fu'.

r, @ro'-'*/ & lfur<t

g6 ALAN coDE
fr"sf !'u-*et a, Atta-,,GaftL1CJ. E ?
Tr7: But one might well inquire why man is such and such an animal.ae 3*,),-C. </4?LK L PLurr B-#v,(L(
The phrase " such and such an nimaf' (zoion toiond is a complo< expres- C"-,*+.,&y,P-olo. ' cHAprER, /o1'q7-
sion. There ae all sorts of terms t-hat we could insert at the placeholder
"suclt," and one of them would be "nvo-footed." Among other things, one Unity of defnition in Metaphysics H.6 and Z.n
could engage in genuine inquiry as to why a man is (a) two-footed arimal
For such an inquiry to be successful there would have to be a middle term Mry Louise Gill
that connects the other two terms in such a way that there is an explana-

In Mapl4,sics H.6 Aistotle asks:

..

parts into a whole and not a mere lis

a wo-footed animal. From this perspective, the detnition by division is
not te account that captures the being or ousia of man. The definition by
division may well be a necessarily uue proposition that classifies the species
by isolating a factor that distinguishes it from other members of its kind,
but it does epture the ousia of the definable item.
Given that the soul is the substance of a living thing, it would be the
possession of a soul of a certain type that explains why something is the
These basic entities ground our unde
kind of living thing it is. Animals, for instance, are perceptiue living things.
makes an object one, whose account i
On this hylomorphic conception of the soul as substance, the vaious
sorts of examples: substantial forms, material composites,
features by reference to which different kinds of animals ae distinguished a'd categoriar
properties.t
and classified are themselves explicable by reference to a single cause, t-he
definition not foundationally with a determinate form such as man., \W.h.at makes man one?
Start
\soul. The Suppose we define man as_ "biped animal,,: why is man
)bedrock. Nonetheless put forward inZ.r7 one *irrg
not an aggregare of two things, animal and biped, which ae
*a
'does succeed, then it oach to solving the distinct
from each other and logically prior to ir
puzzle about definition presented in Z.n. As I have argued above, the - rh; is, mentioned in its
problem ttrere was to show how the different elements in the denition by
It gives.me great pleasure ro dedjcate this chapter to AIlm Gorthelf.
fts topics relace to his own
pioneering reseac on division, definidon, aod the uricy of
subseces. M;ilr;; Jo. i.ruo
was stimulated by orcidng work being done
foster. I was privileged tJanend a Nrional
biolory, organized by,Allan Gorrhelf in !7'rll
pivotal evenr For
isubstace (i.e. man). In that case, definitions by division would not answer but subsuntially
the question posed in Tnby revealing that by virtue of which a definable om discusion
item is one.ro However, there would be hope that a definition of a different
kind, reached by a different route, could. ry in H.6 - forms and material composites _ and
focus. I regud the uniry of otegoria.l propenies

+s Meph, Z.r7.ro4ro,e-r, Here I follow the Oxford ranslation in aking "man" as the subject. osed ofform and mater taken universdly, not a
t" Hen he oui of a thing is not even mentioned in such an account' for which see Meph. theefore wonder why he focuses oo
-., "tlre,
H.3.ro43bIo-r4. *i##il
;'":',,# .Til,H J ff J#:

97
98 MARY LouIsE GILL Unity of dzfnition in Metaphysics H.6 nd Z.n 99
definition?j The question threatens the Platonists, who regard animal ad before we rurn to rhar, let us consider what he goes on ro say, and why it
biped as separate forms. fuistotle poses the problem thus: fails to throw light on his proposal about the unry of form.

\hy is man not those [animal and t by participation'

,ro,in orr. thing, man, but in rwo and so in-general, THE BRONZE SPHERE
man would ,roib. orr. but more tha o ? It is evident rat
rhose who proceed in this way, as rhey are accustomgd to defrne and speak, cannot
Immediately after proposing his solution to the unity of form Aristotle says
give an account ard solve the difficulty. $o45ar7-zz) in H.6:

The trouble with the Platonists is that they treat their forms as defrnite and
actual entities;a so the form man is what it is by partaking of nvo more
ultimate entities, biped and animal. Aristotle states his own solution as
follows:t

But il we sa the one is matrer, the orher form, and the one in potendalry, the
as
oth., ir, the thing we are seeking would no longer seem to be a difficulty.
"c".liry,
(ro45n7-1)

Apparently, biped animal is one thing and not two, because one of the
is- matter, re other form, the one in potentialiry, the orer
"porr.rr*
in auality. But what does this proposal mean? The obvious place to look
for claifiion is in rhe next lines, where Aistode discusses the unity of a
material composite and says that the
I will argu drat the ,r.r6r.qo.rr. P look for
claificatio.
'Se
will ptop.tll' ond ites only
once we understand t. of genus and differentia, and for that we
""iry of the topic in Metaphysics ztz- But acted upon by an ap not explicitly
must rely on Aistotle's first discussi on
say soin this passage g in aciualiry.
At the end of the ch
3 fuistode d.iscusses various soru of priorities. ln Metzph. Z.r.roz8e34-4, he daims that Y is logically
But, as we have said, the proximate mamer ad the form ae the same and one, the
prior (i.e. p
a Somedmes one in potentiaht (dunamefi, the other in actualiry (nergeia). (ro45br7-r9)
nothereco
, The form ad the composite ae both properly designated as something
in actualiry: the form is the actual fearure rhe mamer porendelly has, ad
the composite is the actual object the maner porenrially is the object te
-
mamer will become if it acquires the formal fearure. Aisrode asks: "'S7har
the uniry of the comPosite (as is is the cause of the thing in potentiality (rhe matter) being in actuality (re
items (ro45a3-b7). MY main obj
is solving the Problem o
composite)?"8 His answer is r}re form, but his sratementis puzzling.
fuistode
The final sentence announces that there is no other caue of the potential
of genus and sphere's being an acrual sphere, bur this was the essence of each of the no.

**: 7 Cf. H.z, which focuses on form

take ficacion to go actu:Iiry (meryeia).
analogous, bur unlike Ross and ochers, I
as
8 For the question md
Aisrotlet reply, c. Z.t7 rclran-b9.
uoiry of form to the uniry of rhe composite' not vi versa-
"rhe
from
IOO MARY LOUISE GILL Unity of dzfnition in Metaphysics H.6 and Z.n ror
rVhat is the referent of "this"? Shat essence is he talking about? Ad what
mask the probler.r3 If we ignore the supprementar machinery
Aristotre
are the two things the referent of "this" is the essence o Given the grammar proposal matches his treatment of n
of the sentence, the antecedent of "this" should be the cause (aition),which bronze which composes a sphere i
Aisrode also calls the maker (to poisan).e Scholars resist this identificadon, the spherical shape, which makes
because they assume that the maker is the agent (e.g' a sculptor), and the
athos) of it.'a Since the shape can
intact, and can be realized in other marerials, the shape is an
accidntar
ProPery of the br the bron"e, but rhe bronze
Td.. shapeare ach other." So the accounr
is from at, is the form in the soul" $qzbztl), and the same chapter of a.bron"e sphere
identifies the form in the soul of the agent as rhe essence of the product -
sphere and bronze, th. firs
predicated of the second , as this in tht (tod' en iaidz), formin
matter.,6 In
ftqzay-bz).'o'W'e ca therefore take the maker to be the form in the soul Platonic language, the matte
of the agent - the sphericd sh ch guides re Some scholars think that
sculptoit production." If the , that form is form and thefanctionalmatter of a I
later realized in the finished \(/e can now such a way as to support the pqychic
are doubtless Aistode's central con
a bronze spJrere in H..6.'e organic compounds are subject ro trre
same
problem as.b'onze spheres, .h"gh less bviousry. The situation is more
complicated, because Aistode thinls that organic maer lasts
only as
as the composite it constitutes: if the r is removed, ,h.
fong ,rr"...,
is destroyed together wth the composite. As he puts it, organic mame
separated from the whole exists in na e onry:,o . srr.red h* i,
not a real
hand' because it can no longer operate as a h.nd does. Because the organic

t, For tJre mapp

'a This conori nrorcnege
in Ph. ry,wh
while losirg
one DroDeftv
genemuon
inZ.7j atd,
ln APo. r.4, to be discussed below, Y- is a accident ofX, jusr in y
" case is predicared ofX, but y need
not be rnentioned in dre accourr of what X is, .o, ,,".j x b.
ts.
-".r.ioo i, the.cco*,rof *hat y
16
S-ee,.e..g., Z.8.rq3at4-34, ro33bn-t6, ro35-Si Zsr.ro37az9-33; H.z.ro43a4_7. See also psages
dt dittttt. zznd,z36e7ow
,,

e Cf. Chales L994,B743and 87 n. zr, rough he would disagree wirh my identificarion of the ause
*t*"*"'
',:
i:yi?:;:r es carrs the rornren 8

rsr (unmoved) things, without itself 9

being moved: GC r.7'3" 1^24-br4.

This idea is well discussed by ModnkzooT, trS-r4.

" See, e.g., Metaph.Zto.rq5bz4-5; GAr.r9.7z6bzz-4; Metc.4.rz3g9b3t_39oa2,39oaro_r3.
O2 MARY LOUISE GILL Unity ofdzfnition inMetaphysics H.6 andZ.p ro3
body depends for what it is on the soul of the organism, the human soul
is an essential property of the human body, and the body ceases to be a
human body when re soul is removed."' Despite rhe difference between
functional maer and ordinary stuff such as bronze, functional matter is
itself an accidental compound:"' the functional properties belong to some
lowerlevel matter, which persists when the animal dies' If the account of the
composite must mention the form and the persisting matter, the composite
is definedwith reference to nro more basic entities.'3 Aristode says different
thi the continuant- Non- entrtles.
un n uniform stuffs such
as of the four elements,
eath, water, air, and frre (PA z:.646u2-24). Z.rc nvice says that a huma
beingp
these u
on the
organism dies (Gr4 zt.74bz4-31). Flesh is the organ of touch,nd it loses
tht capacity when removed from a living system. These complications do
not affect the main poinc at somelsrel of hylomorphic analysis - wherher
at the level of flesh and bone, or at rhe level of the four elements - there is a
subject to which the organic form b
survives its removal.a So the proble
Aistode focuses on a bronze statue
the problem isting matter,
whatever its Pheres, when
we consider r destruction'
The analpis of a bronze sphere resembles that of a white man, Aistotle's
favorite example of a accidental compound." In 2.4 he uses the same
label "cloak" for a white man and asks whether cloak has an essence and

. fu we shall see below, Y is an essential properry of X, just in case Y is predicated of x and mur be

**oor.u t *e accounr of wht x is. Fr r'e dasst"

"" ?j::.:jffi*;
sen when the matter has a funcdonal

form

*i
ro4 MARY LOUISE GILL Unity of defnition in Metaphysics H.6 and Ztz ro,
THE UNITY OF FORM TN Z.TZ
of a gen xists as maner
and the (eidz) and
cies
Metaphysics Z.rz presents itself as Aistodet rst attempt to explain the is eviden account from
unity of definition (Z.nsq8a34-l), and here he explicidy denies that a )

genus is related to its differentia in the way that a particula white man is
related to whiteness.Ag"it he uses the example of man defined as "biped
animal":
I mean this difculty. \7'try is the thing one whose account we call a definition -
for instance, man whose account is "biped animal"? Let that be its account. Vhy
is this [man] one and not many, animal and biped? For in the case of a man and
white they are many when one item does not belong to the other, whereas they are

which mak offthe genus are opposites). (ro37bro-zr)

If te genus panook of its differentiae, it would have incompatible prop-

erties for instance, plane figure would be bor-h round and square.'e So
-
the relation between a genus and differentia is not rhat between a subject
and a properry it has. Aistode conasts genus-differentia combinations
with a white man, but he could equally have used the example in H.6,

subject. two sub-kinds (for insrance, knowledge into practical ard theoredcal) in
Vh"t, then, is the relation between a genus and a differentia, if the order to define some definite kind, rn.h r" stecrafr, at the botrom of a
genus does not paftake of the differentia? Aristode discusses definition by genus-species tree. The Philebry, by contrast, analTrzns a kind into its parts
division and then mentions wo possibilities: and features in order to clarify the kind itself, which is divided.3" The

"g Cf.Z.t+.tq9b--6, for a similu objection to the Platonic accott. 'o I discuss tlte Phihbus pas*ge in Gill zoo9.
c,6 MARY LOUISE GILL
pturality - a strearn of undifferentiated vocal sound, which someone might
experience. Socrates says that the Egyptian god Theuth discovered the
letters by recognizing in the searn of vocd sound a sPectrum voiced-
unvoiced. He grouped together similar sounds into smaller and smaller
ranges, until he singled out the indivisible lefters, some voiced (the vowels),
some intermediates (semi-vowels and others), and some unvoiced stops (the
consonants) (Phtb. b642). Thus he worked out how many indivisible
sounds there ae and of what sorts they are. In both versions of the example
sound is grasped by one ofits features, voice.
Socrates gives a second example, again to do with sound, but tiis time
from a different perspective. Sound car be grasped by its pitch, and in this
cse the continuum is high, medium, and low tone. That continuum c.n volum
be divided into smaller ard smaller continua arrd finally into individual
musicI notes and intervals (Phlb. rybrr--r.6).
Platot eriamples reveal that sound can be considered from various per-
spectives. In focusing on one feature - -
pitch we ignore other features
of the kind, such as voice, volume, and rhythm.l' Each feature is a range
which admits a more and a less, and indivisible unia ae located somewhere
within that range. The continuum is never used up: it can be extended
indefinitely in either direction and car be divided into units in more than
one way. The t exhaust
the spectrum in Greek
musii exhaust choice of
differentia (say pitch) ignores other features of the genus (voice, volume,
rhythm). Thus the genus conceived as matrer conrains information not
captured by *y one division. So on the second concePtion the genus is
something more t}ran any one species of the genus.
In Z.riAistode insists that proper procedure takes a differentia of a
differentia, say biped as a differentia of footed, perhaps cloven biped as a
differentia of biped, and so on down to indivisible forms of foored. He
clls the final differentia the substance (ousia) of the thing (to38at9-zo,
qd4-6 atd 25c9.
3 Plato calls atention to these other featues at P lb. 3a See Smydr 1984,
,, The international phonetic dphabet includs more thm a hunded possible sounds, of which
ancient Greek recognizes only some.
ri C. Phlb. t6cto-<2.
Unity ofdefnition in Metaphysics H.6 andZ.p ro7
How, then, do we make sens of the uniry of genus and. differentia on the
second conception?
. The first genus is
pect, voice, a spec-
can be subdivided
tocated somewhere on the voiced ."i'.1: r:::,;t;;ff:#t*:J
all other voiced sounds, perhaps by the op.r,.r, of the mor-rih in voicing
it.t+
In theterminology of MephysicsH.6,a genus such as sound is potential
.because
it can be determine in vai iays, in terms of voi, pitch,
d th. ourset, ,"y.,roi. i*i,,
sound "i
r}rer features of sound, iuch as pitch,
speed, ances of a lowest kind, those other
features stand outside the division ofvoice and ae accidental features of
individual voiced sounds. Sound is a nice example, because the indivisible
kinds - for instance, the letters - can be adeqatery defined by a single
line of division. Pitch, volume, and speed rt. not esiential features of tre
phoneme alpha, the indivisible kind, though they characterize individual
expressions of it.
Examples that particularly interest Aistotle biological kinds such as
-
man - ae much more difficulr, since they are determined as what they
T. by manl aspects of the genus, not just one.3i Scholas often point out
that Aistotlet account in Metapltlsics ztz and H.6 is overly slhematic,
suggesting as it does that the species of a kind can be fully determined by a
single line ofdivision. Parts ofAnimab t3 announces r}'at correct procedure
requires division straightaway by marry differentiae (pA
ry.6a3bg-26) -
not mere by mode of locomotion, but by other functions as well, such as
mode of feeding, reproduction, perception, and cooling.
Experts on Aistotlet biologT now generally agree that his project was
not to classif' aimal kinds into sub-kinds and species but to coiect ard
9x_plain
aimal difFerentiae, grouped under the general headings "ways of
life(bio),activities (praxeis),chaacter-trais(zthe),andparts (rnoria) (IIA
r.t.487attz; 49ra8-lrr)J6 Given his procedure, a single rype of aimal will
turn up in many distinct divisions, becuse it shares features with aimals
in different groups. Differentiae shaed by groups of animals are explained
57.
3t on definition in Aistode's biology, see Balme 1987; Lennox r98 76, atd zoro. on intriecies ofithe
_ problem, see Gonhelf r985b, ry87, and ry97a-
,o Pellegrin r98z; Balme r997;I*nnoxr997a.
Io8 MARY LoUISE GILL Uniry of dzfnition inMetaphysics H.6 andZ.z ro9
(e.g. blooded animals have lungs because they ar land-dwellers), animalt way of life (PA.1.6a28-646u).+'The-
"nd organization is in a way
anomalies are singled out for special aftenrion (e.g. whales and dolphins for the sake ofthe soul, b.c".rse th. rour
cnuols the arimal,s chaacteristic
have lungs but ae water-dwellers).r7 \hat is striking about Aistode's
procedure from the perspective of Z.n is that different lines of division
apparendy yield separate building-blocks.r8 These elemenrs are correlated
in groups of animals, and the msk is to explain why they occur together.3e
At the stage of mere division, before explaaation is uirdertaken, features of
the same creature which are singled out in different divisions are logically
independent of one another. This is so, even if a necessary connection Those.animais may be quite dive
benveen tose features is later established. If this observation is correcr, ir carned out piecemeal without kn
explains why different axes of division cn be investigated separately, and a th.y do in particula sorts of an
why building-blocks c be combined in such a variery ofways in different relevant only to division. The.chief po^int
is that on eirher concepdon of
sorts of creatures. At dre same time it explains why mention of the genus the genus a menrion of it adds
information rhat is not conrained in
adds no information beyond that contained in the final differentia - the the final differentia. On the trst
genus adds no information, because it is immediately considered from the above its species; on t.he second conc
perspective relevat to that division, as in the Philbus example of sound more, it is immediately conceived f
and voice: all other generic information stands outside that division. ard that is the only asped of tJre genus relevat
Differentiae can be investigated independently, but eventually they need li1?", Y"Oertaken,
tnat dlvtslon.
to
to be integrated. In PAry.645br4-zo Aristode san that each of the parrs of fuistotle does not decide benveen the two concepdons
in ztz,but in
the body e:<ists for the sake of some action raxis ti), and that the whole Metaphysics H.6 he claims thar the puzzle
,ti-,rrriry^.ig;", ---7 .,'a
body is constituted for the sake of some complex action raxes tinos differenti "Uo",*- and the
^^maer
genus as ;';
henea polurnerous).ao A saw is constituted for the sake of sawing; similarly
.
as rorm.
differenua
d interpretation _ genus as maer,
a body is constituted in a way (paj for the sake of its soul (PA ry.645bry- like soun one is i., pot.rrtirli"ry, .t.1.fr.. i.,
r9). This passage suggesm that an organism's vaious functions and parts are merely superimposed onto the old
organized ad coordinated, some subordinate to otlers, for te sake of the ally thought. On either concepdon
because it is a determinable kind.
tz PA l6.668bll-469at, 669a2-y. On
us is immediately considered under
re-r.
rfris topic, see lnnox r987a,
38 Cf Pellegrin 1985, ro6, who claims that parrs of animals serve as a son of alphabec they can be omotion, and other determinations
combined in numerorx different ways in different mimals, md the combination promotes suwival Since only t}rat aspect of the genus is
in difierent environments.
,e A cenual passage for Pellegrin 1985 , 98, ro3-4 is PoL 4.4.t29ob2518, wlich compares goverornenc selected axis, rhe genus arrd dierentia
to mimals. Bodr sora of endries have many parrs, artd there ae s may species of ach as the a_ins information not actualized by that
combinations (suuce; of the nessary para. Pellegrin claims thaq whereas che Pal' holds out
the posibility of dening biological species, the biologiczl works never acnralize the possibility. In
his vim Aistodet zoology is primarily moriolory, the snrdy of parts. I-loyd r99o, in a. cridque of
Pellegrin (9-r5), marshals evidence, especially om ,he Metaplrysics, ro show thar Aistode regards
whole animals as subsuace.s md domgm.des their parts, e.g. at Meph.Z.r6.ro4ob5-r6 and ro4ra3- 4 on this topic, see lnnox zoo. see also chales zooo, esp. ch. rz; Harper
r9g 9, u4-tg;ard Modak
t.Uoydt criticism is fai bur Pellegrin has uncovered ar importart facet ofAistodet biologiel zoot' t8934. The accort is likery to be highly comprex, ,s
cottrradGggTsjirr;*, i, rri .rayri,
project. Prior to investigating the unity ofa species the biologist musr locre the building-blocks, of dre elephant's uunk.
differenr combinarions of which ocor in different sorts of mimals. To discover the uniry of a *
species, one must explain why certain building-block ae present md not others. \?hether or not
Aisrode caried out the funher step of esablishing dre unity of species, he was evidendy serious
about che possibility, as witnessed by r}re passage in Pal, 4.4
ao Or plrouc complete. On this passage see lrnnox zoora, 176-8. analogz is much closer.
IIO MARY LOUISE GILL Unity ofdefnition in Metaphysics H.6 andZ.n rrr
stuffsuited ro take on the shape of
THE UNITY OF THE COMPOSITE IN H.6 a sphere: its actuar identity grounds its
Potentialiry.+
V'e observed that the pessage on the bronze sphere, though often taken to
clarify the unity of form, presents the wrong conception for that purpose.
fu Aistotle has construed the relationship between matter ad form until
now, the matter partakes of t-he form. That is the model he rejects for genus
and differentiainZ.tz. Given what he says about participation in Z.rz, it is
notewonhy r-hat later in H.6 he criticizes those who appeal to participation
to explain the unity of concrete composites:
sirnilariry with "biped animal,' just
Because of this difficulty [about the being and unity of material composites such as about the bronze sphere does not
unity of genus and differentia. He

ityandactualiry. Onmy
ete material composites
rial properties. \e are
osire on analogy wi the unity of

tode's use of the particle ycr (,.for,,)

potentialiry and actualiry Gntelzcheis) ad a difference [between them]. (ro+bz-
17) uzzle about the uniry of form to d_re
saying: orr yp crq rropc i
As I
interpreted the example of the bronze sphere before, the analysis the same even if the definition of
invites Aistotle's own criticism.a3 Indeed, he cdls attention to the problem cloak should be 'the spherical
by mentioning a bronze triangle as one example of the wrong analpis readers expect the upcoming
(ro41b4-r5). On the view to be discarded, being a bronze triangle is a preceding discussion of form.
discussion of the bronze sphere, his sc
that of rhe Platonists, whoseview he rejeca. Since he d.enies
that te genus
parrakes of its differentiae (zsz.rq7b-ry), ad. since
H.6 itself faults
explanarions in terms of participation, we sodd rook
for some otrrer way
lump of bronze is potentially spherical, but it is also something actual in to interpret the passage.
its own right. The actual identiry of bronze makes it a had, malleable
4 cf. H.4'o44az7-g,where Aistorre rells us rjat a sau, qlnno be made ou wool or
wood - the

4'
46

the genus. Bu storle rejects in Z.rz when he denies that dre genus
parales ofia unity ofthe genrs ard ia dieentiae is not claied
H:-5. by comparing
I2 MARY L9UISE GILL
Unitt of dcfnition in Metaphysics H.6 and
Z.p rr3
with reference to two more basic componen*,
the bronze and the sphericai
shape.
\e can keep the main
form shape) e.xpl
-(spherical
actuality, and it is the essen

i:r*i
kind,like
ot paruke of its differentiae but is
This difficulry is then (y' p) rhe same, even if rhe definition of cloak should be ingle line of division. Although the
tured by a single dimension,'other

for a material composite is to treat th

This passage claims that the problem of uniry for concrere composites dis-
animal in
appears. As I blem did not disap- ric matter.
pear, because ntiallyasphere, but ok at his
also actually sphere was defined potenria-liry in Maplrysics e.7.
But trst we should consider Aistode's funher
exrension of
"^ the
"'" 'eenus-
differentia model to non-substandal proper.i., i; H.;.;'-"
;;i,11;
d *.d by rhe UNITY OF NON-SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTIES
4e Denniston 1966, 4.It is generally
t6; d. tSJ s.v yp). There is often
y'pc, or simple ye or po. Cons
Y' p', be a mixed *peri ence then,
with a qov ei xcri rrapcoouv
rP0 v evcrr ("But it is nor ac all
clea, itis likely thar protagor,
beng discrepancy rhe MSS, cL 5o
Chnt printed the last sentence of
Democritus, Fr. r9r with y' p: rcnirr( y' p'ereuo( rfll yvurl zu0vgrepu re raerj xcr
rr. ('Vhen you keep to ris mind , thetz, you wllborh erry on in bemer spirirs and . . . ") but dre
present edion (r95r-z) prints yp. To the passages in Denniston should be added Tht ryze3: ofcr
things are for genus.
om Badham tt ,996, zg9_9o,I uke A.istotle to be discussing the mity
le z,oo5, 8o of
ofrhe categories themselves, conery ro nor.,r+, ,r.rg.
,, n. 5o above.
fi4 MARY LOUISE GrLL
Unity ofdtfnition in Metaphysics H.6 andZ.n r5
l<tnd(tod),ti o45a36-b7).The According the Anatics, y
is an accidental predicate of X, just in cse y
claim about readers of Meta- is predicated but y need nor be mentioned in the account oi*hat
ofx
phyics Z.In white and other is, nor need X be mentioned in the accounr of
X
what y is. \hiteness is a
non-subsrantial properties ae defined with reference to something in the special predicate of surface, but a accid.ental
pred.icate
-
category of substance. ta
"";;.
non-substance is a special predicate
ry of substance, which is its primary
ch the non-substatce is defined a
understood. Thus health is aspecia_r
aspecial predicate ofman. InZ.5 Ar
in the account of what X is. For instance, animal belongs in this way ro like it are defined "from addirion,',
man, since animal is predicated of man and must be mentioned in the the sort.of subject in which the properry
definition of man; and heat belongs in this way ro fire, because heat is Non-substances, though not themselves
predicated of fire ard must be mentioned in the definition of fire. Let us substance and property, are nonetheless
call Y ar essential predicate of K More precisely: thing outside their own ctegory i1 tfre category of substan
Y is an essentialpredtcate ofX if and only ifY is predicated of ce.InZ.4and 5
X and Aistode argues that these .ttiitio lack the t
ofprim.ry.rrirrg,
Y must be mentioned in the accounr ofwhat X is. and so are not stricdy definable.
i.trit. uniry
A predicate Y belongs to a subject X ath'bauto in a second wa ifY He still holds something like that view at,the beginningMetaphysics
is predicated of X, and the subject X must be mentioned in the accounr o,
wtrere he sums up the discussion in Z-H before rurning
of what Y is. For instaace, femde belongs to animal ath' hauto in the to the main topic
of that book, potentialiry and actuality:
second wa because female is predicated of animal, and animal must
be mentioned in the accounr of what female is. Similarl odd belongs ut what is in the primary
sense ad to which (pros ho) the other
to number ath' hauto in the second wa because odd is predicated of are refrred, np9ly, substace (for the otheibeings
ae stared
re accounr of s'bstace _ quaatity ar'd q,r"liry a-d the
number, and number mu$ be menrioned in the account of what odd is. oth.r
things said in this way_- for all wiil conrain th
To invoke Aistotle's favorite example of a ath' haato predicate of the or zubr.., ,s we said
in our first remarla). (Ouo41bz73z) "..o,rnt
second sort, snubness belongs ath' haato ro nose, because snubness is
predicated of the nose, and the nose must be mentioned in the account of rf H.6 is consistent with o.r, the claim about the unity of non-substaces
what snubness is. Snubness (a qualiry) is defined as "concaviry in a nose," as isot that they can be defined apart from substance. Female is still defined
"this in that" (Z.5.ro3obr4-zo). Let us callY aspecialpredicate of Kt6 More with reference to arimal, ard whiteness with reference to ,.r.f"... Th.
precisely: passag that follows in H.d, in which Aistotle criticizes people
for their
a.ppeal to participation and the like
Y is a special predicate of X if and only if Y is predicared of X, and X fto4Sb7_ry), b."r, dir.tly on the
must be mentioned in rhe account of what Y is. discussion of non-subsrT". The passage mentions not only bro.r".
triangle, thus recalling the discussion oftaterial composites. The" ma_in
bsrances, such as being healthy and
t' Substarial kinds, such as the species man and horse and the genus animal, were ueated n Mctapltlsics
ted, being healthy (to hugiainein) is
Z as universal composites, which contain form and marter r:ken uliversally. See passages cired above and being white (ra leuon ena) is
nn.23. s.57
ta Z.t.tozSazo-9; 2.4 atd 5 a:elargely devoted to non-subsatial propenies and rheir secondary satus;
see esp. Z.4,ro3oar7ry; Z.5.rqobt4-28 and ro)ru-r+
tt For tlre disdnction, see ao Metzph. Ll8.tozzzr4-r9, to22a24-32. The whole investigation of
categorial being in Z-H is the study of ltnds of ath' hauubeing. See L.7.rot7azz-4, to which
_ fuistode refers in the opening senrence of Z.r
(roz8aro-r3). ,lllTffi:;ffiJ:t
to I owe the label to Pau.l Coppock. the non-subsance aregories
ofconcrete composites in the firsr caregory.
\6 MARY LoUISE GILL
Unity of defnition in Metaphysics H.6 ndZ.n rr7
Aristode's proposal about the manifestation of categorial properties ta1 it is like seeking what i
again extends his solution for the uniry of form. Occurrences of white- rhmg ls some one dring, and
ness and snubness, which ae defined with reference to some subject in the ae somehow one, so tht the
category of substance, involve a subject conceived of as matter and a predi- moves it, from potentialiry to actuality.
cate conceived of as form, the one in potentiality, the other in actualiry. The are simply jusr some one rhing. (loa5r

subject is a determinable kind, and the ourcome of differentiation is the This passage indictes that Aistode
maifestation of some categorial item. Thus being white (an occurrence a pure form such as rnan, defined
of whiteness) is surface (a determinable kind) differendated by whiteness
(a qualiry). Surface has many potentialities (to be hard or soft, rough or
smooth, white or black), but all aspecrs of surface other tha the poten-
tialiry to be white or black ae external to the differentiation of surface
into an instance of whiteness.f Any such instance will occur in a surface and to understand more firlly
which is also smooth or rough, had or soft, and so on, but those features need to look at his ueatment
merely coincide with the whiteness in the surface.Ag"ir, being female is Q.7.
defined with reference to animal, but the only aspect of animal internal to Metaplrysics o as a whole seeks to crarify t'e notions of potentiar and
its differentiation as female is the reproductive capacity. All other features
of animal - mode of feeding, locomotion, perception, and so fonh - ae
external to being female, even though every instance of female occurs in
an animal which has features of those sorts as well. So interpreted, the
genus, though it contains information not actualized in a differentiation,
ing needs to be added to the sub_
does not undermine the unity of the item differentiated. The definition of
a non-substance still mentions a substantial kind, but the reference does
not add information, since the kind is immediately considered from the
yer porendary a sphere, because t,
-;:Hr: ::i3ffi?,H..
yorkrd up into bronze, but once tle combination has been trasformed
perspective of that feature. into bronze, there is stuffof a suitabre kind to
b.
b.. i" the end-state is grounded in what th. ",ph;;..
: p..".iai.y
13 ,,rL;..t ir, i"'.i"
MTTER ND POTENTIALITY
r(renilty. ".*
H.6 ends with a summary ofAistodet proposds:
But,as we have said, the proximate (eschate)te matter ad the form ae the same
and one, rlre one in potentialiry (duname), the other in actualiry Qnergeia), so

t8 Note thar ac 7.4.roz9bzvz, Aistode supposes rhat a white surface can be dened as a smooth
surface. He is relying on Democrirus'view, which he criticizes * Sms. 4,44zbl:-r9.
t9 The Greek eseh can be trarslated either "proximate" or 'ultimate," depending on whether one is
cotnting up om rhe bonom or down from rhe top. I have ucillared in my rranslacion oFit in this
passage, rendering it with most trmslators as roximate" in Gill 1989, r43, but as 'ultimate" in Gill is a subject
zoo8. I becme dissacisfied with roximate," because tfie proximate (or highestJevel) marer in - man - chaacterized by an accidental properq (nis pathesi
organisms is rhe functional mane, which is not the issue in H.6. The relevr maner in H.6 is he
n hultoeimenon antbrpot, ,o49^r9i. The subjec.
il ;; i.rr-
maner which is potentially the produc, in the sense rhar ir ca be nrmed into the product without
|v i" its own right: ir is a torJz ti, a particjas thi.,g oi; "..,1J
J.rr.. ,o.,
funher changes of it (O.7: see below). This is rhe proximate rnaner, rs opposed to lowerJevel maner,
which must rst be transformed inro suitable stuff Although organisms have functional maner,
fto49az73o).
thry also have proximate mattcr, which sepmtes our when rhe organism dies. That is the sort of
matcer Aisrode is ralking about in H.6. 6 I discuss O.7 in more detail in Gill zoog.
II8 MARY LOUISE GILL Uniry ofdefnition inMetaphysics H.6
andZ.p ug
But the situation is different in the case of matter and form. fuistode of the metals used in its composition.
It shaes some properties with ia
chaacterizes the form-matter relation as follows: ingredients, but its o*r, .rr.r.ii
f."turo, *hi.h diff.r.n"tili c-,r.*,
are not
In cases not like that [i.e. not like a physical object and iu non-substantial prop-
erties], but the thing predicated (to hategorournenon) is some form (eidns t and
subject ;:T:
this (nd t, re proximate ubject] (to eschaton) is macter (huk) nd material also jus it is no
substace (ousi huli.And calling [a thing] "that-en" (eeininon) with reference a ceftain so-t.
to its matter and its properties (atd tm hulen hai n patb) turns out to be quite
correct, since both ae indenite (aoris). (to49a34-bz)
s?Aistode claims that a
both its non-substantial
Form-matter predication is not ordinary predication. The item predicated
is said to be some form and this (todz t, the matter of which it is
"o usage is correct, he claims, because
predicated is variously described as indcf.nite $o49bz), potential (to49ar8- b
'We subsrances have categorial con
z4), and not a this (to+ga+-g). specify the product adjectivally (as
"that-en") with reference to it. Their indefinitenessls rooted i
object for their instantiation.
The important idea is that the mafter is present in the product only
some defini ,trt*, r", a man. Mat
non-subsrantial properties in its inde 6.i't:ff
made into a sphere has its own character
which car be
as bronze, b,r. orr..'i.'irLrk d
e depends for its existence on the
obiecr whose
properties of a sphere, which .orrrr..
it with
reflect the distinctive treatments of matter in Metaplrysics Z and H.r-5 and es of the constituent bronze as an
in H.6 ad O. In Generation and Corru.ption r.ro, he pursues the second erties of the sphere it consdtutes.
idea in his analysis of mixture and argues that the ingredients of a mixture k usage, which prefers adjectives to
rence to its mafter.6,
atterin O.7 isAristotle's claim tharan

a compound of earth and water.

Perties owing
the color, t}re
it has because

chcterize it.
I2O MARY LOUISE GILL
Unity of dzfnition in Metaphysics
H.6 nd Z.z rzr

Given that material properties

which they belong, do Arirtotl.

rues are controlled by rheir form.

not merely expressions of whar it

tt
role of maner, see Meph. o.8.ro5ob6-28; Cacl. nz.z83br9-zz,
*.rffoi*ining end, ca!.