the computation of the monetary award in favor of Polymer Rubber vs.
Bayolo Salamuding
the complainants was misleading, anomalous and
highly erroneous; and
the decision sought to be enforced by mere motion
is already barred by the statute of limitations.
LA: ordered quashal of writ of execution.
NLRC: affirmed.
CA: Reversed. Ang as director is jointly and severally
liable with Polymer. He acted in bad faith when it
ceased operations day after promulgation of SC
ISSUE: W/N Ang may be held jointly and severally
liable with Polymer? NO
To hold a director or officer personally liable for
corporate obligations, two requisites must concur:
(1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the
director or officer assented to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation or that the
officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith; and
(2) there must be proof that the officer acted in
bad faith.
There is nothing in the records that show that Ang was
responsible for the acts complained of. At any rate, we
find that it will require a great stretch of imagination to
conclude that a corporation would cease its operations
if only to evade the payment of the adjudged monetary
awards in favor of three (3) of its employees.
Also, to hold Ang personally liable at this stage is quite
unfair. The judgment of the LA, as affirmed by the
NLRC and later by the SC had already long become
final and executory. It has been held that a final and
executory judgment can no longer be altered. Since the
alias writ of execution did not conform, is different from
and thus went beyond or varied the tenor of the
judgment which gave it life, it is a nullity. To maintain
otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision
against depriving a person of his property without due
process of law.
July 24, 2013 | Reyes, J. | Effect of Closure vis--vis ULP
Facts:
Bayolo Salamuding (Salamuding), Mariano Gulanan
and Rodolfo Raif were employees of Polymer Rubber
Corporation who were dismissed after having
committed certain irregularities against Polymer
Salamuding et al. filed a complaint against Polymer and
Joseph Ang for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
non-payment of overtime services, violation of
Presidential Decree No. 851, with prayer for
reinstatement and payment of back wages, attorneys
fees, moral and exemplary damages.
LA found for Salamuding et al. ruling that there was no
ULP but ordered reinstatement and payment of 13th
month pay, overtime pay, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees.
NLRC: affirmed with modifications.
SC: Affirmed.
The day after the Resolution of the SC, Polymer ceased
its operation.
LA thereafter issued a writ of execution based on the
SC resolution. However, it was returned unsatisfied so
another alias writ of execution was issued.
In 2004 (a decade after the Resolution of SC), Polymer
with all its improvements in the premises was gutted by
fire.
Complainants filed a Motion for Recomputation and
Issuance of Fifth (5th) Alias Writ of Execution.
LA issued 5th Alias Writ of Execution prayed for
commanding the sheriff to collect the amount.
In its implementation, the shares of stocks of Ang at
USA Resources Corporation were levied.
Polymer and Ang moved to quash the 5th alias writ of
execution, and to lift the notice of garnishment alleging
that
Ang should not be held jointly and severally liable
with Polymer since it was only the latter which was
held liable in the decision of the LA, NLRC and the
Supreme Court;
 Chronicle Securities Corp. v. NLRC: even an
employer who is found guilty of unfair labor
practice in dismissing his employee may not be
ordered so to pay backwages beyond the date of
closure of business where such closure was due to
legitimate business reasons and not merely an
attempt to defeat the order of reinstatement.
Ruling: The petition is GRANTED
Anent the computation of their liability for the payment
of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in favor of
Salamuding, it must be computed only up to the time
Polymer ceased operations in September 1993. The
computation must be based on the number of days
when Polymer was in actual operation. It cannot be
held liable to pay separation pay beyond such
closure of business because even if the illegally
dismissed employees would be reinstated, they
could not possibly work beyond the time of the
cessation of its operation.