Case outline: Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q.

Ramas,
Elizabeth Dimaano G.R. No. 104768
Published April 25, 2016

The Case

Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas, Elizabeth

Dimaano G.R. No. 104768

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No.
0037.

The first Resolution dismissed petitioners (Republic of the Philippines) Amended Complaint and
ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second
Resolution denied petitioners (Republic of the Philippines) Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for
the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing
petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Statement of Facts

Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG)

o President Corazon C. Aquino, immediately upon assuming Malacaang, enacts

Executive Order 1 (EO No. 1) or the Presidential Commission on Good Governance
(PCGG). It is mandated to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.

o EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power:

(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and

carry out the purposes of this order and the power

(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry

out the purpose of this order.

o Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP
Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.

AFP Board

o The AFP Board, in line with its mandate, investigates Major General Q. Josephus
Ramas.

o On July 1987, the AFP Board issues a resolution and findings on Ramas alleged ill
gotten wealth. It submits the following findings:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and
lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. The aforementioned
property in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.
 He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an
area of 3,327 square meters.

Communication equipment and facilities are found in the premises of

Elizabeth Dimaano, a Confidential Agent of the Military Security Unit, and
are confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas.

These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if
not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine
Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the

raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on
3 March 1986.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the

raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on
3 March 1986.

Elizabeth Dimaano is allegedly Major General Q. Josephus Ramas mistress.

She does not have any means to acquire the communications equipment as
well as the aforementioned money.

o The AFP Board finds a prima facie case against Major General Josephus Ramas for ill
gotten wealth and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars.

o Decision: It is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted

and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.

o On 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379
(RA No. 1379) against Ramas.

o Amended Complaint: Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds,
assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his
other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public
office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos.

o The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found
reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379. The
Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties,
funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Ramas Answer:

o Ramas contends that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his
salary and other legitimate income.
 o He denies ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications
equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

o Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as
a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano
claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

The Sandiganbayan

o On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to
charge the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been
unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.

o Petitioner fails to present witnesses and delays the court for over a year.

o on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had
no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan
granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The
Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court
to take drastic action.

o Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.The
Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they
are subordinates of former President Marcos.

o Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended

Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise
dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

o The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman,
who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such
appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability
of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

o Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of
the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v.
Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases

was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie
case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

Issues
1. PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

2. Propriety of Dismissal of Case Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence Petitioner

also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.

3. Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore
inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case since these
properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not
have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties are
inadmissible in evidence.Ruling

1. First issue:

1. The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned
in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten
wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latters
immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of
their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in
other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the
PCGG.

2. Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG
could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a
subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to
receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a
subordinate of former President Marcos.

3. We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense
contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.

4. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate
as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed
close association with former President Marcos.

2. Second issue:

1. Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that
petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence.
First, this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it.

3. Third issue:

1. On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a

search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was
not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team
seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in
the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two
magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications
equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
2. Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the
search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.
Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were
taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people. Petitioner asserts that
the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973
Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.

3. Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search
applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its
embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate
the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her
since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional
right.

4. Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

5. The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill
of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and
effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of
resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of
the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the
interregnum.

6. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

7. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were
the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives
and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution,
there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary
right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum.

8. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:A revolution has
been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or
state by those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental
change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least
some acts of violence. In Kelsens book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined
as that which occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced
by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself.

9. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary

government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration
orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered
companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the
Freedom Constitution.

10. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during
the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its
 obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue
here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of
international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did
not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.

11. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and
orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed
the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders
should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the
revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus
valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.

12. It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team
confiscated. Thesearch warrant did not particularly describe these items and the
raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal
basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject
of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized these items.The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless
these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the
person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such
person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We
thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

The Dispositive

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the
Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA, HERMINIHILDA, MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG,

CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO,
LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG,
ESTER M. PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M.
DELA PEA, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O.
DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A.
SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M.BUCO, PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG,
ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S.
BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S.
TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO,
MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al.
In their capacity and as members of the Malaya Lolas Organization,

versus

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY

OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the
SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in
the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years,
these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of
a particular measure.

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve
large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the
people whose welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the
Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to
the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest
of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.
The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary
length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given
ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if
apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on
the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means
and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal
person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to
furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and
do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners
have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time
the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga
omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should
be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of
all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that
they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

 Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
Case Digest: GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016

Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality of
EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department
with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and
use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the
Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security
cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and
such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated the
constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and
facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate,
through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.

Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in assailing the
constitutionality of EDCA

No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the
requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right.
But here, aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their
constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a
particular public right that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the
present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens suits that would justify a disregard of the
aforementioned requirements.
Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers

No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it
directed at the disbursement of public funds.

A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that
they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they must
establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A reading of the
EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of
disbursement.

Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit

No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by the
Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any
of its incumbent members, as it is the Senates constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here,
none of the petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.

Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case

Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental importance which justify
setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution
itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign
military bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public interest that the
Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive
Department.

Brion Dissent

Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting
that a public right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of discretion. The court
may exercise its power of judicial review over the act of the Executive Department in not submitting the EDCA
agreement for Senate concurrence not because of the transcendental importance of the issue, but because the
petitioners satisfy the requirements in invoking the courts expanded jurisdiction. Read more

Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate violates the
Constitution

No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the form of a mere
executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into executive
agreements on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that allows
the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves adjustments in detail in the
implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that
have already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the
Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be
transmitted to the Senate.

De Castro Dissent

No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT. Whether the stay of
the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the Constitution does not
distinguish. The EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country.
Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty. Read more

Full Text

De Castro Dissent: EDCA is Entirely a New Treaty Needing Senate Concurrence Full Text l Digest
Brion Dissent: EDCA Issue on Absence of Senate Concurrence Not a Political Question Full
Text l Digest

CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH

75 PHIL 113

FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings in petitioners
case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas MacArthur had
invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of court during the Japanese occupation.
Respondent contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and
that the government established during the Japanese occupation was no de facto government.

ISSUE:

1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain good and valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of said
court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by military forces
and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto
governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that the
proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all
the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts depend
upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed by legislative acts. It is thus obvious
that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases not of political complexion.

Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law Students

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping & Resource
Information Authority and Davide Jr.

-writ of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522

Facts:

RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.
RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the government
reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with
UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other
and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:- it
reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime
passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national security
and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to
the lives of the fishermen.

Issues:

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will be
directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the
countrys maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a
mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral
treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e.,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the
baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order
to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in
accordance to the treatythe role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to
the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the
Philippines sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be
violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical
miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades, had been
claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to
consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and States responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the
territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitutions delineation of internal
waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic
waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not
bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally
accepted principles of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the
absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic
states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the
baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation
is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a law
and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III;
otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter
and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it will weaken the
countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Posted by kaye lee on 9:43 PM

G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP -
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of
the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3
Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding
itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government
units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3.
Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for
judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress,
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty
and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective
exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive
the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by
law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest
order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for
a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from
peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an associative
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of
a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the
spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on
the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a
state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the
MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend
the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution,
but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending
these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago
at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their
spouses.

Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only Moros as
traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The
MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of
choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro
homeland, the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the
public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free
and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute
does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an
ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The
MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic
Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but
the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the
same is on its way to independence.