Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Friday Notes
Contents
Slowdown ahead Weekly Comment____________________________ 2
Research Notes _____________________________ 3
■ Turning. While global GDP growth accelerated up until recently, there is Data Monitor_______________________________ 10
FI Outlook_________________________________ 17
now mounting evidence pointing to a tangible slowdown. The OECD FX Outlook ________________________________ 18
leading economic indicators, one of the most reliable and most forward- CIB View _________________________________ 20
looking yardsticks for the global economy, are already heading clearly CIB Forecasts _____________________________ 21
Calendar__________________________________ 24
south (cf. chart below). Their still high level does, however, argue against
a double-dip recession. CIB MACRO FORECASTS
■ US. The slowdown is already evident in the hard numbers. Recent in % yoy 2009 2010 2011
economic indicators were generally weaker than expected. In the second GDP EMU -4.1 1.0 1.3
quarter, real GDP probably grew at an annual rate of only 2¼% (IV/09: CPI EMU 0.3 1.5 1.8
+5.6%). For the first half of 2011, we expect only 2% (pages 3-5). GDP Germany -4.9 1.8 1.5
■ Fed. The central bank is also becoming increasingly concerned about CPI Germany 0.3 1.1 1.6
the economy, since the retarding effects of the inventory cycle and the GDP Italy -5.1 0.9 1.0
expiring fiscal programs will soon be joined by the headwind from higher CPI Italy 0.8 1.6 1.9
taxes. There is, therefore, a growing risk that the Fed will initiate its
GDP US -2.4 3.0 2.4
tightening cycle later than projected so far. It may possibly wait until
CPI US -0.3 1.8 2.2
summer next year.
CIB FI/FX FORECASTS
■ EMU. In Europe, the spring quarter should have still been pretty good.
2010/11 30-Sept 31-Dec 31-Mar 30-Jun
That, however, is attributable solely to a technical reaction to the poor
EMU 3M (%) 0.95 1.20 1.28 1.35
start to the year because of the cold winter weather and not to the
EMU 10Y (%) 3.00 3.25 3.45 3.50
recovery of final domestic demand. But GDP growth is set to slow down,
although maybe not as pronounced or as early as projected given the US 3M (%) 0.60 0.75 1.05 1.55
recent upbeat readings of PMIs as well as the German Ifo climate index. US 10Y (%) 3.40 3.80 4.20 4.30
■ ECB. The retarding effects of the inventory cycle and fiscal policy EUR-USD 1.24 1.22 1.20 1.18
measures are being joined by external strains. This is increasing the risk USD-JPY 91 95 100 106
that the ECB will also have to postpone the first rate hike, especially if Oil Price 78 85 80 80
today's bank stress test results disappoint investors (pages 6-7 & 8-9).
■ Further topics:
– Weekly Comment: Ready, stress, go! (page 2)
– Data outlook: Higher eurozone inflation due to a base effect;
US consumers becoming more skeptical (page 10).
– Market outlook: Euro to come under renewed pressure? (page 18) Global Head of Research & Chief Strategist
Thorsten Weinelt, CFA (UniCredit Bank)
GLOBAL GROWTH LOSING MOMENTUM +49 89 378-15110
thorsten.weinelt@unicreditgroup.de
15 1.07
longer-term average Head of Economics & FI/FX Research
10 1.05 Marco Annunziata, Ph.D. (UniCredit Bank)
Chief Economist
5 1.03 +44 20 7826-1770
marco.annunziata@unicreditgroup.co.uk
0 1.01
Editor
-5 0.99
Nikolaus Keis (UniCredit Bank)
-10 0.97 +49 89 378-12560
nikolaus.keis@unicreditgroup.de
-15 0.95
Editorial deadline
-20 0.93 Friday, 23. Jul., 12:00H
OECD Industrial production (6M rate of change, in%)
-25 0.91
OECD leading indicators (detrended, RS) Bloomberg
-30 0.89 UCGR
01/97 01/99 01/01 01/03 01/05 01/07 01/09
Internet
www. research.unicreditgroup.eu
Source: Datastream, UniCredit Research
Ready, stress, go! The greatest upside, in my view, still comes from the leeway that
individual national regulators can exploit in outlining the results of
their stress tests. Spain remains the lynchpin: Spanish
Perhaps never before has such a major transparency effort been
policymakers seem to realize that they have perhaps the most to
prepared and launched with such secrecy. With only a few
gain from greater transparency, they were the first to push
hours to go before the publication of the stress test results,
for publication of the results and they have extended the
we know very little about the assumptions and methodology.
tests to cover a substantial share of their banking system;
Even worse, in the last few days there have been concerns
today, they should continue on this track by providing as
that the results might not be easily comparable across
much detail as possible on the tests, and outlining the strategy to
countries, partly because of heterogeneous assumptions on
follow up on the weaker banks. The Spanish banking system,
government bonds – the very concern that forced the publication
with a high ratio of loans to total assets, has been particularly
of the stress test results in the first place. In addition, political
vulnerable to the impact of the recession and in particular to
leaders from some eurozone countries have been on the wires
the contraction in the real estate sector; but on the other hand, it
suggesting that their banking systems are in a fine shape, and
benefits from a high reliance on retail deposits as a funding
all the banks involved would pass the tests. An IMF report
source (cf. Economic Special by Loredana Federico1). If the
released Wednesday, while based on dated information, was a
stress tests show that the banking system can absorb the
clear reminder of the reluctant and recalcitrant attitude of many
ongoing private sector deleveraging – with recapitalization
European policymakers to the idea of publishing the results.
and government help if and as needed – then the relatively
low level of public debt will look much more reassuring. And
As the whole purpose of the exercise is to increase transparency
if it looks like the Spanish system is sufficiently resilient, then
and bolster confidence, we have definitely started on the
risks of EMU-wide contagion will be substantially reduced.
wrong foot. The only thing that has been strengthened so far
is the impression that the eurozone is plagued by a lack of
Realistically, it will take some time for investors to absorb
coordination that risks undermining even the best intentions,
and process the information, given that we will have one
and that national interests continue to trump the common
release by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors
good. The silver lining however is that this should have
(CEBS) followed by individual national releases. Depending on
served as pragmatic expectation management: very few
the extent (if any) to which assumptions and methodologies
investors now expect the European stress tests to provide a
differ across countries, and on the extent to which the level
silver bullet or to even approximate the positive impact that
of details released differs across countries, it might require
the US stress tests had a year ago. The scope for
quite a bit of work to figure out the implications for the
disappointment should therefore have been reduced.
different banking systems and the eurozone financial sector
as a whole. The immediate impact is therefore likely to be
The risk of “accidents” is still significant, however: The biggest
stronger for individual institutions, and especially for those
risk is that the stress tests might be perceived as a weak
placed at the extremes of the distribution, that is banks
“pro-forma” exercise, or even worse an attempt to whitewash
passing the tests with flying colors and banks showing
and pretend that all is well. To avoid this risk, governments
instead a significant shortfall in capital.
will have to come clean, point to the weakest pockets of their
banking systems and initiate remedial action for the most Marco Annunziata, Ph.D. (UniCredit Bank)
fragile banks. A secondary risk is that differences of treatment 44 20 7826-1770
across regulatory jurisdictions might increase confusion on marco.annunziata@unicreditgroup.eu
the relative standing of different banking systems, causing
higher volatility in the risk measures of different banks – it
would indeed be a shame if relatively stronger banks found
themselves even temporarily under heavier pressure simply
for having been tested with more stringent criteria.
1
Eurozone: Waiting for the EU-wide stress test
Initially, it looked as if private consumption expenditures started TRADE DEFICIT RISING STEADILY
the second quarter on a very strong note: After increasing
2.1% in March – the strongest gain since January 2006 – Real trade balance (only goods), in USD bn
retail sales rose another solid 0.6% in April. Accordingly, we -35
had until recently still expected that household spending
-40
might increase by 3+% in the second quarter. In the interim,
however, not only was the growth rate for April revised down -45
to 0.3%, but retail sales even reported two consecutive
-50
declines in May (-1.1%) and June (-0.5%). That was due in part
to lower energy prices, which reduces nominal sales at gas -55
(cf. chart). In nominal terms, inventories increased by only COMPANIES EXPECT WEAKER ORDERS
0.4% and 0.1%, respectively, in April and May, after rising by
60 40
0.6% and 0.7% at the end of 1Q.
30
50
20
STOCKPILING SLOWING 10
40
0
Business inventories, in % mom
30 -10
1.0
-20
Real Nominal 20
-30
0.5
-40
10
0.0 Expectations for new orders 6M hence* -50
Durable goods orders (annualized 6M change in %, RS)
0 -60
-0.5 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10
-1.0
*Average of the surveys of the New York and Philly Fed
-1.5 Source: Census Bureau, Thomson Datastream, UniCredit Research
-2.0
Jan-09 May-09 Sep-09 Jan-10 May-10
Higher taxes to hurt consumption at
Source: Census Bureau/BEA, Thomson Datastream, UniCredit Research the beginning of 2011
At the beginning of 2011, growth will then probably slow
The question is, though, how much of this slowdown is even further due to the expiration of the Bush tax cuts. If
attributable to lower prices, because, ultimately, it is the devel- Congress does not act to make these tax cuts permanent, all
opment of real inventories that is relevant for the contribution income tax, capital gains and dividend tax rates will rise at
to real growth. So far, official data on real inventories are the beginning of 2011. President Obama currently plans to
only available for the month of April. But this too shows a extend the tax cuts for households with an annual income of
slowdown. It therefore remains to be seen whether and if so, to up to USD 250,000. But the Congressional Budget Office,
what extent, the most important growth factor of recent months CBO, estimates that even in this event federal tax revenues
was able to contribute again to GDP growth in the second – i.e. household tax payments – are bound to increase in 2011
quarter. Thus far, we expect a positive contribution of 0.4pp. by more than USD 80bn; that is no less than 0.75% of current
consumption expenditures.3 In any event, we expect the
Less support from the inventory cycle (partial) expiration of the tax cuts will hurt household
spending in the first half of 2011. The extent of the strain can
in the second half of the year of course only be quantified in greater detail once the details
Consequently, the US economy entered the second half of the of the new tax program have been released.
year with less momentum than previously anticipated. The
loss of dynamic is particularly evident in the manufacturing OUR GDP FORECAST FOR THE US
sector, where business surveys indicate that the slowdown
Real GDP and components, in % qoq (annual rate)
continues to intensify. One question in the regional Fed’s
II/10 III/10 IV/10 I/11 II/11 2010 2011
manufacturing surveys relates to expectations for new orders
GDP 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.8 2.1
six months hence. In spring 2009, this forward-looking
Consumption 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2
component had been one of the first to signal the strong
Investments 5.7 5.2 5.8 5.8 5.9 2.2 5.9
increase in durable goods orders (cf. chart next column).
Public spending 0.5 0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.8
Now, its perceptible decline suggests this boom has run its
course. We interpret the deterioration in the orders outlook Source: UniCredit Research
as a clear signal that the support for the economy from the
inventory cycle is fading even more quickly than we had Dr. Harm Bandholz, CFA (UniCredit Bank)
+1 212 672-5957
already anticipated. For that reason, we are adjusting our
harm.bandholz@us.unicreditgroup.eu
growth expectations for the second half of the year down to
2¼% from 2½%.
3
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals
for Fiscal Year 2011, March 2010.
Eurozone GDP: strong 2Q, the second quarter/beginning of the third quarter ranged from
0.7% qoq (our Composite PMI) to 0.30% (EC survey).
slowdown ahead Probably, the “true” figure is somewhere in between, meaning
that survey indicators need to fall quite steeply during the
■ Eurozone GDP likely rose strongly in 2Q, by at least 0.6% summer before they start signaling downside risks to our
qoq (vs. 0.2% in 1Q), with risks tilted to the upside. GDP projections for 2H. Actually, after the upbeat July flash
PMIs and German business climate index, we see risks for
■ The solid GDP reading mostly reflects a strong export the next six months skewed more towards a less pronounced
performance, while the contribution of inventories probably or delayed slowdown.
declined significantly after the whopping 1pp recorded in
the first quarter. Construction bounces back
■ Construction witnessed a technical rebound after the very As widely expected, construction recovered substantially after the
cold winter, but its underlying trend remains weak. Private weather-related slump of the first quarter. The technical
consumption likely remained depressed, dragged down by rebound was particularly evident in Germany, where
a large contraction in car sales. construction output in April-May surged by more than 15% vs.
1Q, leaving the sector on track to add 0.8pp to domestic quarterly
■ Exports have started to slow, but at a moderate pace so far. GDP – implying a +0.2/0.3pp boost for the eurozone as a whole.
We expect GDP growth to ease to around 1% annualized
in 2H, and we continue to see the risk of a double-dip GERMAN CONSTRUCTION COMES TO THE RESCUE
recession as low (around 10%).
30
German construction output (in % mom)
2Q GDP up 0.6%, with upside risks 25
German construction output (3M rate of change, %, RS)
20
In the eurozone, the second quarter probably witnessed a
15
significant pick-up in GDP momentum. Our most updated
10
forecast is for an acceleration to 0.6% qoq (vs. 0.2% in 1Q),
recently revised up by 0.1pp to take into account a surprisingly 5
that risks to our call may well be to the upside. Eurostat will -5
release the GDP flash estimate on 13 August. Here are the -10
main growth themes for 2Q. -15
01/06 01/07 01/08 01/09 01/10
scrapping premium in France and Italy – our own seasonally industrial surveys, both national and referred to the whole
adjusted data indicate a particularly poor performance in the latter eurozone. For the time being, the PMI is telling us that
country. The retail sales component of our consumption exports have started to slow – the export orders index
model shows some tentative signs of life, but the recovery peaked in March at 58.8 and in July was down to 55.1 – but
remains extremely weak, and we don’t expect any meaningful the deceleration is unfolding at a moderate pace and from
improvement to materialize soon. In June, the retail PMI very strong levels.
remained below 50 for the sixth consecutive month, while the
upward trend in consumer confidence came to a halt in the PMI SHOWS A STILL STRONG EXPORT PERFORMANCE
wake of the announced fiscal tightening across the area.
6
July 2010
CAR SALES ON A STEEP DOWNWARD TREND 4
2
25
Car registrations (in % mom)
20 0
Car registrations (i3M rate of change, %, RS)
15 -2
10 -4
5 -6
0 Exports (in % qoq)
-8
-5 PMI-based Model
-10
-10 01/98 01/00 01/02 01/04 01/06 01/08 01/10
-15
ECB not under stress We see two main issues here. The first one is whether the
ECB may soon start feeling uncomfortable with this trend of
rising short-term rates, particularly now that the Fed has
■ Interbank rates have entered an upward trend that led to a
signaled some downside risks to US growth and inflation.
moderate tightening of monetary conditions. However, this
The second one deals with the interbank rate path and the
doesn’t worry the ECB, given that the rate increase is
ECB strategy after the publication of bank stress test results.
totally demand driven, i.e. by a drop in excess liquidity.
■ We analyze two scenarios for interbank rates and the ECB not worried by higher interbank
ECB strategy after the publication of stress test results. rates
The answer to the first question was given by Trichet in the 8 July
■ If stress test results turn out to be a roughly neutral factor for
press conference. Back then, he openly stated that higher
financial markets, the trend of diminishing excess liquidity
interbank rates are totally demand driven and do not reflect a
should continue, and so will the upward trajectory of
change in the ECB’s monetary policy stance, given the
interbank rates.
ECB’s unchanged commitment to provide unlimited liquidity at
1W and 3M maturities. We think this is a sensible argument
■ If the market reacts negatively to the publication of stress
and the ECB can’t be accused of remaining passive on this
test results, tensions in the money market will most likely
front. In fact, while the first leg of the upward trajectory in
resume, leading to an increase of the average liquidity need
Euribor rates was mostly due to resurfacing counterparty risk
of the banking sector as a whole. This should contribute to
in the wake of the escalating debt crisis – and here the ECB
stop, if not reverse, the rise in interbank rates.
reacted properly on 10 June by initiating three more 3M
refinancing operations with full allotment – the second leg of
■ In the case that this automatic stabilization mechanism doesn’t
the Euribor adjustment, which started in July, has been
prove enough to stem tensions in money market rates, the
totally driven by a drop in excess liquidity as banks bid less
ECB will probably extend the provision of unlimited
funds than the ones expiring (cf. chart). In other words, short-
liquidity to six or even twelve months.
term rates are now drifting towards the refi rate to reflect the
perceived better shape of the financial sector, also visible in
(Slightly) tighter monetary conditions the diminishing appeal of the ECB’s overnight facility.
The recent increase in euro area money market rates comes at a
critical juncture, when signs of slowing global growth are becom- EXCESS LIQUIDITY IN THE EMU
ing increasingly clear and stress test results loom. After the
trough at the end of March at 0.63%, the 3M Euribor rate has 400
Excess liquidity (in EUR bn)
climbed to around 0.90%, with an acceleration of the upward 350
Excess liquidity smoothed (in EUR bn)
trend after the expiry of the first 12M LTRO on 30 June 300
2.50 -50
3M Euribor (%) 3M USD Libor (%) -100
2.25
3M GBP Libor (%) 01/07 07/07 01/08 07/08 01/09 07/09 01/10 07/10
2.00
1.75
Source: Bloomberg, UniCredit Research
1.50
1.25
1.00 This sort of adjustment mechanism is exactly what the ECB
0.75 had in mind when it adopted the fixed-rate, full-allotment
0.50 policy, and the central bank can therefore afford to be
0.25 relatively relaxed about moderately higher interbank rates at
0.00 this stage. After all, the monetary policy stance remains
01/09 04/09 07/09 10/09 01/10 04/10 07/10
strongly expansionary, as recently emphasized by some
ECB officials. Remember that at the height of the crisis, the
Source: Bloomberg, UniCredit Research ECB decided not to lower the refi rate all the way down to
zero; instead, the bank held the policy rate at 1%, but allowed
for an endogenous further easing in monetary conditions by This means that at the beginning of 2011 unlimited liquidity will
flooding the market with liquidity and lowering the ECB be available only at regular 1W MROs. Under these
deposit rate to 0.25%, widening the spread with the refi. assumptions, the upward trend of the 3M Euribor rate will
Responding to elevated uncertainty and counterparty risk, probably see a bump at the end of September when there
the banking sector took up an enormous amount of excess will be the simultaneous expiry of 3M, 6M and 12M operations
liquidity, so that short-term market rates fell substantially for a total of EUR 225bn: regardless of how much of this
below the refi. For the ECB this served two purposes. First, it liquidity will be rolled over in the 3M auction, the maturity
allowed the bank to bolster its anti-inflation reputation by of outstanding liquidity will shorten noticeably. All in all,
arguing that it was not following the Fed and the BoE to a the 3M Euribor should rise above the refi already in 4Q10
zero interest rate policy (ZIRP); second, it set the stage for (which is our current view). At that point, carefully calibrated
an eventual initial tightening of monetary conditions without rhetoric hinting at a prolonged period of stable policy rates
the need to hike the refi. This is what seems to be happening should allow the ECB to stabilize money market rates just
now, as some improvement in underlying conditions results in above the refi rate for some time. A clear upward trend in
an endogenous tightening of the monetary stance. This has interbank rates will probably resume only late next year, in
two advantages: first, it avoids the political noise associated anticipation of the first refi rate hike that we see at end-2011.
with a policy rate move; second, it can be automatically
slowed or reversed if conditions change, as the ECB is still 2. The market reacts negatively to the publication of stress test
offering unlimited liquidity. results, either because the stress scenarios are perceived
as too benign (and consequently the capital need is seen
Stress tests and interbank rates: as too low to be reliable), or because the coverage is
considered insufficient to identify all the critical positions
a scenario analysis within individual countries (we recall that results will cover
Let’s now come to the ECB strategy after the publication of at least 50% of each national banking sector); or because
stress test results. We see two main possible scenarios: differences in methodology and assumptions at the national
level are too significant to allow for a meaningful cross-country
1. Stress test results turn out to be a roughly neutral factor for comparability of results. The third appears at the time of
financial markets, with investors not particularly concerned writing as the biggest risk, and the Committee of European
by the absence of a sovereign default scenario and not-too- Bank Supervisors (CEBS) has not yet been able to clarify
aggressive haircuts assumptions. This could happen either whether stress assumptions differ across countries, especially
because the absence of the sovereign default scenario as regards the treatment of sovereign bonds. If this is the
has been widely anticipated and therefore represents no case, tensions in the money market will most likely resume,
surprise to forward looking financial markets, or because leading to an increase of the average liquidity need of the
financial markets are truly convinced that the actual sovereign banking sector as a whole. With the ECB still committed
risk in the euro area has materially declined after the ECB to provide unlimited liquidity, higher demand will lead to
started buying government bonds. In either case, the higher excess liquidity in the system, contributing to stop,
stress test results would be seen as a fairly reliable proxy for if not reverse, the rise in interbank rates. In the case that
the soundness of the financial sector, and the plausibility this automatic stabilization mechanism doesn’t prove
of these results would be reflected in the fact that not all enough to stem tensions in money market rates, the ECB
the banks pass the test but approximately 10-20% of them has two options: lowering the refi rate, which we deem as
require new capital. In this relatively benign environment, very unlikely, or extending the provision of unlimited liquidity
the trend of diminishing excess liquidity should continue – to six or even twelve months. The announcement of a
though probably not in a smooth and linear fashion – and new 6M operation in the late summer will imply some risks
so will the upward trajectory of interbank rates. Note that of a later-than-currently projected start to the tightening
the process would involve some volatility: as some banks cycle, while a 12M operation would probably be consistent
would fail the test, markets would watch how their situation is with a delay of rate hikes into 2012.
being addressed, whether with attempts to raise new
capital on the market, or via direct government intervention. Marco Annunziata, Ph.D. (UniCredit Bank)
+44 20 7826-1770
The sooner and the faster these situations are addressed, marco.annunziata@unicreditgroup.eu
the lower the volatility will be. The ECB would then be
monitoring the situation closely but refraining from any Marco Valli (UniCredit Bank Milan)
+39 02 8862-8688,
active intervention. Most likely, there won’t be any 3M marco.valli@unicreditgroup.de
operation beyond the three already announced for 3Q,
with the final one taking place at the end of September
with maturity at year-end, when there will also be the
expiry of EUR 97bn of liquidly from the last 12M LTRO.
Tuesday, 27 July
EMU, M3 M3 GROWTH NEAR THE ZERO LEVEL
-2
01/99 01/01 01/03 01/05 01/07 01/09
-5
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Wednesday, July 28
GERMANY, CONSUMER PRICES CORE RATE REMAINS MUTED (IN % YOY)
Thursday, 29 July
EMU, ECONOMIC CONFIDENCE ECONOMIC CONFIDENCE STILL CLOSE TO THE CYCLE HIGH
110 10
The ESI (Economic Sentiment Indicator) is expected to
continue its moderate recovery trend in July. We expect 100 0
to see further modest signs of improvement in the
industry and services components, while we already 90 -10
know from the preliminary estimate released yesterday
80 -20
that consumer confidence posted a nice increase. Given
that in the recent recovery phase the EC survey rose 70 EC economic sentiment -30
less than the PMIs, it is plausible to assume that, even EC consumer confidence (RS)
when the PMIs will resume easing, the downward trend in 60 -40
the ESI will be more moderate than the one of the PMIs. 01/99 01/01 01/03 01/05 01/07 01/09
2.5
01/92 01/94 01/96 01/98 01/00 01/02 01/04 01/06 01/08 01/10
Friday, 30 July
EMU, CONSUMER PRICES INFLATION IS SET TO RE-ACCELERATE IN JULY
Tullia Bucco (UniCredit Bank Milan) Chiara Corsa (UniCredit Bank Milan)
+39 02 8862-2079 +39 02 8862-2209
tullia.bucco@unicreditgroup.de chiara.corsa@unicreditgroup.de
Alexander Koch, CFA (UniCredit Bank) Chiara Silvestre (UniCredit Bank Milan)
+49 89 378-13013 chiara.silvestre@unicreditgroup.de
alexander.koch1@unicreditgroup.de
Monday, 26 July
NEW HOME SALES DEMAND FOR NEW HOMES AT RECORD-LOWS
Tuesday, 27 July
S&P/CASE SHILLER HOME PRICE INDEX HOUSE PRICES CONTINUE TO EDGE UP
rose 3.8% over the last twelve months, the highest yoy 10
rate since autumn 2006. And due to a positive basis 5
effect, we expect the yoy rate to accelerate further to 0
more than 5%, which would be the highest level since
-5
August 2006. On a monthly basis, however, the pace of the
-10
price increases has slowed again of late. This moderation
-15
is likely to intensify in the coming months due to the end
of the tax credit for homebuyers. In general, we continue -20
Deflation
to expect that huge (shadow) inventories of unsold -25
01/00 01/02 01/04 01/06 01/08 01/10
homes will prevent a significant house price appreciation
for the time being. Source: Thomson Datastream, UniCredit Research
20
01/00 01/02 01/04 01/06 01/08 01/10
Wednesday, 28 July
DURABLE GOODS ORDERS SLOWER GROWTH IN NEW ORDERS
lose some momentum, due to fading support from the -25 All goods (in % yoy)
Thursday, 29 July
BEIGE BOOK NO NEED TO ACT
The Beige Book summarizes comments received from Key interest rates in %
businesses and other contacts in the twelve Fed districts.
8
The latest report stated, “economic activity continued to Fed funds target rate CIB forecast
improve […], although many Districts described the pace 7 3M Eurodollar
of growth as “modest”. While the current report should 6 3M Eurodollar FRAs
reiterate that the economy continues to improve, the 5
CIB forecast (3M)
overall tone could be a bit more cautious. The latest
4
manufacturing surveys, for example, declined significantly in
New York and Philadelphia, signaling that the massive 3
Friday, 30 July
REAL GDP, ADVANCE ONGOING BUT MORE MODERATE GROWTH
4
The US economy likely expanded for the fourth straight
2
quarter. We expect that real GDP grew an annualized 2.3%
in the second quarter. While private consumption, business 0
IFO INDEX
120
Overall climate
115
Expectations
110 Current conditions
105
100
95
90
85
80
75
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
2
On schedule: Currencies…
0
Last week, we focused on the issue of the stress test results,
-2
and with just a few hours before the scheduled release
(18:00 CET) this issue is naturally still a hot item. Neither -4
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
Moody’s one-notch downgrade of the Irish rating to Aa2 nor
a "dovish" speech by Bernanke were able to budge currencies
Source: Bloomberg, UniCredit Research
and bond markets from the path, outlined last week, which is
based on the experiences of the US stress test at the
beginning of May 2009. For that reason, we are also dedicating ...and bonds
this note to a comparison "then and now" in even greater
detail. Our current recommendations are clearly delineated Last but not least, bond markets are also trading within the
anyway. The decision of our equity market colleagues to anticipated ranges. It doesn’t matter whether one looks at the
upgrade the banking sector on tactical considerations serves 10Y Bund yield, 10Y EUR swap rate or aggregated 7-10Y
as a proxy here. There is an explicit and extremely close yields in the EGB universe; it is the calm before the storm.
correlation between movements in the key currencies. The
USD index, but also the EUR-USD exchange rate, is tracking 10Y BUND YIELD THEN AND NOW
the trends of May 2009 with great precision. The movement Change (in bp) in the 20 trading days before and after the stress test
release
is naturally also benefiting from the recently intensifying
"double dip/deflation" debate in the US, while the ECB is 60
US stress test release EU stress test release
wallowing in underlying optimism. 50
40
USD-INDEX THEN AND NOW
30
Percentage change in the 20 trading days before and after the stress 20
test release
10
4
US stress test release EU stress test release 0
2
-10
0
-20
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
-2
CIB View – Our Global Picture ■ Taking into account the recent escalation of the sovereign
debt crisis together with the weak foundation of the current
Global economy recovery, the ECB should leave its key interest rate
unchanged at currently 1% well into next year. We expect
■ The Great Recession ran its course last autumn. Real
the first hike in 4Q11 (25 bp). But the central bank will continue
worldwide GDP growth even accelerated up until spring. It
to remove excess liquidity again at a measured pace.
was, however, no more than a technical rebound after the
preceding economic collapse that is already facing another
setback. But we do not expect a double-dip recession. Government bond markets
Global economic growth should not re-accelerate before ■ The expected US monetary tightening in 1H 2011 in
late next year. conjunction with growing risk appetite will send government
US bond yields higher (again) later this year, albeit moderately.
■ For 2010, we expect real GDP to rise 4.4% on a PPP basis Combined with the growing supply of Treasuries, long-
(2011: +4.1%; 2009: -1%). Economic activity in industrialized term US yields (10Y) should reach the 3.80% level at the
countries should post only a modest 2.4% increase (2011: end of this year and 4.30% by end-June 2011. 10Y Bund
+2%), after having contracted by 3.1% in 2009. China and yields should barely rise over the next couple of months,
Emerging Asia, which were the first to achieve a trend reaching 3¼% at the end of this year and 3.50% six
reversal last year, will clearly remain at the top of the months later.
growth league.
Exchange rates
US ■ The debt crisis should continue to weigh on the euro
■ After exiting the Great Recession last autumn, real GDP beyond short-term fluctuations. We expect EUR-USD to
growth accelerated to a strong 5.6% in 4Q09 and a weaken again, testing the 1.20 mark in 1Q11. Headwind
satisfactory 2.7% in 1Q10, respectively. But this pace of is also coming from the widening of the transAtlantic
expansion was not sustainable. Growth was primarily fuelled interest rate & yield spread since the Fed will start its
by the re-stocking process as well as the advance effects tightening cycle well before the ECB. We also expect the
due to federal fiscal programs such as the "cash for JPY to weaken over the next year or so. USD-JPY should
clunkers" program. It was therefore borrowed growth from rise to the 100 mark at the end of March next year.
the future. Hence, we expect growth to decelerate further
toward 2% in 1H11 before gaining momentum again late
OUR MACRO FORECASTS
next year. For 2010 as a whole, we expect real GDP to grow
by 2.8% (2011: 2.1%; 2009: -2.4%). in % yoy 2009 2010 2011
GDP EMU -4.1 1.0 1.3
■ The current US growth moderation argues against a rise CPI EMU 0.3 1.5 1.8
in the Fed funds rate any time soon. We expect the Fed to GDP Germany -4.9 1.8 1.5
stick to its Zero Interest Rate Policy (target rate currently CPI Germany 0.3 1.1 1.6
at 0%-0.25%) this year, followed by a first rate hike during
GDP Italy -5.1 0.9 1.0
1H11. This will be preceded by a further gradual removal of
CPI Italy 0.8 1.6 1.9
its Quantitative Easing measures.
GDP US -2.4 3.0 2.4
CPI US -0.3 1.8 2.2
Eurozone
■ The eurozone exited its deepest recession since WWII
OUR FI/FX & OIL PRICE FORECASTS
also in autumn last year. But it was primarily the
turnaround in the inventory cycle, the growth effects of 2010/11 30-Sept 31-Dec 31-Mar 30-Jun
economic stimuli programs and improving net exports that EMU 3M (%) 0.95 1.20 1.28 1.35
lent a helping hand. After a weather-related rebound last EMU 10Y (%) 3.00 3.25 3.45 3.50
quarter, the exceptionally slow pace of the recovery should US 3M (%) 0.60 0.75 1.05 1.55
continue. But we do not expect the EMU-wide economy to US 10Y (%) 3.40 3.80 4.20 4.30
fall back into recession again. Eurozone GDP should grow
EUR-USD 1.24 1.22 1.20 1.18
by only 1% this year, after having contracted by 4.1% last
USD-JPY 91 95 100 106
year. For 2011, we expect EMU-wide GDP growth of 1¼%.
Oil Price 78 85 80 80
Macro Forecasts
GDP, real (%, yoy) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010f 2011f
World economy * 4.7 4.3 4.9 5.0 3.0 -0.6 4.4 4.1
Industrialized countries * 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.5 0.5 -3.1 2.4 2.0
US 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.1 0.4 -2.4 2.8 2.1
Euro area 1.9 1.8 3.1 2.8 0.4 -4.1 1.0 1.3
Germany ** 0.7 0.9 3.4 2.6 1.0 -4.9 1.8 1.5
France 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.3 0.1 -2.5 1.4 1.3
Italy 1.4 0.8 2.1 1.4 -1.3 -5.1 0.9 1.0
Spain 3.3 3.6 4.0 3.6 0.9 -3.6 -0.4 0.6
Austria 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.0 -3.5 1.3 1.4
UK 3.0 2.2 2.9 2.6 0.5 -4.9 1.2 1.8
Switzerland 2.5 2.6 3.6 3.6 1.8 -1.4 2.0 1.5
Sweden 3.5 3.3 4.6 3.4 -0.6 -5.1 2.7 2.1
Japan 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.4 -0.7 -5.3 2.7 1.8
Developing countries * 7.4 7.0 7.9 8.3 6.0 2.4 6.7 6.4
Asia 8.6 9.0 9.8 10.6 7.7 6.9 9.2 8.3
China 10.1 10.4 11.6 13.0 9.6 9.1 10.5 9.0
India 7.9 9.1 9.7 9.3 6.4 5.7 9.4 8.4
Latin America 6.0 4.7 5.7 5.7 4.2 -1.8 4.8 4.0
Brazil 5.7 3.2 3.8 5.7 5.1 -0.2 7.1 4.2
Central and Eastern Europe 7.5 6.1 7.2 6.9 4.0 -5.9 3.0 4.1
Russia 7.2 6.4 7.7 8.1 5.6 -7.9 3.4 5.0
Consumer prices, CPI (%, yoy) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010f 2011f
US 2.7 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.8 -0.3 1.5 1.7
core rate (ex food & energy) 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.0 1.2
Euro area, HICP 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.5 1.7
core rate (ex food & energy) 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.4 0.7 0.4
Germany 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.6 0.3 1.1 1.4
France 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.5 2.8 0.1 1.5 1.5
Italy 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.8 3.3 0.8 1.6 1.9
Spain 3.0 3.4 3.6 2.8 2.8 4.1 1.5 1.6
Austria 2.1 2.3 1.5 2.2 3.2 0.5 1.8 2.0
UK 1.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.6 2.1 3.2 2.6
Switzerland 0.8 1.2 1.1 0.7 2.4 -0.5 1.1 1.1
Sweden 0.4 0.5 1.4 2.2 3.5 -0.3 1.5 1.5
Japan 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.0 1.4 -1.3 -1.0 -0.3
GDP, real (%, qoq) I/09 II/09 III/09 IV/09 I/10f II/10f III/10f IV/10f
US (annualized) -6.4 -0.7 2.2 5.6 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.2
Euro area -2.5 -0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.2
Germany -3.5 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.4
France -1.4 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2
Italy -2.9 -0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Spain -1.7 -1.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Austria -2.1 -0.5 0.7 0.3 -0.1 0.7 0.5 0.5
UK -2.6 -0.7 -0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4
Switzerland -1.1 -0.1 0.5 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3
Sweden -3.0 0.7 -0.3 0.4 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.5
Japan -2.8 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
Consumer prices, CPI (%, yoy) I/09 II/09 III/09 IV/09 I/10f II/10f III/10f IV/10f
US -0.2 -1.0 -1.6 1.5 2.4 1.8 1.0 0.9
core rate (ex food & energy) 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.7
Euro area, HICP 1.0 0.2 -0.4 0.4 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.7
core rate (ex food & energy) 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5
Germany 0.8 0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.4
France 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.4 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.5
Italy 1.5 0.9 0.1 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.9
Spain 0.5 -0.7 -1.0 0.2 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.8
Austria 1.1 0.3 0.0 0.6 1.4 2.0 1.9 1.9
UK 3.0 2.1 1.5 2.1 3.3 3.5 3.1 2.9
Switzerland 0.0 -0.7 -1.0 -0.2 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1
Sweden 0.8 -0.5 -1.2 -0.4 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.9
Japan -0.1 -1.0 -2.2 -1.8 -1.1 -1.3 -1.0 -0.8
Comments: *The GDP shares used for aggregation are based on the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDPs
** Real GDP 2010 unadjusted: +1.9% GDP = Gross Domestic Product, HICP = Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, CPI = Consumer Price Index, f = forecast
US Treasury Market
Fed funds target rate 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.75 1.25
3M USD Libor 0.50 0.60 0.75 1.05 1.55
2Y 0.56 0.85 1.30 2.00 2.40
5Y 1.68 2.11 2.55 3.15 3.45
10Y 2.94 3.40 3.80 4.20 4.30
30Y 3.96 4.25 4.60 4.70 4.75
10Y swap spread (in bp) 0 10 15 20 20
Japan
Target rate 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
3M JPY Libor 0.24 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.40
10Y JGB 1.08 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.65
United Kingdom
Repo rate 0.50 0.50 0,50 0.75 1.50
3M GBP Libor 0.74 0.80 0.95 1.20 1.85
10Y Gilt 3.35 3.55 3.70 3.90 4.00
Switzerland
3M CHF Libor mid target rate 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.75
3M CHF Libor 0.14 0.10 0.30 0.60 0.85
10Y Swissie 1.42 2.00 2.25 2.45 2.35
Norway
Key rate 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00
3M rate 2.68 2.80 3.00 3.20 3.40
10Y government bond yield 3.32 3.95 4.35 4.60 4.75
10Y spread to Bunds (in bp) 67 95 110 115 125
Canada
Key rate 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.25
3M rate 0.94 1.00 1.10 1.30 1.50
10Y government bond yield 3.20 4.05 4.55 4.80 4.90
10Y spread to Bunds (in bp) 55 105 130 135 140
Australia
Key rate 3.50 4.75 5.00 5.25 5.25
3M rate 4.95 5.05 5.30 5.50 5.50
10Y government bond yield 5.20 5.80 6.10 6.15 6.15
10Y spread to Bunds (in bp) 255 280 285 270 265
New Zealand
Key rate 2.75 3.00 3.25 3.50 3.50
3M rate 3.33 3.40 3.70 3.85 4.00
10Y government bond yield 5.40 5.95 6.30 6.50 6.60
10Y spread to Bunds (in bp) 275 295 305 305 310
Mon, 26 Jul '10 0:00 UK House price (Nationwide, in % yoy) Jul 7.2 8.7
0:00 GE Import price index (in % yoy) Jun 8.5
16:00 US New home sales (in thousands) Jun 325 320 300
Wed, 28 Jul '10 GE Harmonized CPI (in % yoy) Jul 1.0 0.8
GE Consumer price index, CPI (national, in % yoy) Jul 1.0 1.2 0.9
7:00 JP Tankan survey small business Jul 47.4
10:00 EC ECB Publishes Bank Lending Survey
13:00 US MBA mortgage applications Jul 23 7.6
14:30 US Durable goods orders ex transportation (in % mom) Jun 0.5 1.6
14:30 US Durable goods orders (in % mom) Jun 0.5 0.8 -0.6
20:00 US Fed Releases Beige Book Economic Report
Thu, 29 Jul '10 8:45 FR Producer price index, PPI (in % mom) Jun 0.3 0.0
9:30 IT Business confidence overall (ISAE, index) Jul 96.0 96.5 96.1
9:55 GE Unemployment rate (in %) Jul 7.6 7.7
9:55 GE Unemployment change (in thousands) Jul -15 -15 -21
10:30 UK Mortgage approvals (in thousands) Jun 48.25 49.815
11:00 EMU European Commission services sentiment (index) Jul 4 4
11:00 EMU European Commission manufacturing sentiment (index) Jul -5 -6
11:00 EMU European Commission economic sentiment (index) Jul 99.7 99.0 98.7
11:00 EMU European Commission consumer confidence climate (index) Aug -14.0 -14.1
11:00 EMU European Commission business climate (index) Jul 0.39 0.37
14:30 US Initial jobless claims (in thousands) Jul 23 464
Fri, 30 Jul '10 1:01 UK Consumer confidence (GFK, index) Jul -20 -19
1:15 JP PMI (Nomura) Jul 53.9
1:30 JP Unemployment rate (in %) Jun 5.2 5.2
1:30 JP Core consumer price index (in % yoy) Jun -1.6 -1.6
1:30 JP Consumer price index (ex fresh food, in % yoy) Jun -1.1 -1.2
1:30 JP Consumer price index (in % yoy) Jun -0.7 -0.9
1:50 JP Industrial production (in % yoy) Jun 18.9 20.4
10:00 IT Producer price index, PPI (in % yoy) Jun 3.8
11:00 IT Consumer price index (in % yoy) Jul 1.5 1.5 1.3
11:00 EMU Consumer price index, CPI (in % yoy, flash estimate) Jul 1.6 1.8 1.4
11:00 EMU Umemployment rate (in %) Jun 10.0 10.0
11:30 SZ KOF business climate Jul 2.3 2.25
14:30 US Employment cost index (in % qoq) Q2 0.4 0.5 0.6
14:30 US PCE deflator (in % qoq annualized) Q2 1.0 0.7
14:30 US Real GDP (in % qoq annualized) Q2 2.3 2.5 2.7
15:45 US Chicago Purchasing Managers Index Jul 56.0 59.1
15:55 US University of Michigan consumer confidence Aug 67.5 66.5
*Asterisked releases are scheduled on or after the date shown; sa = seasonal adjusted, nsa = not seasonally adjusted, wda = working day adjusted
Thu, 05 Aug '10 12:00 GE Industrial orders (in % mom) Jun -0.5
13:00 UK Bank of England repo rate (in %) Jul 23 0.5 0.5
13:45 EMU ECB refi rate (in %) Jul 23 1.0 1.0
14:30 EC Trichet Speaks at ECB Monthly News Conference
*Asterisked releases are scheduled on or after the date shown; sa = seasonal adjusted, nsa = not seasonally adjusted, wda = working day adjusted
Disclaimer
Our recommendations are based on information obtained from, or are based upon public information sources that we consider to be reliable but for the completeness and
accuracy of which we assume no liability. All estimates and opinions included in the report represent the independent judgment of the analysts as of the date of the issue. We reserve the
right to modify the views expressed herein at any time without notice. Moreover, we reserve the right not to update this information or to discontinue it altogether without notice.
This analysis is for information purposes only and (i) does not constitute or form part of any offer for sale or subscription of or solicitation of any offer to buy or subscribe for any
financial, money market or investment instrument or any security, (ii) is neither intended as such an offer for sale or subscription of or solicitation of an offer to buy or subscribe
for any financial, money market or investment instrument or any security nor (iii) as an advertisement thereof. The investment possibilities discussed in this report may not be
suitable for certain investors depending on their specific investment objectives and time horizon or in the context of their overall financial situation. The investments discussed
may fluctuate in price or value. Investors may get back less than they invested. Changes in rates of exchange may have an adverse effect on the value of investments.
Furthermore, past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. In particular, the risks associated with an investment in the financial, money market or investment
instrument or security under discussion are not explained in their entirety.
This information is given without any warranty on an "as is" basis and should not be regarded as a substitute for obtaining individual advice. Investors must make their own
determination of the appropriateness of an investment in any instruments referred to herein based on the merits and risks involved, their own investment strategy and their legal,
fiscal and financial position. As this document does not qualify as an investment recommendation or as a direct investment recommendation, neither this document nor any part
of it shall form the basis of, or be relied on in connection with or act as an inducement to enter into, any contract or commitment whatsoever. Investors are urged to contact their
bank's investment advisor for individual explanations and advice.
Neither UniCredit Bank AG, UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, UniCredit Bank AG Vienna Branch, UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch, UniCredit Securities, UniCredit Menkul
Değerler A.Ş., UniCredit Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka, UniCredit Bank, Bank Pekao, Yapi Kredi, UniCredit Tiriac Bank, ATFBank nor any of their respective directors, officers or
employees nor any other person accepts any liability whatsoever (in negligence or otherwise) for any loss howsoever arising from any use of this document or its contents or
otherwise arising in connection therewith.
This analysis is being distributed by electronic and ordinary mail to professional investors, who are expected to make their own investment decisions without undue reliance on
this publication, and may not be redistributed, reproduced or published in whole or in part for any purpose.
Responsibility for the content of this publication lies with:
a) UniCredit Bank AG, Am Tucherpark 16, 80538 Munich, Germany, (also responsible for the distribution pursuant to §34b WpHG). The company belongs to UCI Group.
Regulatory authority: “BaFin“ – Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Lurgiallee 12, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany.
b) UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, Moor House, 120 London Wall, London EC2Y 5ET, United Kingdom.
Regulatory authority: “BaFin“ – Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Lurgiallee 12, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany and subject to limited regulation by the Financial
Services Authority (FSA), 25 The North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, London E14 5HS, United Kingdom. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Financial Services
Authority are available from us on request.
c) UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch, Via Tommaso Grossi 10, 20121 Milan, Italy, duly authorized by the Bank of Italy to provide investment services.
Regulatory authority: “Bank of Italy”, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Roma, Italy and Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Lurgiallee 12, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany.
d) UniCredit Bank AG Vienna Branch, Julius-Tandler-Platz 3, 1090 Vienna, Austria
Regulatory authority: Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA), Praterstrasse 23, 1020 Vienna, Austria and subject to limited regulation by the “BaFin“ – Bundesanstalt für Finanz-
dienstleistungsaufsicht, Lurgiallee 12, 60439 Frankfurt, Germany. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht are available
from us on request.
e) UniCredit Securities, Boulevard Ring Office Building, 17/1 Chistoprudni Boulevard, Moscow 101000, Russia
Regulatory authority: Federal Service on Financial Markets, 9 Leninsky prospekt, Moscow 119991, Russia
f) UniCredit Menkul Değerler A.Ş., Büyükdere Cad. No. 195, Büyükdere Plaza Kat. 5, 34394 Levent, Istanbul, Turkey
Regulatory authority: Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu – Capital Markets Board of Turkey, Eskişehir Yolu 8.Km No:156, 06530 Ankara, Turkey
g) UniCredit Bulbank, Sveta Nedelya Sq. 7, BG-1000 Sofia, Bulgaria
Regulatory authority: Financial Supervision Commission (FSC), 33 Shar Planina str.,1303 Sofia, Bulgaria
h) Zagrebačka banka, Paromlinska 2, HR-10000 Zagreb, Croatia
Regulatory authority: Croatian Agency for Supervision of Financial Services, Miramarska 24B, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia
i) UniCredit Bank, Na Príkope 858/20, CZ-11121 Prague, Czech Republic
Regulatory authority: CNB Czech National Bank, Na Příkopě 28, 115 03 Praha 1, Czech Republic
j) Bank Pekao, ul. Grzybowska 53/57, PL-00-950 Warsaw, Poland
Regulatory authority: Polish Financial Supervision Authority, Plac Powstańców Warszawy 1, 00-950 Warsaw, Poland
k) UniCredit Bank, Prechistenskaya emb. 9, RF-19034 Moscow, Russia
Regulatory authority: Federal Service on Financial Markets, 9 Leninsky prospekt, Moscow 119991, Russia
l) UniCredit Bank, Šancova 1/A, SK-813 33 Bratislava, Slovakia
Regulatory authority: National Bank of Slovakia, Stefanikovo nam. 10/19, 967 01 Kremnica, Slovakia
m) Yapi Kredi, Yapi Kredi Plaza D Blok, Levent, TR-80620 Istanbul, Turkey
Regulatory authority: Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu – Capital Markets Board of Turkey, Eskişehir Yolu 8.Km No:156, 06530 Ankara, Turkey
n) UniCredit Tiriac Bank, Ghetarilor Street 23-25, RO-014106 Bucharest 1,Romania
Regulatory authority: CNVM, Romanian National Securities Commission, Foişorului street, no.2, sector 3, Bucharest, Romania
o) ATFBank, 100 Furmanov Str., KZ-050000 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the state regulation and supervision of financial market and financial organisations, 050000, Almaty, 67 Aiteke Bi str., Kazakhstan
ADDITIONAL REQUIRED DISCLOSURES UNDER THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF JURISDICTIONS INDICATED
Notice to Austrian investors
This document does not constitute or form part of any offer for sale or subscription of or solicitation of any offer to buy or subscribe for any securities and neither this document
nor any part of it shall form the basis of, or be relied on in connection with or act as an inducement to enter into, any contract or commitment whatsoever.
This document is confidential and is being supplied to you solely for your information and may not be reproduced, redistributed or passed on to any other person or published, in
whole or part, for any purpose.
Notice to Czech investors
This report is intended for clients of UniCredit Bank AG, UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, UniCredit Bank AG Vienna Branch, UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch, UniCredit
Securities, UniCredit Menkul Değerler A.Ş., UniCredit Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka, UniCredit Bank, Bank Pekao, Yapi Kredi, UniCredit Tiriac Bank, ATFBank in the Czech
Republic and may not be used or relied upon by any other person for any purpose.
Notice to Italian investors
This document is not for distribution to retail clients as defined in article 26, paragraph 1(e) of Regulation n. 16190 approved by CONSOB on October 29, 2007.
In the case of a short note, we invite the investors to read the related company report that can be found on UniCredit Research website www.research.unicreditgroup.eu.
Notice to Russian investors
As far as we are aware, not all of the financial instruments referred to in this analysis have been registered under the federal law of the Russian Federation “On the Securities
Market” dated April 22, 1996, as amended, and are not being offered, sold, delivered or advertised in the Russian Federation.
Notice to Turkish investors
Investment information, comments and recommendations stated herein are not within the scope of investment advisory activities. Investment advisory services are provided in
accordance with a contract of engagement on investment advisory services concluded with brokerage houses, portfolio management companies, non-deposit banks and the
clients. Comments and recommendations stated herein rely on the individual opinions of the ones providing these comments and recommendations. These opinions may not suit
your financial status, risk and return preferences. For this reason, to make an investment decision by relying solely on the information stated here may not result in consequences
that meet your expectations.
Notice to Investors in Japan
This document does not constitute or form part of any offer for sale or subscription for or solicitation of any offer to buy or subscribe for any securities and neither this document
nor any part of it shall form the basis of, or be relied on in connection with or act as an inducement to enter into, any contract or commitment whatsoever.
Notice to UK investors
This communication is directed only at clients of UniCredit Bank AG, UniCredit Bank AG London Branch, UniCredit Bank AG Vienna Branch, UniCredit Bank AG Milan Branch,
UniCredit Securities, UniCredit Menkul Değerler A.Ş., UniCredit Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka, UniCredit Bank, Bank Pekao, Yapi Kredi, UniCredit Tiriac Bank, ATFBank in the
Czech Republic who (i) have professional experience in matters relating to investments or (ii) are persons falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) (“high net worth companies,
unincorporated associations, etc.”) of the United Kingdom Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 or (iii) to whom it may otherwise lawfully be
communicated (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”). This communication must not be acted on or relied on by persons who are not relevant
persons. Any investment or investment activity to which this communication relates is available only to relevant persons and will be engaged in only with relevant persons.
Notice to U.S. investors
This report is being furnished to U.S. recipients in reliance on Rule 15a-6 ("Rule 15a-6") under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Each U.S. recipient of this
report represents and agrees, by virtue of its acceptance thereof, that it is such a "major U.S. institutional investor" (as such term is defined in Rule 15a-6) and that it understands
the risks involved in executing transactions in such securities. Any U.S. recipient of this report that wishes to discuss or receive additional information regarding any security or
issuer mentioned herein, or engage in any transaction to purchase or sell or solicit or offer the purchase or sale of such securities, should contact a registered representative of
UniCredit Capital Markets, Inc. (“UCI Capital Markets”).
Any transaction by U.S. persons (other than a registered U.S. broker-dealer or bank acting in a broker-dealer capacity) must be effected with or through UCI Capital Markets.
The securities referred to in this report may not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and the issuer of such securities may not be subject to U.S.
reporting and/or other requirements. Available information regarding the issuers of such securities may be limited, and such issuers may not be subject to the same auditing and
reporting standards as U.S. issuers.
The information contained in this report is intended solely for certain "major U.S. institutional investors" and may not be used or relied upon by any other person for any purpose.
Such information is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute a solicitation to buy or an offer to sell any securities under the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended, or under any other U.S. federal or state securities laws, rules or regulations. The investment opportunities discussed in this report may be unsuitable for certain
investors depending on their specific investment objectives, risk tolerance and financial position. In jurisdictions where UCI Capital Markets is not registered or licensed to trade in
securities, commodities or other financial products, transactions may be executed only in accordance with applicable law and legislation, which may vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and which may require that a transaction be made in accordance with applicable exemptions from registration or licensing requirements.
The information in this publication is based on carefully selected sources believed to be reliable, but UCI Capital Markets does not make any representation with respect to its
completeness or accuracy. All opinions expressed herein reflect the author’s judgment at the original time of publication, without regard to the date on which you may receive
such information, and are subject to change without notice.
UCI Capital Markets may have issued other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. These publications
reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them. Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future
performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is provided in relation to future performance.
UCI Capital Markets and any company affiliated with it may, with respect to any securities discussed herein: (a) take a long or short position and buy or sell such securities; (b)
act as investment and/or commercial bankers for issuers of such securities; (c) act as market makers for such securities; (d) serve on the board of any issuer of such securities;
and (e) act as paid consultant or advisor to any issuer.
The information contained herein may include forward-looking statements within the meaning of U.S. federal securities laws that are subject to risks and uncertainties. Factors
that could cause a company’s actual results and financial condition to differ from expectations include, without limitation: political uncertainty, changes in general economic
conditions that adversely affect the level of demand for the company’s products or services, changes in foreign exchange markets, changes in international and domestic
financial markets and in the competitive environment, and other factors relating to the foregoing. All forward-looking statements contained in this report are qualified in their
entirety by this cautionary statement
This document may not be distributed in Canada or Australia..
UniCredit Research*
Thorsten Weinelt, CFA Dr. Ingo Heimig
Global Head of Research & Chief Strategist Head of Research Operations
+49 89 378-15110 +49 89 378-13952
thorsten.weinelt@unicreditgroup.de ingo.heimig@unicreditgroup.de
Stefan Bruckbauer, Chief Austrian Economist Marcin Mrowiec, Chief Economist, Poland
+43 50505 41951 +48 22 656-0678, marcin.mrowiec@pekao.com.pl
stefan.bruckbauer@unicreditgroup.at Vladimir Osakovsky, Ph.D., Head of Strategy and Research, Russia
Tullia Bucco +7 495 258-7258 ext.7558, vladimir.osakovskiy@unicreditgroup.ru
+39 02 8862-2079 Rozália Pál, Ph.D., Chief Economist, Romania
tullia.bucco@unicreditgroup.de +40 21 203-2376, rozalia.pal@unicredit.ro
Chiara Corsa Kristofor Pavlov, Chief Economist, Bulgaria
+39 02 8862-2209 +359 2 9269-390, kristofor.pavlov@unicreditgroup.bg
chiara.corsa@unicreditgroup.de
Goran Šaravanja, Chief Economist, Croatia
Dr. Loredana Federico +385 1 6006-678, goran.saravanja@unicreditgroup.zaba.hr
+39 02 8862-3180
loredana.federico@unicreditgroup.eu Pavel Sobisek, Chief Economist, Czech Republic
+420 2 211-12504, pavel.sobisek@unicreditgroup.cz
Alexander Koch, CFA
+49 89 378-13013 Jan Toth, Chief Economist, Slovakia
alexander.koch1@unicreditgroup.de +421 2 4950-2267, jan.toth@unicreditgroup.sk
Chiara Silvestre
chiara.silvestre@unicreditgroup.de
Global FI/FX Strategy
US Economics Michael Rottmann, Head
+49 89 378-15121, michael.rottmann1@unicreditgroup.de
Dr. Harm Bandholz, CFA
+1 212 672 5957 Dr. Luca Cazzulani, Deputy Head, FI Strategy
harm.bandholz@us.unicreditgroup.eu +39 02 8862-0640, luca.cazzulani@unicreditgroup.de
Chiara Cremonesi, FI Strategy
Commodity Research +44 20 7826-1771, chiara.cremonesi@unicreditgroup.eu
Jochen Hitzfeld Dr. Stephan Maier, FX Strategy
+49 89 378-18709 +39 02 8862-8604, stephan.maier@unicreditgroup.eu
jochen.hitzfeld@unicreditgroup.de
Armin Mekelburg, FX Strategy
Nikolaus Keis +49 89 378-14307, armin.mekelburg@unicreditgroup.de
+49 89 378-12560
nikolaus.keis@unicreditgroup.de Roberto Mialich, FX Strategy
+39 02 8862-0658, roberto.mialich@unicreditgroup.de
Kornelius Purps, FI Strategy
+49 89 378-12753, kornelius.purps@unicreditgroup.de
Herbert Stocker, Technical Analysis
+49 89 378-14305, herbert.stocker@unicreditgroup.de
Publication Address
UniCredit Research
Corporate & Investment Banking Bloomberg
UniCredit Bank AG UCGR
Arabellastrasse 12
D-81925 Munich Internet
Tel. +49 89 378-18927 - Fax +49 89 378-18352 www.research.unicreditgroup.eu
*UniCredit Research is the joint research department of UniCredit Bank AG (UniCredit Bank), UniCredit CAIB Group (UniCredit CAIB), UniCredit Securities (UniCredit Securities),
UniCredit Menkul Değerler A.Ş. (UniCredit Menkul), UniCredit Bulbank, Zagrebačka banka, UniCredit Bank, Bank Pekao, Yapi Kredi, UniCredit Tiriac Bank and ATFBank.