EN BANC

A.C. No. 10681, February 03, 2015

SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION, Complainants, v. ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint1 filed by complainants Spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S.
Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross misconduct for
violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged that from 19972 until August 2008,3 respondent served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In
this capacity, respondent handled many of their cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a
pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize. 4

Aware of the fact that complainants had money intact from their failed business venture, respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow
the amount of P2,500,000.00, which he promised to return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda, who, believing
that respondent would be soon returning the money, agreed to lend the aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued three (3) EastWest Bank
checks5 in respondents name:6

Check No. Date Amount Payee

0000561925 03-23-06 P750,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
0000561926 03-23-06 P850,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
0000561927 03-23-06 P900,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
Total: P2,500,000.00

Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a piece of paper containing: (a) photocopies of the checks; and (b) an acknowledgment that he
received the originals of the checks and that he agreed to return the P2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5)
days.7 In the afternoon of March 23, 2006, the foregoing checks were personally encashed by respondent. 8

On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay complainants. Thus, in April 2006, complainants began
demanding payment but respondent merely made repeated promises to pay soon. On July 7, 2008, Blesilda sent a demand letter 9 to respondent,
which the latter did not heed.10 On August 4, 2008, complainants, through their new counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna, sent another
demand letter11 to respondent.12 In his Reply,13 the latter denied borrowing any money from the complainants. Instead, respondent claimed that a
certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was the real debtor. Complainants brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa in Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. The parties, however, failed to reach a settlement.14

On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants letter-complaint15charging respondent with violation of Rule 16.04
of the CPR. The rule prohibits lawyers from borrowing money from clients unless the latters interests are fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice.16

In his Comment,17 respondent denied borrowing P2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that Nault was the real debtor. 18 He also claimed that
complainants had been attempting to collect from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.19

In their letter-reply,20 complainants maintained that they extended the loan to respondent alone, as evidenced by the checks issued in the latters
name. They categorically denied knowing Nault and pointed out that it defies common sense for them to extend an unsecured loan in the amount
of P2,500,000.00 to a person they do not even know. Complainants also submitted a copy of the Answer to Third Party Complaint 21 which Nault
filed as third-party defendant in a related collection case instituted by the complainants against respondent.22 In said pleading, Nault explicitly
denied knowing complainants and alleged that it was respondent who incurred the subject loan from them. 23

On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),24 which
was later docketed as CBD Case No. 11-2883.25 In the course of the proceedings, respondent failed to appear during the scheduled mandatory

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CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
conferences.26 Hence, the same were terminated and the parties were directed to submit their respective position papers. 27 Respondent, however,
did not submit any.cralawred

The IBP Report and Recommendation

On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), issued his Report28 finding respondent
guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies and properties
of his client that may come into his possession.29

The Investigating Commissioner observed that the checks were issued in respondents name and that he personally received and encashed them.
Annex E30 of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the three (3) EastWest Bank checks and agreed to return the
P2,500,000.00, plus a pro-rated monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5) days.31

On the other hand, respondents claim that Nault was the real debtor was found to be implausible. The Investigating Commissioner remarked that
if it is true that respondent was not the one who obtained the loan, he would have responded to complainants demand letter; however, he did
not.32He also observed that the acknowledgment33 Nault allegedly signed appeared to have been prepared by respondent himself.34 Finally, the
Investigating Commissioner cited Naults Answer to the Third Party Complaint which categorically states that he does not even know the
complainants and that it was respondent alone who obtained the loan from them.35

In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondents actions degraded the integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule
16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. Respondents failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the IBP-
CBD.36Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the
P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated interest.37

Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and by the applicable laws and rule, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners Report in Resolution No. XX-2013-617 dated May 11, 2013,38 but reduced the penalty
against the respondent to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordered the return of the P2,500,000.00 to the complainants with
legal interest, instead of stipulated interest.

Respondent sought a reconsideration39 of Resolution No. XX-2013-617 which was, however, denied in Resolution No. XXI-2014-29440 dated May 3,
2014.cralawred

The Issue Before the Court

The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Courts Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBPs findings except as to its recommended penalty and its directive to return the amount of P2,500,000.00, with legal
interest, to complainants.

I.

Respondents receipt of the P2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by substantial evidence. As the records bear out, Blesilda,
on March 23, 2006, issued three (3) EastWest Bank Checks, in amounts totalling to P2,500,000.00, with respondent as the payee.41 Also, Annex
E42 of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the checks and agreed to pay the complainants the loan plus the
pro-rated interest of five percent (5%) per month within five (5) days.43 The dorsal sides of the checks likewise show that respondent personally
encashed the checks on the day they were issued.44 With respondents direct transactional involvement and the actual benefit he derived
therefrom, absent too any credible indication to the contrary, the Court is thus convinced that respondent was indeed the one who borrowed the
amount of P2,500,000.00 from complainants, which amount he had failed to return, despite their insistent pleas.

Respondents theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent submitted a document purporting to be Naults
acknowledgment of his debt to the complainants, Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied knowing the complainants
and incurring the same obligation.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would be illogical for them to extend a P2,500,000.00 loan without any collateral or security
to a person they do not even know. On the other hand, complainants were able to submit documents showing respondents receipt of the checks
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CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
and their encashment, as well as his agreement to return the P2,500,000.00 plus interest. This is bolstered by the fact that the loan transaction was
entered into during the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and complainants,45 allowing the former to wield a greater influence
over the latter in view of the trust and confidence inherently imbued in such relationship.

Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected:

CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come into his possession.

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as
any natural tendency goes, this trust and confidence is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.46 The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyers ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty. Lozada48 (Frias) the Court categorically declared that
a lawyers act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent did, is unethical, to wit:

Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case and by independent
advice.
A lawyers act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse of clients
confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her
obligation.49 (Emphasis supplied)

As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and whose interests, by the lack of any security on the
loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the formers word that he will
return the money plus interest within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients
the runaround up to this day. Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.

In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads:

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.

In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed
in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should be equally held
administratively liable on this score.

That being said, the Court turns to the proper penalty to be imposed and the propriety of the IBPs return directive.cralawred

II.

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.50

In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the practice of law for two (2) years after borrowing P900,000.00 from her client, refusing to pay the
same despite court order, and representing conflicting interests.51 Considering the greater amount involved in this case and respondents
continuous refusal to pay his debt, the Court deems it apt to suspend him from the practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the IBPs
recommendation to suspend him indefinitely.

The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBPs Resolution insofar as it orders respondent to return to complainants the amount of
P2,500,000.00 and the legal interest thereon. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of
the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.52 In such cases, the Courts only concern is the determination of respondents
administrative liability; it should not involve his civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. In this case, respondent received the P2,500,000.00 as a loan from complainants and not in
consideration of his professional services. Hence, the IBPs recommended return of the aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit of this
administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.chanrobleslaw

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CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality of this Decision,
with a stern warning that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately executory upon
receipt.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administration for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Leonen, and Jardeleza,
JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013

FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR., Petitioner, v. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN, PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN, AND ROSELLA DE GUZMAN
BAUTISTA, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the November 23, 20091 and the February 11,
20102 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila (RTC), in Civil Case No. 89-50138, entitled "Loreta A. Chong v. Sps. Pedro and Rosita de
Guzman," denying the Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees filed by the petitioner.

The Facts

Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman) engaged the legal services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr.
(petitioner) as defense counsel in the complaint filed against them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong) for annulment of contract and recovery of
possession with damages involving a parcel of land in Paraaque City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1292, with an area of 266
square meters, more or less. Petitioners legal services commenced from the RTC and ended up in this Court. 3 Spouses de Guzman, represented by
petitioner, won their case at all levels. While the case was pending before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter,
they were substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman

4
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SYLLABUS 1
(respondents).4

On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorneys Fees5 before the RTC. He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal
agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value of the subject land if the complaint filed against
them by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully represented them, respondents refused his written demand for
payment of the contracted attorneys fees. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent of the value of the
subject land on the basis of quantum meruit.

On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed order denying petitioners motion on the ground that it was filed out of time. The RTC stated
that the said motion was filed after the judgment rendered in the subject case, as affirmed by this Court, had long become final and executory on
October 31, 2007. The RTC wrote that considering that the motion was filed too late, it had already lost jurisdiction over the case because a final
decision could not be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. There would be a variance of the judgment rendered if his claim
for attorneys fees would still be included.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

The Issues

This petition is anchored on the following grounds:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DETERMINE ATTORNEYS FEES ON THE GROUND THAT IT LOST
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES WOULD RESULT IN A VARIANCE OF THE
JUDGMENT THAT HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION DID NOT BAR PETITIONER FROM FILING THE MOTION TO
RECOVER HIS ATTORNEYS FEES.6nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Petitioner claims that Spouses de Guzman engaged his legal services and orally agreed to pay him 25% of the market value of the subject land. He
argues that a motion to recover attorneys fees can be filed and entertained by the court before and after the judgment becomes final. Moreover,
his oral contract with the deceased spouses can be considered a quasi-contract upon which an action can be commenced within six (6) years,
pursuant to Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Because his motion was filed on September 8, 2009, he insists that it was not yet barred by prescription.7

For their part, respondents counter that the motion was belatedly filed and, as such, it could no longer be granted. In addition, the RTC had already
resolved the issue when it awarded the amount of ?10,000.00 as attorneys fees. Respondents further assert that the law, specifically Article 2208
of the Civil Code, allows the recovery of attorneys fees under a written agreement. The alleged understanding between their deceased parents
and petitioner, however, was never put in writing. They also aver that they did not have any knowledge or information about the existence of an
oral contract, contrary to petitioners claims. At any rate, the respondents believe that the amount of 25% of the market value of the lot is
excessive and unconscionable.8

The Courts Ruling

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because of the denial
of his motion to determine attorneys fees by the RTC. Apparently, the petitioner pursued the wrong remedy. Instead of a petition for review under
Rule 45, he should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because this case involves an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court.

Moreover, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which prohibits direct resort to this Court unless the appropriate remedy cannot
be obtained in the lower tribunals.9 In this case, petitioner should have first elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which has concurrent
jurisdiction, together with this Court, over special civil actions for certiorari.10 Even so, this principle is not absolute and admits of certain
exceptions, such as in this case, when it is demanded by the broader interest of justice. 11

Indeed, on several occasions, this Court has allowed a petition to prosper despite the utilization of an improper remedy with the reasoning that the
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CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
inflexibility or rigidity of the application of the rules of procedure must give way to serve the higher ends of justice. The strict application of
procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.12 Thus, this Court deems it expedient to consider this
petition as having been filed under Rule 65.

With respect to the merits of the case, the Court finds in favor of petitioner.

In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of attorneys fees ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary
sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the
court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.13 Although both concepts are similar in some respects, they
differ from each other, as further explained below:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

The attorneys fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly speaking, an item of damages. It differs from that
which a client pays his counsel for the latters professional services. However, the two concepts have many things in common that a treatment of
the subject is necessary. The award that the court may grant to a successful party by way of attorneys fee is an indemnity for
damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending, through counsel, his cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not his
lawyer, in any of the instances authorized by law. On the other hand, the attorneys fee which a client pays his counsel refers to
the compensation for the latters services. The losing party against whom damages by way of attorneys fees may be assessed is not bound by, nor
is his liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his lawyer. The amount stipulated in such fee arrangement may,
however, be taken into account by the court in fixing the amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.

The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part of his judgment recoveries against the losing party.
The client and his lawyer may, however, agree that whatever attorneys fee as an element of damages the court may award shall pertain to the
lawyer as his compensation or as part thereof. In such a case, the court upon proper motion may require the losing party to pay such fee directly to
the lawyer of the prevailing party.

The two concepts of attorneys fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a prerequisite to their grant, the intervention of or the
rendition of professional services by a lawyer. As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of his lawyer who never rendered services,
so too may a party be not held liable for attorneys fees as damages in favor of the winning party who enforced his rights without the assistance of
counsel. Moreover, both fees are subject to judicial control and modification. And the rules governing the determination of their reasonable
amount are applicable in one as in the other.14 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

In the case at bench, the attorneys fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the compensation for professional services rendered, and not as
indemnity for damages. He is demanding payment from respondents for having successfully handled the civil case filed by Chong against Spouses
de Guzman. The award of attorneys fees by the RTC in the amount of P10,000.00 in favor of Spouses de Guzman, which was subsequently affirmed
by the CA and this Court, is of no moment. The said award, made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages, forms part of the
judgment recoverable against the losing party and is to be paid directly to Spouses de Guzman (substituted by respondents) and not to petitioner.
Thus, to grant petitioners motion to determine attorneys fees would not result in a double award of attorneys fees. And, contrary to the RTC
ruling, there would be no amendment of a final and executory decision or variance in judgment.

The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1) How can attorneys fees for professional services be recovered? (2) When can an action
for attorneys fees for professional services be filed? The case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC15 is
instructive:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466, private respondents present
claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier decision had been reviewed and
partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had
been rendered or in a separate action.

With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorneys fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when
something is due to the client. Attorneys fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the
recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorneys fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to
be paid.

While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the
amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers claim for attorneys fees may arise has become
final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorneys fees may be filed before the
judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence, private
respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of
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CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
filing it ahead of the awards complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment
is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this
Court. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is permitted by the rules. As to the timeliness of the filing, this
Court holds that the questioned motion to determine attorneys fees was seasonably filed.

The records show that the August 8, 1994 RTC decision became final and executory on October 31, 2007. There is no dispute that petitioner filed
his Motion to Determine Attorneys Fees on September 8, 2009, which was only about one (1) year and eleven (11) months from the finality of the
RTC decision. Because petitioner claims to have had an oral contract of attorneys fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of the Civil
Code16 allows him a period of six (6) years within which to file an action to recover professional fees for services rendered. Respondents never
asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses de Guzman refused petitioners legal representation. For this reason, petitioners cause of action
began to run only from the time the respondents refused to pay him his attorneys fees, as similarly held in the case of Anido v. Negado:17

In the case at bar, private respondents allegation in the complaint that petitioners refused to sign the contract for legal services in October 1978,
and his filing of the complaint only on November 23, 1987 or more than nine years after his cause of action arising from the breach of the oral
contract between him and petitioners point to the conclusion that the six-year prescriptive period within which to file an action based on such oral
contract under Article 1145 of the Civil Code had already lapsed.

As a lawyer, private respondent should have known that he only had six years from the time petitioners refused to sign the contract for legal
services and to acknowledge that they had engaged his services for the settlement of their parents estate within which to file his complaint for
collection of legal fees for the services which he rendered in their favor. [Emphases supplied]

At this juncture, having established that petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees and that he filed his claim well within the prescribed period, the
proper remedy is to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of the correct amount of attorneys fees. Such a procedural route, however,
would only contribute to the delay of the final disposition of the controversy as any ruling by the trial court on the matter would still be open for
questioning before the CA and this Court. In the interest of justice, this Court deems it prudent to suspend the rules and simply resolve the matter
at this level. The Court has previously exercised its discretion in the same way in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay:18

In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client, and the intervention of the courts is sought, the
determination requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of the services rendered, taking into account
the facts determinative thereof. Ordinarily, therefore, the determination of the attorneys fees on quantum meruit is remanded to the lower court
for the purpose. However, it will be just and equitable to now assess and fix the attorneys fees of both attorneys in order that the resolution of
a comparatively simple controversy, as Justice Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, would not be
needlessly prolonged, by taking into due consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the
records.19 [Emphasis supplied]

With respect to petitioners entitlement to the claimed attorneys fees, it is the Courts considered view that he is deserving of it and that the
amount should be based on quantum meruit.

Quantum meruit literally meaning as much as he deserves is used as basis for determining an attorneys professional fees in the absence of an
express agreement. The recovery of attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running
away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An
attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the clients cause, taking into account certain factors
in fixing the amount of legal fees.20

Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper amount of attorney fees, to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Rule 20.1 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

c) The importance of the subject matter;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

d) The skill demanded;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Petitioner unquestionably rendered legal services for respondents deceased parents in the civil case for annulment of contract and recovery of
possession with damages. He successfully represented Spouses de Guzman from the trial court level in 1990 up to this Court in 2007, for a lengthy
period of 17 years. After their tragic death in 2003, petitioner filed a notice of death and a motion for substitution of parties with entry of
appearance and motion to resolve the case before this Court.21As a consequence of his efforts, the respondents were substituted in the place of
their parents and were benefited by the favorable outcome of the case.

As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de Guzman and respondents for almost seventeen (17) years. The
Court is certain that it was not an easy task for petitioner to defend his clients cause for such a long period of time, considering the heavy and
demanding legal workload of petitioner which included the research and preparation of pleadings, the gathering of documentary proof, the court
appearances, and the various legal work necessary to the defense of Spouses de Guzman. It cannot be denied that petitioner devoted much time
and energy in handling the case for respondents. Given the considerable amount of time spent, the diligent effort exerted by petitioner, and the
quality of work shown by him in ensuring the successful defense of his clients, petitioner clearly deserves to be awarded reasonable attorneys fees
for services rendered. Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be paid his professional fee based on quantum meruit.

The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice underscores the need to secure
him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A layer is as much entitled to
judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of
the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his
capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled
to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic
if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client he himself would not get his due. 22

The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's fees based on the value of the property subject of
litigation because petitioner failed to clearly substantiate the details of his oral agreement with Spouses de Guzman. A fair and reasonable amount
of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees filed by petitioner Atty. Francisco L.
Rosario, Jr. Based on quantum meruit, the amount of attorney's fees is at the rate of 15% of the market value of the parcel of land, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1292, at the time of payment.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN
OROLA, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

8
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Courts resolution is a disbarment complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).

The Facts

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga (Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip
(Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).2cralaw virtualaw library

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother
of the above-named complainants and the son of Emilio.3cralaw virtualaw library

In the settlement of Trinidads estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding
No. V-3639, the parties were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna,
Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty. Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen,
and the other heirs4 of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for
and in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidads estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the
Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of the latters son, Manuel Orola,
which the RTC granted in an Order5 dated September 20, 2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent filed an Entry of
Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order. 6cralaw virtualaw library

Due to the respondents new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject case; 7 and (b) Section 20(e),
Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio. 8 Complainants further
claimed that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondents appearance,
the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007.9 In this accord,
respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as required under the
Rules.10cralaw virtualaw library

For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the
Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that the records of the case readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs
of Antonio were exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga.11 He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on
her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances thereat were free
of charge.12 In fact, he obtained Maricars permission for him to withdraw from the case as no further communications transpired after these two
hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same case. 13 He added that he had no knowledge of the
fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record
at any instance.14 Finally, he clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator, rather than a litigator, 15 and
that since no settlement was forged between the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007. 16 In support of his assertions,
respondent submitted the affidavits of Maricar17and Atty. Azarraga18 relative to his limited appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior to
his engagement as counsel for Emilio.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15, 2008 submitted by IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating
Commissioner), respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen as the records of the case show that he
never acted as counsel for the other complainants. The Investigating Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance
was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of the
Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.20cralaw virtualaw library

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants
themselves admitted that respondent did not acquire confidential information from his former client nor did he use against the latter any
knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment.21 Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the Investigating
Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his act
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.22cralaw virtualaw library

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the aforementioned report in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated
December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules but imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.

9
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-1725 dated January 3, 2013.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Courts Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBPs finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but reduced the recommended period of suspension to
three (3) months.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in
any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public
policy and good taste.26 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.27 In Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:chanrobles virtua1aw
1ibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers
employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.30cralaw virtualaw library

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBPs finding that respondent represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must
be held administratively liable therefor.

Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special
Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for
having committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his
reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio particularly, Karen in
violation of the above-stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule
on conflict of interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the
same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latters opponent in the same case. That respondents
previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the
aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to
represent conflicting interests.31cralaw virtualaw library

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a
settlement among the family members render the rule inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule
15.04,32Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he may act as mediator,
conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in his
duty to make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilios counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio particularly, Karen and equally secure
their express written consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute
cannot represent any of the parties to it.33 Accordingly, for respondents violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.

10
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was increased from severe reprimand to a suspension of six (6) months
by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any
explanation showing the bases of the IBP Board of Governors modification; as such, it contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules which
specifically mandates that [t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
reasons on which it is based.34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the change in the recommended penalty without any ample justification
therefor. To this end, the Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the requirement to announce in plain terms its
legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which the same is based
is akin to what is required of courts in promulgating their decisions. The reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station than any
other portion of the ratio.35cralaw virtualaw library

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months to be more appropriate
taking into consideration the following factors: first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is undisputed that respondent merely
accommodated Maricars request out of gratis to temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyers
unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar
whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he
acted in good faith; and fourth, complainants admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he
use against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by
his subsequent engagement with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr.,36 the Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three months to the counsel therein who represented parties whose interests are hostile to his other clients in
another case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and unethical conduct, stemming from a
complaint filed by private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo
(Bella).

The Facts

11
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir
of Paci ta by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-
75201). At the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing real
properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy
Realty Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3

In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that respondent, her alleged illegitimate
halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of
Pacitas properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacitas
stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00, 8 despite an existing Trust
Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized
her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.10 Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the
corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but to no avail. 11 In this
relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she had already instituted various legal actions and remedies that
respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the subject property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.12

In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebeccas allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of forum shopping
and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust
agreement. He also contended that the parties transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been
filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits covering the same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and
further prayed for the payment of moral damages and attorneys fees by way of counterclaim.15

On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for the reason that "the facts surrounding the
same arose out of a misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute."17

However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for Intervention, 18praying that the investigation of the
charges against respondent continue in order to weed out erring members of the legal profession. 19

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner issuedhis Report and Recommendation,20 finding
respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus,
recommended the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months.21

On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebeccas motion to withdraw did notserve as a bar for the further
consideration and investigation ofthe administrative case against respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which
provides that "[n]o investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of
the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Separately, the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping,
noting that disciplinary cases are sui generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22

On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the good moral character required from members of
the Bar when the latter failed to comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention his unworthy and
deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property without the formers consent. In fine, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty was recommended.23

In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Courts Ruling

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of
misconduct, viz.:
12
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct determinative as it is of the errant lawyers penalty depends on the factual circumstances of each case.

Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case largely constitutes an internal affair, which had
already been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited by Rebeccas motion to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise
agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887 which involves the subject propertys alleged disposition in violation of the subject trust agreement.
As the Court sees it, his failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca which she takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust
agreement as well as respondents acts of mortgaging the subject property without the formers consent, sprung from his own assertion of the
rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the Courts determination,for that matter had
never been resolved on its merits in view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations
she had previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even adds that respondent "had fully
explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced
that [her] complaint has no basis in fact and in law."25Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of the Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of "serious misconduct" which would warrant its
recommended penalty.1wphi1

Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject
property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited
prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation
nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar,
but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and
justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01,
Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine
of P15,000.00 would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

13
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7360 July 24,2012

ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three
causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared as
prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted
Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa
(Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the
IBP twice modified Comm. Funas recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a suspension of two years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et
al." (Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private complainants. Atty.
Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosas manner of prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.

In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public
prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 1Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty.
Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accuseds favor. Atty. Silvosa
caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor
Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalans request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the
accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate
bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.

In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalans brother
was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to less
serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa
offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.

Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayans decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of
direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticses father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas
(Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case
and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7s television program Imbestigador videotaped and
aired the actual entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty.
Silvosas defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of:

(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one month and eleven days of prision correccional, as
minimum, up to three years, six months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;

(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and

14
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
 (C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.

SO ORDERED.2

In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial
court released its decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accuseds bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was
only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and the accused.

On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribios allegations as "self-serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his
puppeteer to pursue persecution."

On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction
under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since the act involved do [sic] not amount
to a crime." He further claims that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public officer, the charge against
respondent for which he was convicted falling under the category of crimes against public officers x x x."

In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:

As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did
intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosas] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is
presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such would constitute
sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to

Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.

As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the
conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty. Silvosas] vehement denial, the
accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred more than seven (7)
years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on
the veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.

As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for
which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in said case. The
findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment
proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged extortion case.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and should be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.

Respectfully submitted.3

In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of
Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosas suspension from the practice of law to two years. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the
notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1 March 2012.

We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its recommendations in the second and third causes of action.

Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that "A
lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer shall
not refuse his services to the needy."

We agree with Comm. Funas finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond
Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."

15
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
Atty. Silvosas attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can only be described as desperate. He claims his
participation as public prosecutor was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his subsequent
participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our ruling
in Hilado v. David:4

An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor when he is listening to his clients
preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his
clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court.

xxxx

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of
interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest
lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another
case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard.
With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the attorneys intentions were honest and he acted in good
faith.5

Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribios accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before
the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa.
Contrary to Comm. Funas ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio
executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the
IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand,
merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.

Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically
exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the
act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the
Court.7

We disagree with Comm. Funas ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding.

First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of
the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct
the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:

Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely
the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any
person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in government service.

xxxx

It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not
presented as a witness in the present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public
record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayans decision in Criminal
Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.

16
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.10

Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11

we ruled:

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:

1. the offender is a public officer;

2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;

3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something
which it is his official duty to do; and

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an
unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege
on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a
betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good
morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Italicization in the original)

Atty. Silvosas representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of
suspension.1wphi1 Atty. Silvosas final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section
27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosas conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more
severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a
member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the
unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice

17
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015

ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano (complainant) against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-
Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista
Lozada3 suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for
their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for reconsideration. 5

However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al., where complainant was one of the respondents,
complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the
proceedings of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted certified
true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the
counsels,6 as well as the transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the
witnesses during the trial proceedings.7

Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law constitutes willfull
disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years.

On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the complaint against him.8

In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her
husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not
within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of
grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance. 10

On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.11

In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty.
Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the practice
of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.

On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the report and recommendation of the
IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

RULING

18
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.

Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of
law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension.13

Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service
[which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.14

In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing
and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-
examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively
engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended
from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to
2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in the
proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her husband, she is still serving her two
(2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can
represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty.
Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity,
families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's
actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it
proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.

Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court
suspended further respondents from the practice of law for six (6) months for practicing their profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for representing her husband as counsel despite lack of authority to practice law.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the
nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial
discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible. 18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and
is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and
guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondents record as member of the Bar.

Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, so that we can determine the reckoning point when her
suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

19
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.cralawlawlibrary

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015

TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera.
We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of
several post-dated checks.

Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before this court. The Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's
(Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in relation to the latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan.2cralawred

According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She is acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business by
subcontracting the cell site acquisition to Atty. De Vera. 3cralawred

Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of P20,000.00 per month until fully paid.4 Hbwever,
Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De Vera persuaded her to borrow the amount from a common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary Jane),
by mortgaging her property located in Lucena City.5 Atty. De Vera issued IBank6 Check No. 310571 post-dated July 31, 2006 for P500,000.00. Atty.
De Vera also issued at least two more checks to cover the interest agreed upon.7cralawred

Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresita's sister in the amount of P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed
the loan. Atty.De Vera issued IBank Check No. 317689 post-dated July 14, 2006 for P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her
sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8cralawred

Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks "bounced" for being drawn against insufficient
funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks for a second time. However, the checks were dishonored because the account was
closed.9cralawred

Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations, prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty.
De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.10cralawred

The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable cause for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued by the trial court.11cralawred

20
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.12cralawred

On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on the Complaint.13cralawred

Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24, 2010. She presented her version of the facts.

According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting Project to Atty. De Vera's group. The project
involved twenty-nine (29) Globe' Telecom sites across Northern and Southern Luzon.15cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15% downpayment per site. Thus, they agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance the
costs for mobilization and survey, while Teresita would cover the costs for application of building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her P195,000.00 per
site.16cralawred

Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by March 2006.17 At that time, Teresita had to deliver at least five (5) cell sites to Globe
Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not have the funds required for the application of building permits that costs around P10,000.00 for each cell
site.19cralawred

Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita approached Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter lend
Teresita checks to guaranty the loan. The main reason Teresita gave was that she had been frequently arguing with her husband regarding the
loan.20cralawred

Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's sister.21 She only lent Teresita another check as "additional guaranty for the five
sites[.]"22cralawred

Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for value. The checks were not meant to be
deposited.23cralawred

Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She points out that the proceedings before the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office were under reinvestigation since she' did not have the opportunity to answer the criminal complaint.24cralawred

Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera]
had in any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or] abused her position against the interests of the complainant."25cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused.26 In addition, "[a] 11 the bare allegations that [Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed
[Teresita] to mortgage her property and that the checks issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon maturity do not constitute deceitful
conduct on the part of [Atty. De Vera]."27cralawred

On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera's Answer and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for "investigation, report
and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from receipt of [the] records[.]"28cralawred

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scheduled mandatory conferences where the parties defined the issues,
stipulated on facts, and marked exhibits.29 Upon the termination of the mandatory conferences, the parties were "directed to submit their
respective verified position papers within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order."30.

Both parties failed to file their position papers. 31cralawred

The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found Atty. De Vera administratively
liable for serious misconduct and recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law. 32 The Investigating
Commissioner ruled:

Respondent's assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were not security for the loans she obtained but mere guaranty checks and not
for deposit deserves no credence; it is contrary to the ordinary experience.

...

. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic] that indeed respondent incurred monetary obligations from complainant, and
she issued postdated checks to 'the latter as security for the payment of the loans.

Assuming . . . that respondent's version of facts were [sic] true, she is still guilty of serious misconduct.

21
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing . . . worthless check[s]; that is, a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. . . . A check issued as an evidence of debt though not intended to
be presented for payment has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the provisions of the law, respondent is
guilty of serious misconduct.

...

[A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional
capacity[.]33 (Citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary

In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke her oath as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.34 The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera violated the following provisions:

Cannon [sic] 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.35cralawlawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation 36 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct and it is recommended that she be suspended for a period of one (1)
year from the practice of law.37cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-61238 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors resolved to adopt the
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by issuing a worthless check, the
Attorney's Oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year.39 (Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary

Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration40 dated September 17, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors'
Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the Motion for Reconsideration41 dated September 21, 2013.

In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-24142 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors denied the parties'
respective motions:

RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of
the Commission and the resolution .subject of the motion, they being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and
taken into consideration. Moreover, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time pursuant to his Motion for Extension of Time
which is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B of the Rules and resorted to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-
612 dated May 11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in the original)
cralawlawlibrary

The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of
worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to adopt and approve the recommendations of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors.

22
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans alleged by Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as
a guaranty and not as payment for the loan. She also raises the prematurity of the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of the criminal
proceedings considering that "the allegations of deceitful conduct [are] intimately intertwined with the criminal acts complained of."44cralawred

This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the lawyer's act of issuing worthless checks, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, constitutes serious misconduct.

In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for issuing post-dated checks that were dishonored upon
presentment for payment:

In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against respondent Collado.. We do not, however, believe that
conviction of the criminal charges raised against her is essential, so far as either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge
against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when she did not have enough money in her bank account to cover the total
amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that the acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We consider
that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar.46 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment";47 it is serious or gross when it is flagrant.48cralawred

We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an administrative case against a member of the bar:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account
users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any
check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate
the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.

...

Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed
to know them, for. the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby
swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws.49 (Citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary

A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. 50 The Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
....
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
cralawlawlibrary

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred monetary obligations from Teresita. Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the checks to
Teresita. She refused to answer for her liabilities by denying the existence of the loan and claiming that the checks were mere "show
checks."51 However, she failed to present evidence to prove those allegations.

The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly liable to Mary Jane for P540,000.00,53 and on which Atty. De Vera relies upon, is not
sufficient evidence to hold that there was no separate transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera. The Decision involved the post-dated
checks issued by Teresita to Mary Jane only.54 Mary Jane merely claimed that she had no personal knowledge of any transaction between Teresita
and Atty. De Vera.55cralawred

The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending" her checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary
human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed to know the consequences of her acts. She issued several post-dated checks for value
23
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
that were dishonored upon presentation for payment.

Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty
on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a whole."56 A lawyer
"may be removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected
with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to
him.'"57cralawred

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in
Atty. De Vera's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10628 July 1, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed by complainant Maximino Noble III
(Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Facts

Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a Complaint2 for damages against his own brother, Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr.
(Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-
774058-12/07 /09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893 /Issued on March 10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the
said complaint. Orlandos IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he
should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.

Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa5 against
Orlando .. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him
and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying,
among others: " x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as
shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to
squeeze a lot of money from [you]. x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to
Terminate Services of CounseI7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximina "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests
of the defendants in a manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of

24
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to
dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant
complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter
(BM) Nos. 8509 and 192210, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.

In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for
disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when
the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages
sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good faith.12

Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19,
2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying
Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x x. "14

IBP Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding
that a transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required information
would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any
violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the communication
between Orlando and Marcelo, who are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor intended to be published and
known by third persons.

In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and
dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved for reconsideration 17 which was
however denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification deleting the warning.

Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certiorari.19

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality.20It is a special privilege burdened
with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner
as to uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life,
act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.22

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

25
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession.1wphi1 The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum. 23 In Buatis Jr. v.
People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to
another colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the
opposing counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession.25 In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his
brother Marcelo as casual communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the
messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word
''polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive
conduct against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in
the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino
- a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions
directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should
remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed
upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the
bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as
candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer
to disciplinary action.27 While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive
and abusive language.28 The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when
he maligned Maximino to his client.29

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose the required information for
MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall
only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records. 30

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015

MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA, JR., AND MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A.
APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

26
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for allegedly violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests and Canon 15 of the same Code which enjoins a
lawyer to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with clients.

The salient facts of the case follow:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two opposing factions. The first faction, called the
Adeva Group, was composed of Romulo M. Adeva, Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I. Andrade. The other faction, called the Lukban
Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel N. Lukban.

In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary with a total monthly compensation and honorarium of P6,000.

On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution which authorized Pilar I. Andrade, the Executive Vice President and
Treasurer of the complainant at that time, and Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan with the
Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant.

On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application because the Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and
Cesar Echano, who were allegedly not registered as stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the Board of
Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant was having financial difficulties.

On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of complainant's financial capacity to pay the loan.

On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan application in the amount of P200,000 which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of
the complainant.

On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order which nullified the appointment of Librado Guerra and
Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group as members of the Board of Trustees of the complainant. As a result, complainant sent a letter to RBP to inform
the latter of the SEC Order.

On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and informing the latter that the SEC Order was
referred to RBP's legal counsel, herein respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that
respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP.

On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP increased the loan to P400,000.

On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage.

On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.

On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment against the respondent for allegedly representing conflicting
interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty.

Respondent raised three defenses against the complaint for disbarment. First, respondent argued that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and
Ma. Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot represent the complainant in this disbarment case because they were not duly authorized by the Board of
Directors to file the complaint. Second, respondent claimed that he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict of interest which applies only to
the legal counsel of complainant. Respondent argued that he merely served as the corporate secretary of complainant and did not serve as its legal
counsel. Third, respondent argued that there was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage because
all the documents and information related to the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant were public records. Thus, respondent
claimed that he could not have taken advantage of his position as the mere corporate secretary of the complainant.

On February 14, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation2 finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting
interests and recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year. The Investigating Commissioner noted
that respondent appeared for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by his former client, the complainant herein. The Investigating
Commissioner cited cash vouchers3 from 1994 to 2001 showing that respondent was paid by complainant for his retained legal services. According
to the Investigating Commissioner, these vouchers debunk respondent's claim that the complainant merely appointed him as its corporate
secretary. The Investigating Commissioner also held that the personality of complainant's representatives to file this administrative case is
immaterial since proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.

27
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-7704 which affirmed the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner and imposed a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year against respondent.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-2905 which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent.

The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the
case for annulment of mortgage filed by complainant against RBP.

We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770
and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, respondent represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."

This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are
parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.6 Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing
conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.7 In Maturan v. Gonzales8 we further explained the rationale for the prohibition:
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer
becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's
secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the test to determine the existence of conflict of interest:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf
of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to
any of his present or former clients.10 It also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a controversy that is related,
directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.11This rule applies regardless of the
degree of adverse interests.12 What a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything
which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.13 A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client
involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation.14chanrobleslaw

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent represented conflicting interests when he served as counsel for RBP in the case
for annulment of mortgage filed by the complainant, respondent's former client, against RBP.

The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was compensated by complainant for his retained legal services is supported by the
evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent's former client. And respondent appeared as
counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests since respondent
failed to show any written consent of all concerned (particularly the complainant) given after a full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting
interests.15chanrobleslaw

We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant when he sent a
letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the latter of the financial capacity of the complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case
for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the interest of the complainant, his former client.

Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and information in connection with the loan transaction between
RBP and the complainant were public records. In Hilado v. David,16 we laid down the following doctrinal pronouncements:
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent
applies equally even though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the attorney by the client.
(Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)

Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly represented the adverse party with respect to the same

28
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
matter involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former client during that
relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)

In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the extent
to which the former client's affairs might have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the attorney's knowledge thereof.
(Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)

This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel
against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his
client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client is irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict of
interest.

Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a complaint for disbarment is imbued with public interest which allows for a liberal rule
on legal standing. Under Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, "[proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person." Thus, in the
present case, we find that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana A. Apuya can institute the complaint for disbarment
even without authority from the Board of Directors of the complainant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors imposing a penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for one year against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., J., Chairperson, Peralta, Perez,* and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996]

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO
U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of the contentious and adversarial system
in the Philippine legal process are based - the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and
29
CANONS 7-9
SYLLABUS 1
advocate is also what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this
instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the
performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants,
for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033),
entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."[1]

Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,
Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically,
in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings,
i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering
said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as
well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that
they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.[2]

On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion
to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG
Case No. 33 as party-defendant.[3] Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he
will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.[4]

Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:

14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan,
Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA)
plotted, devised, schemed. conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds,
the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC,
and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA,
being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million
shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments
Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the
other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.[5]

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers participation in the acts with which their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala,
Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed under their respective names in Annex A of
the expanded Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the
said shares of stock.

4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for
legitimate business purposes not related to the allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any
material interest therein and therefore denies that the shares appearing in his name in Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint are his
assets.[6]

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint
implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.[7]

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.[8] The
Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
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 In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the
identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.[9]

Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the conditions
precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of
respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March
8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law
Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-
examination of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33.[10]

It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal
the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-
stockholder.[11]

On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG
Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:

x x x.

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be
their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation
could show the lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section
5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these
proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the
PCGG.

The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG
to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same
treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit.[12]

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the
ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving
as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated
and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he
acted as nominee-stockholder.

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 2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not
constitute a substantial distinction as would make the classification reasonable under the equal protection clause.

3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection
clause.

III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the client(s).

2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend
to other privileged matters.

IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be
based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection
of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was denied by
respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's
resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.

Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the
pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in
the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are
prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the
confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.

Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client is not within
the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are
evidence of nominee status.[13]

In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as party-defendant because he "(Roco)
has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco `without an order of court by filing a notice of
dismissal,'"[14] and he has undertaken to identify his principal.[15]

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their
clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the bigger fish as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGGs
willingness to cut a deal with petitioners -- the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of the
Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be
their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein. (Underscoring ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential
Commission on Good Government respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the
PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco; that it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex A of the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA
lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular persons, some in blank.

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 We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these corporations who are now
the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these
blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they
also executed deeds of assignment and some of these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the
shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of these corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say
that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial
year. And not only that, they have no permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of Villareal
Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the principal things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as
they called themselves.[16]

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely
on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners inclusion as co-defendants in
the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these
clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended
Complaint.

II

The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services)
where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein
lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire,[17] and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be
placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. [18] But the lawyer-client
relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special
powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. [19] A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are
entirely different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent.[20] Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-
judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court[21] and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his
client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the
fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good
faith,[22] that is required by reason of necessity and public interest [23] based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good
cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.[24]

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other professional in society. This conception is
entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable tradition.[25] In Stockton v. Ford,[26] the U.S. Supreme Court held:

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one
more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice;
and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed
shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it.[27]

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7,
1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or
his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment. [28] Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client
privilege, as currently worded provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:

xxx

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SYLLABUS 1
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent
of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. [29]

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his clients business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial
disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any
and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But
it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of
attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his
own conscience and not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several constitutional and policy concerns. In the
constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were
made to choose between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets
revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the
price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right
practically nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-
evident.

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options which would
otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent
upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful
exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as
a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.

The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at
bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. [30] Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as
well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.[31]

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not
attach until there is a client.

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is
entitled to know who his opponent is.[32] He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.[33]

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.

34
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SYLLABUS 1
 In Ex-Parte Enzor,[34] a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her client on the ground
that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue of the clients identity that the privilege actually attached to
both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election
laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the votes
correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal
to reveal his clients identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower courts contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the
circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.

U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig,[35] involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability
exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was
obtained.

The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the Sandino Gang, a gang involved in the illegal
importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang,
Joe Sandino.

In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce
documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge
the names. The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case, held:

A clients identity and the nature of that clients fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a
strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was
sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects federal
law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.

The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client privilege. In order to promote freedom of
consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law must
prohibit such disclosure except on the clients consent. 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the clients identity and
the nature of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential communications. [36]

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances
of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,[37] prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyers claim to the effect that he
could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.

In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by respondent corporation, collided with a
second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab,
identified in the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary
examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the
insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under
the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in
his professional capacity. The court said:

That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him to defend its policyholders seems
immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence
contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim against him.[38]

x x x xxx xxx.

All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether they relate
to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid; x x x And whenever the communication made, relates to a
matter so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client, then
it is privileged from disclosure. xxx.

It appears... that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His
client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service
of the summons on him has not been effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained.[39]

In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,[40] the lawyer involved was required by a lower court to disclose whether he represented
certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the courts request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties
were connected with the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State Supreme
Court. Upholding the lawyers refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:

If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of
these mines, it has made progress in establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the
witness would compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to him in
35
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SYLLABUS 1
the course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain transactions. We feel sure that under such
conditions no case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but
the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.[41]

3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would
furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.

In Baird vs Korner,[42] a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken
to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).

It appeared that the taxpayers returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes understated. The clients themselves were
unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation
was then being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12,706.85,
which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a
check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that
Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to
name the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS
summons. For Bairds repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a
lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of
undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that clients income tax liability pending. The court
emphasized the exception that a clients name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services rendered that the
disclosure of the clients identity exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by
persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients
are useful to the government for but one purpose - to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for
that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are
due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime.Certainly the
payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed - to advise his clients what, under the circumstances,
should be done.[43]

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule.

For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal
problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.[44] Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation
would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. [45]

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the clients name
itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.[46]

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least
two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in
issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be no attorney-client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less
than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution
should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as
lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their clients shareholdings.
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SYLLABUS 1
 There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners legal service to their clients. More
important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution
to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict the (client) of a... crime."[47]

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice
about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously
committed something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be
invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not the act for which the advice turns out to be illegal,
his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to
possible action against him.

These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first example;
while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a
case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of
a crime.[48] The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the
attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.

In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such conditions no case has ever yet gone to the
length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it
related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client. [49]"Communications made to an attorney in the course of any
personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in which the
parties stand to each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged communications." [50] Where the
communicated information, which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not much in the
information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged
information which would substantiate the prosecutions suspicions, then the clients identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that
it falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that
for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be
eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings[51]and Tillotson v. Boughner.[52] What these cases
unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.

There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a
convenient and readily available source of information in the building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in
circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which
we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is
obviously protected by the privilege.[53] It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to
disclose the latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.

In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the
latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring
them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may not
be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply dissociate one
from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a
communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of
violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.

The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for negligence on the former. The ethical
duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect
their rights to make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon,[54] the US Second District Court
rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for
the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that
breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation
and damages, and found in favor of the client.

To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller [55] requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-
vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of
work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement
while settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client to
settle for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon[56] famously
37
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attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior,"
the US Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in
the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship.[57]

Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the
words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, [58] "xxx is an exacting goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less,
is not prepared to accept respondents position without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this
wise:

Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does
one plunge so deep in the stream of life - so share its passions its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? x x x But that is not
all. What a subject is this in which we are united - this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our
lives, but the lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we
who are here know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely passion - only to be won by straining all the faculties by which
man is likened to God.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing
to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the clients name is not privileged
information.

If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the circumstances obtaining here does not cover
the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary
responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.

The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired
with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of
UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves,
among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse
of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.

By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the
client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the
PCGG would exact from petitioners a link that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime.

III

In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents allege that the private respondent was dropped as party defendant not only
because of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the
interest of truth may require, which includes... the identity of the principal." [59]

First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court
settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of- court but also in their
Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate
lawyering.[60] Being "similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other conditions and circumstances which
would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping of private
respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed to show - and
absolutely nothing exists in the records of the case at bar - that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since
the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to
have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof
of the undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested
by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply
disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and
private respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed
for the alleged questioned transactions.[61]
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 To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the respondent court without him, therefore, the
PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as a species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification
which made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in
violation of the equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of statutes and regulations. In the
broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be
accorded the same treatment.[62] Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to
the liabilities imposed.

x x x. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances
would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: Favoritism
and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest.[63]

We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG
Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and
PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.[64] It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without
allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGGs demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but
also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings
is premature and that they should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can
raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have
made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality.

It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not
be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client
relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this
Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation which we should not here
countenance.The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to
continue a day longer.

While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which violate the equal
protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992
and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala,
Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, *Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-
defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.".

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Padilla, Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.
Davide, Jr. and Puno, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Narvasa, C.J., and Regalado, J., joins Justice Davide in his dissent.
Romero, J., no part. Related to PCGG Commissioner when Civil Case No. 0033 was filed.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., no part. Participated in Sandiganbayan deliberations thereon.
Mendoza, J., on leave.

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 40
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 EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and
GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan,
promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied petitioners motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state
witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of its preceding disposition. [1]

The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of
Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a Congressman.Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as
counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse.

The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the
Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of title
was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.

However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action[2] for the cancellation of respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title since the
land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered judgment[3] nullifying
said patent and title after finding that respondent Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his
application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.[4]

Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary
investigation conducted thereon, an information for perjury[5] was filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. [6] On
November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the
ground inter alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated. [7] In this criminal case, respondent Paredes was likewise represented by
respondent Sansaet as counsel.

Nonetheless, respondent* Paredes was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on the charge that, by using his
former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he
had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes counsel of record therein.

On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution [8] recommending the criminal prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as
counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal significance in this case, we quote some of his
allegations in that motion:

x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on
detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same evidence x x x but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the
court upon recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and the recommendation of the
Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent herein x
x x.[9] (Italics supplied.)

A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan[10] charging respondent Paredes with a violation of Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in respondent courts resolution of August 1,
1991[11] and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription.

On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a
letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. [12] He claimed that
respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a
41
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notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury
charge.[13] These falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing
of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy.

In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said perjury case in
his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice.[14]

Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated the submissions he had made in his
counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications,[15] respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the
graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by the
trial court after he had been arraigned therein.

For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by
his co-respondents in this case in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he claimed that
he did so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government
witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.

Withal, in a resolution[16] dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges against all the herein private
respondents. The proposal for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal
position:

x x x Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly
induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory and the
evidence which the defense was going to present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged
communication between the lawyer and his client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.

The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution[17] and, ostensibly to forestall any further controversy, he decided to file separate
informations for falsification of public documents against each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases,[18] each of which named one
of the three private respondents here as the accused therein, were filed in the graft court.However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.

As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was
submitted that all the requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was
concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove
the confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.

Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege adverted to by the
Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents in their opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny the desired
discharge on this ratiocination:

From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino
Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in the information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other
confidential matter must have been disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional
capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is privileged.[19]

Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, [20] the controversy was elevated to this Court by the prosecution in an
original action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.

The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1) whether or not the projected testimony of
respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is
eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.

As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship which existed between herein respondents
Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have been disclosed by
respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot
be presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters consent.[21]

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 The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and the actuations of
both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some
distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.

1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases
Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his
counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as
eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is
significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to any communication, without distinction or qualification.[22]

In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no particular mode by which a confidential
communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to
his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means.[23]

Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in view
of the purpose for which such falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of
that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as
annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan.[24] Also, the acts and words of
the parties during the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet
to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.

2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a
distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be
committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a past
crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.

The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications
to be testified to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-
client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in
relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks
his lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which
the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however,
does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers
advice.

Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney,
consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between
attorney and client having to do with the clients contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of
privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client.[25] (Emphases supplied.)

3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by physical
acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to
falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges
now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for
purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy
with his present co-respondents, later committed.Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale
of the attorney-client privilege.

4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted
and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be
for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.[26] In fact, it has
also been pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of
privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not
only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice.[27]

It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful communications intended for an illegal
purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the
genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of
the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.

II

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SYLLABUS 1
 On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to whether respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis,
for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived at a contrary
conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon this second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our
resolution in the petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions requiring preludial clarification.

1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to whether or not respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a
state witness need not prevent this Court from resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and evidence have
been submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the
expeditious administration thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. [28]

2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand charged in three separate informations. It will be
recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for falsification of public
documents against all the respondents herein. That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one
information was filed against each of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of falsification.

This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations in this case by the following discussion thereof by Mr.
Justice Davide, to wit:

Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaets discharge as state witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under
a separate information. I suppose the three cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division of cases arising from the
same incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as
co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment that he was charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of
Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the consolidated and joint trial has
the effect of making the three accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering that they are charged for the same offense. In
criminal law, persons indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint defendants.

As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having been a consolidation of the three cases, the several
actions lost their separate identities and became a single action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the different causes of action
involved had originally been joined in a single action.[29]

Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation (w)hen two or more persons are charged with the commission of a certain
offense was too broad and indefinite; hence the word joint was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the fact that the accused are all
together charged therewith substantially in the same manner in point of commission and time. The word joint means common to two or more, as
involving the united activity of two or more, or done or produced by two or more working together, or shared by or affecting two or more. [30] Had it
been intended that all the accused should always be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could have said so with facility, but it did
not so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the present case and the problems that may arise from amending the
information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.

2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is
the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state witness is that he does
not appear to be the most guilty.[31] not that he must be the least guilty[32] as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then
be whether an accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness.

To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al.[33] we find this obiter:

It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he persuaded the others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a
promised fee. Although he did not actually commit any of the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state witness. All the
perpetrators of the offense, including him, were bound in a conspiracy that made them equally guilty.

However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al.,[34] two conspirators charged with five others in three separate informations for multiple
murder were discharged and used as state witnesses against their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,[35] one of the co-conspirators was discharged from the information charging him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found
that he was not the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co-accused to open the account with the
bank and which led to the commission of the crime.

On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as guilty as his co-accused, and should not be
discharged as he did not appear to be not the most guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the gravity or nature of the acts
committed by the accused to be discharged compared to those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is
imposable on all of them.

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 Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicitly articulated found expression in People vs. Ocimar, et al.,[36] which we quote in
extenso:

Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He
argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite of
appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the others.

We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of
them could positively identify the accused except Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only in the loss
of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the
prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Third,
his testimony could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned
decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without having any prior
knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the
most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by most
guilty we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the
penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take
into account his degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.

xxx

Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly
looks at his actual and individual participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the
other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason of
conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly
warranted. (Italics ours.)

The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense is based on the concurrence of criminal
intent in their minds and translated into concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is
based on the classical school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and, therefore,
warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all.

Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This
adjective device is based on other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape, and the
judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons,
the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience distilled into a judgmental policy.

III

The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness are
present and should have been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.

Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification charged in the criminal cases pending
before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents who
steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case,
hence there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said respondent has indicated
his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications.

His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable witnesses, identified in the basic petition with a digest of
their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor
and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his letter-
complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who participated in the resolution asking their Provincial
Governor to file the appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained the certification of non-arraignment from
Judge Ario.

On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the
Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to testify as a state witness.

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 This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must be emphasized, however,
that such discretion should have been exercised, and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not
merely on the sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.

This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the retirement of two members of its Second
Division [37]and the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment [38] dated June 14, 1995, as required by this
Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and new members thereof [39] declared:

4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which the Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are
based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;

5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by the Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however,
after going over the arguments submitted by the Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully beg leave of the
Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the prosecutions motion to
discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to
that effect within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impugned resolutions and ORDERING that the present
reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave.

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