SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015

SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. AND OSCAR VIOLAGO, VS.
MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG, RESPONDENT.

BRION, J.:
The Facts:

On February 16, 2004, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board decided in
favour of Ma. Cristina (Bayang), in her case filed against San Lorenzo Builders Inc., (San
Lorenzo), for specific performance and damages. San Lorenzos appeal and motion for
reconsideration to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, were also denied. Hence, San
Lorenzo elevated its appeal to the Office of the President (OP). By Resolution of November
17, 2006, the OP denied San Lorenzos appeal, stating that San Lorenzo received the order
of the Board of Commissioners affirming that of the Arbiter decision on July 27, 2005.
When they filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the order on August 10, 2005, fourteen
(14) days have elapsed. Upon their receipt of the order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration on April 17, 2006, they had only one day, or on April 18, 2006 to file their
notice of appeal before the OP. They filed it only on April 27, 2006 or nine days late, hence
the appeal was filed out of time. San Lorenzo moved to reconsider, citing the fresh
period rule enunciated in the case of Neypes vs. CA, but the OP denied it, ruling that the
fresh period rule applies only in judicial appeals, not administrative appeals. Their
petition for review with the Court of Appeals was also denied, hence they elevated their
case to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:

Whether or not the fresh period rule also apply to administrative appeals.
The Courts ruling:

We DENY the petition. It is settled that the fresh period rule in Neypes applies only to
judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.

In Panolino v. Tajala, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of whether the
fresh period rule applies to an appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR
regional office to the DENR Secretary, an appeal which is administrative in nature. We held
in Panolino that the fresh period rule only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:

The fresh period rule in Neypes declares:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule
43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals; and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.
xxxx
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the fresh period
rule shall apply to Rule 40_(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals);
Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45
(appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules
cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioners present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the

decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed
governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted,
Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant
shall perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from
receipt of the resolution of denial; whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party
has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the fresh
period rule in Neypes does not apply.

As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from
decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB
Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in relation to Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 18, series of 1987:
Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, prescribing the rules
and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the Board of Commissioners to the
Office of the President, pertinently reads:
Section 2. Appeal. Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a
decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18
Series of 1987.

The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the
period of appeal to the Office of the President.
Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of
1987, provides that in case the aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an
adverse decision of any agency/office, the said party has the only remaining balance of
the prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the
decision denying his/her motion for reconsideration. 2 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in applying the above-mentioned rules to the present case, we find that the
CA correctly affirmed the OP in dismissing the petitioners appeal for having been filed out
of time.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the
decision dated July 23, 2010 and resolution dated December 2, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100332.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)
FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion
with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court
dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly
received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18,
1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This
was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was
denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners
claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of
the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September
16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
According to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period to appeal, the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration.

(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:

(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. In
the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly
dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside.
When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on
received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this
was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have
appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable
under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended
the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et
al. where the SC again considered the order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration as the final order
which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained
petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order
contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.

The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be
taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word
or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice
of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final
order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period
from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-
18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner,
the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the
process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to
have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTCs
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of
the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well
within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

NOTE:

The FRESH PERIOD RULE do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived from the
Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.