however, the moral relativist could also coslclude tfiat there is no such tfiing

as Moral Truth; hence, a universal ethic is not possible since the foundation
&at would make moral claims universally or objectively true does not exist.
Instead, Moral Truth and moral faEafsitv are taken to be exclusivefy relative to
the particular system that entails thek.1 There simply is no "lligher truth,"
even in principle, that could r e s o h conflicts between incompatible ethical
systems.
I will argue later that this conclusion is too strong, Just because the actual
truth of ethical principles cannot be detemined (i.e,, from PEI), it does not
follow tliat such a standard does not exist, Paradoxically, we cannot con-
clude that moral relativism is true, for the very reason tha; Moral Truth can-
not be deternined. All that follocvs from the premises stated above is that W
cannot prove whether or not Moral Truth exists. But this conclusion merely
amounts to PEI, which is not what distinguisftes the r e l a i v i s It is my con-
texatiun &at moraI relativism is not merely moral skepticism; it is a stronger
view maintaining that universal ethics altogether lacks the foundation it re-
quires, in principle and in pr3~tice.Hence one who believes in the possibility
of universal ethics must at least hold the "morally agnostic" view that Moral
Ti-utli might exist; and one can even believe more strongly that it does exist
while conststencly believing that it is impassible to know what that MaraI
Truth is. The relativist is distinguished by the stronger clairn that Moral
Truth does not exist----a claim that implies not only that the tenets of a partic-
ular ethical system can be judged only by virtue of its own terms or princi-
ples but also that so-called universal principles arc not universal at all. In-
deed, they are not universal because the first principles of the various
systems of universal ethics are not understood as self-justifying. They are
therefore understood as unjusfified and question-beggixlg, from a relativist
perspective. To the contrary, PE1 implies only that the "ultimate" moral sta-
tus of any given moral claim will remain a mystery-which is why ethics de-
fies rhe very bundation it demands,
This conclusion leads to an implication of PE1 that has previously been
overlooked. Ethics is not defeated by indeterminacy, as many moral rela-
tivists suggest. Besides appraising ehc debate b m c e n universal ethics and
relativism, a key aim of this chapter is to show how PE1 is essential for tram-
ing the objectives and challenges of any given ethical system. In addition, be-
cause of PE1 we are assured that subsrantivc moral debatcs can go on indefi-
nitely.
sd iar, I have spoken of ethics in a most general way. As the chapter pro-
gresses, however, X ulill more specificalfy explicate PE1 &rough an analysis
of Western erhics (mainfy, the ethical theories of Aristotle, Kant, and MiH)
and the moral teachings of Confucius. I will also briefly examine how these
ethical systems have engendered different concepts of self. Whereas Rantian
and utilitarian ethics treat the self abstractly or impersonally, the ethics of