MATHEMATICSANDTHEPOSSIBILITYOFTHESYNTHETICAPRIORI

Canweusereasonalonetogainknowledgeaboutasubjectthatisnotinherentinits
meaning?KantclaimsthatthisispossiblewhileAyerobjectsthatthisisnot.By
analyzingbothphilosophersviewsonmathematicalrelations,Iproposetoshowthat
AyersuccessfullydisprovesKantsclaim.First,IwillintroduceKantsclassificationsof
knowledge,andthenshowhowhearguesforaclassificationofmathematicalknowledge
inawaythatfavourshisclaim.IwillthenpresentAyersobjectionstothisclassification
andshowhowKantsargumentdoesnotsuccessfullyrefutetheseobjections.

Inordertoshowhowunderstandcanallowonetogainknowledgeaboutasubjectthatis
notinherentinitsmeaning,letusfirstunderstandKantsdivisionsofknowledge:he
definesallconclusionsmadeaboutasubjectbyanalyzingthemeaningofthesubjectas
analytic,andallconclusionsaboutasubjectthatcannotbefoundinthemeaningofthe
subjectassynthetic.Hedefinesallconclusionsbasedonexperienceasaposteriori,and
allconclusionsbasedpurelyonreasonasapriori.Anexampleofananalyticproposition
isalltriangleshavethreesides.Theconceptofhaving3sidesispartofthedefinition
ofatriangle;oneonlyneedstoexaminethemeaningofthesubject,thetriangle,toderive
thisconclusionaboutit.However,thestatementthatbodiesareheavycannotbe
analyticbecause,evenifallbodiesareheavy,theconceptofabodydoesnotcontainthe
conceptofheaviness**.Thisparticularstatementisanaposterioristatementthe
conclusionwasdrawnfromexperienceofthesubject(body),notfromanalyzingthe
meaningofit.Sinceallaposterioriconclusionsaredrawnfromexperience,theyare
thereforesynthetic.

Kantgoesontoarguethataprioriconclusionscanalsobesynthetic,andthatwecan
knowthem.Thatis,itispossibleforsomeonetoderivepurelyfromreasonaconclusion
aboutasubjectthatisnotcontainedwithinthedefinitionofthesubjectitself.Kant
providesmathematicalrelations,particularlythestatement5+7=12,asevidenceof
syntheticaprioritruths.Theconcept"12"isnotcontainedwithintheconcept"5,"orthe
concept"7,"ortheconcept"+."(B1517).So,inordertoarriveattheconclusionof12,
Kantarguesthatwerequireanactivesynthesisinthemindtounitethedifferent
components.Thus,mathematicalrelationsaccordingtoKantaresyntheticaprioritruths.
Sincewehaveknowledgeofmathematicalrelations,wecanhaveknowledgeofapriori
truths.

Ayerdoesnotagreewiththis.Heagreesthatallaposteriorirelationsaresynthetic.He
alsoagreesthatmathematicalrelationsareapriori.However,heobjectsthatthe
mathematicalaprioritruthsthatKantconsiderssyntheticareactuallyanalytic.Ayer
arguesthathestatement5+7=12isidenticaltotheconclusionatrianglehas3
sidesinthat12isatermweascribeassynonymousto5+7.Thus,heclaimsthat
theapriorisyntheticdoesnotexist.
However,canoneacceptthatallmathematicalclaimsareonlyanalyticallytrue?They
seemtogiveusknowledgeoftheworld,indicatingthattheydonottellusonlyaboutthe
meaningofatermandsomustbesynthetic.Whilenaturalsciencereliesonempirical
methods(ie.Droppingaballtoobservegravity),suchsciencealsoseemstodependon
mathematics(ie.Applyingmathematicallawstocalculatetheforceofgravity)inorderto
establishitslawsofnature.Thesemathematicallawsseemtoreflectconsistentlyin
nature*.Itseemsimpossibleforarelationtobeatautologybutgiveusknowledgeofthe
world.

Ayercouldobjectthatthesecalculationsareonlyanalyticallyrelatedtoexperienceinthe
samewaythattheanalyticclaimanythingwithlegsisaflarpisrelatedtoexperience.
Thelatterrelationreferstotheworld(byreferringtoanythingwithlegs);however,it
doesnottellusanythingaboutthisaspectoftheworld,butonlyaboutthemeaningthat
weassigntodescribeit.Similarly,whenwesaythatifIput5balloonswith7balloonsin
myhand,Iwillhave12balloons,wearebasicallyrepeatingourselvesbyassigningthe
descriptivestatementIhave12balloonstomeanIhave7balloonsand5balloons.

Butwhataboutmorecomplicatedconclusionsofphysics,whicharebasedon
mathematicalcalculations?Itseemslikewecanusethemtopredictthestateofaffairsin
theworldinawaymuchmoremeaningfulthanassigningsynonymstoalreadyknown
statesofaffairs.Forexample,IcanuseNewtonslawthatForce=massxaccelerationto
saythataballoondroppedoffthistoweratmidnightwillreachthegroundat1hour
aftermidnight.ThisisderivedsolelyfromNewtonslaw,basedonmathematics.How
canmathematicsbeanalyticallyrelatedtothisconclusionabouttheworld?Ayercould
arguethatmathematicsisstillplayingadescriptiveroleregardingthisconclusion.In
ordertoarriveatthisconclusion,onemustfirstobservethatallobjectsthatarefalling
acceleratewiththesamespeed.Thisisanempiricalstatement.Onecanassigna
continuumofnumberstodescribespeeds,assignacontinuumofnumberstodescribe
forces,andgeneratemathematicalrelationssuchasNewtonslawofgravitytodescribe
thisempiricaltruth,butmathematicsisinthiswayadescriptorofalreadyknown
empiricalobservationsratherthanageneratorofknowledgeaboutthem.Evenifwe
weretoacceptthatmathematicsdoesnotgiveusknowledgeabouttheworld,however,
weneednotconcludefromthisthatlogicalrelationslikemathematicsarenotsynthetica
priori.ConsidernonEuclideangeometry(mathematicalrelationsappliedtoaseparate
notionofspacethanwhatisreflectedinourexperienceoftheworld,whichthusdonot
tellusaboutourexperienceoftheworld)whatabouttheseconclusions?Eventhough
theydonttellusabouttheworld,theystillseemtorequireasynthesisofconcepts.
Beingreflectedintheworldisthusnotanecessaryconditionofasyntheticapriori
statement.Insteadoftryingtoprovethepossibilityofsyntheticaprioriknowledgeby
showinghowitisreflectedintheworld,perhapsweshouldexaminewhatexactlyit
entailsforsomethingtobesynthetic.

KantandAyerwouldagreethatasyntheticaprioristatementisonethatgenerates
knowledgeaboutasubjectthatwecannotinferfromitsmeaning.Consideracomplex
additionof3124+3988;itdoesnotseemasifitssumisselfevidentinthemeaningof
3124+3988.ItisonlybyapplyingtheexternalintuitionofadditionthatIamableto
generatethissum.Doesthisnotmakeitasynthetictruth?Ayerwouldreplythatthefact
thatthesumisnotimmediatelyevidentwhenIanalyzethestatement3124+3988does
notmeanthatImustapplyanexternalintuitioninordertosynthesizethesum,butthat
thelimitsofmyreasoningabilitykeepmefromimmediatelybeingabletologically
analyzethisstatementandseethatitssumisselfevident.Acompletelyrationalperson
withfullknowledgeofmathematicswouldlearnnothingnewfrommathematics(quote).
Ayerarguesthatitisthereforebecauseofthelimitsofourreason,notanynovelaspectof
mathematicalconclusions,thatwethinkwecangainknowledgefrommathematical
systems.

Toacceptthisresponse,wewouldhavetoconcludethatmathisnothingbutanelaborate
systemofsynonymousconventions.Thiswouldmeanthatwewouldhavetoacceptthat
allmathematicalstatementscanbeselfevident;forexample,wewouldhavetoaccept
thatwecaninherentlyknowthat7+5isidenticalto12inthesamewaythatA=A,
becauseconventionascribesthatbothsidesaresynonymoustoeachother.However,the
natureofmathematicsdoesnotseemreducibletoonlyconventioninthisway.Thereare
infinitenumberswithinthesystemofmathematics.Itisimpossibletoinherentlyknow
infinitecalculations,ie.infiniteconventions.Inorderformathematicstobepossiblewe
wouldneedtohavegeneralconventionsthatwecouldapplytoaninfinitenumberof
circumstances(infinitenumbers).However,thefactthatwemustapplyageneralruleto
aparticularcircumstanceinordertogenerateaconclusionseemstoshowthatweneedto
applyakindoflogicinadditiontothesegeneralconventions.Eveniftherewasaman
whohasfullknowledgeofmathematicalconventions,hewouldstillhavetoapplythis
logictotheseconventionstoreachparticularmathematicalconclusions.So,evenif
mathematicalconventionsdonottellusanythingabouttheworld,particular
mathematicalcalculationsmuststillbederivedfromthemviaexternallogic;theyarenot
selfevident.Thus,wecannotsaythatthecalculationsderivedfromthissystemare
analyticbecausetheyarenotselfevidentsotheymustbesynthetic.Theycannotbea
matterofsolelylinguisticconvention.

Ayercouldarguethatthisparticularizationisselfevidentwithinanymathematical
statement.Thatis,thesubject7+5containswithinitboththeparticularnumbers7and
5,plusthegeneralconventionofaddition.Onceweareawareofthegeneralconvention
ofadditionandareawareofanyparticularnumbersthatitcanapplyto,theircombination
(theresultofaddingthenumbers)shouldbeselfevident.

However,ifwedonotpreservetheexistenceofthesyntheticapriori,itseemslikea
largerproblemcanoccur,whichactsasafinalargumentforthepossibilityofsynthetica
priori.Onecanarguethatbyassertingthestatementsyntheticaprioritruthsarenon
existentitself,Ayerappearstobemakingasyntheticaprioriclaim.Itisanapriori
claimbecauseAyerarrivedatthisevidentlythroughreasoningalone.Itcanbeargued
thatitissyntheticbecausethesubjectoftheclaim,syntheticapriori,doesnotseemto
inherentlycontaintheconceptofnonexistence.Thusitshouldbesyntheticapriori.
However,Ayercouldarguethatsyntheticaprioridoescontainnonexistenceinits
meaning.Perhapshewouldsaythatthemeaningthatmustbegiventoapriorias
knownpurelythroughreasoniscontradictorytothemeaningthatmustbegivento
syntheticasgivingevidencebeyondthemeaningofaterm,becauseofthelogical
reasonsheprovidedabove.Somethingcannotbexandatthesametimenotbex;because
thestatementsyntheticaprioriiscontradictory,thisentailsthatitisnonexistent.Ayer
couldinthiswayarguethatthestatementsyntheticaprioritruthsarenonexistentisan
analyticaprioritruth.

ItseemslikeAyercansuccessfullyshowthateventhemostcomplicatedconclusionisa
matterofanalyticconventionsolongasitisderivablethroughthoughtalone.This
effectivelydisprovesKantsclaimthatcertainaprioriconclusionsaboutasubjectcan
generatenewinformationaboutthesubject.