RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION

G.R. No. 71537 September 17, 1987

EMILIO DE LA PAZ, JR., ENRIQUE DE LA PAZ, MANUELA DE LA PAZ, NATIVIDAD

DE LA PAZ, MARGARITA DE LA PAZ and ZENAIDA DE LA PAZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ADELAIDA S. TRINIDAD, CONRADO
P. SANTOS, JR., CESAR P. SANTOS, FELICITAS S. DE LEON, PONCIANITO P.
SANTOS, SR., EVANGELINE S. TANSINGCO, ANTONIO P. SANTOS, and JAIME P.
SANTOS, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioners have lumped in one amended petition an original action for certiorari to set aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71 at Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 164-A
and a petition for review to nullify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R.
SP No. 05472.

The records show the following incidents which transpired prior to the filing of the instant
petition.

On May 12, 1983, Loreto de la Paz filed a complaint against the petitioners with the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal for a judicial declaration of ownership of a 43,830 square meter parcel of
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 901 of the Register of Deeds, Rizal in the name
of Ponciano de la Paz with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 164-A.

Loreto alleged that the subject parcel of land was among the properties adjudicated to her and her
mother as a result of a partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano de la Paz and approved by the
court in Civil Case No. 1399 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The subject matter of Civil
Case No. 1399 was Ponciano's testate estate.

In their answer, the petitioners denied that the disputed lot was among the properties adjudicated
to Loreto and her mother. They claimed that the parcel of land was not accounted for in the
probate proceedings but is actually community property of the parties.

The parties, except for petitioner Enrique de la Paz, were admittedly compulsory heirs of
Ponciano de la Paz who died in 1916. Loreto was the only legitimate child of Ponciano while: 1)
Emilio de la Paz, Jr., is the son of Emilio, a recognized natural child of Ponciano; 2) Manuela de
la Paz is the recognized natural child of Ponciano; 3) Natividad de la Paz is the daughter of
Emilio, recognized natural child of Ponciano; 4) Margarita de la Paz is the daughter of
Wenceslao, a recognized natural child of Ponciano; and 5) Zenaida de la Paz, is the daughter of
Augusto, another recognized natural child of Ponciano. As regards petitioner Enrique de la Paz,
Loreto denied his claim that he is one of the heirs of Ponciano. The petitioners, however, allege
that he is also a compulsory heir of Ponciano, he being the son of Ponciano de la Paz, Jr., the
eldest child of the decedent.

The parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement during pre-trial. Hence, trial on the merits
followed.

Loreto took the witness stand. She finished her direct testimony on March 12, 19984.

On April 25, 1984, the petitioners' counsel began his cross-examination of Loreto. The cross-
examination was, however, not completed. The petitioners' counsel moved in open court for the
continuance of the cross-examination on the ground that he still had to conduct a lengthy cross-
examination. (p. 17, Court of Appeals' rollo).

On May 18, 1984, Loreto's counsel filed a motion for "correction of transcript" due to some
errors in the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the direct testimony of Loreto. The
motion was granted.

This order granting the correction prompted the petitioners'' counsel to manifest that he would
not be able to undertake the cross-examination of the witness as scheduled. He asked for the
postponement of the May 23, 1984 hearing. The trial court postponed the trial of the case to May
31, 1984 and later to July 5, and 11, 1984. (p. 16, Court of Appeals' rollo)

On August 13, 1984, trial resumed. The petitioners' counsel, however, asked for still another
postponement of the cross-examination to give him a chance to go over the stenographic notes.
In an order of the same date, the hearing was again postponed. (p. 17, Court of Appeals' rollo)

During the scheduled trial on September 14, 1984, neither the petitioners, nor their counsel
appeared despite due notice. Loreto's counsel, therefore, filed a motion that she be allowed to
present evidence ex parte before a commissioner. The motion was granted and Loreto presented
additional evidence ex parte in the afternoon of the same day. On this same date, she finished the
presentation of her evidence and submitted her case for decision.

Despite this development, the petitioners upon their motion were allowed to cross-examine
Loreto.

On the scheduled hearing set on September 18, 1984, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear,
and the cross-examination of Loreto was deferred for the fourth (4th) time. (p. 17, Court of
Appeals' rollo)

Finally, on November 7, 1984, the petitioners' counsel resumed his repeatedly postponed cross-
examination of Loreto. The cross-examination was, however, cut short and rescheduled again on
motion of the petitioners' counsel.
Unfortunately, Loreto died on December 1, 1984. An amended complaint was filed for the
purpose of substituting the respondents, herein, they being the children and heirs of Loreto.

At the resumption of the trial on January 21, 1985, the petitioners moved verbally to strike off
the record the entire testimony of Loreto. The motion was denied. A verbal motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.

In view of the petitioners' manifestation that they will appeal the ruling the appellate court, the
trial court issued on January 24, 1985 a more detailed order denying the motion to strike off the
record Loreto's testimony. (p. 17, Court of Appeals' rollo).

On February 11, 1985, the trial court issued another order allowing, among other things, the
private respondents to present their exhibits. A controversy as to the contents of this February 11,
1985 order will be discussed later.

On February 18, 1985, the petitioners filed a petition with the Intermediate Appellate Court to
annul the lower court's orders dated January 24, 1985 and February 11, 1985 and to prohibit the
court from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 164-A. The petition for certiorari and prohibition
was docketed as AC-G.R. SP. No. 05472.

This petition notwithstanding, the lower court continued the proceedings in Civil Case No. 164-
A. Thus, on March 29, 1985, the lower court promulgated a decision in Civil Case No. 164-A
declaring the private respondents, the children and heirs of Loreto, as the true owners of the
subject parcel of land. Damages were also awarded in favor of the private respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered

(a) Declaring plaintiffs as the true and lawful owners of the parcel of land covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 901 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal;

(b) Ordering the defendants to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 901;

(c) Directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Pasig Branch to cancel Original
Certificate of Title No. 901 and to issue a new one in the names of the plaintiffs;

(d) Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay to the plaintiffs Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as actual damages, Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages, Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as exemplary or corrective damages, Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as attorney's fees, plus the costs; and

(e) Dismissing the defendants counterclaim. (pp. 13-14, rollo)

On June 20, 1985, the appellate court also rendered a decision in AC-G. R. SP No. 05472. The
petition was denied due course and dismissed. A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack
of merit.

Initially, the petitioners filed only a petition to review on certiorari the appellate court's decision
and resolution respectively.

Upon motion of the petitioners, we admitted the amended petition which now seeks to annul the
decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 164-A aside from setting aside the appellate court's
decision and resolution in AC-G.R. SP No. 05472.

In another resolution dated January 20, 1986, we gave due course to the petition and considered
the respondents' comments as answer.

We first review the challenged decision and order of the appellate court. The petitioners contend
that the appellate committed grave abuse of discretion when it sanctioned the trial court's orders
which denied the striking out of the testimony of original plaintiff Loreto de la Paz from the
record.

A motion to strike off testimony from the record is an interlocutory order. Well-settled is the rule
that interlocutory orders may not be subjects of a petition of certiorari unless issued in patent
abuse of discretion. (See Villalon, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 443; Bautista v.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587).

We see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it issued the questioned
order. True, we have consistently ruled on the nature of the right of cross-examination, to wit:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a

judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which
is part of due process. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino,
et al., 1975, 62 SCRA 258).

xxx xxx xxx

The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary in invaluable as

it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal
cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution
does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally
based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the
fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony
of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be
allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the
case. (Bacrach Motor Co., Inc., v. Court of Industrial Relations, 86 SCRA 27
 citing Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., supra,
Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, 64 SCRA 610)

But we have also ruled that it is not an absolute right which a party can demand at all times. This
Court has stated that:

xxx xxx xxx

the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by

conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus,
where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed
to remain in the record.

The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right
to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle
underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was
given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but
failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.

xxx xxx xxx

The case of the herein petitioner, Savory Luncheonette, easily falls within the
confines of the jurisprudence given above. Private respondents through their
counsel, Atty. Amante, were given not only one but five opportunities to cross-
examine the witness, Atty. Morabe, but despite the warnings and admonitions of
respondent court for Atty. Amante to conduct the cross-examination or else it will
be deemed waived, and despite the readiness, willingness and insistence of the
witness that he be cross-examined, said counsel by his repeated absence and/or
unpreparedness failed to do so until death sealed the witness' lips forever. By such
repeated absence and lack of preparation on the part of the counsel of private
respondents, the latter lost their right to examine the witness, Atty. Morabe, and
they alone must suffer the consequences. The mere fact that the witness died after
giving his direct testimony is no ground in itself for excluding his testimony from
the record so long as the adverse party was afforded an adequate opportunity for
cross-examination but through fault of his own failed to cross-examine the
witness. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, supra; at pp.
263-267)

In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to cross-examine Loreto was through no fault of the
respondents. As can be gleaned from the record, Loreto was available for cross-examination
from the time she finished her direct testimony on March 12, 1984 to November 7, 1984, the last
scheduled hearing of the case before her death on December 1, 1984. The petitioners not only
kept on postponing the cross-examination but at times failed to appear during scheduled
hearings. The postponement of the trial on May 23, 1984 to a later date duet o the correction of
the stenographic notes of Loreto's testimony may be justified, but the same cannot be said for the
subsequent posponements requested by the petitioners. The scheduled trials before November 7,
1984, did not push through, because of the petitioners' fault. It may also be recalled that at the
scheduled hearing on September 14, 1984 neither the petitioners nor their counsel appeared
leading to the presentation of evidence ex parte. And also during the scheduled hearing on
September 18, 1984, when the petitioners were allowed to cross-examine Loreto despite the fact
that the case was already deemed submitted for decision, the petitioners again failed to appear.

Under these circumstances, we rule that the petitioners had waived their right to cross-examine
Loreto. Through their own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto. Her testimony
stands.

As regards the petition to set aside the trial court's decision, the pivotal issue hinges on the
contents of the February 11, 1985 order. The petitioners argue that Presiding Judge Benedicto
"arbitrarily and whimsically changed without notice to either party, the tenor of the order it
dictated in open court, apart from injecting facts that did not and could not have transpired on
February 11, 1985, acts apparently calculated to deprive petitioners, as in fact they were deprived
petitioners, as in fact they were deprived of their right to present evidence in their behalf." (p. 38,
Rollo).

According to the petitioners, the trial court issued two conflicting versions of the February 11,
1985 order. The order dictated in open court on February 11, 1985 states:

In view of the manifestation of the counsel for the plaintiff that he is formally re-
offering in evidence all documentary exhibits and testimonial evidence presented
and it appearing that the transcript taken during the ex-parte hearing is already
available and availed of by counsel for the defendant, he is hereby given ten (10)
days from today to file his objections after which this case will be deemed
submitted for resolution. In view of the fact that he will appeal the order of this
court denying his motion to strike out from the record, the testimony of the
plaintiff, Loreto de la Paz, the presentation of the evidence of the defendants is
hereby held in abeyance. (p. 29, Court of Appeals' rollo)

while the signed order dated February 11, 1985 states, to wit:

In view of the manifestation of the counsel for the plaintiff that he is formally re-
offering in the evidence all documentary exhibits and testimonial evidence
presented and after their admission he will rest his case and it appearing that the
transcript taken during the ex-parte hearing has been long available and availed of
by counsel for the defendants, he is hereby given ten (10) days from today to file
his objections thereto after which action will be taken on the admission of said
exhibits. The said period having lapsed without defendants' counsel filing his
 comments on the admission of the exhibits A to Z and the sub-marked exhibits are
admitted in evidence for Plaintiffs, Defendants' counsel forthwith manifested that
he will appeal to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (sic) the ruling of this Court
denying his Motion to Strike off from the records the entire testimony of Plaintiff
Loreto de la Paz who was partly cross-examined already but who died thus his
cross examination could not be completed. Said counsel then refused to present
evidence in behalf of defendants on the ground that he intended to appeal as
already alluded above the Order of this court denying the Motion in question. The
court has ruled in its Order of January 21, 1983 that inspite of the attitude of
Counsel the trial shall proceed as scheduled.

Thus, at the hearing today said Counsel failed to proceed with the trial to present
his evidence. This case shall be deemed submitted for Resolution. (p. 31, Court of
Appeals' rollo)

It is to be noted that in the dictated version of the February 11, 1985 order, the petitioners were
given ten (10) days from February 11, 1985 to file their objections after which the case will be
submitted for resolution and that the presentation of evidence for the petitioners was held in
abeyance.

However, in the other version, the case was declared as already deemed submitted for resolution.

It is this second version of the February 11, 1985 order which the trial court used as justification
for its promulgation of the March 29, 1985 decision in Civil Case No. 164-A.

The record clearly shows that this second version of the February 11. 1985 order was issued
without the knowledge of the parties. In fact, on March 14, 1985, the respondents filed an urgent
motion to consider the case submitted for decision with the following allegations: 1) that in the
hearing of February 11, 1985, the petitioners were required to submit their comment or objection
to respondents' offer of evidence and they were given ten (10) days from the said date within
which to do so, and thereafter to present their evidence; and 2) that notwithstanding the lapse of
more than thirty (30) days, the respondents have not submitted their comment or objection to
petitioners' offer of evidence much less have they take any move to present their evidence. (pp.
32033, Court of Appeals' rollo). the respondents would not have filed this motion if the case was
already deemed submitted for decision pursuant to the second version of the February 14, 1985
order. Furthermore, the respondents do not rebut these allegations.

The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated February 11,
1985, the contents of which conflict with another order of the same date dictated in open court
during the hearing of the case on February 11, 1985.

The issuance of this second version of the February 11, 1985 order prejudiced the petitioners'
cause. They were deprived of their right to present evidence in their behalf.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 164-A must be declared null and
void,

Another issue raised by the petitioners centers on whether or not the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering judgment in Civil Case No. 164-A despite the pendency of the
petition which sought to inhibit it from further proceeding with the case.

The appellate court did not restrain the trial court until April 22, 1985 after the petitioners
presented the certified copy of the February 11, 1985 order. (p. 35, Court of Appeals rollo). The
trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit reversible error. It is within its sound discretion
to either proceed with the case in the absence of the prayed-for restraining order to refrain from
acting on the case until the higher court decides the matter elevated. to it. the circumstances of
each case dictate what action shall be take.

The final issue raised by the petitioners is with regard to the damages awarded the respondents
by the trial court.

In their complaint, the respondents asked for the following damages: 1) at least P150,000.00 as
actual damages; 2) P200,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees plus
exemplary damages which may be deemed just and equitable in the premises. The trial court
awarded to the respondents the following: P500,000.00 as actual damages; P500,000.00 as moral
damages; P500,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

The questioned decision, however, is silent as to how the court arrived at these damages.
Nowhere in the decision did the trial court discuss the merit of the damages prayed for by the
petitioners. There should be clear factual and legal bases for any award of considerable damages.
(See Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488).

WHEREFORE, the amended petition is partly DENIED in that the questioned decision and
resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now court of Appeals in AC-G. R. SP No. 05472
are AFFIRMED. The petition is GRANTED in part. The questioned decision of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 164-A is SET ASIDE as null and void. The successor
Regional Trial Court is directed to conduct further proceedings and to receive the evidence of the
petitioners in Civil Case No. 164-A.

SO ORDERED.

IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTYS WITNESS

 CONCEPCION CHUA GAW,
G.R. No. 160855
Petitioner,

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
SUY BEN CHUA and
FELISA CHUA,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
April 16, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 and Resolution [2] denying the motion for reconsideration. The
assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a Complaint for Sum
of Money in favor of the plaintiff.

The antecedents are as follows:

Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business
enterprises[3] namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood
Industries. The couple had seven children, namely, Santos Chua; Concepcion Chua; Suy Ben
Chua; Chua Suy Phen; Chua Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. On June 19, 1986, Chua
Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven children as his only surviving heirs. At the
time of Chua Chins death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was P415,487.20.[4]
 On December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir [5] (Deed of Partition, for brevity),
wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: one-half (1/2) thereof will
pertain to the surviving spouse, Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other
half, equivalent to P207,743.60, will be divided among Chan Chi and the seven children in
equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25,967.00 each.[6] In said document, Chan Chi and the
six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy
Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.

In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked
respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will use for the construction of
their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable within six (6)
months without interest.[7] On June 7, 1988, respondent issued in their favor China Banking
Corporation Check No. 240810[8] for P200,000.00 which he delivered to the couples house in
Marilao, Bulacan. Antonio later encashed the check.

On August 1, 1990, their sister, Chua Sioc Huan, executed a Deed of Sale over all her
rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a consideration of P255,000.00 in favor of
respondent.[9]

Meantime, the spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from respondent
within the designated period. Respondent sent the couple a demand letter, [10] dated March 25,
1991, requesting them to settle their obligation with the warning that he will be constrained to
take the appropriate legal action if they fail to do so.

Failing to heed his demand, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the
spouses Gaw with the RTC. The complaint alleged that on June 7, 1988, he extended a loan to the
spouses Gaw for P200,000.00, payable within six months without interest, but despite several
demands, the couple failed to pay their obligation.[11]
 In their Answer (with Compulsory Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw contended that
the P200,000.00 was not a loan but petitioners share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber, one of
her familys businesses. According to the spouses, when they transferred residence to Marilao,
Bulacan, petitioner asked respondent for an accounting, and payment of her share in the profits,
of Capital Sawmills Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries Corporation, and Hagonoy Lumber.
They claimed that respondent persuaded petitioner to temporarily forego her demand as it would
offend their mother who still wanted to remain in control of the family businesses. To insure that
she will defer her demand, respondent allegedly gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits
of Hagonoy Lumber.[12]

In his Reply, respondent averred that the spouses Gaw did not demand from him an
accounting of Capitol Sawmills Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries, and Hagonoy Lumber.
He asserted that the spouses Gaw, in fact, have no right whatsoever in these businesses that
would entitle them to an accounting thereof. Respondent insisted that the P200,000.00 was given
to and accepted by them as a loan and not as their share in Hagonoy Lumber.[13]

With leave of court, the spouses Gaw filed an Answer (with Amended Compulsory
Counterclaim) wherein they insisted that petitioner, as one of the compulsory heirs, is entitled to
one-sixth (1/6) of Hagonoy Lumber, which the respondent has arrogated to himself. They
claimed that, despite repeated demands, respondent has failed and refused to account for the
operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver her share therein. They then prayed that
respondent make an accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver to petitioner
her one-sixth (1/6) share thereof, which was estimated to be worth not less than P500,000.00.[14]

In his Answer to Amended Counterclaim, respondent explained that his sister, Chua Sioc
Huan, became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when the heirs executed the Deed of
Partition on December 8, 1986. In turn, he became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he
bought it from Chua Sioc Huan, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990.[15]
 Defendants, in their reply,[16] countered that the documents on which plaintiff anchors his
claim of ownership over Hagonoy Lumber were not true and valid agreements and do not
express the real intention of the parties. They claimed that these documents are mere paper
arrangements which were prepared only upon the advice of a counsel until all the heirs could
reach and sign a final and binding agreement, which, up to such time, has not been executed by
the heirs.[17]

During trial, the spouses Gaw called the respondent to testify as adverse witness under
Section 10, Rule 132. On direct examination, respondent testified that Hagonoy Lumber was the
conjugal property of his parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both Chinese citizens. He
narrated that, initially, his father leased the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently located from
his godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his father constructed the two-storey concrete building standing
thereon. According to respondent, when he was in high school, it was his father who managed
the business but he and his other siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Chua Sioc Huan,
managed Hogonoy Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters. He stated that he also
managed Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high school, but he stopped when he got married and
found another job. He said that he now owns the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating.[18]

On cross-examination, respondent explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol

Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to the other stockholders on January 1, 1991. He
further testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition,
executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he
bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990. [19]

On re-direct examination, respondent stated that he sold his shares of stock in Capitol
Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he received in cash. He also paid the purchase price
of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which payment was not covered by a separate
receipt as he merely delivered the same to Chua Sioc Huan at her house in Paso de Blas,
Valenzuela. Although he maintains several accounts at Planters Bank, Paluwagan ng Bayan, and
China Bank, the amount he paid to Chua Sioc Huan was not taken from any of them. He kept the
amount in the house because he was engaged in rediscounting checks of people from the public
market. [20]

On December 10, 1998, Antonio Gaw died due to cardio vascular and respiratory failure.
[21]

On February 11, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby renders
judgement ordering defendant Concepcion Chua Gaw to pay the [respondent] the
following:
1. P200,000.00 representing the principal obligation with
legal interest from judicial demand or the institution of the
complaint on November 19, 1991;
2. P50,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
3. Costs of suit.
The defendants counterclaim is hereby dismissed for being devoid of
merit.

SO ORDERED.[22]

The RTC held that respondent is entitled to the payment of the amount of P200,000.00 with
interest. It noted that respondent personally issued Check No. 240810 to petitioner and her
husband upon their request to lend them the aforesaid amount. The trial court concluded that
the P200,000.00 was a loan advanced by the respondent from his own funds and not
remunerations for services rendered to Hagonoy Lumber nor petitioners advance share in the
profits of their parents businesses.

The trial court further held that the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition
and the Deed of Sale, evidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy Lumber from Chua Sioc
Huan to respondent, was never impugned. Although respondent failed to produce the originals of
the documents, petitioner judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even
acknowledged her signature thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the best evidence rule. As
for the Deed of Sale, since the contents thereof have not been put in issue, the non-presentation
of the original document is not fatal so as to affect its authenticity as well as the truth of its
contents. Also, the parties to the documents themselves do not contest their validity. Ultimately,
petitioner failed to establish her right to demand an accounting of the operations of Hagonoy
Lumber nor the delivery of her 1/6 share therein.

As for petitioners claim that an accounting be done on Capitol Sawmill Corporation and
Columbia Wood Industries, the trial court held that respondent is under no obligation to make
such an accounting since he is not charged with operating these enterprises.[23]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, alleging that the trial court erred (1) when it
considered the amount of P200,000.00 as a loan obligation and not Concepcions share in the
profits of Hagonoy Lumber; (2) when it considered as evidence for the defendant, plaintiffs
testimony when he was called to testify as an adverse party under Section 10 (e), Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court; and (3) when it considered admissible mere copies of the Deed of Partition and
Deed of Sale to prove that respondent is now the owner of Hagonoy Lumber.[24]

On May 23, 2003, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. [25] The appellate court found
baseless the petitioners argument that the RTC should not have included respondents testimony as
part of petitioners evidence. The CA noted that the petitioner went on a fishing expedition, the
taking of respondents testimony having taken up a total of eleven hearings, and upon failing to
obtain favorable information from the respondent, she now disclaims the same. Moreover, the CA
held that the petitioner failed to show that the inclusion of respondents testimony in the statement
of facts in the assailed decision unduly prejudiced her defense and counterclaims. In fact, the CA
noted that the facts testified to by respondent were deducible from the totality of the evidence
presented.

The CA likewise found untenable petitioners claim that Exhibits H (Deed of Sale) and
Exhibit I (Deed of Partition) were merely temporary paper arrangements. The CA agreed with the
RTC that the testimony of petitioner regarding the matter was uncorroborated she should have
presented the other heirs to attest to the truth of her allegation. Instead, petitioner admitted the
due execution of the said documents. Since petitioner did not dispute the due execution and
existence of Exhibits H and I, there was no need to produce the originals of the documents in
accordance with the best evidence rule.[26]

On December 2, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
[27]

Petitioner is before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following errors:

I. THAT ON THE PRELIMINARY IMPORTANT RELATED ISSUE,

CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED
IN THE APPLICATION AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RULE
ON EXAMINATION OF ADVERSE PARTY OR HOSTILE WITNESS
UNDER SECTION 10 (d) AND (e) OF RULE 132, CAUSING SERIOUS
DOUBT ON THE LOWER COURTS APPEALED DECISIONS
OBJECTIVITY, ANNEX C.

II. THAT ON THE IMPORTANT LEGAL ISSUE RELATIVE TO THE

AFORESAID TWO OPPOSING CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT AND
PETITIONER, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS BEEN
COMMITTED UNDER THE LOWER COURTS DECISION ANNEX
C AND THE QUESTIONED DECISION OF MAY 23, 2003 (ANNEX A)
AND THE RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 2, 2003, (ANNEX B) IN
DEVIATING FROM AND DISREGARDING ESTABLISHED
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ENJOINING COURTS NOT TO
OVERLOOK OR MISINTERPRET IMPORTANT FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES, SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND WHICH ARE OF GREAT WEIGHT
AND VALUE, WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE RESULT OF THE
CASE AND ARRIVE AT A JUST, FAIR AND OBJECTIVE DECISION.
(Citations omitted)

III. THAT FINALLY, AS TO THE OTHER LEGAL IMPORTANT

ISSUE RELATIVE TO CLAIM OR OWNERSHIP OF THE HAGONOY
LUMBER FAMILY BUSINESS, CLEAR AND PALPABLE LEGAL
ERROR HAS BEEN COMMITTED ON THE REQUIREMENTS AND
CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE UNDER
SECTION 3, RULE 130 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.[28]
 The petition is without merit.

Petitioner contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the
respondents testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as part of
her evidence. Petitioner argues that the adverse witness testimony elicited during cross-
examination should not be considered as evidence of the calling party. She contends that the
examination of respondent as adverse witness did not make him her witness and she is not bound
by his testimony, particularly during cross-examination by his own counsel. [29] In particular, the
petitioner avers that the following testimony of the respondent as adverse witness should not be
considered as her evidence:

(11.a) That RESPONDENT-Appellee became owner of the HAGONOY

LUMBER business when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan
through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990 (EXH.H);

(11.b) That the HAGONOY LUMBER, on the other hand, was acquired by the
sister Chua Sioc Huan, by virtue of Extrajudicial Partition and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in favor of a Co-Heir (EXH. I);

(11.c) That the 3 lots on which the HAGONOY LUMBER business is located were
acquired by Lu Pieng from the Santos family under the Deed of Absolute
Sale (EXH. J); that Lu Pieng sold the Lots to Chua Suy Lu in 1976
(EXHS. K, L, & M.); that Chua Siok Huan eventually became owner of
the 3 Lots; and in 1989 Chua Sioc Huan sold them to RESPONDENT-
Appellee (EXHS. Q and P); that after he acquired the 3 Lots, he has not
sold them to anyone and he is the owner of the lots.[30]

We do not agree that petitioners case was prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the
respondents testimony during cross-examination as her evidence.

If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondents
testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel, it constitute a
harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result of the case.
 In the first place, the delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one
party or the other is only significant in determining whether the party on whose shoulders lies the
burden of proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden. In
civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance
of evidence. The rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the defendants evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of
evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of the evidence
presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then determined by considering all the
facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually
presented it.[31]

That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will
not be bound by the formers testimony. The fact remains that it was at his instance that his
adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may
impeach an adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, [32] except
by evidence of his bad character.[33] Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse
witness, although the calling party does not vouch for the witness veracity, he is nonetheless
bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.[34]

A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latters
testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a
state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on. [35] A rule that provides that the party
calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony
may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from
rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.[36] This, the petitioner failed to do.

In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the
respondents testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The petitioner
admitted having signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the property to
Chua Siok Huan was only temporary. On cross-examination, she confessed that no other
document was executed to indicate that the transfer of the business to Chua Siok Huan was a
temporary arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died in 1993, she did not initiate
any action concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim in the instant that,
for the first time, she raised a claim over the business.

Due process requires that in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire
evidence presented.[37] All the parties to the case, therefore, are considered bound by the
favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.[38] As already mentioned, in arriving
at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party
who offered them in evidence. In this light, the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of
evidence was properly attributed to one party, but whether it was accorded the apposite probative
weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be
given its proper weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach
the witness or contradict his testimony.

Significantly, the RTCs finding that the P200,000.00 was given to the petitioner and her
husband as a loan is supported by the evidence on record. Hence, we do not agree with the
petitioners contention that the RTC has overlooked certain facts of great weight and value in
arriving at its decision. The RTC merely took into consideration evidence which it found to be
more credible than the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner.
At this juncture, we reiterate the well-entrenched doctrine that the findings of fact of the
CA affirming those of the trial court are accorded great respect, even finality, by this Court. Only
errors of law, not of fact, may be reviewed by this Court in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.[39] A departure from the general rule may be warranted where the
findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when
the same is unsupported by the evidence on record.[40]There is no reason to apply the exception in
the instant case because the findings and conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those of
the trial court. These findings are buttressed by the evidence on record. Moreover, the issues and
errors alleged in this petition are substantially the very same questions of fact raised by petitioner
in the appellate court.
 On the issue of whether the P200,000.00 was really a loan, it is well to remember that
a check may be evidence of indebtedness.[41] A check, the entries of which are in writing, could
prove a loan transaction.[42] It is pure naivet to insist that an entrepreneur who has several sources
of income and has access to considerable bank credit, no longer has any reason to borrow any
amount.

The petitioners allegation that the P200,000.00 was advance on her share in the profits of
Hagonoy Lumber is implausible. It is true that Hagonoy Lumber was originally owned by the
parents of petitioner and respondent. However, on December 8, 1986, the heirs freely renounced
and waived in favor of their sister Chua Sioc Huan all their hereditary shares and interest therein,
as shown by the Deed of Partition which the petitioner herself signed. By virtue of this deed,
Chua Sioc Huan became the sole owner and proprietor of Hagonoy Lumber. Thus, when the
respondent delivered the check for P200,000.00 to the petitioner on June 7, 1988, Chua Sioc
Huan was already the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber. At that time, both petitioner and
respondent no longer had any interest in the business enterprise; neither had a right to demand a
share in the profits of the business. Respondent became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber only
after Chua Sioc Huan sold it to him on August 1, 1990. So, when the respondent delivered to the
petitioner the P200,000.00 check on June 7, 1988, it could not have been given as an advance on
petitioners share in the business, because at that moment in time both of them had no
participation, interest or share in Hagonoy Lumber. Even assuming, arguendo, that the check was
an advance on the petitioners share in the profits of the business, it was highly unlikely that the
respondent would deliver a check drawn against his personal, and not against the business
enterprises account.

It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale were
acknowledged before a Notary Public. The notarization of a private document converts it into a
public document, and makes it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.[43] It is
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. [44] A notarized document carries evidentiary weight
as to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor
the presumption of regularity. Such a document must be given full force and effect absent a
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects
recognized by law.[45] A public document executed and attested through the intervention of a
notary public is, generally, evidence of the facts therein express in clear unequivocal manner.[46]

Petitioner, however, maintains that the RTC erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of
the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the best evidence rule.In addition,
petitioner insists that the Deed of Sale was not the result of bona fide negotiations between a true
seller and buyer.

The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,[47] of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or
on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise
admissible without need to account for the original. [48]Moreover, production of the original may
be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production.[49]

Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case.
Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in
evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due execution and
admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition. [50] As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in
effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the
manner required by the rules.[51] The petitioner merely claimed that said documents do not
express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper
arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.[52] Apparently, the petitioner does not contest the
contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer
of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary.
 An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties
rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties. [53] The parties
intention is to be deciphered from the language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post
facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the contract. [54] Thus,
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[55]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 dated May 23, 2003 and Resolution dated December
2, 2003 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-38790 November 9, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FEDERICO RELUCIO @ "PEDRING", EDRI PINEDA, ROSENDO VELASCO @
"MANGYO", DANTE ARIOLA, MIGUEL ESPEJO PADRONES @ "EGI", PETER
DOE, and RICHARD DOE, accused, ROSENDO VELASCO @ "MANGYO", accused-
appellant.

J. G. Lapuz & E. F. David for appellant.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr. and
Trial Attorney Windalino Y. Custodia for appellee.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the judgment of conviction against appellant Rosendo Velasco of the crime of
murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fourth Judicial District dated January 4, 1974, the
dispositive part of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, this Court, finding the accused Federico Relucio and Rosendo
Velasco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged in the
information, and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, hereby sentences
them to reclusion perpetua; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
herein deceased victim Gonzalo Talastas in the amount of P12,000.00 without,
however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the nature of
the sentence, and to pay the proportionate costs.

It appears that the other accused Federico Relucio withdrew his appeal upon the filing of a
motion for new trial but pending the resolution of said motion, said accused broke out of the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Jail together with two other inmates named Mario David and Amante
Villasenor for which reason the trial court declared the decision final as to him. (Order of the trial
court of June 4, 1974.)

Appellant was charged with murder in the court below, together with Federico Relucio, alias
"Pedring", Edri Pineda, Dante Ariola, Miguel Espejo Padrones. alias "Egi" Peter Doe and
Richard Doe, in an information dated May 29, 1972 reading as follows:

The City Fiscal accuses Federico Relucio alias "Pedring", Edri Pineda, Rosendo
Velasco alias "Mangyo", Dante Ariola, Miguel Espejo Padrones alias "Egi", Peter
Doe and Richard Doe, the true Identities of the last two-named accused being
presently unknown, of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23 rd day of June, 1971, in the City of Cabanatuan,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding and abetting one another,
with treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Gonzalo Talastas by
shooting the latter on different parts of his body with guns thereby inflicting upon
him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the generic aggravating circumstances of evident

premeditation and cruelty.

Cabanatuan City, May 29, 1972.

FOR THE CITY FISCAL:

SGD.) MARIO M. DEL ROSARIO Special Counsel

The trial began on November 16, 1972 and ended on November 5, 1973, the court holding no
less than twenty-four sessions. Four witnesses, Patrolman Jose E. Garcia, Crispin Angeles, Dra.
Melicia C. de Guzman and Miguel Padrones, testified for the prosecution during the presentation
of the direct evidence and four witnesses, Jose Serafica, Inday Tinio, Benito Custodio and again
Miguel Padrones were presented as rebuttal witnesses. The defense had, aside from the accused
Relucio and Velasco, the following witnesses: Eduardo Mangahas, Jose Aguilar, Ligaya Velasco,
Elias Estrella, judge Alfin Vicencio, Segundino Gabriel, Pablo Padilla, Eusebio Mendiola and Dr.
Emiliano Perez. Later, Velasco testified again in rebuttal. The transcript of the stenographic notes
of the testimonies of all the witnesses consist of over 930 pages.

Of the four witnesses in chief presented by the prosecution only two, Crispen Angeles and
Miguel Padrones, can be said to have given incriminatory evidence against appellant.

-1-

According to Angeles, (pp. 18-115, t.s.n.), on the day in question, June 23, 1971, he met the
deceased Gonzalo Talastas (Along) near the entrance to the Capital Theater in Cabanatuan City
at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. He invited Talastas to see the movie. The latter said he was
waiting for a woman. When the woman named Amanda arrived, she had a female companion,
and the four of them went in. After a while Amanda left and did not go back anymore. So,
Angeles invited Talastas to leave but the latter said he would wait for Amanda to return. A little
later, however, he acceded just the same, but Angeles "left ahead of him."

As Angeles was going out, he met the accused Federico Relucio and another person unknown to
him going inside the theater. After the two went in, Angeles heard shots, after which he saw
Talastas going out of the theater with blood on his shoulder. (He could not say whether left or
right. 'At that moment, he (Angeles) was "in the place opposite the Capital Theater near the
Avenue Theater" (across Burgos Street ). He saw "someone following and shooting him"
(Talastas),' somebody who was chasing him. ... He was firing shots," but he did not say clearly
who fired the shots. His vague testimony on this point is as follows:

Q Where were you when you saw Gonzalo Talastas going out of
the theater?

A I was there in front of the Avenue theater, sir.

Q What happened if you know when you saw Gonzalo Talastas

going out the theater?

A There was somebody who was chasing him, sir.

Prosecutor

Q What was that one chasing him doing while chasing him?

A He was firing shots, sir.

Q To whom was he firing shots?

A Gonzalo Talastas, the one who died.

Q Do you know that one chasing Gonzalo Talastas?

A Yes, sir. The one chasing him I know him by face and the other
one I know him by name only, sir.

Q How many were chasing Gonzalo Talastas?

A There were many but I recognized only four, sir.

Q You said that you know the name of one of them, will you please
tell the Honorable Court the name of one of them whom you know
by name?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is his name?

A Ige, sir.

Q If Ige is in this courtroom, can you point to him?

A Yes, sir.

Atty. Abesamis

We object to the question for it lacks basis because the witness

categorically stated that he only knew the name. He did not state
that he knows the person who carries the name of Ige, your Honor.

Court

But he saw the man. If he did not see, I would not insist. I would
sustain you easily but he saw the face.

Atty. Abesamis

I submit, your Honor.

Court

Witness may answer.

Witness

A Yes, sir. Prosecutor

Q Please point to him?

A (witness pointing to a person wearing a white shirt when asked

of his name answered that he is Miguel Padrones).

Q You said you saw four persons, besides Miguel Padrones, can
you tell if any of the three is in this courtrooms.

A Yes, sir.

Q Please point to them?

A (witness going down from the witness stand and pointing to

somebody sitting handsome and with curly hair who, when asked
of his name, answered that he is Rosendo Velasco).

Q Who else if there are still in this courtroom?

A I have already pointed three. The other one is not here, sir.

Q You said that you recognized four men among those chasing the
deceased Gonzalo Talastas and you pointed to Ige who is Miguel
Padrones and now you pointed to Mangyo who is Rosendo
Velasco, who is the other one?

Atty. Abesamis

Already answered, he already pointed three according to him, your

honor.

Court

Q You only pointed two as far as the Court remembers. You said
four were there other still present in the courtroom?

A Yes, sir. This is the third one (witness pointing to somebody who
is used to be Identified to be Federico Relucio), and the fourth one
is not here.

Prosecutor
 Q You said that they were chasing Gonzalo Talastas, what
happened with that chasing?

A He was hit and he fell down, sir.

Q Where did he fall ?

A In front of the Tiwag College, sir.

Q How far is that point from the theater where Gonzalo Talastas
came?

A It was quite far, sir, I cannot estimate but he came from the
Capital theater, and he fell down in front of the Liwag College.

Court

Q Can the parties determine as to the distance from the Capital

theater up to the Liwag College?

(Make of record that the distance approximated by the parties is

more or less 150 meters).

(t.sn., pp. 37-42, hearing of November 16, 1972.)

Explaining further, he testified that Talastas was running towards the east and that "those chasing
him, some were in the jeep and others running. " Among those in the jeep was appellant Rosendo
Velasco, the only one he recognized, and among those on foot he recognized only Miguel
Padrones. After Talastas fell, the witness went to the municipal building "looking for a policeman
whom I know because I will tell him that Gonzalo Talastas was shot", but he could not find
anyone he knew, so he went home.

On cross-examination, however, he identified Padrones as the only one chasing Gonzalo thus:

Atty. Pablo

Q Now, you saw Ige chasing him on foot when he was going out of
the theater or when he was already running along the street?

A When he was already running in the street sir.

Q He was alone chasing him when he was proceeding along the

Liwag College?
 A I only saw one. He was alone Ige only, sir. (t.s.n., p. 60, hearing
of November 16, 1972.)

Moreover, whatever frail indication may appear in the testimony of this, witness linking
appellant to the offense charged was virtually shattered by Exhibit 17, the sworn statement of the
same witness given to Detective Justiniano E. Fernandez of the Cabanatuan City Police on
January 11, 1972, which the defense presented for impeachment purposes, strangely without
objection on the part of the prosecution notwithstanding that the defense failed to lay the
predicate therefor. (t.s.n., p. 388.) In said statement, Angeles gave practically a different story
from beginning to end - from the reference to the time place and reason how he and Talastas and
Amanda came to be together that fateful afternoon up to the Identification of Ige or Egi (Miguel
Padrones) as the one who shot Talastas) from that related by him on the witness stand. Exhibit
17 reads as follows:

CCPD-Bilang 1356-71

SALAYSAY NI CRISPIN ANGELES Y SANTIAGO NA KUHA SA

PAGTATANONG NI TIKTIK JUSTINIANO P. FERNANDEZ NG PANGKAT
NG TAGATUGAYGAY NG HIMPILAN NG PULISYA NG LUNGSOD NG
KABANATUAN NGAYONG IKA-11 NG BUAN NG ENERO 1972, SA
GANAP NA IKA-4:00 NG HAPON.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

01. TANONG:-Ito'y isang pagsisiyasat, ikaw ba'y handang

magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay na ang
iyong sasabihin dito ay pawang katotohanan lamang.?

SAGOT:-Opo.

02. T-Sabihin mo ang iyong pangalan at bagay na maaring pa sa

iyong pagkatao at sabihin mo din kung saan ka kasalukuyang
naninirahan?

S-CRISPIN ANGELES Y SANTIAGO po, 22 taong may asawa,

magsasaka at sa kasalukuyang naninirahan sa Bo. Pamaldan,
Lungsod ng Kabanatuan.

03. T-Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto ngayon sa Tanggapan ng

Pulisya at ikaw ay nagbibigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na
salaysay dito?

S-Dahilan po sa akoy nagpapatunay sa isang pangyayari na

naganap.
04. T-Ano ba ang pangyayaring ito na ayon sa iyo ay naganap na
nais mong patunayan dito?

S-Ganito po iyon. Nuong ika-2:00 ng hapon ng ika-23 ng buan ng

Hunyo 1971, samantalang kami nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS
ay nanduon sa isang bahay na aming tinutuluyan sa Bo. Aduas,
dito sa Lungsod ng Kabanatuan, ay dumating itong si MANDA at
ang isang babae na sinabi niyang kanyang pinsan at kami ay
kanilang inamuki na samahan sila na manood ng Cine. Amin
naman pong sinamahan ang dalawang babae na ito at ang kanilang
piniling pasukin na Cine ay iyong Capital sa may daang Burgos.
Ng kami'y nanduon na sa loob ng sine, hindi pa gaanong
nagtatagal kami sa aming pagkakaupo na magkakatabi duon sa
hulihang upuan sa ibaba sa gawing kaliwa ay nagpaalam ang
dalawang kasama naming ito na sila'y di umano'y pupunta sa
kasilyas ng mga babae at sila'y iihi. Ng mayruon ng humigit
kumulang na kahalating oras ang nakakaraan ang dalawang babae
na ito ay hindi pa nagbabalik sa kanilang upuan sa tabi naming
dalawa ay nainip kami at amin silang hinanap subalit hindi na
namin sila nakita. Sa pangyayaring ito ay nagusap kami nitong si
GONZALO TALASTAS at napagkasunduan naming dalawa na
kami'y lumabas na din, ang ginawa ko ay nagpatiuna na ako sa
paglabas na sumusunod itong is GONZALO TALASTAS at siya
ay naghinto sa may tapat ng takilya. Ng ako'y malapit ng
makarating duon sa mga bungad ng pasilyo ay napansin ko na
mayruong tatlong tao na mayruong mga dalang baril ang naduon sa
magkabilang gilid at sa aking palagay ay mayruong silang
inaabangan. Ng ako'y makalagpas na sa mga taong ito, iyong isa sa
kanilang tatlo ay humiwalay at pumasok duon sa loob. Sa napansin
kong ito ang ginawa ko ay nagbalik ako at sa aking pagpasok ay
bigla na lamang mayruong pumutok na baril at ng aking tingnan
ang pinangalingan ng putok ay nakita ko itong si FEDERICO
RELUCIO na mayruong palayaw na "PEDRING "na binabaril
itong si GONZALO TALASTAS na tinamaan sa kanyang kaliwang
balikat. Nakita ko din na gumanti itong si GONZALO TALASTAS
at tinamaan din itong si PEDRING na hindi ko alam kung saang
parte. Nakita ko din po na itong si GONZALO TALATAS ay
tumakbong papalabas ng sine na naiwanan itong si PEDRING
duon sa loob. Sa ginawang paglabas nitong si GONZALO
TALASTAS ay sumunod na din ako at nakita ko na iyong ibang
mga kasamahan nitong si PEDRING na nagaabang sa labas at
nakasakay duon sa jeep na di pasaheros na kasama na duon iyong
dalawang kasamahan nitong si PEDRING na nakita kong nakatayo
sa magkabilang gilid ng pasilyo ng Cine Capital. Nakita ko na
bumaba itong si PEDRING na hinabol itong si GONZALO
TALASTAS na kasalukuyan nuong nagtatakbo napatungo duon sa
may gawi ng Cine Broadway na binabaril naman nitong si IGE ng
isang baril na Carbine, subalit hindi tinamaan itong si GONZALO
TALASTAS. Nakita ko din po na itong si EDRI ay nagbalik at
kanyang kinuha ang isang jeep na army type at kanyang iminaneho
ito na kasama itong dalawa na sina Mangyo Velasco at si Dante
Arriola at kanilang pinulot itong si IGE Natapos na maisakay itong
si IGE ay kanila ng sinundan itong is GONZALO TALASTAS at
kanilang inabutan duon sa may panulukan ng daang Bonifacio at
Burgos na sumasakay sa tricycle. Inihinto po nitong si EDRI ang
jeep na army type at bumaba itong si IGE at kanyang binaril itong
is GONZALO TALASTAS ng dala niyang Carbine. Tinamaan
itong is GONZALO TALASTAS at nakita kong nabuwal at habang
ito'y nabubuwal ay binabaril ito ng mga kasamahan ni EDRI na
naiwanan duon sa jeep na tumatama naman sa katawan nito.
Matapos ang maramihang pagpapaputok na ginawa ng mga
naiwanan sa jeep, itong si IGE ay lumapit dito sa kinabuwalan
nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS at kanyang itinaas ang ulo nito
at pinaputukan ng kanyang baril na mahigsi sa may gawing likuran
at pagkatapos ay kinuha niya ang baril na dala nitong si
GONZALO TALASTAS. Pagkatapos nuon ay sumakay na itong si
IGE duon sa jeep na nakahinto at sila'y tumakas na.

05. T-Ayon sa iyo ay sinundan mo itongmga taong ito at iyong

sinubaybayan ang mga nagaganap na pangyayari, saan lugar ka
naman lumagay nuon?

S-Duon po ako nanduon at nakakubli sa bangketa bago dumating

sa Mobil Gas Station sa gawing kanan ng daang Burgos.

06. T-Ilan bang magkakasama itong mga taong ito na pumatay dito
kay GONZALO TALASTAS?

S-Sa akin pong pagkakakita sila'y mayruong pito ang bilang.

07. T-Binangit mo dito sila, FEDERICO RELUCIO @ PEDRING,

EDRI PINEDA, @ IGE, @ MANGYO VELASCO at DANTE
ARRIOLA, lumilitaw o lumalabas na mayruon na itong lima ang
bilang, iyong dalawa na hindi mo nabangit dito dahil sa ayon sa
iyo ay pito ang magkakasamahan na ito. Sino pa iyong dalawa
kung nakikilala mo?

S-Hindi ko po sila kilala dahilan sa nuon ko lamang sila nakita.

08. T-Ayon sa iyo dito na nuong lumabas itong si GONZALO
TALASTAS sa loob ng Cine Capital na mayruon ng tama ng baril
upang tumakas ay nakita mo na iyong mga kasamahan nitong si
PEDRING RELUCIO na siyang pumasok dito sa loob ng sine at
binaril si GONZALO TALASTAS ay nanduon sa isang jeep na di
pasahero na parada sa tapat ng bowling alley, at ng tugisin nila
itong si GONZALO TALASTAS ay sakay na sila ng isang jeep na
army type ang ibig mo bang sabihin dito ay dalawa ang sasakyan
na ginamit ng mga taong ito?

S-Opo.

09. T-Alam mo ba kung ano ang mga Plaka ng dalawang

sasakyang ito na ginamit ng mga taong ito na pumatay dito kay
GONZALO TALASTAS?

S-Hindi dahil sa hindi ko na napagruonan ng pansin ito at ang

hinahabol ko ay iyong nagaganap na pangyayari tungkol sa
pagkapatay dito kay GONZALO TALASTAS.

10. T-Ito bang mga taong binangit mo dito liban dito sa dalawa na
hindi mo kilala, ay dati mo ng kilala?

S-Opo iyong tatlo na sina, FEDERICO RELUCIO PEDRING, @

EDRI PINEDA at @ IGE na pawang mga taga Bo. Talipapa, dito
sa Lungsod ng Kabanatuan, at itong dalawang sina MANGYO
VELASCO at DANTE ARRIOLA ay hindi pa gaanong nagtatagal.

11. T-Ano ba naman ang relasyon ninyong dalawa dito sa

dalawang babae na sumundo sa inyo duon sa inyong tinuluyang
bahay sa Bo. Aduas, na humimok sa inyo na sumama sa kanila na
manood ng Cine?

S-Wala po kaming relasyon, subalit hindi katagalang magkakilala.

12. T-Sino sa dalawang ito ang kakilala ninyo?

S-Iyon pong MANDA.

13. T-Saan ba naman nagtitira itong si MANDA at ang kanyang

kasama na isang babae din?

S-Sa Bo. Dalampang po.

14. T-Hindi mo ba alam kung ano ang kanilang mga apilyedo?

S-Hindi ko na po maalala ang kanilang mga apilyedo subalit sila

ay maituturo ko kung sila'y aking makitang muli.

15. T-Simula ng pangyayaring iyon, nagkita ba kayong mull ng

dalawang babae na ito?

S-Hindi na po napakita sila sa akin.

16. T-Sa iyong pagaaral o pagkakaalam ano ang motibo ng

ginawang pagpatay dito kay GONZALO TALASTAS ng mga
taong binangit mo dito?

S-Ang pagkakaalam ko po ay dahilan sa ginawang pagbaril nitong

si GONZALO TALASTAS dito kay VITO RELUCIO na kapatid
nitong si PEDRING RELUCIO na pamangkin naman nitong si
EDRI PINEDA.

17. T-Alam mo din ba kung bakit binaril nitong si GONZALO

TALASTAS itong si VITO RELUCIO?

S-Opo.

18. T-Ano naman ang pagkakaalam mo?

S-Dahil sa nasabi po sa akin ng personal nitong si GONZALO

TALASTAS na iyon daw pong kanyang asawa ay siniraang purl
nitong si VITO RELUCIO at ito'y nagsumbong dito.

19. T-Ayon saiyo dito na ng mangyari ang pagpatay dito kay

GONZALO TALASTAS ay nuong ika-23 ng buan ng Hunyo 1971
ng bandang hapon, bakit ngayon ka lamang nagbigay ng isang
malaya at kusang-loob na salaysay dito bilang pagpapatunay na
pangyayari naiyon na paganap?

S-Dahil po sa ako'y natatakot sapagkat panahon nila ng panunugis.

20. T-Ito ba lang ang dahilan kung kaya ngayon ka lamang

nagkaruon ng lakas ng loob upang magpatunay sa naganap na
patayan naito na ang naging biktima dito ay si GONZALO
TALASTAS?
 S-Mayroon pa po, wala namang nagpunta sa akin na investigador
upang ako'y tanungin tungkol sa naganap na pangyayaring ito.

21. T-Dito ba sa pagbibigay mo ng isang malaya at kusangloob na

salaysay dito sa Himpilang ito ay walang tumakot saiyoo kaya
nangakong ikaw ay bibigyan ng pabuya upang sabihin mo dito ang
lahat ng mga binangit mo na salaysay mong ito?

S-Wala po ang lahat ng mga sinabi ko dito sa harap ninyo ay

kusang-loob ko at walang pumilit sa akin o tumakot dili kaya ay
nangako na ako'y bibigyan ng ano mang pabuya, bagkus ito ay
aking karapatan bilang isang mamamayang Pilipino at tungkulin
ko din pong makipagtulungan sa mga ahensya ng batas lalo na sa
ganitong uri ng krimen ginanap na nagdamay pa ng iba.

22. T-Nasabi mong nagdamay pa ng iba, bukod dito kay

GONZALO TALASTAS, mayroon pa bang ibang mga taong
naging biktima ng pangyayaring ito?

S-Mayroon po.

23. T-Sino naman ang mga taong ito kung mayroon kang
nalalaman?

S-Sa akin pong pagkakaalam ay iyong mayari ng dating tindahan

na isang babae na asawa ng manager ng isang bangko dito sa
Lungsod ng Kabanatuan na napagalaman ko ang pangalan na
GINANG LUISA MONDELO.

24. T-Ano naman ang naging pinsala nito kung nalalaman mo?

S-Ayon po sa aking pagkakaalam ay tinamaan ito ng ligaw na bala

sa kanyang baraso hindi ko po malaman kung kaliwa o kanan.

25. T-Tutuo bang lahat ang mga sinabi mong ito at handa mong
panumpaan sa harap ng Hukuman kung sakaling ikaw ay
kailanganin na magpatutuo sa pagpapatunay sa pangyayaring iyon
nasaksihan ng ayon sa iyo?

S-Opo.

(Lumagda) CRISPIN S. ANGELES (Pp. 369-372, Record of Lower Court.)

As may be seen, the material discrepancies between the contents of the above-quoted statement,
on the one hand, and the testimony of Angeles in open court, on the other, are so irreconcilable
that even if the proper predicate had been laid upon proper objection of the fiscal it is doubtful, if
any believable reconciliation could have been given by him. In open court, he testified that in the
afternoon of June 23, 1971, it was at the entrance of the Capital Theater that he met Talastas and
invited him to see the movie but the latter said that he was waiting for Amanda. It turned out,
according to Exhibit 17, that he and Talastas were still in Barrio Aduas, where they were staying,
when Manda arrived with a woman companion and invited them to go to the "cine". In his
testimony, he said that it was Amanda who left and did not go back anymore, while in the above
statement, he declared that both of their two female companions told them they would only go to
the comfort room but eventually disappeared. In court, he said that when Manda did not return,
he invited Talastas to leave but the latter answered he would wait for Manda's return. In Exhibit
17, it appears that he and Talastas agreed to follow and look for their lady companions and that
he went ahead and Talastas stopped by the ticket booth. Whereas in court, he testified that he was
already in the middle or across Burgos Street near the Avenue Theater when he heard shots inside
the Capital Theater where Talastas had returned, as they met Federico Relucio with a companion,
unknown to him, who were going inside, hence, he did not see who fired the shots, in the above
sworn statement, he categorically stated that upon seeing Relucio, who had separated from his
two armed companions and gone inside, he (Angeles) went back inside the theater and actually
saw Relucio firing at Gonzalo and the latter retaliating with his own gun. In court, he said that
when Talastas came out of the theater already wounded and running towards the east, the two
companions of Relucio, referring to Velasco and Padrones, chased Talastas, with Relucio riding
in a jeep and Padrones going on foot. In Exhibit 17-A, he said:

04. S-Nakita ko din po na itong si GONZALO TALASTAS ay

tumakbong papalabas ng sine na naiwanan itong si PEDRING
duon sa loob. Sa ginawang paglabas nitong si GONZALO
TALASTAS ay sumunod na din ako at nakita ko na iyong ibang
mga kasamahan nitong si PEDRING na nagaabang sa labas at
nakasakay duon sa jeep na di pasaheros na kasama na duon iyong
dalawang kasamahan nitong si PEDRING na nakita kong nakatayo
sa magkabilang gilid ng pasilyo ng Cine Capital. Nakita ko na
bumaba itong si EDRI na ang kanyang apilyedo ay PINEDA at
itong si IGE at kanilang hinabol itong si GONZALO TALASTAS
na , kasalukuyan nuong nagtatakbo na patungo duon sa may gawi
ng Cine Broadway na binabaril naman nitong si IGE ng isang baril
na Carbine, subalit hindi tinamaan itong si GONZALO
TALASTAS. Nakita ko din po na itong si EDRI ay nagbalik at
kanyang kinuha ang isang jeep na army type at kanyang iminaneho
ito na kasama itong dalawa na sina Mangyo Velasco at si Dante
Arriola at kanilang pinulot itong si IGE Natapos na maisakay itong
si IGE ay kanila ng sinundan itong si GONZALO TALASTAS at
kanilang inabutan duon sa may panulukan ng daang Bonifacio at
Burgos na sumasakay sa tricycle.
In court, Angeles intimated that Padrones or Egi did not fire at Talastas, leaving the inference
that it was appellant Velasco who was shooting the deceased. In the above statement, he
positively said:

Inihinto po nitong si EDRI ang jeep na army type at bumaba itong si IGE at
kanyang binaril itong si GONZALO TALASTAS ng dala niyang Carbine.
Tinamaan itong si GONZALO TALASTAS at nakita kong nabuwal at habang
ito'y nabubuwal ay binabaril ito ng mga kasamahan ni EDRI na naiwanan duon sa
jeep na tumatama naman sa katawan nito. Matapos ang maramihang
pagpapaputok na ginawa ng mga naiwanan sa jeep, itong si IGE ay lumapit dito
se kinabuwalan nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS at kanyang itinaas ang ulo nito
at pinaputukan ng kanyang baril na maiksi sa may gawing likuran at pagkatapos
ay kinuha niya ang baril na dala nitong si GONZALO TALASTAS. Pagkatapos
nuon ay sumakay na itong si IGE duon sa jeep na nakahinto at sila'y tumakas na.

In brief, in court, Angeles' account of the participation of appellant in the shooting of Talastas
was vague and inconclusive; in his statement, Exhibit 17, nothing points definitely and
specifically to appellant as having fired any shot at all; importantly the one clearly and
categorically referred to as having shot Talastas is Egi or Padrones

It results, therefore, that at least insofar as herein appellant Velasco is concerned, the testimony
of Angeles has been completely impeached or discredited.

It is a basic postulate in the law on evidence that every witness is presumed to be truthful and
perjury is not to be readily inferred just because apparent inconsistencies are evinced in parts of
his testimony. Every effort to reconcile the conflicting points should first be exerted before any
adverse conclusion can be made therefrom. These considerations he at the base of the familiar
rule requiring the laying of a predicate, which is essence means simply that it is the duty of a
party trying to impugn the testimony of a witness by means of prior or, for that matter,
subsequent inconsistent statements, whether oral or in writing, to give the witness a chance to
reconcile his conflicting declarations, such that it is only when no reasonable explanation is
given by him that he should be deemed impeached. Thus, Section 16 of Rule 132 provides:

Section 16. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements.

Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related
to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present,
and he must be asked whether he made such statements if so, to explain them. If
the statements be in writing they must be to the witness before any question is put
to him concerning them.

In United States vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil 385, at pp. 406-407, the Court made a clear exposition of
the universal rule of laying a predicate as follows:
 In order that we may not be misunderstood, as wen as for the purpose of
clarifying the practice in such matters, a few words may here be properly said in
respect to the proper mode of proceeding in a case where a party wishes to get
before the court contradictory statements made by a witness who is testifying for
the adversary party. For instance, if the attorney for -the accused had information
that a certain witness, say Pedro Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn
statement before the fiscal materially different from that given in his testimony
before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-examining said
witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make
such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement
different from that delivered in court. If the witness admits the making of such
contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission, while the
witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other
hand, if the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused
has the right to prove that the witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal
should refuse upon due notice to produce the document, secondary evidence of
the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-examining a
witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of
the American courts 'laying a predicate' for the introduction of contradictory
statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon
cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to
impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the
discretion of the court.

We wish to add that in a case of this kind, if the accused had, by affidavit or
otherwise, made it appear to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses named
had made statements in their declarations before the fiscal materially at variance
with their statements in court and that the production of said declarations was
necessary or even desirable, in the interests of justice, the court would have had
ample power to order their production.

This doctrine has been reiterated consistently in subsequent cases. (Moran, Comment on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1970 ed., P. 92, citing People vs. Resabal, 50 Phil. 780; People vs.
Quingsy, 54 Phil. 88; People vs. Lara, 75 Phil. 786; and People vs. Escusura, 82 Phil. 41.)

But it, as in the instant case of the witness Angeles, the prosecution did not object to the
presentation of Exhibit 17 which was offered expressly for impeachment purposes,
notwithstanding that the defense did not give the witness the opportunity to give his own
explanation of the apparent contradictions in his testimony, the trial judge and the appellate
courts have no alternative but to determine, if they can, possible reconciliation on the basis alone
of logic and common experience. The omission to object on the ground of failure to lay the
predicate is waived by the omission to interpose the same when the impeaching contradictory
statement is offered. (Evidence, [Rules of Court] Vol. VII, 1973 ed. by Vicente Francisco, p.
398.) On this score, We find the inconsistencies in the two versions of Angeles utterly beyond
possible rational explanation. The various discrepancies We have pointed out above - and there
are still others We have not mentioned are so disparate that there can be no other conclusion
than that the witness must have lied in either of them. Accordingly, We have to reject both of
them.

-2-

The testimony of the other witness Miguel Padrones, one of appellant's co-accused, cannot be
viewed in better light.

After Patrolman Garcia and Crispen Angeles had testified, at the hearing on January 4, 1973, the
prosecutor, District State Prosecutor Mariano D. Copuyoc, asked for resolution of his motion to
discharge the accused Miguel Padrones in order to be utilized as a state witness, evidently by
virtue of Section 9 of Rule 119, on the ground that "this representation has found absolute
necessity of the testimony of said defendant because the prosecution has no other direct evidence
available for the prosecution of the offense committed except the testimony of said Miguel
Padrones; that the said testimony of the defendant Miguel Padrones could be substantially
corroborated in its material points by the testimony of the other prosecution witness Crispin
Angeles; that the said accused Miguel Padrones appears to be the least guilty and that he has
never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude." No notice was given to the
defense of the motion; it turned out it was filed as early as December 14, 1972, after Angeles had
already finished testifying on December 6, 1972. Counsel for Relucio and Velasco protested they
had no notice of the motion and objected to it contending that from the testimony of Angeles,
Padrones did not appear to be the least guilty and that the prosecution had not shown that
Padrones had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, but the trial court
overruled them.

Briefly, the testimony of Padrones on direct examination (pp. 427-453, t.s.n.) was as follows:

Between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., June 23, 1971, while he was in the residence of Atty. Perez (in
Cabanatuan City), "an information was received" ... from a person named Og that Gonzalo
Talastas was inside Capital Theater also in Cabanatuan City. The "information" was addressed to
the accused Federico Relucio who was then present together with Atty. Perez and two other
persons not known to the witness. Then appellant Mangyo Velasco and two others unknown to
the witness arrived. After these three arrived, "they (referring to "Relucio, Mangyo and the other
two whom I do not know and I went to the Capital Theater". They went there "because Gonzalo
Talastas was really to be killed." This, he was told by Relucio, for "according to Federico
Relucio, Gonzalo Talastas was the one who killed his brother." He did not mention anything
about any conversation among those present from which a conspiracy could be deduced.

Upon arriving at the Capital Theater, Pedring (Relucio) went inside, while the witness and
Mangyo and the two others were in front of the bowling hall. Padrones said they were all armed,
Relucio with a.45, Mangyo with a.38 caliber and a carbine, the other two with armalite and he
(Padrones) with a.45, but there was no suggestion that they did so with the intent to kill anyone.
Not long after Federico (Relucio) entered the theater, there were shots (he does not know how
many). "Not long after, the late Gonzalo Talastas went outside of the theater with a wobbling
motion (susuray-suray), and wounded . . in his chest portion (where there was) blood." Gonzalo
ran going towards "hulo" (east). Not long thereafter, Federico Relucio followed also wounded.

Then, Mangyo (Velasco), the other two unknowns and Padrones "boarded a jeep and ... followed
them (Talastas and Relucio) with us inside the jeep. " They followed them up to the Old Republic
Telephone Company Building. Gonzalo "was running" and Relucio "boarded a tricycle, sir,
following Gonzalo Talastas. " And when the witness and his companions were already in front of
the Republic building, "Doon nga po pinagbabaril (si) Gonzalo Talastas. ... Mangyo and the other
two whom I do not know and also Pedring, (Relucio) because Pedring arrived," were the ones
who shot him, and Gonzalo died.

After the cross-examination of Padrones, the prosecution rested its case, asking for and securing
at the same time, the dismissal of the case against the accused Dante Arriola as to whom the
prosecutor did not unexplainedly present any evidence. At this point, it may be stated relatedly
that Our review of the records of this case has revealed a number of other loose ends in the
proceedings which warrant special attention. Indeed, what must have been a preconceived plan
of the prosecution to save Padrones and to pin down appellant instead is quite evident. And
worse, it was not without significant, if perhaps unwitting, assistance from the court.

Thus, having in view the testimony of Angeles We have discussed earlier, which had only a hazy
reference to the supposed participation of appellant in the offense charged, and taking into
account Exhibit 17, which the prosecution could not have been ignorant of, pointing to Padrones
instead of said appellant as the one who chased and shot the deceased as the latter came out of
Capital Theater, it is to be wondered how Padrones was selected as state witness. Moreover, from
Padrones' own account, readily available beforehand to the prosecutor, he was with Relucio, who
was the one who had the motive to do away with Gonzalo, earlier than appellant Velasco in the
house of Atty. Perez, and there is no indication at all that before the group went to Capital
Theater, appellant knew, unlike Padrones, that Gonzalo was to be killed. To reiterate, there is no
evidence that the killing of Talastas was ever talked about in the house of Atty. Perez.

In other words, the prosecution could easily have chosen other witnesses, even from among the
other alleged participants in the affray, who appeared to have had minor parts therein, if not from
the tricycle drivers who, from Padrones own account, must have seen what happened, and yet
Padrones had to be the one allowed to go scot-free. Withal, the repeated references to unknown
participants is unnatural. How could there be a conspiracy of the character charged in the
information where four of the participants were not supposedly known to any of the witnesses
who themselves are alleged to have been in the conspiracy? Why was Dante Ariola included in
the information when there was absolutely no evidence against him? Why was Edri Pineda who
was mentioned by Angeles in Exhibit 17 or Dante Ariola, who was also charged, not chosen
instead? For that matter, why was Atty. Perez in whose house and in whose presence the plot to
kill Talastas is alleged to have originated not among the accused?
All these questions and many more are intriguing, but the most mystifying circumstance extant
in the record was the attitude of both the prosecution and the trial judge in regard to what appears
clearly to be a statement given by Padrones to the Cabanatuan City police in the person of a
certain Patrolman Corporal J. S. Viloria on October 5, 1972 immediately after he was arrested.
This is the same statement, Annex A, on which the defense motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial, the denial of which is the plaint in the fourth assignment of error of appellant's brief.

Counsel for accused Relucio started his cross-examination of Padrones by inquiring about the
circumstances surrounding his arrest and detention which incontestably took place on October 5,
1972. The witness readily revealed that:

ATTY. ABESAMIS

q Immediately after your arrest you were placed in jail?

D.S. PROSECUTOR

Answered already, Your Honor.

COURT

Answer the question.

WITNESS

a No, sir.

ATTY. ABESAMIS

q Where were you first brought by the apprehending officers

immediately after you were arrested in the afternoon of October 5,
1972?

a An investigation was made, sir, on any person.

q Who investigated you?

a Viloria, sir.

q Where?

a At the city hall, sir.

q In what part of the city hall did Viloria investigate you, please
tell the Court?

a Downstairs at his table, sir.

COURT

(To witness) Speak louder.

ATTY. ABESAMIS

q This Viloria is also a member of the Cabanatuan City police

force?

a Yes, sir.

q Who were present when you were investigated by Viloria?

a The two of us, sir.

q He was asking you questions?

a Yes, sir,

q And you were giving answers to the questions propounded by

Viloria to you?

a Yes, sir.

q And Viloria was typing the questions propounded and the

answers given by you?

a Yes, sir.

q And Viloria investigated you in connection with your anti-

government activities?

a No, sir.

q In what connection were you investigated by Viloria?

a Regarding the case of Gonzalo Talastas, sir.

q Did you sign that written investigation?

a Yes. sir, I signed it.

q Also on October 5, 1972?

a I was brought before the presence of Judge Vicencio, sir.

q But you have not answered my question, Mr. Witness. My

question to you was, did you sign that typewritten investigation
conducted by Viloria also on October 5, 1972?

a Yes, sir, I signed it before the judge.

q On October 5, 1972?

a Yes, sir.

q You were escorted by armed policemen of Cabanatuan City when

you were brought in connection with that written investigation
before Judge Vicencio on October 5, 1972?

D.S. PROSECUTOR

It is very immaterial and irrelevant, Your Honor.

COURT

Answer the question.

WITNESS

a Yes, sir.

ATTY. ABESAMIS

q Who were those policemen who brought you to Judge Vicencio

on October 5, 1972?

a They were two, sir.

q I am not asking you about the number; I am asking you who they
were?

a One of them is Viloria and I do not know the other policemen

who is old.
 q Now, could you tell the Honorable Court the time when Viloria
started investigating you on October 5?

a I cannot remember, sir.

q But it was night time?

a No, sir.

q But the investigation was conducted several hours after you were
already apprehended by the three policemen headed by Pat.
Adriano?

D.S. PROSECUTOR

It is vague, Your Honor.

ATTY. ABESAMIS

To obviate the objection, I will modify the question.

q How many hours after you were arrested were you investigated
on October 5?

a The moment we arrived at the city hall I was investigated, sir.

(t.s.n., pp. 66-70, hearing of January 4, 1973)

On the basis of such clear and categorical testimony about a statement signed by him before
Judge Vicencio of the City Court on that date October 5, 1972, the defense counsel asked "the
Honorable District State Prosecutor to produce the written investigation of this witness on
October 5, 1972, if he has it in his possession." (p. 70, Id.) And to add to the basis for such
request, there was the following manifestation of Atty. Pablo, counsel for Velasco:

ATTY. PABLO

May it please the Honorable Court.

Atty. Taguiam would be a witness to this statement of mine that in the first
hearing of this case, Your Honor, Atty. Taguiam requested the District State
Prosecutor to lend him the two affidavits executed by this witness and I reiterate
that the first affidavit was dated October 5, and the second, October 20, 1972.
After Atty. Taguiam has read this affidavit I was able to take hold of this affidavit
and to read it. It was the District State Prosecutor who lent these two affidavits to
Atty. Taguiam during the first hearing of this case.
 (pp. 71-72, Id.)

Surprisingly, the reaction of the state prosecutor was negative, and the following exchange of
words took place:

ATTY. ABESAMIS

Your Honor please, I would like to make it appear on record that

when the recess was called by the Honorable Court in order to
afford the District State Prosecutor to look over his records, he Was
sorting out his records in connection with this case in order to look
for the affidavit demanded of him to be produced by the defense.
May we know from the Honorable District State Prosecutor what is
the answer.

D.S. PROSECUTOR

I do not have any affidavit dated October 5, but with respect to the
affidavit they want me to produce I want that that affidavit be
described what is that.

ATTY. ABESAMIS

But Your Honor, it is already sufficiently described, the affidavit

executed by this witness on October 5.

COURT

How about on October 20?

ATTY. PABLO

And December 14, Your Honor.

D.S. PROSECUTOR

I would not answer that, Your Honor, unless it is described.

ATTY. ABESAMIS

We would like to make it appear on record, Your Honor, by the

actuation of the Honorable District State Prosecutor construes a
suppression of the evidence, a suppression of a very vital evidence
 which the defense has been demanding pursuant to the rule on
discovery as sanctioned under our rules of court.

We will proceed, Your Honor.

D.S. PROSECUTOR

May I state also a manifestation that it could not be suppression if

it came from the mouth of this witness. The witness is present. You
can ask him, so it could not (be) suppression of evidence. (pp. 73-
75, Id.)

Then came the inexplicable ruling of the court:

COURT

Well those are manifestations only of counsel. You give the basis
for the Court to compel the Fiscal to produce such document. Up
to now there is no basis. I think, the Fiscal would want to describe
that affidavit. He does not like to fish. All right, continue. (pp.
76, Id.)

Not only that, in its decision, the trial court reasoned out thus:

But it is not all rosy with the testimony of Miguel Padrones. Like all other
witnesses of the same capabilities he suffers from a poor memory as regards
remembering dates of events and faces of persons whom he occasionally saw and
met. The records is replete of incidents showing the poor memory of the witness
as regards the exact dates of events and the faces of persons he met. The
following instances will show that while in the witness stand he was asked the
following: 'Do you remember where were you on June 23, 1971 between the
hours of four o'clock in the afternoon?' His answer was: 'I was in the residence of
Atty. Perez.' It may be noted that June 23, 1971 was the date of the commission of
the crime and the same date was included in the question. But when he was asked
again on cross examination the date of the commission of the crime, he answered
that he could not remember but if he would be allowed to refer to his affidavit he
could answer the same. It was only when he was snowed to refer to his affidavit
that he came to know that the crime was committed on June 23, 1971. Again, he
was asked when on October 5 he was arrested, and he answered that he did not
know other than that it was after lunch. There was much confusion with regard to
the execution of the affidavit of Padrones on October 5. The Court believes that
there was no such affidavit executed on October 5, 1971. The confusion came up
only when Padrones was asked when he was arrested and he answered on October
5. In answer to the subsequent questions he answered that he was brought before
 Judge Alfin Vicencio, the city judge, now the Honorable Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Masbate. Then the defense assumed in the following questions
that the investigation took place on October 5 and that this affidavit was taken on
the same date, to which the accused answered in the affirmative. Whether the
accused realized the truth of his answer or not, the Court has its doubts, upon
which it based its conclusion that this witness has a poor memory as to dates of
events. Capitalizing on this weakness of the witness, the defense confined its
cross examination on the several affidavits supposedly executed by Miguel
Padrones on October 5 and 20. But Padrones denied vehemently that after that
investigation of October 5 he made any affidavit except that given by him to
Corporal Viloria on October 20, 1971, which the latter offered to show to the
defense (referring to the affidavit of December 14, 1972). The District State
Prosecutor also denied possession of the affidavit of October 5 of Miguel
Padrones. The defense, to strengthen its position, manifested that the affidavit of
October 5 was lost and that this could be confirmed by Atty. Fidel Taguiam,
counsel of one of the defendants; but Atty. Taguiam was never presented in court
to confirm or deny the same. The Court honestly believes that there was no such
affidavit ever executed on October 5, 1971 and that the witness might be referring
to the affidavits executed by him on October 20, 1971 (Exhibit "2" Relucio) and
on December 14, 1972 before the District State Prosecutor. To further Justify their
actuations, the defense called on to the witness stand the former Cabanatuan City
Judge Alfin Vicencio, now the presiding judge of one of the branches of the Court
of First Instance of Masbate. His Honor testified that he remembers one Miguel
Padrones to have executed an affidavit before him on October 5, 1971, but that he
had only a general Idea of its contents. The defense got what it wanted to get from
the lips of His Honor, Judge Alfin Vicencio and i.e., that it was only accused
Miguel Padrones who shot and killed the deceased victim Gonzalo Talastas when
the latter caught up with him near the Retelco building. As a whole, His Honor
wanted this Court to believe that only Miguel Padrones shot and killed Gonzalo
Talastas and that his co-accused Federico Relucio and Rosendo Velasco were not
with Padrones when he killed said deceased victim. To this testimony of His
Honor, it is regrettable to state that he failed to state at least, all the substantial
contents of the said affidavit, assuming that there was really an affidavit of
October 5 executed by Miguel Padrones. Human as we all are, it is unavoidable
for our minds to slip, particularly as regards the dates, considering the length of
time and the work that confronted His Honor, the Honorable Alfin Vicencio. (Pp.
107-110, Appendix A, Appellant's Brief.)

Such ratiocination is strange, to say the least. The record shows that His Honor himself asked:

COURT

q Do you know the date when the statement was made?

 a It was on the 5th, sir.

q Of October?

a Yes, sir.

COURT

Proceed. (t. t.s.n., p. 77, hearing of January 1973)

As can be seen, seemingly there was a deliberate and concerted intent to prevent the
impeachment of Padrones, except that the prosecutor failed to realize that with his omission to
object to the testimony of Judge Vicencio, all his transparent moves to suppress the presentation
of the statement of said witness of October 5, 1972 would come to naught. The record reveals
only too plainly that several recesses were allowed by His Honor at critical stages of the cross-
examination for the obvious purpose of affording the witness opportunity to adjust his testimony
with the help of the prosecutor that with his being already released after his discharge on
January 4, 1972 so much so that after the spirited skirmishes between defense counsel and the
prosecutor when the session of January 4, 1972 was to end, the significance of which could not
have been lost to him, at the resumption of the trial on February 12, 1972, the witness tried to
sing a different tune. As to be expected, he came out with the theory that the statement given by
him before Patrolman Corporal Viloria on October 5, 1972 was actually signed by him on
October 19 or 20, 1972 before Fiscal del Rosario thus:

COURT:

Q Are you sure that your statement was taken on the 5th of
October?

A Yes, sir.

Q So Sgt. Viloria has taken two affidavits from you?

A It was only on the 5th, sir.

Q How many times did that Sgt. Viloria taken your statement?

A It was only the time when I was apprehended, sir.

Q And when was that time when you were apprehended?

A On the 5th, sir.

Q Why is there now an affidavit subscribed and sworn to before
Fiscal Del Rosario dated October 19?

A It was there at the City Court where I was made to sign my

statement, sir.

Q When was that? Refer to your affidavit to refresh your memory,

A (Witness reads Exhibit" 2-A.") Maylaska question.

Q Read it all.

ATTY. PABLO:

May we make of record that the State Prosecutor is instructing the

witness to read the contents of the statement before the witness
could be guided by this Honorable Court that he read the said
affidavit.

COURT:

Now what is your question, Mr. Padrones?

A Because, this morning I was being asked by them whether I was

made to sign before Viloria, but they are not asking me whether I
have signed before the Fiscal, sir.

Q What do you mean? Explain further.

A Only about that question whether I was made to sign before

Viloria that is why I answered yes. But it was not asked of me
whether I was made to sign before Fiscal Del Rosario, sir.

ATTY. ABESAMIS:

Q So you mean to tell the Honorable Court is that your affidavit

dated October 5,1972 was signed before Police Cpl. Viloria?

A It was only before the city hall that I affixed may signature, sir.

Q Precisely that affidavit of yours dated October 5, 1972 was

signed by you before Judge Vicencio, is that correct?

A Before Del Rosario, sir.

Q So the affidavit dated October 5, 1972, for purposes of
clarification only, Your Honor, was signed by you before Fiscal
Del Rosario?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is that affidavit which you signed before Judge Vicencio

and that is included in your cross examination before on January 4,
1973?

A It came from the City Court, sir.

Q That was not on October 5, 1972?

A I do not know, sir, whether it was the one.

COURT:

Q The question is what is that affidavit that you subscribed and

swore to before Judge Vicencio, if you have any?

A I do not remember that affidavit, sir. What I remember I only

signed before Fiscal Del Rosario, sir.

Q So you do not recall having signed any statement before Judge

Vicencio?

A In the City Court I do not remember having signed any affidavit

before Judge Vicencio, sir.

Q In any other place do you remember having signed any affidavit

before Judge Vicencio?

A None, sir.

Q You are sure?

A I remember nothing, sir.

Q You do not remember or you do not even recall that you were
presented before Judge Vicencio by Police Cpl. Viloria?

PROSECUTOR:
We request that the witness be shown any statement to that effect,
if there is any.

COURT:

He is testing the credibility of the witness.

ATTY. ABESAMIS:

Q When you testified here on January 4, 1973 you said following

which I am reading from the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken during January 4, 1973 hearing ...

PROSECUTOR:

It seems the witness is confused about his affidavit.

ATTY. ABESAMIS:

The witness, Your Honor, is not confused; the witness is lying.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. ABESAMIS:

I will read from your testimony during the trial of January 4, 1973,
specifically the questions and answers found on page 68, which I
quote:

In what connection were you investigated by Viloria?

A. Regarding the case of Gonzalo Talastas, sir.

Q. Did you sign that written investigation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Also on October 5, 1972?

A. I was brought before the person of Judge Vicencio, sir.

Q. But you have not answered my question. My question to you
was, did you sign that typewritten of Viloria also on October 5,
1972?

A. Yes, sir, he signed it before the judge.

Q. On October 5, 1972?

A. Yes, sir.

And Your Honor, on page 76, 1 read the following questions and
answers:

Q. Who was carrying the typewritten investigation when you were

brought before the judge on October 5,1972?

A. Viloria, sir.

Q. After coming from the place of Judge Vicencio who was

carrying that statements?

A. Viloria also, sir.

Q My question now, Mr. Witness, is will you insist that you were
never brought before Judge Vicencio in order to swear, to sign and
to subscribe your statement in connection with this case since the
beginning?

A I do not remember, sir. What I remember is I signed it before

Fiscal Del Rosario, sir.

COURT:

Q Then why did you assure counsel for the defense before the
court that you were presented before Judge Vicencio, during our
hearing of January 4, 1973?

A I do not remember having been asked that question, sir.

Q It was asked of you and the court also remembers that question
asked of you. Will you now insist that you were never brought
before Judge Vicencio in connection with this case?

A I cannot comprehend the question, sir.

 Q What do you not comprehend?

A Regarding that point that I was brought before the judge, sir.

Q But when you were asked by counsel about that fact on January
4, 1973 your mind was clear then, is it not?

A I do not remember whether I was brought before Judge Vicencio,

sir.

Q You know very well Judge Vicencio before that date?

A I know him to be in the City Court, sir. He was being pointed to

me by the police, sir.

Q My question is do you know Judge Vicencio personally before

that date'!

A Yes, sir.

Q What about Fiscal Del Rosario, you know him also personally

A Yes, sir.

COURT:

Continue.

ATTY. ABESAMIS:

We request also, Your Honor, that pages 68 and 69 of the transcript

of the stenographic notes of the trial dated January 4, 1973 be
marked as Exhibit '3 Impeachment-Relucio' and the bracketed
portion be marked as Exhibit '3-A-Impeachment-Relucio.'

COURT:

Mark it. (t.s.n., pp. 23-31, hearing of February 12, 1973)

His Honor continued asking questions as the witness was already faltering, until finally, to save
him, the session was adjourned:

Q What day were you arrested?

A On a Friday, sir.

Q That was on October 5, 1972?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, that coming Monday you were brought before Fiscal Del
Rosario?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you remember if you signed this affidavit before Fiscal Del

Rosario?

A It was only the statement which I swore to that I remember, sir.

Q Did you see Fiscal Del Rosario sign his name?

A Yes, sir.

Q You do not remember if you signed the affidavit before Fiscal

Del Rosario?

A I signed, sir.

Q What pen did you use? The pen of Fiscal Del Rosario or some
other kind of pen?

A I do not remember whether I used the same pen used by the

Fiscal, sir. I remember only that I borrowed a ball pen placed on
the table of the Fiscal, sir.

Q But you said you signed that statement of yours before

Policeman Viloria, do you recall that now?

A I do not remember whether I was able to sign that or not, sir.

Q Are you tired already?

A My head is aching, sir.

 COURT:

All right, we will adjourn this hearing and continue tomorrow, as

previously scheduled. At any rate it is already twelve o'clock noon.
(pp. 35-36, Id.)

At this point, it must be noted that Exhibit 2-A, the statement which Padrones claimed above to
have been admittedly taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 but, supposedly signed by him later
and not on the same day before Judge Vicencio as he had previously stated, bears the following
heading:

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI MIGUEL PADRONES y ESPEJO SA

PAGTATANONG NI P/CPL J. S. VILORIA DITO SA HIMPILAN NG PULISYA
NG KABANATUAN NGAYONG IKA-19 NG OKTUBRE 1972 SA GANAP NA
IKA 5:15 NG HAPON...

and ends with the following jurat:

NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa aking harap ngayong ika 20 ng Oktubre

1972, dito sa Lunsod ng Kabanatuan.

With the dates October 19 and 20 thus appearing in this statements, how could there be any
proximity to the truth in the assertion of Padrones that his statement was first taken by Viloria on
October 5, 1972 and that it was signed by him before Fiscal del Rosario on October 19, 1972 and
that it was the very statement he had been referring to earlier as having been signed by him
before Judge Vicencio?

And then, at the session of February 13, 1972, he tried to foist upon the court another theory:

COURT:

I was the one asking questions yesterday to the witness. Let me

finish my questioning of this witness.

Q So that the court understands from you that you have only
executed two affidavits in connection with this case, one was taken
from you by Cpl. Viloria of the Cabanatuan City police
department; and the second was taken before District State
Prosecutor Copuyoc, is that right?

A No, sir, it is on the 19 th; the third is on the 4th.

Q So you have three affidavits taken in connection with this case,

is that it?
A The one taken by Viloria which was subscribed before Fiscal Del
Rosario, sir.

Q Yes, and the other one taken is that one taken by Fiscal
Copuyoc?

A Yes, sir.

Q I did not mention any dates, remember.

A Yes, sir.

Q I repeat again. Your mind is not yet confused this morning?

A Yes, sir.

Q The first affidavit was taken before Cpl. Viloria of the city police
and subscribed and sworn to before Fiscal Del Rosario?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the second was the one executed before District State
Prosecutor?

A Yes, sir.

Q You have not executed any other affidavit in connection with

this case before any administering officer?

A None, sir.

COURT:

Continue.

ATTY. ABESAMIS:

Q In answer to a question propounded by the Honorable Court you

said that your third affidavit was on the 4th, do you remember
having said that?

A It was here that I swore, sir.

Q To an affidavit?
 A Being a witness, sir.

Q So when you executed a third affidavit on the 4th you merely

refer to your declaration made in open court on January 4, 1973?

A I cannot comprehend very well what is affidavit, sir.

Q Did you make a written statement in connection with this case

on the 4th?

COURT:

Fourth of what?

ATTY. ABESAMIS:

Q On the 4th of your testimony?

COURT:

Fourth of what month? Be specific, let us be fair with the witness,

especially with his kind of mentality. (t.s.n., pp. 38-41, hearing of
Feb. 12, 1973.)

Only to fall back at the trial on February 19, 1973 on his original version that Viloria
accompanied him before Judge Vicencio:

ATTY. ABESAMIS:

q You having stated before this Honorable Court on January 4,

1973 under oath that you were accompanied by Viloria in order to
swear to one of your statements and another policeman whom you
do not know, will you still insist that you were never accompanied
by Viloria?

a When I signed before Fiscal del Rosario, Viloria was not with
me, sir.

q When was Viloria with you?

a It was on the 5th, sir.

q Before whom?
 a Before Judge Vicencio, sir.

q Where?

a In the city jail, sir. (pp. 13, 14, Id.)

We have taken pains to quote above several portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes of
the proceedings in the court below even at the risk of unduly extending this opinion and there
are actually many more of similar tenor that can be mentioned in order to bring out in bold
relief how Padrones, the state witness who was freed from prosecution by the fiscal and the trial
court played fast and loose with the truth in the course of his lengthy testimony. How unfounded
indeed is His Honor's laudation of Padrones in the decision under review to the following effect:

This Court has been extra careful in the analysis and appreciation of the evidence
in question, particularly that of the two principal witnesses for the prosecution,
namely: Crispin Angeles and Miguel Padrones. The latter having been discharged
as prosecution witness he cannot escape, of course, like all accused similarly
situated the imputation that he was allowed to be discharged from the information
only for one basic reason, i.e., to escape criminal responsibility. The discharge of
one or two accused is allowed by law in consideration of justice and truth with the
injunction to the discharged accused to testify to the truth and run the risk only of
being recalled and included in the information again should he refuse to live up to
his commitment to the prosecution. That injunction is the consideration that
compels the discharged accused to toe the line. Nevertheless, the Court has been
scrupulously and judiciously wary over the conduct, behavior and testimonies of
this particular witness, Miguel Padrones. Even his means of walking from the
place where he was seated to the witness stand and his return to his seat did not
escape the vigilance of this court. As Padrones was called to the witness stand for
several times the Court observed that he walked in a natural manner, as if he was
to face nobody. He answered the questions immediately if he understood them
and if he did not he asked the interpreter to repeat the same; he answered the
questions without hesitation or nervousness. In fine, he took everything in his
stride, and one noticeable behavior which he has shown the Court was when he
answered questions the said witness looked straight to the Court and lowered his
eyes only after he has answered the same. This Court went further into his
educational attainment and he admitted he was only a second grader. He made no
bones about his educational background. The Court believes he has acquired a
very low standard of education, otherwise, he would not be a willing tool of the
accused Federico Relucio who, together with him in that afternoon of June 23,
1971 purposely went to the Capital theater to kill Gonzalo Talastas. He showed
his blind loyalty to Relucio as a friend, if the Court were to believe the theory of
the defense. But, of course, the testimonies of Relucio and his wife on this point
were of doubtful efficacy. According to the defense and this is admittedly true,
Miguel Padrones was a member of the BSDU and at one time a security guard. As
 person belonging to a unit of the BSDU was fighting the dissidents, while being a
security guard helps the police authorities to maintain peace and order in a given
place, so that by the nature of the work of Miguel Padrones, he is working for,
with and by the side of the law. Notwithstanding his low educational attainment
there was not even a record of conviction offered by either the prosecution or
defense. Under these circumstances attributed to the same witness, what more can
a court of justice expect from an ignorant and sincere witness like Miguel
Padrones? (Appellant's Brief, pp. 104-106.)

Such unusually elaborate but obviously unmerited encomium given a discharged state witness
could have no other purpose than to induce the appellate court to reply implicitly on the findings
in the decision.

There is more than meets the eye here in the actuations of the district state prosecutor who
handled the case for the People, and regrettably, the trial court was apparently carried away by
his antics to the point that His Honor came to seemingly join in the effort to concoct the obvious
falsehood that Padrones did not swear to a statement about the incident in question before Judge
Vicencio on October 5, 1972. Judge Vicencio was city judge then of Cabanatuan City and at the
time of the trial was already presiding in the Court of First Instance of Masbate. He declared
under oath:

Atty. Abesamis

Q Sir, you said that you are the encumbent CFI judge of Masbate,
when did you assume that office?

A I assumed office on May 21, 1973 and I took my oath on May

16, sir.

Q Before that date Sir what was your occupation?

A I was the city judge of Cabanatuan City presiding over Branch 1,

sir.

Q On October 5, 1972 were you still the City judge of Cabanatuan

City presiding over Branch I of the said court?

A Yes, sir.

Q And as City judge of Cabanatuan City on October 5, 1972 it was

your duty to administer all oaths of affiants on their respective
statements is that correct?

A Yes, sir.
Q Now, sir, I would like to inform you that a certain Miguel
Padrones alias Ige testified before this Honorable Court as a
witness for the prosecution on January 4, 1973 and among others,
he said the following: that he was arrested by the Cabanatuan City
Police Department on October 5, 1972 in the afternoon thereof;
that he was formally investigated by the police department of
Cabanatuan City and that his statement was taken by a certain Cpl.
Julio S. Viloria on the same date October 5, 1972 page 68 of the
transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Miguel
Padrones on January 4, 1973. After Padrones made that declaration
before the Honorable Court, the defense asked for the production
of that affidavit which he allegedly executed on October 5, 1972
but the Honorable District State Prosecutor said that he did not
have it in his possession and the manifestation of the District State
Prosecutor is page 71 of the transcript of the stenographic notes of
the same hearing. He likewise stated that he signed his affidavit of
October 5, 1972 on the same date before you. However, during the
hearing of February 12, 1973 before this Honorable Court the same
Padrones declared under oath that Ms affidavit dated October 5,
1972 was signed by him before Fiscal del Rosario of the Office of
the City Fiscal of Cabanatuan City pages 25-26 of the transcript of
the stenographic notes, February 12, 1973, and he said
categorically that he does not remember having signed any
statement before Judge Vicencio in the city court nor in any other
place for that matter page 26 t.s.n. February 12, 1973 which we
have exerted efforts to locate that alleged statement of Miguel
Padrones executed on October 5, 1972 but we failed to do so. Now,
on the basis of this will you please tell us sir whether or not on
October 5, 1972 a certain Miguel Padrones alias Ige had appeared
before you in order to swear to a statement given by him before
Cpl. Viloria on the mm date October 5, 1972?

A I remember this Miguel Padrones accompanied by policeman

Viloria and del Rosario. They went to my residence at Gen. Tinio
street and they sat in the terrace of my residence. It was there when
I asked to administer the oath to Mr. Padrones, sir.

Q That was sir in the afternoon of October 5, 1972?

A It was late in the afternoon of that date, sir.

Q Now since that affidavit could not be retrieved and could not be
found despite efforts exerted by the defense to look for the same,
can you tell us sir the contents in brief of that statement of Miguel
Padrones alias 'Ige'?

A I can give you a general Idea of the statement, sir.

Q Yes, sir, please state.

A Padrones stated among others that he is Ige mentioned in a

warrant of arrest with respect to the death of a certain Gonzalo
Talastas. I believe it was then that he stated that Gonzalo Talastas
shot a certain Federico Relucio inside the Capital theater and that,
he, Padrones chased this Talastas along Burgos Avenue and caught
up with him in front of the former Retelco office at Burgos Avenue
and then he shot this Talastas, sir.

Q What else did he state in that statement?

A Well that is the general idea that I recall that he chased Talastas
and he shot him until he died, sir.

Q Did Padrones state in that affidavit where he left Federico

Relucio after Relucio was shot by Talastas inside the Capital
theater and after Padrones had chased Gonzalo Talastas?

A I do not remember Padrones having made any statement except

that according to him, Talastas shot Federico Relucio inside the
Capital theater and that on his part, he chased Talastas along
Burgos Avenue caught up with him in front of the former Retelco
office that is the residence of the late Judge Cecilio then he shot
Talastas, sir.

Q Did Padrones as far as you could recall mention in that affidavit

his companions in chasing and shooting Gonzalo Talastas?

A I do not remember any other name except him, Talastas and

Relucio. Those are the names that I remember.

Q Do you remember if Padrones had ever mentioned in that

statement of his the name of Rosendo Velasco alias "Mangyo"?

A No, sir, I do not remember that he ever mentioned.

Atty. Abesamis:
 That is all, your honor.

Court:

Cross

Fiscal:

No cross examination, your honor.

(t.s.n., pp, 28-35, hearing. of July 25, 1973.)

For the trial court to hold in its decision under review, in the face of this solemn testimony of a
fellow member of the judiciary of equal rank, as against the wavering and fast changing
declarations of a discharged accused, that "it is regrettable to state that he (Judge Vicencio) failed
to state at least the substantial contents of said affidavit, (the statement of Padrones before him of
October 5, 1972) assuming that there was really an affidavit of October 5 executed by Miguel
Padrones. Human as we all are, it is unavoidable for our minds to slip particularly as regards the
dates, considering the length of time and the work that confronted His Honor, the Honorable
Alfin Vicencio" is purely a slanted rationalization and an unexcusable display of uncommon
naivety truly unbecoming of a judicial trier of facts. This observation is also justified by His
Honor's own admission that:

But it is not all rosy with the testimony of Miguel Padrones. Like all other
witnesses of the same capabilities he suffers from a poor memory as regards
remembering dates of events and faces of persons whom he occasionally saw and
met. The records is replete of incidents showing the poor memory of this witness
as regards the exact dates of events and the faces of persons he met. The
following instances will show that while in the witness stand he was asked the
following: 'Do you remember where were you on June 23, 1971 between the
hours of four o'clock and five o'clock in the afternoon?' His answer was: 'I was in
the residence of Atty. Perez.' It may be noted that June 23, 1971 was the date of
the commission of the crime and the same date was included in the question. But
when he was asked again on cross-examination the date of the commission of the
crane, he answered that he could not remember but if he would be allowed to refer
to this affidavit he could answer the same. It was only when he was allowed to
refer to this affidavit that he came to know that the crime was committed on June
23, 1971. Again, he was asked when on October 5 he was arrested, and he
answered that he did not know other than that it was after lunch. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 107).

In other words, His Honor could excuse the supposed lapse of memory of a discharged accused,
while he would condemn a supposedly similar fault in the testimony of a judge.
We hold that, contrary to the unwarranted and incomprehensible finding of His Honor, the
evidence on record conclusively establishes that Padrones did give to Patrolman Corporal Viloria
of the Cabanatuan City Police on October 5, 1972 immediately after his arrest, his own account
of what happened in the afternoon of June 23, 1971 at the Capital Theater and subsequently near
the Old Republic Telephone Company in Cabanatuan City that led to the death of Gonzalo
Talastas and that he signed and swore to said statement before Judge Alfin Vicencio, then of the
City Court of Cabanatuan City, that same day to whom he was brought by the same Patrolman
Corporal Viloria. We consider the attitude shown in the premises by District State Prosecutor
Mariano D. Copuyoc of feigning ignorance of Annex A and attempting to foist upon the court the
theory that Exhibit 2-A was the one given by Padrones on October 5, 1972, to be lacking in
candor to the court and prejudicial to the interests of justice. Likewise, the circumstances under
which Exhibit 2-A, the supposed statement of Padrones bearing two dates, October 19 or 20,
1972, and supposedly signed before Fiscal del Rosario, came into being need to be inquired into,
there being indications from the circumstances We have found home by the record that it is not
of regular origin. We further hold that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving
due course to the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the defense dated April 16, 1974,
if only for the purpose of delving deeper into the execution of Annex A thereof, which appears to
be the statement given by Padrones on October 5, 1972 to Patrolman Corporal Viloria and which
he signed and swore to before Judge Vicencio, wherein Padrones categorically confessed that he,
and not appellant Velasco, was the one who chased and shot to death Gonzalo Talastas during the
incident here in question, thus:

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI MIGUEL PADRONES Y ESPEJO SA

PAGTATANONG NI P/CPL J S VILORIA DITO SA HIMPILAN NG PULISYA
NG KABANATUAN NGAYON IKA 5 NG OKTUBRE 1972 SA GANAP NA
IKA 5:15 NG HAPON... .

01. TANONG: Ito ay isang pagsisisyasat ipinaaalata ko saiyo ang

iyong karapatan na itinatadhana ng Saligang Batas ng Bansang
Pilipino na ang sino man ay hindi maaaring piliting magbigay ng
ano mang pahayag at kung magbibigay man ay maaari namang
gamitin ng laban saiyo sa alin mang Hukuman, ikaw ba ay
handang sumagot sa mga itatanong saiyo?

SAGOT: Opo.

02. T: Ano ang iyong pangalan at iba pang pagkakailanlan saiyo?

S: MIGUEL PADRONES Y ESPEJO, 43 taon, may-asawa,

manggagawa sa NIA, Talipapa, Kabanatuan.

03. T: Ano ang iyong palayaw?

S: IGI po.
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan al narito ka sa Himpilan ng Pulis?

S: Ako po ay kasalukuyang napipiit sa isang usapin.

05. T: Aling asunto ang iyong kinasasangkutan?

S: Iyon pong pagkapatay kay ALONG.

06. T: Kailan napatay si ALONG?

Buan po ng Hunyo 1971.

07. T: Saang lugar napatay si ALONG?

S: Duon po sa Burgos, Kabanatuan malapit sa dating "Republic

Telephone".

08. T: Papaano napatay si ALONG?

S: Sa barilan po.

09. T: Sino ang tao o mga taong kabarilan ni ALONG?

S: Ako po.

10. T: Maliban sa iyo, wala na bang iba pang tao o mga taong
kasama sa pakikipagbarilan kay ALONG?

S:. Wala na po.

11 T: Isalaysay mo nga ang buong pangyayari .

S: Si RELUCIO at saka ako ay nagpunta sa bahay ni Atty. PEREZ

sa Gen. Tinio, Kabanatuan at pagdating namin duon ay nabalitaan
ni RELUCIO na si ALONG ay nasa loob ng cine 'Capital'.

12 T: Sa nabalitaan ni RELUCIO na tungkol kay ALONG ano pa

ang nangyari, kung mayroon man?

S: Inaya po ako ni RELUCIO at sumakay kami sa tricycle at

nagpunta kami sa malapit sa cine 'Capital'.

13. T: Nuong dumating kayo sa may cine 'Capital ano ang inyong
ginawa?
S: Pumasok si RELUCIO sa cine samantalang ako ay naghintay sa
labas ng cine.

14. T: Nuong makapasok si RELUCIO sa loob ng cine Capital ano

ang nangyari?

S: Hindi po nagtagal ay nagkaroon ng mga putok sa loob ng cine.

15 T: Matapos kang makarinig ng mga putok ano ang iyong

nakita?

S: Lumabas po si ALONG.

16. T: Saan nagtuloy si ALONG?

S: Nagtatakbo po siyang patungong hulo.

17. T: Ano pa ang nangyari nuong tumakbo si ALONG?

S: Sinundan ko po si ALONG sa pamamagitan ng paghabol sa

kanya.

18. T: Inabutan mo ba si ALONG?

S: Inabutan ko po sa malapit sa dating Tanggapan ng 'Republic

Telephone'.

19 T: Ano ang nangyari ng abutan mo si ALONG?

S: Nagbarilan po kami.

20. T: Ano ang baril ni ALONG ?

S: 45 calibre po.

21. T: Matapos ang putukan saan ka nagtuloy?

S: Umuwi na po ako sa amin.

22. T: Si ALONG ano ang ayos ng iyong iwan?

S: Patay na po.
 23. T: Ano ba ang nagudyok sa iyo upang ipahayag sa akin ang
iyong salaysay na ito?

S: Gusto ko pong maliwanagan ninyo ang pangyayari sa

pagkamatay ni ALONG.

24. T: Ano ang ipinamaril mo kay ALONG?

S: Carbine at calibre 45 po.

24. T: Wala na akong itatanong mayroon ka pang nais sabihin?

S: Wala na po.

25. T: Lalagdaan mo at panunumpaan ang inyong salaysay na ito

patotoo at pagpapatibay sa iyong sinabi?

S: Opo.

(Nilagdaan) MIGUEL PADRONES

NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa aking harap ngayong ika 5th ng Oktubre,

1972, sa Lunsod ng Kabanatuan.

(Nilagdaan) ALFIN VICENIO City Judge (Pp. 509-610, Record.)

Indeed, in the light of all the foregoing, We can safely say that with the testimony of Judge
Vicencio, the evidence against appellant Velasco coming from the lips of Padrones is not entitled
to any credit at all. And there is even no need for the new trial prayed for by the defense. In the
premises, such a proceeding would obviously be superfluous.

- 3-

With the disgusting character of the prosecution's evidence against herein appellant Velasco We
have disclosed above, and Our ineludible conclusions against the evidentiary value of the
testimonies of Crispin Angeles and the discharged defendant Miguel Padrones, it goes without
saying that the charge of murder against said appellant has no leg to stand on. Accordingly, We
find no need to elucidate on the other evidence on record, which, to be sure, based on Our careful
study thereof could absolve him just the same, We have no alternative but to reverse the
judgment of conviction of the trial court, for lack of any evidence to support the same.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court under review is hereby reversed and the appellant
Rosendo Velasco is acquitted and ordered immediately released from custody unless there is any
reason for his further detention other than this case, with the corresponding portion of the
costs de officio. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice and the Provincial
Fiscal of Nueva Ecija, for their information and guidance relative to the actuations of Special
District Prosecutor Copuyoc and Fiscal del Rosario discussed in the above opinion.

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
TAN SHUY, G.R. No. 190375
Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

SPOUSES GUILLERMO Promulgated:

MAULAWIN and PARING CARIO-
MAULAWIN, February 8, 2012
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the 31 July 2009 Decision and 13 November 2009 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA).[1]

Facts

Petitioner Tan Shuy is engaged in the business of buying copra and corn in the Fourth District of
Quezon Province. According to Vicente Tan (Vicente), son of petitioner, whenever they would
buy copra or corn from crop sellers, they would prepare and issue a pesada in their favor.
A pesada is a document containing details of the transaction, including the date of sale, the
weight of the crop delivered, the trucking cost, and the net price of the crop. He then explained
that when a pesada contained the annotation pd on the total amount of the purchase price, it
meant that the crop delivered had already been paid for by petitioner.[2]
 Guillermo Maulawin (Guillermo), respondent in this case, is a farmer-businessman
engaged in the buying and selling of copra and corn. On 10 July 1997, Tan Shuy extended a loan
to Guillermo in the amount of 420,000. In consideration thereof, Guillermo obligated himself to
pay the loan and to sell lucad or copra to petitioner. Below is a reproduction of the contract:[3]

No 2567 Lopez, Quezon July 10, 1997

Tinanggap ko kay G. TAN SHUY ang halagang . (P420,000.00) salaping
Filipino. Inaako ko na isusulit sa kanya ang aking LUCAD at babayaran
ko ang nasabing halaga. Kung hindi ako makasulit ng LUCAD o
makabayad bago sumapit ang ., 19 maaari niya akong ibigay sa may
kapangyarihan. Kung ang pagsisingilan ay makakarating sa Juzgado ay
sinasagutan ko ang lahat ng kaniyang gugol.

P................ [Sgd. by respondent]

.
Lagda

Most of the transactions involving Tan Shuy and Guillermo were coursed through Elena
Tan, daughter of petitioner. She served as cashier in the business of Tan Shuy, who primarily
prepared and issued the pesada. In case of her absence, Vicente would issue the pesada. He also
helped his father in buying copra and granting loans to customers (copra sellers). According to
Vicente, part of their agreement with Guillermo was that they would put the annotation sulong on
the pesada when partial payment for the loan was made.

Petitioner alleged that despite repeated demands, Guillermo remitted only 23,000 in
August 1998 and 5,500 in October 1998, or a total of 28,500. [4] He claimed that respondent
had an outstanding balance of 391,500. Thus, convinced that Guillermo no longer had the
intention to pay the loan, petitioner brought the controversy to the Lupon Tagapamayapa. When
no settlement was reached, petitioner filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Respondent Guillermo countered that he had already paid the subject loan in full.
According to him, he continuously delivered and sold copra to petitioner from April 1998 to
April 1999. Respondent said they had an oral arrangement that the net proceeds thereof shall be
applied as installment payments for the loan. He alleged that his deliveries amounted to
420,537.68 worth of copra. To bolster his claim, he presented copies of pesadas issued by Elena
and Vicente. He pointed out that the pesadas did not contain the notation pd, which meant that
actual payment of the net proceeds from copra deliveries was not given to him, but was instead
applied as loan payment. He averred that Tan Shuy filed a case against him, because petitioner
got mad at him for selling copra to other copra buyers.
 On 27 July 2007, the trial court issued a Decision, ruling that the net proceeds from
Guillermos copra deliveries represented in the pesadas, which did not bear the notation pd
should be applied as installment payments for the loan. It gave weight and credence to
the pesadas, as their due execution and authenticity was established by Elena and Vicente,
children of petitioner.[5] However, the court did not credit the net proceeds from 12 pesadas, as
they were deliveries for corn and not copra. According to the RTC, Guillermo himself testified
that it was the net proceeds from the copra deliveries that were to be applied as installment
payments for the loan. Thus, it ruled that the total amount of 41,585.25, which corresponded to
the net proceeds from corn deliveries, should be deducted from the amount of 420,537.68
claimed by Guillermo to be the total value of his copra deliveries. Accordingly, the trial court
found that respondent had not made a full payment for the loan, as the total creditable copra
deliveries merely amounted to 378,952.43, leaving a balance of 41,047.57 in his loan.[6]

On 31 July 2009, the CA issued its assailed Decision, which affirmed the finding of the
trial court. According to the appellate court, petitioner could have easily belied the existence of
the pesadas and the purpose for which they were offered in evidence by presenting his daughter
Elena as witness; however, he failed to do so. Thus, it gave credence to the testimony of
respondent Guillermo in that the net proceeds from the copra deliveries were applied as
installment payments for the loan.[7] On 13 November 2009, the CA issued its assailed
Resolution, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.

Petitioner now assails before this Court the aforementioned Decision and Resolution of
the CA and presents the following issues:

Issues

1. Whether the pesadas require authentication before they can be admitted in evidence,
and

2. Whether the delivery of copra amounted to installment payments for the loan
obtained by respondents from petitioner.

Discussion

As regards the first issue, petitioner asserts that the pesadas should not have been
admitted in evidence, since they were private documents that were not duly authenticated. [8] He
further contends that the pesadas were fabricated in order to show that the goods delivered were
copra and not corn. Finally, he argues that five of the pesadas mentioned in the Formal Offer of
Evidence of respondent were not actually offered.[9]
 With regard to the second issue, petitioner argues that respondent undertook two separate
obligations (1) to pay for the loan in cash and (2) to sell the latters lucad or copra. Since their
written agreement did not specifically provide for the application of the net proceeds from the
deliveries of copra for the loan, petitioner contends that he cannot be compelled to accept copra
as payment for the loan. He emphasizes that the pesadas did not specifically indicate that the net
proceeds from the copra deliveries were to be used as installment payments for the loan. He also
claims that respondents copra deliveries were duly paid for in cash, and that the pesadas were in
fact documentary receipts for those payments.

We reiterate our ruling in a line of cases that the jurisdiction of this Court, in cases
brought before it from the CA, is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law.[10]Factual
findings of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on this
Court except if unsupported by the evidence on record.[11] There is a question of fact when doubt
arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts; or when there is a need to calibrate the whole
evidence, considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof,
the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to one
another and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[12]

Here, a finding of fact is required in the ascertainment of the due execution and
authenticity of the pesadas, as well as the determination of the true intention behind the parties
oral agreement on the application of the net proceeds from the copra deliveries as installment
payments for the loan.[13] This function was already exercised by the trial court and affirmed by
the CA. Below is a reproduction of the relevant portion of the trial courts Decision:

x x x The defendant further averred that if in the receipts or pesadas issued

by the plaintiff to those who delivered copras to them there is a notation pd on the
total amount of purchase price of the copras, it means that said amount was
actually paid or given by the plaintiff or his daughter Elena Tan Shuy to the seller
of the copras. To prove his averments the defendant presented as evidence two (2)
receipts or pesadas issued by the plaintiff to a certain Cario (Exhibits 1 and 2
defendant) showing the notation pd on the total amount of the purchase price for
the copras. Such claim of the defendant was further bolstered by the testimony of
Apolinario Cario which affirmed that he also sell copras to the plaintiff Tan Shuy.
He also added that he incurred indebtedness to the plaintiff and whenever he
delivered copras the amount of the copras sold were applied as payments to his
loan. The witness also pointed out that the plaintiff did not give any official
receipts to those who transact business with him (plaintiff). This Court gave
weight and credence to the documents receipts (pesadas) (Exhibits 3 to 64)
offered as evidence by the defendant which does not bear the notation pd or
paid on the total amount of the purchase price of copras appearing therein.
Although said pesadas were private instrument their execution and
authenticity were established by the plaintiffs daughter Elena Tan and
sometimes by plaintiffs son Vicente Tan. x x x.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
 In affirming the finding of the RTC, the CA reasoned thus:

In his last assigned error, plaintiff-appellant herein impugns the conclusion

arrived at by the trial court, particularly with respect to the giving of
evidentiary value to Exhs. 3 to 64 by the latter in order to prove the claim of
defendant-appellee Guillermo that he had fully paid the subject loan already.

The foregoing deserves scant consideration.

Here, plaintiff-appellant could have easily belied the existence of Exhs.

3 to 64, the pesadas or receipts, and the purposes for which they were offered
in evidence by simply presenting his daughter, Elena Tan Shuy, but no effort
to do so was actually done by the former given that scenario. [15] (Emphasis
supplied)

We found no clear showing that the trial court and the CA committed reversible errors of
law in giving credence and according weight to the pesadas presented by respondents. According
to Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, there are two ways of proving the due execution
and authenticity of a private document, to wit:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of

the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed
to be. (21a)

As reproduced above, the trial court found that the due execution and authenticity of
the pesadas were established by the plaintiffs daughter Elena Tan and sometimes by plaintiffs
son Vicente Tan.[16] The RTC said:

On cross-examination, [Vicente] reiterated that he and her [sic] sister

Elena Tan who acted as their cashier are helping their father in their business of
buying copras and mais. That witness agreed that in the business of buying copra
and mais of their father, if a seller is selling copra, a pesada is being issued by his
sister. The pesada that she is preparing consists of the date when the copra is
being sold to the seller. Being familiar with the penmanship of Elena Tan, the
witness was shown a sample of the pesada issued by his sister Elena Tan. x x x

xxxxxxxxx
 x x x. He clarified that in the pesada (Exh. 1) prepared by Elena and also
in Exh 2, there appears on the lower right hand portion of the said pesadas the
letter pd, the meaning of which is to the effect that the seller of the copra has
already been paid during that day. He also confirmed the penmanship and
handwriting of his sister Ate Elena who acted as a cashier in the pesada being
shown to him. He was even made to compare the xerox copies of the pesadas
with the original copies presented to him and affirmed that they are faithful
reproduction of the originals.[17] (Emphasis supplied)

In any event, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the due execution and
authenticity of the pesadas. As found by the CA, Tan Shuy could have easily belied the existence
of x x x the pesadas or receipts, and the purposes for which they were offered in evidence by
simply presenting his daughter, Elena Tan Shuy, but no effort to do so was actually done by the
former given that scenario. The pesadas having been admitted in evidence, with petitioner failing
to timely object thereto, these documents are already deemed sufficient proof of the facts
contained therein.[18] We hereby uphold the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in
that the pesadas served as proof that the net proceeds from the copra deliveries were used as
installment payments for the debts of respondents.[19]

Indeed, pursuant to Article 1232 of the Civil Code, an obligation is extinguished by

payment or performance. There is payment when there is delivery of money or performance of
an obligation.[20] Article 1245 of the Civil Code provides for a special mode of payment called
dation in payment (dacin en pago). There is dation in payment when property is alienated to the
creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money.[21] Here, the debtor delivers and transmits to the
creditor the formers ownership over a thing as an accepted equivalent of the payment or
performance of an outstanding debt.[22] In such cases, Article 1245 provides that the law on sales
shall apply, since the undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale; that is, the
creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, the payment for which is to be
charged against the debtors obligation.[23] Dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the
extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be
proved, unless the parties by agreement express or implied, or by their silence consider the thing
as equivalent to the obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished.[24]

The trial court found thus:

x x x [T]he preponderance of evidence is on the side of the defendant.

x x x The defendant explained that for the receipts (pesadas) from April 1998 to
April 1999 he only gets the payments for trucking while the total amount
which represent the total purchase price for the copras that he delivered to
the plaintiff were all given to Elena Tan Shuy as installments for the loan he
owed to plaintiff. The defendant further averred that if in the receipts or pesadas
issued by the plaintiff to those who delivered copras to them there is a notation pd
on the total amount of purchase price of the copras, it means that said amount was
actually paid or given by the plaintiff or his daughter Elena Tan Shuy to the seller
of the copras. To prove his averments the defendant presented as evidence two (2)
receipts or pesadas issued by the plaintiff to a certain Cario (Exhibits 1 and 2
defendant) showing the notation pd on the total amount of the purchase price for
the copras. Such claim of the defendant was further bolstered by the
testimony of Apolinario Cario which affirmed that he also sell [sic] copras to
the plaintiff Tan Shuy. He also added that he incurred indebtedness to the
plaintiff and whenever he delivered copras the amount of the copras sold
were applied as payments to his loan. The witness also pointed out that the
plaintiff did not give any official receipts to those who transact business with him
(plaintiff). x x x

Be that it may, this Court cannot however subscribe to the averments of

the defendant that he has fully paid the amount of his loan to the plaintiff from the
proceeds of the copras he delivered to the plaintiff as shown in the pesadas
(Exhibits 3 to 64). Defendant claimed that based on the said pesadas he has paid
the total amount of P420,537.68 to the plaintiff. However, this Court keenly noted
that some of the pesadas offered in evidence by the defendant were not for
copras that he delivered to the plaintiff but for mais (corn). The said pesadas
for mais or corn were the following, to wit:

xxxxxxxxx

To the mind of this Court the aforestated amount (P41,585.25) which the above
listed pesadas show as payment for mais or corn delivered by the defendant
to the plaintiff cannot be claimed by the defendant to have been applied also
as payment to his loan with the plaintiff because he does not testify on such fact.
He even stressed during his testimony that it was the proceeds from the copras
that he delivered to the plaintiff which will be applied as payments to his loan. x x
x Thus, equity dictates that the total amount of P41,585.25 which corresponds
to the payment for mais (corn) delivered by the plaintiff shall be deducted
from the total amount of P420,537.68 which according to the defendant
based on the pesadas (Exhibits 3 to 64) that he presented as evidence, is the
total amount of the payment that he made for his loan to the plaintiff. x x x

xxxxxxxxx

Clearly from the foregoing, since the total amount of defendants loan to the
plaintiff is P420,000.00 and the evidence on record shows that the actual
amount of payment made by the defendant from the proceeds of the copras
he delivered to the plaintiff is P378,952.43, the defendant is still indebted to
the plaintiff in the amount of P41,047.53 (sic) (P420,000.00-P378,952.43).
[25]
(Emphasis supplied)
 In affirming this finding of fact by the trial court, the CA cited the above-quoted portion
of the RTCs Decision and stated the following:

In fact, as borne by the records on hand, herein defendant-appellee Guillermo was

able to describe and spell out the contents of Exhs. 3 to 64 which were then
prepared by Elena Tan Shuy or sometimes by witness Vicente Tan. Herein
defendant-appellee Guillermo professed that since the release of the subject loan
was subject to the condition that he shall sell his copras to the plaintiff-appellant,
the former did not already receive any money for the copras he delivered to the
latter starting April 1998 to April 1999. Hence, this Court can only express its
approval to the apt observation of the trial court on this matter[.]

xxxxxxxxx

Notwithstanding the above, however, this Court fully agrees with the
pronouncement of the trial court that not all amounts indicated in Exhs. 3 to
64 should be applied as payments to the subject loan since several of which
clearly indicated mais deliveries on the part of defendant-
appellee Guillermo instead of copras[.][26] (Emphasis supplied)

The subsequent arrangement between Tan Shuy and Guillermo can thus be considered as
one in the nature of dation in payment. There was partial payment every time Guillermo
delivered copra to petitioner, chose not to collect the net proceeds of his copra deliveries, and
instead applied the collectible as installment payments for his loan from Tan Shuy. We therefore
uphold the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that the net proceeds from
Guillermos copra deliveries amounted to 378,952.43. With this partial payment, respondent
remains liable for the balance totaling 41,047.57.[27]

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED. The 31 July 2009 Decision and 13 November
2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90070 are hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 170974 March 3, 2008

ROMEO I. SUERTE-FELIPE, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari praying for the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26162 dated 29 December 2005 affirming with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, in Criminal Case No. 00-0182,
convicting petitioner Romeo I. Suerte-Felipe of the crime of homicide for the death of one
Godofredo Ariate.

The Information filed against petitioner dated 15 November 1999 charged him with homicide:

The undersigned Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ROMEO SUERTE I. FELIPE of the crime
of HOMICIDE committed as follows:

That on or about July 11, 1999, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot by means of a firearm one
GODOFREDO ARIATE, thereby, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds which caused
his death.3

The prosecutions version of the 11 July 1999 incident is as follows:

Prosecution witness Rodolfo Alumbres testified that he was in Bgy. 180, Maricaban, Pasay City
at around 7:30 that night. Around four-arms length from him were petitioner Suerte-Felipe and
the deceased Godofredo Ariate, who were arguing over something. Petitioner was accompanied
by PO3 Edison Madriago and PO3 Eduardo Jimeno. 4 Petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber
firearm, while Madriago and Jimeno were each armed with a 9mm firearm. All of a sudden,
petitioner fired around four shots at Godofredo. Seeing Godofredo fall down, Alumbres rushed to
his aid and attempted to bring the latter to the hospital, but petitioner shot him twice and hit him
once on the right leg. Fearing that he might be shot again, Alumbres pretended to be dead.

Godofredos son, William Ariate, and Barangay Chairman Pio Arce witnessed the incident. Arce,
upon arriving at the scene of the crime, attempted to appease petitioner by shouting,
"Romy, ayusin na lang natin to." Petitioner did not heed Arces appeal and instead fired at Arce.
Arce used his .38 caliber revolver to defend himself against petitioner who was then more than
six meters from him. Arce took cover and exchanged fire with petitioner. Petitioners
companions, Madriago and Jimeno, also fired at Arce.

Godofredo was declared dead on arrival at the Pasay City General Hospital. Edgardo Ariate,
another son of Godofredo, identified the body and requested an autopsy examination. Dr.
Ludovino J. Lagat, Jr. conducted the autopsy, which showed that Godofredo sustained three
gunshot wounds which caused his death. The first wound was located at the outer portion of his
right arm. The second wound was at the right flank and the third wound was at the epigastric
area, both affecting the intestines and the liver. Armando Mancera, photographer of the Medico-
Legal Division of the NBI, took pictures of the body.

Ballistics examination of the slug revealed that the slug was fired from a .45 caliber pistol.
Bonifacia Casias Ariate presented a marriage contract to prove that she was Godofredos lawful
wife. She also presented receipts amounting to P21,800.00 representing the expenses during
Godofredos funeral.

Petitioner had a different version of the events of that night.

Petitioner testified that it was the deceased, Godofredo Ariate, and his six to seven companions,
which included Pio Arce and William Ariate, who were the unlawful aggressors that night.
Godofredo was irked when petitioner chided him for cursing and slapping a retarded boy in the
streets. Godofredo and his companions attacked and repeatedly stabbed petitioner. Madriago and
Jimeno were also attacked by Godofredos group. Arce fired at petitioner, Jimeno and Madriago
using a .38 caliber revolver. At this point, petitioner drew his .45 caliber firearm in self-defense
and accidentally fired it in an upward direction.

Danilo Villa, a street vendor, came out for the first time to narrate what he allegedly witnessed on
the night of the incident. Villa practically backed up petitioners testimony. He said that he did
not report what he saw to the police, nor did he tell his wife or any of his relatives about it.

The defense would have also presented as witness Dr. Roger Archangel, the doctor who
performed surgeries on petitioner, but his testimony was dispensed with as explained in the trial
courts 20 September 2001 Order:

(T)he formal taking of the testimony of Dr. Archanghel was dispensed with after the
prosecution agreed that: (1) Dr. Arcanghel was the one who attended and treated the
accused for the injuries he sustained as reflected in the Medical Records as marked in
Exhibits "1", "1-a". "1-b", "1-c", "1-d", "1-e", "1-f", "1-g" and "1-h". By reason of this
stipulation, the testimony of Arcanghel is dispensed with and the fact, among others, that
the accused sustained injuries as shown in the aforesaid exhibits, now form part of the
record of this case as evidence for the accused.5

On 8 November 2001, the Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty as charged, to wit:

WHEREFORE, accused ROMEO I. SUERTE FELIPE is hereby found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.

Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of

EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum, to SEVENTEEN
(17) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Moreover, said accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Godofredo Ariate the sum of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Godofredo Ariate, P21,800.00 as actual
damages, and to pay the costs.6

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following as errors:

 I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WAS GODOFREDO
ARIATES BODY THAT WAS AUTOPSIED BY DR. LUDOVINO LAGAT;

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SLUG RECOVERED
BY DR. LUDOVINO LAGAT CAME FROM THE FATAL WOUND THAT KILLED
GODOFREDO ARIATE;

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SLUG RECOVERED
BY DR. LUDOVINO LAGAT CAME FROM THE .45 FIREARM OF THE
APPELLANT;

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE TESTIMONY OF

APPELLANT AS CONFUSED AND UNBELIEVABLE, AND THAT OF DANILO
VILLA AS THAT OF A PLANTED WITNESS; AND

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE TESTIMONIES

OF RODOLFO ALUMBRES AND PIO ARCE NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR LACK
OF CREDIBILITY.7

On 29 December 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, disposing of the
case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay city, Branch
117, in Criminal Case No. 00-0182, convicting appellant Romeo I. Suerte-Felipe of
homicide is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that an additional amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is awarded to the heirs of the victim Godofredo
Ariate as moral damages. No pronouncement as to costs.8

Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the following arguments:

I. THERE IS REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE GUILT OF PETITIONER THERE

BEING NO CLEAR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS
GODOFREDO ARIATES BODY THAT WAS AUTOPSIED BY DR. LUDOVINO
LAGAT.

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AUTOPSIED BODY WAS THAT OF

GODOFREDO ARIATE, STILL THERE IS REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
PETITIONER IS GUILTY THERE BEING NO CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE SLUG
IN QUESTION WAS RECOVERED FROM ANY FATAL WOUND THAT CAUSED
HIS DEATH.

III. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE SLUG IN QUESTION WAS RECOVERED

IN ANY FATAL WOUND, STILL THERE IS REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO
 PETITIONERS GUILT THERE BEING NO CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE SAME
SLUG CAME FROM THE .45 FIREARM OF PETITIONER

IV. THERE IS REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY SINCE THE

CONCLUSION THAT HIS TESTIMONY IS AS "CONFUSED AS IT IS
UNBELIEVABLE", AND THAT OF HIS WITNESS DANILO VILLA AS THAT OF A
"PLANTED WITNESS" IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED FACTS AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT

V. THERE IS REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO PETITIONERS GUILT, HIS

CONVICTION BEING BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF RODOLFO ALUMBRES
AND PIO ARCE NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR LACK OF CREDIBILITY AS THE
TRIAL COURT ITSELF EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGED9

The arguments presented by both sides concerning the guilt or innocence of petitioner can be
divided into two sets: those concerning physical evidence, and those concerning testimonial
evidence. We are going to tackle these sets of evidence seriatim.

Physical Evidence

Petitioner unleashed a three-pronged attack against the physical evidence presented by

respondent. Firstly, petitioner claims that there is no clear evidence to support the conclusion of
the Court of Appeals that it was Godofredo Ariates body that was autopsied by Dr. Ludovino
Lagat. Secondly, petitioner claims that assuming arguendo that the autopsied body was that of
Godofredo Ariate, there is no clear evidence that the slug in question was recovered from a fatal
wound that caused Godofredo Ariates death. Lastly, petitioner argues that
assuming arguendo that the slug in question was recovered from a fatal wound, there is no clear
evidence that the same slug came from the .45 firearm of petitioner.

At the outset, we must stress that while physical evidence ranks very high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence and can be relied upon principally to ascertain the truth, 10 presentation
thereof is not absolutely indispensable to sustain a conviction. Petitioners stance that the
insufficiency of physical evidence inevitably leads to acquittal is flawed, as we have, on several
occasions, sustained convictions based on purely testimonial evidence. In the same manner, guilt
beyond reasonable doubt may be produced by the amalgamation of certain physical and
testimonial evidence which, when taken separately, would have been insufficient to sustain a
conviction.

Whether the autopsied body was that of Godofredo Ariate

Petitioner claims that a most sedulous reading of Dr. Lagats testimony engenders reasonable
doubt since it shows that he himself was uncertain and incompetent to prove that the body he
autopsied was that of Godofredo Ariate. He allegedly admitted that he had no personal
knowledge of who signed the Request for Autopsy11 and the Certificate of Identification of Dead
Body,12 and that no relative of Godofredo was around to identify the body during autopsy.

Petitioner further argues that the following facts on record engender reasonable doubt that it was
Godofredo Ariates body that was autopsied:

1. Dr. Lagat testified that apart from him, only the embalmer was around during the
autopsy. But there was no showing whatsoever that the said embalmer knew Godofredo
Ariate personally;

2. The prosecution rested its case without presenting any representative of the funeral
parlor and/or any friend or relative of Godofredo Ariate, including Godofredos son,
William Ariate, to properly identify on the said Request for Autopsy and Certificate of
Identification of Dead Body.

The pertinent portions of Dr. Lagats testimony, cited by petitioner, are as follows:

Q When you do conducted medico legal examinations they are always predicated on
written request either by the police agency or any particular person interested, isnt it?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that request is always in writing?

A Yes, sir.

Q Among that, precisely, is your Exhibit "A" where it appears that a certain Eduardo
Ariate signed. Im showing to you.

A This is the request I received.

xxxx

Q And of course, since you did not prepare this it was only referred to you, you do not
know actually the signature appearing there?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You did not see him signed (sic)?

A Yes, sir.

Q And of course, too, the specimen submitted, since you did not prepare it, you merely
rely [on] what appears here?
A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, even the date and place of the alleged incident you dont have personal
knowledge, of course?

A Yes, sir.

Q With respect to Certificate of Identification of Dead Body, do counsel understand that

this is also prepared by Veronica Funeral Parlor?

A Yes, sir.

Q So like Exhibit "B", this could properly be testified to and authenticated by the
personnel of Veronica Funeral Parlor?

A Yes, sir.

Q Again, theres nothing here which indicate that this is officially numbered or marked by
your office?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Is it not a fact that documents of this, Im sure have serial number?

A For the request and the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body that was prepared by
the funeral parlor accredited by the NBI, we dont usually put any identified number.

Q You again rely on everything stated here, in fact, you cannot tell whose signature
appears here?

A Yes, sir.

Q You did not, like Exhibits "A" and "B", authenticate these after your examination, in
other words, you did not initialed (sic)?

A Yes, Sir.

xxxx

Q And of course, at the time you initially conducted whatever examination you are
required under the law, nobody, not even the person who allegedly identified the body
was there, to identify it to you?

A I was not aware if the person identified is another one.

Q And you did not required who identified?

A It was relayed to me that it was the son.

Q According to whom?

A The agent of the funeral parlor. That is according to the request and Certificate of Dead
Body.

Q And that agent of the funeral parlor, may we know, if you come to know the name?

A I cannot remember the funeral agent during that time.

Q Even up to now you did not try to verify?

A Yes, sir.13

According to the Court of Appeals, the records clearly show that the body autopsied and
referred to in the autopsy report of Dr. Ludovino Lagat of the NBI was no other than that
of Godofredo Ariate. The body submitted for autopsy was identified by Godofredos son,
Edgardo.14 Pictures of Godofredos body, taken by Armando Mancera during the autopsy,
likewise establish the identity of the victim. Moreover, the entries found in the assailed
Autopsy Report should be deemed prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, as
there had been no proof of any intent on the part of Dr. Lagat to falsely testify on the
identity of the victims body.15

We do not find any convincing reason to depart from the findings of the Court of
Appeals. The presentation in evidence of the Certificate of Identification of Dead
Body,16 the latter being a public record made in the performance of a duty of officers in
the Medico-Legal Office of the National Bureau of Investigation, is governed by Rule
132, Sections 19 and 23 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in

evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
 (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

xxxx

SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.Documents consisting of entries in

public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter.

Thus, entries in the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body are deemed prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein, i.e., that a body has been properly identified as that of Godofredo
Ariate. This prima facie evidence of identification cannot be rebutted by an extremely
meticulous fault-finding inquiry into the chain of custody of the body of the victim, as such body
cannot be easily replaced or substituted by ill-minded persons. What petitioner is asking of us is
not to be sedulous anymore, but to be paranoid and unreasonably mistrustful of the persons
whom our very rules require us to trust. Petitioners criticism of the identification of the body of
the victim miserably fails to inject any reasonable doubt in our minds, not when petitioner is
even loath to say that the body autopsied was not that of Godofredo Ariate but that of some other
person.

We must stress at this point that there was no indication of any impropriety or irregularity
committed by the medico-legal officer in this case with respect to the autopsy on the body of the
late Godofredo Ariate. Dr. Lagats duty was to perform the autopsy and not to obsessively
investigate the authenticity of the signature appearing on all requests presented to him. Thus, Dr.
Lagat, as a medico-legal officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duties.

Whether petitioner fired the bullet that caused the death of Godofredo Ariate

On petitioners argument that the slug recovered from the victims body did not come from the
second but from the third wound of Godofredo, the Court of Appeals presented its observation
that both the second and the third wounds sustained by Godofredo were fatal, as both involved
vital organs such as the intestines and the liver.17Either wound, thus, could have caused the death
of the victim.

Petitioner argues that this is "pure and simple speculation," for "there is nothing on record that
wound number three, despite affecting the intestines and liver, could have caused
death."18 Petitioner also presented the following related testimonies:

(1) Dr. Lagat admitted uncertainty on the following:

 a. Which of the 3 wounds was inflicted first and which caused [the] death;

b. Whether said wounds were caused by 3 weapons, or just by the same gun; and

c. The caliber of the gun[s] that may have been used; these cannot be determined
based solely on the appearance or nature of said wounds;

(2) SPO3 Danico Unicos testimony that the Scene of the Crime Operatives (SOCO) also
recovered another slug at the scene of the crime, which was brought to the SPD
headquarters for ballistic examination, but he was never informed of the test result;

(3) Rodolfo Alumbres written statement that he saw not only petitioner, but also Eduardo
Jimeno and Edison Madriago, shooting at Godofredo; and

(4) The following testimony of NBI Ballistician Rodolfo Bilgera, to wit:

a. The [ballisticians] could not determine what particular .45 gun the slug in
question came from until said gun is examined and compared with the slug.

b. Whether they were caused by three weapons, or by the same gun;

c. The caliber of the guns used, which cannot be determined based solely on the
appearance or nature of the wounds.19

On the issue of whether the slug that was recovered from the victims body came from the .45
caliber firearm of petitioner, the Court of Appeals reiterated the observation of the RTC that the
ballistics examination of the subject slug revealed a diameter and a set of riflings which were
peculiar to a .45 caliber pistol.20 Petitioner was admittedly the only one holding a .45 caliber gun
at the time of the incident. His two companions, Madriago and Jimeno, were each armed with a
9mm firearm, while Arce was holding a .38 caliber revolver. Furthermore, Godofredo had a
heated argument before Godofredo was shot. Thus, it was petitioner who had the motive to kill
Godofredo.

Petitioner notes that Dr. Lagat himself refused to confirm that the slug he recovered was the
same slug submitted for examination. His testimony reads:

Atty. Ferancullo

Q You stated doctor, that you referred the slug to the Ballistics Division of the NBI and
you handed and identified Exhibit "G," (later changed to Exh. "Y"), my question Doctor
is that, do you know whose signature above the name Ludovino Lagat?

A It was signed for, by Mr. Mansera, in my behalf.

 Q Can you explain to us why it was signed for and in your behalf by Mr. Mancera?

A Because I instructed him to submit the slug to the ballistician.

Q Since you were not the one who signed the request, do you affirm and confirm the
veracity of the contents of the letter, now you handed to this representation?

Atty. Llamas:

He will be incompetent, Your Honor, because he was not the one who even signed
the indorsement.

Court:

Whats the question again?

Sten:

(Reading back question)

Court:

Witness may answer.

Witness:

I cannot tell whether this slug submitted was taken from the cadaver, Mr. Mansera
can testify more on that.

xxxx

Atty. Llamas to the witness:

Q You sated very categorically that this transmittal of the slug was made by Man[c]era
and that you cannot be sure whether the slug referred to herein is the same slug taken
from the cadaver, do you re-affirm that answer of yours?

A Yes, Sir.21

According to petitioner, Mansera expressed similar incompetence and uncertainty in the

following testimony:

Q This letter, Mr. witness, refers to one (1) slug, extracted from the body of one,
Godofredo Ariate, what did you do to that slug?
 A What I did Sir, was I put the slug in the plastic bag and then put the number in the
plastic bag and then brought it to the Firearm Division, Sir.

Q If that plastic bag containing the case number that you placed will be shown to you,
will you be able to recognize it Mr. Witness?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How about the bullet you placed inside the plastic bag, will you be able to recognize
the same?

A No sir, only if it still contained in the plastic bag, Sir.22

Petitioner argues that the private prosecutor negligently ended his examination of Mansera
without even trying to show and ask him to identify the slug inside or outside the plastic bag
referred to. As a result, there was no testimonial confirmation that the slug recovered during the
autopsy was the same slug that was examined and determined to be the .45 bullet. Without such
confirmation under oath, it was utterly baseless to conclude that the slug in question came from
petitioners gun, since it was that of a .45 caliber firearm, which only the accused has.

Petitioner also argues that the attribution solely to petitioner of the motive to kill was uncalled
for. Even though Eduardo Jimeno and Edison Madriago had no previous quarrel with Godofredo
Ariate, prosecution witness Alumbres himself allegedly stated in his written statement that he
had seen not only petitioner, but also Jimeno and Madriago, firing at Godofredo Ariate. The
probability that Jimeno and Madriago were the actual killers could not be diminished by the fact
that their guns were 9mm Berretas, since no slug was recovered from the fatal wound number
two.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the family of the victim, William Ariate in particular who
witnessed the shooting, could not have allowed a situation where the wrong man was being made
to answer for the death of his father. Petitioner counters that prosecution witness Pio Arce
testified that William, after the shooting, attacked and stabbed, not petitioner, but one of the
policemen who was with petitioner at that time, notwithstanding that said policemen had no
quarrel with his father.23

In determining the sufficiency of the physical evidence to prove that petitioner fired a fatal bullet
which killed Godofredo Ariate, an examination of the following findings of Dr. Lagat in Autopsy
Report No. N-99-832 is in order:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Postmortem rigidity, complete, generalized.

Pallor, generalized.
Gunshot Wounds.
 1.) ENTRANCE 2.0 x 1.4 cm; oval; inverted edges; abrasions collar widest at the inferior
border; located at the outer portion of the right arm; 16.0 cm. below the elbow; directed
upward medially; involving the skin and underlying soft tissues; fracturing the ulna and
radius; then making an EXIT 2.0 x 1.5 cm.; irregular in shape; everted edges; located at
the inner aspect of the same arm; 7.0 cm. below the elbow.

2.) ENTRANCE 1.0 x 1.1 cm.; oval; inverted edges; abrasion collar widest at the inferior
border; inverted edges; located at the right flank (posterior axillary line); 25.0 cm. of the
anterior median line and 108.0 cm. from the right heel; directed forward, upward and
medially; involving the skin and underlying soft tissues; entering the peritoneal cavity;
involving the intestines and liver; then making an EXIT 2.0 x 2.0 cm.; irregular in shape;
everted edges; located at the left upper quadrant of the abdomen; 15.0 cm. from the
anterior median line and 117.0 cm. above the left heel.

3.) 0.9 x 1.1 cm.; oval inverted edges; abrasion collar at the upper portion, located at the
epigastric area, 105.50 cm. from the right heel; directed backward, downward and to the
right; involving the skin and soft tissues; involving the stomach, liver and intestines, then
the slug lodged at the right gluteal region; 85.0 cm. from the right heel.

Visceral organs pale.

Hemoperitoneum 1,200 c.c.

Stomach full of partially digested food particles.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

GUNSHOT WOUNDS, BODY.

REMARKS: One (1) slug recovered and submitted to Firearms and Investigation
Division for Ballistics examination.24

Indeed, Dr. Lagat testified that he recovered a slug in wound number three25 and not in wound
number two as stated in the RTC Decision. However, despite the error committed by the trial
court in describing the location where the slug was recovered, there is no factual basis for
petitioners contention that wound number three is not a fatal wound. As shown above, wound
number three involves the stomach, liver and intestines.26 While Dr. Lagat did not testify that
wound number three (or wounds number one and two for that matter) was fatal, we believe that it
is safe to conclude that wounds number two and three were probably fatal, involving as they did
vital parts of the body. This is an example of a circumstantial evidence, which is distinguished
from direct evidence as follows:

Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference
or presumption; (Lack County vs. Neilon, 44 Or. 14, 21, 74 P. 212) while circumstantial
 evidence is the proof of fact or facts from which, taken either singly or collectively, the
existence of a particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable
consequence (State vs. Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 494, 21 S.W. 193; Reynolds Trial Ev., Sec. 4,
p. 8)27

While we therefore agree with petitioner that the above physical evidence does not conclusively
prove that petitioner fired the bullet which killed Godofredo Ariate, we should find out whether
the above circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution can prove the controverted fact
beyond reasonable doubt if considered together with other evidence presented. Thus, Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.Circumstantial evidence is sufficient

for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

While we shall deal with the credibility of the witnesses later, it is important to note at this point
that Alumbres testified that it was petitioner who fired first. According to Alumbres, he was four-
arms length away from Godofredo Ariate who was then face to face with petitioner. Alumbres
saw Godofredo Ariate arguing with petitioner, when suddenly, petitioner cocked his gun and shot
Godofredo at pointblank range.28

Connecting this testimony to the autopsy report, we observe that it was wound number three that
was inflicted frontally. The entry point of gunshot wound number three is the area midway along
the lower portion of the chest and the upper area of the stomach directed downwards. On the
other hand, wound number two entered into the right flank (posterior auxiliary line) and exited at
the left upper quadrant of the abdomen. The prosecution posits that this may have been the next
shot that hit Godofredo, and the impact must have occurred while body twisted toward the left
after receiving wound number three. The prosecution thinks that wound number one may have
been the third gunshot wound. It is the one located at the outer portion of the right arm below the
elbow and may have been inflicted while Godofredo was falling face down because the entry
wound was 16 centimeters below the elbow and it exited higher at only seven centimeters below
the elbow. While the trajectory of the bullet was upward from the lower portion of the arm below
the elbow, it could have been fired downward while the arm below the elbow was raised in a
defensive position.

While there is some doubt as to which between wounds number one and two was the second
wound inflicted and which of them was the third, the position (the area midway along the lower
portion of the chest and the upper area of the stomach directed downwards) of wound
number three (where the .45 bullet was found) is perfectly compatible with Alumbres
testimony on petitioners first shot against Godofredo Ariate, which first shot was fired
at pointblank range. It also makes the version of petitioner (that he accidentally fired the
gun upwards) very unlikely.

The uncertainty of Dr. Lagat as to whether the above wounds were caused by three weapons or
by just one weapon and as to the caliber of the firearms used does not in any way make us doubt
his statements. Dr. Lagat is not competent to answer questions on such area, as his expertise is in
the field of medical ballistics which Dr. Lagat stated "pertains to the injury sustained by the
victim."29 Dr. Lagat further explained that it is the job of the ballistician to determine the nature
and caliber of the firearm and ammunition used in the shooting.30

Likewise unavailing is petitioners anticipation that reasonable doubt would come from the
statement of SPO3 Danilo Unico (that there was another slug recovered at the crime scene which
was brought to the Southern Police District Headquarters for ballistic examination, the results of
which was allegedly never revealed to him). SPO3 Unico is to be blamed for the fact that the
results were never revealed to him. This is shown by the following lapses that SPO3 Unico
committed: (1) the investigation report dated 12 August 1999 that he prepared, signed and
thereafter submitted to the Chief of Police of the Pasay City Police Office 31 never mentioned the
fact that he had allegedly recovered evidence at the crime scene and submitted the same for
ballistic examination; (2) SPO3 Unico never showed in court any document purporting that he
recovered any bullet slug; (3) SPO3 Unico did not present in court any written request for
ballistic examination; (4) despite being a seasoned investigator, SPO3 Unico did not even bother
to follow up the results of the alleged ballistic examination:

Q Was a ballistic examination conducted?

A Yes, your honor.

Q What was the result?

A It is not yet

Q You did not bother to get a result before turning over your case to the prosecution? Or
filing a referral letter to the prosecutors office? You think you have completely turn over
your case to the prosecutors office?

A: Since nobody told me to prepare a report. Anyway, I can get a result, your Honor.

Q: You should have done that before filing a letter of referral to the prosecutors office.
Because the prosecutor can only be as good as the possessors of evidence turned over to
him. He cannot more foolish than the he cannot add more ingredients of what was
turned over to him. The prosecutor is only make good of what is turned over to him. If
the police submit to him a handwash then he have a handwash to a case x x x.32
Petitioner stresses that Alumbres had testified that he saw petitioner, PO3 Jimeno and PO3
Madriaga shooting at the victim. However, during the same cross-examination, Alumbres
categorically stated that the first shot came from petitioner as he fired at Godofredo Ariate at
pointblank range. Hence, he testified:

Q And since the firing was so sudden, you cannot tell whose gun or whose shot fired first
at Ariate?

A The first shot came from Romeo Suertes gun.

Q That is how you surmised it?

A Thats what I know, sir.33

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in holding that the slug came from petitioners gun in
light of the purported testimony of Rodolfo Bilgera that he cannot determine that the particular .
45 slug came from petitioners gun. However, the records are clear that the reason why Bilgera
was never able to compare the slug in question is that petitioner never turned over his gun to the
NBIs Firearms and Investigation Division (FID). Thus, Rodolfo Bilgera testified that the gun
was never submitted to the FID for ballistic examination. Bilgera had to compare the rifling of
the .45 caliber slug recovered from the body of Godofredo Ariate with the rifling that petitioners
.45 caliber handgun makes.34 Without petitioners gun, the ballistician cannot make such a
comparison. The ballistician can only determine the caliber of the firearm used based on rifling
of the recovered bullet slug.35 Bilgera cannot determine that the slug recovered came from
appellants handgun.

Petitioner claims that his failure to produce the gun was not an excuse, as Bilgera could have
looked into the FIDs records for comparison purposes, but did not did not make any effort to
look into their office records for any .45 caliber slug that would match the .45 caliber slug
recovered from Godofredo Ariates body. However, Bilgera testified that he cannot definitely
rely on such records. A ballistician can make a definite conclusion only after the firearm is
submitted for the ballistic examinations.36

As regards the loss of the petitioners gun, petitioner explains the same in the part of the
testimony where he also admits that his gun was a .45 caliber pistol:

ATTY. FERANCULLO

Q: For clarification, the gun that you had at that time when the incident occur is a .45
caliber pistol, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx
 Q: This .45 caliber handgun of yours, if this license to your name, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: The Serial Number of this .45 caliber is 91139 and this is a .45 caliber Nurinco?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you bring it with you now that .45 caliber, Mr. Witness?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why did you not bring it now, Mr. Witness?

A: The gun was missing when I fell down and lost my consciousness.

Q: Are you certain, Mr. Witness, with your answer that the firearm, that the .45 caliber
gun of yours is missing and that you did not sell it?

A: I cannot recall anything when I fell down I do not know what happened so, I do not
know whether it was missing or it was sold.

Q: You did not sell it?

A: No sir, I did not sell it because it was missing.

Q: Did you execute an Affidavit of Loss to the effect that your gun was missing?

A: No, sir, because I was in the hospital thats why I have no time to declare the loss of
my firearm, what I know is that its missing.

Q: So up to now, you have not executed an Affidavit of Loss, have it forwarded to the
Firearms and Explosives Division of the PNP?

A: No, not yet.37

While Bilgera could not determine that the particular .45 slug came from petitioners gun,
Bilgera was certain that the slug recovered and examined was a slug coming from a .45 caliber
gun. This is shown in Bilgeras testimony:

ATTY. FERANCULLO

Q: Mr. Witness, Mr. Flores stated in this report, marked as Exhibit "W",
Findings/Conclusion which I quote: "Examination made on the bullet marked as "GA",
 revealed that it is a caliber .45 copper coated with bullet and was fired through the barrel
of a caliber .45 firearm which rifling inclining to the left." How did your group, five
ballisticians of the NBI, arrived at the conclusion that the bullet referred to FID for
examination by Dr. Lagat was fired from a caliber .45 firearm?

A: Because this bullet was designed from a .45 caliber firearm.38

Petitioner himself admitted owning a .45 caliber pistol that was allegedly lost at the time of the
shooting. At the time of the shooting, only petitioner was observed carrying a loaded .45 caliber
pistol.

Finally, just as petitioner questioned the chain of custody of the body of Godofredo Ariate,
petitioner also claims that there is no convincing evidence that shows that the slug recovered
from wound number three by Dr. Lagat and thereafter submitted for ballistic test was the same
slug submitted to and examined by Bilgera.

As stated above, it is not the task of the medico-legal officer to determine the caliber of the
weapon used in the shooting; it is the job of the ballistician based on the slug that was recovered
from the body of the victim. After Dr. Lagat recovered the slug while performing the autopsy of
the late Godofredo Ariate, he instructed Armando Mancera to place the recovered slug inside a
plastic sachet and to mark the sachet. Armando Mancera followed Dr. Lagats instructions by
placing the slug inside the sachet and marking said plastic sachet with the initials N-99-
832.39 Mancera and Dr. Lagat thereafter prepared the letter-request dated 12 July 1999 for the
recovered slug to be submitted to the FID of the NBI to undergo a ballistic examination. 40 The
contents of said letter are as follows:

TO: F.I.D.

Respectfully submitted the ff: (1) one slug extracted from the body of one
GODOFREDO ARIARTE y de Ocampo, 57 yrs., married, carpenter, Res. # 39
Bo. Bayanihan Onex St., Maricaban, Pasay City.

CASE NO: N-99-832

Alleged Case: Shooting

For analysis and/or test as follows:

For ballistic examination.

Mancera later on testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the recovery and marking of
the recovered slug:

ATTY. FERRANCULO
Q: Mr. Witness, when Dr. Ludovino Lagat testified before this Honorable Court, he
identified [a] letter dated July 12, 1999, addressed to the FID of the NBI and inform the
Court that the signature appearing above his name Ludovino Lagat is your initial. Will
you please examine the document and tell the Honorable Court whether you will be able
to identify the initial atop the name Ludovino Lagat?

A: My signature, Sir.

Q: And how about the signature beside the name Ludovino Lagat and atop the name
Armando Mancera, do you know whose signature is that?

A: My signature, Sir.

Q: Mr. Witness, please explain to the Honorable Court the reason why instead of Dr.
Lagat affixing his signature atop his name, your initial is the one now appearing atop his
name?

A: Because after the conducted autopsy Sir, Dr. Lagat left Sir, so I was the one who
initialed them sir.

Q: And who prepared this letter, Mr. Witness?

A: Me, Sir.

Q: And who instructed you to prepare this letter?

A: Dr. Lagat, Sir.

xxxx

Q: This letter, Mr. Witness, refers to one (1) slug, extracted from the body of one,
Godofredo Ariate, what did you do to that slug?

A: What I did sir, was I put the slug in the plastic bag and then put the number in the
plastic bag and then brought it to the Firearm Division, Sir.

Q: If that plastic bag containing the case number that you placed will be shown to you,
will you be able to recognize it, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How about the bullet you placed inside the plastic bag, will you be able to recognize
the same again?
 A: No sir, only if it still contained in the plastic bag, Sir.

Q: Mr. Witness, Im showing to you a plastic bag containing markings N-99-832

previously marked in evidence as Exhibit "X-1", will you please examine this plastic bag
and tell the Honorable Court the relationship of this plastic bag you said you placed the
markings, the case number?

A: This is the one, Sir.

xxxx

Q: Mr. Witness, this letter you typed is addressed to FID, what is your proof that this
letter was received by the FID?

A: There is a stamp received, Sir.41

The above clearly shows that per instruction of Dr. Lagat, Armando Mancera placed an
identifying mark (N-99-832) on the sachet where the slug was placed before he sent the slug to
the FID of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for ballistic examination. Through said
marking, Mancera positively identified during the trial that the slug he had brought to the NBI
for ballistic examination was the same slug that was recovered by Dr. Lagat from the body of
Godofredo Ariarte.

Testimonial Evidence

The Court of Appeals observed that the remaining assigned errors boiled down to the issue of
credibility of the witnesses presented in court. The Court of Appeals applied the settled rule that
factual findings of the trial court especially on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great
weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal inasmuch as the matter of assigning
values to the testimonies of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court, which can
weigh said testimony in the light of the witness demeanor, conduct and attitude during the trial.

Petitioner challenges said ruling by claiming that this case falls under at least one of the
exceptions where a review of the factual findings of the trial court is warranted.

The trial courts evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses is as follows:

For his defense, the accused cannot seem to make up whether to interpose self-defense, or
to altogether deny any participation in the shooting to death of Godofredo Ariate. He is
loath to say that he shot Ariate accidentally, yet, his testimony is also abundant with
overtures that if he did shot Ariate, it was purely accidental. Consequently, the testimony
of the accused is as confused as it is unbelievable.
Accused alleges that Godofredo Ariate and Rodolfo Alumbres together with about eight
people walked up to him and repeatedly stabbed him on his back; Pio Arce followed by
shooting him. Armed with a 45 cal. pistol as he was, accused admitted having drawn it
from his waistline. Having thus drawn the gun, one reasonably expects that accused will
fire his gun at his supposed attackers in legitimate retaliation and self-preservation. But
that is not so. After being stabbed and shot, he would have this court believe that he drew
his gun and fired it not at anybody but only as a warning shot.

For this court, that act of the accused is unbelievable. But the accused has an altogether
different concern. He thought the act of deliberately firing his gun under this life-and-
death situation that he has conjured would place him in bad light. So, he made an abrupt
turn-around and say things that he hoped would place him in good light. Thus, he alleges
that he merely "accidentally pulled the trigger and fired his gun upwards"; he had "no
intention of firing it", "there was no instance that he pointed his gun at any of his
attackers".

Yet, in no time at all, accused negated his own protestation as a passive prey when he
asseverated that "he drew his gun for self-defense". The court wonders how he could
draw the gun and use it in self-defense if he intends to fire only a warning shot, or,
maybe, a shot in the air. How could he prevent his attackers from further attacking him if
he simply draws his gun and but not aim it at any of them, or if he was content with
merely drawing his gun without intention of firing it or pulling its trigger? The court is
not persuaded by such an unnatural and abnormal human conduct. The court is inclined to
believe what is natural, normal and consistent with the common experience of
humankind. The accused did not only draw his gun, nor did he accidentally pull its trigger
and fire it upwards. While Alumbres and Arce cannot be believed in other aspects of their
testimony, the court is fully convinced with their positive identification of the accused as
the killer of Godofredo Ariate.

Danilo Villa, the lone witness accused called to corroborate his mongrelized defense
theory of denial/self-defense/accident, carries the earmarks of a planted witness. He said
he witnessed the incident when the accused his "Pareng Romy" was repeatedly
stabbed and shot on July 11, 1999. After July 11, 1999, he always sees the accused in the
afternoons and evenings and engages in a conversation with him. Strangely, never did he
mention to his "Pareng Romy" what he witnessed nor did the accused ask him if he
witnessed the incident. Stranger even is the fact that of the many meetings he had with
the accused, never did they discuss about the bloody incident of July 11.

Then, all of a sudden, a week before he testified in court on October 4, 2001 and for the
first time accused requested him to testify in the accuseds defense. And that, too, was
the first time he learned that the accused was charged for the death of Godofredo Ariate.

If the accused is a friend to Villa as the latter would like to impress upon this court, it is
normal human conduct for Villa to share with the accused in the many conversations they
 had what he witnessed. The accused for his part, will just be too happy to find in Villa not
just a friend, but someone who sees the July 11 incident the way he wants this court to
see it: that he is either completely innocent, or that he shot Ariate in legitimate self-
defense, or that his shooting of Ariate was pure accident. Then he could have, with
anxious anticipation of justice being done, preserved the testimony of Villa, and utilize it
as early as the preliminary investigation stage of this case. But the accused did not.

That Villa didnt say a word to the accused about the July 11 incident and the accused
never cared to illicit from Villa any knowledge he may have about said incident, only
shows that Villa knows nothing of his own personal knowledge about it.42

Petitioner claims that his testimony was not at all "confused" or "unbelievable," but was simply
either misunderstood or taken out of context. He claims that "far from being mongrelized (his)
claim of self-defense, accident and lack of participation is a factual admixture, the components of
which, taken singly or jointly, are clear and credible."

According to petitioner, when he said he drew his gun for self-defense, he never claimed that he
was able to effectively proceed to defend himself with his gun. Quoting his testimony, petitioner
clarified that what he stated was that he was "not able to fire a warning shot" and had "no chance
to aim (his) gun" because after drawing his gun and trying to aim it, he "accidentally pulled the
trigger and fired upwards," not only because he was "so weak and about to faint" but also
because "somebody suddenly stabbed (him) at (his) back." Petitioner argues that his testimony
cannot be doubted, for it is undisputed that he suffered wounds at the front, side and back of his
body, including his legs and the lower part of his stomach.

Petitioner claims that contrary to the trial courts observation, he intended to aim and shoot the
gun directly at his attackers. He was, however, not able to have a decent shot because of the
frenzy of the moment and the numerous wounds he sustained. Thus, petitioner claims it was
baseless and irresponsible for the trial court to say that he had no intention of firing his gun.

Petitioner also claims that the judge was biased, based on the fact that out of the 256 questions
asked of the petitioner, the trial judge propounded 84 questions or around one-third of the total;
while of the 188 questions thrown to defense eyewitness Danilo Villa, 107 questions or almost
three-fifths of the total came from the trial judge.

As regards the testimony of Danilo Villa, petitioner claims that the trial courts rejection of his
testimony "just because Villa failed to report what he saw to the authorities until the week he
testified in court" is capricious and injudicious. Petitioner claims that Villa had sufficiently
explained his silence in testifying that (1) fear had prevented him from reporting to the
authorities, and that (2) lack of knowledge of the ongoing prosecution prevented him from telling
petitioner what he knows.

As regards the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, petitioner found the trial courts giving
credence to the same as "anomalous," since, according to petitioner, "the trial court itself
lambasted Alumbres and Arce and their respective testimonies." Petitioner quoted several parts
of the trial courts Decision on its criticisms of these testimonies:

(1) "there are loose ends in the(ir) testimony";

(2) "as dramatis personae of this bloody human drama, they will try mighty hard to free
themselves from any blame and portray themselves in the best possible light they can
conjure"; and

(3) "they leave something to be desired in their effort to project themselves as innocent
babes and level-headed guardians of peace"43

Petitioner claims that the testimonies of Alumbres and Arce are full of exaggerations, falsehoods
and inconsistencies. On the part of Alumbres, petitioner alleges that:

(1) When asked about his work, he claimed he is a "laborer." But to justify his presence at
the scene of the incident that night of 11 July 1999, he hastened to add that he is a "tanod"
of Brgy. 180. However, the incident happened in Brgy. 185, where petitioner resides, and
not Brgy. 180, where he and Arce had jurisdiction;

(2) Alumbres claimed that he was standing beside an alley in Brgy. 180 when he "saw"
his "friend" Godofredo talking with petitioner who was with policemen Jimeno and
Madriago, and that as he looked again, he "saw" petitioner and even Jimeno and
Madriago firing at Godofredo. On cross-examination, however, he admitted not seeing
the alleged shooting, but merely hearing gunshots (putukan), so "inalam niya", that is, he
"came near to check who was the gun holder." With this admission, he belied his earlier
claim that he saw Godofredo talking with petitioner and the petitioner shooting at
Godofredo;

(3) Alumbres claimed that he saw Godofredo and petitioner talking, but did not hear their
conversation. He later claimed that he heard their conversation, but did not know if they
were quarreling. Then in the end of his examination, he admitted having heard the
conversation between Godofredo and petitioner before the shooting and it was about
Raymond, a mentally retarded boy whom petitioner earlier protected by stopping
Godofredos maltreatment of him;

(4) Alumbres at first said that he saw only the petitioner shooting at Godofredo, then he
changed his mind and said that he saw not only petitioner, but also Jimeno and Madriago
firing at Godofredo;

(5) Alumbres described appellant as his "long time acquaintance", but he later
contradicted himself by saying that petitioner may not know him, and that after the
shooting, he had to ask around about petitioners work;
 (6) Alumbres called Jimeno and Madriago as petitioners policemen "alalay," but it turned
out that Jimeno and Madriago were not petitioners "alalay" but co-employees at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and that Alumbres did not even know their names at
the time of the incident;

(7) When shown a sketch of the scene of the accident, he immediately claimed inability
to see because "malabo and mata ko", but he in no time proceeded to recognize,
described and even helped mark certain places indicated in the sketch;

(8) He belied his claim of weak eyesight when he boldly claimed having seen the bullets
of the policemen that were meant for him hit the wall of a house.

(9) Alumbres also stressed that three (3) shots were fired at him: the first shot came from
petitioner and (h)it him, while the second and third shots, which came from Jimeno and
Madriago, hit the wall of a house. Later, he stated that four (4) shots were fired at him:
"Romeo (petitioner) fired his gun twice, the two policemen, one each", and petitioners
first shot missed him, but his second shot hit his right leg.44

Petitioner claims that Pio Arces contradictions are as follows:

(1) When asked if he remembered anything unusual that happened that night of 11 July
1999, he readily said that there was none. Then he changed his mind by saying that
William Ariate told him that his father Godofredo was having a quarrel, but petitioner
triggered an exchange of fire, wherein he saw petitioner shooting Godofredo and
Alumbres.

(2) Arce denied any knowledge of petitioner being attacked and wounded.45

Petitioner also claims that Arces and Alumbres testimonies contradict each other:

(1) According to Alumbres, petitioner had already shot him and Godofredo when Arce
arrived. But Arce contradicted Alumbres, saying that when he arrived at the scene he saw
petitioner loudly quarreling yet with Godofredo, and so he talked to petitioner but
petitioner fired at him, and then he saw petitioner firing at Godofredo and later at
Alumbres;

(2) Alumbres claimed that when Arce arrived, the latter shouted "Romy, tama na yan,
bagsak na yang dalawa". On the other hand, Arce claimed to have shouted only the
following "Romy, ayusin na lang natin ito.";

(3) Alumbres claimed that when Arce arrives, the latter fired a warning shot. But Arce
never claimed he fired any warning shot;
 (4) Alumbres claimed that Arce brought him and Godofredo to the hospital. But Arce
claimed that he merely shouted for people to bring Godofredo and Alumbres to the
hospital then he left the scene immediately; and

(5) Alumbres claimed (though he later made a modification) that before the shooting, he
saw/heard appellant and Godofredo merely talking, but he did not know if they were
quarreling as he was about three full arms length away. On the other hand, Arce claimed
that as soon as he arrived he saw petitioner loudly arguing with Godofredo.46

Petitioner finally decries the "deafening silence" of Alumbres and Arce on the established fact
that it was petitioner who was attacked and, hence, had many wounds. Alumbres never
mentioned any stabbing; he knew only the gunshot wound petitioner sustained. In the case of
Arce, he never saw any stabbing attack on petitioner.

The credibility of the witnesses of the defense and the prosecution

We have held that the trial judge is the best and the most competent person who can weigh and
evaluate the testimonies of witnesses.47 Likewise, the trial court is in the best position to assess
the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses, their demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand.48

Hence, other than the reasons expressly stated by the trial court in its Decision, the witnesses
demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand were also taken in account by the court. This
is particularly relevant in cases such as this, where different interpretations can be had of the
same set of testimonies. Indeed, if petitioners testimony is interpreted the way he explains it
now before us, his story can be adjudged consistent.

But whether the trial court believes what petitioner says is another thing. For example, it is
indeed possible that petitioner just happened to meet and greet Jimeno (who denied 49 knowing
petitioner) and Madriago, who were both armed, while going home, and just as they were about
to be accosted by the group of Godofredo. It is possible that petitioner indeed lost his gun at the
time of the incident and merely refrained from reporting its loss even after he was discharged
from the hospital. For Villas part, its is also possible that he only informed petitioner of what he
knew in the week of his testimony, because he only came to know of the homicide charge in the
same week. But it is not enough for petitioner to show that these were all possible; he must
likewise convince the Court that these were what indeed happened, particularly in this case
where testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were found credible. Petitioners claims that he
and Villa "adequately explained" certain lapses, or that their testimonies were "believable" are
but a self-serving evaluation of the testimonies of his own witnesses.

In the same way, the physical evidence consisting of the injuries suffered by petitioner does not
necessarily convert the "mongrelized claim of self-defense, accident and lack of participation"
into one of a "factual admixture" brought about by petitioners state of mind when he drew and
fired his gun. The wounds could have been inflicted after petitioner shot Godofredo, a factual
scenario rendered probable by the physical evidence consisting of the position of Godofredos
wound number three. As discussed earlier, the entry point of Godofredos wound number three,
which was probably the first wound inflicted, was the area midway along the lower portion of
the chest and the upper area of the stomach directed downwards. It is likely that this was inflicted
at pointblank range by someone not "so weak and about to faint."

We are not nave to feign ignorance that both sets of witnesses those of the prosecution and the
defense have something to hide. There was something more to the incident than either group is
letting us on. That was why the trial court stated that there were loose ends in the prosecutions
testimony, and that they "will try mightily hard to free themselves from any blame and portray
themselves in the best possible light they can conjure." Thus, a lot of unanswered questions
remain, including the number of wounds inflicted on petitioner and Godofredo, and the injury of
Alumbres. Just as Alumbres and Arce were silent on the wounds sustained by petitioner, defense
witnesses likewise had nothing to say on the wounds of Godofredo and Alumbres. However,
despite these unanswered questions, we agree with the trial court that the prosecution had been
"forthright and consistently credible in positively identifying the accused as the one who shot
Godofredo Ariate to death."

As regards the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Alumbres and Arce, we find these
"inconsistencies" either trivial or readily explainable. Those alleged inconsistencies that can
easily be explained are the following:

(1) There is clearly no inconsistency in Alumbres claims that he was a laborer and that,
at the same time, he is a tanod. Petitioner did not pursue the subject or offer any evidence
that would show that Alumbres was lying. As a tanod, it is not incredible for Alumbres to
be within an area adjacent to his jurisdiction;

(2) On the observation that Alumbres earlier claimed that he saw petitioner shoot
Godofredo, but later claimed that he heard a gunshot that made him look to determine
who fired the same, it is quite possible that it was the first shot that made him look back
at petitioner and Godofredo just in time to see the rest of the first shots fired by petitioner
at Godofredo. Being merely three arms away from the firing, it is not unlikely that, after
his eyes wandered for a brief moment, he does not even have to twist his head to another
direction to be able to look back at petitioner and Godofredo, thus seeing even the very
first shot fired;

(3) On the claim that Alumbres at first said that he saw only the petitioner shooting at
Godofredo, then changed his mind and said that he also saw Jimeno and Madriago firing
at Godofredo, Alumbres had clarified that it was Godofredo who fired the first shot. This
was what he was referring to the first time it was asked;

(4) Alumbres asking around about petitioners work is not at all incompatible with
considering petitioner an acquaintance. It is not unlikely for persons to have
acquaintances whose work they do not know;
 (5) On calling Jimeno and Madriago as petitioners "alalay," Alumbres was merely
describing how Jimeno and Mardriago appeared to be at that time. Not knowing the
names of Jimeno and Madriago at the time of the incident is not inconsistent with any of
Alumbres statements.

(6) When Alumbres said "malabo and mata ko," Alumbres was clearly referring to a
problem concerning reading near objects, as shown in the second day of cross-
examinations when he failed to read small letters on the map presented to him, saying it
is blurred.50 When Alumbres said "malabo ang mata ko" during the first day of cross-
examination,51 Alumbres did not refrain from answering the question regarding the
exhibit and even helped mark certain places indicated in the sketch, probably after
adjusting his view. This shows that his statement "Malabo ang mata ko" was not intended
to let him escape a line of questioning, as petitioner implies. This thus likewise debunks
petitioners claim that Alumbres belied his claim of weak eyesight when he boldly
claimed having seen the bullets of the policemen that were meant for him hit the wall of a
house.

(7) The differing accounts on how much Alumbres heard of the exchange between
Godofredo and petitioner before the shooting, as opposed to what he found out later;
what Pio Arce said when he arrived, and how many shots were fired, are trivial and can
easily be forgotten.

(8) When Pio Arce said that he did not remember anything unusual on the night of 11
July 1999, he was clearly referring to the time before the incident. Otherwise, he would
not have been testifying at all!

(9) The failure of Alumbres to notice when Arce arrived at the scene of the crime is quite
understandable, considering the events that were already transpiring.

We have held that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details and collateral
matters do not affect either the substance of their declarations, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimonies; slight contradictions in fact serve to strengthen the sincerity of a witness and
prove that his testimony is not rehearsed.52 It is settled that so long as the witnesses testimonies
concur on substantial matters, the inconsistencies and contradictions do not affect the witnesses
credibility or the verity of their testimonies.53

All things considered, there is nothing to indicate that both Alumbres and Arce deviated from the
gist of their testimonies, i.e., that both of them saw petitioner gun down Godofredo Ariate. The
aforesaid alleged contradictory statements are but minor inconsistencies when a witness is
testifying in court, which only shows that both men witnessed the unfolding of the shooting
incident from different vantage points. The slight divergence in their testimonies also goes to
show that both men were not rehearsed before they testified at the trial, but testified based on
their own perceptions.
Damages

The trial court ordered petitioner to pay actual damages of P21,800.00 and indemnity for death in
the amount of P50,000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed these awards and ordered petitioner to
pay an additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. We sustain these awards of damages
to the heirs of Godofredo Ariate. The amount of actual damages had been duly proven by
receipts.54 No proof is necessary for the award of civil indemnity for death other than the fact of
death of the victim and the culpability of the assailant. 55 The award of moral damages in cases of
violent death is indeed fixed at P50,000.00 under current case law.56

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.
No. 26162 dated 29 December 2005 affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, in Criminal Case No. 00-0182, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, G.R. No. 164457

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA,C.J.,Chairperson,
-versus- LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. April 11, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the States evidence of guilt in
order to ensure that such evidenceadheres to the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing
an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the
judge; otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified.The accused need
notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that is discredited for failing the test.Acquittal should then
follow.

Antecedents
Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in DumagueteCitythat averred:

That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for
sometime prior thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a saleswoman of
Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received
the total sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company under the
express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the
collection to the said company, but far from complying with her obligation and
after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands therefore, and with
intent to defraud the said company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the said company but instead, did,
then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount of P131,286.97.

Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.[1]

Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no
stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining.Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.

The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the branch
manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footluckers) in Dumaguete City since October 8,
1994; that petitioner was an employee of Footluckers, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she
became a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to take orders
from wholesale customers coming from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia,
Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from them;
that she could issue and sign official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which she would
then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments for tallying and
reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him
to confront her; that she responded that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting
clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he
decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a
customer of petitioners that the customers outstanding balance had already been fully paid
although that balance appeared unpaid in Footluckers records; and that one night later on,
petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated any money of
Footluckers and to plead for him not to push through with a case against her, promising to settle
her account on a monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to
work.[2]

On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-direct examination and re-

crossexamination were completed.

The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whomFootluckers
employed as its store auditor since November 16, 1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001.
She declared that Go had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that
they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstandingbalances
for them; that she first conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from Mabinay to
Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the course of her
audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50
customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner
submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report
denominated as List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in
Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997 marked as Exhibit A; and that based on
the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.[3]

During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioners
various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives,
inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first column that contained the dates of the entries, a second
that identified the invoices by the number, a third that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted the
credit (or the amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit minus credit).Only 49 of
theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by the RTC because the 50thledger could no longer
be found.

In the course of Guivencansdirect-examination,petitioners counsel interposed a

continuing objection on the ground that the figuresentered in Exhibits B to YYand their
derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not
themselves presented in court.[4]With that, petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine
Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to
prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.

TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits, including Exhibits B to

YYand their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and
issued by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the
accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencans so-called Summary (Final Report) of
Discrepancies.[5]

After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a demurrer to
evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so, and instead rested itscase.The
Prosecution and Defense submitted their respective memoranda, and submitted the case for
decision.[6]

On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted not to
present evidence for her defense the Prosecutions evidence remained unrefuted and
uncontroverted,[7]rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:

Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Court
finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly, she is
hereby sentenced to suffer an INDETERMINATE PENALTY of imprisonment of
8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by law
and to indemnify private complainant the amount of P131,286.92 with interest at
12% per annum until fully paid and to pay the costs.

Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,

the cash bail put up by the accused shall be effective only until the promulgation
of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the motion on May 7,
[9]
2004.

Issues

Insisting that the RTCs judgment grossly violated [her] Constitutional and statutory right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her because, while the charge
against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented
against her and upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an offense not alleged or
included in the Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and that said
judgment likewise blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of
evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all private
documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in accordance with Sec.
20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, petitioner has directly appealed to the
Court via petition for review on certiorari, positing the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT

MATTER , CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE
OF FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.

2. WHETHER THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF
THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED WHEN SHE WAS
CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION
CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HER IS ESTAFA THROUGH
MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING

IN EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS B TO YY-YY-2, ALL PRIVATE DOCUMENTS,
THE DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH WERE NOT
PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, RULE 132 OF THE SAID
REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT SAID
EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY THE ACCUSED, A
CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING

THE TESTIMONY OF KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE OBJECTION
THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED
FALSIFIED EXHIBITS B TO YY-YY-2INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE
ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER, FOR BEING
IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION REMAINS
UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED DESPITE ACCUSEDS
OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT
TO THE CRIME CHARGED.

6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES NOT CROSS-EXAMINING

KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON THAT HER TESTIMONY IS
 IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO PROVE AN
OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE
ADMISSION OF SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES
OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE
CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT EXHIBIT A, WHICH IS THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS COVERED BY
SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA WITH DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS
NOT HEARSAY AND SELF-SERVING.[10]

The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:

1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the
falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by petitioner to her
customersviolated petitioners right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation;

2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of the

falsification of the duplicate receiptsdespite the information not alleging the
falsification;

3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioners guilt
for estafaas chargeddespite their not being duly authenticated;and
4. Whether or not Guivencanstestimony onthe ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B
to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioners misappropriation
or conversion wasinadmissible for being hearsay.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

I
Failure of information to allege falsification
did not violate petitioners right to be informed
of thenatureand cause of the accusation

Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation when: (a) it held that the information did not have to
allege her falsification of the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted her of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Codeby relying on the evidence on falsification.

The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.

The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person accused of a crime, among them
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when the information was
filed in the RTC, contained the following provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature
and cause of the accusation in the information, to wit:

Section 8.Designation of the offense. Whenever possible, a complaint or

information should state the designation given to the offense by the statute,
besides the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the same, and if there is
no such designation, reference should be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it. (7)

Section 9.Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without
repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. (8)
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation
in the informationshould never be taken for granted by the State. An accused cannot be
convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict
him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of
the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. [11] Indeed, the
accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him.

The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and penalized by Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision

mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium

periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision

correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not
exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not
exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be
committed by any of the following means:

xxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,

money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property.
 xxx

The elements of the offense charged were as follows:

(a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal property in trust, or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;

(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such money, goods or other
personal property, or denied his part in its receipt;

(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the prejudice of

another; and

(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the delivery or
return of such money, goods or other personal property.[12]

According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or converted the
sums paid by her customers, and later falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such
duplicates to her employer to show that the customers had paid less than the amounts actually
reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to conceal
her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the falsificationwas not an offense separate
and distinct from the estafacharged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts
of falsification as its means of establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an essential
ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied to her.

We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein completely pleaded

the estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Codewithin
the context of the substantive lawand the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the information
to allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an element of
the estafacharged.

Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with petitioners concern thuswise:

In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the]

prosecutions evidence utterly fails to prove the crime charged. According to the
defense, the essence of Karen Guivencans testimony is that the accused falsified
the receipts issued to the customers served by her by changing or altering the
 amounts in the duplicates of the receipts and therefore, her testimony is
immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is misappropriation under Art. 315,
paragraph (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever of
any falsification or alteration of amounts in the [i]nformation under which the
accused was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that
the testimony of Karen Guivencan should therefore not be considered at all as it
tended to prove an offense not charged or included in the [i]nformation and would
violate [the] accuseds constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her. The Court is not in accord with
such posture of the accused.

It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime
charged in the [i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru
[f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not prove falsification.
Such argumentation is not correct. Since the information charges accused
only of misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised
[P]enal Code, the Court holds that there is no necessity of alleging the
falsification in the Information as it is not an element of the crime charged.

Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and

Falsification will constitute as one complex crime and when they are
considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa Through
Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to falsify certain
documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another person. In other
words, the falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa. However,
if the falsification is committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate
offenses of estafa and falsification are committed. In the instant case, when
accused collected payments from the customers, said collection which was in
her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or erroneous entries which
she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal
some amount of her collection which she did not remit to the company xxx.[13]

II
Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay,
did not prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecutions
duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a
finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. [14] The
Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense.
[15]
In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not
anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed
on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less
than the Constitution has guaranteed.[16]Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no
burden of proof,[17]that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not
overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor.In other words, the weakness of the defense
put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not
discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in
identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.

Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
petitioner for the estafa charged in the information?

To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the Prosecution presented the

testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly
issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the
accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for
each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. [18]The
ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive.

On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as
Footluckers sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal
knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customersor remitted by
petitioner to Footluckers.This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to
YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found
in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC
of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as
evidence of petitioners misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner.
The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of misappropriation or conversion
hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
 To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy,
and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a
rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in
the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft
ofpersonal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her
testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying
but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.

In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say
about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts
in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such
testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other
person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested
because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be cross-
examined.

It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any
particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to
explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple
assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.
[19]
Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.[20] The testimony may have been given under oath
and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.[21]

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference,
and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand,
subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as
an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted,
the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies
that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to
prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those
words.[22] This kind of utterance ishearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.[23]The distinction
is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not
apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.[24]

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that
explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding
hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine
the originaldeclarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. [25]If
hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. [26]It is then
to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness,

being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to
the administration of justice.

To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the

truth in a dispute while also safeguardinga partys right to cross-examine her adversarys
witness,the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe
witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in courtunder oath or affirmation.
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz:

Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of

witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under
oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question
calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given
orally. (1a)

The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the cross-examination by the
adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination

of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse
party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith,
with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts
bearing upon the issue. (8a)

Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal
cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face
xxx, the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal
proceedings.

We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns

about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath

or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing

counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant

or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.[27]

Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans testimony as well as Exhibits B to

YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioners
misappropriation or conversion.

III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence

Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits B to
YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private documents that were not duly
authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a public document and a
private document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz:

Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in

evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of
the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments, and
 (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may
be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or
a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record
of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is any
other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a
notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or
set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or
the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication
of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is
an ancient one within the context of Section 21, [28] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under
oath by the adverse party;[29](c) when thegenuineness and authenticity of the document

have been admitted;[30] or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.[31]

There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents
because private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or uses.
Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be
presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to
their authentication in the manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz:

Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private

document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of

the maker.
 Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.

The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of petitioner in various

receipts, to wit:

ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with the original
receipts, do you have copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in my possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable Court, can you
assure this

(Next Page)

ATTY ABIERA (continuing):

Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this case, Anna
Lerima Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would present
this,or offer the same as soon as the original receipts can be
presented, but for purposes only of your testimony, Im going to
point to you a certain signature over this receipt number FLDT96
20441, a receipt from Cirila Askin, kindly go over the signature and
tell the Honorable Court whether you are familiar with the
signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word collector.

(Next Page)

ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather, of the
accused in this case appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the original
receipts Your Honor, because its quite voluminous, so we will just
forego with the testimony of the witness but we will just present the
same using the testimony of another witness, for purposes of
 identifying the signature of the accused. We will request that this
signature which has been identified to by the witness in this case be
marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to present the original copy
and present the same to offer as our exhibits but for the meantime, this
is only for the purposes of recording, Your Honor, which we request
the same, the receipt which has just been identified awhile ago be
marked as our Exhibit A You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit A.
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit A-1.

(Next Page)

COURT:
Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. A-1. What is the number of that receipt?

ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that: received from Cirila
Askin.[32]
xxx

As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner on the
receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit A, while
the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out
after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a meremachinecopy, not the original.
Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a
later date the originalsof the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts.
But that promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered to
authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receiptsthrougha different witness (though then still
unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both
themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of
petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and
was no longer evenincluded in the Prosecutions Offer of Documentary Evidence.

It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441was
subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not
establishthat the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had
earliersought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy
(Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the
marking nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No.
20441 for all intents and purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to referinstead
toan entirely differentdocument entitled List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA PATULA
w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20, 1997.

In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on two receipts based alone
on the fact that the signatures contained the legible family name of Patula was ineffectual, and
exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner. Apparently,
Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioners signature on the receipts either because she
lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen petitioner affix her signature
on the receipts, as the following excerpts from her testimony bear out:

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation sheet,
will you go over these Miss witness?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The other
receipt is the one showing her payment prior to the last payment.
COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as Exhibit B-3, receipt
number 20441.

(Next Page)

COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked as
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the collector, are your
familiar with that signature? (shown to witness)
A. Yes.
Q. Whose signature is that?
A. Miss Patula.
Q. How do you know?
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
 Q. Are you familiar with her signature?
A. Yes.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit B-3-a
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit B-4 and the signature as
Exhibit B-4-a.
COURT:
Mark it.[33]

xxx

ATTY. ZERNA:
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued to one
Divina Cadilig. Will you please identify this receipt if this is the
receipt of your office?
A.Yes.
Q.There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose signature is this?
A.Ms. Patula.
Q.How do you know that this is her signature?
A.Because we can read the Patula.[34]

We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers the
Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the amountspetitioner hadallegedly
received from the customers and the amounts she had actually remitted to Footluckers.
Guivencanexclusively relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit
report on petitioners supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of independent
knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the following excerpts of her testimony show:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed that this
Cecilia Askin has an account of P10,791.75?
ATTY. DIEZ:
The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office record.
COURT:
Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and showed it
to the customers for confirmation.

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. What about the receipts?
COURT:
Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied that amount
in the ledger and you had it confirmed by the customers, what was the
result when you had it confirmed by the customers?
WITNESS:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance of P10,971.75.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the balance of this customer is
still P10,971.75

(Next Page)

ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):

[i]n your office?
COURT:
That was already answered paero, the office has a ledger.
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?
A. No, Maam.[35]

(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and the
duplicate, will you please enlighten the Honorable Court on that
discrepancy which you said?
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her ledger
shows a zero balance she has fully paid while in the original

(Next page)

WITNESS (continuing):
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety-one Pesos
and Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75).
COURT:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there?
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already forwarded to the
Manila Office.
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it has already a
zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original receipt she
has still a balance.
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
The confirmation sheet ---
 COURT:
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in your earlier
testimony? Is that what you referred to as the receipts, the original
receipts?
A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that that
particular customer still has a balance of Ten Thousand something?
A. The receipt is no longer here.
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the ledger?

A. Yes.[36]

In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions evidence, it should come as no
surprise that petitioners counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously
overruled the objections and allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated ledgers, as
follows:

(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)

ATTY. ZERNA:

CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION

Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers. Where is it
now?
A It is here.
Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how much is her
account in your office?
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the question, let
me interpose our objection on the ground that this ledger has not
been duly identified to by the person who made the same. This
witness will be testifying on hearsay matters because the supposed
ledger was not identified to by the person who made the same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they were already
duly identified by this witness. As a matter of fact, it was she who
brought them to court

(Next Page)

COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is not this
witness, Your Honor. How do we know that the entries there is
(sic) correct on the receipts submitted to their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the witness
answer.
WITNESS:
A Its the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the auditor of
Footluckers.
COURT:
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those entries were
taken. So, you answer the query of counsel.
xxx

ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing objection to
the questions profounded(sic) on those ledgers on the ground that,
as I have said, it is hearsay.

COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.

Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared the entries
on those ledgers, is she still connected with Footluckers?

A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,

COURT:
Alright proceed.

(Next Page)

ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of business. So, exempt
from the hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.[37]
 The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions flawed presentation
was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well
as withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to prove
the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a

person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or
signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was the
onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and
Wires Corporation:[38]

On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that
Jeanne Kings testimony was hearsay because she had no personal knowledge
of the execution of the documents supporting respondents cause of
action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report,
and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even though King was
personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and
Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with personal
knowledge of the facts which gave rise to respondents cause of action. Further,
petitioner asserts, even though she personally prepared the summary of weight of
steel billets received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the
weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.

At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause of action is founded on

breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets.
To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its importation of
10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300.00, and second, the
actual steel billets delivered to and received by the importer, namely the
respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondents
importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the
volume of steel billets being imported, and therefore competent to testify
thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the
 shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have
personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she
prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she based the summary
only on the receipts prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets
received was hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected to at the
trial.

On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly

authenticate respondents documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132,
Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be
authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom
its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it
executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or
the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that King was none of the
aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary of the weight of steel
billets based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus,
the summary of steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and
Kings testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.

xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private.
Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section 20of the same law, in turn,
provides that before any private document is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature
or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are
private documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19,
thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they can
be admitted in evidence.With the exception concerning the summary of the
weight of the steel billets imported, respondent presented no
supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they cannot
be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the
imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to
prove petitioners liability.

That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because petitioner decided not to
subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender her contrary evidencewas
inconsequential. Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencans
testimony bypetitioners counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied thathearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative value. [39]Verily, the flaws of the
Prosecutions evidence were fundamental and substantive, not merely technical and procedural,
and were defects that the adverse partys waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould
not set right or cure. Nor did the trial courts overruling of petitioners objections imbue the flawed
evidence with any virtue and value.

Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application of the hearsay
rule by also terselystating that the ledgers were prepared in the regular course of business.
[40]
Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the
time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received
as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.

This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping mannerof justifying the
application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show the concurrence of
the several requisites before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the hearsay
rule. The requisites are as follows:

(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;

(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer;

(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a
duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or religious;

(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.[41]

The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case, a judge must
rigidly test the States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic
rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such
evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of law
in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal should
follow.
IV
No reliable evidence on damage

Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the Court declares that the
disposition by the RTC ordering petitioner to indemnify Footluckers in the amount
of P131,286.92 with interest of 12% per annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually
founded. Yet, she cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that basis. Heracquittal has to
bedeclared as without prejudice to the filing of a civil action against her for the recovery of any
amount that she may still owe to Footluckers.

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe decision

convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged, and ACQUITS her for failure of the
Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action
brought against her for

the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76792 March 12, 1990

RESURRECCION BARTOLOME, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (now Court of Appeals) and HEIRS OF
SPOUSES BERNABE BARTOLOME and URSULA CID, respondents.

Rafael B. Ruiz for petitioners.

E.L. Peralta for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court "adjudicating the whole Lot No. 11165 in favor of" Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid,
thereby reversing the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte, Branch XII at Laoag
City. The dispositive portion of the latter decision states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered adjudicating the eastern portion to

the heirs of the late Epitacio Batara measuring 27 meters from south to north by
32 meters from east to west, with an area of 864 square meters, bounded on the
east by the Provincial Road; on the north by the heirs of Rufo Manuel; on the west
by a portion of the same Lot No. 11165; and on the south by Lot No.11164; the
remaining portion to the heirs of Doroteo Bartolome, bounded on the east by the
portion of Lot No. 11165 adjudicated to the heirs of Epitacio Batara and heirs of
Rufo Manuel; on the north by Eugenio Andrada; on the west by Nieves Caday or
Lot No. 11166; and on the south by Lot No. 11164.

Likewise, the heirs of Epitacio Bartolome Batara are hereby ordered to reserved
(sic) the road right of way for the necessary expansion of the road adjacent to the
eastern side of said lot, subject, however, to just compensation.

Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding Decree be issued
accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The record shows that a 725-square meter portion of said Lot No. 11165 located in Barrio 11,
Laoag, Ilocos Norte, was first declared as his property by Epitacio Batara under tax declaration
No. 5708 dated May 23, 1906. 3 The property was described therein as bounded on the north by
the property of Pedro Manuel, on the east by the road, on the south by the property of Doroteo
Bartolome and on the west by the property of one named Esteban, and as having "una casa de
tabla de dimension 5 x 4 metros" as improvement. Tax declaration No. 5708 was superseded by
tax declaration No. 37576 labelled as a "revision of declaration of real property (urban)" dated
April 23, 1914. 4 The residential lot described in the latter tax declaration contained an area of
772 square meters with a "casa" and a "granero" as improvements thereon.

Epitacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales, had two children: Catalina and Pedro. The latter
died a bachelor and without issue. Catalina, who married someone surnamed Bartolome, bore
five children named Isabela, Tarcila, Calixto, Resurreccion and Ruperta. In 1912, before he left
Laoag to settle in Culalabo, Gamo (Burgos), Isabela, Epitacio entrusted the lot to his cousin,
Doroteo Bartolome, who owned the lot bounding Epitacio's property on the south. 5 Maria
Gonzales remained in the lot for sometime. When she later followed Epitacio to Isabela, she
allowed Doroteo Bartolome to continue taking charge of the property. 6

In 1916, Epitacio Batara died in Isabela. Five years later or in 1921, Maria Gonzales and her
grandchildren, Calixto and Resurreccion Bartolome, returned to Laoag. As they found that the
house on their lot was destroyed by fire, they boarded in someone else's house. Calixto
constructed a bamboo fence around his grandfather's lot and he and Resurreccion, who was
studying in Laoag, cleaned it. Resurreccion went back to Isabela after Maria Gonzales' death in
1926. 7 It was also in that year when Doroteo Bartolome, to whom Epitacio had entrusted his
land, migrated to Davao City. Doroteo died there two years later. 8

Thereafter, the Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over the land involved herein
(Cadastral Case No. 53). On October 23, 1933, Ursula Cid, the widow of the son of Doroteo
Bartolome, Bernabe, who died in 1928, 9 filed an answer in Cadastral Case No. 53, claiming
ownership over Lot No. 11165 with an area of 1660 square meters, described as bounded on the
north by the property of Rufo Manuel and Eugenia Andrada, on the east by the provincial road,
on the south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome, and on the west by the property of Nieves
Caday and Eugenia Andrada, and with a house as improvement thereon. The land was allegedly
acquired by Ursula Cid through inheritance from Doroteo Bartolome, the father of Ursula's
deceased husband, Bernabe. 10

More than three months later or on January 30, 1934, Resurreccion Bartolome also filed an
answer in the same cadastral case claiming ownership over a portion of Lot No. 11165 with an
area of 864 square meters described as bounded on the north by the property of the heirs of Rufo
Manuel, on the east by Blumentritt Street, on the south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome,
and on the west by the property of Bernabe Bartolome. No improvements on the lot were
indicated in the answer which also stated that said portion of Lot No. 11165 was acquired by
claimant Resurreccion Bartolome "by inheritance from my grandfather and grandmother . . .
Epitacio Batara and Maria Gonzales." 11

From then on, no further proceedings were held in the cadastral case. Meanwhile, in 1934,
Resurreccion Bartolome verbally entrusted the portion she had claimed to Maria Bartolome,
whom she later described as the daughter of Doroteo Bartolome. 12

In 1939, Ursula Cid and her children also migrated to Davao City leaving their house on Lot No.
11165 to a lessee, Severino Ramos. Ursula and her son, Dominador Bartolome, instructed Maria
Bartolome, the sister of Bernabe, to receive the rentals for the house from Severino
Ramos. 13 Maria Bartolome also paid the taxes on the property until 1948, when Dominador took
over the task. 14 But on September 22, 1950, Maria Bartolome, as "administrator of the parcel of
land situated at Bo. 11, Laoag, Ilocos Norte," leased Lot No. 11165 to the Philippine United
Trading Co., Inc. 15 The rentals for the property were paid by the lessee to Dominador Bartolome
until the edifice housing the company was burned down in 1968. 16 Resurreccion Bartolome, who
had been residing in Isabela, was given by Maria Bartolome a small amount, which could have
been about P50, in consideration of the lease contract. 17

In June, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sent out
notices for the "continuation of the hearing" on June 13, 1968 in Cadastral Case No. 53. 18 It
should be remembered, however, that from the time Ursula Cid and Resurreccion Bartolome
filed their answers to the petition in the cadastral case, there had been no progress in the
proceedings.
A year later or in 1969, Maria J. Bartolome filed in Cadastral Case No. 53 a "motion to admit
answer in intervention," alleging that she is one of the children of Doroteo Bartolome and that
she and her co-heirs had been excluded in Ursula Cid's answer to the petition. She therefore
prayed that the answer
19
of Ursula Cid be amended so as to include the rightful heirs of Doroteo Bartolome. At the
same time, she filed an answer claiming co-ownership over Lot No. 11165 with Clemente, Julia
and Rosario Bartolome and Ursula Cid, the widow of Bernabe. She likewise alleged therein that
she and her siblings inherited the 1660-square meter lot from Doroteo Bartolome. 20

Three months later, Ursula Cid filed a motion to amend her answer to reflect the complete
"ground or basis of acquisition" of Lot No. 11165. 21 In her amended answer, Ursula Cid stated
that she was the absolute owner of Lot No. 11165; that she had been the possessor of Lot No.
11165 for over fifty years; that she "acquired by inheritance from Bernabe Bartolome, who
together with her, purchased the . . . lot which used to be three adjoining lots from their
respective owners;" and that Lot No. 11165 had been declared for tax purposes in the name of
her late husband Bernabe Bartolome. 22

No hearing was conducted in the case until 1974. To buttress her claim that she and her husband
purchased Lot No. 11165, Ursula Cid presented at the trial three deeds of sale: [a] one dated
March 1, 1917 showing that Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid bought a 374-square meter lot
for fifteen pesos from the spouses Domingo Agustin and Josefa Manrique; 23 [b] another
document dated February 18, 1913 executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of Bernabe Bartolome
evidencing the sale of another lot also for fifteen pesos; 24 and [c] still another deed executed by
Maria Gonzales y Paguyo on February 9, 1917 in favor of Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid
ceding to the latter 772 square meters of land for P103.75. 25 The last-mentioned piece of land is
the one being claimed by Resurreccion Bartolome.

On May 10, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte rendered a decision the dispositive
portion of which is quoted above. The court entertained only the answers of Ursula Cid and
Resurreccion Bartolome. It found that the lots described in Exhibits 2 and 3 presented by Ursula
Cid "are not within Lot 11165" and that said exhibits "are defective as the vendors are not the
real owner(s)" of the lots described therein. As to Exhibit 4, the court ruled that it has "no
probative value as the same is incomplete and unsigned." The court also held that Ursula Cid's
possession of the land "after the claimants had filed their respective answer(s) or after the
declaration of a general default," did not confer ownership on her because said possession was
interrupted and merely tolerated by all the parties during the pendency of the case. 26

Ursula Cid appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision reversing the lower
court, the appellate court held that the deeds of sale presented by Ursula Cid are ancient
documents under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It also ruled that Ursula Cid's
continuous possession of the lot from its acquisition and her exercise of rights of ownership over
it vested her with the legal presumption that she possessed it under a just title.
Her motion for the reconsideration of said decision having been denied, Resurreccion Bartolome
filed the instant petition for review on certiorari based on two principal issues: [a] whether the
provisions of Rule 132 on ancient documents are applicable with respect to Exhibit 4, and [b]
whether acquisitive prescription runs during the pendency of a cadastral case.

Exhibit 4 consists of three pieces of paper. The first piece is a blank sheet which apparently
serves as a cover page. The two other pages contain the handwritten document in Ilocano stating
that in consideration of the amount of P103.75, Maria Gonzales y Paguyo sold to the spouses
Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid 772 square meters of land bounded on the north by the
property of Pedro Manuel, on the east by the Bacarra road, on the south by the property of
Doroteo Bartolome and on the west by the property of Bernabe Bartolome. The third sheet or
page 2 thereof contains a warranty against eviction and other disturbances with the last three
lines indicating the date of the execution of the instrument.

According to Dominador Bartolome, he first saw Exhibit 4 in the possession of his mother,
Ursula Cid, when he was just eleven years old. He noticed that the document had a fourth page
containing the signature of Maria Gonzales and that all four pages were sewn
together. 27 However, when the document was entrusted to him by his mother in 1947 as he was
then representing the family in litigation concerning the land, the document's fourth page was
already missing. 28 He stated that his mother told him that the fourth page was lost during the
Japanese occupation while they were evacuating from Davao City. 29

Dominador Bartolome also presented in court a sworn statement in Ilocano executed by Ursula
Cid on February 19, 1937. 30 In her statement, Ursula Cid declared that the sale of the lot to her
and her husband by Maria Gonzales was evidenced by a written instrument; that the land had
been transferred in the name of her husband; that she had been paying taxes therefor, and that
they had been in continuous possession of the land for more than twenty years. 31

Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. Where a private writing is more
than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given.

We agree with the appellate court that the first two requirements ordained by Section 22 are met
by Exhibit 4. It appearing that it was executed in 1917, Exhibit 4 was more than thirty years old
when it was offered in evidence in 1983. 32 It was presented in court by the proper custodian
thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. 33 We notice, however, that the
Court of Appeals failed to consider and discuss the third requirement; that no alterations or
circumstances of suspicion are present.

Admittedly, on its face, the deed of sale appears unmarred by alteration. We hold, however, that
the missing page has nonetheless affected its authenticity. Indeed, its importance cannot be
overemphasized. It allegedly bears the signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in
question and therefore, it contains vital proof of the voluntary transmission of rights over the
subject of the sale. Without that signature, the document is incomplete. Verily, an incomplete
document is akin to if not worse than a document with altered contents.

Moreover, there is a circumstance which bothers the Court and makes the genuineness of the
document suspect. If it is really true that the document was executed in 1917, Ursula Cid would
have had it in her possession when she filed her answer in Cadastral Case No. 53 in 1933.
Accordingly, she could have stated therein that she acquired the portion in question by purchase
from Maria Gonzales. But as it turned out, she only claimed purchase as a mode of acquisition of
Lot No. 11165 after her sister-in-law, Maria J. Bartolome and the other descendants of Doroteo
Bartolome sought intervention in the case and demanded their rightful shares over the property.

All these negate the appellate court's conclusion that Exhibit 4 is an ancient document.
Necessarily, proofs of its due execution and authenticity are vital. Under Section 21 of Rule 132,
the due execution and authenticity of a private writing must be proved either by anyone who saw
the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or by a
subscribing witness. The testimony of Dominador Bartolome on Exhibit 4 and Ursula Cid's
sworn statement in 1937 34 do not fall within the purview of Section 21. The signature of Maria
Gonzales on the missing fourth page of Exhibit 4 would have helped authenticate the document
if it is proven to be genuine. But as there can be no such proof arising from the signature of
Maria Gonzales in the deed of sale, the same must be excluded. 35

Even if Exhibit 4 were complete and authentic, still, it would substantially be infirm. Under
Article 834 of the old Civil Code, Maria Gonzales, as a surviving spouse, "shall be entitled to a
portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate
children or descendants who has not received any betterment." And, until it had been ascertained
by means of the liquidation of the deceased spouse's estate that a portion of the conjugal property
remained after all the partnership obligations and debts had been paid, the surviving spouse or
her heirs could not assert any claim of right or title in or to the community property which was
placed in the exclusive possession and control of the husband as administrator thereof. 36 Hence,
in the absence of proof that the estate of Epitacio Batara had been duly settled, Maria Gonzales
had no right to sell not even a portion of the property subject of Exhibit 4.

On the issue of whether acquisitive prescription runs during the pendency of a cadastral case, we
hold, as this Court held in Cano v. De Camacho, 37 that the institution of cadastral proceedings,
or at least the publication of the notice therein issued, has the effect of suspending the running of
the prescriptive period. Hence, the appellate court erred in ascribing acquisitive prescription in
favor of Ursula Cid "up to the present." 38

Neither can Ursula Cid successfully assert that prior to the institution of the cadastral
proceedings, she and her husband had gained acquisitive prescription over the property. Until
Doroteo Bartolome migrated to Davao City in 1926, he was in possession of the whole lot
including the portion entrusted to him by Epitacio Batara. Granting that the 1520-square meter
lot Bernabe Bartolome had declared as his own in 1925 39 is within Lot No. 11165, still, the
period from 1925 until the filing of the cadastral case in 1933 failed to give him an advantage. It
is short of the 10-year actual, adverse and uninterrupted period of possession mandated by
Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order that a full and complete title could be vested
on the person claiming to be the owner of a piece of land.

Furthermore, while it is true that the property had been declared for tax purposes by Bernabe
Bartolome and that, subsequent to his death, taxes thereon were paid in the name of his son,
Dominador, 40 ownership thereof had not been acquired by Ursula Cid or her heirs. Aside from
the fact that said declarations and payments were made during the pendency of the cadastral
case, a tax declaration in the name of the alleged property owner or of his predecessor-in-interest,
does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. 41 In the same
manner, neither does the payment of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for.

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, the Court is unprepared to decree 824 square meters
of Lot No. 11165 in favor of Resurreccion Bartolome and her co-heirs to the estate of Epitacio
Batara. The revised declaration of real property in the name of Epitacio, which petitioners
presented as Exhibit B, reveals that Epitacio Batara owned only 772 square meters of the lot
involved. Certainly, petitioner and her co-heirs may not be entitled to an area greater than what
their grandfather claimed as his own.

Similarly, what remains of Lot No. 11165 after the portion herein adjudicated to Resurreccion
Bartolome and her co-heirs has been determined, may not be granted to the heirs of Bernabe
Bartolome and Ursula Cid exclusively. The two other deeds of sale presented as Exhibits 2 and 3
having been found worthless by the trial court as they involve parcels of land not within Lot No.
11165 and the vendors of which were not the real owners of the property, which findings of facts
are binding on this Court, the law mandates that the property, having been inherited from
Doroteo Bartolome, must be shared in equal portions by his children or their heirs.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
reversed and set aside.

The eastern portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 772 square meters is hereby adjudicated in
favor of the heirs of Epitacio Batara who are herein represented by Resurreccion Bartolome
while the remaining area of Lot No. 11165 is hereby adjudicated in favor of the heirs of Doroteo
Bartolome.

Petitioners shall pay the cost of the survey and subdivision of Lot No. 11165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS
ST. MARYS FARM, INC., G.R. No. 158144
 Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES, INC., RODOLFO REYES, JJ.
A. AGANA, JR., and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF LAS PIAS, METRO MANILA, Promulgated:
Respondents.
July 31, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming in toto the
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 254, Las Pias City, which dismissed for
lack of merit the complaint for annulment of sale.

The factual antecedents of the case, as narrated by the RTC, are as follows:

[I]t appears that herein plaintiff was the registered owner of an originally twenty-
five thousand five hundred ninety-eight (25,598) square meters of land situated at
Bo. Pugad Lawin, Las PiasCity under Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648
(11521-A) of the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City.

In compliance with a final court decision in Civil Case No. 87-42915 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XL of Manila, plaintiff passed and approved on 27
June 1988 a board resolution authorizing defendant Rodolfo A. Agana to cede to
T.S. Cruz Subdivision four thousand (4,000) square meters of the land covered by
the aforecited Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A). Allegedly, after
the consummation of this transaction, defendant Rodolfo A. Agana did not return
to plaintiff the borrowed aforementioned title and[,] instead, allegedly forged a
board resolution of the plaintiff corporation supposedly to the effect that plaintiff
had authorized him to sell the remaining twenty-one thousand five hundred
ninety-eight (21,598) square meters of the subject property. A series of
transactions thereafter took place between defendant Rodolfo A. Agana and
defendant Prima Real Properties, Inc. (Prima) which transactions culminated to
the signing on 5 September 1988 of an absolute deed of sale transferring the
ownership of the subject land from herein plaintiff to herein defendant
Prima. After the consummation of the sale, defendant Prima effected the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A) in the name of
plaintiff and in lieu thereof another Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 in the
name of defendant Prima was issued by defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva in his
capacity as Register of Deeds of Las Pias City.

Subsequent developments had it that on 6 October 1988, defendant Prima duly

purchased from T.S. Cruz Subdivision the aforementioned four thousand (4,000)
square meters portion of the subject property which development thereafter led to
the cancellation of the aforementioned Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175
and the issuance by the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City of two separate titles
both in the name of defendant Prima, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7863
covering the aforementioned four thousand square meters and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-7864 covering the herein twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety-
eighty (21,598) square meter subject property.

In its complaint which was amended twice, the second amendment even needed
the intervention of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and mandamus
after the same was denied admission by Hon. N.C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the
then Assisting Court of Makati, [Muntinlupa], Metro Manila, herein plaintiff
alleged inter alia that the authorization certified to by Antonio V. Agcaoili,
Corporate Secretary of the plaintiff and used by defendant Rodolfo A. Agana in
selling the subject property to defendant Prima was a forgery as the board of
directors of the plaintiff never enacted a resolution authorizing herein defendant
Rodolfo A. Agana to sell herein subject property to defendant Prima or to anyone
else for that matter. Plaintiff further claimed that defendant Prima in collusion
with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana acted maliciously and in bad faith in relying on
the forged authority without taking any step to verify the same with the plaintiff
as owner of the subject property. According to plaintiff, the deed of absolute sale
entered into between defendants Prima and Rodolfo A. Agana being the result of
fraudulent transaction was void thereby, among others, causing damage to the
plaintiff. For canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-A)
knowing fully well that the authorization to sell [to] defendant Rodolfo
A. Agana was a forgery, defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva was likewise made
liable for damages.

On the other hand, defendant Prima separately with defendant Rodolfo A. Agana
in their respective answers, sought and insisted constantly on the dismissal of the
complaint based solidly on the ground that Venice B. Agana and Ma. Natividad A.
Villacorta who filed in behalf of the plaintiff the original complaint and the
amended and the second amended complaints as well, respectively, lacked legal
 capacity to sue because they were not authorized therefor by the board of
directors of the plaintiff. Furthermore, defendant Prima argued that it acted in
good faith when it relied solely on the face of the purported authorization of
defendant Rodolfo A. Agana and entered into the deed of absolute sale and paid in
full the purchase price of PhP2,567,760.00 of the subject property. This fact,
according to defendant Prima, made it a buyer in good faith and for value. To cap
its argument, defendant Prima in adopting the defense of defendant Rodolfo A.
Agana asserted that even assuming that the authorization of defendant Rodolfo A.
Agana was forged when plaintiff, through its President, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr.
(brother of Rodolfo) accepted/received part of the aforestated purchase price
knowing fully well the same to be the proceeds of the sale of the subject property,
plaintiff has been precluded as it is now estopped from asking for rescission of the
deed of absolute sale and reconveyance of the subject property.[3]

After due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment on April 7, 2000, dismissing the
complaint for annulment of sale with damages filed by the petitioner.[4]

The trial court found that the respondent was a buyer in good faith and for value, relying
on the authority of Rodolfo A. Agana to sell the property in behalf of the petitioner company, as
evidenced by a notarized board resolution. As such, the trial court ruled that the petitioner was
bound by the acts of its agent and must necessarily bear whatever damage may have been caused
by this alleged breach of trust.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto.

Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following errors:

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Respondent Agana was duly
authorized by Petitioner under the Certification dated June 30, 1988 (Exhibits D
and 3) to enter into the sale of the subject property with Respondent Prima Real.
(A) There is no proof of the Certifications authenticity and due execution;

(B) There is clear and convincing evidence that the Certification was
forged.

(C) Even assuming that the Certification was authentic and duly executed,
it was not sufficient in form and by its terms to authorize Respondent
Agana to sell the subject property or receive payment on behalf of
Petitioner.
II

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Respondent Prima Real
was the author of its own damage by not making reasonable and prudent inquiries
into the fact, nature and extent of Respondent Aganas authority, and by causing
the issuance of checks in the name of Respondent Agana.

The petition must fail.

A cursory reading of the issues reveals that these are factual matters which are not within the
province of the Court to look into, save only in exceptional circumstances which are not present
in the case at bar. Well settled is the rule that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
only questions of law must be raised.[5] As a matter of procedure, the Court defers and accords
finality to the factual findings of trial courts, especially when, as in the case at bar, such findings
are affirmed by the appellate court. This factual determination, as a matter of long and sound
appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal. It is not the
function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of
the factual holding of the lower courts.[6]

Petitioner insists that the sale of the realty entered into between respondent Agana, purportedly
on behalf of the petitioner, and respondent Prima is null and void for lack of authority on the part
of respondent Agana to sell the property.[7] The board resolution allegedly granting Rodolfo
Agana the authority to sell in behalf of the company, as certified by Corporate Secretary Atty.
Antonio V. Agcaoili, is alleged to be a forgery. Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta, who served as
assistant to Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., the President of St. Marys Farm, Inc., in 1988 testified that
the board of directors did not hold any meeting on June 27, 1988; that, in fact, the signature of
Atty. Antonio Agcaoili was not genuine; and that said document was merely presented to the
notary public for notarization without Atty. Agcaoili appearing before him.

Despite this insistence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of
the respondent court affirming those of the trial court on this matter. Anent the forged signature
of Atty. Agcaoili, the CA did not err in not giving evidentiary weight to the findings of the
Document Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the ground that the
findings were not really conclusive. In the first place, the procedure for the investigation of
questionable handwriting was not properly followed. There is nothing on record that will
conclusively show that the alleged standard sample signatures of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili, which
were submitted to the NBI and made the basis of comparison, were the genuine signatures of the
same Atty. Antonio Agcaoili. Moreover, the examiner testified that it was possible to have
variations in the standard signatures of Atty. Agcaoili, caused by certain factors such as passage
of time, pressure and physical condition of the writer which may have decisive influences on his
handwritings characteristics.[8] Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be concluded that a
particular signature appearing in those documents is not genuine for lack of proper identification
and a more accurate comparison of signatures. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the
burden of proof lies in the party making the allegation.[9] Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the
petitioner failed to discharge this burden.

Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution bearing the Secretarys
Certification, petitioner wants us to consider the same as inadmissible on the ground that Atty.
Agcaoili did not appear before a notary public for notarization. We do not agree, because in the
past, we have already held that the non-appearance of the party before the notary public who
notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify or render the parties transaction void ab initio.
[10]
However, the non-appearance of the party exposes the notary public to administrative liability
which warrants sanction by the Court. This fact notwithstanding, we agree with the respondent
court that it is not enough to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements
contained in the board resolution. To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear
and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the
certificate.[11] In the absence of such proof, the document must be upheld. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, making it admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity.[12]

On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had every reason to rely on
Rodolfo Aganas authority to sell the subject property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an
innocent purchaser for value in good faith. Our pronouncement in Bautista v. Silva[13] is
instructive:

A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and pays
full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the
property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the
thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.

To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he
relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made
 further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title.
Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following
conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the
latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not
aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any
defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the
property.[14]

All the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned case are present in the case at bar, enough
for us to consider Prima as a buyer in good faith. Prima Real Properties, Inc. is a company
engaged in the buying and selling of real properties. As borne out by the records, respondent
exerted efforts to verify the true background of the subject property. Rodolfo Agana presented to
respondent the (1) notarized board resolution which stated that at a special meeting held on June
27, 1988, the board of directors authorized Mr. Rodolfo A. Agana, Treasurer, to sell the subject
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-1648; [15] (2) a separate
Certification by the petitioners president, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., authorizing its Treasurer,
Rodolfo Agana, to sell said property;[16] and, (3) TCT No. T-1648 of the subject
property. Convinced that Rodolfo Agana had the authority to sell on behalf of the company after
being presented all these documents, the sale between the parties was thereby consummated. A
deed of sale was executed on September 5, 1988[17] and the full consideration of P2,567,760.00
for the subject property was paid.[18]

It is of no moment that the checks were made payable to Rodolfo Agana and not to the
company which, according to the petitioner, should have alerted the respondent to inquire further
into the extent of Aganas authority to transfer the subject property. This was no longer necessary
considering that respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Aganas authority to sell,
evidenced by the notarized Certification. As explained in the Bautista case:

When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that

is duly notarized, we know it to be a public document where the notarial
acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution. A buyer
presented with such a document would have no choice between knowing and
finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial
acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and replaced it with a
presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public
and acknowledged that he executed the document, understood its import and
signed it. In reality, he is deprived of such choice not because he is incapable of
knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial system, he has been
given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly
 notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that because it is precisely that
fiction of regularity which holds together commercial transactions across borders
and time.

In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has [in
his] possession title to the property but whose capacity to sell is restricted,
qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he inquired into the title of the
seller as well as into the latters capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on
the notarial acknowledgment found in the sellers duly notarized special power of
attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the
notarial acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to the
document, its due execution and authenticity.[19]

Aside from the pertinent documents presented, respondent also relied on the confirmation
and certification of the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City and Mr. Timoteo S. Cruz, owner of the
land likewise sold by Rodolfo Agana for the petitioner, with similar authorization by the
petitioner and signed by the corporate secretary Atty. Agcaoili. Aganaacted as petitioners
authorized agent and had full authority to bind the company in that transaction with Cruz.

Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner that respondent Aganas authority was only
limited to negotiate and not to sell the subject property, suffice it to state that the board resolution
further averred that he was authorized and empowered to sign any and all documents,
instruments, papers or writings which may be required and necessary for this purpose to bind the
Corporation in this undertaking.[20] The certification of the President, Marcelino Agana, Jr. also
attests to this fact. With this notarized board resolution, respondent Agana, undeniably, had the
authority to cede the subject property, carrying with it all the concomitant powers necessary to
implement said transaction. On the strength of the deed of absolute sale executed pursuant to
such authority, title over the land in petitioners name was cancelled and a new certificate of title
TCT No. T-6175[21] was already issued in the name of Prima Real Properties, Inc.

Thus, it is too late in the day to have the sale voided, notwithstanding the retraction made
by Rodolfo Agana in his Comment[22] on the Petition filed with this Court.Therein, he admits that
he acted solely and without proper authority of the corporation. Agana states that he wishes to
end once and for all the rift that had occurred in the corporation; and in order to buy peace for all
the parties and for himself, he is willing to return the money paid by Prima so that ownership of
the property can be returned to the petitioner. In light of this admission that Agana had no
authority, petitioner posits that there is justifiable reason for the Court to re-visit or evaluate the
facts of the case anew.
 Unfortunately, the Court cannot give weight to this magnanimous gesture of Agana;
neither will the Court lend credence to Aganas assertion that he acted solely and without proper
authority from the corporation, inasmuch as it was raised for the very first time in this Court and
only after 8 years from the inception of the case. In all the pleadings filed by
respondent Agana in court, he was steadfast in his position that he had authority to sell the
subject property. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot
thereafter take a position contradictory to, or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts
admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. [23] In the instant case,
there is no proof of these exceptional circumstances.Clearly, the retraction was merely an
afterthought on the part of respondent Agana with the intention to end the rift in the family
corporation.

Considering all the foregoing, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent Prima is an innocent
purchaser in good faith and for value.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals

is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-34267-68 January 25, 1991

BIAK-NA-BATO MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and BALATOC-LUBUAGAN MINES, INC., respondents.

BIAK-NA-BATO MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ARTURO R. TANCO JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and MOUNTAIN MINES, INC., respondents.

Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.

Norberto J. Quisumbing, Francisco Catral & A.N. Bolinao, Jr. and Bengzon, Villegas & Zarraga
for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside the September 17,
1971 decision of the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources * in DANR Case
Nos. 3613-3613-A entitled "Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs. Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc.
and Mountain Mines, Inc." affirming the decision of the Director of Mines ** dated December
17, 1970 in Mines Administrative Cases Nos. V-494 and V-495, finding the respondents to have a
better right to the 170 mining claims of about 1,520 hectares located at the Cordillera Mountains,
in Pasil, Municipality of Balatoc, Province of Kalinga-Apayao.

As gathered from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:

During the mining boom in 1933, a group of hopeful and enthusiastic individuals from the North,
among them Jose Moldero, Saturnino Moldero, Miguel Moldero and Manuel Dirige, appeared to
have located from November, 1933 to February, 1934 one hundred seventy (170) mining claims
in hinterlands of the Cordillera Mountains in Sitios of Pasil and Balatoc, Municipality of
Lubuagan, Mountain Province (now known as the Municipality of Balatoc, Province of Kalinga-
Apayao). The land covered by said 170 mining claims is adjacent and surrounds the mining
properties of Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. The said 170 mining claims were divided into four
(4) groups, viz: NAGASAT Group consisting of 42 claims; MUGAO Group consisting of 40
claims; LUCKY STRIKE Group consisting of 40 claims; and BUMABAG Group consisting of
48 claims (Rollo, Vol. III, Appellant's Brief, p. 1122 [pp. 25-26]).

On September 3, 1936, Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines Association entered into an Operating

Agreement with Jose Moldero as Attorney-in-fact of the claimowners of the Nagasat and Mugao
Groups of claims (Rollo, Vol. I, Annex "M-1", pp. 449-451-A).

On September 19, 1936, Saturnino Moldero sold to Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines Association twenty
(20) claims of the Nagasat group (Rollo, Vol. I, Annex "M-2", pp. 452-453) while Miguel
Moldero sold seven (7) claims (Rollo, Vol. I, Annex "M-5", pp. 459-460). Subsequently, Balatoc-
Lubuagan Mines, Inc. then already organized as a mining corporation acquired fifty two (52)
claims, of the Nagasat and Mugao Groups and acquired the operating right on thirty (30) claims
also of the Nagasat and Mugao groups belonging to Miguel Modero, Emilia L. Villanueva, A.D.
Salvador, Esteban Flores, Nicasio Balinag, Rufino Custaran, Felipe Tuason, Rita A. de Pardo and
Hilario T. Agatep which was later on conveyed to respondent Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc.
(Rollo, Vol. III, Appellees' Brief, p. 1144 [P. 20]).

On the same date September 3, 1936, Mountain Mines, Association entered into an agreement
with Jose Moldero over forty (40) mining claims known as Lucky Strike Group and on
September 22, 1936, Mountains Mines, Inc. already a corporation entered into an agreement with
Jose Moldero over forty eight (48) mining claims known as Bumabag Group (Rollo, Vol. I,
Annexes "M", "M-4", pp. 446-448; 456-458).

On September 19, 1936, Mountain Mines, Inc. purchased from Saturnino Moldero ten (10)
claims of the Lucky Strike Group and two (2) more claims of the Lucky Strike Group on October
6, 1936 purchased from Miguel Moldero (Rollo, Vol. I, Annexes "M-3", "M-6", pp. 254-255;
461-462).

That in September 1936, Mountain Mines, Inc. acquired the entire eighty-eight (88) claims under
a deed of sale executed in its favor by Feliciano Arceo, the attorney-in-fact of Jose Moldero,
Saturnino Moldero and Miguel Moldero as claimowners and attorney-in-fact of the other
claimowners (Rollo, Vol. I, Annexes "C", "F", pp. 287-289; 296-297). That all these mining
claims were located under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (Rollo, Vol. III, Appellees' Brief,
p. 1144 [p. 21]).

In 1936-37 said mining corporations (Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc.)
engaged the services of Mining Engineers, Thomas F. Breslin, Bernardo Cuesta and Fulgencio
Consolacion to explore and develop the mining area; for its pre-war exploration and
development, Mountain Mines, Inc. spent the sum of P142,219.00 and increased its authorized
capital in 1937 from P200,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 to meet the cost of exploration (Rollo, Vol.
III, Solicitor's Brief, p. 1156 [p. 7]).

After the war, in 1949-50, private respondents (Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain
Mines, Inc.) reconstituted their corporate records before the Securities and Exchange
Commission. In 1953, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 739, they filed
reconstitution proceedings before the Bureau of Mines to reconstitute the records of the 170 lode
claims. The reconstitution proceedings filed by Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. over 42 lode
claims known as Nagasat Group and 40 lode claims known as Mugao Mining Group were
docketed before the Bureau of Mines as MAC Case No. V-79 Rollo, Vol. III, Solicitor's Brief, p.
1156 [p. 8]).

The reconstitution proceedings of Mountain Mines, Inc. over the 48 lode claims known as
Bumabag Mining Group and 40 lode claims known as Lucky Strike Mining Group was docketed
as MAC Case No. V-80 (Rollo, Ibid.).

The Bureau of Mines published the requisite notice of hearing of the reconstitution proceedings
in the newspapers of general circulation in Manila, and posted the notice of hearing in the
Bulletin Board in Manila and served copies thereof to the District Mining Office in Baguio,
Mining Recorder in Bontoc, and in Lubuagan, Sub-province of Kalinga-Apayao, where the
mineral claims are situated (Rollo, Ibid.).

The Bureau of Mines in accordance with the provision of R.A. 739 conducted hearings and heard
the testimonies of Apolonio Navarro, Anacleto Navarro, Atty. Macario Gacanes. Also presented
was Atty. Isidro Berruyo, and the affidavits of Miguel Moldero, one of the original locators and
attorneys-in-fact of the claimowners, who confirmed the sale of Mountain Mines, Inc. of the 88
lode claims and to Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. of the 82 lode claims (Rollo, Ibid.).

On May 23, 1956, the Bureau of Mines after due hearing and notice issued the corresponding
orders of reconstitution and eighty-eight (88) mining claims of Mountain Mines, Inc. and eighty-
two (82) mining claims of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. claim maps, lists of mining claims,
option agreement, deeds of sale, power of attorney and other documents were reconstituted
(Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 679-681; 682-684).

After the finality of the Order of Reconstitution, on July 26, 1956, the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines,
Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. entered into an Operating Agreement on Royalty basis with
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. over the 170 lode claims as reconstituted. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
recorded the Royalty Agreement as well as the 170 lode claims in the Office of the Mining
Recorder of Bontoc. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. explored the respondents' mining area for a
period of one (1) year and thereafter, operating rights over the mining property were granted to
Messrs. Spellmeyer and Stewart, A. Soriano & Company, Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Corporation in 1958; Mitsubishi Shij Kaisha, Ltd. in 1959; Jacinto Steel, Inc. in 1961; Messrs.
Thomas J. Weck and Robert N. Jones and Alfonso M. Villaaba Company in 1963; Philmetals
Mining Corporation in 1968 and Industrial and Commercial Earthmovers, Inc. (now Inco Mining
Corporation) in 1969 (Rollo, Vol. III, Appellees' Brief, p. 1156 [pp. 10-11]).

In 1960, a geological survey of the entire area of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain
Mines, Inc.'s properties was conducted by Engr. Tranquilino Medina who rendered a favorable
report thereon; that up to 1970, said mining companies have assigned men working in the area
guarding the properties under field superintendent Miguel Moldero who had employed some
natives for the reopening and driving of tunnels, blazing trails in the mining area; that some of
these men are Felix Gumisa, Francisco Aguac, Dacuyag Balinggao and these men have
continuously performed the required assessment works on the area; that affidavits of annual
assessment works for the years 1965, 1966 and 1967 were duly filed with the Mining Recorder
of Bontoc, Mt. Province; and that they have paid the real estate tax for the one hundred seventy
(170) claims for the years 1956 to 1970 (Rollo, Vol. III, Appellees' Brief, p. 1144 [p. 22]).

In March, 1968, Mountain Mines, Inc. filed an application for lease over 9 lode claims identified
as Mold, Roque, Ifugao, President, Nicodemus, Isabel, Inting, Iscariote and Judas, as well as the
application for order of survey (Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 1091-1093).

On the other hand, Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. filed a lease application over 11 lode claims
identified as Z-13, Z-14, Z-15, Z-19, Z-20, Z-21, Z-25, Z-26, Z-27, Z-31, Z-32 and Z-33 and an
application for order of survey (Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 1095-1097).

The Bureau of Mines issued the order of survey in November 1968 and actual survey of 21 lode
claims was conducted in December 1969 (Rollo, Vol. III, Solicitor's Brief, p. 1156 [pp. 1213]).

Meanwhile, on different dates in 1967, Bernardo Ardiente, Emilio Peralta, Mario Villarica,
Anastacio Canao and Salvador Ellone located several claims covering a wide area of vacant,
unoccupied and unclaimed land of the public mineral lands situated in Sitios Pasil and Balatoc,
Municipality of Lubuagan, Kalinga-Apayao. The land covering the mining claims is adjacent to
the patentable mining properties of the Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. (Rollo, Vol. I, Petition,
pp. 40-41).

On February 8, 1969, the petitioner Biak-na-Bato Mining Co. was created as a partnership in
accordance with law.1wphi1 And on November 19, 1969, the above-named locators, namely:
Bernardo Ardiente, Emilio Peralta, Mario Villarica, Anastacio Cano and Salvador Ellone, each
executed a Deed of Transfer of Mining Rights assigning, transferring and conveying to the
petitioner the mining claims covered by the aforesaid declarations of location (Rollo, Ibid., pp.
41-42).

On December 4,1969, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Co. filed with the Bureau of Mines the application
for lease and a petition for an order of lease survey of the aforementioned mining claims
(Rollo, Ibid., p. 42). However, it received a notice of the letter of the Director of Mines refusing
to issue the order of lease survey because the areas covered by the mining claims were allegedly
in conflict with the four (4) groups of mining claims purportedly owned by the Balatoc-
Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. (Rollo, Ibid., pp. 45-46).

On January 12, 1970, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company filed its separate protest with the Bureau
of Mines against Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. docketed as MAC No. 494 and the other against
Mountain Mines, Inc. docketed as MAC No. 495. In said protest, Biak-Na-Bato Mining
Company contests and disputes the right of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. to eleven (11) mining
claims and the right of Mountain Mines, Inc. to another nine (9) mining claims (Rollo, Vol. I,
Petition, p. 12).

Actually, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company raised in its protest only the issue of abandonment
while Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. questioned the validity of the
former's location as "table location". Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company without amending its
pleadings questioned the reconstitution proceedings in MAC Cases Nos. V-79 and V-80 by
claiming that the two (2) deeds of sale over the 88 lode claims in favor of Mountain Mines, Inc.
and the other two (2) deeds of sale over 52 lode claims of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. were
fake, fictitious or manufactured. However, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company did not contest the
validity of the reconstitution of the declarations of location of the 170 lode claims (Rollo, Vol.
III, Solicitor's Brief, p. 1156 [p. 13]). In March 1970, while its protest was being heard, it filed
with the Bureau of Mines a motion claiming that Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain
Mines, Inc.'s men had entered the area in controversy by force and have been molesting,
harassing and threatening petitioner's supposed workers in the area. The Bureau of Mines issued
a restraining order directing both parties to desist from performing any further mining activities
in the area in controversy. On April 7, 1970, Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines,
Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration for the immediate lifting of said restraining order. They
denied under oath that they entered the area by force or that there was violence or even threat to
peace in the area, contrary to the pretensions of Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company who had never
been in the area (Rollo, Ibid., p. 5).

To determine the truth of the Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company's claim in its motion as well as to
ascertain the assessment work done in the area claimed by both parties, the Director of Mines
ordered an ocular inspection of the mining area in May 1970 (Rollo, Ibid.).

On June 8, 1970, after the ocular inspection was conducted and having determined the falsity of
the allegations of petitioner's motion, the Director of Mines lifted the restraining order
(Rollo, Ibid.).
After the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Mines inspection team, a report was
submitted with topographic map and pictures of the improvements. According to the report, the
ground works improvements and other form of assessment works in the mining properties of said
respondents were significant and extensive, all evaluated and assessed at P582,996.60 (Rollo,
Vol. II, pp. 621-690).

On December 17,1970, the Director of Mines promulgated its decision in both cases, MAC
Cases Nos. V-494 and V-495, holding that as against Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company, the
Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc., have a better right to the 170 mining
claims of about 1,520 hectares located at the Cordillera Mountains, in Pasil, Municipality of
Balatoc, Province of Kalinga-Apayao (Rollo, Annex "B", pp. 134-145).

From the said decision of the Director of Mines, petitioner appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, docketed as DANR Case No. 3613 entitled "Biak-Na-Bato
Mining Company vs. Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc." and DANR Case No. 3613-A entitled
"Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs. Mountain Mines, Inc." (Rollo, Petition, p. 9).

In its appeal, the Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company questioned the first ocular inspection report.
The Secretary in the exercise of his appellate power and in justice to the petitioner ordered a
second ocular inspection, after which the second inspection team submitted a report confirming
the findings of the first ocular inspection team, and also reported that Biak-Na-Bato Mining
Company despite opportunity afforded was not able to show its location in the area (Rollo, Vol.
II, pp. 693-701).

On September 17, 1971, the Secretary rendered his decision on the appeal, affirming the findings
of facts of the Director of Mines and declaring Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Baguio Mines,
Inc.'s mining area not open for relocation in 1967-1968 and therefore Biak-Na-Bato Mining
Company's locations null and void. The Secretary also declared that its mining claims are table
located, and therefore, null and void, and that it had no legal personality to file the protest in the
Bureau of Mines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal should be, as hereby it is,
DISMISSED, the decision of the Director of Mines, dated December 17, 1970,
AFFIRMED. (Rollo, Vol. I, Annex "A", pp. 121-133,).

Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company questions the findings of fact of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources that: (a) its mining claims are mere table locations: (b) that Balatoc-Lubuagan
Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. did not abandon their claims; and (c) that the documents
presented by the latter for reconstitution are not fraudulent.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources made the following findings and
conclusions: (a) that the locations made by Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company's assignors were
mere table locations not actually made on the ground as required by Sections 39, 40, 41 and 47
of the Mining Law and, therefore, the declarations made thereunder are null and void. As such,
no rights could accrue in favor of the so-called locators, and having no rights the latter could not
assign any rights in favor of Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company. Neither the latter nor its assignors
have the personality to file any protest before the Bureau of Mines: (b) that the presumption of
abandonment was overturned by the showing that Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain
Mines, Inc. have filed their affidavits of annual assessment work for the years 1965, 1966 and
1967 in question and have paid the real estate taxes for 170 claims for the years 1956 to 1970;
and (c) that the only irregularity pointed out by Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company is the fact that
the original locators were not notified, which was settled by the Order of Reconstitution which
was preceded by publications and hearings and which have become final. Even the fact that the
questioned documents did not appear in the notarial register, did not make said documents
spurious, fake and non-existent because the notarial register is not always the memorial of all the
daily transactions of a notary public. The notary being only human, lapses by way of omission
may happen.

As a general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction,
decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former
have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings
of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if
such findings are supported by substantial evidence (San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA
261 [1989], Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Lopez Enage, 152 SCRA 80 [1987]) and are
controlling on the reviewing authorities (Doruelo v. Ministry of National Defense, 169 SCRA
448 [1989]) because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they
are assigned. Even the courts of justice, including this Court, are bound by such findings in the
absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which is not present in this case at bar
(Gordon v. Veridiano II, 167 SCRA 53 [1988]).

There is no question that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is substantially supported by evidence. Substantial evidence
has been defined or construed to mean not necessarily preponderant proof as required in ordinary
civil cases but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion (Castro v. CA, 169 SCRA 383 [1989]; Bagsican v. CA, 141 SCRA 226
[1980]; Lustre v. CAR, 10 SCRA 659 [1964]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE

G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.
DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and
submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of
nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.

The Facts and the Case

On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and
the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo
hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.

Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save
their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital,
two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage
relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and
released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no
longer be repaired.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a
hospital. The form carried a physicians handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene
filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical
City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was there confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena
duces tecum.2

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielenes
motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action
of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the RTC.

On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielenes petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow
the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever
relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital
records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this
case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his
alleged forcible confinement.

Question Presented

The central question presented in this case is:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered
by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.

The Ruling of the Court

Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records of
Johnnys confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in support of her
action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for
subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:

SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons

cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxxx

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken
the reputation of the patient.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without
the patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is
intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his
ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of
that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in
the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.4

1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be
made part of the physicians testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in
those records that concern the patients health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such
evidence for admission in court. Thus:

SEC. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the
offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.

Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records. It is when those records are produced
for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence,
but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is
about non-disclosure of privileged matters.

2. It is of course possible to treat Josielenes motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure
available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action
and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or
operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection
and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
(Emphasis supplied)

But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are "not privileged."

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it
is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c)
of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital recordsthe results
of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or
treatment he gave himwould be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the

patients consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patients records.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latters prior consent.

3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that
he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth
claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged
character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that
provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder
admissible. When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when
a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in
evidence.1wphi1

But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already
presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify
Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not
yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of
his hospital records would again be premature.

For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request
for the production in court of Johnnys hospital records.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.

SO ORDERED.

ATLAS CONSOLIDATED G.R. No. 159490

MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Present:
Petitioner,
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
COMMISSIONER OF Promulgated:
INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent. February 18, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the May 16, 2003
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 46494, which affirmed the
October 13, 1997 Decision[2] of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case No. 5205
entitled Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (Atlas) v. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (CIR), involving petitioner Atlas application for issuance of tax credit
certificate or refund of value-added tax (VAT) payments in accordance with Section 106(b) of the
Tax Code on zero-rated VAT payers. Also assailed is the August 11, 2003 Resolution [3] of the CA
denying Atlas motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Atlas is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the
production of copper concentrates for export. It registered as a VAT entity and was issued VAT
Registration Certificate No. 32-0-004622 effective August 15, 1990.

For the first quarter of 1993, Atlas export sales amounted to PhP 642,685,032.24. Its
proceeds were received in acceptable foreign currency and inwardly remitted in accordance with
Central Bank regulations. For the same period, Atlas paid PhP 7,907,662.53 for input taxes, as
follows:

Local PhP 7,117,222.53

Importation 790,440.00
Total PhP 7,907,662.53

Thereafter, Atlas filed a VAT return for the first quarter of 1993 with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) on April 20, 1993, and also filed an amended VAT return.

On September 20, 1993, Atlas applied with the BIR for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund under Section 106(b) of the Tax Code. The certificate would represent the
VAT it paid for the first quarter of 1993 in the amount of PhP 7,907,662.53, which corresponded
to the input taxes not applied against any output VAT.

Atlas then filed a petition for review with the CTA on February 22, 1995 to prevent the
running of the prescriptive period under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code.

The Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals

The petition for review before the CTA was docketed as CTA Case No. 5205. On October
13, 1997, the CTA rendered a Decision denying Atlas claim for tax credit or refund.
The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, [Atlas] claim for issuance
of tax credit certificate or refund of value-added taxes for the first quarter of 1993
is hereby DENIED for insufficiency of evidence. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[4]

We note that respondent CIR filed his May 24, 1995 Answer asserting that Atlas has the
burden of proving erroneous or illegal payment of the tax being claimed for refund, as claims for
refund are strictly construed against the taxpayer. However, the CIR did not present any evidence
before the CTA nor file a memorandum, thus constraining the CTA to resolve the case before it
solely on the basis of the evidence presented by Atlas.

In denying Atlas claim for tax credit or refund, the CTA held that Atlas failed to present
sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of tax credit or refund for the alleged input taxes paid by
Atlas. Relying on Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 3-88 which was issued to implement the then
VAT law and list the documents to be submitted in actions for refunds or tax credits of input
taxes in export sales, it found that the documents submitted by Atlas did not comply with said
regulation. It pointed out that Atlas failed to submit photocopies of export documents, invoices,
or receipts evidencing the sale of goods and others. Moreover, the Certification by Atlas bank,
Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation, did not indicate any conversion rate for US dollars to
pesos. Thus, the CTA could not ascertain the veracity of the contents indicated in Atlas VAT
return as export sales and creditable or refundable input VAT.

Atlas timely filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision contending that it
relied on Sec. 106 of the Tax Code which merely required proof that the foreign exchange
proceeds has been accounted for in accordance with the regulations of the Central Bank of
the Philippines. Consequently, Atlas asserted that the documents it presented, coupled with the
testimony of its Accounting and Finance Manager, Isabel Espeno, sufficiently proved its case. It
argued that RR 3-88 was issued for claims for refund of input VAT to be processed by the BIR,
that is, for administrative claims, and not for judicial claims as in the present case. Anyhow,
Atlas prayed for a re-trial, even as it admitted that it has committed a mistake or excusable
negligence when the CTA ruled that RR 3-88 should be the one applied for Atlas to submit the
basis required under the regulation.

Atlas motion for reconsideration was rejected by the CTA through its January 5, 1998
Resolution, ruling that it is within its discretion to ascertain the veracity of the claims for refund
which must be strictly construed against Atlas. Moreover, it also rejected Atlas prayer for a re-
trial under Sec. 2 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, as Atlas failed to submit the required
affidavits of merits.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 On Atlas appeal, the CA denied and dismissed Atlas petition on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence to support Atlas action for tax credit or refund. Thus, through its May
16, 2003 Decision, the CA sustained the CTA; and consequently denied Atlas motion for
reconsideration.

The CA ratiocinated that the CTA cannot be faulted in denying Atlas action for tax credit
or refund, and in denying Atlas prayer for a new trial. The CA concurred with the CTA in the
finding that Atlas failure to submit the required documents in accordance with RR 3-88 is fatal to
Atlas action, for, without these documents, Atlas VAT export sales indicated in its amended VAT
return and the creditable or refundable input VAT could not be ascertained. The CA struck down
Atlas contention that it has sufficiently established the existence of its export sales through the
testimony of its Accounting and Finance Manager, as her testimony is not required under RR 3-
88 and is self-serving.

Also, the CA rejected Atlas assertion that RR 3-88 is applicable only to administrative
claims and not to a judicial proceeding, since it is clear under Sec. 245 (now Sec. 244 of the
NIRC) that [t]he Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner, shall
promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of
this Code. Thus, according to the CA, RR 3-88 implementing the VAT law is applicable to
judicial proceedings as this Court held in Eslao v. COA that administrative policies enacted by
administrative bodies to interpret the law have the force of law and are entitled to great weight.
[5]
The CA likewise agreed with the CTA in denying a new trial for Atlas failure to attach the
necessary affidavits of merits required under the rules.

The Issues

Hence, the instant petition of Atlas raising the following grounds for our consideration:

A. In rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals failed to
decide this matter in accordance with law or with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court.

B. In rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution the Court of Appeals is guilty
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
violated Atlas right to due process and sanctioned a similar error from the Court
 of Tax Appeals (CTA), calling for the exercise of this Honorable Courts power of
supervision.[6]

The foregoing issues can be simplified as follows: first, whether Atlas has sufficiently
proven entitlement to a tax credit or refund; and second, whether Atlas should have been
accorded a new trial.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

First Issue: Atlas failed to show sufficient proof

Consistent with its position before the courts a quo, Atlas argues that the requirements
under RR 3-88 are only applicable in administrative claims for refunds before the BIR and not
for judicial claims, as in the instant case. And that it is CTA Circular No. 1-95, as amended by
CTA Circular No. 10-97, which applies and which Atlas asserts it has complied with. It contends
that CTA Circular No. 10-97, being the later law, is deemed to have qualified RR 3-88. Thus, it
contends that what is only required is a submission of a summary of the invoices and a
certification from an independent public accountant.

We are not persuaded.

First, we reiterate the prevailing rule that the findings of fact of the CA are generally
conclusive and binding and the Court need not pass upon the supporting evidence. For, it is not
this Courts function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. [7] Stated a bit differently, the
CAs findings of fact affirming those of the trial court will not be disturbed by the Court. [8] This is
as it should be for the trial court, as trier of facts, is best equipped to make the assessment of
issues raised and evidence adduced before it. Therefore, its factual findings are generally not
disturbed on appeal unless it is perceived to have overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted
certain facts or circumstances of weight, which, if properly considered, would affect the result of
the case and warrant a reversal of the decision involved. In the instant case, we find no cogent
reason to depart from this general principle.

Second, the Rules of Court, which is suppletory in quasi-judicial proceedings, particularly

Sec. 34[9] of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, is clear that no evidence which has not been
formally offered shall be considered. Thus, where the pertinent invoices or receipts purportedly
evidencing the VAT paid by Atlas were not submitted, the courts a quo evidently could not
determine the veracity of the input VAT Atlas has paid. Moreover, when Atlas likewise failed to
submit pertinent export documents to prove actual export sales with due certification from
accredited banks on the export proceeds in foreign currency with the corresponding conversion
rate into Philippine currency, the courts a quo likewise could not determine the veracity of the
export sales as indicated in Atlas amended VAT return.

It must be noted that the most competent evidence must be adduced and presented to
prove the allegations in a complaint, petition, or protest before a judicial court. And where the
best evidence cannot be submitted, secondary evidence may be presented. In the instant case, the
pertinent documents which are the best pieces of evidence were not presented.

Third, the summary presented by Atlas does not replace the pertinent invoices, receipts,
and export sales documents as competent evidence to prove the fact of refundable or creditable
input VAT. Indeed, the summary presented with the certification by an independent Certified
Public Accountant (CPA) and the testimony of Atlas Accounting and Finance Manager are
merely corroborative of the actual input VAT it paid and the actual export sales. Otherwise, the
pertinent invoices, receipts, and export sales documents are the best and competent pieces of
evidence required to substantiate Atlas claim for tax credit or refund which is merely
corroborated by the summary duly certified by a CPA and the testimony of Atlas employee on
the export sales. And when these pertinent documents are not presented, these could not be
corroborated as is true in the instant case.

Fourth, Atlas mere allegations of the figures in its amended VAT return for the first
quarter of 1993 as well as in its petition before the CTA are not sufficient proof of the amount of
its refund entitlement. They do not even constitute evidence[10] adverse to CIR against whom
they are being presented.[11] While Atlas indeed submitted several documents, still, the CTA
could not ascertain from them the veracity of the figures as the documents presented by Atlas
were not sufficient to prove its action for tax credit or refund. Atlas has failed to meet the burden
of proof required in order to establish the factual basis of its claim for a tax credit or
refund. Neither can we ascertain the veracity of Atlas alleged input VAT taxes which are
refundable nor the alleged actual export sales indicated in the amended VAT return.
 Clearly, it would not be proper to allow Atlas to simply prevail and compel a tax credit or
refund in the amount it claims without proving the amount of its claim. After all, [t]ax refunds
are in the nature of tax exemptions,[12] and are to be construed strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer.

Fifth, it is thus academic whether compliance with the documentary requirements of RR

3-88 is necessary. Suffice it to say that a revenue regulation is binding on the courts as long as
the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed. [13] It has not been disputed that RR 3-88 has
been duly promulgated pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of Finance upon the
recommendation of the CIR. As aptly held by the courts a quo, citing Eslao,[14] these RRs or
administrative issuances have the force of law and are entitled to great weight.

Sixth, it would not be amiss to point out that Atlas contention on the applicability of CTA
Circular No. 10-97 is misplaced. For one, said circular amended CTA Circular No. 1-95 only in
1997 whereas the proceedings of the instant case were conducted prior to 1997. In
fact, Atlas Formal Offer of Evidence[15] was filed before the CTA on September 2, 1996. For
another, even if said circular is retroactively applied for being procedural, still, it does not
afford Atlas relief as the documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence adduced before the
CTA are insufficient to prove the claim for refund or tax credit.

Second Issue: No denial of due process

Atlas asserts denial of due process when the courts a quo denied its prayer to be given the
opportunity to present the required documents, asserting that the reliance by the courts a quo on
Sec. 2 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure is misplaced as said proviso
applies only to a motion for new trial and not to a motion for reconsideration.

We are not convinced.

Clearly, Atlas attempted or showed willingness to submit the required documents only
after the CTA rendered its decision. Aside from assailing the applicability of RR 3-
88, Atlas argued in its motion for reconsideration before the CTA that, on the alternative, the case
be re-opened to allow it to present the required documents as it followed in good faith the
requirement under Sec. 106 of the 1977 Tax Code, and alleged that it has committed a mistake or
excusable negligence when the CTA ruled that RR 3-88 should be the one applied requiring Atlas
to submit the documents needed.

Obviously, Atlas reliance on Sec. 106 of the 1977 Tax Code is unacceptable for such does
not constitute excusable negligence. In short, Atlas is guilty of inexcusable negligence in the
prosecution of its case. The courts a quo relied on the procedural deficiency of non-compliance
with Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court in denying a new trial. In doing so, the courts a
quo recognized Atlas motion for reconsideration also as a motion for new trial, which was
alternatively prayed for by Atlas.

Be that as it may, even if Atlas has complied with the affidavits-of-merits requirement, its
prayer for a new trial would still not prosper. First, Atlas is guilty of inexcusable negligence in
the prosecution of its case. It is duty-bound to ensure that all proofs required under the rules are
duly presented. Atlas has indeed repeatedly asserted that in its action for the instant judicial
claim, the CTA is bound by its rules and suppletorily by the Rules of Court. It certainly has not
exercised the diligence required of a litigant who has the burden of proof to present all that is
required. Second, forgotten evidence, not presented during the trial nor formally offered, is not
newly found evidence that merits a new trial. Third, and most importantly, it goes against the
orderly administration of justice to allow a party to submit forgotten evidence which it could
have offered with the exercise of ordinary diligence, more so when a decision has already been
rendered.

In fine, we reiterate our consistent ruling that actions for tax refund, as in the instant case,
are in the nature of a claim for exemption and the law is not only construed in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer, but also the pieces of evidence presented entitling a taxpayer to an
exemption is strictissimi scrutinized and must be duly proven.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the CAs
May 16, 2003 Decision and August 11, 2003 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 46494. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 RAFAEL ARSENIO S. DIZON, in his capacity as G.R. No. 140944
the Judicial Administrator of the Estate of the
deceased JOSE P. FERNANDEZ, Present:
Petitioner,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
COURT OF TAX APPEALS REYES, JJ.
and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Promulgated:
Respondents.
April 30, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [2] dated April 30,
1999 which affirmed the Decision[3] of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) dated June 17, 1997.[4]

The Facts

On November 7, 1987, Jose P. Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a petition for the probate of his
will[5] was filed with Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (probate court).
[6]
The probate court then appointed retired Supreme Court Justice Arsenio P. Dizon (Justice
Dizon) and petitioner, Atty. Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon (petitioner) as Special and Assistant Special
Administrator, respectively, of the Estate of Jose (Estate). In a letter [7] dated October 13, 1988,
Justice Dizon informed respondent Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of
the special proceedings for the Estate.

Petitioner alleged that several requests for extension of the period to file the required estate tax
return were granted by the BIR since the assets of the estate, as well as the claims against it, had
yet to be collated, determined and identified. Thus, in a letter [8] dated March 14, 1990, Justice
Dizon authorized Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf of the
Estate the required estate tax return and to represent the same in securing a Certificate of Tax
Clearance. Eventually, on April 17, 1990, Atty. Gonzales wrote a letter [9] addressed to the BIR
Regional Director for San Pablo City and filed the estate tax return[10] with the same BIR
Regional Office, showing therein a NIL estate tax liability, computed as follows:

COMPUTATION OF TAX

Conjugal Real Property (Sch. 1) P10,855,020.00

Conjugal Personal Property (Sch.2) 3,460,591.34
Taxable Transfer (Sch. 3)
Gross Conjugal Estate 14,315,611.34
Less: Deductions (Sch. 4) 187,822,576.06
Net Conjugal Estate NIL
Less: Share of Surviving Spouse NIL .
Net Share in Conjugal Estate NIL
xxx
Net Taxable Estate NIL .
Estate Tax Due NIL .[11]

On April 27, 1990, BIR Regional Director for San Pablo City, Osmundo G. Umali issued
Certification Nos. 2052[12] and 2053[13] stating that the taxes due on the transfer of real and
personal properties[14] of Jose had been fully paid and said properties may be transferred to his
heirs. Sometime in August 1990, Justice Dizon passed away. Thus, on October 22, 1990, the
probate court appointed petitioner as the administrator of the Estate.[15]

Petitioner requested the probate court's authority to sell several properties forming part of
the Estate, for the purpose of paying its creditors, namely: Equitable Banking Corporation
(P19,756,428.31), Banque de L'Indochine et. de Suez (US$4,828,905.90 as of January 31, 1988),
Manila Banking Corporation (P84,199,160.46 as of February 28, 1989) and State Investment
House, Inc. (P6,280,006.21). Petitioner manifested that Manila Bank, a major creditor of
the Estate was not included, as it did not file a claim with the probate court since it had security
over several real estate properties forming part of the Estate.[16]
 However, on November 26, 1991, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection of the BIR,
Themistocles Montalban, issued Estate Tax Assessment Notice No. FAS-E-87-91-003269,
[17]
demanding the payment of P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax, itemized as follows:

Deficiency Estate Tax- 1987

Estate tax P31,868,414.48

25% surcharge- late filing 7,967,103.62
late payment 7,967,103.62
Interest 19,121,048.68
Compromise-non filing 25,000.00
non payment 25,000.00
no notice of death 15.00
no CPA Certificate 300.00

Total amount due & collectible P66,973,985.40[18]

In his letter[19] dated December 12, 1991, Atty. Gonzales moved for the reconsideration of the
said estate tax assessment. However, in her letter[20] dated April 12, 1994, the BIR Commissioner
denied the request and reiterated that the estate is liable for the payment of P66,973,985.40 as
deficiency estate tax. On May 3, 1994, petitioner received the letter of denial. On June 2, 1994,
petitioner filed a petition for review[21] before respondent CTA. Trial on the merits ensued.

As found by the CTA, the respective parties presented the following pieces of evidence, to wit:

In the hearings conducted, petitioner did not present testimonial evidence but
merely documentary evidence consisting of the following:

Nature of Document (sic) Exhibits

1. Letter dated October 13, 1988

from Arsenio P. Dizon addressed
to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue informing the latter of
the special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate (p. 126,
BIR records); "A"

2. Petition for the probate of the

will and issuance of letter of
administration filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 87-42980 (pp. 107-108, BIR
records); "B" & "B-1

3. Pleading entitled "Compliance"

filed with the probate Court
submitting the final inventory
of all the properties of the
deceased (p. 106, BIR records); "C"

4. Attachment to Exh. "C" which

is the detailed and complete
listing of the properties of
the deceased (pp. 89-105, BIR rec.); "C-1" to "C-17"

5. Claims against the estate filed

by Equitable Banking Corp. with
the probate Court in the amount
of P19,756,428.31 as of March 31,
1988, together with the Annexes
to the claim (pp. 64-88, BIR records); "D" to "D-24"

6. Claim filed by Banque de L'

Indochine et de Suez with the
probate Court in the amount of
US $4,828,905.90 as of January 31,
1988 (pp. 262-265, BIR records); "E" to "E-3"

7. Claim of the Manila Banking

Corporation (MBC) which as of
November 7, 1987 amounts to
P65,158,023.54, but recomputed
as of February 28, 1989 at a
total amount of P84,199,160.46;
together with the demand letter
from MBC's lawyer (pp. 194-197,
BIR records); "F" to "F-3"

8. Demand letter of Manila Banking

Corporation prepared by Asedillo,
Ramos and Associates Law Offices
addressed to Fernandez Hermanos,
Inc., represented by Jose P.
Fernandez, as mortgagors, in the
total amount of P240,479,693.17
as of February 28, 1989
(pp. 186-187, BIR records); "G" & "G-1"

9. Claim of State Investment

House, Inc. filed with the
RTC, Branch VII of Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No.
86-38599 entitled "State
Investment House, Inc.,
Plaintiff, versus Maritime
Company Overseas, Inc. and/or
Jose P. Fernandez, Defendants,"
(pp. 200-215, BIR records); "H" to "H-16"

10. Letter dated March 14, 1990

of Arsenio P. Dizon addressed
to Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales,
(p. 184, BIR records); "I"

11. Letter dated April 17, 1990

from J.M. Gonzales addressed
to the Regional Director of
BIR in San Pablo City
(p. 183, BIR records); "J"

12. Estate Tax Return filed by

the estate of the late Jose P.
Fernandez through its authorized
representative, Atty. Jesus M.
Gonzales, for Arsenio P. Dizon,
with attachments (pp. 177-182,
BIR records); "K" to "K-5"

13. Certified true copy of the

Letter of Administration
issued by RTC Manila, Branch
51, in Sp. Proc. No. 87-42980
appointing Atty. Rafael S.
Dizon as Judicial Administrator
of the estate of Jose P.
Fernandez; (p. 102, CTA records)
and "L"

14. Certification of Payment of

estate taxes Nos. 2052 and
2053, both dated April 27, 1990,
issued by the Office of the
Regional Director, Revenue
Region No. 4-C, San Pablo
City, with attachments
(pp. 103-104, CTA records.). "M" to "M-5"

Respondent's [BIR] counsel presented on June 26, 1995 one witness in the
person of Alberto Enriquez, who was one of the revenue examiners who
conducted the investigation on the estate tax case of the late Jose P.
Fernandez. In the course of the direct examination of the witness, he
identified the following:

Documents/
Signatures BIR Record

1. Estate Tax Return prepared by

the BIR; p. 138

2. Signatures of Ma. Anabella

Abuloc and Alberto Enriquez,
Jr. appearing at the lower
Portion of Exh. "1"; -do-

3. Memorandum for the Commissioner,

dated July 19, 1991, prepared by
revenue examiners, Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc, Alberto S. Enriquez and
Raymund S. Gallardo; Reviewed by
Maximino V. Tagle pp. 143-144

4. Signature of Alberto S.
Enriquez appearing at the
lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do-

5. Signature of Ma. Anabella A.

Abuloc appearing at the
lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do-

6. Signature of Raymund S.
Gallardo appearing at the
Lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do-

7. Signature of Maximino V.
Tagle also appearing on
p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do-
 8. Summary of revenue
Enforcement Officers Audit
Report, dated July 19, 1991; p. 139

9. Signature of Alberto
Enriquez at the lower
portion of Exh. "3"; -do-

10. Signature of Ma. Anabella A.

Abuloc at the lower
portion of Exh. "3"; -do-

11. Signature of Raymond S.

Gallardo at the lower
portion of Exh. "3"; -do-

12. Signature of Maximino

V. Tagle at the lower
portion of Exh. "3"; -do-

13. Demand letter (FAS-E-87-91-00),

signed by the Asst. Commissioner
for Collection for the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, demanding
payment of the amount of
P66,973,985.40; and p. 169

14. Assessment Notice FAS-E-87-91-00 pp. 169-170[22]

The CTA's Ruling

On June 17, 1997, the CTA denied the said petition for review. Citing this Court's ruling in Vda.
de Oate v. Court of Appeals,[23] the CTA opined that the aforementioned pieces of evidence
introduced by the BIR were admissible in evidence. The CTA ratiocinated:
Although the above-mentioned documents were not formally offered as evidence
for respondent, considering that respondent has been declared to have waived the
presentation thereof during the hearing on March 20, 1996, still they could be
considered as evidence for respondent since they were properly identified during
the presentation of respondent's witness, whose testimony was duly recorded as
part of the records of this case. Besides, the documents marked as respondent's
exhibits formed part of the BIR records of the case.[24]
Nevertheless, the CTA did not fully adopt the assessment made by the BIR and it came up with
its own computation of the deficiency estate tax, to wit:

Conjugal Real Property P 5,062,016.00

Conjugal Personal Prop. 33,021,999.93
Gross Conjugal Estate 38,084,015.93
Less: Deductions 26,250,000.00
Net Conjugal Estate P 11,834,015.93
Less: Share of Surviving Spouse 5,917,007.96
Net Share in Conjugal Estate P 5,917,007.96
Add: Capital/Paraphernal
Properties P44,652,813.66
Less: Capital/Paraphernal
Deductions 44,652,813.66
Net Taxable Estate P 50,569,821.62
============

Estate Tax Due P 29,935,342.97

Add: 25% Surcharge for Late Filing 7,483,835.74
Add: Penalties for-No notice of death 15.00
No CPA certificate 300.00
Total deficiency estate tax P 37,419,493.71
=============

exclusive of 20% interest from due date of its payment until full payment thereof
[Sec. 283 (b), Tax Code of 1987].[25]

Thus, the CTA disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, viewed from all the foregoing, the Court finds the petition
unmeritorious and denies the same. Petitioner and/or the heirs of Jose P.
Fernandez are hereby ordered to pay to respondent the amount
of P37,419,493.71 plus 20% interest from the due date of its payment until full
payment thereof as estate tax liability of the estate of Jose P. Fernandez who died
on November 7, 1987.

SO ORDERED.[26]

Aggrieved, petitioner, on March 2, 1998, went to the CA via a petition for review.[27]
The CA's Ruling

On April 30, 1999, the CA affirmed the CTA's ruling. Adopting in full the CTA's findings, the
CA ruled that the petitioner's act of filing an estate tax return with the BIR and the issuance of
BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not deprive the BIR Commissioner of her authority to
re-examine or re-assess the said return filed on behalf of the Estate.[28]

On May 31, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [29] which the CA denied in its
Resolution[30] dated November 3, 1999.

Hence, the instant Petition raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not the admission of evidence which were not formally offered
by the respondent BIR by the Court of Tax Appeals which was subsequently
upheld by the Court of Appeals is contrary to the Rules of Court and rulings of
this Honorable Court;

2. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals erred in
recognizing/considering the estate tax return prepared and filed by respondent
BIR knowing that the probate court appointed administrator of the estate of
Jose P. Fernandez had previously filed one as in fact, BIR Certification
Clearance Nos. 2052 and 2053 had been issued in the estate's favor;

3. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals erred in
disallowing the valid and enforceable claims of creditors against the estate, as
lawful deductions despite clear and convincing evidence thereof; and

4. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals erred in
validating erroneous double imputation of values on the very same estate
properties in the estate tax return it prepared and filed which effectively
bloated the estate's assets.[31]

The petitioner claims that in as much as the valid claims of creditors against the Estate are in
excess of the gross estate, no estate tax was due; that the lack of a formal offer of evidence is
fatal to BIR's cause; that the doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oate has already been abandoned in a
long line of cases in which the Court held that evidence not formally offered is without any
weight or value; that Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence requiring a formal offer of
evidence is mandatory in character; that, while BIR's witness Alberto Enriquez (Alberto) in his
testimony before the CTA identified the pieces of evidence aforementioned such that the same
were marked, BIR's failure to formally offer said pieces of evidence and depriving petitioner the
opportunity to cross-examine Alberto, render the same inadmissible in evidence; that
assuming arguendo that the ruling in Vda. de Oate is still applicable, BIR failed to comply with
the doctrine's requisites because the documents herein remained simply part of the BIR records
and were not duly incorporated in the court records; that the BIR failed to consider that although
the actual payments made to the Estate creditors were lower than their respective claims, such
were compromise agreements reached long after the Estate's liability had been settled by the
filing of its estate tax return and the issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053; and that
the reckoning date of the claims against the Estate and the settlement of the estate tax due should
be at the time the estate tax return was filed by the judicial administrator and the issuance of said
BIR Certifications and not at the time the aforementioned Compromise Agreements were entered
into with the Estate's creditors.[32]

On the other hand, respondent counters that the documents, being part of the records of the case
and duly identified in a duly recorded testimony are considered evidence even if the same were
not formally offered; that the filing of the estate tax return by the Estate and the issuance of
BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not deprive the BIR of its authority to examine the
return and assess the estate tax; and that the factual findings of the CTA as affirmed by the CA
may no longer be reviewed by this Court via a petition for review.[33]

The Issues

There are two ultimate issues which require resolution in this case:

First. Whether or not the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the admission of the pieces
of evidence which were not formally offered by the BIR; and

Second. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the CTA in the latter's determination of the
deficiency estate tax imposed against the Estate.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases
filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases.
Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as
the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before
the CTA.[34] Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.

The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of Vda. de Oate, which reiterated this Court's
previous rulings in People v. Napat-a[35] and People v. Mate[36] on the admission and
consideration of exhibits which were not formally offered during the trial. Although in a long
line of cases many of which were decided after Vda. de Oate, we held that courts cannot consider
evidence which has not been formally offered,[37] nevertheless, petitioner cannot validly assume
that the doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oate has already been abandoned. Recently, in Ramos v.
Dizon,[38] this Court, applying the said doctrine, ruled that the trial court judge therein committed
no error when he admitted and considered the respondents' exhibits in the resolution of the case,
notwithstanding the fact that the same
were not formally offered. Likewise, in Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,[39] the Court made reference to said doctrine in resolving the issues therein.
Indubitably, the doctrine laid down in Vda. De Oate still subsists in this jurisdiction. In Vda. de
Oate, we held that:

From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the
same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular
document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v.
Aviles [186 SCRA 385], we had the occasion to make a distinction between
identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said
that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking
of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its
case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if
he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he
chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider
the same.
 However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403] citing People v. Mate [103 SCRA
484], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered
to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following
requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified
by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.[40]

From the foregoing declaration, however, it is clear that Vda. de Oate is merely an
exception to the general rule. Being an exception, it may be applied only when there is strict
compliance with the requisites mentioned therein; otherwise, the general rule in Section 34 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should prevail.

In this case, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied. The assailed pieces of
evidence were presented and marked during the trial particularly when Alberto took the witness
stand. Alberto identified these pieces of evidence in his direct testimony.[41] He was also
subjected to cross-examination and re-cross examination by petitioner.[42]But Albertos account
and the exchanges between Alberto and petitioner did not sufficiently describe the contents of the
said pieces of evidence presented by the BIR. In fact, petitioner sought that the lead examiner,
one Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc, be summoned to testify, inasmuch as Alberto was incompetent to
answer questions relative to the working papers. [43] The lead examiner never testified. Moreover,
while Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's evidence was duly recorded, the BIR documents
themselves were not incorporated in the records of the case.

A common fact threads through Vda. de Oate and Ramos that does not exist at all in the instant
case. In the aforementioned cases, the exhibits were marked at the pre-trial proceedings to
warrant the pronouncement that the same were duly incorporated in the records of the case. Thus,
we held in Ramos:

In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been satisfied. The
exhibits in question were presented and marked during the pre-trial of the
case thus, they have been incorporated into the records. Further, Elpidio
himself explained the contents of these exhibits when he was interrogated by
respondents' counsel...

xxxx

But what further defeats petitioner's cause on this issue is that respondents'
exhibits were marked and admitted during the pre-trial stage as shown by the Pre-
Trial Order quoted earlier.[44]
While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, [45] as rules of procedure are
not ends in themselves and are primarily intended as tools in the administration of justice, the
presentation of the BIR's evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be
disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the
truth of BIR's claims against the Estate. [46] The BIR's failure to formally offer these pieces of
evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to its cause. [47] Such failure is aggravated by the fact
that not even a single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we
take against the BIR.

Per the records of this case, the BIR was directed to present its evidence [48] in the hearing of
February 21, 1996, but BIR's counsel failed to appear.[49] The CTA denied petitioner's motion to
consider BIR's presentation of evidence as waived, with a warning to BIR that such presentation
would be considered waived if BIR's evidence would not be presented at the next hearing. Again,
in the hearing of March 20, 1996, BIR's counsel failed to appear.[50] Thus, in its
Resolution[51] dated March 21, 1996, the CTA considered the BIR to have waived presentation of
its evidence. In the same Resolution, the parties were directed to file their respective
memorandum. Petitioner complied but BIR failed to do so.[52] In all of these proceedings, BIR
was duly notified. Hence, in this case, we are constrained to apply our ruling in Heirs of Pedro
Pasag v. Parocha:[53]
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their
findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by
the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose
or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other
hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be
required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.

Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v.
Court of Appeals ruled that the formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived
after failing to submit it within a considerable period of time. It explained
that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three
(3) months because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-
compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless
delays and derail the speedy administration of justice."
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had
reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a
formal offer of documentary or object evidence. Despite several extensions of
 time to make their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their
commitment and allowed almost five months to lapse before finally submitting
it. Petitioners' failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is
anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice.

Having disposed of the foregoing procedural issue, we proceed to discuss the merits of the case.

Ordinarily, the CTA's findings, as affirmed by the CA, are entitled to the highest respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the lower courts committed gross error
in the appreciation of facts.[54] In this case, however, we find the decision of the CA affirming
that of the CTA tainted with palpable error.

It is admitted that the claims of the Estate's aforementioned creditors have been condoned. As a
mode of extinguishing an obligation,[55] condonation or remission of debt[56] is defined as:

an act of liberality, by virtue of which, without receiving any equivalent, the

creditor renounces the enforcement of the obligation, which is extinguished in its
entirety or in that part or aspect of the same to which the remission refers. It is an
essential characteristic of remission that it be gratuitous, that there is no
equivalent received for the benefit given; once such equivalent exists, the nature
of the act changes. It may become dation in payment when the creditor receives a
thing different from that stipulated; or novation, when the object or principal
conditions of the obligation should be changed; or compromise, when the matter
renounced is in litigation or dispute and in exchange of some concession which
the creditor receives.[57]

Verily, the second issue in this case involves the construction of Section 79 [58] of the National
Internal Revenue Code[59] (Tax Code) which provides for the allowable deductions from the gross
estate of the decedent. The specific question is whether the actual claims of the aforementioned
creditors may be fully allowed as deductions from the gross estate of Jose despite the fact that
the said claims were reduced or condoned through compromise agreements entered into by the
Estate with its creditors.

Claims against the estate, as allowable deductions from the gross estate under Section 79 of the
Tax Code, are basically a reproduction of the deductions allowed under Section 89 (a) (1) (C)
and (E) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 (CA 466), otherwise known as the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, and which was the first codification of Philippine tax laws. Philippine
tax laws were, in turn, based on the federal tax laws of the United States. Thus, pursuant to
established rules of statutory construction, the decisions of American courts construing the
federal tax code are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of our own tax laws.[60]

It is noteworthy that even in the United States, there is some dispute as to whether the deductible
amount for a claim against the estate is fixed as of the decedent's death which is the general rule,
or the same should be adjusted to reflect post-death developments, such as where a settlement
between the parties results in the reduction of the amount actually paid. [61] On one hand,
the U.S. court ruled that the appropriate deduction is the value that the claim had at the date of
the decedent's death.[62] Also, as held in Propstra v. U.S.,[63] where a lien claimed against the
estate was certain and enforceable on the date of the decedent's death, the fact that the claimant
subsequently settled for lesser amount did not preclude the estate from deducting the entire
amount of the claim for estate tax purposes. These pronouncements essentially confirm the
general principle that post-death developments are not material in determining the amount of the
deduction.

On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) opines that post-death
settlement should be taken into consideration and the claim should be allowed as a deduction
only to the extent of the amount actually paid. [64] Recognizing the dispute, the Service released
Proposed Regulations in 2007 mandating that the deduction would be limited to the actual
amount paid.[65]

In announcing its agreement with Propstra,[66] the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held:

We are persuaded that the Ninth Circuit's decision...in Propstra correctly apply
the Ithaca Trust date-of-death valuation principle to enforceable claims against
the estate. As we interpret Ithaca Trust, when the Supreme Court announced the
date-of-death valuation principle, it was making a judgment about the nature of
the federal estate tax specifically, that it is a tax imposed on the act of transferring
property by will or intestacy and, because the act on which the tax is levied occurs
at a discrete time, i.e., the instance of death, the net value of the property
transferred should be ascertained, as nearly as possible, as of that time. This
analysis supports broad application of the date-of-death valuation rule.[67]

We express our agreement with the date-of-death valuation rule, made pursuant to the ruling of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States.[68] First. There is no law, nor do we
discern any legislative intent in our tax laws, which disregards the date-of-death valuation
principle and particularly provides that post-death developments must be considered in
determining the net value of the estate. It bears emphasis that tax burdens are not to be imposed,
nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statute expressly and clearly imports, tax statutes
being construed strictissimi juris against the government.[69] Any doubt on whether a person,
article or activity is taxable is generally resolved against taxation. [70] Second. Such construction
finds relevance and consistency in our Rules on Special Proceedings wherein the term "claims"
required to be presented against a decedent's estate is generally construed to mean debts or
demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his
lifetime, or liability contracted by the deceased before his death.[71] Therefore, the claims existing
at the time of death are significant to, and should be made the basis of, the determination of
allowable deductions.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision

dated April 30, 1999 and the Resolution dated November 3, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. S.P. No. 46947 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Bureau of Internal Revenue's
deficiency estate tax assessment against the Estate of Jose P. Fernandez is
hereby NULLIFIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES RAMON and ESTRELLA RAGUDO, petitioners, vs. FABELLA ESTATE

TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51230, to wit:

1. Decision dated 19 July 2000,[1] affirming with modification an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court at Pasig City, Branch 155, in an action for recovery of possession
thereat commenced by the herein respondent against the petitioners; and

2. Resolution dated 29 January 2001,[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The facts may be briefly stated, as follows:

 Earlier, the tenants of a parcel of land at Mandaluyong City with an area of 6,825 square
meters (hereinafter referred to as the Fabella Estate), which formed part of the estate of the late
Don Dionisio M. Fabella, organized themselves and formed the Fabella Estate Tenants
Association, Inc. (FETA), for the purpose of acquiring said property and distributing it to its
members.

Unable to raise the amount sufficient to buy the property from the heirs of Don Dionisio M.
Fabella, FETA applied for a loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) under the latters Community Mortgage Program.

However, as a pre-condition for the loan, and in order that specific portions of the property
could be allotted to each tenant who will have to pay the corresponding price therefor, NHMFC
required all tenants to become members of FETA.

Accordingly, all the tenants occupying portions of the Fabella Estate were asked to join
FETA. While the rest did, the spouses Ramon Ragudo and Estrella Ragudo who were occupying
the lot subject matter of this controversy, consisting of about 105 square meters of the Fabella
Estate, refused to join the Association. Consequently, the portion occupied by them was awarded
to Mrs. Miriam De Guzman, a qualified FETA member.

Later, and with the help of the city government of Mandaluyong, FETA became the
registered owner of the entire Fabella Estate, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2902 issued in its name by the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong in 1989.

To effect the ejectment of the spouses Ragudo from the portion in question which they
continued to occupy despite the earlier award thereof to Mrs. Miriam de Guzman, FETA filed
against them a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City.

In a decision dated 6 August 1990, the MeTC dismissed the unlawful detainer case on the
ground that it was an improper remedy because the Ragudos had been occupying the subject
portion for more than one (1) year prior to the filing of the complaint, hence the proper action
should have been one for recovery of possession before the proper regional trial court. FETA
appealed the dismissal to the Regional Trial Court at Pasig City, which affirmed the same.

FETA then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for recovery of possession against the
Ragudos. In their Answer, the spouses interposed the defense that they have already acquired
ownership of the disputed portion since they have been in occupation thereof in the concept of an
owner for more than forty (40) years. They further argued that FETAs title over the entire Fabella
Estate is fake because as appearing on TCT No. 2902, it was originally registered as OCT No.
13, a title which has been previously adjudged null and void by RTC-Pasig in a much earlier case
involving different parties. Finally, they insist that FETAs right to recover has been barred by
laches in view of their more than 40-year occupancy of the portion in question.
 Eventually, in a decision dated 29 July 1994, [3] the trial court rendered judgment in FETAs
favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) ordering [spouses Ragudo] to vacate the premises in question and to turn over possession
thereof to [FETA];

2) to pay [FETA] rent in the amount of P500.00 for the month of November 1981 and every
month thereafter until they vacate the premises;

3) to pay [FETA] attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00;

4) to pay [FETA] the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

5) to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Therefrom, the spouses Ragudo went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, whereat their
appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51230.

Meanwhile, pending resolution by the appellate court of the Ragudos appeal, FETA filed
with the trial court a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, to which the
Ragudos interposed an Opposition, followed by FETAs Reply to Opposition. Then, on 11
October 1994, the Ragudos filed with the trial court a Rejoinder to Reply With Counter-Motion
to Admit Attached Documentary Evidence Relevant to the Pending Incident.[4] Attached thereto
and sought to be admitted therein were the following documents and photographs, to wit:

1. Letter dated 21 November 1989[5] of the spouses Ragudos son, Engr. Aurelio Ragudo,
addressed to FETA, stating therein that the Ragudos were willing to become FETA
members;

2. Joint Affidavit, dated 07 October 1994, of three (3) residents of the Fabella Estate;[6]

3. Photos of three (3) alleged houses of Miriam de Guzman located at the Fabella Estate;[7]

4. Photos of two (2) alleged houses of the sons of Miriam de Guzman located at the Fabella
Estate;[8]

5. Photo of a lot allegedly awarded by FETA to its president, Amparo Nobleza, located at the
Fabella Estate;[9] and
 6. Photo of a three (3)-storey house of Noblezas relative named Architect Fernandez located
at the Fabella Estate.[10]

In an order dated 25 November 1994, the trial court admitted in evidence the attachments to
the Ragudos' aforementioned Rejoinder With Counter-Motion, etc., and ultimately denied FETAs
motion for execution pending appeal.

Later, in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230, the Ragudos filed with the appellate court a Motion To
Admit Certain Documentary Evidence by Way of Partial New Trial, In the Interest of Justice,
[11]
thereunder seeking the admission in evidence of the very documents earlier admitted by the
trial court in connection with the then pending incident of execution pending appeal, and praying
that said documents be made part of the records and considered in the resolution of their appeal
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230.

This time, however, the Ragudos were not as lucky. For, in a Resolution dated 19 May 1997,
[12]
the appellate court denied their aforesaid motion and ordered expunged from the records of
the appealed case the documents they sought admission of, on the ground that they could not be
considered as newly discovered evidence under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Dispositively, the
Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant motion to admit certain documentary evidence by way of partial new
trial is DENIED for lack of merit.

ACCORDINGLY, the Joint Affidavit dated October 7, 1994 of Honesto Garcia III and Miguela
L. Balbino and the latter of Aurelio Raguo to Atty. Cesar G. Untalan dated November 21, 1989
are ordered EXPUNGED from the records of this case.

SO ORDERED.

The Ragudos moved for a reconsideration, invoking liberality in the exercise of judicial
discretion and the interest of equity and substantial justice. Unmoved, the appellate court denied
their motion in its subsequent Resolution of 24 September 1997.[13]

Eventually, in the herein assailed decision dated 19 July 2000, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the Ragudos appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230 and affirmed with modification the
RTC decision in the main case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, except for
the second clause of the dispositive portion which should be MODIFIED, as follows:

2) to pay [FETA] rent in the amount of P500.00 for the month of November, 1989 and every
month thereafter until they vacate the premises.

SO ORDERED.
 With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its
equally challenged Resolution of 29 January 2001, the Ragudos are now with us via the instant
recourse, commending for our resolution the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING IN

EVIDENCE THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE INTRODUCED BY RAGUDO AT
THE APPELLATE LEVEL ON THE GROUND OF LIBERALITY OF PROCEDURAL
RULES, EQUITY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, THE MISTAKE AND
EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THEIR FORMER COUNSEL, AND
THE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PARENS PATRIAE CLAUSE OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.

2. WHETHER OR NOT ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND EQUITABLE LACHES

HAD SET IN TO WARRANT THE CONTINUED POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT
LOT BY RAGUDO AND WHETHER THE SAME PRINCIPLES HAD CREATED A
VESTED RIGHT IN FAVOR OF RAGUDO TO CONTINUE TO POSSESS AND
OWN THE SUBJECT LOT.[14]

Informed of Mr. Ramon Ragudos death on 26 March 2001, the Court, in a resolution dated
14 January 2002,[15] allowed his substitution by his other heirs.

The recourse must fall.

Relative to the first issue, it is petitioners submission that the appellate court committed an
error when it refused admission as evidence in the main case the documents earlier admitted by
the trial court in connection with FETAs motion for execution pending appeal. Appealing to this
Courts sense of judicial discretion in the interest of equity and substantial justice, petitioners
explain that the documents in question were not presented and offered in evidence during the
trial of the main case before the RTC due to the honest mistake and excusable negligence of their
former counsel, Atty. Celso A. Tabobo, Jr.

We are not persuaded.

In this jurisdiction, well-entrenched is the rule that the mistake and negligence of counsel to
introduce, during the trial of a case, certain pieces of evidence bind his client. [16] For sure,
in Aguila vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas, [17] we even ruled that the omitted evidence by
reason of counsels mistake or negligence, cannot be invoked as a ground for new trial:

On the effects of counsels acts upon his client, this Court has categorically declared:

It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the
conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had
he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to
be admitted and reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as
new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. x x x Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency
of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense, or
the burden of proof, x x x failure to introduce certain evidence, to summon witnesses and to
argue the case are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so
great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his case. (Vol. 2,
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, pp. 218, 219-220, citing Rivero v. Santos, et al., 98
Phil. 500, 503-504; Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279; Montes v. Court, 48 Phil. 64; People v.
Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167; U.S. v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33; see also People v. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151,
1164). In the 1988 case of Palanca v. American Food, etc. (24 SCRA 819, 828), this principle
was reiterated. (Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 296, 304). [Citations in the original;
Emphasis supplied].

This is, as it should be, because a counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are
necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his
client.[18] And, any act performed by counsel within the scope of his general and implied
authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of the client himself and consequently, the
mistake or negligence of the clients counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment against him.[19]

A contrary rule would be inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice. For, all that a
losing party will do is to invoke the mistake or negligence of his counsel as a ground for
reversing or setting aside a judgment adverse to him, thereby putting no end to litigation. Again,
to quote from our decision in Aguila:

Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and recognize his earlier
claims to the disputed property on the justification that his counsel was grossly inept. Such a
reason is hardly plausible as the petitioners new counsel should know. Otherwise, all a defeated
party would have to do to salvage his case is claim neglect or mistake on the part of his
counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There would be no end to
litigation if this were allowed as every shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of
challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would
likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum.
This would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any time by
the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. (Emphasis supplied).

Admittedly, the rule thus stated admits of exceptions. Thus, in cases where the counsels
mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court [20] or when
he is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the clients deprivation of his property without due
process of law,[21] the client is not bound by his counsels mistakes and the case may even be
reopened in order to give the client another chance to present his case.

Unfortunately, however, petitioners case does not fall under any of the exceptions but rather
squarely within the ambit of the rule.
 As it is, petitioners were given full opportunity during the trial of the main case to adduce
any and all relevant evidence to advance their cause. In no sense, therefore, may it be argued that
they were denied due process of law. As we said in Antonio vs. Court of Appeals,[22] a client
cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court and there is no denial of due process as
long as he has been given an opportunity to be heard, which, we emphasize, was done in the
instant case.

Petitioners further argue that the documents which their former counsel failed to adduce in
evidence during trial of the main case must be allowed to stay in the records thereof and duly
considered in the resolution of their appeal because they were duly admitted in the trial court
during the hearing on the incidental motion for execution pending appeal.

Again, we are not persuaded.

With the reality that those documents were never presented and formally offered during the
trial of the main case, their belated admission for purposes of having them duly considered in the
resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 51230 would certainly collide with Section 34, Rule 132, of the
Rules of Court, which reads:

SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (Emphasis
supplied).

To stress, it was only during the hearing of the motion for execution pending appeal that said
documents were presented and offered in evidence. Sure, the trial court admitted them, but the
admission was only for the purpose for which they were offered, that is, by way of opposition to
FETAs motion for execution pending appeal. It is basic in the law of evidence that the court shall
consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it was offered.[23]

While the said documents may have the right to stay in the records of the case for purposes
of the incidental issue of execution pending appeal, they do not have that same right insofar as
far as the main case is concerned, and ought not be considered in the resolution thereof.

Petitioners next contend that acquisitive prescription and equitable laches had set in, thereby
vesting them with a right to a continued possession of the subject lot.

The contention holds no water.

It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the
Torrens system. In a long line of cases, [24] we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title
cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty
Corporation vs. Vallez, et al.,[25] we held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when
the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code [26] in relation to
Act 496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529[27]):
Appellants claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126 of the
Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act
shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse
possession. Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and
inconsequential. (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioners would take exception from the above settled rule by arguing that FETA as well as
its predecessor in interest, Don Dionisio M. Fabella, are guilty of laches and should, therefore, be
already precluded from asserting their right as against them, invoking, in this regard, the rulings
of this Court[28] to the effect that while a registered land may not be acquired by prescription, yet,
by virtue of the registered owners inaction and neglect, his right to recover the possession thereof
may have been converted into a stale demand.

While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners posture, a closer look at our
jurisprudence negates their submission.

To start with, the lower court found that petitioners possession of the subject lot was merely
at the tolerance of its former lawful owner. In this connection, Bishop vs. Court of
Appeals[29]teaches that if the claimants possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful
owner, the latters right to recover possession is never barred by laches:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed
that they were aware of the petitioners occupation of the property, and regardless of the
length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at
all. This right is never barred by laches. (Emphasis supplied).

To the same effect is our pronouncement in Urquiaga vs. Court of Appeals,[30] to wit:

We find no reversible error committed by respondent Court of Appeals. We sustain private

respondents ownership of Lot No. 6532-B. As between the verbal claim of ownership by
petitioners through possession for a long period of time, which was found by the court a
quo to be inherently weak, and the validly documented claim of ownership of respondents,
the latter must naturally prevail. (Emphasis supplied).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
JOSEFINA CRUZ-AREVALO, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2005
Complainant, [OCA-IPI No. 04-2122-RTJ]

Present:

- versus - Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),

Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.

JUDGE LYDIA QUERUBIN-LAYOSA,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Promulgated:
Quezon City,
Respondent. July 14, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative Complaint[1] filed by Josefina Cruz-Arevalo charges Judge Lydia

Querubin-Layosa[2] with manifest bias and partiality and ignorance of the law relative to Civil
Case No. Q-03-50379, entitled Josefina Cruz-Arevalo and Conrado R. Cruz v. Home
Development Mutual Fund and Federico S. Quimbo.
 Complainant narrates that Conrado R. Cruz executed an authorization letter[3] and a
special power of attorney (SPA)[4] in her favor to represent him in Civil Case No. Q-03-50379
while he undergoes medical treatment in the United States of America (USA). Notwithstanding
the presentation of the authorization letter and SPA during the pre-trial, respondent judge
declared Cruz non-suited due to his absence. She also refused to issue an order to that effect thus
depriving Cruz the right to challenge her order by way of petition for certiorari. Complainant
also assails the order of respondent judge to exclude several paragraphs in the Affidavit which
was adopted as the direct testimony of her witness without giving her counsel a chance to
comment on the objections raised by the defendants. Moreover, she refused to issue a written
order excluding certain paragraphs thus depriving complainant the opportunity to
file certiorari proceedings.

Complainant likewise accuses respondent judge of inaction, indifference or collusion by

silence[5] with the defendants for not acting on her Motions for Writs of Subpoena Duces
Tecum and Ad Testificandum[6] thus providing opportunity for defendant Quimbo to avoid
compliance therewith. Complainant prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure impartiality and
proper dispensation of justice.[7]

On November 14, 2004, respondent judge made the following ruling in Civil Case No. Q-03-
50379:

Considering that plaintiff Josefina Cruz-Arevalo had filed a Complaint against

undersigned Presiding Judge with the Office of the Court Administrator and

considering further that she had also filed with said Office a motion for re-raffle

of this case, on grounds of partiality and bias on the part of said Judge, while such

grounds for re-raffle are unfounded and while there is no legal basis for inhibition,

if only to assuage her fears of not obtaining a fair and impartial trial, and having

already entertained serious doubt on her objectivity in trying and eventually

deciding the case, the undersigned Presiding Judge deems it wise to voluntarily

inhibit herself from trying the case.

Accordingly, undersigned Presiding Judge hereby inhibits herself from trying this

case.
 Let the entire record be forwarded to the Office of the Executive Judge

through the Clerk of Court of this Court for re-raffle.[8]

In her Comment[9] dated January 12, 2005, respondent judge explains that the letter
presented by complainant allegedly authorizing her to represent Cruz in the pre-trial of Civil
Case No. Q-03-50379 is defective because it was not duly notarized and authenticated. She
likewise found the SPA defective as it pertains to complainants authority to receive Cruzs
contribution to the PAG-IBIG Provident Fund and not to represent him in the pre-trial of the civil
case. Thus, finding the absence of Cruz during the pre-trial inexcusable and without any proper
representation in his behalf, respondent judge dismissed the complaint insofar as he is concerned.

As regards the exclusion of several paragraphs in the Affidavit constituting as the direct
testimony of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., respondent judge points out that she gave the other
party the chance to go over the affidavit and make objections thereto like any direct testimonial
evidence. She claims that no written order is necessary as demanded by complainants counsel
because her rulings were made in open court during the course of trial and are already reflected
in the transcript of the stenographic notes. With regard to complainants Motions for Writs of
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum, respondent judge avers that they were not given
due course because the legal fees for said motions were unpaid and the person alleged to have
possession or control of the documents sought to be produced is not named or specified therein.
[10]

In its Report[11] dated October 18, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
complainants accusations unmeritorious and recommended the dismissal of the administrative
case for lack of merit.[12]

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

The records clearly show that Conrado R. Cruz was absent during the pre-trial of Civil
Case No. Q-03-50379, despite the specific mandate of the Rules of Court for parties and their
counsel to personally appear therein.[13] While non-appearance of a party may be excused if a
duly authorized representative shall appear in his behalf, [14] however Cruz failed to validly
constitute complainant because his authorization letter and SPA were not respectively
authenticated and specific as to its purpose. Without any authorized representative, the failure of
Cruz to appear at the pre-trial made him non-suited. Respondent judge thus correctly dismissed
the complaint in so far as he is concerned. [15]
 As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of complainants witness,
the rule is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If
a partys offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be
attached to form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for
the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the
proposed testimony. These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded
evidence and are made for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered
against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence.
The appellate court will better understand and appreciate the assignment of error if the evidence
involved is included in the record of the case.[16]

On the other hand, the ruling on an objection must be given immediately after
an objection is made, as what respondent judge did, unless the court desires to take a reasonable
time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during the
trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the
situations presented by the ruling.[17] Respondent judge correctly ordered the striking out of
portions in Atty. Arevalos affidavit which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
[18]
Objections based on irrelevancy and immateriality need no specification or
explanation. Relevancy or materiality of evidence is a matter of logic, since it is determined
simply by ascertaining its logical connection to a fact in issue in the case. We agree with OCAs
observation that:

There is also nothing irregular when respondent [judge] did not issue an
order to reflect the objections of the defense counsel to each of the allegations in
the sworn affidavit which was adopted as the direct testimony of complainants
counsel as the courts rulings thereto were made during the trial. As pointed out by
respondent [judge], these matters are already reflected in the transcript of
stenographic notes and are not subject to written order. Orders resolving motions
for continuance made in the presence of the adverse party, or those made in the
course of a hearing or trial, may properly be made orally. (Echaus vs. CA, GR No.
57343, July 23, 1990, [187 SCRA 672]). Moreover, the acts of a judge in his/her
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though erroneous in
the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption which complainant failed to prove
in the instant case.

Further, while records show that the person alleged to have possession or control of the
documents sought to be produced is actually named or specified in the Motions for Writs of
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum filed by complainant in Civil Case No. Q-03-
50379, respondent judge was correct not to have entertained the same as the legal fees
corresponding thereto were not paid. Respondent judge is not obliged to remind complainant or
her counsel regarding said fees as the rules of procedure and practice already mandate that fees
prescribed in filing of pleadings or other application which initiates an action or proceeding shall
be paid in full.[19] However, this issue has become moot as respondent judge subsequently issued
the subpoena prayed for after the complainant paid the required fees.

Finally, complainant failed to present evidence to show the alleged bias of respondent
judge; mere suspicion that a judge was partial is not enough. [20] Bare allegations of partiality will
not suffice in an absence of a clear showing that will overcome the presumption that the judge
dispensed justice without fear or favor. It bears to stress again that a judges appreciation or
misappreciation of the sufficiency of evidence adduced by the parties, or the correctness of a
judges orders or rulings on the objections of counsels during the hearing, without proof of malice
on the part of respondent judge, is not sufficient to show bias or partiality.[21] The Court will not
shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring members of the bench. At the
same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only
serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against Judge Lydia Querubin-Layosa,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
ADELA G. RAYMUNDO, EDGARDO R. G.R. No. 171036
RAYMUNDO, LOURDES R. RAYMUNDO,
TERESITA N. RAYMUNDO, EVELYN R. Present:
SANTOS, ZENAIDA N. RAYMUNDO, LUIS N.
RAYMUNDO, JR. and LUCITA R.
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
DELOS REYES,
CARPIO MORALES,
Petitioners,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

- versus -

ERNESTO LUNARIA, ROSALINDA RAMOS Promulgated:

and HELEN MENDOZA,
 Respondents. October 17, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review are the Court of Appeals Decision [1] dated October 10,
2005 and the Resolution[2] dated January 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593.

The facts in this case are as follows:

Sometime in May 1996, petitioners approached respondent Lunaria to help them find a buyer for
their property situated at Marilao, Bulacan with an area of 12,126 square meters for the amount
of P60,630,000. Respondent Lunaria was promised a 5% agents commission in the event that he
finds a buyer. After respondents found a buyer, Cecilio Hipolito, an Exclusive Authority to Sell [3] was
executed embodying the agreement made by the parties. After the corresponding Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property[4] was registered in the Registry of Deeds, a copy thereof was given to the Far
East Bank and Trust Co., which was then holding in escrow the amount of P50,000,000 to be
disbursed or paid against the total consideration or price of the property.

On February 14, 1997, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the co-owners, advised respondents to go
to the bank to receive the amount of P1,196,000 as partial payment of their total commission.
Also, respondents were instructed to return after seven days to get the balance of the commission
due them.

On February 21, 1997, respondents returned to the bank. However, the check covering
the balance of their commission was already given by the bank manager to Lourdes R.
Raymundo, the representative of the petitioners. Respondents tried to get the check from the
petitioners, however, they were told that there is nothing more due them by way of commission
as they have already divided and distributed the balance of the commissions among their
nephews and nieces.
 For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal agreement entered into
by the parties after the execution of the written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the
5% agents commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for
Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito. The share given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be
in consideration for the help she would extend in the processing of documents of sale of the property,
the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in securing an order from
the court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the other hand, will be used by him for the
payment of realty taxes.

Hence, for failure of the respondents to receive the balance of their agents commission, they filed
an action for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Courtof Valenzuela City,
Branch 172. On January 22, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision [5] in favor of the
respondents. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P1,834,900.00, representing the unpaid commission, plus interest thereon at the
legal rate from the filing of this case until fully paid;

2) Ordering the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P200,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and

3) Ordering the defendants [to], jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the
amount of P150,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed. In a Decision dated October 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modification that the amount of moral and
exemplary damages awarded to respondents shall be reduced. The dispositive portion reads:
 WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 22, 2002 is
affirmed, subject to the modification that the award of moral damages is reduced
to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages to P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On October 28, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [8] However, it was
denied in a Resolution dated January 10, 2006. Hence, the instant petition raising the following
issues:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE

PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE IN THIS CASE (DECISION, PAGE
7, PARAGRAPH 1). THIS PRINCIPLE HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE
FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.

II.

FURTHER, IT ERRED IN REQUIRING, ALBEIT IMPLICITLY, THE

PETITIONERS TO ESTABLISH THE VERBAL AGREEMENT MODIFYING
THE EARLIER WRITTEN AGREEMENT (THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY
TO SELL) BY MORE THAN A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
(DECISION, PAGE 8). THIS IS PLAINLY CONTRARY TO LAW THAT
MERELY REQUIRES PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES.

III.

FINALLY, EVEN CONCEDING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT

PETITIONERS STILL OWE THE RESPONDENTS THE BALANCE OF
THEIR COMMISSION, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING
THE PETITIONERS ARE EACH JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY [LIABLE]
FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE ENTIRE BROKERS FEES. THIS RULING
HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND IS CONTRARY TO ART. 1207 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE.[9]

Plainly stated, the issues for resolution are: Did the Court of Appeals err (1) in applying
the parol evidence rule; (2) in requiring petitioners to establish their case by more than a
preponderance of evidence; and (3) in holding petitioners jointly and severally liable for the
payment of the entire brokers fees?

Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the
parol evidence rule to the facts of the case because the verbal agreement was entered into
subsequent to the written agreement. Further, they aver that there is no rule that requires an
agreement modifying an earlier agreement to be in the same form as the earlier agreement in
order for such modification or amendment to be valid.

Conversely, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals did not apply the parol evidence
rule in this case. Although the appellate court stated and emphasized the general legal principle
and rule on parol evidence, it did not apply the parol evidence rule with regard to the evidence
adduced by the petitioners.

We rule for the respondents. To begin with, we agree with petitioners claim that the parol
evidence rule does not apply to the facts of this case. First, the parol evidence rule forbids any
addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence
purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.
[10]
Notably, the claimed verbal agreement was agreed upon not prior to but subsequent to the
written agreement. Second, the validity of the written agreement is not the matter which is being
put in issue here. What is questioned is the validity of the claim that a subsequent verbal
agreement was agreed upon by the parties after the execution of the written agreement which
substantially modified their earlier written agreement.

Nonetheless, even if we apply the parol evidence rule in this case, the evidence presented
by the petitioners fell short in proving that a subsequent verbal agreement was in fact entered
into by the parties. We subscribe to the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that
the evidence presented by petitioners did not establish the existence of the alleged subsequent
verbal agreement. As pointed out by the trial court:

Note that no written evidence was presented by the defendants to show

that the plaintiffs [herein respondents] agreed to the above-sharing of the
commission. The fact is that the plaintiffs are denying having ever entered into
such sharing agreement. For if the plaintiffs as sales agents indeed agreed to share
the commission they are entitled to receive by virtue of the Exclusive Authority to
Sell with Lourdes G. Raymundo and Hipolito, it passes understanding why no
 written agreement to that effect was ever made. The absence of such written
agreement is mute but telling testimony that no such sharing arrangement was
ever made.[11]

As to the second issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in requiring them
to prove the existence of the subsequent verbal agreement by more than a mere preponderance of
evidence since no rule of evidence requires them to do so. In support of this allegation,
petitioners presented petitioner Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she was given 2/5 share of
the commission pursuant to the verbal sharing scheme because she took care of the payment of
the capital gains tax, the preparation of the documents of sale and of securing an authority from
the court to sell the property.

For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not require petitioners to
prove the existence of the subsequent oral agreement by more than a mere preponderance of
evidence. What the appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to prove and establish the
alleged subsequent verbal agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.

Petitioners abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant

that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.[12]It refers to the
weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term greater weight of evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence.
It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto.[13]

Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented by the
petitioners is not sufficient to support their allegation that a subsequent verbal agreement was
entered into by the parties. In fact, both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes Raymundo was
in reality offered the 2/5 share of the agents commission for the purpose of assisting respondent
Lunaria in the documentation requirement, then why did the petitioners not present any written
court order on her authority, tax receipt or sales document to support her self-serving testimony?
Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the commission sharing was unilaterally
prepared by petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that respondents participated in
the preparation thereof or gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of 1/5 of the
commission to the buyer to be used in the payment of the realty taxes cannot be given credence
since the payment of realty taxes is the obligation of the owners, and not the buyer. Lastly, if the
said sharing agreement was entered into pursuant to the wishes of the buyer, then he should have
been presented as witness to corroborate the claim of the petitioners. However, he was not.

As to the third issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that the
petitioners were each jointly and severally liable for the payment of the brokers fees. They
contend that the Civil Code provides that unless the parties have expressly agreed to be jointly
and severally liable for the entire brokers fees, each of the petitioners should only be held liable
to the extent of their pro-indiviso share in the property sold.

For their part, respondents argue that the appellate court did not err in affirming the joint
and several liability of the petitioners. They aver that if there was error on the part of the trial
court, it was not raised or assigned as error by petitioners in their appeal. It was also not included
in the Statement of Issues in their brief which they submitted for resolution by the Court of
Appeals. In fact, the same was never mentioned, much less questioned, by petitioners in their
brief.

On this score, we agree with respondents. The general rule is that once an issue has been
adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew
and should be finally laid to rest. [14] In this case, petitioners failed to address the issue on their
solidary liability when they appealed to the Court of Appeals. They are now estopped to question
that ruling. As to them, the issue on their liability is already valid and binding.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October
10, 2005 and the Resolution dated January 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
75593 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

WEIGHT OF SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS

[G.R. No. 168220. August 31, 2005]

SPS. RUDY PARAGAS and CORAZON B. PARAGAS, petitioners, vs. HRS. OF

DOMINADOR BALACANO, namely: DOMINIC, RODOLFO,
NANETTE and CYRIC, all surnamed BALACANO, represented by NANETTE
BALACANO and ALFREDO BALACANO, respondents.
R ES OLUTIO N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for review seeks to annul the Decision [1] dated 15 February 2005 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64048, affirming with modification the 8 March 1999
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, of Santiago City, Isabela, in Civil Case
No. 21-2313. The petition likewise seeks to annul the Resolution [3] dated 17 May 2005 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents were synthesized by the Court of Appeals in its decision.

Gregorio Balacano, married to Lorenza Sumigcay, was the registered owner of Lot 1175-E and
Lot 1175-F of the Subd. Plan Psd-38042 [located at Baluarte, Santiago City, Isabela] covered by
TCT No. T-103297 and TCT No. T-103298 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Isabela.

Gregorio and Lorenza had three children, namely: Domingo, Catalino and Alfredo, all surnamed
Balacano. Lorenza died on December 11, 1991. Gregorio, on the other hand, died on July 28,
1996.

Prior to his death, Gregorio was admitted at the Veterans General Hospital in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya on June 28, 1996 and stayed there until July 19, 1996. He was transferred in the
afternoon of July 19, 1996 to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where he was
confined until his death.

Gregorio purportedly sold on July 22, 1996, or barely a week prior to his death, a portion of Lot
1175-E (specifically consisting of 15,925 square meters from its total area of 22,341 square
meters) and the whole Lot 1175-F to the Spouses Rudy (Rudy) and Corazon Paragas
(collectively, the Spouses Paragas) for the total consideration of P500,000.00. This sale appeared
in a deed of absolute sale notarized by Atty. Alexander V. de Guzman, Notary Public for Santiago
City, on the same date July 22, 1996 and witnessed by Antonio Agcaoili (Antonio) and Julia
Garabiles (Julia). Gregorios certificates of title over Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were consequently
cancelled and new certificates of title were issued in favor of the Spouses Paragas.

The Spouses Paragas then sold on October 17, 1996 a portion of Lot 1175-E consisting of 6,416
square meters to Catalino for the total consideration of P60,000.00.

Domingos children (Dominic, Rodolfo, Nanette and Cyric, all surnamed Balacano;) filed on
October 22, 1996 a complaint for annulment of sale and partition against Catalino and the
Spouses Paragas. They essentially alleged in asking for the nullification of the deed of sale that:
(1) their grandfather Gregorio could not have appeared before the notary public on July 22, 1996
at Santiago City because he was then confined at the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon
City; (2) at the time of the alleged execution of the deed of sale, Gregorio was seriously ill, in
fact dying at that time, which vitiated his consent to the disposal of the property; and (3) Catalino
manipulated the execution of the deed and prevailed upon the dying Gregorio to sign his name
on a paper the contents of which he never understood because of his serious condition.
Alternatively, they alleged that assuming Gregorio was of sound and disposing mind, he could
only transfer a half portion of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F as the other half belongs to their
grandmother Lorenza who predeceased Gregorio they claimed that Lots 1175-E and 1175-F form
part of the conjugal partnership properties of Gregorio and Lorenza. Finally, they alleged that the
sale to the Spouses Paragas covers only a 5-hectare portion of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F leaving a
portion of 6,416 square meters that Catalino is threatening to dispose. They asked for the
nullification of the deed of sale executed by Gregorio and the partition of Lots 1175-E and 1175-
F. They likewise asked for damages.

Instead of filing their Answer, the defendants Catalino and the Spouses Paragas moved to dismiss
the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the plaintiffs have no legal capacity - the Domingos
children cannot file the case because Domingo is still alive, although he has been absent for a
long time; (2) an indispensable party is not impleaded that Gregorios other son, Alfredo was not
made a party to the suit; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action that Domingos children
failed to allege a ground for the annulment of the deed of sale; they did not cite any mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud, but merely alleged that Gregorio was seriously
ill. Domingos children opposed this motion.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, but directed the plaintiffs-appellees to amend the
complaint to include Alfredo as a party. Alfredo was subsequently declared as in default for his
failure to file his Answer to the Complaint.

The defendants-appellees filed their Answer with Counterclaim on May 7, 1997, denying the
material allegations of the complaint. Additionally, they claimed that: (1) the deed of sale was
actually executed by Gregorio on July 19 (or 18), 1996 and not July 22, 1996; (2) the Notary
Public personally went to the Hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on July 18, 1996 to
notarize the deed of sale already subject of a previously concluded covenant between Gregorio
and the Spouses Paragas; (3) at the time Gregorio signed the deed, he was strong and of sound
and disposing mind; (4) Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were Gregorios separate capital and the
inscription of Lorenzas name in the titles was just a description of Gregorios marital status; (5)
the entire area of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were sold to the Spouses Paragas. They interposed a
counterclaim for damages.

At the trial, the parties proceeded to prove their respective contentions.

Plaintiff-appellant Nanette Balacano testified to prove the material allegations of their complaint.
On Gregorios medical condition, she declared that: (1) Gregorio, who was then 81 years old,
weak and sick, was brought to the hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on June 28, 1996 and
stayed there until the afternoon on July 19, 1996; (2) thereafter, Gregorio, who by then was weak
and could no longer talk and whose condition had worsened, was transferred in the afternoon of
July 19, 1996 to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where Gregorio died. She
claimed that Gregorio could not have signed a deed of sale on July 19, 1996 because she stayed
at the hospital the whole of that day and saw no visitors. She likewise testified on their
agreement for attorneys fees with their counsel and the litigation expenses they incurred.

Additionally, the plaintiffs-appellees presented in evidence Gregorios medical records and his
death certificate.

Defendants-appellees, on the other hand, presented as witnesses Notary Public de Guzman and
instrumental witness Antonio to prove Gregorios execution of the sale and the circumstances
under the deed was executed. They uniformly declared that: (1) on July 18, 1996, they went to
the hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya where Gregorio was confined with Rudy; (2) Atty.
De Guzman read and explained the contents of the deed to Gregorio; (3) Gregorio signed the
deed after receiving the money from Rudy; (4) Julia and Antonio signed the deed as witnesses.
Additionally, Atty. De Guzman explained that the execution of the deed was merely a
confirmation of a previous agreement between the Spouses Paragas and Gregorio that was
concluded at least a month prior to Gregorios death; that, in fact, Gregorio had previously asked
him to prepare a deed that Gregorio eventually signed on July 18, 1996. He also explained that
the deed, which appeared to have been executed on July 22, 1996, was actually executed on July
18, 1996; he notarized the deed and entered it in his register only on July 22, 1996. He claimed
that he did not find it necessary to state the precise date and place of execution (Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, instead of Santiago City) of the deed of sale because the deed is merely a
confirmation of a previously agreed contract between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas. He
likewise stated that of the stated P500,000.00 consideration in the deed, Rudy paid
Gregorio P450,000.00 in the hospital because Rudy had previously paid Gregorio P50,000.00.
For his part, Antonio added that he was asked by Rudy to take pictures of Gregorio signing the
deed. He also claimed that there was no entry on the date when he signed; nor did he remember
reading Santiago City as the place of execution of the deed. He described Gregorio as still strong
but sickly, who got up from the bed with Julias help.

Witness for defendants-appellants Luisa Agsalda testified to prove that Lot 1175-E was
Gregorios separate property. She claimed that Gregorios father (Leon) purchased a two-hectare
lot from them in 1972 while the other lot was purchased from her neighbor. She also declared
that Gregorio inherited these lands from his father Leon; she does not know, however, Gregorios
brothers share in the inheritance. Defendant-appellant Catalino also testified to corroborate the
testimony of witness Luisa Agsalda; he said that Gregorio told him that he (Gregorio) inherited
Lots 1175-E and 1175-F from his father Leon. He also stated that a portion of Lot 1175-E
consisting of 6,416 square meters was sold to him by the Spouses Paragas and that he will pay
the Spouses Paragas P50,000.00, not as consideration for the return of the land but for the
transfer of the title to his name.

Additionally, the defendants-appellants presented in evidence the pictures taken by Antonio

when Gregorio allegedly signed the deed.[4]

The lower court, after trial, rendered the decision declaring null and void the deed of sale
purportedly executed by Gregorio Balacano in favor of the spouses Rudy Paragas and Corazon
Paragas. In nullifying the deed of sale executed by Gregorio, the lower court initially noted that
at the time Gregorio executed the deed, Gregorio was ill. The lower courts reasoning in declaring
the deed of sale null and void and this reasonings premises may be summarized as follows: (1)
the deed of sale was improperly notarized; thus it cannot be considered a public document that is
usually accorded the presumption of regularity; (2) as a private document, the deed of sales due
execution must be proved in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence either: (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker; and (3) it was incumbent upon the
Spouses Paragas to prove the deed of sales due execution but failed to do so the lower court said
that witness Antonio Agcaoili is not credible while Atty. Alexander De Guzman is not reliable.[5]

The lower court found the explanations of Atty. De Guzman regarding the erroneous entries
on the actual place and date of execution of the deed of sale as justifications for a lie. The lower
court said

The Court cannot imagine an attorney to undertake to travel to another province to notarize a
document when he must certainly know, being a lawyer and by all means, not stupid, that he has
no authority to notarize a document in that province. The only logical thing that happened was
that Rudy Paragas brought the deed of sale to him on July 22, 1996 already signed and requested
him to notarize the same which he did, not knowing that at that time the vendor was already in a
hospital and [sic] Quezon City. Of course had he known, Atty. De Guzman would not have
notarized the document. But he trusted Rudy Paragas and moreover, Gregorio Balacano already
informed him previously in June that he will sell his lands to Paragas. In addition [sic, (,) was
omitted] Rudy Paragas also told him that Balacano received an advance of P50,000.00.

The intention to sell is not actual selling. From the first week of June when, according to Atty.
De Guzman, Gregorio Balacano informed him that he will sell his land to Rudy Paragas, enough
time elapsed to the time he was brought to the hospital on June 28, 1996. Had there been a
meeting of the minds between Gregorio Balacano and Rudy Paragas regarding the sale, surely
Gregorio Balacano would have immediately returned to the office of Atty. De Guzman to execute
the deed of sale. He did not until he was brought to the hospital and diagnosed to have liver
cirrhosis. Because of the seriousness of his illness, it is not expected that Gregorio Balacano
would be negotiating a contract of sale. Thus, Rudy Paragas negotiated with Catalino
Balacano, the son of Gregorio Balacano with whom the latter was staying.[6]

The lower court also did not consider Antonio Agcaoili, petitioner Rudy Paragass driver, a
convincing witness, concluding that he was telling a rehearsed story. The lower court said

The only portion of his testimony that is true is that he signed the document. How could the
Court believe that he brought a camera with him just to take pictures of the signing? If the
purpose was to record the proceeding for posterity, why did he not take the picture of Atty. De
Guzman when the latter was reading and explaining the document to Gregorio Balacano? Why
did he not take the picture of both Gregorio Balacano and Atty. de Guzman while the old man
was signing the document instead of taking a picture of Gregorio Balacano alone holding a ball
pen without even showing the document being signed? Verily there is a picture of a document
but only a hand with a ball pen is shown with it. Why? Clearly the driver Antonio Agcaoili must
have only been asked by Rudy Paragas to tell a concocted story which he himself would not dare
tell in Court under oath.[7]

The lower court likewise noted that petitioner Rudy Paragas did not testify about the signing
of the deed of sale. To the lower court, Rudys refusal or failure to testify raises a lot of questions,
such as: (1) was he (Rudy) afraid to divulge the circumstances of how he obtained the signature
of Gregorio Balacano, and (2) was he (Rudy) afraid to admit that he did not actually pay
the P500,000.00 indicated in the deed of sale as the price of the land?[8]

The lower court also ruled that Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were Gregorios and Lorenzas
conjugal partnership properties. The lower court found that these lots were acquired during the
marriage because the certificates of title of these lots clearly stated that the lots are registered in
the name Gregorio, married to Lorenza Sumigcay. Thus, the lower court concluded that the
presumption of law (under Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines) that property
acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership fully applies to
Lots 1175-E and 1175-F.[9]

Thus, on 8 March 1999, the RTC, Branch 21, of Santiago City, Isabela, rendered a
Decision[10] in Civil Case No. 21-2313, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby rendered:

1. DECLARING as NULL and VOID the deed of sale purportedly executed by

Gregorio Balacano in favor of the spouses Rudy Paragas and Corazon Paragas
over lots 1175-E and 1175-F covered by TCT Nos. T-103297 and T-103298,
respectively;

2. ORDERING the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-258042 and T-258041 issued in the
name of the spouses Rudy and Corazon Paragas by virtue of the deed of sale; and

DECLARING the parcel of lands, lots 1175-E and 1175-F as part of the estate of the deceased
spouses Gregorio Balacano and Lorenza Balacano.[11]

In the assailed Decision dated 15 February 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision
of the trial court, with the modification that Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were adjudged as belonging
to the estate of Gregorio Balacano. The appellate court disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. We AFFIRM the

appealed Decision for the reasons discussed above, with the MODIFICATION that Lots 1175-E
and 1175-F belong to the estate of Gregorio Balacano.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant for whatever action her
Office may take against Atty. De Guzman.[12] (Emphasis in the original.)

Herein petitioners motion for reconsideration was met with similar lack of success when it
was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution[13] dated 17 May 2005.

Hence, this appeal via a petition for review where petitioners assign the following errors to
the Court of Appeals, viz:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO
PERFECTED AND PARTIALLY EXECUTED CONTRACT OF SALE OVER
LOTS 1175-E AND 1175-F PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF THE DEED OF SALE.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, SERIOUSLY FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION ON THE AUTHENTICITY AND DUE
EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF SALE MADE BY THE RESPONDENTS
DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, BASED ITS CONCLUSION THAT GREGORIOS CONSENT TO
THE SALE OF THE LOTS WAS ABSENT MERELY ON SPECULATIONS AND
SURMISES.

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF
RESPONDENTS LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE FOR NOT BEING THE
PROPER PARTIES IN INTEREST.

E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING ATTY. ALEXANDER DE
GUZMAN AND ANTONIO AGCAOILI AS NOT CREDIBLE WITNESSES.[14]

At bottom is the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
upholding the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the nullity of the Deed of Sale
purportedly executed between petitioners and the late Gregorio Balacano.

To start, we held in Blanco v. Quasha[15] that this Court is not a trier of facts. As such, it is
not its function to examine and determine the weight of the evidence supporting the assailed
decision. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which are supported by substantial evidence,
are binding, final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, [16] and carry even more weight when
the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court. Moreover, well- entrenched is the
prevailing jurisprudence that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The foregoing tenets in the case at bar apply with greater force to the petition under
consideration because the factual findings by the Court of Appeals are in full agreement with that
of the trial court.

Specifically, the Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court, found that there was no prior
and perfected contract of sale that remained to be fully consummated. The appellate court
explained -

In support of their position, the defendants-appellants argue that at least a month prior to
Gregorios signing of the deed, Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas already agreed on the sale of
Lots 1175-E and 1175-F; and that, in fact, this agreement was partially executed by Rudys
payment to Gregorio of P50,000.00 before Gregorio signed the deed at the hospital. In line with
this position, defendants-appellants posit that Gregorios consent to the sale should be
determined, not at the time Gregorio signed the deed of sale on July 18, 1996, but at the time
when he agreed to sell the property in June 1996 or a month prior to the deeds signing; and in
June 1996, Gregorio was of sound and disposing mind and his consent to the sale was in no wise
vitiated at that time. The defendants-appellants further argue that the execution or signing of the
deed of sale, however, irregular it might have been, does not affect the validity of the previously
agreed sale of the lots, as the execution or signing of the deed is merely a formalization of a
previously agreed oral contract.

...

In the absence of any note, memorandum or any other written instrument evidencing the alleged
perfected contract of sale, we have to rely on oral testimonies, which in this case is that of Atty.
de Guzman whose testimony on the alleged oral agreement may be summarized as follows: (1)
that sometime in the first week of June 1996, Gregorio requested him (Atty. de Guzman) to
prepare a deed of sale of two lots; (2) Gregorio came to his firms office in the morning with a
certain Doming Balacano, then returned in the afternoon with Rudy; (3) he (Atty. de Guzman)
asked Gregorio whether he really intends to sell the lots; Gregorio confirmed his intention; (4)
Gregorio and Rudy left the law office at 5:00 p.m., leaving the certificates of title; (5) he
prepared the deed a day after Rudy and Gregorio came. With regard to the alleged partial
execution of this agreement, Atty. de Guzman said that he was told by Rudy that there was
already a partial payment of P50,000.00.

We do not consider Atty. de Guzmans testimony sufficient evidence to establish the fact that
there was a prior agreement between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas on the sale of Lots 1175-
E and 1175-F. This testimony does not conclusively establish the meeting of the minds between
Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas on the price or consideration for the sale of Lots 1175-E and
1175-F Atty. de Guzman merely declared that he was asked by Gregorio to prepare a deed; he did
not clearly narrate the details of this agreement. We cannot assume that Gregorio and the Spouses
Paragas agreed to a P500,000.00 consideration based on Atty. de Guzmans bare assertion that
Gregorio asked him to prepare a deed, as Atty. de Guzman was not personally aware of the
agreed consideration in the sale of the lots, not being privy to the parties agreement. To us, Rudy
could have been a competent witness to testify on the perfection of this prior contract;
unfortunately, the defendants-appellants did not present Rudy as their witness.

We seriously doubt too the credibility of Atty. de Guzman as a witness. We cannot rely on his
testimony because of his tendency to commit falsity. He admitted in open court that while
Gregorio signed the deed on July 18, 1996 at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, he nevertheless did
not reflect these matters when he notarized the deed; instead he entered Santiago City and July
22, 1996, as place and date of execution, respectively. To us, Atty. de Guzmans propensity to
distort facts in the performance of his public functions as a notary public, in utter disregard of the
significance of the act of notarization, seriously affects his credibility as a witness in the present
case. In fact, Atty. de Guzmans act in falsifying the entries in his acknowledgment of the deed of
sale could be the subject of administrative and disciplinary action, a matter that we however do
not here decide.

Similarly, there is no conclusive proof of the partial execution of the contract because the only
evidence the plaintiffs-appellants presented to prove this claim was Atty. de Guzmans testimony,
which is hearsay and thus, has no probative value. Atty. de Guzman merely stated that Rudy told
him that Rudy already gave P50,000.00 to Gregorio as partial payment of the purchase price;
Atty. de Guzman did not personally see the payment being made.[17]

But, did Gregorio give an intelligent consent to the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F when he
signed the deed of sale? The trial court as well as the appellate court found in the negative. In the
Court of Appeals rationale-

It is not disputed that when Gregorio signed the deed of sale, Gregorio was seriously ill, as he in
fact died a week after the deeds signing. Gregorio died of complications caused by cirrhosis of
the liver. Gregorios death was neither sudden nor immediate; he fought at least a month-long
battle against the disease until he succumbed to death on July 22, 1996. Given that Gregorio
purportedly executed a deed during the last stages of his battle against his disease, we seriously
doubt whether Gregorio could have read, or fully understood, the contents of the documents he
signed or of the consequences of his act. We note in this regard that Gregorio was brought to the
Veterans Hospital at Quezon City because his condition had worsened on or about the time the
deed was allegedly signed. This transfer and fact of death not long after speak volumes about
Gregorios condition at that time. We likewise see no conclusive evidence that the contents of the
deed were sufficiently explained to Gregorio before he affixed his signature. The evidence the
defendants-appellants offered to prove Gregorios consent to the sale consists of the testimonies
of Atty. de Guzman and Antonio. As discussed above, we do not find Atty. de Guzman a credible
witness. Thus, we fully concur with the heretofore-quoted lower courts evaluation of the
testimonies given by Atty. de Guzman and Antonio because this is an evaluation that the lower
court was in a better position to make.
Additionally, the irregular and invalid notarization of the deed is a falsity that raises doubts on
the regularity of the transaction itself. While the deed was indeed signed on July 18, 1996 at
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the deed states otherwise, as it shows that the deed was executed
on July 22, 1996 at Santiago City. Why such falsity was committed, and the circumstances under
which this falsity was committed, speaks volume about the regularity and the validity of the sale.
We cannot but consider the commission of this falsity, with the indispensable aid of Atty. de
Guzman, an orchestrated attempt to legitimize a transaction that Gregorio did not intend to be
binding upon him nor on his bounty.

Article 24 of the Civil Code tells us that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one
of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.[18]

Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Gregorios consent to the sale of
the lots was absent, making the contract null and void. Consequently, the spouses Paragas could
not have made a subsequent transfer of the property to Catalino Balacano. Indeed, nemo dat
quod non habet. Nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him.[19]

We likewise find to be in accord with the evidence on record the ruling of the Court of
Appeals declaring the properties in controversy as paraphernal properties of Gregorio in the
absence of competent evidence on the exact date of Gregorios acquisition of ownership of these
lots.

On the credibility of witnesses, it is in rhyme with reason to believe the testimonies of the
witnesses for the complainants vis--vis those of the defendants. In the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, we are guided by the following well-entrenched rules: (1) that evidence
to be believed must not only spring from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be
credible, and (2) findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witness are matters best left to
the trial court who had the front-line opportunity to personally evaluate the witnesses demeanor,
conduct, and behavior while testifying.[20]

In the case at bar, we agree in the trial courts conclusion that petitioners star witness, Atty.
De Guzman is far from being a credible witness. Unlike this Court, the trial court had the unique
opportunity of observing the demeanor of said witness. Thus, we affirm the trial court and the
Court of Appeals uniform decision based on the whole evidence in record holding the Deed of
Sale in question to be null and void.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court declared as null and void the deed of sale
therein inasmuch as the seller, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, was already of
advanced age and senile. We held

. . . She died an octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when the deed was allegedly
executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of the deed were entered in the registry
allegedly on May 16 and June 10, 1966. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to
contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when
such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from
properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably
incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the
alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She
narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there
is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price
for her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to show that said price was paid to and
received by her. Thus, we are in agreement with the trial courts finding and conclusion on the
matter: . . .

In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale was allegedly signed by Gregorio on his death bed in the
hospital. Gregorio was an octogenarian at the time of the alleged execution of the contract and
suffering from liver cirrhosis at that circumstances which raise grave doubts on his physical and
mental capacity to freely consent to the contract. Adding to the dubiety of the purported sale and
further bolstering respondents claim that their uncle Catalino, one of the children of the decedent,
had a hand in the execution of the deed is the fact that on 17 October 1996, petitioners sold a
portion of Lot 1175-E consisting of 6,416 square meters to Catalino for P60,000.00.[22] One need
not stretch his imagination to surmise that Catalino was in cahoots with petitioners in
maneuvering the alleged sale.

On the whole, we find no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV
No. 64048 that would warrant the reversal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision [23] and
the Resolution,[24] dated 15 February 2005 and 17 May 2005, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64048 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EQUIPOISE RULE
COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, G.R. No. 150762
y EVANGELISTA,
Petitioner,
Present:
Quisumbing, J.,
Chairman,
Carpio,
- versus - Carpio Morales, and
Tinga, JJ.
Promulgated:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. January 20, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the 23 June 2000 Decision[2] and the 7

November 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450. The Court of

Appeals affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

Branch 50 (trial court) in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. The trial court found Coverdale

Abarquez y Evangelista (Abarquez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the

crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055.

The Charge

The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide

in two Informations,[5] as follows:

Criminal Case No. 94-135055

The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the
crime of HOMICIDE, committed as follows:

That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines,

the said accused conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO
ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has already been charged for the same
 offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under Crim. Case No. 93-
129891 and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
one RICARDO QUEJONG Y BELLO, by then and there stabbing him twice with
a bladed weapon and hitting him with a gun at the back, thereby inflicting upon
the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Criminal Case No. 94-135056

The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the

crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, committed as follows:

That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y
VILLANUEVA, who has already been charged for the same offense before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila under Crim. Case No. 93-129892 and mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide directly by overt
acts, to wit: by then and there holding one JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI and
stabbing him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left arm, but the said
accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of homicide as a consequence, by reason of causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the injury inflicted upon said JOSE BUENJIJO
PAZ Y UMALI is only slight and not fatal.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The cases were tried jointly.

The Version of the Prosecution

On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz [8] (Paz), Ricardo Quejong (Quejong) and

their friends were in the house of one Boyet at 3342 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. They were

drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of Boyets son. About 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong
decided to go home. Boyet Tong, Abarquezs son Bardie and Sonito Masula (Masula) joined Paz

and Quejong. They proceeded towards the exit of San Jose St.

Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyets house, Alberto Almojuela also

known as Bitoy (Almojuela), a certain Ising and Abarquez also known as Dale, were likewise

drinking liquor in front of Almojuelas house. As the group of Paz was passing towards the main

road, Almojuela and his companions blocked their path.

Almojuela asked Paz, Are you brave? Paz replied, Why? Almojuela got angry and

attacked Paz with a knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury.

Abarquez held Paz on both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez,

What is our atraso, we were going home, why did you block our way? Abarquez

answered, Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, tumigil ka na.

Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried

to get away from Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong

fall on the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and

found him already bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried

to pull up Quejong but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of San Jose St. to

ask for help. While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout, You left your companion

already wounded!

When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground.

Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his companions brought Quejong to the

UST Hospital. They next proceeded to Police Precinct No. 4 to report the incident. However,
there was nobody in the precinct. With Kagawad Villanio Usorio, Paz went to the WPD General

Headquarters to report the incident. At the WPD General Headquarters, they learned that

Quejong died at the UST Hospital. Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic Managuelod at Jose

Reyes Memorial Hospital. The medico-legal certificate showed that Paz sustained a 3-cm.

lacerated wound on his left forearm.

About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad (SPO1 Vidad) was at the WPD Homicide Division,

his station received a call from the UST Hospital informing them of the death of Quejong. SPO1

Vidad and PO3 Ed Co went to the UST Hospital morgue and investigated the incident. They

learned that Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong. Upon the execution of sworn

statements by Paz and Masula, SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela and Abarquez for homicide and

frustrated homicide and prepared the referral letter to the inquest prosecutor.

Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela voluntarily surrendered to one

SPO4 Soriano at Police Station No. 10 and was turned over to the WPD Homicide Division.

Dr. Antonio Rebosa[9] (Dr. Rebosa), a medico-legal consultant at UST Hospital, conducted the

post-mortem examination and autopsy on Quejong. Dr. Rebosa reported that Quejong sustained

two stab wounds and suffered from massive hemorrhage due to penetrating stab wounds to the

heart and left lung. According to Dr. Rebosa, a sharp instrument probably caused the wound. Dr.

Rebosa also reported that Quejong sustained abrasions and contusions on the right upper body,

the wrist and on the lower extremities.

The Version of the Defense

Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his residence at 3363 San Jose St.,

Sta. Mesa, Manila. About 7:30 p.m., Almojuelas wife informed him that the group of Paz was

challenging Almojuela to a fistfight. Abarquez, being a barangay kagawad, proceeded to

Almojuelas house. Almojuelas house was about twenty meters away from Abarquezs house.

When he arrived at Almojuelas house, Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground being strangled

by Quejong. Paz was holding Almojuelas waist and boxing him at the stomach. Masula was near

Almojuelas head holding a piece of stone as if waiting for a chance to hit him. Abarquez shouted

at the group to stop. The group did not heed Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning shot into the

air. Still, the group did not heed Abarquez who then fired a second warning shot. Paz, Quejong,

and Masula scampered away.

Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group of Paz from

smoking marijuana. Almojuela then went inside his house while Abarquez went home. On his

way home, Abarquez met the Chief Tanod of the barangay and two kagawads. Kagawad Rudy

Lego (Lego) advised him to report the incident to the police. They all proceeded to Precinct No.

4 where Lego reported the incident to the desk officer. The desk officer told them that a person

had been stabbed. When Abarquez reached their house, he saw policemen and media men with

their barangay chairman. He informed them that he had just reported the incident. Upon the

request of SPO1 Vidad, Abarquez then went to the police station to shed light on the incident.

Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his daughter informed him that there was

marijuana smoke coming to their window. He went outside to look for the source of the smoke

and saw Quejong, Paz, and Masula smoking marijuana. Almojuela asked the group to move

away as there were children inside the house. He was on his way back to the house when
Quejong tried to strangle him. Later, Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard Abarquez

shouting, Tumigil na kayo. Quejong, Masula, and Paz ran away.

Winfred Evangelista[10] (Evangelista) testified that he was resting in front of his house when he

heard a commotion. He noticed that Paz and Quejong were quarreling. Evangelista saw Paz

kicking Almojuela. Abarquez arrived to break up the fight but he was told not to interfere.

Abarquez was forced to fire a warning shot and the persons involved in the commotion ran away.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision[11] dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found Abarquez guilty as an

accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution failed to prove that

Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could

not be convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide. However, the trial court ruled that

Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed

Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court finds the

accused, Coverdale Abarquez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide only as accomplice and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional to ten (10) years of
prision mayor. In Criminal Case No. 94-135056, the accused is hereby acquitted.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[12]
Abarquez appealed the trial courts Decision before the Court of Appeals.

In its Decision[13] of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision. The

Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in giving more credence to the testimony of Paz. The

Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was able to establish that Abarquez aided Almojuela

in fatally stabbing Quejong. The Court of Appeals rejected Abarquezs allegation that he was

merely at the crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties.

In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,[14] the Court of Appeals denied Abarquezs motion for

reconsideration.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

The issues[15] Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt;

2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving more credence
to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

Abarquez alleges that the prosecutions evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is

not sufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice. He further alleges that there was a

misapprehension of facts and that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their
conclusion based entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures. Abarquez also assails the

credibility of the witnesses against him.

The Ruling of This Court

The petition is meritorious.

The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the

testimony of a witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of

substance and value, which if considered, might affect the result of the case. [16] This case is an

exception to the rule.

Concurrence in Criminal Design

Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those persons who, not being

included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous

acts.[17]

Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1) community of

design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the

principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or

simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. [18] Mere commission

of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough.[19] Thus:

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered,
which cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to
be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the
 accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation.[20]

Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene

cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged.[21]

Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the

testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing

him from helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela. Paz testified:

q. And what happened in the exchange of words or altercations

between Bitoy and Ricardo Quejong?
a. They grappled with each other, sir.

q. When Bitoy and Ricardo grappled with each other, what did you do,
if any?
a. I was intending to help Ricky but I was held back by Dale, sir.

q. And how this Dale hold you?

a. He held my two shoulders, sir.

PROSECUTOR F. G. SUPNET:
I would like to make it of record demonstrated being held by the accused
holding both shoulders, your Honor.
q. Now, when this Dale Abarquez held both on your shoulders, what
happened next, if any?
a. He got angry scolding us. While scolding me the two
who were grappling each other walking away, sir. (sic)

q. Now, you said Bitoy and Ricky were moving, what happened in the
course of grappling, if any?

You testified that Ricky and Bitoy were grappling each other, what
happened in the course of grappling? (sic)
a. They fell to the ground, sir.

q. After that what happened next, if any?

 a. When I saw them fall I struggle and I was able to release from the
hold of Dale and I approach the two. I saw Ricky blooded so I was trying
to pull him, sir. (sic)

q. You said you saw Ricky blooded, why was he blooded? (sic)
a. He was stabbed by Bitoy, sir.

q. And did you see what instrument did Bitoy used in stabbing Ricky or
Ricardo? (sic)
a. It was a knife, sir. (Witness indicating a length about 6 inches
including the handle).

q. Now, you said also that while the two were grappling while you were
trying to free yourself from the hold Dale Abarquez, Pinagalitan kayo, in
what way or manner did Dale Abarquez reprimanded you? (sic)
a. You Jose is too brave, sir. (sic)[22]

xxx xxx xxx

q. You said you were first attacked by Bitoy, is that correct?

a. Yes, sir.

q. After Bitoy pacified Bardy Abarquez, he went after Ricky Quejong,

is it not?[23]
a. They were just arguing, sir.

[q.] And it was during that time when you were held in both shoulders by the
accused [C]overdale Abarquez?
a. Yes, sir.
q. and that Coverdale Abarquez was infront of you, is it not?
a. Yes, sir on my side.

q. And he was holding your shoulder to pacify you and Bitoy from
further quarrelling you, is it not?
a. That is not the way of pacifying, sir.

q. How can you demonstrate how you were held on the shoulder by
Abarquez?

ATTY. GASCON:
Make I make it of record your Honor that the interpreter act as the witness
while the witness act as the accused demonstrating holding both hands of
interpreter preventing the witness and saying Joey tumigil ka na, joey
tumigil ka na.

COURT:
 q. How many times?

a. Twice, Your Honor.

ATTY. GASCON:
The accused told you Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na because you
were trying to attack Bitoy, is it not?

a. How can I be charged, he was the one holding the knife, sir. (sic)
q. So what was the reason why the accused restrained you and told you Joey
tumigal ka na, Joey tumigil ka na. What would be the reason?

a. While I was just talking to Bitoy, when he told me to stop.

COURT:
Does the Court get from you that you are trying to explain to Bitoy when
the accused tried to hold you and prevent you?

a. Yes, sir.
q. That is why the reason you concluded that the accused is not
pacifying you but to stop you from helping the victim?

a. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

q. The only word that the accused [C]overdale Abarquez uttered was
Joey, tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na, is it not?
a. He uttered that you are MATAPANG, Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na.[24]

Pazs testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuelas criminal

design. Tumigil literally means stop. Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the

fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to Almojuela.

However, Paz could not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because

Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquezs action as

an attempt to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial

court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while

restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not

shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez
was trying to stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquezs act of trying to stop Paz does not

translate to assistance to Almojuela.

In People v. Fabros, [25] the Court explained:

To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of

and participation in the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the
accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the same
end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal design.

xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the
(principals) criminal design did not automatically make him an accomplice. This
circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence in the principals criminal
intent.

Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop Almojuela. However, Paz testified

that Abarquezs son Bardie, who was one of Pazs companions, was the one trying to pacify

Almojuela. The trial court in its factual findings confirmed this when it stated that while

Abarquez was holding Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying Almojuela.[26]

The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as a barangay kagawad in

not extending assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This, however, does not necessarily show

concurrence in Almojuelas criminal act. When Paz ran away, Abarquez shouted at him that he

left his wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of the extent of Quejongs

injury and he expected Paz to look after his own companion.

When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor.

Thus:

Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence stands
as a fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the
prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt. Every
 vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed. The defense of the
accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this framework, the
prosecution must prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need
not even speak at all. The presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.[27]

We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue

or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof

loses.[28] Hence:

xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to
convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.[29]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June 2000 Decision

and 7 November 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450, which

affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 in

Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. We ACQUIT Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista as an

accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No pronouncement as to

costs.

SO ORDERED.

CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE

[G.R. No. 142532. November 18, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOHNNY M. QUIZON, appellant.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

A decision, dated 27 March 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 29,
found appellant Johnny M. Quizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. He was sentenced by the trial court to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Information charging him with the offense, to
which he pled not guilty, read:

That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with grave abuse of
confidence, with intent of gain, and by means of violence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away, against the consent of the owners thereof, a cash
money amounting to P17,000.00 and assorted jewelry, belonging to the Suarez Travel Agency
and/or Conchita M. Pasquin, with a total value of no less than P17,000.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the owners thereof in the said total sum; that on the occasion of the said robbery and
for the purpose of enabling him to take, steal and carry away the said articles and money, the
herein accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of his superior strength, and with intent to kill, treacherously
attack, assault, and with the use of personal violence upon said Conchita M. Pasquin, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries after accused stuffed her mouth with a clothing an
outcry, and as a direct result of which, said Conchita Pasquin died.[1]

The case for the prosecution was pieced together by the trial court from the testimony of a
number of witnesses.
Conchita Magpantay Pasquin was associated with Suarez Travel Services in Angeles City.
She used the offices of the travel agency as also her residence. Although she was separated from
her husband, Bonifacio Pasquin, her relationship with him, nevertheless, remained cordial. On 05
September 1997, around nine o clock in the morning, Conchita went to the
adjacent Quitalig Law Office and lent a magazine to a friend, Rowena Abril, a secretary in the
law firm. In the afternoon of that day, between one and two oclock, Rowena heard loud noises
coming from Conchitas office, but she did not pay too much attention to the incident. Twenty-
five minutes later, a man passed by Rowena as she was leaving her office to go to a nearby store.
Rowena had the impression that the man, who was walking hurriedly, came from the office of
Suarez Travel Services. At about four-fifty in the afternoon, Rowena went to see Conchita to
return the magazine. She noticed that the door leading to Conchitas office was open but the main
door was closed. Since nobody opened the door for her, Rowena decided to leave.
At lunch time on 05 September 1997, Myla Miclat and her live-in
partner Roel Sicangco went to see Conchita to hand over the amount of P17,000.00 in payment
for Mylas round trip plane fare to Guam. While they were inside Conchitas office,
Johnny Quizon, whom Conchita introduced as her nephew, came in. Conchita asked her nephew
if he already had taken his lunch. Conchita told Myla that her nephew was a former drug addict,
and that she was helping him mend his ways. Quizon was present when Myla gave the money
to Conchita. Conchita told Myla that she was going to purchase the ticket and instructed her to
return later that day to pick it up. It was approximately seven oclock in the evening when Myla,
accompanied by a friend, returned to Suarez Travel Services. She knocked at the door but
nobody answered although she could see that there was still light inside the work
place. Myla tried calling up Conchita but the telephone just kept on ringing. The following day
of 06 September 1997, around five-thirty in the morning, Myla returned to Conchitas office.
Again, nobody was in sight. Myla went to the agencys neighbor to inquire if there was someone
inside the office. The neighbor climbed, peeped inside and saw a body covered with a blanket.
Marietta Suarez, the owner of Suarez Travel Services, received a call at six-thirty in the
morning of 06 September 1997 to inform her that something bad had happened to Conchita. She
did not go to the office the day previous as she had to accompany her husband to a social
function. Marietta and her husband forthwith proceeded to the agency. A number of police
officers and some people were by then at the scene. Apparently, the policemen forced open the
door and found the body of Conchita wrapped with a white blanket. Conchitas jewelry box and
the money paid by Myla were missing.
On the evening of 06 September 1997, Conchitas husband, Bonifacio Pasquin, who was then
in Bataan received a call from his brother-in-law Jose Servidal informing him
of Conchitas death. The following morning, on his way to Angeles City, Pasquin chanced
upon Conchitas eldest brother, Jose Magpantay, who was also bound for the
city. Magpantay informed Pasquinthat on 05 September 1997, he received a call
from Conchita who told him that she was going to Manila to bring an undetermined sum of
money. Conchita happened to mention that her nephew, Johnny Quizon, was in her office at that
time. Later, during the investigation, Pasquin showed Rowena a picture of Quizon and she
identified him to be the same person who passed by her in haste that afternoon of 05 September
1997.
Dr. Proceso Mejia, a City Health Officer of Angeles City, conducted an autopsy on the
remains of Conchita at half past noon on 06 September 1997. The body showed discoloration on
the face, neck, back and upper extremities, contusion on the right side of the face and abrasions
on her right and left side of the neck, right elbow, right forearm and the palm. Dr. Mejia
concluded that at the time of his examination, Conchita must have been dead for more than
twelve, but not beyond twenty-four, hours. Dr. Mejia did not find any abnormalities on the body
of the victim and decided to send the vital organs to the Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for toxicological and histopath examination.
Dr. Noel Minay, a medical specialist of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted a
pathological examination on the vital organs of Conchita, particularly, her brain, heart, lungs and
pancreas. He concluded that Conchita could have died of cardiac arrest, asphyxiation or
ingestion of a considerable amount of poisonous substance.
The case was referred for investigation to SPO2 Danilo Cruz of the Angeles City Detective
Group. After reading the initial report, SPO2 Cruz, accompanied by SPO2
Alfredo Quiambao and a brother of Conchita, went to Quizons house at 174 Isarog St., La
Loma, Quezon City. Johnnys relatives were not aware of his whereabouts but could only say that
on the morning of 06 September 1997, Johnny and his live-in partner Fe Coronel went
to Tondo, Manila. The trio decided to go to Fes house in Paraaque City, arriving thereat at
around ten oclock in the evening. Fes mother told them that Fe had left on 05 September
1997 and had not returned since. In the course of their investigation, SPO2 Cruz interviewed one
Rodolfo Cueva, a mailman at the Angeles City Post Office, who told him that he (Cueva) went
to Conchitas office between two and two-thirty in the afternoon of 05 September 1997 to deliver
an express mail. Cueva left when nobody would open the door. Returning in the morning, he
learned that the addressee was already dead.
Johnny Quizon was arrested at his house in Quezon City by police operatives a week
after Conchitas burial.
The defense gave its version of the incident.
Nimfa Quizon married the father of Johnny Quizon in 1980, three years following the death
of his first wife, Imelda, a sister of Nimfa. Nimfa took care of Johnny since he was barely five
years old. On the evening of 04 September 1997, Nimfa asked Johnny to go and visit his
aunt Conchita in Angeles City whose television set needed repair. Johnny left La
Loma, QuezonCity, at about ten oclock the following morning of 05 September 1997. He arrived
in Angeles City between twelve-thirty and one oclock in the afternoon. At the offices of Suarez
Travel Services, he found his aunt Conchita talking with Roel Sicangco and Myla Miclat. He
waited. After Roel and Myla had left, Conchita told him that he could not work as yet on the
television set as she had a lot of other things to attend to first in Manila. He asked Conchita if she
wanted company but she told him to go ahead as she still had to entertain a woman who just
came in. He left Conchitas office and saw Roel and Myla waiting for a passenger jeepney.
Johnny noticed a man on board a parked vehicle who was holding a clutch bag. He saw the man
enter his aunts office. Meanwhile, he boarded a passenger jeepney and went to the terminal of
the Philippine Rabbit bus line. Johnny reached La Loma at four oclock in the afternoon. He
informed Nimfa that he was unable to repair Conchitas television set. Between four-thirty
and five oclock in the afternoon, Nimfa received a call from Conchita who informed him that she
sent Johnny home since she had as yet a lot of paper work to do. The following
morning, Nimfa was informed of Conchitas death. Johnny was advised by Nimfa not to go to the
wake because Conchitas brothers suspected him of being responsible for the killing of their
sister. Johnny stayed at the house of his live-in partner and came home only after the burial.
In convicting Quizon of the crime with which he was indicted, the trial court held:

The fact of death of victim Conchita Pasquin is beyond dispute. Her cadaver was found in her
bedroom wrapped with a white blanket. There was also a contusion on the right side of the face
and abrasions on the victims right and left side of the neck, right elbow, right forearm and at the
palm. Accused likewise admitted that he went to the office of the victim in the afternoon
of September 5, 1997 and saw thereat Myla Miclat and Roel Sicangco who left ahead of him.

xxx xxx xxx

Nobody actually saw how the victim was killed and how the robbery was committed. The
Prosecution is relying only on circumstantial evidence to secure the conviction of the accused
Johnny Quizon. Under our rules on evidence, an accused can still be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available provided that enough circumstantial evidence has been established by the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime (People
vs. Lagao, Jr., 271 SCRA 51.)
 xxx xxx xxx

No direct evidence was presented by the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused. We are
constrained to consider the circumstantial evidence introduced by the prosecution to determine
whether the same would be sufficient to convict the accused:

1. Conchita Pasquin was a victim of foul play. There were contusions and abrasions on the upper
part of the body. The steel door of the office was left open the whole night of the September 5 up
to the early morning of September 6, when the victims body was discovered. The light of the
office was also on and her body was wrapped in a white blanket when discovered. Definitely she
could not have died a natural death.

2. The accused was at the victims office in the afternoon of September 5,

1997 when Myla Miclat gave the sum of P17,000.00 for the purchase of her plane ticket
in Manila.

3. The victim was in a hurry to leave for Manila to purchase Myla Miclats plane ticket. In
fact, Myla Miclat was told by the victim to return that evening to the office to get her ticket.

4. When Myla Miclat and her boyfriend left the victims office, there were no other person inside
the office except the accused and the victim at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.

5. At around 2:00 oclock of that same afternoon, Rowena Abril, a secretary of the law office
adjacent to the Suarez office, heard three very loud noises coming from the victims office. When
Rowena went out after around 25 minutes to buy something at a nearby store, she saw the
accused hurriedly leaving the said office. The accused hurriedly left for Manila that same
afternoon leaving the victim behind who was also in a hurry to go to Manila to purchase the
plane ticket of Myla Miclat.

6. At around 2:00 oclock of that same afternoon, Rowena Abril heard several knockings at the
victims office but nobody opened the door.

7. At around 10 minutes before 5:00 p.m., Rowena Abril went to the office of the victim to return
the magazine the victim lent to her earlier, but nobody answered her, so she just left.

8. Myla Miclat returned that evening at around 7:00 p.m. but nobody opened the door of the
victims office.

9. On September 7, 1997, the body of the victim was brought to the house of the accused but the
latter never showed up during the entire wake for the victim.

10. The police were not able to find him at his girlfriends house.

11. The accused also did not attend the burial.

12. The alibi given by the accused for not attending the wake and the burial of his aunt was that
he was trying to avoid his uncles who were mad at him because he was being suspected of killing
his aunt. The accused was arrested by the police at their house where the wake was held one
week after the burial hence, he was not really afraid of his uncles.

13. Instead of helping the police in solving the crime and apprehending the killer of his aunt (as
he claims to be innocent) the accused went into hiding immediately after the killing.

14. The victim was not able to leave for Manila to buy the plane ticket for Myla Miclat but the
said amount of P17,000.00 for the plane ticket was never recovered.

The abovecited circumstances clearly made an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
perpetrator of the crime.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Johnny Quizon is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accused Johnny Quizon is further ordered to pay the heirs of Mrs. Marietta Suarez the sum of
P34,133.10 as actual damages and to pay the heirs of Conchita M. Pasquin the amount of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity.[2]

In his appeal to this Court, Johnny M. Quizon raised the lone assignment of error that -

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT GUILTY OF

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE WITHOUT HIS GUILT HAVING BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[3]

The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an appellees brief, submitted to the
Court a well-ratiocinated manifestation and motion averring that the existence of every bit of
circumstantial evidence was not satisfactorily established. The OSG maintained:

Appellant should be acquitted and released. The prosecution miserably failed to meet the
requirements of circumstantial evidence necessary for conviction.

First. The trial court erred in accepting the testimony of Miclat that appellant was the last person
who was with the victim before she died. The trial court similarly blundered in debunking the
testimony of both Sicangco and the appellant that after appellant had left the office, other persons
entered the victims office [TSN, January 7, 1999, pp. 8-10, Testimony of Roel Sicangco;
TSN, May 25, 1999, pp. 12-13, Testimony of Johnny Quizon]. However, there was nothing
in Miclats testimony that directly refuted the testimony of Sicangco that there were other persons
who entered the office afterwards. Miclat declared that she did not see whether or not the man
with the collectors bag returned after they left the office. Miclats testimony went:
 Q Im only concern [sic] with the better administration of justice. I know that you want
to cooperate so much by your testimony. Now, you are supposed to be a star
witness for the presence of the accused in that office. My question is, you did not
see the accused doing anything to the victim, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not also see whether that man with a collectors bag went back or not in that
office?
A No sir.
Q But you know in every office it is usually visited by several persons because of their
papers or transaction?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in that office it is usually visited by several persons because of their papers or
transaction?
A Yes, sir. [TSN, September 9, 1998, pp. 17-18]

Sicangco, on the other hand, testified to the circumstances after they left the travel agency, and
whose declaration was never rebutted by Miclat. He stated:

Q How do you know that Johnny Quizon arrived at 1:30 oclock in the afternoon
of September 5, 1997?
A Dahil sa estimate ng pagdating namin sa office at saka iyong interval.
Q When you left the office together with your live-in-partner, where was
Johnny Quizon then?
A Noong papaalis na kami sa agency, tapos nakita ko si Johnny sa may
funeral palabas at habang naghihintay kami ng jeep, nakita ko siya sumakay ng jee
p papuntang Dau, Mabalacat.
Q When you and your wife and Johnny Quizon left the premises, were there still other
persons inside the office besides that man and his lady companion?
A Noong palabas na kami sa agency, napansin ko si Johnny sa may likuran.
At habang naghihintay kami ng jeep, nakita ko iyong babae at iyong lalake pumaso
k sa travel agency.
Q Did you see Johnny Quizon ride on a jeep?
A Yes, sir.
Q To what destination?
A Dau, Mabalacat.
Q Before this Court your live-in-partner testified that when you left the office, she did
not notice that man and his lady companion entering the office, what can you say
about that?
 Court:
Did she testify about a man and a woman?
Atty. Castillon [defense counsel]:
Yes, Your Honor, during my cross-examination.
Pros. Quiambao:
[for the government] What she testified was that when she left, the only persons left
in the office were the victim and Johnny Quizon.
Atty. Castillon:
That is what she testified. And I am trying to find out from this witness if that is true.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Castillon:
Because according to the witness, they came back and entered the office.

Clearly, the prosecution could present only a witness who saw appellant in the vicinity of the
crime scene on the day the crime was committed. If the testimony of Sicangco is suspect as being
tainted with pity for a fellow-inmate, it is to be noted that Sicangco likewise freely admitted of
his love for Miclat [TSN, January 7, 1999, p. 23]. Miclat, on the other hand, categorically
declared that she did not know whether other persons entered the office afterwards. As
against Miclat, a former live-in-lover, and appellant, a mere fellow-inmate, Sicangcos sympathy
for appellant exceeded his love for Miclat because he did not want an innocent person to suffer
for a crime he did not commit
[Ako nagtetestigo ako para matulungan si Johnny. Basta ako gusto kong tulungan si Johnny dahi
l napakahirap nang maparusahan ng hindi mo naman ginawa. [TSN, January 7, 1999, p. 13]

That appellant was the last person seen with the victim on the day she died does not necessarily
prove that he killed her. It was not established that appellant and the victim were together until
the crime was committed. It was not even shown that appellant was the only one who was with
the victim before she died. The travel agency was already opened when Miclat, Sicangco and
appellant came. There were several persons there even before Miclat and company arrived. The
prosecution has not completely discounted the possibility that there were other persons who
transacted business with the victim when Miclat and appellant left, considering that the travel
agency is a place of business that caters to several clients. There was an eyewitness, Sicangco,
who declared that at least two persons came after appellant left the office [TSN, January 7, 1999,
pp. 8-10]. Even the secretary of the neighboring law firm, prosecution witness Abril, testified
that there were several persons who were knocking at the door of the victims office after
appellant left (TSN, May 6, 1998, p. 13).

True, a person may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence; but the proven
circumstances should inexorably lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused as the guilty person, to the exclusion of all others. Where the evidence presented admits
of other conclusions, the accused must be acquitted. Only if the judge below could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an
exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant is laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did
he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty. It is
critical that the moral force of the criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is important in our free society
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot
adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with
utmost certainty [People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 (1992); People v. Andag, 96 SCRA 861
(1980); People v. Benamira, 277 SCRA 232 (1997)].

A much graver set of inculpatory circumstantial evidence against the accused were present
in People v. Mijares, [297 SCRA 520 (1998)]. Despite that, the accused was acquitted. A seven-
year old playmate testified seeing accused Mijares as the last person who was with the victim the
night the victim was killed. The victim, a girl of tender age, was found dead. The two most
damning circumstances crucial to the prosecutions case were that 1] appellant was the last person
seen with the victim; and 2] his slippers were found at the crime scene. This Honorable Court
ruled that these circumstances are subject to two antithetical interpretations, one of guilt and the
other of innocence. This case even cited two analogous cases which fall squarely with the case at
bar, viz:

In People v. Ragon, the trial court convicted appellant of murder, based on these circumstances:
he and his companions were the last persons seen with the victim, and the cap worn
by Ragons companion was found beside the victims dead body. x x x However, this Court found
that the circumstantial evidence presented did not conclusively point to Ragon as the perpetrator
of the murder. The presence of the cap of Ragons companion beside the dead body only proved
that said person, not necessarily Ragon himself, was at the locus criminis. That such cap was
found in the vicinity of the crime scene did not necessarily imply that the accused killed the
victim.

In People v. Binamira, the trial court convicted the accused based on the following pieces of
circumstantial evidence: (1) he was accosted by security guards near the crime scene; (2)
he was walking suspiciously fast; (3) bloodied clothes were allegedly recovered from him.
Appellant therein was acquitted because the evidence, in view of the constitutional presumption
of innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and was thus insufficient to support a
conviction. Indeed, this Court has ruled that a person cannot be held liable for the killing, unless
all the proven circumstances point to his guilt.

The case of People v. Boneo [174 SCRA 612 (1989)] recounts a fisherman who was last seen
alive with the Boneo brothers. He accompanied the brothers out to sea late at night to get an
animal he was supposed to buy from the other side of the shore. He was found dead and the
P3,000.00 he was carrying gone. The Supreme Court waxed poetic when it declared - This rule
must be observed with more rigor where the evidence of the prosecution is merely
circumstantial, as in the case at bar. While this is not to say that this kind of evidence will never
be sufficient to convict, it does mean that it must be especially persuasive if it is to still, as it
must, every whisper of doubt that the accused is not innocent. Absent conclusive proof of his
guilt, the prisoner must be released and purged of all the stigma of the charge upon his head.

In People v. Garcia, [215 SCRA 349 (1992)], this Honorable Court lauded the OSG for utmost
objectivity and fairness by acquitting the accused because the only circumstance that can be
appreciated against him was that the prosecution witness saw him standing near the banana
plants about fifteen meters away from the house of the victim minutes before the discovery of the
deceased.

Similar circumstances did not merit a conviction, as in People v. Nicolas, [204 SCRA 191
(1991)], where the accused was present at the store where the victim was killed and with him
was found part of the stolen money as well as bloodied pants. In People v. Geron [281 SCRA 36
(1997)], the string of circumstances which the trial court relied upon for conviction consisted of
the presence of the accused at the crime scene; he had in his possession articles belonging to the
victims at the time he was apprehended; and the accused fled from the crime scene. This
Honorable Court held that the above circumstances point to no inference exclusively consistent
with the guilt of the accused. It explained that: First, the mere presence of the accused at
the locus criminis and his possession of certain items belonging to the victims, while it may have
pointed the finger of suspicion at him, cannot be solely interpreted to mean that he has
committed the robbery and the attendant killings. (at p. 47)

Second. The trial court was unable to cite any particular circumstance at all to show that
appellant in the case at bar had a motive to commit the crime.

There is absolutely no motive for appellant to rob or kill the victim. Noteworthy is the testimony
of the sister of the deceased, Nimfa Quizon, who testified in appellants favor. Appellant is not
her own son, but her nephew [TSN, February 24, 1999, p. 3]. Further, Miclat herself heard from
the victim that she had been the one responsible for the appellants rehabilitation
[TSN, September 9, 1998, p. 8]. It goes against the grain of human experience for a sister to
prevaricate on the true identity of the killer of her own blood-sister just to hide the guilt of a
nephew.

Lest it be forgotten, the Constitution mandates that the accused must be presumed innocent.
Hence, if the circumstances are capable of several interpretations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence has not
fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a conviction [People
v. Mijares, 297 SCRA 520 (1998)].

Third. The trial court considered appellants failure to attend the funeral rites of the victim as a
sign of guilt. This is not so [People v. Andag, supra; People v. Mijares, supra]. Appellant and the
sister of the victim testified that the brothers of the victim, uncles of the appellant, strongly
suspected him as the killer. He simply followed the order of his step-mother, his
aunt Nimfa Quizon, to avoid attending the wake and the burial to avoid any mishap that might
occur because of the supposition that he was the killer.
Fourth. The trial court faults him for not clearing his name upon notice that he was a suspect
and that he went into hiding, citing that the wicked man flees though no one pursues.
Unfortunately, no such flight could be ascribed to the appellant. The trial court lost sight of the
fact that appellant was not a resident of Angeles City, and that he stayed in the house of his father
in La Loma, Quezon City to do some odd jobs and at the house of his girlfriend
in Paraaque [TSN, May 25, 1999, p. 11]. Flight, in order to be considered as an indication of
guilt, presupposes that a person escapes from the authorities to evade prosecution. It does not
contemplate a situation where the accused returns to his home where at any time, he may be
picked up for questioning in connection with or arrested for having committed a crime. Flight,
when adequately explained, cannot be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt. Appellant
presented an unrebutted explanation that he fled, not because of guilt for having perpetrated a
crime, but rather for fear of his own relatives reprisal as the primary suspect in the killing of his
own aunt. [People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 (1992)]; People v. Geron, 281 SCRA 36
(1997)]; People v. Mijares, 297 SCRA 520 (1998)].

Fifth. The Courts acceptance of various details as to the irregularity and strangeness of
appellants actions as constitutive of his guilt like appellants hurried leaving of the premises, his
leaving the victim behind when both of them were going to Manila, and his alleged lack of
cooperation with the police in searching for the true criminal, is premised on a precarious
foothold.

Likewise, there is no testimony as to the death of the victim, but only a general medico-legal
explanation that the strangulation of the victim hastened the victims heart and lung disease.
There is no evidence of fingerprints, hair and skin samples on the deceased that might lead to the
identity of the killer. The rope or cloth or blanket that was supposed to have strangled the victim
was not presented. There was no testimony that the belongings of the victim were in disarray to
show struggle during the crime. The prosecution was unable to present evidence as to how the
victim died. The alleged P17,000.00 paid to victim and the pieces of jewelry lost were never
presented in court, much less were they found on the appellant.

As the saying goes: The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is
without rudder or compass. [People v. Geron, 281 SCRA 36 (1997)]. No court, when confronted
with issues that affect the life and liberty of citizens in a free society, should treat flippantly the
latters constitutional guarantees and supply deficiencies in the evidence for the prosecution with
its own bias, suspicion or speculation [People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 (1992)].[4]

The OSG thus prayed:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
in Angeles City, dated March 27, 2000, in Criminal Case No. 97-893 be REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE and accused-appellant JOHNNY M. QUIZON be ACQUITTED.[5]

The Court upholds the recommendation of the Solicitor General.

Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.

The foregoing elements must all be obtaining in order to aptly warrant the conviction of an
accused. The circumstances proved must be congruous with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilt.[6] It must be shown (a) that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which
the inferences are derived have been firmly established and (b) that the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court has once
said:

x x x. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.[7]

Evidently, Conchita Magpantay Pasquin was a victim of foul play. The circumstances recited
by the trial court, however, would be insufficient to create in the mind of the Court a moral
certainty that appellant was the one responsible for the commission of the crime. Appellants
mere presence at the locus criminis would be inadequate to implicate him[8] in the commission of
the crime. No evidence was adduced that appellant was the last person to see or talk to the victim
before she was killed. Roel Sicangco testified that when he and Myla arrived at Conchitas office,
the latter had just finished talking to a woman and a man with a collectors bag.
After Roel and Myla finished their transaction with Conchita, the same man and woman, whom
they saw earlier, again entered Conchitas office. Roel testified that he saw Johnny come out of
the office and board a passenger jeepney going to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The prosecution
failed to show that Sicangco had any good reason to lie. Even while the trial court had observed
that Conchitas jewelry and money were never found, no evidence was introduced that appellant
had them, or that he had them in his possession at anytime after Conchitas death. The trial court
found it strange that appellant did not wait for Conchita when the latter said that she was also
leaving for Manila. Appellant said that he did offer to wait for Conchita but she told him to go
ahead as she still had some other work to attend to.
The fact that appellant did not attend Conchitas wake is not an indication of either flight or
guilt. Nimfa Quizon would appear to have warned appellant against going to the wake after he
earned the ire of their relatives who had suspected him to be the killer.
Significantly, no ill-motive was ascribed on appellant to either kill or rob his own aunt.
The circumstances recited by the trial court might be enough to create some kind of
suspicion on the part of the trial court of appellants involvement, but suspicion is not enough to
warrant conviction. A finding of guilt based on conjecture, even if likely, cannot satisfy the need
for evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
complicity in the crime.[9] No matter how weak the defense is, it is still imperative for the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence for the
prosecution, it has been said, must at all times stand or fall on its own weight and it cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. [10] An accused has the right to be
presumed innocent, and this presumption prevails until and unless it is overturned by competent
and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[11] In case of any reservation
against the guilt of accused, the Court should entertain no other alternative but to acquit him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of finding appellant JOHNNY M.
QUIZON guilty of robbery with homicide is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Court further orders appellants immediate release from
custody, unless he is lawfully held for another lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision
immediately and to report to this Court the action taken hereon not later than five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.