tribesmen (and its clear that this participation
is preferred), he didnt incite to crime, nor did he politically support the crimes
and helped cover them up. To make matters worse, Vukcevic was the one
who prosecuted the perpetrators for the past 12 years. As political power
today is on the side of the perpetrators, instigators, and political admirers of
war crimes, a different decision of the supposedly independent Bar
association would be a surprise. A different treatment of the prosecutors office
would also be unexpected. However, we should at least call a spade a spade:
unworthiness of the candidate is not the issue, but the (ethnic) justification of
crimes by those who decide on the status of the candidates. And if they think
that their position is not morally problematic, they should say it loud and clear
without hesitation.

Translated by Marijana Simic

Peanik.net, 28.01.2017.

9. januar lapsus memoriae

ekajte! Pa ta se u stvari obeleava 9. januara? Od tolike prie ko e

marirati, ko e i ta pevati, zametnuli smo sutinu. A sutina je u odgovoru na
pitanje ta se dogodilo 9. januara 1992? Jer to je datum koji je izabran da
bude roendan republike. Kaem izabran, jer se datumi koji e se slaviti
biraju na osnovu politike odluke o tome koje e najvanije ideje i vrednosti
prenositi ba taj datum, koja je to poruka koja e se svake godine ponavljati,
s kolena na koleno.

U svom izvanrednom lanku u Vremenu Dejan Anastasijevi nas je podsetio

da su tog dana 1992. godine srpski poslanici na elu s Radovanom
Karadiem napustili skuptinu BiH u Sarajevu, otili na Pale i tamo proglasili
osnivanje Srpske republike BiH.

ta danas znai obeleavanje ba tog datuma? Da bismo na to pitanje

odgovorili treba u pomo pozvati jednu inae na prvi pogled neinspirativnu
pomonu istorijsku nauku hronologiju. Moda je neinspirativna, al esto
upravo redosled dogaaja na najjednostavniji i najvidljiviji nain otkriva
sutinu, koja se moe zagubiti u masi kontroverznih informacija svojstvenih
poetku rata.
Dakle, ako se kae da je RS nastala 9. januara, onda se kae da je tog dana
proglaena ta nova tvorevina, a na tlu prethodne republike Bosne i
Hercegovine. Time se priznaje da se radilo o aktu separatizma, da je RS
otcepljena od BiH, da je tim inom 9. januara prestala da postoji BiH na ranije
poznat nain. Samo da podsetim u tom januaru 1992. jo nije bilo ni
referenduma o nezavisnosti BiH, ni preporuke Evropske zajednice da se
prizna nezavisnost BiH, a rat su mogli da predvide samo najcrnji pesimisti.
Drugim reima, slavei 9. januar rukovodstvo u Banja Luci reava pitanje
kokoke i jajeta. Dakle: prvo je nastala RS, pa je onda, u aprilu, poeo rat.

To je zanimljiva hronologija, jer se obino govori da je RS nastala, kao to

kae patrijarh Irinej, na prostorijma koji su zaliveni krvlju i utemeljeni na
kostima, odnosno da je ona nastala kao POSLEDICA rata. U tom, ovde inae
vladajuem narativu, rat je izbio (tako kao neka prirodna pojava, oluja
takorei), pa se u njemu kalila nova republika. Po toj hronologiji, ona je imala
iskljuivo odbrambena svojstva da u ratu zatiti srpski narod od
nastupajueg genocida.

Tako smo stigli do sutine problema. Jer ako bi se taj vladajui narativ
pretoio u hronologiju, onda bi za roendan RS bilo mnogo boljih kalendarskih
kandidata od 9. januara. Mogao bi to biti bilo koji datum, ali pod jednim
uslovom da pada posle 6. aprila kada je poeo rat u BiH. Samo je u tako
postavljenim datumima mogao da opstane mit o RS kao rezultatu rata i njenim
odbrambenim svojstvima.

Ovako, sa 9. januarom kao datumom koji se slavi kao dan nastanka RS

uspostavlja se sasvim suprotan redosled dogaaja i sasvim drugaija
hronologija. Naime, ako je otcepljenje RS prethodilo ratu, ono vie ne moe
biti njegova POSLEDICA. Sasvim suprotno, stvaranje RS postaje njegov
UZROK. Time elnici Republike Srpske, koji su sami ba taj datum izabrali,
prihvataju hronologiju koja u potpunosti rui njihovo sopstveno tumaenje rata
u BiH. Ne znamo da li je u vrhu RS bilo debate o hronologiji, niti kako su se
odluili ba za taj datum. Koji su bili argumenti da se odlue ba za njega?
Meni se ini da se radi o lapsus memoriae, omaci u seanju i miljenju, koja,
kako i za druge vrste omaki kau neki psihoanalitiari, otkriva nesvesno. Jer
slavei 9. januar vostvo RS priznaje ono to je stalno pokuavalo da negira:
da je uzrok rata u Bosni separatizam srpskog rukovodstva, jer se bez rata
nova dravna tvorevina nije mogla stvarno izdvojiti iz BiH, nije se mogla
uprostoriti, nisu se mogle odrediti njene granice, niti bi ona mogla biti etniki
ista kako se to elelo i kao to je to danas.

Slavei 9. januar vostvo Republike Srpske ustanovljuje hronologiju koja

otkriva sutinu. Taj hronoloki lapsus im je izleteo, ali je sada, posebno od
kada je i referendumom potvren, ozvaniio redosled dogaaja koji daje ranije
poricanu sliku bosanskog rata i njegovih uzroka. Zato predlaem da
prihvatimo 9. januar, ako nita drugo onda kao prvi, mada jo uvek nesvesni
korak ka priznavanju odgovornosti za sve to je nastupilo posle njega.

Peanik.net, 13.01.2017.

January 9th lapsus memoriae

Wait a minute! What are we actually celebrating on January 9th? All those
stories about who will march, and who will sing what, have caused us to forget
the essence. And the essence is the answer to the question about what
actually happened on January 9th, 1992. Because this date was chosen as the
Republics birthday. I said chosen, because celebration dates are chosen
based on political decisions about the ideas and values represented by those
dates and the messages which will be repeated annually for generations to
come.

In his outstanding article published in Vreme, Dejan Anastasijevic reminded us

that, on that day in 1992, Serbian members of parliament, led by Radovan
Karadzic, left the BiH parliament in Sarajevo, went to Pale and there
proclaimed the founding of the Serbian republic of BiH.

What does it mean to celebrate this date today? To answer this question, we
need to call upon what may seem like an uninspiring secondary historical
science chronology. It may be boring or unimaginative, but, very often, the
sequence of events reveals the essence in the most simple and obvious way.
An essence which may get lost in the sea of controversial information which
marked the beginning of the war.
So, if we say that RS was founded on January 9th, then we are saying that on
that day this new entity was established on the territory of the previous
republic Bosnia and Herzegovina. This means admitting that this was an act
of separatism, that RS separated from BiH, and that, by that act, BiH in its
previous form ceased to exist. Let me just remind you that in January 1992
the referendum on independence of BiH was not yet organized, there was no
recommendation by the European community to acknowledge the
independence of BiH and only the gravest pessimists expected the war. In
other words, by celebrating January 9th, Banja Luka officials are solving the
chicken-or-egg issue. So: RS was established first and then, in April, the war
started.

This is an interesting chronology, because it is usually considered that RS was

created on territories watered with blood and built on bones, as patriarch
Irinej said. This means that it was created as a CONSEQUENCE of the war.
So, according to this mainstream narrative the war struck (just like that, as if
it was a storm or some other natural disaster) and forged the new republic.
According to that chronology, the founding of RS was completely defensive
established to protect the Serbs from the coming genocide.

This has brought us to the essence of the problem. Because, if we translated

this mainstream narrative into chronology, we could find much better dates for
RSs birthday than January 9th. It could be celebrated on any date after April
6th, when the war in BiH started. Only in this chronology, the myth of RS as a
result of the war and its defensive attributes could be true.

This situation with January 9th being celebrated as the day of the foundation of
RS sets a completely opposite sequence of events and completely different
chronology. Because, if the separation of RS preceded the war, it couldnt
have been its CONSEQUENCE. On the contrary, establishment of RS
becomes its CAUSE. By choosing this date, RS officials have accepted the
chronology which is completely contrary to their own understanding of the BiH
war. We dont know whether they debated on chronology or how they chose
this date. What were the arguments in favor of this date? It seems to me that
what were dealing with here is lapsus memoriae, an oversight in memory and
thought which, like all other oversights, is revealed unconsciously. By
celebrating January 9th, RS leaders are admitting to what they were always
trying to deny: that the cause of the BiH war was separatism of Serbian
leaders, because, without a war, a new state couldnt have become truly
separate from BiH, its boundaries couldnt have been set, nor could it be
ethnically clean as they wanted it and as it is today.

By celebrating January 9th, Republika Srpska leadership has established a

chronology which reveals the essence. This chronological lapse happened
and now, especially since it was confirmed on the referendum, it has
formalized the sequence of events painting the full picture of the war in Bosnia
and its causes which was previously denied. So, I suggest we accept January
9th, if anything, as the first, though still unconscious step towards the
recognition of responsibility for everything that occurred afterwards.

Translated by Marijana Simic

Peanik.net, 19.01.2017.

Why the history and why the Turks?

After entering Srebrenica, on July 11th, 1995, general Mladic said: I give this
city to the Serbian people. After many rebellions, the time has finally come for
our revenge against the Turks in this country. In the movie about the
Scorpios, which we were able to see thanks to the Humanitarian Law Fund,
we saw hieromonk Gavrilo giving his blessing to the Scorpios before they
committed the massacre in Srebrenica, saying: My brothers, the Turks have
risen from the grave and attacked Serbian sanctities. Make your army strong
and able to overpower the enemy of the people. Those days, the minstrel
sang: Lets show the entire world that Bosnia is our motherland and not a
Turkish province.

I chose these quotes among many others to illustrate the ideological and
cultural context of the massacre. I chose these three specifically to illustrate
that the context was the same on all levels: from a minstrel, folk singer, to the
church which Mirko Djordjevic said provided the spiritual logistics for the
massacre to the executioner, general Mladic. This is why I will try to answer
two questions: why the history and the massacre, why the history in general
and why the Turks.

History is the key ingredient of national consciousness and that image of who
we are is made based on real and, even more often, erroneous interpretations
of the past. This is normal, everyone does it, it happens in all societies, but
there is much more of this in societies that have some problem with the
present, which find it difficult to manage or solve problems, and to progress.
These are the societies that pander to themselves, as is often heard here: we
produce more history than we can consume. This is another one of those self-
deceptions and delays of dealing with their real problems. In Pescanik, we
called it a collective Peter Pan syndrome, where society refuses to grow up,
because it seems that in childhood which, for society, means in history
everything was safer, warmer and more certain.

If we agree on this explanation of why history is important, we come to the

issue of Turks. Weve all heard and continue to live in the mantra on 500
years of Turkish slavery and I think that its the key to our historical
consciousness. As part of a research conducted a couple of years ago by the
Belgrade centre for human rights, which was later published as the book
News from the past, Strategic marketing asked a so-called representative
sample 120 questions which were prepared by a group of historians I was a
part of. These were identity questions related to the nation and history. Now, I
am going to present some of them to you.

One of the questions was In your opinion, what is the most important event in
Serbian history. The interviewees were able to give their own answers. 48%
of them, i.e. almost half of them, said something about the Turks: the battle of
Kosovo, the First uprising, the Second uprising, etc. The battle of Kosovo was
the absolute champion with 22%. Some successful periods of our history, the
famous golden ages, werent even mentioned. So, it seems that we dont
count successes.
We also sked the question Describe the period of Turkish rule and offered
three possible answers. The first was Centuries-long Turkish yoke, the
second was an attempt of rational explanation where we said, Like every
great empire, this had its ups and downs, and the third answer was I dont
know. 76% of people chose the mythological claim of 500 years of Turkish
yoke. Only 23% were even able to imagine some other answer. The most
terrifying thing is that only 1% said that they didnt know. When other
questions were concerned, about 30% of the interviewees said that they didnt
know, which is also very worrying. But everyone knew the answer to this
question.

And finally, we asked the citizens whether all Serbian monuments were
destroyed during that Turkish yoke. And 63% said Yes, which means that 63%
of people arent able to think rationally about that subject and cant remember
the monuments in Kosovo and monasteries which clearly survived the Turkish
rule. That myth is so powerful, that it makes them neglect their own
experiences. The myth is stronger and thats why they answered the way they
did. This research was done professionally, and the interviewers paid attention
to the answers given by men, women, young, old, educated and uneducated.
Complete consensus of men and women, young and old was achieved only
on these questions related to the Turks. However, I must stress that the young
have the toughest attitude towards the Turks. So, our assumption that its
fading away is not true, since we saw that the young are at the forefront of
this.

Today we are giving a public lecture on Srebrenica, and examining the matrix
of our learning about ourselves. The Turks are our mental time limit. The year
1389 is the beginning of our new era. Thats where things begin, or end. Turks
are the buzzword, they are an excuse, they are an explanation for everything.
They are the irrational solution to every real problem. Streets are dirty
because of those 500 years. Communism happened because of the 500
years. We cant manage democracy because of the 500 years. We cant go
on because of the Turks. We forget that we had 200 years since the creation
of the modern Serbian state and could have done something.

If someone took the Turks away from us, we would have to face ourselves.
They are the key to our identity and our key excuse. Hence Ratko Mladics
speech. Thats why the battle in Srebrenica was against the Turks, that was
the way of dehumanizing them, which makes it OK to kill them. Hence the
relationship towards the Srebrenica massacre and denial of the genocide.
Because its more than a mere denial. To acknowledge the Srebrenica
genocide is to penetrate the deepest layers of our identity. If we admitted that
crime to ourselves, our historic perspective would change. Everything would
turn upside-down and Matija Beckovics leftover of a slaughtered nation
would lose its morally superior position of a victim, who, by default, cant be a
butcher.

If we were to move to the other side, become a genocidal nation instead of a

nation which suffered genocide, construction of the existing national identity
would collapse and a new one would have to be built. Therefore, I think that
learning about Srebrenica is a key lesson about our own history, and I hope
that books that historians throughout the region are jointly developing,
textbooks on the history of the wars in Yugoslavia from multiple perspectives,
will be a contribution to this.

From the public lecture held in Belgrade, CZKD, March 7th, 2016: School of
knowledge Srebrenica, mapping of genocide and post-genocidal
society, FAMA Methodology and Gallery 11/07/95

Translated by Marijana Simic

Zato istorija i otkud Turci

Posle ulaska u Srebrenicu 11. jula 1995. general Mladi je rekao: Poklanjam
srpskom narodu ovaj grad. Napokon je doao trenutak da se, posle bune
protiv dahija, Turcima osvetimo na ovom prostoru. U filmu o korpionima, koji
smo videli zahvaljujui Fondu za humanitarno parvo, vidi se i jasno uje
jeromonah Gavrilo koji blagosiljajui korpione pred zloin u Srebrenici kae:
Brao, Turci se povampirie, hoe srpske svetinje. Daj vernoj vojsci tvojoj da
bude na savlaivanje neprijatelja naroda. Tih dana narodni guslar pevao je
ovako: Pokaimo cijelom svijetu da je Bosna naa edovina, a ne turska
alajbegovina.

Izabrala sam ove citate u moru drugih da bih pokazala idejni ili kulturni
kontekst u kome se zloin dogodio. Izabrala sam ba ova tri da bi se videlo da
je toga bilo na svim nivoima: od guslara, narodnog pevaa, preko crkve za
koju je ba povodom Srebrenice Mirko orevi rekao da je pruala duhovnu
logistiku zloinu do egzekutora, generala Mladia. Zato u pokuati da
ovde odgovorim na dva pitanja: zato istorija i zloin, zato istorija uopte i
otkud Turci.

Istorija je kljuni sastojak nacionalne svesti i ta slika ko smo mi pravi se na

osnovu stvarnih, a jo vie i ee pogrenih tumaenja prolosti. To je
uobiajeno, to rade svi, to moemo da naemo u svim drutvima, ali toga ima
mnogo vie u drutvima koja imaju neki problem sa sadanjou, koja se
teko snalaze, koja teko reavaju probleme i teko idu dalje. To su drutva
koja sama sebi povlauju, kao to esto ovde moete da ujete: da
proizvodimo vie istorije nego to moemo da potroimo. I to je jo jedno od
tih samozavaravanja i odlaganja da se suoimo sa svojim pravim problemima.
U Peaniku sam to nazvala kolektivnim sindromom Petra Pana, gde jedno
drutvo odbija da odraste, jer mu se ini da je u detinjstvu a za drutvo bi to
mogla da bude istorija sve bilo sigurnije, toplije i izvesnije.

Ako se sloimo sa ovim objanjenjem zato je istorija vana, dolazimo do

pitanja zato Turci. Svi smo uli i stalno ivimo u mantri 500 godina turskog
jarma, i mislim da ona ima kljuno mesto u naoj istorijskoj svesti. Za jedno
istraivanje koje smo pre nekoliko godina radili sa Beogradskim centrom za
ljudska prava, koje je objavljeno kao knjiga Novosti iz prolosti, Stratedik
marketing je takozvanom reprezentativnom uzorku postavio 120 pitanja koje
je pripremila grupa nas istoriarki. Bila su to identitetska pitanja o vezi sa
nacijom i istorijom, i sada u vam predstaviti neka od njih.

Jedno pitanje je bilo Koji je, po vama, najvaniji dogaaj srpske istorije, i tu
su ispitanici sami nudili odgovor. I 48%, dakle skoro pola njih, izjavilo je neto
u vezi sa Turcima, bila to Kosovska bitka, bio to Prvi ustanak, Drugi ustanak
Kosovska bitka je apsolutno na mestu broj 1 sa 22% odgovora. Neki uspeni
periodi iz nae istorije, uvena zlatna doba gotovo da se uopte nisu nala u
odgovoru na pitanje ta je najvanije u naoj istoriji. Dakle, uspesi se tu ne
broje.

Postavili smo i pitanje Opiite period turske vladavine i ponudili tri odgovora.
Prvi je bio Vekovni turski jaram, drugi je bio pokuaj racionalnog objanjenja
i tu smo rekli Kao i svako veliko carstvo, i ovo je imalo uspone i padove, i
trei odgovor je bio Ne znam. I 76% ljudi zaokruilo je mitski odgovor o 500
godina turskog jarma. Svega 23% je uopte bilo u stanju da zamisli da je
mogu i neki drugi odgovor. Najstranije od svega je to to je samo 1% reklo
da ne zna. Inae je na sva druga pitanja redovno oko 30% graana, to je
takoe vrlo zabrinjavajue, odgovaralo da ne zna. Samo ovaj odgovor su svi
znali.

I na kraju, pitali smo graane da li su tokom tog turskog jarma uniteni svi
srpski spomenici. I 63% je odgovorilo pozitivno, to znai da 63% ljudi nije u
stanju da razumno misli o toj temi i ne moe da se seti srpskih svetinja na
Kosovu, srpskih manastira koji su oigledno opstali pod turskom vlau. Tolika
je snaga tog mita da oni zanemaruju sopstveno iskustvo. Mit je jai i oni daju
taj odgovor. Ovo ispitivanje je raeno profesionalno, pa se vodilo rauna o
tome kako odgovaraju mukarci, ene, mladi, stari, obrazovani i
neobrazovani. Jedino smo na ova pitanja u vezi sa Turcima dobili potpuni
konsenzus i ena i mukaraca, i mladih i starih, s tim to moram da naglasim
da mladi ipak imaju najtvri odnos prema Turcima. Dakle, naa predstava da
to odumire nije tana, jer se pokazalo da mladi u tome prednjae.

Danas drimo javni as o Srebrenici i ispitujemo matricu naeg uenja o nama

samima. Turci su naa mentalna vremenska granica. Godina 1389. je poetak
nae Nove ere. Tu stvari poinju, ili se zavravaju. Turci su potapalica, oni su
opravdanje, oni su objanjenje za sve. Oni su iracionalno reenje za svaki
realni problem. Prljave su ulice zbog 500 godina. Komunizam je bio zbog
500 godina. Ne ide nam s demokratijom, zbog 500 godina. Ne moemo dalje
zbog Turaka. Zaboravljamo da smo u 200 godina od stvaranja moderne
srpske drave moda mogli neto da uradimo.
Kada bi nam neko uzeo Turke, morali bismo da se suoimo sa samima
sobom. Oni su klju naeg identiteta i kljuno opravdanje. Ali odatle govor
Ratka Mladia. Zato se u Srebrenici ide na Turke, jer se time oni
dehumanizuju, pa ih je dozvoljeno ubijati. Odatle i odnos prema zloinu u
Srebrenici i poricanje genocida. Jer to je vie od obinog poricanja.
Priznavanje genocida u Srebrenici zadire u najdublje identitetske slojeve.
Kada bi sebi priznali taj zloin, promenila bi se naa istorijska perspektiva.
Sve bi se preokrenulo i Bekoviev ostatak zaklanog naroda bi izgubio
moralno superiornu ulogu rtve, koja po definiciji ne moe biti krvnik.

Ako bismo preli na drugu stranu, iz genocidiranog naroda u genocidni narod,

sruila bi se zgrada postojeeg nacionalnog identiteta i morala bi da se
napravi nova. Zbog toga mislim da je uenje o Srebrenici kljuna lekcija iz
istorije, i nadam se da e knjige na kojima zajedno rade istoriari iz itavog
regiona, multiperspektivne itanke o istoriji ratova u Jugoslaviji, biti doprinos
tome.

Sa javnog asa u Beogradu, CZKD, 7. marta 2016: kola znanja Srebrenica

mapiranje genocida i post-genocidno drutvo, FAMA Metodologija i Galerija
11/07/95.

Peanik.net, 11.03.2016.

Apis: povratak na mesto zloina

Apis je metafora. Kad kaem Apis, mislim na kabadahijsku politiku moi koja rui
pravila pre nego to se uspostave, ponitava zakone pre nego to se primene,
obesmiljava institucije, ismeva procedure, demokratiju vidi kao slabost, drugog kao
neprijatelja. Snaga mu je u topuzu, mo u zaverenikim organizacijama, sila mu je
najjai argument. Apis drutvo ini slabim, uplaenim, moralno tupim i spremnim na
svaki postupak koji izgleda kao da glavu uva. Apis je pretnja pred kojom drugaije
miljenje izgleda kao ludost, integritet kao glupost, nezavisnost kao samoubilaka
avantura najvieg rizika. To ime je metafora za najdublju politiku koroziju, moralnu
korupciju, ivi pesak koji usisava sve to na njemu nastane.
Ali, krenimo od poetka. Majski prevrat 1903. njegovo je delo. Oficiri koje je predvodio
nisu samo ubili Aleksandra i Dragu Obrenovi, ve su njihova tela iskasapili i sa prozora
dvora u centru Beograda bacili u vrt. Taj dogaaj doveo je Srbiju u prvu veu
meunarodnu izolaciju, jer su sve tada vodee evropske sile (ukljuujui i Rusiju) uvele
sankcije zbog surovog kraljeubistva i injenice da se vlade koje su se smenjivale nisu
usuivale da na bilo koji nain sankcioniu oficire, to je bio izriit zahtev evropskih
monarhija. Tek su 1906, tri godine nakon prevrata, zbog istrajnosti embarga od strane
tada najuticajnije sile, Velike Britanije, oficiri penzionisani. Njihova mo se time samo
preselila u jo neuhvatljivije sfere iz kojih su, osloboeni svake odgovornosti, upravljali
dravom. Savremenici su ih zvali vanustavni inioci, neodgovorni faktori,
nekontrolisani elementi.

Nakon prevrata 1903. godine proklamovana je u Srbiji parlamentarna monarhija

zasnovana na demokratskim principima uistinu liberalnog Ustava. Meutim, tokom tih
11 godina zlatnog doba u Srbiji je promenjeno 18 vlada i odrano je 5 izbora. Najei
uzrok tim smenama bili su pritisci koje su na dravne institucije vrili oficiri-zaverenici,
koji su svoje interese ostvarivali naizmeninim davanjem i oduzimanjem podrke do krvi
suprotstavljenim politikim strankama. Takve manipulacije su razorno delovale na krhku,
tek uvedenu demokratiju. S vremenom su stranke zaboravile svoja politika uverenja i
principe, zanemarile tek postavljene institucije i proklamovane javne interese, a sva
politika se svela na pridobijanje podrke vaninstitucionalnih inilaca olienih u Apisu i
njegovoj zaverenikoj grupi. Ljuti protivnici, radikali i samostalci, sveli su politiku
debatu na bespotednu borbu za Apisovu naklonost. U tako otvoren politiki prostor on
je uetao kao apsolutni gospodar, podravao je as jednu as drugu stranku, pomerao
politike pione, zavaao pa vladao, podizao emocije, blokirao institucije, rastakao
dravu.

itava javnost znala je da se odluke ne donose u institucijama, ve da ih u svojim

rukama dre Apis i njegovi, koji se na javnoj sceni nisu ni videli. Delujui uvek u potaji
primoravali su predstavnike izabranih vlasti da donose odluke koje su delovale
nelogino i neracionalno. Velika ministarska imena bila su primorana da Apisu lino
prinose nacrte zakona i ugovora na odobrenje. Prialo se da je zguvao nacrt
saveznikog ugovora s Bugarskom pre Prvog balkanskog rata i njime gaao ministra
spoljnih poslova Milovana Milovanovia koji mu ga je doneo na overu.

Pod svojom kontrolom drali su kralja Petra I, kojeg su 1903. godine doveli na vlast.
Direktno su uticali na dinastika pitanja, pa su tako izazvali i abdikaciju
prestolonaslednika ora, ije je mesto prvog u naslednom redu zatim zauzeo njegov
mlai brat Aleksandar. Apis je imao mo da prisili kralja da, suprotno Ustavu i svim
principima parlamentarizma, otputa vlade koje su imale veinu, rasputa parlament i
utie na raspisivanje izbora. Uvlaio ga je u svoje politike igre. Na kraju, nakon
prikupljanja dodatne moi zahvaljujui pobedama u Balkanskim ratovima, pod pretnjom
vojnog udara, prisilili su kralja Petra na povlaenje iz zdravstvenih razloga. Vlast je
tada, 1914, preuzeo njegov sin, regent Aleksandar, kojeg su, u svim krizama pred i
tokom Prvog svetskog rata uverljivo podseali da su oni ti koji su mu omoguili vlast, pa
da e mu je oni i uzeti, kao i dvojici njegovih prethodnika. Time su, iako verbalno
monarhisti, stalno potkopavali autoritet kralja i drave u celini, ime su dodatno i stalno
destabilizovali nikad stabilizovanu zemlju.

Vaninstitucionalno delovanje znailo je da se slobode promovisane u pravnim aktima

rue na ulici, pretnjom, fizikom silom. Poznat je sluaj kad su svima znani oficiri pred
itavim korzoom na Terazijama, izmeu Moskve i Kasine, prebili dvojicu opozicionara,
naprednjaka Pavla Marinkovia i liberala Mihaila orevia. Svi su to videli, svi su znali
ko su poinioci. Znalo se i da je to otvoreno politiko zastraivanje, pa dakle i
uskraivanje slobode misli, govora, udruivanja, politikog delovanja Drugim reima,
da se time rue svi ustavni principi i temelji zlatnog doba srpske demokratije. Istraga,
meutim, nikada nije pokrenuta.

Sloboda tampe jeste bila zagarantovana veoma liberalnim Zakonom o tampi iji je
prvi lan glasio: tampa je u Srbiji slobodna. I bila je. Kritika vlasti u opozicionim i
nezavisnim listovima zaista je bila bespotedna. Jeste tano i da je policija povremeno
plenila tampu s prodajnih mesta, ali je u svim poznatim sluajevima sud, jo tokom
istog dana, oslobaao novine i vraao ih na ulicu, ime je dokazivao svoju Ustavom
predvienu nezavisnost. Meutim, slobode tampe ipak nije bilo. Njene granice
odreivali su vanustavni inioci, koji su nou, dok se tampaju novine, uletali u male
opozicione tamparije, drvenim palicama lomei skupe maine, koje je nakon toga bilo
skoro nemogue obnoviti. Bila je to najefikasnija cenzura, pouzdan metod regulisanja
slobode tampe, njena sutinska negacija ak i onda kada su je dravne ustanove
titile. Zato jedan citat iz opozicione Pravde, iz 1907. godine, najbolje oslikava sutinu te
demokratije i tog razumevanja slobode: To je sistem u kome graani formalno imaju
sva prava, ali ne smeju ni jedno upotrebljavati. Jedan naroit, hibridan reim kakav je
mogu samo u balkanskim zemljama. Formalno je taj reim vrlo slobodouman, stvarno
on je negacija svake slobode.

Sloboda udruivanja jo je ubedljivije regulisana nasiljem, posebno poznatim sluajem

ubistva brae Milana i Maksima Novakovia. Oni su bili oficiri, protivnici zaverenika.
Traili su da se ubice kraljice i kralja odstrane iz vojske i da im se sudi za ubistvo.
Napravili su prvi pravi srpski NVO Udruenje za legalno reenje zaverenikog pitanja.
Govorili su da vojska, na ijem su elu oficiri koji su ubili kralja kome su poloili
zakletvu, ne moe sluiti svojoj pravoj, bezbednosnoj svrsi, jer je sama najvea
opasnost. Udruenje je prvo zabranjeno. Zatim su Novakovii uhapeni. A onda su,
tokom noi, u glavnom beogradskom zatvoru, ubijeni. Sva tampa je sutradan izala sa
identinim saoptenjem na prvoj strani. Maksim i Milan Novakovi umrli su tokom noi
u Glavnjai, tako to je Milan ubio Maksima, a zatim i sebe. Poznato odnekud?
Meutim, ve sutradan se postavilo pitanje otkud najveim politikim protivnicima
zaverenika u zatvoru pitolji? Afera je krenula da se otplie. Izalo je na videlo da su
ubijeni u prisustvu vlasti, da su se te noi u glavnom zatvoru nali ministar unutranjih
poslova, ef beogradske policije i direktor zatvora. Afera je potresala Srbiju pune etiri
godine, sud je nezavisnom istragom utvrdio odgovornost ministra, ali postupak nikada
nije pokrenut. U dva navrata je preko skuptine pokuano da se ministar policije pozove
na odgovornost, da mu se na taj nain skine imunitet i da se otvore vrata pokretanju
krivinog postupka. Vladajua veina je te predloge odbila. Ubistvo Novakovia nikada
nije procesuirano. A svi su sve znali.

U Balkanskim ratovima oficiri-zaverenici stekli su i ratnu slavu. Tek posle toga niko vie
nije mogao da ih obuzda. Apis i drugi predvodnici pred ratove osnovane tajne
organizacija Crna ruka ili Ujedinjenje ili smrt su kao nagradu za ratno herojstvo, kao
leno, na upravu dobili nove krajeve, odnosno oblasti Sandaka, Kosova i Makedonije,
na koje se 1912-1913. godine proirila srpska drava. Uprkos burnim skuptinskim
raspravama i otporu opozicije i javnosti, na te delove zemlje nije proiren liberalni srpski
Ustav, pa novi graani nisu dobili politika prava koja su imali stanovnici Srbije.
Naprotiv, tu je bio uveden poseban vojno-policijski reim kojim su rukovodili zaverenici,
o ijem su nasilju i zloupotrebama stalno stizali izvetaji s terena. Zamislite samo kako
je ta uprava postupala i kako je nova drava mogla izgledati svojim novim stanovnicima!
I kakve je posledice na odnose izmeu Srba, Albanaca, Bonjaka i Makedonaca
ostavilo osloboenje.

Mo Apisa i njegovih postajala je tokom tog prolea 1914. sve vea. I onda je Gavrilo
Princip pucao u Sarajevu. Ma ta ko o tome mislio, svi se slau da je taj dogaaj
pokrenuo lavinu Prvog svetskog rata, koja se prvo sruila upravo na Srbiju. I ma ta ko
o tome mislio, nesporna je injenica da je Principa i njegove obuavala i naoruavala
Crna ruka. ta su oni tano time hteli da postignu? Da li su bili svesni da atentat moe
da izazove svetski sukob? Da li je taj pucanj bio usmeren vie protiv Paia i
Aleksandra nego protiv Ferdinanda i Sofije? Da li je trebalo da dovede samo do
lokalnog rata sa Austro-Ugarskom da bi se nastavio i okonao posao osloboenja i
ujedinjenja, to je Paieva vlada odbijala svesna iscrpljenosti zemlje posle dve godine
Balkanskih ratova. Verovatno odgovore na ova pitanja nikada neemo saznati. Ali ono
to je izvesno jeste da su Apis i njegovi 1914, ponovo kao i 1903, sudbonosne odluke
za zemlju uzeli u svoje ruke i nasiljem uveli Srbiju u splet traginih dogaaja koji su
opet, po ko zna koji put, prekinuli njen razvoj, demografski je unitili i vratili je unazad
mnogo vie nego to je tokom burnih prethodnih 11 godina uspela da se unapredi. Kao
da je time utvreno samoubilako pravilo u istoriji Srbije jedan korak napred, a zatim
mnogo, mnogo njih unazad.
I onda je, 1917. godine, dolo do preokreta. Tokom borbi na Solunskom frontu, regent
Aleksandar je uspeo da prvo uhapsi Apisa i njegove saradnike i zatim organizuje
politiko suenje, na kome su za trojicu najistaknutijih presuene smrtne kazne pod
optubom da su pripremali ubistvo regenta Aleksandra. Mnoge su pretpostavke kako je
i zato dolo do tog politikog obrauna i zato ba u tako osetljivom trenutku rata?
Nagaa se da je tako neto bilo mogue zahvaljujui tome to je vojvoda Putnik u to
vreme bio na samrti, a smatrao se najveim zatitnikom zaverenika. Neki nagaaju da
je to bilo ostvarivo zahvaljujui injenici da je u februaru dolo do prve revolucije u
Rusiji, ime su zaverenici izgubili mona lea? Ili zato to je neposredno pre toga
poginuo Vojvoda Vuk, ije su etnike jedinice bile mimo dravne kontrole i stalna
pretnja fizikog uklanjanja vladajuih ljudi drave. Pouzdanog i dokazanog odgovora na
to pitanje nema, ali pored mnogih preostalih tajni izvesno je da je iskoriena prilika da
se i Pai i regent oslobode stalne pretnje po dravu i sebe lino. Na pomolu je bio
rasplet Prvog svetskog rata i agonije srpske drave i oigledno je da je doneta politika
odluka i skupljena snaga da se u novo vreme ue bez stalne pretnje oliene u stvarnim
gospodarima i monicima poretka nastalog 1903. godine.

Vie decenija kasnije, posle jo jedne revolucije i jo jednog svetskog rata, 1953.
godine, organizovan je novi montirani politiki proces, na kome su, pod uticajem
Aleksandra Rankovia i jedne sline, ma koliko ideoloki drugaije, tajne slube, Apis i
crnorukci rehabilitovani. Bila je to osveta i monarhiji i dinastiji i prethodnom sistemu, ali i
jasna poruka da nove revolucionarne vlasti svoj kontinuitet uspostavljaju s istorijskim
uzorima koji su kao osnovni princip utvrdii da se vlast dobija i brani orujem. Na tom
obnovljenom Solunskom procesu Apis i njegovi proglaeni su oslobodiocima i
revolucionarima, onima koji ubrzavaju istoriju, rue tradicije i raskidaju s utvrenim
pravilima politikog ponaanja, uzimaju stvari u svoje ruke, upravljaju sudbinom. Kao i
svaka radnja s prolou i ova je, te 1953, bila kristalno jasna poruka za budunost.

Danas se ponovo nalazimo pred jednom novom fazom Apisovog ivota. I opet je to
radnja s prolou, namenjena nama danas, kao i onima koji e doi. Inicijativa da se
Apisovi posmrtni ostaci prenesu i sveano, uz dravne poasti, sahrane na
Kalemegdanu najnoviji je doprinos kulturi seanja u Srbiji. ta nam govori ta inicijativa?
Pa, kao to je to esto sluaj, govori nam ba ono to kae! A kae da se Srbija i danas,
i posle svega, identifikuje upravo s tom istorijskom linou, slavi njegova dela,
proglaava njegove ideje i vrednosti kao svoje, sledi njegov put. A to znai da ona
istrajava na svojim sutinski antievropskim opredeljenjima; da nema nameru da se
promeni; da ba nee da potuje zakone, institucije i procedure; da joj je sila prea od
pregovora i dogovora; da se podrivanje svake prilike za normalizaciju u unutranjoj i
spoljnoj politici vidi kao zatita interesa najmonijih; da se od programa srpskog
ujedinjenja nee odstupati; da je ruenje korisnije od stvaranja, a nerazvijenost bolji
prostor za apsolutnu vlast od uspenog i modernog drutva; da dileme zapravo i nema,
jer joj je jedina alternativa smrt, kako i kae slogan Apisove organizacije. A kad dileme
nema, nema ni slobode. A nee je ni biti.

Ako drava najnovijim politikim danse macabre ponovo stane iza Apisa, kao i 1953, on
e prestati da bude metafora. Ponovo e postati stvarnost, sutina raspojasane,
razdrljene, siledijske politike na koju se Srbija toliko puta vratila kao da joj je ba to
najprivlaniji kontinuitet. Podseae nas tu, s Kalemegdana, da se svako iskakanje od
davno zacrtanog plaa najskupljom cenom i da skretanje s puta nije predvieno.
Zloglasno e nam poruiti da se dri stoletnog kontinuiteta, u kome se glava gubi ako se
ne razume da ovde vai slogan, koji su koristili opozicionari poetkom 20 veka, ija
vlada toga i drava, ija vlast toga i sloboda. I da ta glava moe biti vaa ili moja,
kraljeva, prestolonaslednikova ili premijerova.

Zato bi povratak Apisa u Beograd bio povratak na mesto zloina. I to ne samo onog
bukvalnog iz maja 1903, nego onog sutinskog zloina protiv Srbije. Defenestracijom
kraljevskog para Apis je kroz prozor bacio i svaku nadu da bi Srbija mogla da ue u
stabilni period razvoja i dovravanja svega nedovrenog. Zato je taj zloin iz 1903.
prazloin, onaj iz kojeg su proizali svi drugi u dugom trajanju od 1903. do 2003, od
Obrenovia do inia, preko Drugog svetskog rata i krvoprolia devedesetih, ponovo
pod crnorukakom crnom zastavom s lobanjom i ukrtenim kostima i nepromenjenom
idejom ujedinjenja ili smrti. Dravna sahrana Apisa na Kalemegdanu jasno bi poruila
da s tog puta ne skreemo.

Peanik.net, 08.09.2015.

Apis return to the crime scene

Apis is a metaphor. When I say Apis, I refer to the ruthless politics of power
which breaks the rules before they are established, cancels laws before they
are implemented, makes institutions pointless, mocks procedures, perceives
democracy as a weakness and others as the enemy. Its might is in its arms,
its power in conspiracy organizations, force is its strongest argument. Apis
makes society weak, frightened, morally blunt, and ready to take any action to
save its own life. Apis is a threat which makes a different opinion seems like
madness, integrity like stupidity, independence like a suicidal adventure. That
name is a metaphor for the deepest political corrosion and moral corruption,
the quicksand which sucks in everything.
But lets start from the beginning. The overturn of May 1903 was his doing. His
officers didnt only kill Aleksandar and Draga Obrenovic, but butchered their
bodies and threw them out the palace window in the center of Belgrade. That
event led Serbia into its first significant international isolation, since all major
European forces (including Russia) decided to impose sanctions for the brutal
regicide and the fact that rotating governments didnt dare to sanction the
officers, which was an explicit demand of European monarchies. The officers
were forced to retire in 1906, three years after the overturn, only because of
the persistent embargo of the most influential state of the time, Great Britain.
This caused their power to only transfer into even more evasive spheres
which allowed them to govern the state free of any responsibility. Their
contemporaries called them extra-constitutional factors, irresponsible
factors, uncontrolled elements.

After the overturn in 1903, a parliamentary monarchy based on the democratic

principles of a truly liberal Constitution was proclaimed in Serbia. However,
during those 11 years of the golden era, 18 governments were changed and
5 elections were held. The most common cause of these changes was
pressure from the officers/conspirators, who fulfilled their interests by
switching their support between severely opposing political parties. This kind
of manipulation ruined the fragile, newly established democracy. In time, the
parties forgot their political beliefs and principles, neglected newly established
institutions and proclaimed public interests, and the entire politics came down
to winning the support of extra-constitutional factors, personalized by Apis
and his conspiracy group. The radicals and independents, fierce opponents,
turned political debate into a ruthless fight for Apiss sympathy. He was made
king of this open political space, switched his support from one party to
another, moved political pawns, caused fights, raised spirits, blocked
institutions, melted down the state.

The entire public knew that decisions werent made within institutions, but by
Apis and his lot, who were invisible in the public scene. By acting from the
shadows, they forced representatives of elected governments to make
decisions which seemed illogical and irrational. Great ministers were forced to
present drafts of laws and contracts for Apiss approval. It is said that he tore
up the draft of a cooperation agreement with Bulgaria before the First Balkan
War and threw it at the minister of foreign affairs, Milovan Milovanovic, who
had brought it to him for approval.

They brought king Petar I to power in 1903 and kept him under their control.
They directly influenced dynasty issues, caused the abdication of heir
apparent Djordje, whose position was then taken by his younger brother
Aleksandar. Apis had the power to force the king to dismiss governments that
had the majority, dismiss the parliament, and influence elections, contrary to
the Constitution and all principles of parliamentary democracy. He forced the
king into his political games. And finally, after acquiring additional help thanks
to the victories in the Balkan wars and under the threat of military coup, they
forced king Petar to abdicate due to his health issues. His son, regent
Aleksandar, came to power in 1914. During all crises before and during World
War One, the group kept reminding him that they are the ones who brought
him to power and that only they could take it from him, just like they did with
two of his predecessors. Although monarchists by words, by doing this they
undermined the authority of the king and the state, which continually and
additionally destabilized the already unstable state.

Non-institutional actions meant destroying the freedoms proclaimed by legal

acts by force and threat. A case of the famous officers beating up two
representatives of opposition parties, progressionist Pavle Marinkovic and
liberal Mihailo Djordjevic in the middle of Terazije, is well known. Everyone
saw it, everyone knew who did it. They also knew that it was about political
threat, i.e. denial of freedom of thought, speech, political action, etc. In other
words, that it cancels out all constitutional principles and foundations of the
golden era of Serbian democracy. The case, however, was never
investigated.

Freedom of press was guaranteed by a very liberal Law on the Press whose
first article said: The press in Serbia is free. And it was. Critique of the
government in the opposition press was indeed ruthless. It is true that the
police used to confiscate newspapers from stores, but, in all known cases, the
court freed the newspapers on the same day and returned them to the
streets, thus proving its constitutionally guaranteed independency. However,
the press was not free. Its limits were defined by the extra-constitutional
factors, which used to storm into opposition printing shops at night, when the
newspapers were printed, and brake expensive machines, making them
almost impossible to repair. It was the most efficient censorship, a reliable
method for regulating free press, its true negation despite the protection of the
state institutions. One citation from the opposition newspaper Pravda from
1907 describes the essence of that democracy and that understanding of
freedom the best: It is a system which formally guarantees all the rights of its
citizens, but forbids them to act on them. One peculiar, hybrid regime which
could happen only in the Balkan countries. Formally that regime is very liberal,
in reality it negates every freedom.

Freedom of association was even more convincingly regulated by violence,

especially in the well-known case of the murder of brothers Milan and Maksim
Novakovic. They were officers, enemies of the conspirators. They asked for
the murderers of the king and queen to be removed from the army and tried
for murder. They created the first Serbian NGO, The Association for legal
solution of the issue of conspirators. They kept saying that the army, headed
by the officers who murdered the king they were sworn to, cant serve its real
purpose, because it itself poses the greatest threat. The Association was first
banned, then the Novakovics were arrested. And then they were murdered, at
night in the main Belgrade prison. All newspapers brought the same headline
the following morning. Maksim and Milan Novakovic died during the night in
Glavnjaca. Milan shot Maksim and then killed himself. Sounds familiar?
However, the question arose the following morning of how the biggest
enemies of the conspirators managed to get ahold of a gun in prison. The
case started to unfold. It became evident that they were murdered in the
presence of the government, that the minister of police, the chief of Belgrade
police, and the warden of the jail were present at the main prison that night.
The scandal shook Serbia for four years to come. An independent court
investigation determined the ministers responsibility, but the case was never
tried. The assembly tried on two occasions to establish the responsibility of
the minister, to remove his immunity and allow the criminal proceedings to
start. The ruling majority refused those attempts. The Novakovics murderers
were never tried. And everyone knew everything.

The officers/conspirators became war heroes in the Balkan wars. After that,
there was no stopping them. Apis and the other leaders of the secret
organization Crna ruka or Unification or death which was founded just
before the wars, received the new lands, i.e. Sandzak, Kosovo and
Macedonia which were won in 1912-1913, as a reward for their bravery in the
wars. Despite fierce debates and resistance from the opposition and public,
the liberal Serbian Constitution wasnt applied to those areas, so the new
citizens didnt have the same political rights as the citizens of Serbia. On the
contrary, a new military-police regime managed by the conspirators was
introduced there. Its violence and abuses were regularly reported from the
field. Imagine what that management must have done and what the new
citizens thought about their new state, and the consequences of the
liberation on the relations between Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians and
Macedonians!

The power of Apis and his lot increased during the spring of 1914. And then
Gavrilo Princip fired that fateful shot in Sarajevo. No matter what you think of
that, everyone agrees that that event started the avalanche of World War One,
which collapsed onto Serbia first. And no matter what you think of that, the
fact that Princip and his lot were trained and armed by Crna ruka is evident.
What did they hope to gain by that? Were they aware that the assassination
could cause a world war? Was that shot meant more for Pasic and Aleksandar
than for Ferdinand and Sofia? Was it meant to cause only a local war with
Austro-Hungary in order to continue and finish the business of liberation and
unification, which Pasics government refused to do, aware of the state of the
country after two years of Balkan wars? We will probably never find the
answers to these questions. But the fact is that Apis and his lot made crucial
decisions themselves in 1914, just like they did in 1903 and used violence to
lead Serbia into a series of tragic events which, once again, stopped its
development, ruined it demographically and pushed into a state far worse
than 11 years ago. Its as if they wanted to prove the suicidal rule of Serbian
history one step forward, and then many, many steps back.

And then the situation turned in 1917. During the fights on the Thessaloniki
front, regent Aleksandar managed to arrest Apis and his cooperators and
organize a political trial. The three most prominent of them were tried for
conspiracy to murder regent Aleksandar and sentenced to death. There are
many assumptions as to how and why this political clash happened at such a
delicate moment in the middle of war. One guess is that it was made possible
by the fact that marshal Putnik, who was considered to be the biggest
protector of the conspirators, was on his death bed. Another guess is that it
was because of the fact that the first revolution in Russia had happened in
February that year, which caused the conspirators to lose a powerful ally. Or
by the fact that marshal Vuk, whose chetnik units were out of state control and
a constant threat to the state officials, was killed shortly before that. There is
no reliable and substantiated answer to this question, but it is clear that Pasic
and the regent saw an opportunity to get rid of the constant threat to the state
and themselves and used it. The end of World War One and Serbian agony
was near and they apparently made a political decision and managed to enter
a new era without a constant threat personified in the masters of the order
created in 1903.

Several decades later, after another revolution and another world war, in
1953, a new fixed political process was organized. Governed by Aleksandar
Rankovic and a similar, however ideologically different secret association, the
process rehabilitated Apis and his associates. It was a pay-back to the
monarchy and the dynasty and the previous system, but also a clear message
that the new revolutionary government is establishing its continuity with the
historic role-models whose basic principle was to win and defend power with
violence. Apis and his lot were proclaimed liberators and revolutionaries,
those who accelerate history, destroy tradition and cancel the established
rules of political behavior, take matters into their own hands, control destiny.
Just like any other dealing with the past, this one was a crystal clear
message for the future.

Today, we find ourselves before a new phase of Apiss life. And, again, it is a
dealing with the past meant for us today and those of tomorrow. The initiative
that Apiss remains be transferred and ceremonially buried with state honors
at Kalemegdan is the latest addition to the culture of remembrance in Serbia.
What does that initiative mean? Well, as it often happens to be the case,
exactly what its saying! And its saying that, even today, after everything,
Serbia is identifying itself with that man, celebrates his deeds, proclaims his
ideas and values for its own, follows his path. And that means that it persists
in its essentially anti-European commitments; that it doesnt plan to change;
that it refuses to obey the laws, institutions and procedures; that force is more
dear to it than negotiations and agreements; that every chance for
normalization of internal and external politics is undermined as a way to
protect the interest of the most powerful; that it wont back down from the
program of Serbian unification; that destruction is more useful than creation
and underdevelopment is a better ground for absolute power than a
prosperous and modern society; that there is actually no question about it,
since its only alternative is death, as stated by the slogan of Apis
organization. And when there is no alternative, there is no freedom. And there
never will be.

If the state uses this latest danse macabre to once again support Apis, just
like it did in 1953, he will cease to be a metaphor. He will become reality once
again, the essence of dissolute, disheveled bully policy which Serbia
repeatedly returns to, as if it was its favorite continuity. He will lay in
Kalemegdan and remind us that every attempt to break the code will be
punished most severely and that there will be no sidetracks. He will
notoriously remind us of the continuity of the slogan used by the opposition at
the beginning of the 20th century: he who rules the government, rules the
state; he who has power, owns freedom. And that anyone who fails to
understand it will pay with their lives, whether its you, me, the king, the heir to
the throne, or the prime minister.

That is why the return of Apis to Belgrade would be a return to the crime
scene. And not only the literal crime from May 1903, but the essential crime
the crime against Serbia. By defenestrating the royal couple, Apis threw out
the window any hope that Serbia could enter a period of stable development.
That is why the crime from 1903 is the first crime, the one which caused all
others from 1903 to 2003, from the Obrenovics to Djindjic, from World War
Two to the bloodshed of the nineties, once again implemented under the black
flag with the skeleton head and crossbones and the same idea of unification
or death. A state funeral for Apis at Kalemegdan would clearly state that we
remain on that path.

Translated by Marijana Simic

Peanik.net, 14.09.2015.
 Integration fatigue

Depressing, pessimistic, bitter. These adjectives can perhaps best describe

the Belgrade conference on What we mean when we say Europe, attended
by leading intellectuals from the former Yugoslavia. Whether they came from
Slovenia, an EU member of over ten years standing; Croatia the newest
member state; or from the candidate or prospective candidate countries,
almost all participants shared the same feeling: fatigue. Moreover, the
harshest criticism of Europe was delivered precisely by the intellectuals from
the member states. Others still had some hope.

An overwhelming majority of participants spoke nostalgically of Yugoslavia,

maybe even of socialism, which they fiercely criticized back when they lived in
it. Both Yugoslavia and socialism appeared in the Belgrade debate as a world
more prosperous and happy than the European one. Were these just
intellectual laments, musings of the habitually dissatisfied, pointless
complaints offering no solutions?

Where does this integration fatigue come from? I believe there are several
reasons for it in the ex-Yugoslav societies. When the Yugoslav nations created
their nation states in the wars of the 1990s, some of them for the first time in
their history, they expected the new national framework to solve every
problem; expecting that instantly after gaining independence they will become
more successful, freer, or as they used to say come into their own. But
once they reached their goal, they didnt like what they saw in the mirror. They
failed to build institutions, strengthen the rule of law, individual liberty,
economic progress, social well-being. And then they faced a problem. They
could no longer blame Yugoslavia or communism for their failure. They had to
face it as their own. A scapegoat was urgently needed. Inevitably, this part
was assigned to Europe. They are disappointed in Europe because they are
disappointed in themselves.
Disappointed in themselves and disappointed in Europe, because when they
say Europe, they see themselves as a run-down backyard of an edifice with
a splendid facade. In Yugoslavia they were an important international Cold
War actor. Now they feel like the poor cousin from the sticks in muddy shoes.
Theyre trying to wipe off the dirt on the back of their pants leg, only growing
more embarrassed. Lost in transition, they failed to find their place in Europe,
and Europe did not see itself in them. This is why many participants spoke of
neocolonialist relations, orientalism, neoliberal capitalism which deepens
inequality feeding on the poor. This is why the Yugoslav socialist paradise
looks like a future ideal, and not the long discarded past. The fatigue turns into
resistance and the new Eurosceptic Left is on the rise.

Somewhere along the line, Europe lost its own way. This is why we too,
coming from the backyard, see the simplified image Europe is the EU, the
EU is Brussels, Brussels is the treasury and the treasury is empty. As the
young leftist from Zagreb, Srecko Horvat, said in Belgrade: We came to the
after-party. Europe allowed itself to be perceived as a bad parent: one who
raises a child with money and when the money runs out, hes left with no
arguments. Usually, this is when a child looks for a way out in rebellion or
starts searching for another authority figure.

This disappointment with self and Europe fell on fertile ground. Analyzing the
European discourse in former Yugoslav countries, as some participants of the
Belgrade debate have shown, one can conclude that these countries see
Europe from the outside, as the other. According to this narrative, it is
because of Europe that we have to follow laws, build institutions, take care of
national minorities and protect freedoms. It is seen as a burden, an
abandonment of the self, an undesirable constraint. This is how both the
Right and Left see it. For the Right, it threatens national identity, globalizing it,
forcing it into the melting pot of multiconfessionalism and multiculturalism. For
the Left, it is the antithesis of social rights, an exploitation of the deprived
South, a crude market devoid of values. The European crisis gave arguments
to both.

The view from the former Yugoslavia was the view from without, exhausted,
disappointed and despondent. This says a lot about the Balkans, but it speaks
volumes about Europe. This is its mirror. Enlargement fatigue and expectation
fatigue are parts of the same problem. For Europe, this should be a symptom,
and not another misunderstood Balkan exoticism. While the Balkans and
Europe see otherness in each other, they fail to see the problem.

It is true that Europe, like democracy, needs to be in crisis, that it is its natural
state. It is also true that the threats are growing, that Europe is also
threatened in Kiev and in Paris. But in order for crises and threats to make it
stronger, as in previous cases of historical turmoil, Europe must redefine and
profoundly reform itself. It must rethink what is common and what is particular,
how far national sovereignty goes and where the common goal begins. This,
in turn, is also what needs to be done by the former Yugoslav states, still
ethno-nationalistically gazing at their own navel. The Balkans perspective
shows that Europes greatest problem is that it no longer understands itself,
that it is no longer our own. This is why it will again become its own once it
becomes our own too, once it becomes a problem solver, and not the
problem itself.

Speech from the Berlin conference Europe?.

Peanik.net, 04.03.2015.

Integration fatigue

Na skupu u Berlinu Europe?, autorka je izvestila sa Beogradske debate o

Evropi, odrane u decembru 2014.

Depresivan, pesimistian, gorak. Moda bi se tim pridevima najbolje mogao

opisati skup odran u Beogradu na temu ta mislimo kad kaemo Evropa,
na kome su uestvovali vodei intelektualci iz bive Jugoslavije. Bez obzira da
li dolaze iz Slovenije, koja je vie od 10 godina lanica EU, iz najnovije lanice
Hrvatske ili onih drava koje su kandidati ili kandidati da postanu kandidati,
gotovo svi uesnici su delili isto raspoloenje: fatigue. Uz to, najotriju kritiku
Evrope mogli smo uti upravo od intelektualaca iz drava lanica. Drugi su jo
imali neku nadu.

Ubedljiva veina uesnika je govorila s nostalgijom prema Jugoslaviji, moda

ak i prema socijalizmu, iji su estoki kritiari bili kad su u njemu iveli. I
Jugoslavija i socijalizam su na Beogradskoj debati izgledali kao prosperitetniji
i sreniji svet od ovog evropskog. Da li su to bile obine intelektualne
alopojke, kontemplacije veno nezadovoljnih, jalove kuknjave koje ne nude
reenja?

Odakle taj integration fatigue? Mislim da drutva bive Jugoslavije imaju

nekoliko posebnih razloga za to. Kada su u ratovima 90-ih jugoslovenski
narodi stvarali svoje nacionalne drave, neki i prvi put u istoriji, oekivali su da
e taj novi dravni okvir reiti sve probleme, da e odmah po sticanju
nezavisnosti postati uspeniji, slobodniji, ili kako su tada govorili svoji. Kad
su ostvarili cilj, nisu se sami sebi dopali. Nisu uspeli da izgrade institucije, da
uvrste vladavinu prava, slobodu pojedinaca, ekonomski napredak, socijalno
blagostanje. I tada je nastao problem. Za svoj neuspeh vie nisu mogli da
krive ni Jugoslaviju ni komunizam. Morali su da se suoe s tim kakvi su kad su
svoji. Hitno je morao da se nae krivac. Neumitno, to mesto je zauzela
Evropa. Razoarani su Evropom, jer su razoarani sobom.

Razoarani su sobom, razoarani su Evropom, jer kad kau Evropa sebe vide
kao zaputeno zadnje dvorite iza zgrade s raskonom fasadom. S
Jugoslavijom su bili znaajan meunarodni inilac u Hladnom ratu. Sada se
oseaju kao siromani roak sa sela, u blatnjavim cipelama. Pokuavaju da ih
obriu o pantalone, ali time je njihova sramota samo jo vea. Izgubljeni u
tranziciji, svoje mesto u Evropi nisu nali, a ni Evropa nije videla sebe u njima.
Zato su mnogi uesnici govorili o neokolonijalnom odnosu, o orijentalizmu, o
neoliberalnom kapitalizmu koji produbljuje razlike, hrani se siromanima.
Jugoslovenski socijalistiki raj zbog toga izgleda kao ideal budunosti, a ne
kao odavno odbaena prolost. Fatigue prerasta u otpor i uspon nove,
evroskeptine levice.

U meuvremenu, i Evropa je negde zagubila samu sebe. Zato smo i mi, koji
dolazimo iz backyarda, videli pojednostavljenu sliku Evropa je EU, EU je
Brisel, u Briselu je blagajna, a u blagajni vie nema novca. Kako je u
Beogradu rekao mladi leviar iz Zagreba Sreko Horvat : Doli smo
na afterparty. Evropa je dozvolila da se o njoj stvori percepcija loeg roditelja:
onog koji vaspitava novcem, a kad novca nestane on ostaje bez argumenata.
I tada deca, najee, izlaz trae u pobuni ili u potrazi za nekim drugim
autoritetom.

Ta razoarenja sobom i Evropom, dola su na spremno tlo. Kad se analizira

diskurs o Evropi u zemljama bive Jugoslavije, kao to su to pokazali neki od
uesnika Beogradske debate, moe se zakljuiti da se Evropa iz tih zemalja
gleda spolja, da se ona vidi kao drugi. Po tom narativu, zbog Evrope
moramo da potujemo zakone, gradimo institucije, pazimo nacionalne
manjine, uvamo slobode. Ona se vidi kao napor, odustajanje od sebe,
nepoeljna stega. Tako je vide i desnica i levica. Desnici ona ugroava
nacionalni identitet, globalizuje ga, tera u melting pot multikonfesionalizma i
multikulturalnosti. Za levicu ona je antiteza socijalnim pravima, ekploatacija
siromanog juga, golo trite ispranjeno od vrednosti. Kriza u Evropi dala je
argumente i jednima i drugima.

Pogled iz bive Jugoslavije bio je pogled spolja, umoran, razoaran i

besperspektivan. To mnogo govori o Balkanu, ali jo vie o Evropi. To je njeno
ogledalo. Zamor od proirenja i zamor od ekanja delovi su istog problema.
Za Evropu to treba da bude simptom, a ne ponovo pogreno shvaena
balkanska egzotika. Dok se Balkan i Evropa gledaju kao drugost, ne
uspevaju da vide problem.

Tano je da Evropa, kao i demokratija, mora da bude u krizi, da je to njeno

prirodno stanje. Tano je i da se pretnje umnoavaju, da je Evropa ugroena i
u Kijevu, i u Parizu. Ali da bi je krize i pretnje uinile jaom, to joj je u
prethodnim istorijskim lomovima uspevalo, Evropa mora da se redefinie i
duboko reformie. Da ponovo razmisli ta je zajednitvo a ta posebnost,
dokle ide nacionalna suverenost i gde poinje zajedniki cilj. To, sa svoje
strane, moraju da urade i drave nastale na tlu bive Jugoslavije, jo uvek
etnonacionalistiki zagledane samo u svoj pupak. Pogled s Balkana pokazao
je da je najvei problem Evrope to to je prestala da razume sebe, to vie
nije naa. Zbog toga e ona ponovo biti svoja kad opet postane i naa, kad
postane ime za reavanje problema a ne problem sam.
Peanik.net, 04.03.2015.

Mitski rat

Zato je Prvi svetski rat uopte toliko vaan? Zato moe da izazove tolike
emocije? Zato je on neto to se politiki zloupotrebljava?

Poimo od toga da je ba jedan istoriar, to je vano, rekao da je Prvi svetski

rat kljuno mesto srpskog identiteta. Jedan istoriar to nikako ne bi smeo da
kae. Ono to je sigurno u svim analizama konstrukcije identiteta, to je da oni
nastaju na osnovu stereotipa, raznih emotivnih prerada istorije. Jednog
istoriara bi trebalo, recimo, da zanimaju pitanja kao to su: kako je to
izgledalo na srpskom selu, na primer, tih est godina koliko su mukarci
ratovali, od 1912-1918, kakva je bila glad, koliko je dece umrlo? Kad istoriar
kae da se od toga pravi identitet, to znai da on svesno govori da istoriari
treba da preziru stvarnost i da se bave pre svega emocijama koje moemo da
iscedimo iz neke prolosti.

Kljuni trenutak je 1972. godina, kada izlazi etvorotomni roman Dobrice

osia Vreme smrti. On je, u stvari, odredio istorijsko seanje Prvog
svetskog rata, s tim to je vano imati na umu da je ta 1972. bila politiko
istravanje Dobrice osia, odnosno to je bilo prerano. Jugoslavija jo nije
ula u krizu kakva e se desiti osamdesetih, i taj roman nije odmah imao tu
ulogu koju e kasnije dobiti, ve je imao ulogu, ako moemo tako metaforino
da kaemo, ideoloke ponornice. Bilo je potrebno da proe 10 godina i da se
desi sve ono to se desilo od 1980. pa nadalje, odnosno bilo je potrebno prvo
da umre Tito, zatim da krene Kosovska kriza 1981. i naravno da krene duboka
ekonomska kriza Jugoslavije. I sva ta tri, i jo ko zna koji okidai, doveli su u
pitanje jugoslovensku federaciju i ve ranih osamdesetih postavili pitanje
njene ili reorganizacije, ili njenog ruenja.
To je politiki kontekst koji je bio neophodan da bi Prvi svetski rat dobio sada
svoje pravo mitotvorno mesto, i to mitotvorno mesto mislim da treba da
smestimo u 1983. godinu, kada je u Jugoslovenskom dramskom postavljena
predstava na osnovu romana Dobrice osia, Kolubarska bitka. Mislim da je
to taj presudni trenutak. Tada su novine pisale da je ta predstava pokrenula,
kako su govorili, provalu istorije, da se u pozorite ulazilo kao u crkvu. Svi koji
smo bili na toj predstavi moemo da se setimo da je publika ustajala, navijala,
vikala juri, da se plakalo, smejalo, da je to zaista bio jedan verski ritual koji
bismo mogli da poredimo sa inicijacijom ulaska u novoroenu naciju, i mislim
da je ta predstava bila taj pravi okida. Meutim, naravno, nije to neto to je
moglo da napravi homogenizaciju naroda koja je bila potrebna, nije mogla
cela Srbija da doe u Jugoslovensko dramsko.

Celu Srbiju je pokrenulo neto drugo, ponovo u sferi kulture, i sada smo u
godini 1985. kada je objavljen roman Danka Popovia Knjiga o Milutinu. To
je taj prekretni dogaaj, i mislim da komotno tu knjigu moemo da zovemo
mala crvena knjiga, seajui se kulturne revolucije Mao Ce Tunga. Ta knjiga
je odigrala presudnu ulogu. Sa 140 i nekoliko strana ona je neka vrsta
dajdest dela Dobrice osia. Tu su sve te ideje na gomili. I ono to je odmah
vano da kaemo, iz ega je jasno da se ne radi ni o kakvom kulturnom, jo
manje istorijskom fenomenu, ve da se radi o potpuno novoj, zapravo,
politikoj situaciji, govori podatak da je za godinu i po dana objavljeno 18
izdanja te knjige, i da se rauna da je ona prodata u oko 500 hiljada
primeraka. To je bila ta knjiga koja je ula u svaku srpsku kuu, i ona je
prenela glavne mitske ideje.

Da podsetim, Milutin je srpski seljak, i knjiga poinje njegovim ueem u

Balkanskim ratovima a zavrava se njegovom smru u takozvanim
komunistikim kazamatima. Dakle, on prolazi itav 20. vek i samim tim je
personifikacija srpske nacije. Pisalo se tada da je on arhetipski srpski seljak,
da je on suma nacionalnih istina, da je on nosilac srpske istorijske sudbine,
kolektivni heroj, a mislim da je najtanije rekao sam pisac, Danko Popovi,
kada je rekao da je Milutin deda svih Srba. Ta knjiga je dobila mesto
ideolokog pamfleta. Ona je izvrila neku vrstu medijskog prenoenja ideja
Dobrice osia do irokih masa.
Prvi svetski rat se vratio tek 2013. godine, kada su poele pripreme za
stogodinjicu i Peanik je, naravno, reagovao odmah. Postavili smo pitanje o
emu se tano sad radi i sad smo, mislim, u situaciji da sloimo te kockice. Da
bismo razumeli kako je mogue da Prvi svetski rat uvek izazove povienu
temperaturu, moramo da napravimo analizu tih kljunih mitskih mesta, da
vidimo koje su te osnove, to bi ovaj istoriar rekao, srpskog identiteta,
odnosno tog mitskog i emotivnog tumaenja istorije.

Prvi svetski rat je izuzetno vaan zato to je nekoliko bitaka koje su se u

njemu dogodile, poevi od Cerske i Kolubarske, zakljuno sa probojem
Solunskog fronta, presudno za stvaranje tog mita o ratnikoj i pobednikoj
naciji. Mislim da je Arsenije Jovanovi, koji je reirao Kolubarsku bitku u
pozoritu, najbolje u jednom intervjuu kasnije to sam definisao, rekavi da je
Kolubarska bitka u stvari Kosovska bitka, ali sa pobedom na kraju. To ne znai
da je pobeda bitnija od poraza. Naprotiv, poraz je bitniji, ali ipak ta pria o
pobedi godi, ona je vana za nacionalno samopouzdanje, za heroizaciju
nacije.

Poreenjem knjievnosti i udbenika istorije moj cilj je da pokaem kako su te

predstave iz knjievnosti, od Dobrice osia preko Knjige o Milutinu,
direktno ule u na sistem obrazovanja, preskoivi potpuno kritiku
istoriografiju. Knjievnost se direktno ulila u na sistem obrazovanja.

Ideja o heroizaciji prolosti, na primer, ulazi u dananji udbenik kroz citat

nekog francuskog oficira koji kae hajde da verujemo da to zaista kae
Samo je francuska konjica, i to uz velike napore, mogla da stigne srpsku
peadiju. U jednom romansiranom seanju francuskog oficira ovako neto je
sasvim doputeno, ali da to ue u udbenik istorije, i to bez ikakvog otklona,
bez ikakvog dovoenja u pitanje kako je mogue da francuska konjica jedva
prati srpsku peadiju i to na visinama Kajmakalana, ve jasno govori da se tu
radi o pripisivanju natprirodnih svojstava srpskoj vojsci i srpskom narodu. Ako
se setimo, krajem osamdesetih, tokom priprema za rat se govorilo svi nai
ratovi su pobedniki, nai protivnici su sve ratove izgubili i na tome se
hranila nacionalna arogancija. Meutim, eto, kada neto postavite na mitu,
stvar se obino preokrene, i Srbija je devedesetih doivela sve te velike
poraze.
Druga kljuna ideja zbog koje je Prvi svetski rat taj osnivaki mit jeste ideja o
naciji-rtvi, ta samoviktimizacija naroito se lako izvodi na Prvom svetskom
ratu gde je Srbija realno izgubila izmeu treine i etvrtine stanovnitva. Ali
jedno pitanje je kolike su stvarne rtve, a drugo pitanje je kako se mi prema
tim rtvama odnosimo, na koji nain ih pamtimo. U svakom sluaju, ta
samoviktimizacija, koja je zloupotreba tih rtava, uasno je vana zato to
narod-rtva ima sve te moralne i politike privilegije, svaki njegov postupak je
unapred oproten, i ona slui da se svi okolni narodi stalno podseaju na taj
nikad isplaeni dug. Ili, kao to je Amos Oz rekao jednom prilikom,
prisustvujemo svetskom prvenstvu za najveu rtvu meu narodima. Mislim
da su Srbi odavno u toj trci.

To je neto to je, na alost, takoe ulo u nastavu istorije, i ovde se esto

koriste izvori. To je taj tipian mehanizam, gde kaete pa evo, izvor kae.
Pitanje je, naravno, kakav je tvoj odnos prema tom izvoru, kako e ti aka
uputiti da ita taj izvor ili je aku od 13 godina preputeno da ga shvati. Na
primer, na jednom mestu u dananjem udbeniku, gde se opisuje situacija u
Valjevu stoji da su okupatorske snage javljale da i mukarci i ene smrtnu
kaznu doekuju stoiki, mirno. Smrtna kazna izgubila je svaku efektivnost.
Smrti se niko nije plaio. I kada vidimo bilo koji opis u dananjim udbenicima
vidimo da je to ne samo ideja, ve i sam jezik Dobrice osia, tako da u
udbenicima pie Srbija je bila zemlja smrti. To je ponovo irenje tih epskih
vrednosti, u kojima se razvija prezir prema smrti i pripremaju se i najnovije
generacije za ideju da je smrt vrhunac koji oni uopte mogu i da doive.

Nova mitska taka koja se moe graditi na osnovu dogaaja u Prvom

svetskom ratu, jeste ona ideja o srpskom narodu kao o velikodunom, koji sve
ini za druge, i tu dolazimo do jednog izuzetno vanog mesta za itavu tu
ideologiju, a to je emocija nepravde jer ona je moda najjai lepak za naciju.
Ona je ta koja homogenizuje sve pojedince tim snanim oseajem da smo mi
objekt stalne istorijske nepravde gde vi stalno nekom neto dajete, gde ste
vi stalno neshvaeni i na kraju najloije proete. To je vano zbog toga to
homogenizuje naciju, ali je vano i zato to je to najlaki okida za revan. To
je taj sindrom neuzvraene ljubavi koji vas zapravo mobilie, koji je bio, ako
se seate krajem osamdesetih i poetkom devedesetih kljuan za poetak
rata i za ruenje Jugoslavije. Milutin neprekidno o tome govori. On stalno
govori mi idemo da oslobaamo druge, mi ginemo zbog drugih, i onda
poimence ide ta sve radimo za Slovence, ta za Hrvate i tako dalje, ali on
stalno ima taj oseaj da je ta njegova rtva nepriznata, da to niko ni nee, da
ga svi udno gledaju.

Naravno, to je knjievnost i moemo o Knjizi o Milutinu da razgovaramo na

razliite naine ali, to bi neki rekli, knjievnost ima pravo da bude kriva.
Udbenici nemaju pravo da budu krivi, oni imaju potpis ministarstva
obrazovanja, i sada emo da vidimo kako su ove Milutinove misli direktno
prele u udbenik preskaui rezultate naune istoriografije i to pre svega
kroz ideju da je Srbija oslobodila druge jugoslovenske narode, dala im dravu.
Jo jedna izuzetno vana komponenta za taj srpski nacionalizam jeste da je
Srbija svaki put dala ruku narodima koji se uvek nau nekako na pogrenoj
strani istorije. Ali mi, iz te velikodunosti, uvek im damo ruku i prevedemo ih,
provuemo ih kroz taj moralni usek istorije, a oni nas ponovo zloupotrebe.
Citiram udbenik gde se kae: Srbija je omoguila ostalim jugoslovenskim
narodima da formiranjem jugoslovenske drave napuste stranu poraenih i da
se prikljue pobednicima.

Sledea mitska taka koja je bila izuzetno vana tokom osamdesetih, ali nita
nije izgubila na emotivnom potencijalu, jeste mit o neprijatelju koji takoe
odlino moe da se gradi na osnovu interpretacija Prvog svetskog rata,
pogotovo kada govorimo o svim susednim narodima ali i kad govormo o
Evropi kao takvoj. Jer nisu nam neprijatelji samo Austrougarska i Nemaka
protiv kojih smo ratovali nego su, bogami, neprijatelji i saveznici koji su raznim
pokuajima pregovaranja sa naim neprijateljima, Italijanima i Bugarima, hteli
da daju nae teritorije i tako dalje. To jeste bilo tako, ali je ponovo pitanje ta
ete vi iz toga zakljuiti. Da li ete zakljuiti da sa velikim silama treba da
gledate kako ete svoje interese da ostvarite, ako je takva situacija, ili vi treba
ponovo da sve pretvarate u sopstvene neprijatelje, to radi i naa knjievnost i
na sistem obrazovanja. Zato je vaan mit o neprijatelju? On je dodatni tap
koji pomae osvetu. I ako je nekome ostalo neto nejasno, Milutin zakljuuje,
citiram: Treba da im vratimo, da pobijemo Arnaute. Oni su pobili nae,
razmrskali im glave uicama sekira. On najdirektnije poziva na osvetu. I svaki
put kad na taj nain poreamo neprijatelje, moramo da znamo da je to uvek
poziv na revan.
Na kraju dolazimo do poslednjeg mita. To je mit o Jugoslaviji za koji je ponovo
Prvi svetski rat, naravno, kljuan, jer je ta drava tada stvorena. Tu dolazimo
do kljunog mesta i kod Dobrice osia i kod Milutina, i kod dananjih
udbenika, a i kod dananjih politikih reakcija na Prvi svetski rat, zbog toga
to se sve to smo ranije pomenuli herojstvo, velike srpske rtve, velika
nerazumevanja i velike nepravde sve je uzalud. To je Dobrica osi
formulisao: Jugoslavija kao istorijska greka. Tu ideju potpuno otvoreno
nalazimo u udbenicima, recimo, za osmi razred. U dananjem udbeniku
pie: Srbija je od prihvatljivog pijemonta srpstva dakle, kroz
ovo prihvatljivo direktno pisac udbenika uestvuje u debati i kae ta je dobro
dakle, Srbija se od prihvatljivog pijemonta srpstva proglasila za magloviti
pijemont jugoslovenstva. Ponovo jasno sugerie korienjem prideva. Bio je
to ishitren i nedovoljno promiljen preokret, fatalan mit o jugoslovenskoj
dravi. Ne treba, naravno, ni govoriti da udbenik sasvim sigurno nije mesto
za ovakvu vrstu rasprave i lupanja amara istorijskim junacima, istorijskim
idejama i situacijama ali, naravno, poto kod nas obrazovanje nema
obrazovnu svrhu, ovakve stvari su tu kljune.

Ukratko sam pokazala koja su to kljuna mitska mesta, i sad moemo da

preemo na ono to je politika sfera danas. Drava je odgovorila jednim
skupom u Akademiji nauka koji je otvorio predsednik, koji je podneo jo jedan
referat o Prvom svetskom ratu gde je ponovo, istim nabojem, rekao Srbija
nee dozvoliti reviziju, Srbija e se suprotstaviti, Srbija ovaj put nee preutati
i tako dalje. On i dalje ivi u toj napetosti. Meutim, vano je da su brzo posle,
ili ak istovremeno sa tim skupom u Akademiji nauka, u posetu doli Milorad
Dodik i Emir Kusturica, i tom prilikom su i predsednik Srbije i premijer Srbije
Aleksandar Vui izjavili da oni nee ii u Sarajevo, ve u Andrigrad i tamo
sami sa sobom obeleiti atentat koji se dogodio u Sarajevu.

Tim gestom oni su jasno hteli da pokau da Srbija ni ne eli da se pravi da je

sada neka druga Srbija. Oni koji stalno govore da je ovo sada neki veliki
zaokret, zapravo ovim gestom pokazuju da ne samo to nisu doneli novo,
nego da i na simbolikom planu svima poruuju da je to ona uvek ista Srbija
koja nee pruiti ruku, koja nee iskoristiti ovu priliku da ba ode u Sarajevo.
Oni odlaze kod Kusturice u Andrigrad. Poruuju tano ono to iz retorike
Tomislava Nikolia mi i moemo da zakljuimo, tj da se rat nikada nije zavrio,
da smo mi jo u ratu iz devedesetih, to se jasno poruuje odlaskom u
Republiku Srpsku. to je jo mnogo gore, pokazuje se da smo mi jo uvek u
1914. da i taj rat jo uvek traje.

Iz radio emisije 27.06.2014.

Peanik.net, 03.07.2014.

The mythical war

Why is World War One so important? Why does it cause such strong
emotions? Why is it politically abused?

Lets start with the important fact that it was a historian who said that the First
World War is a key point of Serbian identity. A historian mustnt say something
like this. The one thing that is certain about these analyses of identity
construction is that they emerge based on stereotypes, various emotional
adaptations of history. A historian should be interested in what was life like in
Serbian villages during those six years when men were away at war, from
1912 to 1918, how severe was the famine, how many children died? When a
historian says that these things constitute the identity, it means that he is
saying that historians should despise reality and deal, foremost, with emotions
that we can squeeze out of the past.

The key moment happened in 1972, when four-volume novel Time of death
by Dobrica Cosic was published. Basically, the novel determined historic
remembrance of World War One, but important thing to remember is that 1972
was Dobrica Cosics political charge, i.e. that it was too soon. Yugoslavia was
not yet in crisis that was to happen in the eighties, and that novel didnt
immediately play the role it would later play, but a role of, to put it
metaphorically, ideological sinking river. Another 10 years had to pass and
everything that happened from 1980s onward had to happen, i.e. Titos death,
Kosovo crisis that started in 1981 and, of course, deep economic crisis of
Yugoslavia. These three and who knows what other triggers questioned
Yugoslav federation and posed a question of its reorganization or its
destruction in the early eighties.

That was the political context needed for World War One to get its proper
mythical place, and that mythical place was set in 1983, when a play based on
Dobrica Cosics novel Kolubara battle was staged in Jugoslovensko dramsko
theatre. I think that was a decisive moment. The newspapers wrote that the
play initiated, as they called it, an avalanche of history, that people entered the
theatre as if coming into a church. All of us who saw the play remember the
audience standing, cheering, shouting attack, crying, laughing; it was indeed
a religious ritual we could compare with initiation into a new-born nation, and I
think that that play was the real trigger. However, of course, it couldnt create
homogenization of the nation that was needed; not entire Serbia could come
to Jugoslovensko dramsko.

It was something else that pushed the entire Serbia and again it came from
the culture; now we are in the year 1985, when a novel Book of Milutin by
Danko Popovic was published. That was a decisive event, and I think that we
can call that text a little red book, remembering Mao Tze Tungs Cultural
Revolution. That book played the key role. With some 140 pages, it was a
digest of Dobrica Cosics novel. All of the ideas were there. The important
thing to mention here, the thing that makes it clear that this was no cultural, let
alone historical phenomenon, but completely new political situation, is the fact
that 18 editions of that book were published during a year and a half and that
it is considered that 500,000 copies were sold. That was a book that reached
every Serbian household and conveyed main mythical ideas.

Just a reminder, Milutin is a Serbian peasant and the book starts with his
participation in Balkan wars and ends with his death in so-called communist
prisons. So, he goes through the entire 20th century and is a personification of
Serbian nation. It was said that he is an arch-type of a Serbian peasant, that
he is a sum of national truths, that he is a bearer of Serbian historical faith, a
collective hero, and I think that it was best put by the writer himself, Danko
Popovic, when he said that Milutin is the grandfather of all Serbs. That book
was considered an ideological pamphlet. It conveyed Dobrica Cosics ideas to
the masses.

First World War didnt return to focus until 2013, when preparations for the
centennial began and, of course, Pescanik immediately reacted. We asked
ourselves what exactly was this about and now I think that we have all pieces
of the puzzle. In order to understand how it is possible that World War One
always causes such heat, we have to analyze those key mythical points, to
see what are the bases of, like that historian said, Serbian identity, i.e. that
mythical and emotional understanding of the history.

World War One is extremely important because several battles that happened
during it, starting with the battles of Cer and Kolubara to the break-through of
Thessaloniki front, are of key importance for development of the myth about
warrior and victorious nation. I think that Arsenije Jovanovic, who staged
Kolubara battle in theater, defined it best in an interview when he said that
Kolubara battle is actually Kosovo battle, but with a victory at the end. That
doesnt mean that victory is more important than the defeat. On the contrary,
the defeat is more important, but nevertheless a story about victory feels
good, it is important for the national self-esteem, for heroization of the nation.

By comparing literature and history text books, my goal is to prove that these
works of literature, from Dobrica Cosic to Book of Milutin entered our system
of education directly, completely skipping critical historiography. Literature
entered our system of education directly.

The idea of heroization of the past enters todays school books, for example,
by quoting a French officer who had said lets believe that he had really said
that Only French cavalry, but with great effort, could keep up with Serbian
infantry. In a romantic memory of a French officer something like this is
completely acceptable, but the fact that it entered a history textbook, without
any deflection, without questioning how is it possible that the French cavalry
struggles to keep up with Serbian infantry on the altitudes of Kajmakcalan,
shows clearly that this is about assigning supernatural attributes to Serbian
army and Serbian people. Let me remind you, at the end of the eighties,
during the preparations for the war, it was said that all our wars were
victorious, our enemies lost all wars and it fed national arrogance. However,
it turns out that when you base something on a myth, the deal usually turns
upside down, and Serbia suffered all those great defeats in the nineties.

The second key idea that makes World War One a founding myth is an idea of
a victim-nation, that self-victimization is especially easily transcribed to World
War One when Serbia indeed lost between one third and one fourth of its
population. But, the question of actual number of victims and the question of
our attitudes towards these victims and the way we remember them are two
completely separate issues. Anyway, that self-victimization, which means
abuse of those victims, is extremely important because victim-nation has all
those moral and political privileges, its every action is forgiven in advance and
used to constantly remind all neighboring nations of that never-paid debt. Or,
as Amos Oz said we are witnesses of a world championship for the biggest
victim of all nations. I think that Serbs have entered this competition a long
time ago.

Unfortunately, this also entered the history education and the sources are
often used here. It is a typical mechanism, when you say there, the sources
say so. The question, of course, is about your attitude towards the source,
how will you guide a student to read that source or whether it is up to a 13
year old student alone to understand the source. For example, there is a
description of war time situation in town of Valjevo in the current textbook. It
says that occupying forces reported that both men and women await death
sentence stoically, with ease. The death penalty has lost all effectiveness. No
one was afraid to die. And when we look at any description in todays
textbooks we see that it is not only an idea, but the very language of Dobrica
Cosic, so the textbooks say that Serbia was the land of death. Again, it is
promotion of those epic values that nurture despise of death and prepare new
generations for the idea that death is the climax they strive to experience.

New mythical point that can be built upon the events of World War One is the
idea of Serbian people as generous, the one that does everything for others,
and there we come to an important point of the whole ideology the feeling of
injustice, because it is probably the strongest glue of a nation. It is the one
that homogenizes all individuals with a strong sense that we are object of
constant historic injustice you keep giving, but you are always
misunderstood and, eventually, end up worst. It is important because it
homogenizes the nation but also because it is the easiest trigger for a
rematch. This is the syndrome of unrequited love that actually mobilizes you,
which was, if you remember the late eighties and early nineties, the key to
start the war and the destruction of Yugoslavia. Milutin constantly speaks
about it. He keeps saying were going to free others, we are dying for others,
and then counts what we do for the Slovenians, for the Croats, and so on, but
he always has the feeling that his victim is denied, that nobody wants it, that
everyone looks at him weird.

Of course, it is just literature and we can talk about Book of Milutin in

different ways but, as some would say, literature has the right to be wrong.
Textbooks dont have the right to be wrong, they bear the signature of the
Ministry of Education, and now we will see how these Milutins thoughts went
directly into the textbook, skipping the results of scientific historiography
primarily idea that Serbia liberated other Yugoslav nations and gave them
their states. Another extremely important component of the Serbian
nationalism is that each time Serbia lent a hand to nations who always found
themselves at the wrong side of history. But we, out of our generosity, always
lend them a hand and help them cross to the right side, guide them through
the moral notch of history, but still they abuse our effort again and again. This
is a quotation from the textbook: Serbia has enabled other Yugoslav nations
to leave the defeated side and join the winners, by forming the Yugoslav
state.

The next mythical item that was extremely important in the eighties, but lost
nothing if its emotional potential since, is the myth of an enemy, which can
also be built on the basis of interpretation of World War One, especially when
we talk about all neighboring nations, but also when we talk about Europe as
such. Because, Austria-Hungary and Germany against whom we were at war
are not our only enemies, but, by God, allies who have tried on several
occasions to negotiate with our enemies, the Italians and the Bulgarians, who
wanted to give our territory, and so on, they are all also our enemies. Facts
may be such, but again the question is what you will conclude from this. Do
you conclude that when dealing with the great powers you should watch over
your interests in any given situation, or are you supposed to turn them all into
your enemies again, which is the case with our literature and our education
system. Why is the enemy myth important? It is an additional point that helps
vengeance. And if anyone was unclear about that, Milutin would conclude,
and I quote: We need to pay them back, to kill the Arnauts. They killed ours,
smashed their heads with ax loops. He directly calls for revenge. And every
time we line up the enemies like this, we need to know that it is always a call
for a rematch.

Finally we come to the last myth. It is a myth of Yugoslavia, which was again
heavily influenced by First World War because of course thats when the state
was created. Here we come to key points of both Dobrica Cosic and Milutin,
and todays textbooks, and todays political response to First World War,
because everything mentioned above the heroism, great Serbian victims,
big misunderstanding and severe injustice that was all in vain. In words of
Dobrica Cosic: Yugoslavia was a historical mistake. This idea is completely
openly found in, for example, the eighth grade textbook. Todays textbook
says: Serbia left the acceptable Piedmont of Serbhood using the
term acceptable textbook writer joins debate and says what is right or wrong
Serbia left the acceptable Piedmont of Serbhood and proclaimed itself the
foggy Piedmont of Yugoslavhood. Again, the use of adjectives is clearly
suggestive. It was a hasty and poorly thought-out reversal, the fatal myth of
Yugoslav state. There is no need to stress that textbooks are certainly not the
place for this kind of debate nor for blaming historical heroes, historical ideas
and situations but, of course, since our education has no educational
purpose, these things are the key.

I have briefly shown key mythical points, and now we can move on to the
political sphere today. The state responded with a conference in the Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Arts, opened by the president who filed another
report on World War One, and again, with the same emotional charge, he said
that Serbia will not allow revisionism, Serbia will counter, this time Serbia will
not be silent, and so on. He still lives in that tension. However, it is important
that soon after, or even at the same time this conference at the Academy of
Sciences and Arts took place, Milorad Dodik and Emir Kusturica came to visit,
and on this occasion both the President Tomislav Nikolic and PM Aleksandar
Vucic said that they would not go to Sarajevo, but to Andricgrad instead where
they would mark the assassination that took place in Sarajevo by themselves.

By this gesture they clearly wanted to show that Serbia does not even want to
pretend that is a different Serbia today. Those who keep saying that this is
now some major political shift, actually showed by this gesture that not only
did they not bring about anything new but that they symbolically want to tell
everyone that this has always been and always is that same Serbia which will
not offer peace, which will not take this opportunity to just go to Sarajevo.
They go to Kusturica in Andricgrad. They say exactly what we can deduce
from the rhetoric of Tomislav Nikolic that the war never ended, that were still
at war of the nineties, which is clearly stated by going to Republika Srpska.
Whats even worse, it shows that we are still in 1914 and that the war is still
on.

From the radio show 27 June 2014

Translated by Marijana Simic

Peanik.net, 05.07.2014.

Zato se (opet) ne oseam dobro

posle presude suda u Hagu?

Ovo je eksperiment u kojem je Dubravka Stojanovi, povodom oslobaajue

presude generalu Periiu, u svom tekstu posveenom oslobaanju
Gotovine zamenila imena i unela manje izmene.
Od izricanja oslobaajue presude generalu Periiu oseam knedlu u grlu
koju sam toliko puta osetila tokom poslednjih 25 godina. Ve satima me mui.
Preispitujem se, pretresam po glavi, pokuavam da analiziram. I sve mi neto
ne ide. Pitam se da li imam prava da se ne slaem s odlukom Suda? Mislim o
tome da li ova presuda menja moj odnos prema ratu? Da li odnos prema, na
primer, bombardovanju Zagreba ili Sarajeva, treba i moe da bude sada
drugaiji? Da li promena sudske odluke moe i sme da izmeni na odnos
prema ratnim zloinima? Reila sam zato da se preispitujem javno i da s
vama malo prodiskutujem ta je to to mi u celoj situaciji smeta.

Prvo to je tom presudom gurnuto u stranu je istorijska ocena rata. Ova

presuda, zasnovana na stavu da je JNA samo pomagala u legalnom delu rata
i u ostvarenju optih ciljeva rata, iskljuuje ideoloki kontekst rata i time menja
njegovo ukupno razumevanje. Odnosno, kako kau istoriari, nije se vodilo
rauna o uzrocima, a mislim da se to u anglosaksonskom pravu zove motiv.
To je taj kljuni okvir koji omoguava da se razume zloin i utvrdi odgovornost.
Posle oslobaajue presude generalu Periiu, gubi se kljuni motiv, odnosno
ideoloki okvir rata koji je njegov uzrok. Rat je sada ostao samo graanski,
odbramben i oslobodilaki, kako se to i devedesetih govorilo u Srbiji.
Oslobaajuom presudom legalizovani su opti ciljevi rata, ime smo se
veoma udaljili od mogunosti da se pokrene pitanje odgovornosti ba za
programe koji su do rata doveli. Rat je time normalizovan, uporediv sa bilo
kojim drugim.

Problem je u tome to se jugoslovenski sluaj ne moe porediti s klasinim

ratnim sukobima. Na prvom mestu, bio je to rat napravljen u okviru zajednike
drave, iji cilj je bilo njeno cepanje, zauzimanje teritorija i stvaranje to istijih
nacionalnih drava. Radilo se o posebnom istorijskom trenutku nastalom
neposredno posle pada Berlinskog zida i ruenja dotadanje podele sveta.
Intelektualne i politike elite veine jugoslovenskih naroda ocenile su da je to
idealan trenutak da, iza lea velikim istorijskim dogaajima, ostvare svoje
stare nacionalistike opsesije. Jedino to je bilo novo bio je kontekst kraja
Hladnog rata. Sve ostalo bilo je staro, a pre svega antijugoslovenske
ideologije koje su reenje svih problema videle u stvaranju nacionalnih
drava. Te ideologije ljuljale su obe jugoslovenske drave i dovele do njena
dva krvava raspada.
Intelektualne i politike elite jugoslovenskih naroda koristile su nacionalizam
da bi jaale sopstvene pozicije i gradile vlastitu mo u svom malom narodu.
Spojeni sudovi srpskog i hrvatskog nacionalizma pretakali su nesreu svojih
siromanih drutava, ekajui odluujui eksperiment u kome bi, u optoj
eksploziji, istisnuli onog drugog. Ti nacionalizmi, a naroito srpski i hrvatski,
negovali su jedan drugog. Decenijama su u obe sredine postojali ideolozi
konanog reenja, koji su snaili jedni druge. esto su se i nalazili i crtali
karte. Pisali su nacionalne programe, putali u javnost gasove svojih otrovnih
ideja. Objanjavali su svojim narodima da su ba oni i samo oni eksploatisani
u Jugoslaviji; da ih oni drugi odvajkada mue; da oni uvek najgore prou; da
mir nije dobar, jer u njemu izgube sve to su, trijumfujui u ratu, zadobili. Pisali
su romane, pesme, istorijske studije, govorili sa predikaonica, drali
predavanja i tribine, navijali za sportske heroje svoje nacije, zabavljali drutva
na slavama, priali viceve. Pobedili su u svojim javnostima i pre nego to je
doao trenutak u kome su mogli da naprave rat. U tim nacionalizmima,
naroito srpskom, hrvatskom i slovenakom, nalazio se motiv za rat. Mrnja je
bila njegova prirodna ambalaa. Rat je bio plod nacionalistike grabei i
alavosti koja je gonila ka zauzimanju teritorija i udovinim zloinima da bi
zemlja ostala samo naa. Bez tog konteksta rat u bivoj Jugoslaviji se ne
moe razumeti. Zloini uinjeni na svim ratitima, pa i bombardovanje
Zagreba, Zadra, Sarajeva i genocid u Srebrenici, bili su deo tog interaktivnog
delovanja nacionalizama, tog rada mrnje.

ta je sada novo u oceni rata donela presuda iz Haga? Ponitavanjem

prvostepene presude reeno je da za zloine nije odgovorna JNA. Time se
ponitava injenica da se ona stavila u slubu Slobodana Miloevia i da
njeno dejstvovanje po civilnim ciljevima nije pripadalo tek ma kakvom ratnom
sukobu. Ako iz sloenosti jugoslovenskog konflikta izbriemo ratne planove i
nacionalne programe kao njihove motive, liiemo se mogunosti da uvidimo
da je u njemu svako video ansu da se istakne i ostvari makar deo svojih
bolesnih nacionalistikih snova, dok je nekada zajednika jugoslovenska
vojska stala na stranu samo jednog programa onog iji je cilj bilo stvaranje
drave u kojoj e, kako se govorilo, iveti ceo srpski narod. Ako sve to
izbriemo iz istorije tog rata, onda to znai istorijsko ienje injenice da su
progoni stanovnitva i masovni zloini bili duboko ugraeni u ratne programe i
postavljeni kao ciljevi za stvaranje etniki istih novih drava. Svoenjem
uloge JNA samo na pomaganje, udaljavamo se od dubinskog razumevanja
uzroka jugoslovenskog rata, a kad se ne razumeju uzroci onda se ni posledice
ne vide dobro. I tee se mogu izbei ponavljanja tog uzrono-posledinog
delovanja. Ako svako ne preispita svoje greke nee umeti da ih prepozna
kad ponovo u njih padne.

Zbog toga se plaim politikih posledica oslobaajuih presuda. One mogu da

postanu osnove za nove sukobe. Bosna i Hercegovina i Hrvatska, s
oseanjem nedosegnute pravde, postaju frustrirane i mogu kliziti u
samosaaljenje, samoviktimizaciju i samoizolaciju, to su idealne psiholoke
osnove za razvijanje agresivnosti. Inae tanke nade u pravednost
pravosudnih institucija, sada dodatno iezavaju, posebno za Bonjake. U
Srbiji, inae nevoljno prihvatanje ideje da je zloina u ratu uopte i bilo, sada
moe u potpunosti da nestane i da se time svako suoavanje s odgovornou
za ratove devedestih na duge staze izgubi. Tonue tako Srbija sve dublje u
bolest svog izjedajueg nacionalizma, polako ali pouzdano gasei mogunosti
za ozdravljenje.To e bitno oteati poziciju svakome ko u srpskom drutvu
bude eleo da ponovo otvori tu temu i postavi pitanje odgovornosti za zloine.

A bez toga nema stvarnog suoavanja s prolou i sa samima sobom. I bez

toga e put do razvijenih, reformisanih, demokratskih, evropskih drutava biti
dui. U tom sluaju ovakav kraj rata moe za Srbiju biti jo jedan poraz. Ova
pobeda moe je podstai da pod tepih stavi sve svoje vojne poraze, da
zaboravi njihove uzroke, i da sasvim potisne potragu za razlozima koji su je
doveli u tu situaciju.

Sad neto o samom Sudu u Hagu. Neki kau da je zadatak suda u Hagu bio
da sudi zloincima i da pomirenje nije bilo u opisu njegovog posla. Ne bih se
sloila. Slaem se, naime, sa stavom Sre Popovia da svrha suenja nije
samo da se kazne poinioci, ve i da se uspostavi moralna ravnotea koja je
zloinom poremeena, da se pokae da je drutvo sposobno sebe da lei da
bi se prema prolosti uspostavio moralni odnos, jer prolost uva vitalne
resurse za obnovu sadanjosti (V. Benjamin). Pored te funkcije za koju sam
se nadala da e ostvariti Haki sud u postjugoslovenskim drutvima,
podravala sam ga jer sam, sa stanovita moje struke, verovala da e nam
pomoi da saznamo ta se sve desilo u ratovima devedestih, da e skupiti
saznanja koja e omoguiti buduim istraivaima da steknu to taniju sliku
dogaaja. To znanje je, za mene, put ka pomirenju. Verovala sam da e sud
sakupiti pouzdana znanja koja e pomoi zavaenim stranama da razumeju
dogaaje i da sami krenu dalje. Pa i u pomirenje.

Sada mislim da je taj sud izgubio autoritet i mogunost da deluje u pravcu

pomirenja. Zato to deluje kao da je pomirenje trebalo da se zasnuje na
amnestiji zloinaca. Mir, mir niko nije kriv! I opet ne mislim da je Haki sud
ispao (samo) politiki. Gore od toga. Ispao je neozbiljan. Od presude na 27
godine zatvora do oslobaajue presude? Kao to je povodom oslobaanja
Gotovine u Zagrebu napisao Zoran Pusi: ili je Raspravno ili je albeno vee
gadno pogreilo.

I da se vratim sad na pitanja s poetka. Da li e ovakve presude i amnestije

onih koji su bili na komandnim pozicijama uticati na to da jugoslovenski rat
ponem da razumevam drugaije nego pre njih? Nee. Nee zbog toga to
su, za mene, na prvom mestu uvek i jedino rtve. Zato mi nijedna
oslobaajua presuda Hakog suda nee olakati teg koji u sebi nosim od
1991. godine i nee me nagnati da zaboravim rtve koje su za sobom ostavile
oslobodilake vojske. I nee me odvratiti od toga da stalno traim da njihovi
krvnici odgovaraju. I da uvek i na prvom mestu govorim o odgovornosti za rat i
programima koji su nas u njega odveli. To radim zbog toga to sauestvujem
sa rtvama. I zato to od odnosa prema rtvama zavisi da li emo ikad krenuti
napred.

I da ponovo kaem: sauestvujem sa srpskim rtvama isto onoliko koliko

sauestvujem sa rtvama Srba. I zato se poslednjih meseci, od poetka
kolektivne amnestije u Hagu, ne oseam dobro. Kao i u drugim situacijama
kada nam jave da se za poioniocima i dalje traga. Kad pravda ne stigne.
Kad sistem omogui da se zakljui da se zloin isplatio. Kad zloin postane
sistem.

Peanik.net, 28.02.2013.
 Why dont I feel good after the verdict
of the Hague tribunal?

Since the acquittal of Croatian generals, I have a lump in my throat, which I

felt so many times during the last 25 years. It has been troubling me for days.
I am questioning myself, wondering, trying to analyze. And it does not seem to
be working. I wonder whether I have the right not to agree with the Courts
decision. I am not sure whether the fact that Ivica Dacic is praising Natasa
Kandic and saying that the two of them agree about the verdict is a good or a
bad thing? Should the attitude towards, for example, the anniversary of
Vukovar, be different now? Can the overturned court decision change our
attitude towards war crimes, and is this permissible? This is why I decided to
question myself publicly, and to discuss with you the things that bother me
about this situation.

The first thing pushed aside with this verdict is the historical assessment of
the war. The verdict, based on the 200 meter radius excludes the ideological
context of war, thus entirely changing the way it is perceived. That is, as
historians would claim, the causes were not taken into account I believe that
the Anglo-Saxon law calls this motive. This is the crucial framework that allows
us to comprehend a crime, and ascertain responsibility. After the acquittal for
the operation Storm, the key motive is lost the ideological framework of war,
which is its cause. The war remains now, at least in regard to the participation
of Croatia, waged solely in defense and for liberation, as Croatia has been
saying these days. Thus, operations Flash and Storm were conducted only
to return the territories which the Serbian side conquered in order to create, as
they used to say in Belgrade in those days a state where the entire Serbian
nation will live. In that case, the war in Croatia could be compared, for
example, with the Iraqi attack on Kuwait. In that case, everything was clear
one side was the aggressor, the other the victim.

The problem lies in the fact that the Yugoslav case cannot be compared with a
standard military attack by one state on another one. Firstly, this was a war
created within the framework of a common state, with the goal of tearing that
state apart, taking over territories and creating nationally homogenous states.
It was a specific moment in history, immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the toppling of the then existing division of the world. Intellectual and
political elites of the majority of Yugoslav nations believed this to be the ideal
moment for realizing their old nationalist obsessions, hiding in the shadow of
great historical events. The only new thing was the context of the end of the
Cold war. Everything else was old, particularly the anti-Yugoslav ideologies,
which perceived the creation of national states as the answer to all problems.
These ideologies undermined and brought down in blood both Yugoslav
states.

Intellectual and political elites of Yugoslav nations used nationalism to

strengthen their own positions and augment their power in their respective
small nations. The interconnected Serbian and Croatian nationalism nurtured
each other, but also the unhappiness of their poor societies, waiting for the
decisive experiment, in which they would be able to oust the competing
nationalism in a general explosion. Ideologists of the final solution, who
strengthened each other, existed on both sides for decades. They often met
and draw maps together. They wrote national programs, publicly emitting
gasses from their toxic ideas. They explained to their nations that they were
the only ones exploited in Yugoslavia; that the other side has been torturing
them for ages; that they always came out the worst; that peace was not good,
because in peace they would lose everything they won in war. They wrote
books, poems, historical studies, talked from pulpits, held lectures and public
debates, cheered for the sport heroes of their nations, entertained people
during celebrations, told jokes. They won in their respective publics, even
before the moment when they were able to create the war came about. In
these nationalisms, particularly Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian, was the
motive for war. Hate was its natural packaging. The war was a product of
nationalist voraciousness and greed, which drove towards conquering
territories and monstrous crimes, just so that the land would remain only
ours. Without this context, the war in former Yugoslavia cannot be
understood. Crimes committed on all battlefields, including the operation
Storm, were part of this interactive nationalism, this work of hate.

What changes in the assessment of war has the Hague verdict brought? By
overturning the first-instance verdict, it was acknowledged that Croatian
generals were not responsible for crimes, and, consequently, that the
operation Storm did not belong to the described historical context. If we erase
the Croatian nationalism from the complexity of the Yugoslav conflict as one of
its motives, we deprive ourselves of the possibility to perceive that, in addition
to the undeniable Serbian responsibility for the war, everyone else saw the
war as an opportunity for promotion and for achieving at least part of their sick
nationalist dreams. By reducing the Storm to a liberation operation, we are
stepping away from the thorough understanding of the cause of the Yugoslav
war. And when causes are not understood, then consequences cannot be
seen clearly. And the repetition of these causal actions is harder to avoid. If
each side fails to reexamine its own mistakes, it will not be able to recognize
them if it were to commit them again.

This is why I fear the political consequences of the acquittal. It can become
the basis for a new conflict. Serbia, defeated on all levels, with the feeling of
unattained justice, becomes a problem. To itself, and everyone else. Deep in
its frustration, Serbia is slipping toward self-pity, self-victimization and self-
isolation, which are the ideal psychological bases for developing
aggressiveness. The already weak respect for institutions, judicial in particular,
has now almost vanished. And this always brings a society closer to a new
dictatorship. The already reluctant acceptance of the idea that crimes were
even committed during the war, may now disappear completely, and thus any
long-term possibility of acknowledging the responsibility for the wars waged
during the nineties might be lost. Serbia will therefore only sink deeper into the
sickness of the all-consuming nationalism, slowly but certainly extinguishing
the possibility for recovery.

For Croatia, such a decision by the Court can have even more difficult
consequences. The triumphalism we have witnessed during the last few days
gives rise to the fear that the image of the Storm as an immaculate military
operation has been cemented in the Croatian public by this verdict. This will
make it significantly more difficult for anyone in the Croatian society to try to
reopen this topic and pose the question of responsibility for crimes committed.
And without this, there can be no real process of facing the past or oneself.
Even without this, the road towards developed, reformed, democratic,
European societies will be a long one. In that case, such an ending to the war
can be more devastating for Croatia than for Serbia. If it wants to, Serbia can
learn from its defeat. Croatia has fewer chances to learn from its victory.
Victories are, in general, not reexamined.

As to the moral aspect, it appears that such a decision of the Court comes
from an old-time attitude towards war. The starting point of this attitude
towards war is that the side which began the war and which bears the most
responsibility for crimes cannot be a victim. Therefore, the protection of
international law does not apply to the civilians who belong to the
responsible side. Against them, the use of any means is legitimate.
According to this logic, the incinerated victims of Hiroshima were legitimate
targets, and are responsible for their own deaths. The citizens of Dresden,
leveled to the ground in the triumphal attack by the winners of the Second
World War, were, as it they were convicted, deprived of their civil, as well as
human rights. In this case, the cruel, shameless and heartless exodus of
around 12 million Germans from the victorious countries should not be either
a moral or a legal topic. As in the ancient times, they had deserved revenge.
Eye for an eye, I think it is said. I was hoping that the perception of human
rights has progressed somewhat in the meantime, and that every victim is
only just a victim. And that the liberator and victor is not above the law. And
that telling the Serbs from Croatia it is your own fault, does not solve the
problem of responsibility for crimes committed against them.

And now, a few words about the Hague Tribunal itself. Some people are now
claiming that the task of the Hague Tribunal was to try the criminals, and that
reconciliation was not within their job description. I cannot agree. Namely, I
agree with the standpoint of Srdja Popovic, that the purpose of the trials is not
only to punish the perpetrators, but also to establish a moral balance which
has been disrupted by crimes, to show that the society is ready to heal itself in
order to establish a moral attitude towards the past, because the past
preserves the vital resources for renewing the present (V. Benjamin). In
addition to this function, which I hoped the Hague Tribunal would accomplish
in post-Yugoslav societies, I supported this Court, because, from the
standpoint of my profession, I believed that it would help us find out what
happened during the wars of the nineties, that it will compile knowledge which
will allow future researchers to acquire the most accurate picture of what
happened. For me, this knowledge is the road towards reconciliation. I did not,
of course, believe that the task of the Hague Tribunal was to dispense equal
justice and to impose the same sentence to everyone, on the basis of
brotherhood and unity. Not everyone was the same. However, I did believe
that the Court will gather reliable knowledge which would aid the conflicting
sides in understanding the events and moving forward on their own. Even
towards reconciliation. Now I believe that the Court has lost its authority, as
well as the possibility to act towards reconciliation. From the verdict of 24
years in prison to an acquittal? As Zoran Pusic recently wrote from Zagreb:
either the Trial or the Appeals Chamber has made a serious mistake.

Let me return now to the issue from the beginning of this article. I do not
believe that I have taken the side of Serbian nationalism with these
standpoints. What separates me fundamentally from Serbian nationalists is
the fact that nothing, including this verdict, will make me forget the victims left
on all the battlefields by the Serbian side. Or to speak always, and in the first
place, about the responsibility of the Serbian side. I do this out of my empathy
for the victims. And because it depends on our attitude towards the victims
whether we will ever move forward.

However, the fact that I have empathy for the victims of Serbs, does not mean
that I do not have empathy for the Serbian victims. And this is why I dont feel
good now. As in some other situations, when we are told that perpetrators
have still not been apprehended. When justice never arrives. When the
system enables people to conclude that crime pays off. When crime becomes
the system.

Translated by Bojana Obradovic

Peanik.net, 29.11.2012.
 Sto godina fantazije

Balkanski ratovi 1912-2012

Balkanski ratovi veoma su podesan istorijski dogaaj za konstrukciju mitske
nacionalne i istorijske svesti u Srbiji. Bili su to najpopularniji ratovi u modernoj
srpskoj istoriji, koji su u tadanjim medijima najavljivani kao dan velikog
obrauna ili ostvarenje zavetne misli. Svoj konstruktivni potencijal dobili su
zbog znaajne vojne pobede nad mitskim vekovnim neprijateljem i zbog toga
to je, zahvaljujui njima, Srbija udvostruila dravnu teritoriju.

Upravo zbog toga to nude materijal za kreiranje politiki upotrebljivog

narativa, tumaenja Balkanskih ratova doivela su tokom poslednjeg veka
zanimljive mutacije u udbenicima istorije. Vrlo rano su uli u kolske
programe, pa ih nalazimo ve u udbenicima iz 1920. godine, u prvim
knjigama izalim posle Prvog svetskog rata. U tim knjigama veoma je vidljiv
uticaj neposrednih istorijskih iskustava. Naime, kao osnovni krivac za izbijanje
Balkanskih ratova navodi se najsveiji neprijatelj Austro-Ugarska. Od
tridesetih godina dolo je do uravnoteenijeg predstavljanja uzroka ratova i do
standardizacije narativa po kome se, u srpskim udbenicima, kao presudan
uzrok Balkanskih ratova, uvrstio teak poloaj srpskog naroda pod Turcima,
zulumi i pogoranje stanja koje je nastupilo posle mladoturske revolucije.

Predstavljanje uzroka ratova u udbenicima imalo je, pored faktografskih, i

razliita ideoloka pakovanja. U meuratnom razdoblju najee se govorilo o
dunosti Srbije da oslobodi vekovima tlaeni srpski narod. Tako je rat dobio
jedan od kljunih interpretacijskih okvira: on je tumaen kao oslobodilaki,
odbrambeni i pravedan, to je u kasnijim udbenicima postalo gotovo formula
svedena na koncizan, apodiktiki jeziki stil koji ne doputa dileme i debatu:
Prvi balkanski rat je bio pravedan, a drugi je bio nepravedan.
Ali, pored tog ve vrlo rano tipiziranog naina ocenjivanja Balkanskih ratova,
razna vremena i politike potrebe donosili su razliite ideoloke nijanse. Tako
je, neposredno posle Prvog svetskog rata, navoeno da je problem koji je
doveo do ratova reen po naelu narodnosti, u emu vidimo jasnu
vilsonijansku inspiraciju. U nekim knjigama nastalim izmeu dva svetska rata
nalazimo i nanos ideologije integralnog jugoslovenstva. Pisalo se o
oduevljenju koje su srpske pobede izazvale kod drugih Jugoslovena koji su
taj rat smatrali kao svoj ili da je tim ratovima ostvaren petovekovni san
Jugoslovena.

Razdoblje socijalizma donelo je svoj ideoloki prtljag. U knjigama iz tog

vremena mogu se nai kritike ocene i osude ekspanzionistikih tenji srpske
buroazije ili direktno prozivanje njenih osvajakih namera, pogotovo
pokuaja srpske buroazije da sebi obezbedi izlaz na more. Meutim,
uprkos toj kritikoj noti, i u socijalistikom periodu se u Balkanskim ratovima
video dobar materijal za slanje korisnih i aktuelnih politikih poruka. Zbog toga
u udbenike ulazi ocena da su ti ratovi doneli i osloboenje od feudalizma,
to je bilo uklopljeno u tumaenje istorije kao smene drutveno politikih
sistema i klasne borbe kao njenog pokretaa. Ta ideoloka ovojnica
omoguila je da Balkanski ratovi, u vreme socijalizma, dobiju dodatnu
oslobodilaku dimenziju, jer su pored nacije, oslobaali i klasu. U udbenicima
objavljenim u vreme Slobodana Miloevia, zadrano je to dvojstvo, uz neto
vee insistiranje na veliini nacionalne pobede. Zanimljivo je da se u
udbeniku nastalom posle 2000. moe nai novi nanos nacionalnog
romantizma, u kljuu borbe za hrianstvo, a sada i za sopstvenu, kako pie,
srpsku civilizaciju.

Budui da je osnovni klju tumaenja Balkanskih ratova u svim generacijama

udbenika bila ideja o odbrambenom i oslobodilakom ratu, bilo je potrebno
kreativno intervenisati u opisu nekih dogaaja ili predstavljanju injenica.
Tako se izlazak srpske vojske na Jadransko more preko severne Albanije ne
navodi kao ratni cilj Srbije, ve se opisuje kao sluajna vojna akcija. Tako se u
jednom udbeniku iz 1927. godine navodi: Srbi su zauzeli Ohrid i Resan, a
ostatak razbijene turske vojske se beei povukao u Albaniju, preko ijih
krevitih planina su srpska dva odeljenja prela s najveim tekoama i stigla
do Jadranskog mora i ula u Dra. Takvim narativom stie se utisak da je
srpska vojska sluajno ula u albanske planine gonei ostatke turske vojske.

ei sluaj je da se srpski prodor preko severne Albanije prikae

hronolokom zamenom mesta odreenih dogaaja, tako da izgleda kao da se
srpska vojska nala u severnoj Albaniji samo da bi pomogla crnogorskim
jedinicama kod Skadra, iako se radi o dva odvojena dogaaja: jednom
prodoru do Draa iz novembra 1912. godine i drugoj operaciji kod Skadra iz
februara 1913. godine. Prvo takvo tumaenje nalazimo u udbeniku iz 1922.
godine, u kome je autorka napisala: Posle predaje Skadra, naa vojska poe
osvajati Arbaniju, prodre na obalu Jadranskog mora i osvoji Le i Dra. Takvo
povezivanje ova dva prodora srpske vojske do Jadrana u jedan dogaaj
maskira teritorijalne pretenzije Srbije i njenu tenju da sebi obezbedi izlazak
na more, koji bi doveli u pitanje isto odbrambeni karakter rata. Zbog toga je
ta hronoloka mutacija prihvaena u skoro svim sledeim generacijama
udbenika.

Socijalistiko razdoblje donelo je nova tumaenja, pa je ekspedicija u severnoj

Albaniji osuivana kao akt ekspanzionizma, a navodilo se i da je srpska
okupacija izazvala otpor albanskog naroda i pobunu. U knjigama iz razdoblja
vlasti Slobodana Miloevia ta kritika je nestala, a vratila se hronoloka
mutacija. Posle Miloevievog reima, u udbenike su uli novi interpretativni
nanosi. U njima se izlazak Srbije na Jadran preko severne Albanije prikazuje
kao legitiman, a nastanak Albanije kao problem. Uz to, pojavljuje se i dodatno
tumaenje srpsko-albanskog sukoba, koje je bilo u potpunosti usklaeno s
potrebama aktuelnog politikog trenutka izazvanog gubitkom suvereniteta nad
Kosovom1999. godine: Stvaranjem albanske drave Srbija je ostala bez
znatnog dela teritorije koji je trebalo da joj pripadne () Stvorena je albanska
drava koja e u narednim decenijama biti faktor nestabilnosti u ovom delu
Evrope i uvek neprijateljski nastrojena prema Srbiji.

Drugi balkanski rat je imao relativno stabilnu interpretaciju u udbenicima

istorije, bez obzira na razliite politike sisteme koji su se smenjivali tokom 20.
veka. U toj interpretaciji, sva odgovornost za rat lei na Bugarskoj, koja je
zahvaljujui tome stekla poloaj idealnog arhineprijatelja. Ona je predstavljena
kao saveznica koja trai previe, kri dogovore, udara s lea, muki.
Socijalistiki period se i u ovom pitanju donekle razlikovao, jer se, uz ocene da
se radilo o nepravednom i bratoubilakom ratu, nalazi i kritika ocena da je
Drugi balkanski rat bio posledica sukobljenih zahteva meu saveznicima, pa
se navodi i da je Srbija imala svoj deo krivice: I Srbija i Bugarska su bile otre
u svojim zahtevima, pa je sukob bio neizbean. Miloevievi udbenici su taj
rat, bez mnogo komentara, ocenjivali kao nepravedan, dok je u prvim
udbenicima nastalim posle pada Miloevia, nanet naglaeni nacionalni
romantizam, a dogaaji iz 1913. godine dodatno upotrebljeni radi insistiranja
na ugroenosti Srbije. Boldovanim slovima u njima pie: Gubitkom izlaska na
more, Srbija je bila u nepovoljnijem poloaju od ostalih balkanskih drava. ()
Srbija i Crna Gora dovedene su u situaciju da zatite svoje dravne interese
od Bugarske. U najnovijim udbenicima koji su sada u upotrebi, ponovo se
moe nai kritika opaska da je do rata dovela nepopustljivost Srbije i
Bugarske.

Balkanski ratovi bili su idealan prostor za diseminaciju mitskih sadraja i

epskog sistema vrednosti. Kao blistava pobeda, oni su nudili idealan okvir za
jaanje nacionalnog ponosa i kreiranje identiteta u skladu sa slavnim
vojnikim tradicijama. Slavljenje vojske i njenog znaaja bio je sastavni deo
vaspitanja i obrazovanja u svim vremenima tokom poslednjeg veka i pod svim
politikim sistemima. S naroitim oduevljenjem se u svim generacijama
udbenika opisuje polet i oduevljenje koje su pokrenuli ratovi. U prvim
generacijama knjiga navodi se da je Srbin hitao na bojno polje i da je vest o
pripremama za rat sa Turskom oduevila itav srpski narod, koji je dobio
sokolova krila i poleteo bojnim poljima. Opisuje se da se nije radilo o pohodu
jedne vojske, nego o pohodu celog naroda, o pohodu u kome se znala smo
jedna zapovest: napred!. Ulazak srpske vojske na Kosovo opisan je izuzetno
emotivno, pa se moe nai da su prelazei preko Kosova, plakali od radosti.
I same bitke, kao bitka kod Bitolja, opisane su kao epopeja: Srpska vojska je
pod borbom prelazila reke i ravnice, gazei vodu do pojasa i pevajui. Kroz
topovsku grmljavinu i prasak puaka razlegla se pesma: Oj Moravo, moje selo
ravno. Udbenici u vreme socijalizma i Miloevia bili su uzdraniji i nisu bili
natopljeni emotivnim pristupom, ali se u najnovijim knjigama, nastalim posle
2000. godine, takvi tonovi ponovo mogu nai: Posebno su oficiri prednjaili u
moralnom podstreku, s nestrpljenjem oekujui veliku pobedu nad vekovnim
neprijateljem.
U svim generacijama udbenika postoji jo jedan zajedniki imenilac:
naglaavanje da je srpska vojska bila uspenija od saveznikih. Kljuna ideja
je da su srpske pobede bile znaajnije od drugih, ali i da saveznici ne bi mogli
ostvariti svoje ciljeve bez srpske pomoi. Ve u prvom udbeniku napisanom
posle Prvog svetskog rata nalazimo tu ideju: Saveznici su isto pobeivali, ali
njihove vojske nisu mogle tako uspeno ii napred. S toga je Srbija, svrivi
prva svoj zadatak, poela pomagati svojim saveznicima. Pomo Bugarima
kod Jedrena i Crnogorcima kod Skadra svuda je jedna od kljunih tema, ali se
u nekim udbenicima moe nai i pomo Grcima. Tako se za Prvi balkanski
rat kae da su se Grci, iako bejahu jednom prilino stradali, srpskim
uspesima oporavili i veto uspeli da im Turci predadu Solun. Isto se ponavlja i
u Drugom ratu: srpska vojska je odrala najsjajniju borbu na Bregalnici, te su
potom i Grci poeli neto uspevati.

Takve poente osnova su za izgradnju mita o vitetvu koji poiva na konceptu

plemenitog junaka, ili kako je to formulisano u jednom od ranih udbenika:
Srbin je dobar junak, hrabar i plemenit vitez. Takva slika je u snanom
kontrastu sa jednim drugim, ali jednako vanim i snano podvuenim motivom
o naciji-rtvi, za koji, takoe, Balkanski ratovi daju povoljnu matricu. Ona se
pre svega stvara pomou stalnog ponavljanja formule o nezahvalnosti
saveznika, u prvom redu Bugara. Kao ne manji neprijatelji pojavljuju se i
velike sile koje su, kako navode svi udbenici, onemoguile da Srbija do kraja
materijalizuje svoje vojne pobede, nepravedno joj oduzimjui delove teritorija
koje je ona smatrala svojima. I u delovima lekcija koje se odnose na velike sile
esto se koristi emotivan govor kojim se pravila slika o istorijskoj sudbini:
Srpski narod je i na londonskom sastanku velikih sila bio oteen kao na
Berlinskom kongresu, to se kasnije formiralo kao vrst mitski sadraj o Srbiji
koja dobija u ratu, a gubi u miru.

Ipak, za ocenu interpretacije Balkanskih ratova kao modle za istorijsku svest,

kljuan je odnos prema starijoj istoriji. Balkanski ratovi se tu pojavljuju kao
prenosnik veze koja postoji sa srednjim vekom, kao sprovodnik koji
savremene generacije povezuje s mestom istorijskog roenja. Oni su
trenutak u prolosti koji ispravlja isprekidanu vremensku vertikalu, koji
povezuje pretke i potomke, obnavlja epsko shvatanje vremena, u kome vreme
stoji. Ve od prvog udbenika u kome su ratovi opisani pojavlju se svi kljuni
motivi: osveta Kosova, ispunjavanje Kosovskog amaneta; pominje se
osvetnika poruka Za Kosovo Kumanovo, za Slivnicu Bregalnicu. Pojavljuju
se i kljune istorijske linosti, s kojima se uspostavlja direktan kontinuitet. Tako
se navodi da je kralj Petar Karaorevi posle 520 godina nogom stupio u
Skoplje, Duanovu prestonicu, kao i da je osloboen Skadar, prestonica
prvih srpskih kraljeva. Stari junaci su ak prepoznati u savremenicima:
Snaga kraljevia Marka se probudila u Srbima. Od vremena socijalizma
takvo istorijsko povezivanje se vie ne nalazi u udbenicima, tako da
kosovskog mita od druge polovine 20. veka nije bilo u kolskom sistemu.

Ova analiza pokazala je da su Balkanski ratovi bili veoma podesan dogaaj

za izgradnju kljunih sastavnih delova nacionalno romantiarskog mita, ali da
su sve politike faze kroz koje su u 20. veku prole Srbija i Jugoslavija,
izborom injenica, naglaavanjem jednih i zanemarivanjem drugih, koristile te
dogaaje za slanje sebi potrebnih politikih poruka. Jo se jednom potvrdilo
da istorija jeste nauka o sadanjosti, da je svaka generacija pie iz poetka.
Ovaj kratki ogled nam je pokazao i da analizom tumaenja pojedinih istorijskih
dogaaja moemo mnogo saznati o savremenosti, koja se u slici prolosti
ogleda kao u ogledalu.

Predavanje na meunarodnoj konferenciji posveenoj stogodinjici balkanskih

ratova: The Balkan Wars 1912/13 Experience, Perception, Remembrance,
11 13. oktobar 2012, Center for Balkan and Black Sea Studies / Yildiz
Technical University, Istanbul.

Peanik.net, 13.10.2012.

The mould of war remembrance

The Balkan wars in Serbian history textbooks 1920-2012
Balkan wars were convenient historical events for constructing a mythic
national and historical awareness in Serbia. They were the most popular wars
in modern Serbian history, in the media at the time announced as the day of
reckoning, or the realization of the Old Testament goal. They achieved their
constructive potential because of the great victory over the mythical, age-
old enemy, and because, as their result, Serbia doubled in size.

Because of the quantity of material for creating politically useful narratives,

during the past century, interpretations of Balkan wars went through
interesting mutations in history textbooks. They entered the curriculum quite
early, so one finds them in the 1920 textbooks, the first ones to be published
after the First World War. Immediate historical experiences play a very
important role in these books. The most recent enemy, the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, is mentioned as the main culprit for the outbreak of the Balkan wars.
Since 1930s, there was a more even-handed presentation of the causes of
the wars, and standardization of the narrative, according to which, in Serbian
textbooks, the decisive cause of the wars came to be hardship of Serbian
people under Turkish rule, increased taxation, and overall worsening of
conditions following the Young Turks revolution.

Beside factual, presentation of the causes for the wars in textbooks also had
various ideological packaging. In the interwar period, members of the elite
spoke about the Serbias duty to liberate Serbian people, who have been
harassed for centuries. Thus, wars achieved one of their key interpretational
frames: they were to be interpreted as liberation wars, defensive, and just
which in later textbooks almost became a formula reduced to a concise,
apodictic language style that does not permit dilemmas or debate: The First
Balkan war was just, and the Second one was unjust.

However, beside that early framed way of evaluating Balkan wars, different
times and political needs brought various ideological shades. Thus,
immediately following the First World War, it was stated that the problem that
led to the wars was solved using the principle of nations, where one can see a
clear Wilsonian influence. Some books published between 1918 and 1941
also include remnants of ideology of the integral Yugoslavism. They mention
joy that Serb victories inspired with other Yugoslavs, which considered that
war as their own, as these wars realized the five centuries old Yugoslav
dream.

The socialist period brought its own ideological baggage. Books from that time
include critical views and condemnations of expansionist aspirations of
Serbian bourgeoisie, or direct questioning of its conquering intentions,
especially attempts by the Serbian bourgeoisie to secure the access to the
Adriatic Sea. However, despite these criticisms, Balkan wars were also
perceived as convenient for sending useful and actual political messages.
That is why a view that these wars also brought liberation from feudalism
was part of these considerations, incorporated in the interpretation of history
as the alteration of socio-political systems, and class struggle as its main
cause. This ideological framework enabled Balkan wars to gain an additional
liberation dimension during socialism, as they also liberated class, not just the
nation. Textbooks published during the rule of Slobodan Milosevic retained
that dualism, with slightly more emphasis on the greatness of national victory.
It is interesting that the post-2000 textbook includes a new layer of national
romanticism, in the key of the struggle for Christianity, as well as for ones
own, as the authors put it, Serbian civilization.

As the main key for interpreting Balkan wars in all generations of textbooks
was the idea of defensive and liberation war, it was necessary to creatively
intervene in describing some events, or presenting facts. Thus, the Serbian
armys exit to the Adriatic Sea through North Albania is not presented as
Serbias war aim, but as an accidental military action. A 1927 textbook notes:
Serbs captured Ohrid and Resen, and the remains of defeated Turkish army
retreated to Albania, through whose cliffs and mountains two Serb regiments
went with great difficulties, reached the Adriatic Sea and entered Durres.
Such a narrative tries to explain that Serbian army accidentally entered
Albanian mountains, while pursuing the remnants of the Turkish army.

More often, Serb incursion into North Albania is presented by chronologically

changing places of certain events, so it seems that the Serb army ended up in
North Albania only in order to help the Montenegrin units near Shkoder, even
though these are different events; one is the November 1912 push to Durres,
and another is the February 1913 operation near Shkoder. The first such
interpretation is found in the 1922 textbook, in which the author wrote:
following the victory at Shkoder, our army began to conquer Albania, moving
to the Adriatic coast and taking Lesh and Durres. Such combining of two Serb
army campaigns toward Adriatic into one masks Serbian territorial aspirations,
and her longing to secure the access to the sea, and all of this would bring
into question the allegedly purely defensive nature of these wars. Therefore,
this chronological mutation is accepted in almost all consequent generations
of textbooks.

The socialist period brought new interpretations, so the North Albanian

campaign was condemned as an act of expansionism, with remarks that the
Serb occupation resulted in resistance and uprising by the Albanian people.
Textbooks published during the rule of Slobodan Milosevic delete this
criticism, while the chronological mutation is back. After the fall of Milosevic,
new layers of interpretation enter textbooks. They describe Serbias push
toward the Adriatic and across North Albania as fully legitimate, and the
creation of Albania as a problem. There is also an additional interpretation of
the Serb-Albanian conflict, fully in accord with the needs of the political
situation of the time, caused by the loss of sovereignty over Kosovo in 1999:
Through creation of the Albanian state, Serbia lost a significant part of the
territory that she was supposed to have () The Albanian state was created,
and in the decades that follow, it will be the factor of instability in this part of
Europe, and always hostile to Serbia.

The second Balkan war had a relatively stable interpretation, despite the
different political systems which alternated during the 20th century. In this
interpretation, Bulgaria is fully responsible for the war, and, because of this,
she has acquired a status of an ideal archenemy. She has been described as
an ally that asks for too much, breaks agreements, and hits from the back,
traitorously.

Even here, the socialist period was slightly different, as, with remarks that this
was an unnecessary and fratricidal war, there is also a criticism that the
Second Balkan war was the consequence of the conflicting demands among
the allies, so Serbia was partly to blame as well: Both Serbia and Bulgaria
demanded too much, so the conflict was unavoidable. Textbooks from the
Milosevic era evaluated the war as unjust, without commenting too much,
while textbooks published after the fall of Milosevic include a prominent dose
of national romanticism and the 1913 events are additionally used for insisting
that Serbia is endangered. In bold print, it is noted that: By losing the access
to the Sea, Serbia was in less favourable position than other Balkan states.
() Serbia and Montenegro were put into the situation that they had to defend
their national interests from Bulgaria. The latest textbooks, currently in use,
again note that the war was caused by both Serbian and Bulgarian obstinacy.

Balkan wars were an ideal space for disseminating mythical content and
epical value system. As a spangled victory, they offered an ideal framework for
strengthening national pride and creating identity according to glorious military
traditions. Celebrating army and its importance was an integral part of
upbringing and education in all times during the last century, and under all
political systems. All generations of textbooks especially insist on the
enthusiasm and joy that the wars initiated. First generations of books note that
Serbs rushed to the battlefield, and that the news on preparations for the
war against Turkey brought joy to the entire Serbian people, who gained the
wings of the hawk and flew to fields of battle. Descriptions note that this was
not about one armys quest, but the quest of an entire people, the one where
only one command was known: forward! The entrance of the Serbian army
to Kosovo was described in very emotional terms, including descriptions that
soldiers while going through Kosovo, wept with joy. Even battles, like the one
near Bitola, are described in epic terms: The Serb army crossed in battle
rivers and plains, going through hip-deep water, and singing. Through the
thunder of canons and the blast of rifles, the song echoed Hey Morava, my
village in the plains. Textbooks published during socialism and during
Milosevics rule were more temperate, and without emotional attitude, but
such descriptions re-surface in the most recent books, published after 2000:
Officers especially lead the way in moral impetus, impatiently anticipating
great victory over the age-old enemy.

There is another common factor in all textbooks: the emphasis that the Serb
army was more successful than the allied ones. The key idea is that the Serb
victories were more important than others, as well as that the allies would
have been unable to achieve their own goals without Serbian aid. This idea is
mentioned in the very first textbook written after the First World War: The
allies won as well, but their armies could not go forward with such success.
That is why Serbia, after accomplishing her task first, started helping her
allies. The help to Bulgarians at Edrene and Montenegrins at Shkoder are
among the key topics, but some books also mention help to the Greeks. Thus,
it is said for the First Balkan war that the Greeks even though they suffered
very much, regained strength through Serbian successes, and skilfully
managed to get Thessaloniki from the Turks. The same happened in the
Second war: The Serb army had the most glorious battle in Bregalnica and,
after that, Greeks began to have some success as well.

Such statements present a foundation for building a myth of chivalry, based

on the concept of the noble hero, or, as formulated in one of the early
textbooks: A Serb is a good hero, brave and noble knight. Such an image is
in sharp contrast with another, but equally important and strongly outlined
nation-victim motif, for which Balkan wars also provide a good matrix. It is
provided through constant repetition of the formula of the ingratitude of allies,
primarily Bulgarians. The great powers are also listed as enemies, as,
according to all the textbooks, they prevented Serbia from gaining fully from
her military victories, unjustifiably taking from her parts of the territories that
Serbia regarded as her own. Lessons related to the great powers also use an
emotional style, in order to present an image of the historical destiny: The
Serbian people were wronged at the London meeting of the great powers, just
as they were in the Berlin congress. Later this formed as a firm mythical story,
according to which Serbia won in wars, but lost in peace.

However, for the evaluation of the interpretation of Balkan wars as a model

for historical consciousness, the relation to ancient history is of prime
importance. Balkan wars here serve as transmitters of the connection with
the Middle Ages, as a transformer connecting contemporary generations
with the place of their historical birth. They are a moment in the past that
corrects a broken timeline, connecting ancestors and descendants, renews
an epical understanding of time, where time stands still. The very first textbook
that describes these wars has all the key motives: revenge for Kosovo,
fulfilling the Kosovo behest; there is a cry for vengeance For Kosovo
Kumanovo, for Slivnica Bregalnica. There are also key historical
personalities, with whom a direct continuity is established. Thus, King Petar
Karadjordjevic after 520 years stepped into Skopje, the capital of [Medieval
King] Dushan, and Shkoder, the seat of the first Serbian kings is liberated.
Ancient heroes were even recognized in the contemporaries: The strength of
Prince Marko was awakened in Serbs. Since the socialist period, such
historical connectedness is not present in the books, so since the mid-
20th century there was no Kosovo myth in the school system.

This analysis demonstrated that the Balkan wars were very convenient events
for building key components of the national romantic myth, as well as that all
the political phases that Serbia and Yugoslavia went through during
20th century, by selecting facts, stressing some among them and ignoring
others, used these events for sending political messages that they needed. It
reaffirms an idea that history is the science about the present, and that each
generation writes it from the beginning. This short essay shows how an
analysis of certain historical events can tell us a lot about our contemporary
world, which reflects in the image of the past like in a mirror.

The Balkan Wars 1912/13, Experience, Perception, Remembrance,

International Conference on the Occasion of the 100th Anniversary, 11 13
October, 2012 at the Center for Balkan and Black Sea Studies / Yildiz
Technical University, Istanbul.

Peanik.net, 18.10.2012.

Prvi i poslednji izvetaj o korupciji i

medijima
Krajem septembra 2011. godine skoro istovremeno usvojena su dva vana
medijska dokumenta u Srbiji Strategija razvoja sistema javnog informisanja
do 2016. godine i Izvetaj o pritiscima i kontroli medija. Kratka istorija ova dva
dokumenta veoma je pouna: prvi je pripreman dve godine, angaovani su
veliki resursi (Ministarstvo kulture, medijska udruenja, meunarodne
organizacije, struna javnost i NVO), u njega je uloeno mnogo novca
(200.000 evra evropskih donacija za izradu studije meunarodnih eksperata,
40.000 dolara za izradu ekspertskog saetka konsultantskoj kui PwC
PricewaterhouseCoopers, serija okruglih stolova sa domaim i stranim
uesnicima u organizaciji OEBS-a i Ambasade Velike Britanije, radna grupa
Ministarstva kulture za pisanje predloga); drugi je, samostalno, na osnovu
viemesenog istraivanja pripremio Savet za borbu protiv korupcije. Iako je
re o izvetaju jedne institucije, u njemu je prepoznatljiv struni i ljudski
rukopis Verice Bara, predsednice Saveta za borbu protiv korupcije,
neumorne u raspetljavanju tekih korupcionakih afera.

Uz veliku medijsku panju, Strategijom je objavljeno da e se drava povui iz

vlasnitva u medijima najkasnije u roku od 24 meseca po utvrivanju
zakonskog osnova. To znai da je glavni domet dugooekivanog dokumenta
obaveza da se u prilino dalekoj budunosti uradi ono to je Zakonom o
javnom informisanju bilo propisano ve 2003. ali nikada nije ostvareno.
Pribliavanje EU uslovilo je propisivanje jo nekih obaveza, pre
svega projektno finansiranje i kontrola dravne pomoi, ali u jednako
nepreciznoj formi. Iako je Strategiju usvojila Vlada Republike Srbije, teko je
rei ko e se stvarno zalagati za njeno sprovoenje. Re je o prilino
nekonzistentnom tekstu u kome ima meusobno nepomirljivih principa, pa se
za sada uglavnom svi hvale ueem u njegovoj pripremi (lan radne
grupe), a niko odgovornou za njegov sadraj, a posebno ne posledice (mi
se nismo sloili sa tim predlogom, ali je Vlada to ipak usvojila). Tako je bilo i
sa svim do sada usvojenim medijskim zakonima od poetka bolne, dugotrajne
i neefikasne tranzicije. O njima se po kuloarima prepriavaju bitke za svaki
zarez i formulaciju i proizvodi uobiajena mitologija po kojoj su se ekspertski
timovi i radne grupe zalagale za najvie standarde, ali vlast to nije
prihvatala. Kao posledica su uvek nastajali nesprovodivi zakoni, oni koji slue
da se prema Evropi pokae dobra volja, ali koji nita znaajnije ne menjaju.
U Strategiji jo pie da se ne zna koliko je dravno vlasnitvo u medijima, sa
koliko novca drava uestvuje u finansiranju medija, koliko novca dobija javni
servis od pretplate a koliko iz komercijalnih izvora, ali da e drava sve to
urediti po evropskim strandardima. Iako nema kontrole do sada postojeeg
sistema finansiranja medija iz javnih izvora, niti efikasne zatite od
nedozvoljene koncentracije, to e, kae se, ubudue i pod mnogo
komplikovanijim okolnostima, sigurno biti obezbeeno. Skoro je uvredljivo da,
sa svim tim naporima uloenim u Strategiju, u njoj ima tako malo podataka o
medijima u Srbiji, a jo je uvredljivije potpuno odsustvo bilo kakve razvojne
vizije u jednoj oblasti koja se tako ubrzano menja.

Drugi dokument je uglavnom najavljen kratkim vestima kada se pojavio, ali se

vrlo malo pisalo o njegovom sadraju. Re je o Izvetaju Saveta za borbu
protiv korupcije Vlade Republike Srbije, a koji ne lii ni na jedan tekst o
medijima koji je ikada izaao iz bilo koje dravne institucije. Izvetaj o kontroli
i pritiscima na medije napisan je jasno, hrabro, analizira tokove novca u i oko
medija i mehanizme trgovine medijskim uticajem. Obilje podatka uglavnom
nepoznatih javnosti dovedeni su u vezu i izvedeni su zakljuci o korupciji i
klijentelizmu u medijima. Izvetaj se ita kao krimi pria ona prati tragove
novca koji krue po adresama offshore kompanija, tajkuna, medija i drave
selei se po celoj planeti. to je jo vanije, Izvetaj jasno pokazuje kako se
novac kree da bi se sakrilo pravo vlasnitvo, spreila kontrola nedozvoljene
koncentracije i kritiki rad medija. Oekivalo bi se da e jednu ovako
dokumentovanu analizu mediji jedva doekati, pokuati da popune
nedostajue detalje i ispitati zato se to deava sa medijima u Srbiji.

Umesto toga Izvetaj je okruen medijskom tiinom.

Skriveni vlasnici medija

Kako to da je u vreme tolikih studija, okruglih stolova i rada na Strategiji,
najprecizniju analizu pritisaka i kontrole medija uradio jedan savetodavni
organ Vlade koji i nije nadlean za medije? Savet je poao od jednostavne
pretpostavke da su mediji vani u borbi protiv korupcije, a da tu bitku ne mogu
da vode ako su i sami korumpirani. Zbog toga je istraivao saradnju sa
medijima u 50-ak dravnih institucija, a na osnovu prikupljenih podataka
zakljuio da su tri najvea problema medija u Srbiji:

(1) netransparentnost medijskog vlasnitva,

(2) ekonomski uticaj drave na rad medija kroz razne vidove budetskih
davanja, i
(3) problem RTS koji umesto javnog servisa ima ulogu servisa politikih
stranaka i vladajuih elita (str 3).

Prema analizi Saveta, mediji su zatvoreni za probleme sa kojima se zemlja

suoava, jer se nad njima vri politiki pritisak i jer je nad njima uspostavljena
potpuna kontrola. Vie ne postoji medij iz kojeg graani mogu da dobiju
potpune i objektivne informacije, jer pod snanim pritiskom koji stie iz
politikih krugova, mediji preutkuju dogaaje ili o njima izvetavaju
selektivno (str. 1).

Od 30 najznaajnijih analiziranih medija (12 dnevnih, 7 nedeljnih novina, 6 TV

i 5 radio stanica), 18 je sa netransparentnim valsnitvom. Razlog to njihovi
pravi vlasnici nisu poznati javnosti najee je prisustvo offshore kompanija i
vidljiva namera da se stvarni vlasnici sakriju od javnosti. Istraivaki napori
Saveta da utvrde neke vlasnike strukture stvarno izgledaju kao krimi pria:
nacionalni emiteri kao TV Prva, RTV B92, Radio Indeks i Radio Roadstar, ali i
pisani mediji poput Veernjih novosti i Presa, za direktne vlasnike imaju
preduzea registrovana na Kipru, dok TV Avala i nedeljnik Standard imaju
nepoznate vlasnike u Austriji. Problem sa offshore kompanijama u strukturi
vlasnitva je to te kompanije najee slue kao koljke i nemaju klasinu
infrastrukturu u zemlji iz koje dolaze. Vlasnik je nekad fiziko lice u Srbiji, a
ponekad se vlasnik firme sa Kipra krije u mrei drugih preduzea osnovanih
irom sveta (str. 6).

Mnogo je primera koji pokazuju koliko je Savet u pravu. Kada je u jesen 2010.
godine jedan od najbogatijih ljudi u Srbiji, Milan Beko, u televizijskoj emisiji
javno rekao da je vlasnik Veernjih novosti, oko kojih se inae vode veliki
sporovi, to nije bilo vidljivo iz navodno uredne dokumentacije Agencije za
privredne registre, a Komisiji za hartije od vrednosti kasnije je trebalo sedam
meseci da tu injenicu i zvanino utvrdi. Zvanino, Veernje novosti su u
vlasnitvu dve austrijske (Trimax Investmants 24,99% i Ardos Holding
24,90%) i jedne kiparske kompanije (Karamat 12,55%). Kontroverze oko
njihovog vlasnitva izale su u javnost kada je na njih ukazala nemaka
kompanija WAZ posle neuspelih pokuaja da kupi Veernje novosti.

Drugi primer je TV Avala, u kojoj su novinari krajem 2011. godine poeli trajk
zbog toga to mesecima nisu primali platu. Prema evidenciji Republike
radiodifuzne agencije, veinski vlasnici TV Avala su austrijska kompanija
Greenberg Invest (48,4%), domai biznismen Danko uni (46,65%),
Ekonomski institut (0,99% u kome rade Danko uni, ministar u vreme
Miloevia i ef konsultantske kue Dilojt u Srbiji, i Aleksandar Vlahovi, bivi
ministar za privatizaciju), i eljko Mitrovi (4,95%). trajk je trajao 65 dana i
tokom njega se veinski vlasnici nikada nisu pojavili, niti su trajkai ikada
traili razgovor sa njima. U ime vlasnika oglaavao se eljko Mitrovi koji je
istovremeno jedini vlasnik TV Pink, najvee komercijalne televizije u Srbiji. Za
sve to vreme, RRA nijednom nije reagovala zbog nepotovanja programskih
obaveza, iako je TV Avala dva meseca umesto redovnog programa emitovala
samo filmove, TV serije i reprizne programe. Pola godine kasnije, eljko
Mitrovi je javno govorio o planovima za prodaju TV Avale kompanijama CMI
ili AlJazeera.

U Izvetaju se ukazuje i na moguu povezanost vlasnika TV Prve i TV B92,

ije vlasnike veze vode do grke medijske grupacije Antena. Kada su prole
godine grki vlasnici kupili TV B92, RRA je dozvolila prodaju, ali u javnosti
postoje sumnje da je re o istom vlasniku koji je ranije kupio TV Prvu, a
sumnje su pojaane komplementarnim programskim koncepcijama i
promenama u sadraju koje su vidljive posle vlasnikih promena na obe
televizije.

I tako, prema tvrdnjama Saveta, od jedanaest radio i televizijskih emitera sa

nacionalnom dozvolom, ak devet je sa netransparentnim vlasnitvom, pa se
u Izvetaju postavlja logino pitanje: na kakvo objavljivanje objektivnih i
istinitih informacija su spremni mediji koji kriju pravog vlasnika kao svoju
najveu tajnu?

Kako utie drava

Drugi problem na koji ukazuje Izvetaj su razliiti vidovi finansiranja i uticaja
drave u medijima. Drava je uvek veliki medijski vlasnik ali, u ovom trenutku,
to vlasnitvo, kao ni ono privatno, nije transparentno. Budetsko finansiranje
dravnih medija je jo manje transparentno i bez efikasne javne kontrole. Na
primer, Vlada Srbije je krajem marta po hitnom postupku odobrila kredit
dravnoj novinskoj agenciji Tanjug za izvetavanje o izborima 6. maja 2012.
godine. Kredit je beskamatni, u iznosu od 17,5 miliona dinara (oko 170.000
evra), a odluka je doneta na istoj sednici na kojoj je Vlada usvojila mere
kojima e utedeti 15,7 miliona dinara. Tanjug se finansira iz budeta sa
216.715.000 dinara (oko 2,1 miliona evra) godinje, a o ovako izuzetnim
kreditima i finansiranju se u javnosti obino nikada ni ne sazna. Inae, taan
iznos finansijske pomoi drave medijima nije poznat, i u zavisnosti od izvora,
re je o 21 ili 25 miliona evra godinje. Jedan deo ovog novca godinama se
dodeljuje javnim konkursima za sufinansiranje medijskih projekata, ali drava
ni danas nema jedinstvenu evidenciju utroenih sredstava, niti efikasno prati
troenje, efekte i izvetavanje o ovim sredstvima.

Ali, direktno budetsko finansiranje dravnih medija nije jedini kanal uticaja na
medije. Istraivanih 50 dravnih institucija izdvaja oko 15 miliona evra za
oglaavanje i promociju, a meu njima najvie Telekom Srbije, Ministarstvo
ivotne sredine, Agencija za privatizaciju, Ministarstvo ekonomije, Ministarstvo
zdravlja i Ministarstvo poljoprivrede. Prema Izvetaju, na ovaj nain ostvaruje
se i partijska i lina promocija, a u medijima je nemogue nai analitiki tekst
o radu bilo koje od ovih institucija. Savet navodi podatke da su politiari koji
vode resore sa najveim budetima za oglaavanje ujedno i oni koji su u
istraivanom periodu bili najee u medijima. Najskuplje promotivne
kampanje u to vreme bile su Oistimo Srbiju (Ministarstvo ekologije),
promocija start-up kredita (Ministarstvo ekonomije), Kosovo je Srbija i
kampanja za vakcinaciju protiv gripa AX1N1.

Mediji u stvari ostvaruju prihode od dravnih institucija na sedam razliitih

naina: oglaavanjem, na osnovu specijalizovanih usluga informisanja,
informisanjem po ugovoru, pretplatom na usluge i servise, subvencijom u
kulturi, izdvajanjem iz fondova namenjenih civilnom sektoru, pa ak i za
usluge istraivanja. Izgleda da se sve to finansira iz oko 40 miliona evra,
koliko zbirno iznose budeti za oglaavanje i dravno finansiranje. Taj novac
se uglavnom bez javne kontrole sliva u medije i svakako je veoma znaajan
iznos na medijskom tritu, koje ivi od ukupno 175 miliona vrednog trita
oglaavanja.

Izvetaj se posredno bavi i ulogom agencija za odnose sa javnou,

marketinkih i produkcijskih kua i dolazi do poraznog zakljuka da su one
veinom u vlasnitvu stranakih aktivista ili sa njima povezanih osoba. Meu
njima je svakako paradigmatina uloga dve najvee agencije: Multikom Group
u kojoj vlasniki udeo ima Dragan ilas, gradonaelnik Beograda i zamenik
predsednika DS, i Meken Erikson u vlasnitvu Srana apera, uticajnog lana
DS i bliskog prijatelja biveg predsednika Srbije Borisa Tadia. Obe agencije
imaju veoma razvijene poslove u oblasti oglaavanja, PR i proizvodnji
programa ukljuujui i veinu najkomercijalnijih licencnih programa, kao to su
Veliki brat, Menjam enu, 48 sati svadba, Operacija Trijumf, Karaoke obraun
i Ja imam talenat. U javnosti se esto govori da one kontroliu trite reklama
i posreduju izmeu oglaivaa i medija. Agencije od medija otkupljuju oglasni
prostor koji kasnije prodaju pojedinanim klijentima i u toj transakciji zarauju
novac, ali istovremeno i vre uticaj i kontrolu nad ukupnim medijskim
finansiranjem.

Ovo zamreno klupko novca i uticaja svedoi o visokom stepenu korupcije u

komercijalnim i javnim medijima i o visokom stepenu politikog paralelizma,
odnosno preslikavanju politikog i finansijskog uticaja centara moi na medije.
U tako frontalnom napadu, jedan po jedan poputaju finansijski iscrpljeni
mediji. Uprkos visoko polarizovanom drutvu i podeljenoj javnosti u vreme 90-
ih i uprkos nedemokratskom reimu, u Srbiji je postojalo nekoliko medija koji
su proneli slavu nezavisnog novinarstva i bili stubovi kritike
javnosti. Izvetaj o kontroli medija pokazao je koliko je to davna medijska
prolost i da skoro vie i nema medija koji su spremni za ovakvu ulogu, pa ak
ni za to da zaponu javni razgovor o medijima. Treinu svih tekstova
o Izvetaju koja se pojavila u ovdanjim medijima objavio je dnevni list Danas,
a veina iz nekadanje porodice nezavisnih medija ga je uglavnom preutala.
Poto ga ni Vlada Republike Srbije nikada nije razmatrala, iako je re o
dokumentu njenog Saveta za borbu protiv korupcije, Izvetaj je bio na dobrom
putu da bude zaboravljen. Ali, dva meseca posle objavljivanja, nedeljnik
Vreme mu je izenada posvetio Dosije: Korupcija u medijima u dva broja za
redom. Pored teksta svoje novinarke kojim je predstavljen Izvetaj, objavljeno
je i sedam tekstova uticajnih medijskih radnika.

Na tom malom uzorku medijskog sveta moe se lako proitati odnos prema
temi i Savetu. Predsednici dva novinarska udruenja, koji o mnogim stvarima
imaju razliita vienja, Vukain Obradovi (NUNS) i Ljiljana Smajlovi (UNS),
ovoga puta su bili jedini koji hvale Izvetaj i ukazuju na njegov znaaj za
razumevanje stanja i u medijima i u novinarstvu. Svi direktori i glavni urednici
misle drugaije slau se da ima korupcije u medijima ali, naravno, u nekim
drugim kuama, ne u njihovoj. Uz to, Veselin Simonovi, glavni urednik Blica
(Ringier Axel-Springer), smatra da Izvetaj napada asnu industriju i radi za
dravu, odnosno, vlast; Aleksandar Tijani, direktor Radio televizije Srbije, da
se u njemu ispod kiobrana opteg interesa trai poslovno unitenje javnog
servisa, to moe biti samo u interesu medijskih i drugih tajkuna, a Dragan
Bujoevi, glavni urednik Politike, o kojoj se zna sve ali ne i ko joj je vlasnik, o
tome se ne izjanjava nego se hvali nezavisnou koju i Savetu prieljkuje.

U narednom broju, Darko Broi, direktor komercijalne istraivake agencije

AGB Nilsen, brani ugled industrije oglaavanja koja ovde radi kao i u itavom
civilizovanom svetu, i objanjava kako Savet pogreno misli da novac koji
dravne institucije ili kompanije daju za oglaavanje i novac koji drava na
druge naine usmerava u medije imaju ikakve veze. Zavrni tekst Dragoljuba
arkovia, glavnog urednika nedeljnika Vreme, Opanjkavanje o troku
drave, poinje reenicom: Ko o emu, Verica Bara o korupciji i
objanjava kako je ona udarnikim radom stvorila sliku drutva u kome je
percepcija korupcije jaa nego to je korupcija sama po sebi. Kao dobar
poznavalac medijskih i drugih prilika u Srbiji, arkovi zna isto to i
Aleksandar Tijani, koji u svom tekstu, takoe, upozorava drutvo na razorne
posledice koje izaziva baraizam. Meta njihovih napada nisu ni tajkuni ni
vlast, ni korupcija ni Savet za borbu protiv korupcije, nego Verica Bara. Nije
vano ta Izvetaj govori, ko blokira ili paralie medije ili ta Savet moe ili ne
moe da sazna o korupciji. Vano je diskreditovati Vericu Bara, iji intergritet i
lini ugled u javnosti ve odavno nisu vezani za instituciju, pa ni posao kojim
se bavila.

Skoro da je simbolino to je prvi ovdanji Izvetaj o korupciji u medijima

ujedno i poslednji koji je Verica Bara uradila. Nedavno je preminula, ali i u
ovom sluaju je postavila standard i pokazala kako se javno moe govoriti o
stvarima koje se ak i mediji trude da sauvaju tajnim.

Medijska prea br 42, maj-juni 2012, str 19-20, Mirovni institut, Ljubljana

Savet za borbu protiv korupcije, Izvetaj o pritiscima i kontroli medija

Izvetaj o pritiscima i kontroli medija na sajtu Peanika

Peanik.net, 20.06.2012.

The first and the last report on

corruption and the media

In late September 2011, two important media documents were adopted almost
simultaneously in Serbia: Strategy for the development of the public
information system in the Republic of Serbia until 2016 (the Strategy) and the
Report on pressures on and control of media in Serbia (the Report). A brief
history of these two documents is very informative: the first took two years to
develop, engaged significant human resources (the Ministry of Culture, media
associations, international organizations, experts and NGOs), money
(European donations totaling 200,000 Euros for the development of an
international expert study, 40,000 Dollars for the preparation of an expert
summary document by PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers, a series of
roundtable discussions with local and international participants organized by
OSCE and the Embassy of Great Britain, the Ministry of Culture working
group which wrote the proposal); while the other was created independently
following several months of research by the Anti-Corruption Council. Although
it is an institutional report, its bears the characteristic writing and personal
touch of Verica Barac, the president of the Anti-Corruption Council known for
her tireless engagement on tackling serious cases of corruption.

The release of the Strategy received great media attention, with the
announcement that the state will withdraw from media ownership no later
than 24 months after a legal basis has been established. This means that the
greatest achievement of the long awaited document was to obligate, in the
distant future, something that the Law on Public Information already required
in 2003 but that was never implemented. EU accession also calls upon the
adoption of other legislation such as those dealing with project financing and
the control of state support, but this was done in an equally imprecise form.
Although the strategy had been adopted by the Government of the Republic of
Serbia, it is difficult to say who will really advocate for its implementation.
Given that it contains many inconsistencies and some mutually irreconcilable
principles, up to now everyone has primarily been praising themselves for
participating in its preparation (member of the working group), but no one is
taking liability for its content and in particular possible outcomes (I did not
agree with this proposal, but the Government nevertheless adopted it). This
has so far been the case with all media-related legislation adopted since the
beginning of the painful, time consuming and inefficient transition. In the
corridors there are often recounts of the battles for every comma and
formulation, creating a common mythology according to which the expert
groups and working groups advocated for the highest standards but the
authorities did not accept them. As a result they always became
unenforceable laws that serve to demonstrate good will towards Europe, but
which ultimately never had any significant impact.

Although the Strategy states that its not known what is the extent of state
media ownership, how much money the state provides to the media, what is
the amount public media receives from public vs. commercial sources, it
claims that the state will regulate all these issues according to European
standards. Despite the fact that currently there is no control over the system of
media financing through public sources or effective protection from illegal
media concentration, it claims that this will be done in the future, even under
much complicated circumstances. Its almost insulting that after all the efforts
put into the development of the Strategy, it contains so little information about
the media in Serbia, and even more insulting is the complete absence of any
insight how such a rapidly changing area will be developed in the future.

When it appeared, the second document was mostly mentioned in short news
briefs, but very little was said about its content. Although the Report was
created by governments Anti-Corruption Council, it does not read like any
media-related report created by a state institution. The Report is written clearly
and boldly, it analyzes cash flows in and related to the media, as well as
mechanisms used to trade or commission media influence. The Report
analyzes an abundance of publicly mostly unknown information and
conclusions are made about corruption and clientelism in the media. The
report reads like a detective story it follows the money associated with
companies that have offshore addresses, moguls, media and government
circulating around the globe. More importantly, the report shows clearly how
the money moves so to hide true ownership and prevent unauthorized control
of illegal media concentration and publics media scrutiny. One would have
expected that such a document would be eagerly picked up by the media
which would attempt to fill the missing details and examine why this is
happening with the media in Serbia.

Instead, the Report has been immersed in media silence.

Hidden media owners

How is it that at the time of so many studies, panel discussions and work on
the Strategy, the most accurate analysis of the pressures and controls over
the media was done by a government advisory body not responsible for the
media? The Council started from a simple assumption that media is important
in tackling corruption, and that this battle cannot be waged if the media
themselves are corrupt. The Council investigated collaborations between the
media and approximately 50 state institutions, and based on this information
identified three most pressing issues:

(1) lack of transparency of media ownership,

(2) governments economic influence on the media through various forms of

budgetary contributions, and

(3) Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) which instead of being in public service is

providing services for political parties and the ruling elite (p. 3).

According to the analysis of the Council, the media do not report on problems
facing the country because they are politically pressured and because they
are completely controlled. There is no longer a source from which citizens can
obtain complete and objective information, because being under intense
political pressure media either remain silent or report about issues and events
in a selective manner (p. 1).

Out of the 30 major analyzed media (12 daily and seven weekly newspapers,
6 TV and 5 radio stations), 18 have non-transparent ownership. This is done
through the use of offshore companies with intent to hide true owners. The
Councils attempts to identify an ownership structure resemble real detective
stories: the national broadcasters such as a TV Prva, B92, Radio Index and
Radio Roadstar, and print media such as Vecernje Novosti and Pres, have for
owners companies registered in Cyprus, while TV Avala and the weekly
Standard have unknown owners in Austria. Problem with having offshore
companies in the ownership structure is that these companies are usually
used as a shell and have no classical infrastructure in the country of origin.
The owner is sometimes a person in Serbia, and sometimes the owner of the
company in Cyprus is hidden inside an established network of companies
registered in other parts of the world (p. 6).

There are many examples proving the Councils claims. When in autumn 2010
one of the richest men in Serbia, Milan Beko, said publicly that he was the
owner of Vecernje Novosti, a newspaper implicated in large disputes, this was
not apparent from the supposedly proper documentation of the Agency for
Business Registers, so it took the Commission for Securities seven months to
officially establish this for a fact. Officially, Vecernje Novosti are owned by
two Austrian (Trimax Investmants 24.99% and Ardos Holding 24.90%) and
one Cypriot company (Karamat 12.55%). Controversies over their
ownership first appeared in the public following the allegations of the German
company WAZ after its unsuccessful attempt to buy the newspaper.

Another example is the TV Avala, in which journalists in late 2011 went into a
strike because they were not receiving their salaries for months. According to
the records of the Republic Broadcasting Agency (RBA), the majority owners
of TV Avala are the Austrian company Greenberg Invest (48.4%), a local
businessman Danko uni (46.65%), the Institute of Economics (0.99% in
which employees are Danko uni, a onetime Minister from Milosevic era and
the head of the consulting firm Deloitte in Serbia, Aleksandar Vlahovic,
Serbias former Minister for privatization), and Zeljko Mitrovic (4.95%). The
strike lasted for 65 days during which time the majority owner never appeared
nor did strikers ever make such demands. On behalf of the owners spoke
Zeljko Mitrovic who is the sole owner of TV Pink, the largest commercial
television station in Serbia. During all this time, RBA didnt once respond to
any of the programming non-compliance obligations, although for two months
TV Avala broadcasted only movies, TV series and program reruns instead of
its regular program. Six months later, Zeljko Mitrovic spoke publicly about the
plans to sell TV Avala to CMI or AlJazeera.

The report also points to a possible connection between the owners of TV

Prva and TV B92 implicating the Greek media group Antenna. When last year
the Greek owners bought B92, RBA allowed this, but there are suspicions that
this was done by the company that previously purchased TV Prva. This is
supported by similar changes in programming and content following the
ownership changes on both televisions.

And so, according to the Council, out of eleven radio and television
broadcasters with a national license, nine have non-transparent ownership,
raising a logical question: how will the media publish objective and truthful
information if their greatest concern is to conceal their true owners?
How the state influences
The second problem identified by the Report is the different forms of financing
and states influence over the media. The state is always a large media owner
but at this moment, this ownership, similarly to that of private enterprises is
not transparent. Budgetary financing of state-owned media is even less
transparent and lacking effective public control. For example, in late March,
the Serbian government approved a loan to the state news agency (Tanjug)
for reporting on elections on May 6 through an expedited procedure. The
decision about the interest free loan of 17.5 million Dinars (170,000 Euros)
was made at the same meeting at which the government adopted austerity
measures that will save 15.7 million Dinars. Tanjug receives annually 216.715
million Dinars (about 2.1 million Euros) from the state budget; information
about such loans and exceptional financing usually never reaches the public.
The exact amount of governments financial assistance to the media is not
known, and depending on the source, it ranges from 21 to 25 million Euros a
year, with many of these funds being awarded through public tenders for co-
funding various media projects. However, Serbia still does not have a single
record of funding, effective monitoring of spending and impact evaluation.

Direct government financing of state media is not the only form of influence.
The analyzed 50 state institutions spend about 15 million Euros for advertising
and promotion, with primary clients being Telekom Serbia, the Ministry of
Environment, the Agency for Privatization, the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of
Health and the Ministry of Agriculture. According to the Report, this is used for
party and personal promotion, at the same time making it impossible to find
any critical article on the work of these departments in the media. The Council
states that politicians who headed departments with largest advertising
budgets are also the ones who, during the study period, were the most
present in the media. The most expensive promotional campaigns during the
study period were Clean up Serbia (Ministry of Ecology), the promotion of
start-up loans (Ministry of Economy), Kosovo is Serbia and the vaccination
campaign against influenza H1N1.
The media actually earns income from state institutions in seven different
ways: advertising, funding for specialized information services, contract-based
informing, subscriptions for different services, subsidizing cultural content,
funding earmarked for civil society, and research. Approximately 40 million
Euros originates from budgetary sources. This money is provided largely free
of public control and certainly represents a very significant proportion of the
175 million Euro worth advertising market.

The Report indirectly deals with the role of public relations agencies,
marketing and production companies, and comes to a devastating conclusion
that they are largely owned by party activists and individuals with strong
political ties. Among them certainly most notable are Multikom Group, in part
owned by Dragan Djilas, Mayor of Belgrade and the Deputy of the Democratic
Party (DP), and McCann Erickson owned by Srdjan Saper, an influential
member of the DP and a close friend of the former Serbian President Boris
Tadic. Both agencies have well developed services in the field of advertising,
PR and production of programs including most commercial licensed programs
such as Big Brother, Trading Wives, 48 Hours Wedding, Operation Triumph,
Karaoke War and I Have Talent. Public rumor is that they control the
advertising market and mediate between the advertisers and the media.
Agencies purchase advertising space from the media, which is subsequently
sold to individual customers for profit; this simultaneously allows these
companies to exert influence and control over all media funding.

This intricate web of money and influence demonstrates a high level of

corruption in the commercial and public media, and a high degree of political
parallelism that is, the translation of political and financial influence of power
centers on the media. In such a frontal attack, financially exhausted media
yield one by one. Despite the highly polarized and divided society and public
during the 90s and despite the undemocratic regime, there were several
media outlets in Serbia that were famous for their independent journalism and
were core to critical public thinking. The Report has shown that this is ancient
history and that there is almost no media outlet today which wants to take on
such role, even for the sake of initiating a public discussion about the media.
One third of all published articles concerning the Report appeared in the daily
Danas, while the majority of once members of independent media largely
ignored it. Despite being created by governments Anti-Corruption Council,
because it was never endorsed or reviewed by the Government, the Report
was on its way to being forgotten. But two months following the release, the
weekly Vreme unexpectedly published a series of articles Dossier: Corruption
in the Media in two subsequent issues. In addition to the text of one of its
journalists who presented the Report, Vreme also published seven articles
written by influential media workers.

In this small sample of the media world one can easily see the how the topic
and the Council are perceived in Serbia. Presidents of the two journalists
associations, who see the majority of things differently, Vukasin Obradovic
(NUNS) and Ljiljana Smajlovic (UNS), were this time the only ones who
praised the Report and talked about its importance for understanding the
current state of affairs in the media and journalism altogether. All directors and
chief editors have a different opinion they all agreed that there is corruption
in the media but, of course, in companies that are not theirs. In addition,
Veslin Simonovic, editor in chief of Blic (Ringier Axel-Springer) thinks the
Report is an attack on an honorable industry and that the Report is published
in the interest of the state, ie, the Government; Aleksandar Tijanic, director of
RTS, believes that under the parole of public interest lies the intent to
destroy the public broadcaster, which can only be in the interest of media
moguls and other oligarchs; Dragan Bujosevic, editor in chief of Politika, about
which we know everything except who owns it, did not comment the Report
but instead expressed hope that the Council will become an independent
institution.

In the next issue, Darko Brocic, head of the commercial research agency AGB
Nielsen, defends the reputation of the advertising industry that operates in
Serbia saying that it operates the same way it does in the whole civilized
world, and explains that the Council wrongly thought that the money provided
by state institutions or companies for advertising, and the money provided by
the state to media for other reasons have anything to do with each other. The
final piece by Dragoljub Zarkovic, editor of the weekly Vreme, Criticism on
publics expense, begins with the sentence: Again the same old, Verica
Barac talks about corruption and explains that by working overtime she
created an impression of the society in which the perception of corruption is
stronger than corruption itself. As a connoisseur of media and the Serbian
society, Zarkovic knows the same things as Aleksandar Tijanic, who in his
paper also warns about the devastating consequences of Baracism. The
target of their attacks are not the tycoons or the government, or corruption or
the Anti-Corruption Council, but Verica Barac. It is not important what the
Report says, who is blocking or hindering the media or what the Council may
or may not know about corruption. What is important is to discredit Verica
Barac, whose personal integrity and reputation in the public have not for a
long time been associated with institutions or even her job.

It is almost symbolic that the first Report on corruption in the media was at the
same time the last one conducted by Verica Barac. Recently deceased, she
has set the standard and showed that it is possible to talk publicly about
things that even the media are trying to keep secret.

Media prea No. 42, May-June 2012, pp. 19-20, Peace Institute, Ljubljana (in
Slovenian)

The Summary of the Report on pressures on and control of media in Serbia

(in English)

Report on the pressures and control of media on the site Peanik (in
Serbian)

Peanik.net, 27.06.2012.

The iron curtain rule

The IAS group, a huge (and, of course, private) German company, which
operates in workplace safety and has over 130 offices around Germany and
over 1,200 employees, recently advertised hiring 30 doctors of general
medicine to work in Munich, Stuttgart, Ulm, Augsburg, Dresden, Manheim,
Karlsruhe, etc.

Just as a (fortunate) coincidence, a German who is very inclined to Serbia

happened to be working in that company. He suggested they look for those 30
doctors in Serbia, instead of Ukraine and Slovakia, and suggested that the
IAS group should publish an ad in the oldest newspapers in the Balkans
Politika.

Besides this lobbying by our German, the idea to hire doctors from Serbia
coincided with the general climate of improved bilateral relations between
Germany and Serbia, as well as the upcoming (June 23rd) visit of German
chancellor Angela Merkel and increased economic cooperation.

Then, the HR department of the IAS group tried to place an appropriate ad for
30 doctors of general medicine. The requirements were:

Proficiency in German (B2), at least two years of experience in general

medicine or as an internist, basic knowledge of MS Office, willingness to work
in the field and a drivers license.

The IAS groups HR department contacted a company called Ankerst, working

in international representation of publishers, presentations and advertising in
printed and electronic media, on the internet, but also on billboards, whose
portfolio consists of, among others, Delo, Jutarnji list, Slobodna Dalmacija,
Dnevni Avaz, Oslobodjenje, Vecernje Novosti, Blic, Politika, Vijesti, Pobjeda,
Kapital, Nova Makedonija, etc.

But the idea to advertise in the oldest newspaper in the Balkans didnt work.

Why, when everything seemed perfect and there seemed to be no problems

for those 30 doctors from Serbia to get a job in a respectable German
company?
An article, which Ankerst published on its website, said that the conditions for
advertising in the oldest newspaper in the Balkans had one insurmountable
obstacle for any German employer, including the IAS group.

The article said that the oldest newspaper in the Balkans will except job
advertisements only from companies registered (and working) in Serbia or
companies which plan to do so.

So, others like the IAS group cant place advertisements in the oldest
newspapers in the Balkans offering jobs abroad to Serbian citizens.

Ankersts conclusion about these conditions is interesting, apparently written

by someone with a sense of humor and a fan of our president: This is our
states way of preventing trained professionals from leaving the country and
looking for jobs abroad where they earn more.

And so, thanks to a closed border and conditions for advertising, 30 doctors of
general medicine from Serbia are left empty handed.

Can the oldest newspaper in the Balkans, the president of our state,
conditions, rules, etc. prevent doctors/trained professionals from looking for
jobs in Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway, etc.?

They can.

Thats why its no wonder that an anti-European stench keeps coming from
some (mainly the oldest) Augean stables. Supposedly, its an attempt to
defend Serbia from the European market demon, while, actually, its done in
order to prevent free movement and stop trained professionals from earning a
livelihood in accordance with their qualifications and skills.

Are the doctors fleeing Serbia?

Of course they are.

According to the Medical chambers data, 250 good standing certificates were
issued until mid-May this year, a document which is necessary for applying to
jobs abroad. In 2014, 927 of these certificates were issued three times as
much as in 2012, when the most certificates were issued to doctors of
medicine (161).

Do I need to remind you about the average salary of a specialist in Serbia?

About 50,000 dinars. Just enough to make everybody look across the border.

Although the IAS groups ad didnt say anything about the salary, its not hard
to find some basic information about that. Annual salary of a doctor of general
medicine is between EUR 46,726 and 58,667. And annual salary of a
specialist in occupational medicine is between EUR 59,187 and 74,762.
Additional 8% bonus for achieving 100% of the work plan is promised, as well
as an additional monthly contribution to work fund of EUR 13,30 (that sum is
given to an employee when he/she retires, without any taxes).

So, since the conditions didnt allow the publishing of the IAS groups
advertisement in Serbia, it was published on its website and in countries
neighboring Germany,

Trained medical professional usually leave Serbia at their own initiative or in

agreement with some medical establishment in an EU country. And that is how
its going to be until relations between Serbia and the EU are settled and the
unwritten rules of the president and the written rules of the oldest
newspapers in the Balkans are avoided.

Various anachronous both written and unwritten rules cant last forever.

But, as long as they do, doctors and other trained professions will continue to
be hired by illegal agencies. They will also continue to work abroad under
inhumane conditions. And when something tragic happens and exposes such
human trafficking (Russia, Libya), politicians and the media will make a fuss
and pretend to care.

EU accession of Serbia will solve the problem of the doctors, as well as other
trained professionals who will be able to look for jobs legally, in accordance
with the demand and offered salaries.
In a system like that, any European company will be able to hire any
authorized advertising agency and publish a job ad for any kind of trained
professionals in any newspapers in Serbia.

That is the safest road to ensure that these people work legally and that they
dont get cheated at their places of destination.

Legal employment is a standard promoted and implemented by the labor laws

of the European Union.

Someone in Serbia doesnt like that.

And, so, they make up rules to drown the right to work and the right of free
movement of workers.

Translated by Marijana Simic

Peanik.net, 22.06.2015.

Pravilo gvozdene zavese

IAS grupa, velika (naravno privatna) nemaka firma koja se bavi i zatitom na
radu a ima preko 130 filijala irom Nemake i oko 1.200 zaposlenih, nedavno
je iskazala potrebu da zaposli tridesetak doktora opte medicine koji bi radili u
Minhenu, tutgartu, Ulmu, ugsburgu, Drezdenu, nhajmu, Karlsrueu

Pukim (i srenim) sluajem dogodilo se da u toj firmi radi Nemac koji je veoma
naklonjen Srbiji. On je predloio da se tih tridesetak lekara, umesto u Ukrajini
ili Slovakoj, potrae u Srbiji i sugerisao da IAS grupa objavi oglas za radno
mesto lekara opte medicine u najstarijim novinama na Balkanu Politici.

Uz to lino lobiranje naeg Nemca, ideji zapoljavanja lekara iz Srbije ila je

na ruku i opta klima sve boljih bilateralnih odnosa Nemake i Srbije, skora
(23. jun) poseta nemake kancelarke Angele Merkel Beogradu i irenje
ekonomske saradnje.

Onda je Kadrovska sluba IAS grupe dobila zadatak da objavi odgovarajui

oglas za 30 lekara opte medicine. Uslovi su bili:

znanje nemakog jezika (B2), najmanje dve godine prakse u optoj medicini ili
kao internista, osnovno znanje MS-Office i spremnost za rad na terenu uz
posedovanje vozake dozvole.

Tim povodom kadrovska sluba IAS grupe obratila se firmi Ankerst koja se
bavi meunarodnim zastupanjem izdavaa, prezentacijama i oglaavanjem u
tampanim i elektronskim medijima, na internetu ali i bilbordima i fasadama, u
ijem portfoliju su izmeu ostalih Delo, Jutarnji list, Slobodna Dalmacija,
Dnevni avaz, Osloboenje, Veernje novosti, Blic, Politika, Vijesti, Pobjeda,
Kapital, Nova Makedonija

Ali, ideja s oglasom u najstarijim novinama na Balkanu nije upalila.

Zato kad su se (to bi se reklo) sve kockice idealno sloile, pa se oekivalo

da nee biti problema da tih 30 lekara iz Srbije dobije posao u uglednoj
nemakoj firmi.

U tekstu u kojem kompanija Ankerst na svom sajtu objanjava uslove

oglaavanja u najstarijim novinama na Balkanu stoji jedna nepremostiva
prepreka za svakog nemakog poslodavca, pa i za IAS grupu.

U tom tekstu pie da oglase u najstarijim novinama na Balkanu u vezi

zaposlenja mogu da objavljuju SAMO kompanije koje su registrovane
(posluju) u Srbiji ili to planiraju da urade (da posluju).
Dakle, ostali kao na primer IAS grupa ne mogu da objavljuju oglase u
najstarijim novinama na Balkanu u kojima nude zaposlenje u inostranstvu
radnicima iz Srbije.

Zanimljiv je i zakljuak Ankersta povodom tih pravila, koje kao da je napisao

neki aljivdija koji, usput, voli da citira predsednika nae drave: Na taj nain
drava spreava obuene profesionalce da napuste zemlju i trae posao u
drugoj zemlji gde mogu vie da zarade.

Tako je zahvaljujui sputenoj graninoj rampi i pravilima oglaavanja izvisilo

trideset lekara opte medicine iz Srbije.

Mogu li najstarije novine na Balkanu, predsednik nae drave, propisi,

pravila da spree lekare-obuene profesionalce da krenu u Nemaku,
Austriju, vedsku, Norveku trbuhom za kruhom?

Mogu.

Zato i ne udi to se iz jo ponekih (uglavnom, najstarijih) Augijevih tala

uporno iri antievropski zadah. Tobo, da bi se Srbija odbranila od evropske
trine poasti, a zapravo da bi se onemoguilo slobodno kretanje i spreili
obueni profesionalci da zarauju u skladu sa svojim kvalifikacijama i
vetinama.

Bee li lekari iz Srbije?

Naravno da bee.

Podaci Lekarske komore pokazuju da je lekarima do sredine maja ove godine

izdato 250 sertifikata o dobrom glasu (good standing certificate), papira koji
je neophodan pri prijavljivanju za rad u inostranstvu. Prole, 2014. godine
izdato je 927 takvih sertifikata tri puta vie nego 2012. godine kada je
najvie sertifikata izdato doktorima medicine (161).

Da li treba podseati kolika je prosena mesena zarada lekara specijaliste.

Oko 50.000 dinara. Taman tolika da svako ko moe gleda preko granice.
Iako u konkursu IAS grupe nisu (to je uobiajena praksa) objavljeni podaci o
zaradama, nije teko iskopati neke osnovne informacije vezane za zarade.
Godinja zarada lekara koji treba dalje da se usavrava kree se od 46.726
do 58.667 evra. A godinja zarada lekara sa specijalizacijom u oblasti radne
medicine kree se od 59.187 do 74.762 evra. Predvieno je i dodatnih 8 odsto
bonusa kad se plan ispuni 100 odsto, ali i dodatna uplata u fond rada (slino
minulom radu) od 13,30 evra meseno (tu sumu zaposleni dobija pri odlasku
u penziju bez ikakvog odbitka i bez poreza).

Naravno, poto pravila nisu dozvoljavala objavljivanje oglasa IAS grupe u

Srbiji konkurs je objavljen na njenom portalu i u zemljama u nemakom
okruenju.

Obueni medicinski pofesionalci iz Srbije uglavnom pale preko grane

samoinicijativno ili u dilu s konkretnom medicinskom ustanovom u nekoj od
drava Evropske unije. Tako e biti dok se ne urede odnosi Srbije i EU,
izbegavaju nepisana pravila predsednika nae drave i pisana pravila
najstarijih novina na Balkanu.

Razna anahrona pisana i nepisana pravila ne mogu veno da traju.

Ali dok traju, lekare i druge obuene profesionalce najee e i dalje vrbovati
ilegalne agencije i spretni meetari i ponekad pod krajnje nehumanim
uslovima angaovati da rade u inostranstvu. I kad se, esto pod traginim
okolnostima (Rusija, Libija), otkrije takva trgovina ljudima onda politiari i
mediji i Srbiji prave dramu i izigravaju duebrinike.

Ulazak Srbije u Evropsku uniju reie problem lekara, ali i svih drugih
obuenih profesionalaca koji e posao moi legalno da potrae tamo gde za
njima postoji potreba i gde su dobro plaeni.

U takvom sistemu bie dovoljno da bila koja evropska firma preko bilo koje
ovlaene kompanije za oglaavanje u bilo kojim novinama u Srbiji objavi
oglas da nudi posao bilo kojem obuenom profesionalcu.

To je najsigurniji put da ti ljudi nee raditi na crno i nee biti prevareni tamo
gde odlaze da rade.
Legalno zapoljavanje i posao na belo je standard za koji se zalae i koji
primenjuje radno zakonodavstvo Evropske unije.

Nekome u Srbiji to ne ide u prilog.

Pa izmilja pravila da bi udavila pravo na rad i pravo na slobodno kretanje.

Peanik.net, 16.06.2015.