[G.R. No. 101783.

January 23, 2002]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., EDGARDO S. ISIP,
HON. JUDGE MANUEL M. CALANOG, JR., and HON. JUDGE TIRSO D'C. VELASCO, respondents.
Interest republicae ut sit finis litium[1] - it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by
the same parties and their privies over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. From this overwhelming concern springs
the doctrine of res judicata an obvious rule of reason according stability to judgments.
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari are the a) Decision in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 dated January
16, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City; [2] and b) its Order dated September 10, 1991[3] denying
the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 11, 1974, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, with the objective of enabling the grantees of
electric franchises to reduce their rates "within the reach of consumers", [4] promulgated Presidential Decree No.
551[5] providing for the reduction from 5% to 2% of the franchise tax paid by electric companies, thus:

SECTION 1. Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all
grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two (2%) of their
gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation, distribution
and sale of electric current.

On February 5, 1982, the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed with the Board of Energy (BOE) a
"Petition for Specific Performance, Damages and Violation of P. D. No. 551" [6] against the Manila Electric Company
(Meralco), docketed as BOE Case No. 82-198. PCFI sought for the immediate refund by Meralco to its customers of
all the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551, through the reduction of its franchise tax from 5% to 2%, with interest at
the legal rate; and for the payment of damages and a fine in the amount of P50, 000.00 for violating P.D. 551. It
moored its petition on Section 4 of P.D. No. 551 which provides:

Sec. 4. All the savings realized by electric franchise holders from the reduction of the franchise tax under Section 1 and
tariff reductions and tax credits under Sections 2 and 3, shall be passed on to the ultimate consumer. The Secretary
of Finance shall promulgate rules and regulations and devise a reporting systems to carry out the provisions of this
Decree.

In its answer to the petition, Meralco alleged that it was duly authorized by the BOE in its Order dated March 10,
1980 in BOE Case No. 79-692 to retain the disputed savings; and that the said Order had long become final.
On November 25, 1982, the BOE issued its Decision dismissing PCFI's petition, declaring that Meralco was
indeed authorized by the BOE, in BOE Case No. 79-692, to retain the disputed savings under P.D. 551, thus:

It is at once evident from the foregoing controlling facts and circumstances, particularly the Order of this Board
dated March 10, 1980, as confirmed by the reply-letter dated March 3, 1981, that Meralco has been duly
authorized to retain the savings realized under the provisions of P.D. 551. The authority granted in the said Order
and letter is so clear and unequivocal as to leave any room for contradictory interpretation. This Board, therefore, holds
as untenable petitioners claim that respondent Meralco was never authorized under the said Order and letter to hold on
to the savings realized under the said decree.

"The Board likewise finds to be devoid of merit petitioners contention that pursuant to Opinion No. 140, Series of
1979, of the Minister of Justice, it is absolutely mandatory on the part of respondent Meralco to pass on to its
customers the savings under consideration. It must be pointed out that the Order of March 10, 1980 was issued by this
Board on the basis of the recommendation contained in the Memorandum dated November 30, 1979 of the Minister of
Finance, which was approved by the President of the Philippines in his directive to this Board dated December 11,
1979 issued thru Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave. This Board believes and so holds that the approval by
the President of the Philippines of the aforesaid Finance Ministrys recommendation had the effects of (a) reversing or
modifying the aforementioned Opinion of the Minister of Justice; and (b) confirming the promulgation by the Ministry
of Finance, conformably with the specific authority granted it under P.D. No. 551, of an additional rule or regulation
for the implementation of the said decree for the guidance of this Board. In issuing the Order of March 10, 1980,
therefore, the Board has done no more than follow and be guided by the said additional rule or regulation.

"It is noteworthy to mention also that the registered oppositors in BOE Case No. 79-692 (formerly BPW Case
No. 72-2146), where the respondent herein originally filed its motion requesting for authority to defer the
passing on to its customers of the franchise tax reduction benefits under P.D. No. 551, have done nothing to seek
relief from or to appeal to the appropriate forum, the said Order of March 10, 1980. As a consequence, the
disposition contained therein have long become final.

xxxxxx

"That Meralco has been authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the franchise tax under
P.D. No. 551 is, therefore beyond question."[7] (Emphasis supplied)
 PCFI filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the BOE. Hence, PCFI filed a Petition for Certiorari
with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 63018. In a Resolution dated October 22, 1985, this Court dismissed the petition
for lack of merit, holding that:

We see no grave abuse of discretion warranting the setting aside of the BOE order.

"P.D. No. 551 ordered the Minister of Finance to issue implementing rules and regulations. The Minister authorized all
grantees of electric franchises, not Meralco alone, whose rates of return on their rate bases were below the legal
allowable level to either ask for increased rates or to defer the passing on of benefits under the decree to consumers
until just and reasonable returns could be had. Lengthy investigations, audits, hearings, and determinations over
practically an eight year period preceded the questioned decision. The petitioners failed both below and in this petition
to successfully refute the facts ascertained in the audits and examinations. The BOE approved option formed the basis
of subsequent determinations of Meralco rates and the adopted formula became the basis of computations. When this
petition was filed on January 27, 1983, the November 25, 1982 ruling was already final and executory. Moreover,
the March 10, 1980 judgment rendered in BOE Case No. 79-692, where Meralco had filed a motion for authority
to defer passing on to customers the savings from the reduction of franchise taxes, was not appealed or
questioned by the petitioners. Instead, they filed BOE Case No. 82-198 on February 5, 1982 or almost two years
later, raising the same issues against the same parties. BOEs questioned decision in Case No. 82-198 used the
facts in BOE Case No. 79-692 for its conclusions. Not only had the March 10, 1980 decision confirmed the
findings of the Minister of Finance on Meralcos accounts and finances but in filing the second case, the
petitioners were asking for a readjudication of the same issues in another challenge to these same findings . x x x.
[8]
(Emphasis supplied)

Four years thereafter, PCFI and a certain Edgardo S. Isip, private respondents herein, filed with respondent
Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-
3659. Private respondents prayed for a ruling on who should be entitled to the savings realized by Meralco under P.D.
No. 551. Once again, they insisted that pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 551, the savings belong to the ultimate
consumers.
Meralco, in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata, citing this Court's
Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 which affirmed the BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198.
On January 16, 1991, respondent RTC rendered the assailed Decision declaring null and void the Resolution of
this Court in G.R. No. 63018 and on the basis of the Dissenting Opinion of the late Justice Claudio Teehankee, held
that the disputed savings belong to the consumers, thus:

Respondent Meralcos theory is devoid of merit. As correctly stated in the dissenting opinion of the late Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee in the October 22, 1985 resolution of the Supreme Court in SC G.R. No. 63018, the
decision of the Board of Energy is ultra vires, hence, null and void. x x x.

"It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear, it leaves no room for interpretation. The
memorandum issued by the Minister of Finance which was made the basis of the decision of the Board of Energy has
no legal effect because Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 551 is clear and unequivocal.

xxxxxx

"Since the law is clear, what is left to be done by the administrative body or agency concerned is to enforce the law.
There is no room for an administrative interpretation of the law. In the instant case, the Board interpreted PD 551 and
chose not only to enforce it but to amend and modify the law on the basis of a Memorandum and the authority issued
by the Minister of Finance to all grantees of electric-franchises, not Meralco alone, whose rates of return on their rate
basis were below the legal allowable level, to either ask for an increased rates or to defer the passing on of benefits
under the decree to consumers, until just and reasonable return could be had. This is beyond the authority granted by
PD 551 to the Minister of Finance. PD 551 merely ordered the Minister of Finance to issue implementing rules and
regulations. He cannot amend or modify the clear mandate of the law. The act therefore of the Minister of Finance
was ultra vires, hence, null and void. Considering that said act became the basis of the Board of Energys
decision, it follows that said decision is likewise null and void and the Supreme Court resolution affirming said
decision is also null and void having proceeded from a void judgment, hence, cannot be considered as valid
judgment that will be a bar to the present action."[9] (Emphasis supplied)

Meralco moved for a reconsideration of the above Decision but was denied by respondent court in its Order of
September 10, 1991.
Hence, Meralco's petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
"I RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 89-3659 IS NOT BARRED
BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.
II RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID A RESOLUTION OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
III RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REMEDY OF DECLARATORY
RELIEF WAS STILL AVAILABLE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
IV RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF."[10]
Meralco contends that Civil Case No. Q -89-3659 is already barred by prior judgments, referring to a) this Courts
Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 sustaining the BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198; and b) the Order dated March
10, 1980 of the same Board in BOE Case No. 79-692, both holding that Meralco is authorized to retain its savings
realized under P.D. 551. Meralco likewise argues that respondent RTC cannot annul the Resolution of this Court in
G.R. No. 63018 considering that trial courts cannot set aside decisions of a superior court. And lastly, Meralco
maintains that private respondents can no longer avail of the remedy of an action for declaratory relief in view of the
rule that such action should be filed before a violation of the statute occurred. [11]
In their comment,[12] private respondents argue that this Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 cannot be a bar to
Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 for declaratory relief considering that it did not delve on the essential issue raised in the
latter case, i.e., who is entitled to the savings. Further, they claim that public interest would be defeated by the
application of res judicata.
The petition is meritorious.
The issue - whether or not Meralco is duly authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the
franchise tax under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12 % allowable rate recognized in this
jurisdiction has long been settled. Thus, the relitigation of the same issue in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 cannot be
sanctioned under the principle of res judicata.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment.[13] In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and
received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all other
matters that could have been adjudged therein. [14] For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: 1) there must be a final judgment or order; 2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the two cases
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. [15]
All the above requisites are extant in the records and thus, beyond dispute.
Re: FIRST REQUISITE - there must be a final judgment:
It is beyond question that this Courts Resolution dated October 22, 1985 in G.R. No. 63018, sustaining the BOEs
Decision dated November 25, 1982 in BOE Case No. 82-198 which dismissed PCFI's petition, attained finality on
December 4, 1985. As a matter of fact, this Court had long ago issued an Entry of Judgment stating that the said
Resolution "became final and executory and is x x x recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgements." Prior thereto, or
on March 10, 1980, the BOE's Order in BOE Case No. 79-672 became final when the oppositors therein did not appeal.
Re: SECOND REQUISITE - the court which rendered the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties:
There is no question that the BOE has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties herein. Under P.D. No.
1206,[16] The BOE is the agency authorized to "regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric
companies."[17] As such, it has jurisdiction over Meralco, an electric company, and over the savings it realized under
P.D. No. 551. It bears stressing that P.D. No. 551 was passed precisely to enable the grantees of electric franchises to
reduce their rates within the reach of consumers. Clearly, the matter on how the disputed savings should be disposed of
in order to realize a reduction of rates is within the competence of the BOE.
Re: THIRD REQUISITE - it must be a judgment or order on the merits:
The BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198 is a judgment on the merits. A judgment is on the merits when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or
dilatory objections. After according both parties the opportunities to be heard, the BOE disposed of the controversy by
resolving the rights of the parties under P.D. No. 551. In its Decision, the BOE declared in clear and unequivocal
manner that Meralco "has been duly authorized to retain the savings realized under the provisions of P.D. No. 551" and
that private respondent PCFIs argument to the contrary is "untenable." The BOE's Decision was upheld by this Court in
G.R. No. 63018.
Re: FOURTH REQUISITE - there must be between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes
of action:
There is identity of parties between the two cases. BOE Case No. 82-198 was a contest between private
respondent PCFI, as petitioner, and Meralco, as respondent. Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 involves the same contenders,
except that respondent Edgardo Isip joined PCFI as a plaintiff. But his inclusion as such plaintiff is inconsequential. A
party by bringing forward, in a second case, additional parties cannot escape the effects of the principle of res
judicata when the facts remain the same. Res judicata is not defeated by a minor difference of parties, as it does not
require absolute but only substantial identity of parties. [18]
The subject matters of BOE Case No. 82-198 and Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 are likewise identical since both refer
to the savings realized by Meralco from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551. The subject matter of an
action refers to the thing, wrongful act, contract or property which is directly involved in the action, concerning which
the wrong has been done and with respect to which the controversy has arisen. [19] In both cases, the controversy is how
the disputed savings shall be disposed of - whether they shall be retained by Meralco or be passed on to the consumers.
 With respect to identity of causes of action, this requisite is likewise present. In both cases, the act alleged to be in
violation of the legal right of private respondents is Meralco's retention of the savings it realized under P.D. No.
551. While it is true that BOE Case No. 82-198 is one for specific performance, while Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 is for
declaratory relief - in the ultimate - both are directed towards only one relief, i.e., the refund of the disputed savings to
the consumers. To seek a court's declaration on who should benefit from the disputed savings (whether Meralco or the
consumers) will result in the relitigation of an issue fairly and fully adjudicated in BOE Case No. 82-198.
Clearly, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action. The difference of actions in the
aforesaid cases is of no moment. The doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating for
the same thing and more importantly, the same contentions. [20] As can be gleaned from the records, private respondents
arguments in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 bear extreme resemblance with those raised in BOE Case No. 82-198.
Respondent RTC's Decision granting PCFI and Isip's petition for declaratory relief is in direct derogation of the
principle of res judicata. Twice, it has been settled that Meralco is duly authorized to retain the savings it realized
under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12% allowable rate. The pronouncement of the BOE in
BOE Case No. 82-198 finding such fact to be "beyond question" is clear and not susceptible of equivocation. This
pronouncement was sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 63018. In finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the BOE, this Court saw the wisdom of its assailed Decision. Thus, this Court held: "[I]n dismissing the petition for
specific performance, the BOE authorized Meralco, in lieu of increasing its rates to get a more reasonable return on
investments while at the same time refunding to consumers the benefit of P.D. No. 551, to instead defer the passing on
of benefits but without the planned increases. Instead of giving back money to consumers and then taking back the
same in terms of increased rates, Meralco was allowed by the BOE to follow the more simplified and rational
procedure."[21]
Private respondents now argue that G.R. No. 63018 merely decreed the postponement of the passing of Meralco's
savings to the consumers until it could increase its rate charges. On this point, this Court categorically ruled:

"X x x. And finally, as stated by the Solicitor General, if only to put the issue to final rest, BOEs decision
authorizing Meralco to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of franchise tax as long as its rate of
return falls below the 12% allowable rate is supported by P.D. No. 551, the rules and administrative orders of
the Ministry of Finance which had been duly authorized by the decree itself and by directives of the President to
carry out the provisions of the decree, and most of all by equitable economic considerations without which
the decree would lose its purpose and viability."[22]

Corollarily, let it not be overlooked that the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract etc. for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. It may be
entertained only beforethe breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract etc., to which it refers. [23] The petition gives
a practical remedy in ending controversies which have not reached the stage where other relief is immediately
available. It supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of
obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs. [24] Here, private respondents brought the petition for
declaratory relief long after the alleged violation of P.D. No. 551.
Lastly, we are dismayed by respondent RTC's adherence to the Dissenting Opinion, instead of the Majority
Opinion, of the members of this Court in G.R. No. 63018, as well as its temerity to declare a Resolution of this Court
"null and void" and "cannot be considered as valid judgment that will be a bar to the present action."
A lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, especially of this Court, for to do
so will negate the principle of hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. A final judgment, albeit erroneous,
is binding on the whole world. Thus, it is the duty of the lower courts to obey the Decisions of this Court and render
obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands
conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system
of the nation."[25] "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings,"
as eloquently declared by Justice J. B. L. Reyes.[26]
Respondent RTC, and for this matter, all lower courts, ought to be reminded that a final and executory decision or
order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are
not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim. [27] In
setting aside the Resolution and Entry of Judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 63018, respondent court grossly violated
basic rules of civil procedure.
In fine, we stress that the rights of Meralco under P.D. No. 551, as determined by the BOE and sustained by this
Court, have acquired the character of res judicata and can no longer be challenged.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed RTC Decision dated January 16, 1991 and Order
dated September 10, 1991 in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
 Manila Electric vs Phil Consumers Foundation
Jan. 23, 2002 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Facts:
Marcos, with the objective of enabling the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates "within the reach
of consumers", promulgated Presidential Decree No. 551 1 providing for the reduction from 5% to 2% of the
franchise tax paid by electric companies
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed with the Board of Energy a "Petition for Specific
Performance, Damages and Violation of P. D. No. 551" against the Manila Electric Company (Meralco)
PCFI sought for the immediate refund by Meralco to its customers of all the savings it realized under P.D. No.
551, through the reduction of its franchise tax from 5% to 2%, with interest at the legal rate; and for the
payment of damages and a fine in the amount of P50, 000.00 for violating P.D. 551 (petition based on Section
4 of P.D. No. 5512)
Meralco alleged that it was duly authorized by the BOE in its Order dated March 10, 1980 to retain the
disputed savings; and that the said Order had long become final
BOE issued its Decision dismissing PCFI's petition, declaring that Meralco was indeed authorized by the BOE
saying that:
the registered oppositors in BOE Case, where the respondent herein originally filed its motion
requesting for authority to defer the passing on to its customers of the franchise tax reduction benefits
under P.D. No. 551, have done nothing to seek relief from or to appeal to the appropriate forum, the
said Order of March 10, 1980
As a consequence, the disposition contained therein have long become final
That Meralco has been authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the franchise tax
under P.D. No. 551 is, therefore beyond question.
PCFI filed a MFR but was denied by the BOEPCFI filed a Petition for Certiorari with SC, but it dismissed
the petition for lack of merit because when this petition was filed, the earlier ruling was already final and
executory.
Four years thereafter, PCFI and a certain Isip, filed with RTC a petition for declaratory relief praying for a
ruling on who should be entitled to the savings realized by Meralco under P.D. No. 551 they insisted that
pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 551, the savings belong to the ultimate consumers.
RTC rendered the assailed Decision declaring null and void the earlier Resolution of this Court and on the
basis of the Dissenting Opinion of the late Justice Claudio Teehankee, held that the disputed savings belong to
the consumers

Issue: WON the petition filed is already barred by prior judgments

Held: YES
The issue - whether or not Meralco is duly authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the
franchise tax under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12 % allowable rate recognized in this
jurisdiction has long been settled. Thus, the relitigation of the same issue in cannot be sanctioned under the principle
of res judicata.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and
received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all other
matters that could have been adjudged therein. For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: 1) there must be a final judgment or order; 2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the two cases
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
All the above requisites are extant in the records and thus, beyond dispute.
1- BOE's Order in became final when the oppositors therein did not appeal
2- BOE has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties herein since BOE is the agency authorized to
"regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies
3- BOE's Decision is a judgment on the merits. A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights
and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections.
4- There is identity of the parties, subject matters, and identity of causes of action. The test of identity of
causes of action lies not in the form of an action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no
moment. The doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating for the same
thing and more importantly, the same contentions.

1 SECTION 1. Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees
of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two (2%) of their gross receipts
received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current
2 Sec. 4. All the savings realized by electric franchise holders from the reduction of the franchise tax under Section 1 and tariff
reductions and tax credits under Sections 2 and 3, shall be passed on to the ultimate consumer. The Secretary of Finance
shall promulgate rules and regulations and devise a reporting systems to carry out the provisions of this Decree
 Case Digest: Spouses Abad vs. Fil-Homes Realty
G.R. No. 189239: November 24, 2010

FACTS:

Fil-Homes filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners. Respondent alleged that since 1980, they have
made demands for petitioners to vacate, but they went unheeded. Petitioners countered that there is no possession by
tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years;
and that respondentspredecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. During the
pendency of the case, the city of Paranaque filed a case of expropriation. A writ of possession was granted to the city.

The respondent won in the unlawful detainer case, but the RTC reversed the ruling upon appeal reasoning that there
was no "tolerance" on the part of Respondents. On appeal of the Respondents to the CA, it upheld the decision of the
MeTC. Thus, the current petition.

ISSUES:

A. Whether or not Petitioners should be ejected from the premises.

HELD: Petition is devoid of merit.

CIVIL LAW: Ejectment

As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their resolution held in
abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership. In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of
possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance
was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of
respondents prior to the City's possession of the lots.

Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance authorizing the
initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state so. Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the
basis of the ordinance. Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is nonsequitur for petitioners to claim
that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied with
before they can be considered to be beneficiaries.
 G.R. No. 162575 December 15, 2010
BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG, Petitioner, vs. SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., Respondent

Facts:
Respondent Subic Bay Distribution, Inc. (SBDI) entered in two Distributorship Agreements with petitioner and Able
Transport

By virtue of the provisions of the distribution agreement, petitioner applied for and was granted a credit line by the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), International Exchange Bank (IEBank), Security Bank Corporation (SBC) and
Asia United Bank (AUB) in favor of respondent

All these banks separately executed several undertakings setting the terms and conditions governing the drawing of
money by respondent

Petitioner allegedly failed to pay her obligations to respondent despite demand, thus, respondent tried to withdraw from
these bank undertakings

Petitioner then filed with the RTC separate petitions against the banks (UCPB, IEBank, SBC and AUB) for declaration
of nullity of the several bank undertakings and domestic letter of credit which they issued with the application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction

Petitioner alleged that said contracts are oppressive, unreasonable and unconscionable on the ground, among others,
that the prevailing market rate with which petitioner will be charged of as interests and penalties is exorbitant rendering
it against public morals and policy

The court then issued an Order granting the TRO and requiring petitioner to implead respondent Subic Bay as an
indispensable party

RTC: ordered issuance of Writ of Prelim Injunc restraining all the Banks from releasing any funds to Respondent Subic
Bay.

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration to the judgment of the RTC, Respondent filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Pizarro
and petitioner.

CA: granted petition for certiorari and lifted the TRO issued by the RTC; Hence this appeal.

Petitioner claims that:

CA decision is void for want of authority of the CA to act on the petition as the banks should have been impleaded for
being indispensable parties, since they are the original party respondents in the RTC
CA committed serious and reversible error in giving due course and granting Respondents petition even if it failed to
file a Motion for Reconsideration before the Trial Court

ISSUES:
Whether or not the banks in this case are necessary parties in the petition for certiorari filed by respondent in the Court
of Appeals?
Whether or not the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration before the lower court was a fatal infirmity to a
Certiorari Petition?

RULING:

NO.
In the instant case, the banks have no interest in the issuance of the injunction, it is only the petitioner who is the
person interested in sustaining the proceedings in court since she was the one who sought for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the banks from releasing funds to respondent. The banks' interests as defendants in the
petition for declaration of nullity of their bank undertakings filed against them by petitioner in the RTC are separable
from the interests of petitioner for the issuance of the injunctive relief

Moreover, certiorari, as a special civil action, is an original action invoking the original jurisdiction of a court to annul
or modify the proceedings of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is an original
and independent action that is not part of the trial or the proceedings on the complaint filed before the trial court.

Clearly, in filing the petition for certiorari, respondent should join as party defendant with the court or judge, the person
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court, and it shall be the duty of such person to appear and defend, both
in his own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings. In this case, there is no doubt that it is
only the petitioner who is the person interested in sustaining the proceedings in court since she was the one who sought
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the banks from releasing funds to respondent. As earlier
discussed, the banks are not parties interested in the subject matter of the petition. Thus, it is only petitioner who
should be joined as party defendant with the judge and who should defend the judge's issuance of injunction.

NO
The settled rule is that a Motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.

The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

In the instant case, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration can be brushed aside based on the ground that the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court.la
 CRUZ vs. GINGOYON

FACTS:

While there are remedies available to a party adjudged in contempt of court, same may only be availed of when the procedures
laid down for its availment are satisfied.

This case stemmed from a Civil Complaintfiled by Ferdinande Cruz against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr., for abatement of
nuisance. Cruz sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the basketball goal which was permanently attached to the
second floor of Minas residence but protrudes to the alley which serves as the publics only right of way. Mina was declared in
default hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.

October 21, 2005, respondent judge Gingoyon, in his Decision, declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the
case on the ground that petitioner lacked locus standi. ( ruling that the action for abatement of nuisance should be commenced
by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual like the petitioner)

Cruz filed an Motion for Reconsideration on the Order dated 10.21.2005 alleging that respondent judge has been secretly
communicating with Benjamin Mina. Cruz, requested the respondent court to hear his motion for reconsideration on November
18, 2005.

Respondent judge set the hearing for the motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2005 as per request by the petitioner and
directed him to substantiate his serious charge or show cause on even date why he should not be punished for contempt.

On November 18, 2005, Cruz, however, did not appear. Judge Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an Order in open court to give
petitioner another 10 days to show cause.

In his Compliance to the Show Cause Order, Cruz maintained that the alleged contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand
on for the same were based on the circumstances of the instant case.

On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court. An Order of Arrest
was then issued against the petitioner on even date.

On December 1, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., Cruz filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest
contending the he already filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

On December 1, 2005, in his Order, the respondent court denied the Ex-Parte Motion based on petitioners failure to attach the
alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The respondent court held that unless petitioner has shown
proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, the filing of this petition.

ISSUES:

WON the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court; and
WON abuse of discretion was committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion.

RULING:

On the first issue, the court finds the it unmeritorious.

Contemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt. A pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending has been held to be
equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same
within the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, constitutes direct contempt.

The court agrees with the respondent judge that Cruz is guilty of direct contempt of court. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Cruz with the respondent court contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant off
the record, which is considered as a grave offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis. In fact,
when asked to adduce proof of the allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but repeatedly argued that it is his fair
observation or conclusion. Instead of showing proof of the alleged communication between Judge Gingoyon and the defendant
off the record, petitioner stubbornly insisted that there is nothing contumacious about his allegation against the Judge as he was just
giving his fair and logical observation. Clearly, petitioner openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing without factual basis.
Suffice it to say that this accusation is a dangerous one as it exposes Judge Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from
office.

On the second issue, the court finds it lack of merit.

 Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides: Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct
contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or
prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such
person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and
perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

In this case, we find that the respondent court properly denied petitioners Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof that he already
filed a petition for certiorari. Notably, the Ex-Parte Motion was filed with the respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00
A.M. and therein petitioner stated that he already filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court. However, perusal of the records
would show that the Petition for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the same day but at 1:06 P.M. Clearly, when the
motion was filed with the respondent court, it cannot be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly filed with this
Court.

We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should
be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. For the guidance of the petitioner, [t]his Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. Its jurisdiction is
concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases. However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party
seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of
last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial
tradition. Unwarranted demands upon this Courts attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction.

Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence
of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented. In
consequence, the instant petition should have been filed with the CA as there is no allegation of any special or compelling reason to
warrant direct recourse to this Court. However, to avoid further delay, we deem it practical to resolve the controversy.
 INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION vs. HON. SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City, JUAN DELMENDO and HONORATA DELMENDO and JOAQUIN PADILLA and
SOCORRO PADILLA
Facts:

In 1968, Joaquin and Socorro Padilla bought on credit three units of Isuzu trucks from the Industrial Transport and
Equipment, Inc. They executed a promissory note for P159,600, the balance of the purchase price, securing payment
thereof by a chattel mortgage of said trucks and, as additional collateral, a real estate mortgage on their property.
Subsequently, Industrial Transport and Equipment, Inc. indorsed the note and assigned the real estate mortgage to
petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation (IFC).

Padillas failed to pay several installments on the note, the assignee IFC sued Joaquin Padilla in CFI for the recovery of
the unpaid balance which later on ruled in favor of IFC. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial court was sustained
the judgment which became final and executory.

Meanwhile, on 1971, Juan and Honorata Delmendo filed a complaint for recovery against IFC, and the Padilla spouses
alleging that they were the transferees of the real property covered by the mortgage. The Delmendos prayed for the
cancellation of the mortgage lien annotated on the TCT and the delivery to them by petitioner of the owner's copy of
said title with damages and attorney's fees, considering that petitioner IFC had waived its rights over the mortgage
when it instituted a personal action against the Padillas in the previous civil case.

Petitioner IFC moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending that it had not waived its right over the mortgage
lien.

The Delmendos filed a motion for summary judgment which respondent trial court granted and denying the MR of
IFC. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether by filing a personal action for the recovery of a debt secured by a real estate mortgage, petitioner is deemed to
have abandoned, ipso jure, its mortgage lien on the property in question.

Held:

Yes.

The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary
action to recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor,
including the subject- matter of the mortgage, subject to the qualification that if he fails in the remedy by him elected,
he cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived.

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other
words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his
mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason,
they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the
latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only
one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated,
cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the
filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will,
in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so
much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

We hold, therefore, that, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may
institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In
other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no
means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action
will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged
property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an
unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the
properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the
deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to
the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election.
Therefore, by instituting Civil Case No. Q-14417 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City) to recover the
unpaid balance on the promissory note from the Padilla spouses and by subsequently obtaining a judgment in its favor,
petitioner IFC is considered to have abandoned its mortgage lien on the subject property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-133625.

"a mortgagee who sues and obtains a personal judgment against a mortgagor upon his credit waives thereby his right to
enforce the mortgage securing it."

The end result is the discharge of the real estate mortgage and the Delmendos, having purchased the mortgaged
property, automatically step into the shoes of the original mortgagors with every right to have the title delivered to
them free from said encumbrance.
 CASE TITLE: ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC. vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 91500

FACTS

On January 19, 1960, Republic Act No. 3001 was passed granting petitioner the permit or franchise to construct,
maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in the Philippines. Petitioner was able to construct, maintain and
operate ten (10) radio broadcasting stations all over the country.

Under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3001, petitioner's franchise or permit "shall be subject to amendment, alteration
or repeal by the Congress of the Philippines when the public interest so requires . ..."

Later on, Presidential Decree No. 576-A entitled "Decree Regulating The Ownership And Operation Of Radio And
Television Stations And For Other Purposes" was enacted providing that no person or corporation may own, operate, or
manage more than one radio or television station in one municipality or city; nor more than five AM and FM radio
stations; nor more than five television channels in the entire country, and no radio or television station shall be utilized
by any single-interest group to disseminate information or otherwise influence the public or the government to serve or
support the ends of such group.

Petitioner alleged that said Decree has caused it great and irreparable damage, because (a) it divested petitioner of
its franchise without due process of law and forced it to divest itself of some of its radio stations; (b) it deprived
petitioner of its right to further construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in other cities or
municipalities of the country; 2 (c) it deprived petitioner of its right to avail of loan facilities or renew its existing loan
availments from any bank or financial institution in order to expand and continue the operation of its radio
broadcasting business; and (d) petitioner suffered loss of income.

Hence, this petition to declare Presidential Decree No. 576-A as unconstitutional and null and void ab initio.

ISSUE: WON the Petition of Prohibition used by the Petitioner is the appropriate remedy

HELD: NO.The petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of Presidential Decree No. 576-A.
As such, it must be treated as one seeking declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action should
be brought before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme Court. A petition for declaratory relief is not
among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.

Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be annulled. Petitioner does not allege that
it has filed an application for a license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and
that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner
does not also allege that it had been penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is,
likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been confiscated or shut down pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or
controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights. All that petitioner seeks is the nullification of Presidential
Decree No. 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under Republic Act No. 3001.

Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants."

The function of the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and not to give advisory opinions. 6 The
power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the
statute sought to be reviewed.

The allegation of petitioner that its petition should be treated as a petition for prohibition does not place petitioner in
any better position. The petition cannot be considered as one for prohibition as it does not seek to prohibit further
proceedings being conducted by any tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions.

In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to prohibit any proceeding being conducted by public respondent which
adversely affects its interest. Petitioner does not claim that it has a pending application for a broadcast license which is
about to be denied under Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Apparently, what petitioner seeks to prohibit is the possible
denial of an application it may make to operate radio or television stations on the basis of the restrictions imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the petition is premature.

Petitioner prays for reinstatement of its rights under its original franchise. Reinstatement is an affirmative remedy and
cannot be secured through a writ of prohibition which is essentially a preventive and not a corrective remedy. It cannot
correct an act that is a fait accompli. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.
 Longino v General
16 February 2005 | Callejo, Sr

Overview: COSLAP rendered a decision and issued a writ of execution in favor of Serrano and against Longino. The
CA affirmed this decision. However, on a petition for prohibition against COSLAP, the SC ruled that the CA erred in
affirming COSLAPs decision and that the remedy chosen by Longino was proper. Since the COSLAP was without
jurisdiction to render such decision, it was null and void and never final and executor and that the principal purpose
for the writ of prohibition is to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation or assumption of jurisdiction on the part
of an inferior court or quasi-judicial tribunal.

Statement of the Case

Petition for review on certiorari for the reveral of the decision of the CA

Statement of Facts

Philippine National Railways (PNR) executed a contract of lease in favor of Julian Estrella over its property. Estrella
filed an application with the PNR for a lease of an additional area but the latter did not act on the said application.
Sometime after, Estrella and Serrano entered into a verbal contract of lease in which one of the apartments to be
constructed would be leased to Serrano. However, Estrella failed to construct the apartments. Hence, Serrano was
compelled to construct, at her expense, a commercial apartment on a portion of the property leased by Estrella. She
also built a second commercial apartment.

Upon expiration of the lease of Estrella, PNR officials told Serrano that Estrella had no right to lease a portion of the
property to third persons. Serrano filed a complaint for damages against Estrella and was able to present her evidence
ex parte. PNR and Serrano then entered into a lease contract over that portion of the lot.

TC rendered judgment in favor Serrano and against Estrella. The decision became final and executor, and the sheriff
sold the house owned by Estrella at public auction to Serrano. Estrella vacated the house and it was turned over to
Serrano.

Serrano and Esperanza Longino, a PNR retiree, executed an agreement, in which Serrano allowed her to occupy a
portion of the property. Longino also filed an application with the PNR for a lease of the property. When Serrano
learned of the application, she wrote PNR, citing the RTC decision and informed them on her purchase of Estrellas
house. PNR recommended the approval of Serranos application and the denial of Longinos.

PNR and Longino executed a lease contract near the house of Serrano, formerly owned by Estrella. Serrano filed a
handwritten complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) demanding that PNR lease
the property to her. COSLAP issued a status quo order then assumed jurisdiction over the case. COSLAP rendered a
resolution in favor of Serrano and against Longino. COSLAP issued a writ of execution when Longino failed to appeal
the decision.

Longino filed a petition for prohibition against COSLAP with the CA, but the latter dismissed the petition. Hence,
Longino filed this petition with the SC.

Applicable Laws:
Sec 2, Rule 65

Issues:
WON petition for prohibition under Rule 65 was the proper remedy? Yes.

Rationale
The principal purpose for the writ of prohibition is to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation or
assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or quasi-judicial tribunal. It is granted when it is necessary
for the orderly administration of justice, or prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive
manner, or multiplicity of actions. The writs of certiorari and prohibition, for that matter, are intended to annul or void
proceedings in order to insure the fair and orderly administration of justice.

Requisites:
(1) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial;
(2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion;
(3) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law

Grave abuse of discretion: it must be demonstrated that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law

Excess of jurisdiction: the court, board or office has jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted
without authority. The writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
Plain, speedy and adequate remedy: if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment
or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency

In a case where a lower court or quasi-judicial body commits an error in the excess of its jurisdiction, if such
error is one of judgment, it is revocable only by appeal. On the other hand, if the act complained of was issued by such
court or body with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, a
decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void. It could never become final and executory; hence, appeal
therefrom by writ of error is out of the question.

The CA erred in ruling that the COSLAP had jurisdiction on the complaint of Serrano and that the latter was
the legal possessor and had preferential right to lease the property. Consequently, the Resolution of the COSLAP as
well as the writ issued by it are null and void. The COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the complaint of Serrano. The
nature of the action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations in
the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for. Jurisdiction over the action
does not depend on the defenses set forth in the answer, or in a motion to dismiss of the defendant. Even if a tribunal or
a quasi-judicial body of the government has jurisdiction over an action but exceeds its authority in the course of the
proceedings, such act is null and void.

Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are
specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. In relation thereto is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction involving
matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in
nature. Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question within which the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially when the question demands the sound exercise of administrative discretion requiring
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact. The court cannot arrogate into itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction of which is initially
lodged with the administrative body of special competence. But disputes requiring no special skill or technical
expertise of an administrative body and which could be resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned,
the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or
destruction of property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem. The
property subject of the application of both parties is not public land but property belonging to the PNR, which is a part
of its North Rail Project. he dispute between the parties was not critical and explosive in nature so as to generate social
tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate action. The issues raised by the parties in their
pleadings involved the application of the New Civil Code in relation to the Charter of the PNR, which clearly do
involve the application of the expertise of the COSLAP.

Judgment: decision of the CA and COSLAP are reversed and set aside
 G.R. No. 165851 February 2, 2011
MANUEL CATINDIG, represented by his legal representative EMILIANO CATINDIG-RODRIGO, Petitioner,
vs. AURORA IRENE VDA. DE MENESES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 168875
SILVINO ROXAS, SR., represented by FELICISIMA VILLAFUERTE ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA IRENE VDA. DE MENESES Respondents.

Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165851, filed by petitioner Manuel Catindig, represented by Emiliano Catindig-
Rodrigo, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 65697, which affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 320-M-95; and (2) Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 168875, filed by petitioner Silvino Roxas, Sr., represented by
Felicisima Villafuerte Roxas, seeking to set aside the Decision 2 and Resolution3 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 65697,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 320-M-95.

The property subject of this controversy pertains to a parcel of land situated in Malolos, Bulacan, with an area of
49,139 square meters, titled in the name of the late Rosendo Meneses, Sr., under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-1749 (hereinafter referred to as the Masusuwi Fishpond). Respondent Aurora Irene C. Vda. de Meneses is the
surviving spouse of the registered owner, Rosendo Meneses, Sr.. She was issued Letters of Administration over the
estate of her late husband in Special Proceedings Case No. 91498 pending before the then Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila, Branch 22. On May 17, 1995, respondent, in her capacity as administratrix of her husband's estate,
filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession, Sum of Money and Damages against petitioners Manuel Catindig and
Silvino Roxas, Sr. before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, to recover possession over the Masusuwi
Fishpond.

Respondent alleged that in September 1975, petitioner Catindig, the first cousin of her husband, deprived her of the
possession over the Masusuwi Fishpond, through fraud, undue influence and intimidation. Since then, petitioner
Catindig unlawfully leased the property to petitioner Roxas. Respondent verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the
Masusuwi Fishpond, but all were futile, thus, forcing respondent to send demand letters to petitioners Roxas and
Catindig. However, petitioners still ignored said demands. Hence, respondent filed a suit against the petitioners to
recover the property and demanded payment of unearned income, damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

In his Answer, petitioner Catindig maintained that he bought the Masusuwi Fishpond from respondent and her children
in January 1978, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Catindig further argued that even assuming that respondent
was indeed divested of her possession of the Masusuwi Fishpond by fraud, her cause of action had already prescribed
considering the lapse of about 20 years from 1975, which was allegedly the year when she was fraudulently deprived
of her possession over the property.

Petitioner Roxas, on the other hand, asserted in his own Answer that respondent has no cause of action against him,
because Catindig is the lawful owner of the Masusuwi Fishpond, to whom he had paid his rentals in advance until the
year 2001.

After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [respondent herein],

(a) Ordering the defendants [petitioners herein] to vacate the Masusuwi Fishpond and turn over the
possession/occupancy thereof to plaintiff [respondent herein];

(b) Ordering the defendants [petitioners herein] to pay and/or reimburse plaintiff [respondent herein] the
amount of P90,000.00 per year since 1985 up to the time possession of the fishpond is surrendered to plaintiff
[respondent herein];

(c) Ordering the defendants [petitioners herein] jointly and severally to pay plaintiff [respondent herein] the
amount of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

The counterclaims of defendants [petitioners herein] are ordered dismissed, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.4

The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between respondent and petitioner Catindig was
simulated and fictitious, and therefore, did not convey title over the Masusuwi Fishpond to petitioner
Catindig.1avvphi1 It gave due credence to the testimony of respondent that petitioner Catindig convinced her to sign
the said deed of sale, because it was intended to be a mere proposal subject to the approval of the trial court wherein
the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Meneses, Sr. was still pending. The court a quo was further
convinced that the Deed of Absolute Sale lacked consideration, because respondent and her children never received the
stipulated purchase price for the Masusuwi Fishpond which was pegged at PhP150,000.00. Since ownership over the
property never transferred to Catindig, the trial court declared that he has no right to lease it to Roxas. The court also
found that petitioner Roxas cannot claim good faith in leasing the Masusuwi Fishpond, because he relied on an
incomplete and unnotarized Deed of Sale.

Aggrieved, petitioners separately challenged the trial court's Decision before the CA. The CA dismissed both the
petitioners' appeals and affirmed the RTC. The CA ruled that the trial court properly rejected petitioners' reliance on the
deed of absolute sale executed between respondent and petitioner Catindig. The CA also found that since it is settled
that a Torrens title is a constructive notice to the whole world of a property's lawful owner, petitioner Roxas could not
invoke good faith by relying on the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his lessor, petitioner Catindig.

Hence, petitioner Catindig filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS IN REALITY, ONE FOR
ANNULMENT OF CONTRACT UNDER ARTICLES 1390 AND 1391 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASED ON ALLEGED
FRAUD AND/OR INTIMIDATION, HAS NOT PRESCRIBED.

3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING

THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.

On the other hand, petitioner Silvino Roxas, Sr. filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, raising this lone issue:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER IS JOINTLY
AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH HIS CO-DEFENDANT; AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT HE WAS A
LESSEE IN GOOD FAITH OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

The issues raised by petitioner Catindig could be reduced into whether the Deed of Sale was genuine or simulated.

Petitioner Catindig maintains that the deed of sale was voluntarily signed by respondent and her children, and that they
received the consideration of PhP150,000.00 stipulated therein. Even on the assumption that they were defrauded into
signing the agreement, this merely makes the deed voidable, at most, due to vitiated consent. Therefore, any cause of
action respondent may have, had already prescribed, and the contract was already ratified by respondent's failure to file
any action to annul the deed within four years from 1978, the year when respondent discovered the fraud.

Respondent, on the other hand, insists that the deed of sale is not merely voidable, but void for being simulated. Hence,
she could not have filed an action for annulment of contract under Articles 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code, because
this remedy applies to voidable contracts. Instead, respondent filed an action for recovery of possession of the
Masusuwi Fishpond.

The issue on the genuineness of the deed of sale is essentially a question of fact. It is settled that this Court is not duty-
bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. This is especially true where the
trial court's factual findings are adopted and affirmed by the CA as in the present case. Factual findings of the trial
court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. 5

The Court finds that there exists no reason for Us to disturb the trial court's finding that the deed of sale was simulated.
The trial court's discussion on the said issue is hereby quoted:

After evaluating the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented by the parties, this court is convinced that
the Deed of Absolute Sale relied upon by the defendants [petitioners herein] is simulated and fictitious and has no
consideration.

On its face, the Deed of Absolute sale (Exh. "G", Exh. "1") is not complete and is not in due form. It is a 3-page
document but with several items left unfilled or left blank, like the day the document was supposed to be entered into,
the tax account numbers of the persons appearing as signatories to the document and the names of the witnesses. In
other words, it was not witnessed by any one. More importantly, it was not notarized. While the name Ramon E.
Rodrigo, appeared typed in the Acknowledgement, it was not signed by him (Exhs. "G", "G-1", "G-4").

The questioned deed was supposedly executed in January, 1978. Defendant [petitioner herein] Catindig testified that
his brother Francisco Catindig was with him when plaintiff [respondent herein] signed the document. The evidence,
however, shows that Francisco Catindig died on January 1, 1978 as certified to by the Office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Malolos, Bulacan and the Parish Priest of Sta. Maria Assumpta Parish, Bulacan, Bulacan.

The document mentions 49,130 square meters, as the area sold by plaintiff [respondent herein] and her two (2) children
to defendant [petitioner herein] Catindig. But this is the entire area of the property as appearing in the title and they are
not the only owners. The other owner is Rosendo Meneses, Jr. [stepson of herein respondent] whose name does not
appear in the document. The declaration of defendant [petitioner herein] Catindig that Rosendo Meneses, Jr. likewise
sold his share of the property to him in another document does not inspire rational belief. This other document was not
presented in evidence and Rosendo Meneses, Jr., did not testify, if only to corroborate defendant's [petitioner herein]
claim.6

The Court also finds no compelling reason to depart from the court a quo's finding that respondent never received the
consideration stipulated in the simulated deed of sale, thus:

Defendant [petitioner herein] Catindig declared that plaintiff [respondent herein] and her children signed the instrument
freely and voluntarily and that the consideration of P150,000.00 as so stated in the document was paid by him to
plaintiff [respondent herein]. However, it is not denied that the title to this property is still in the name of Rosendo
Meneses, Sr., and the owner's duplicate copy of the title is still in the possession of the plaintiff [respondent herein]. If
defendant [petitioner herein] Catindig was really a legitimate buyer of the property who paid the consideration with
good money, why then did he not register the document of sale or had it annotated at the back of the title, or better still,
why then did he not have the title in the name of Rosendo Meneses, Sr. canceled so that a new title can be issued in his
name? After all, he claims that Rosendo Meneses, Jr. [stepson of herein respondent] also sold his share of the property
to him. This will make him the owner of the entire property. But the owner's duplicate copy of the title remains in the
possession of the plaintiff [respondent herein] and no evidence was presented to show that at anytime from 1978, he
ever attempted to get it from her. Equally telling is defendant's (Catindig) failure to pay the real estate taxes for the
property from 1978 up to the present. x x x7

It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never
been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration. Moreover, Article 1471 of the Civil
Code, provides that "if the price is simulated, the sale is void," which applies to the instant case, since the price
purportedly paid as indicated in the contract of sale was simulated for no payment was actually made. 8

Since it was well established that the Deed of Sale is simulated and, therefore void, petitioners claim that respondent's
cause of action is one for annulment of contract, which already prescribed, is unavailing, because only voidable
contracts may be annulled. On the other hand, respondent's defense for the declaration of the inexistence of the contract
does not prescribe.9

Besides, it must be emphasized that this case is one for recovery of possession, also known as accion publiciana, which
is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding, in order to determine the better and legal
right to possess, independently of title.10 The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession
only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and
binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession where
the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership,
being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.11

Thus, even if we sustain petitioner Catindig's arguments and rule that the Deed of Sale is valid, this would still not help
petitioners' case. It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by TCT No. T-1749, registered in the name of
respondent's husband. On the other hand, petitioner Catindig's claim of ownership is based on a Deed of Sale.
In Pascual v. Coronel,12 the Court held that as against the registered owners and the holder of an unregistered deed of
sale, it is the former who has a better right to possess. In that case, the court held that:

Even if we sustain the petitioner's arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it would still not bolster
the petitioners case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered owners' superior right to possess the
property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of which between the certificate of title and an
unregistered deed of sale should be given more probative weight in resolving the issue of who has the better right to
possess. There, the Court held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of
petitioner as opposed to the unregistered deeds of sale of respondents. x x x

Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err in giving more
probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-a-vis the contested unregistered Deed of Sale. x x x13

There is even more reason to apply this doctrine here, because the subject Deed of Sale is not only unregistered, it is
undated and unnotarized.

Further, it is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. 14 It is conclusive evidence
with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. 15 Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a
Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. 16

In addition, as the registered owner, respondent's right to evict any person illegally occupying her property is
imprescreptible. In the recent case of Gaudencio Labrador, represented by Lulu Labrador Uson, as Attorney-in-Fact v.
Sps. Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas and Sps. Rogelio Pobre and Melinda Fogata Pobre,17 the Court held that:
As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his property. This right is
imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying
their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation
of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of
their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never
barred by laches.18

Petitioner Roxas assailed the Decision and the Resolution of the CA via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, when the
proper remedy should have been the filing of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

While petitioner Roxas claims that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that the assailed
findings of the CA, that Roxas is jointly and severally liable with petitioner Catindig and in not considering him as a
lessee in good faith of the subject property, amount to nothing more than errors of judgment, correctible by appeal.
When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on
all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the
exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors
of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari. 19 Where the issue or question involved affects
the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is
beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. 20

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari will not be
entertained remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. 21 Under Rule 45,
decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent
action based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the
lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45. 22 One of the requisites of certiorari is that
there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy,
his petition may be dismissed outright.23

In the present case, the CA issued its Decision and Resolution dated October 22, 2004 and May 20, 2005, respectively,
dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner Roxas. Records show that petitioner Roxas received a copy of the May 20,
2005 Resolution of the CA denying the motion for reconsideration on May 30, 2005. Instead of filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 within 15 days from receipt thereof, 24 petitioner, in addition to his several motions
for extension, waited for almost four months before filing the instant petition on September 22, 2005. Indubitably, the
Decision and the Resolution of the CA, as to petitioner Roxas, had by then already become final and executory, and
thus, beyond the purview of this Court to act upon.25

It is settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether
it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 26 When a decision becomes final and
executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to review the
said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice
to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justifiable
controversies with finality.27

Finally, while it is true that this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in
the interest of justice, may treat a Petition for Certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, the instant Petition cannot
be treated as such, primarily because it was filed way beyond the 15-day reglementary period within which to file the
Petition for Review.28 Though there are instances when certiorari was granted despite the availability of appeal, 29 none
of these recognized exceptions were shown to be present in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165851 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 22,
2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65697, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil
Case No. 320-M-95, is AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 168875 is DISMISSED. The Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated October 22, 2004 and May 20, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
65697, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 320-M-95,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-36627 November 19, 1932
EL HOGAR FILIPINO, Mutual Building and Loan Association, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
A. P. SEVA, Judicial Administrator of the Estate of the deceased Leonor G. de Seva, defendant-appellant.

This is an appeal taken by A. P. Seva, as judicial administrator of the estate of Leonor G. de Seva, from the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated August 3, 1931, confirming the sale made by the sheriff of said court, of a
parcel of residential property with the improvements thereon situate in the City of Manila, and mortgaged to the
plaintiff, El Hogar Filipino, the highest bidder being Victor Buencamino for P12,550, and ordering the issuance of
another writ of execution for the rest of the sentence under execution.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns seven alleged errors as committed by the court a quo in the aforesaid
order, which we shall take up in the course of this decision.

The first question to decide in this appeal, and that raised in the first assignment of error, is whether or not the property
herein litigated was sold extrajudicially by the sheriff of Manila. The appellant himself answers this question in his
brief recital of the facts, wherein he states that by virtue of a writ of execution dated June 29, 1931, issued by the Court
of First Instance of Manila in the foreclosure proceedings instituted by El Hogar Filipino against A. P. Seva, as
administrator of the estate of the late Leonor G. de Seva, the sheriff of Manila sold the property at public auction.
Inasmuch as a competent court has ordered the public auction sale of the real property, and this order has been carried
out, the sale cannot be called extrajudicial.

As for the other assignments of error referring to the insufficiency of the price at which the property was sold at public
auction, this court laid down the following doctrine in the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Green (52 Phil., 491):

MORTGAGE; SALE OF REALTY UNDER EXECUTION. Inasmuch as the opposition to the confirmation
of the sale made by the sheriff pursuant to the execution only alleged as a ground that the price for which the
mortgaged property was sold was absolutely inadequate and unreasonable, and whereas it has heretofore been
held by this court that a smaller price, for which the same property was sold at the first auction,
notwithstanding that it was inadequate, was not sufficient by itself alone to annul the order confirming the sale
(which was annulled for a different reason); therefore, the fact that the opponent was not given an opportunity
to present evidence in support of the allegations of his opposition does not constitute a prejudicial error which
would nullify the order confirming the sale made by the sheriff.

In the present case the appellant has no shown, either in the lower court or in this court, that there was anybody who
offered, or as willing to offer, a higher price for the property in question, if the sale made by the sheriff to Victor
Buencamino would be set aside, and another auction sale held.

With reference to the question whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila that took cognizance of the
foreclosure proceedings here mentioned, has jurisdiction to order the public auction sale of the mortgaged property
situate in Occidental Negros, this court laid down the following doctrine in the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney-General (20 Phil., 523):

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF SECTION 377, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Section 377 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, providing that actions affecting real property shall be brought in the province where the land
involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is located, does not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over
the land itself but relates simply to the personal rights of the parties as to the place of trial.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VENUE NOT CONNECTED WITH JURISDICTION; WAIVER BY PARTIES. Venue is not
connected with jurisdiction over the subject matter; and the defendant's rights in respect thereto, as they are conferred by
section 377 above referred to, may be waived expressly or by implication. Act No. 136 before referred to having
conferred the fullest and completest jurisdiction possible upon Courts of First Instance relative to the real estate of the
Islands, section 377 referred to will not be held or construed to restrict or limit that jurisdiction, it not containing express
provisions to that end. (See also Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. De Leon and Fernandez, 56 Phil., 169; Cerf vs. Medel,
33 Phil., 37; Katigbak vs. Tai Hing Co., 52 Phil., 622; Marquez Lim Cay vs. Del Rosario, 55 Phil., 962.)

In volume 42, page 31, section 1528, of Corpus Juris, there is the following statement:

PROPERTY IN SEVERAL COUNTIES. Although there is contrary authority, where tracts of land situated in
different counties are embraced in one mortgage, the proper court of either county has jurisdiction to foreclose the
mortgage and order the sale of all the land. Several mortgages securing an entire debt are in effect one and may be
foreclosed in any county in which part of the land lies, . . . .

It has already been held, therefore, that when various parcels of land or real property situate in different provinces, are
included in one mortgage contract, the Court of First Instance of the province wherein they are situated or a part
thereof is situated, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for the foreclosure of said mortgage, and the
judgment therein rendered may be executed in all the other provinces wherever the mortgaged real property may be
found.
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the order appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in its entirety, with costs against
the appellant. So ordered.
 Vda. de Ouano vs. Republic
G.R. NO. 168770, 9 FEBRUARY 2011

FACTS:

1. In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs predecessor agency pursued a program to expand
the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.
2. As an assurance from the government, there is a promise of reconveyance or repurchase of said property so
long as Lahug ceases its operation or transfer its operation to Mactan Cebu Airport.
3. Some owners refused to sell, and that the Civil Aeronautics Administration filed a complaint for the
expropriation of said properties for the expansion of the Lahug Airport.
4. The trial court then declared said properties to be used upon the expansion of said projects and order for just
compensation to the land owners, at the same time directed the latter to transfer certificate or ownership or title
in the name of the plaintiff.
5. At the end of 1991, Lahug Airport completely ceased its operation while the Mactan-Cebu airport opened to
accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights.
6. This then prompted the land owners to demand for the reconveynace of said properties being expropriated by
the trial court under the power of eminent domain. Hence these two consolidated cases arise.
7. In G.R. No. 168812 MCIAA is hereby ordered by court to reconvey said properties to the land owners plus
attorneys fee and cost of suit, while in G.R. No. 168770, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners Oaunos and
against the MCIAA for the reconveynace of their properties but was appealed by the latter and the earlier
decision was reversed, the case went up to the CA but the CA affirmed the reversed decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Should MCIAA reconvey the lands to petitioners? YES

HELD:

The notion that the government via expropriation proceedings acquires unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title
to the covered land is no longer tenable. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of
which was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties,
one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes
into play. There is really no occasion to apply the fee simple concept if the transfer is conditional.

The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its
public purpose. Once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so
desires, may seek its reversion subject of course to the return at the very least of the just compensation received.

In expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. The mandatory requirement of due
process ought to be strictly followed such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public
purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the
complaint.

Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]. If the genuine public
necessitythe very reason or condition as it wereallowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land
ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the governments retention of the expropriated land. The
same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much different from
the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use
by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use
it predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is offensive to our laws.

The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and in the process dishonor
the judgment of expropriation. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the
condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires.

Hence, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos
and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA
what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to
be computed from default, which in this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the reconveyance
obligation.
 G.R. No. L-29736 February 28, 1929
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LUCIO ECHAUS TAN SIUA, defendant-appellant.

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros by the Philippine Trust Co., hereinafter
called the bank, for the purpose of foreclosing a mortgage on five parcels of real property belonging to the appellant,
Lucio Echaus Tan Siua, given as security for a debt owing to the bank by the Visayan General Supply Co., Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the debtor. Upon hearing the cause the trial judge entered judgment declaring the defendant
herein to be indebted to the bank in the amount of P53,741.82, with interest at the rate of P10 per cent per annum, to be
capitalized monthly, also declaring the defendant to be indebted to the bank in the sum of P4,000 for stipulated
attorney's fee, with the requirement that said sums be deposited in court within three months from the date of the
judgment, in default of which the mortagaged property to be sold in ordinary course of foreclosure; and with further
provision that execution should issue against the defendant for any balance of the aforesaid indebtedness which should
not be satisfied from the proceeds of the sale. From this judgment the defendant, Lucio Echaus Tan Siua, appealed.

It appears that by agreement dated May 18, 1923, the plaintiff bank granted to the Visayan General Supply Co., Inc.,
credit in current account to the extent of P40,000, which credit was, in ordinary course, utilized by the debtor party.
Among the stipulations of this contract material to be here noted, we find the following, namely: First, that the Visayan
General Supply Co., Inc., should pay interest on the average daily debit balances of its said current account at the rate
of 10 per cent annum, or at such other time as the party of the second part might deem expedient, and the amount
thereof debited in said current account; secondly, it was agreed that the debit balance shown in said current account by
the books of the bank should be taken and held to be the true and correct amount owing by the debtor; thirdly, the
debtor party agreed to furnish for the payment of any sum advanced by the bank to debtor.

Pursuant, apparently, to the agreement of the debtor to furnish security for said indebtedness, the defendant, Lucio
Echaus Tan Siua, on August 2, 1923, mortgaged to the bank the five parcels of land which are the subject of this
proceeding for the purpose of securing the aforesaid indebtedness.

From this mortgage we reproduce two provisions which are partinent to the present contoversy, as follows:

This mortgage is given as security for the payment on demand of a credit in current accoount in the sum of forty
thousand pesos (P40,000), Philippine currency, granted by the mortgagee to the Visayan General Supply Co., Inc.,
together with interest on the average daily debit balances of said current account at the rate of ten per cent (10%)
per annum, payable quarterly, all in accordance with the terms and conditions of a certain agreement for the credit
in current account entered into by and between the said Visayan General Supply Company, Inc., under date of May
18, 1923, a copy of which said agreement is attached hereto, marked A, and made a part hereof.

xxx xxx xxx

The conditions of this obligation are such that if the mortgagor shall well and truly pay, or caused to be paid, any
sum or sums that may be done to the mortgagee by the Visayan General Supply Company, Inc., under and by virtue
of the terms of that certain agreement for credit in current account entered into by between the said Visayan General
Supply Company, Inc., and the Philippine Trust Company, under date of May 18, 1923, a copy of said agreement is
attached hereto, marked A, and made a part hereof; and shall comply with all terms and conditions set forth in this
mortgage, then this obligation shall be void; otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect.

It will be observed that in the first of the two paragraphs above quoted the credit in current account granted by the bank
is described as bearing interest at the rate of 10 per centum per annum, payable "quarterly;" and from this the appellant
contends, with some plausibility, that the interest due to the bank cannot be capitalized monthly but only quarterly. On
the part of the appellee it is claimed that the word "quarterly" was used in the mortgage by manifest error and that the
word "quarterly" should be read "montly," as stated in the contract of May 18, 1923.

We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellee on this point is correct and that the error is manifest and
apparent from the mortgage itself in relation with the principal contract. The reasons that conduct us to this conclusion
are these: First, the mortgage was evidently given pursuant to that clause of the original contract by which the debtor
had agreed furnish security to the bank for any sum for which the debtor might become obligated to the bank under the
terms of the original agreement; secondly, the paragraph of the mortgage in which the word "quarterly" is used
explicitly states that the terms and conditions" of the original agreement; thirdly, the same paragraph of the mortgage
makes express reference to the original agreement for the granting of credit in current account by the bank to the debtor
and said contract is incorporated in the mortgage by reference; fourthly, in the defeasance clause of the mortgage,
which is the second of the two paragraphs above qouted from the mortgage, the debt secured is not described as being
one for the payment of interest quarterly, but the original contract is again referred to and incorporated in the said
clause without specifying how the interest should be paid.

From this accumulation of circumstances the conclusion is irresistible that a mistake was made in using the word
"quarterly" in the mortgage as descriptive of the oblihgation to pay interest on the principal debt; and inasmuch as the
original contract is incorporated to give effect to the mortgage in the sense evidently intended by the parties, that is to
say, that the interest on the principal debt must be paid in accordance with the terms of the original contract. Under the
original contract it is clear that the interest was to be debited in current account and capitalized monthly.
Error is assigned to the action of the trial court in allowing the stipulated attorney's fee of P4,000. In view of the fact
that this fee continues less than 7 per cent of the amount which the court found to be due, we think that the
stipulation was reasonable and that fee was properly incorporated in the judgment.

The last error assigned is directed to that feature of the appealed decision in which the trial court ordered that execution
should issue personally against the defendant for any deficiency that might result from the failure of the mortgaged
property to bring the full amount of the indebtedness due to the creditor. it is admitted by the appellee that this feature
of the judgment must be eliminated, since the defendant did not assume personal liability for the debt but only
mortgaged his property in security therefor.

From what has been said it follows that that portion of the dispositive part of the appealed judgment which purports to
make the defendant liable for any deficiency must be eliminated.

With this modification the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
 G.R. NO. 170189: September 1, 2010
SPOUSES ELEGIO CAEZO AND DOLIA CAEZO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES APOLINARIO AND
CONSORCIA L. BAUTISTA, Respondents

FACTS:

Spouses Elegio and Dolia Caezo (appellees) are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 186 square
meters, covered by TCT No. 32911. Whereas, Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia Bautista (appellants) are the
registered owners of a parcel of land, containing an area of 181 square meters, covered by TCT No. 31727. Both
parcels of land are located at Coronado Heights, Barangka Ibaba, Mandaluyong City and registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Appellants lot is adjacent to that of appellees.

Sometime in 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot. During the construction, appellees
discovered that their lot was encroached upon by the structures built by appellants without appellees knowledge and
consent.

Three surveys were conducted which confirmed the fact of encroachment. However, despite oral and written demands,
appellants failed and refused to remove the structures encroaching appellees lot.

Spouses Caezo filed their complaint for the issuance of a writ of demolition with damages on 13 April 2000. In an
Order dated 15 August 2000, the trial court declared the spouses Bautista in default for failure to answer within the
reglementary period. The trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the spouses Caezo. The trial court found that
the spouses Bautista built structures encroaching on the land owned by the spouses Caezo. The spouses Bautista also
refused to remove the structures and respect the boundaries as established by the various surveyors. A referral to the
Barangay Lupon failed to settle the controversy amicably. The trial court thus ruled that the spouses Bautista are
builders in bad faith, such that spouses Caezo are entitled to an issuance of a writ of demolition with damages.

On appeal, the appellate court rendered its Decision which reversed the Trial Courts Decision. The appellate court
ruled that since the last demand was made on 27 March 2000, or more than a year before the filing of the complaint,
the spouses Caezo should have filed a suit for recovery of possession and not for the issuance of a writ of demolition.
A writ of demolition can be granted only as an effect of a final judgment or order, hence the spouses Caezos
complaint should be dismissed. The spouses Caezo failed to specify the assessed value of the encroached portion of
their property. Because of this failure, the complaint lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause of action. Finally, the
appellate court ruled that should there be a finding of encroachment in the action for recovery of possession and that
the encroachment was built in good faith, the market value of the encroached portion should be proved to determine the
appropriate indemnity.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should have filed recovery of possession and not writ of demolition

HELD:

PROPERTY LAW

The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a Writ of Demolition with Damages is in reality an
action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Accion
reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper
regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and
seeks recovery of its full possession.

The spouses Caezo were able to establish their ownership of the encroached property. Aside from testimonial
evidence, the spouses Caezo were also able to present documentary and object evidence which consisted of
photographs, transfer certificates of title, and a relocation survey plan.

The relocation survey plan also corroborated Elegio Caezos testimony on the reason for the spouses Bautistas
attitude regarding the encroached property. The relocation survey plan showed that the spouses Bautistas property
encroached upon that of the spouses Caezo by 0.97 centimeters, while the spouses Bautistas property was encroached
upon by 1.01 centimeters by another landowner.

The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses Bautista were aware of the encroachment
upon their lot by the owner of Lot 15 and thus they made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the spouses
Caezo. This awareness of the two encroachments made the spouses Bautista builders in bad faith. The spouses Caezo
are entitled to the issuance of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the spouses Bautista, in accordance with
Article 450 of the Civil Code.