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L-47182-83

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.L4718283October30,1978

FEDERATIONOFFREEWORKERS(BISIGNGMANGGAGAWASAUTEX),petitioner,
vs.
CARMELOC.NORIELasDirectoroftheBureauofLaborRelations,DepartmentofLaborUNIVERSAL
TEXTILEMILLSWORKERSUNIONALUandUNIVERSALTEXTILEMILLS,INC.,respondents.

JaimeD.Lauronforpetitioner.

VenerandoB.BrionesforrespondentUnion.

LutgardoB.BarboforUniversalTextileMills,Inc.

FERNANDO,J.:

WhatimmediatelycallsattentioninthiscertiorariproceedingassailingthedecisionofrespondentCarmeloC.Noriel,
DirectoroftheBureauofLaborRelations,reversinganorderoftheMedArbitercallingforacertificationelection,is
theprolixityofcounselforpetitionerFederationofFreeWorkers(BisigngManggagawasaUtex)andcounselfor
respondentunionUniversalTextileMillWorkersUnionALU. 1Thepleadingsfiledwouldnothavesufferediftheywere
lessdetailed. 2Forthedecisiveissueraisedisquitesimpleanduncomplicated.Withtheexpressadmissionbyrespondent
Norielhimselfthatthepetitionforcertificationelectionwassupportedbythesignaturesof1,070employees,morethan30%
ofthelaborforceinthecollectivebargainingunit,thegraveabuseofdiscretionallegedisquiteapparent.Thelanguageof
Article 258 of the Labor Code is categorical and mandatory. 3 It should follow then that once the statutory requisite is
satisfied, the certification election must be held. Our decisions, as will be made apparent, are quite clear on that point.
certiorarilies.

AsinalmosteverylaborcontroversythatoflatehadbeenelevatedtothisTribunal,itsorigincouldbetracedtothe
fiercestruggleforsupremacybetweenalaborunionhavingacollectivebargainingcontractwithmanagementand
another union seeking to replace it and thus desirous of holding a certification election. So it was in this case,
petitionerlaborunionhaving,evenbeforethesixtydayfreedomperiod,filedsuchapetitionasinthemeanwhilea
supplementalcontractwhichwouldextendanexistingcollectivebargainingagreementbetweenmanagementand
respondentunionwasenteredintoandpresumablyratifiedbymorethanamajorityoftheworkersintheUniversal
TextileMills,Inc.TheMedArbiterruledinfavorofrespondentUniondenyingcertification,buthewasreversedby
respondent Noriel, the case being remanded to the former precisely for the "reception and evaluation of the
supporting signatures of at least 30% of the employees which petitioner may present and for the resolution of all
(other)pendingissues." 4AmotionforreconsiderationbyrespondentUnionwasunavailing,respondentNorielrulingthat
"theratificationofthecollectiveagreement...isbeingprotestedandthesamecanbethreshedoutinanappropriatehearing
before a MedArbiter, and that the issue on the consent requirement can best be resolved by an appreciation of FFW's
evidence."5Asaresult,anorderwasissuedbytheMedArbiteronMay3,1977callingforacertificationelection. 6Itcame
asasurprisetorespondentUnion,therefore,thatnotwithstandingsuchafindingofthe30%requisitehavingbeensatisfied,
theassaileddecisionofSeptember29,1977recognized"theeffectivityandvalidityoftheMay28,1976agreementbetween
[respondentUnion]andUniversalTextileMillsforthefirstyearofitsdurationcovering1977"andatthesametimedirected
respondent Union "to renegotiate with the management at Universal Textile Mills the benefits and other conditions of
employmentforthesecondandthirdyearofthecontractwithinthree(3)monthsfromreceiptofthisResolutionandtosubmit
the renegotiated benefits to the workers for acceptance and ratification through a secret balloting to be supervised by this
Office," 7 The refusal to require the certification election as ordained by the Labor Code and the adoption of a rather
unorthodoxapproachwassoughttobejustifiedonpragmaticconsiderations.

ItwassuchfailureofrespondentNorieltoabidebytheexpressmandateofArticle258oftheLaborCodeaswellas
therulespromulgatedforitsapplicabilityandtheratherambiguousaswellasnovelaspectsoftheassaileddecision
thatpromptedthispetitionforcertiorari.Asnotedattheoutset,certiorarilies.
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1. No administrative agency can ignore the imperative tone of the above article. The language used is one of
command.Onceithasbeenverifiedthatthepetitionforcertificationelectionhasthesupportofatleast30%ofthe
employees in the bargaining unit, it must be granted. The specific word used can yield no other meaning. It
becomesunderthecircumstances,"mandatory"forrespondentNorielasDirectoroftheBureauofLaborRelations
toordersuchcertificationelectionpreciselytoascertainwhichlabororganizationshouldbetheexclusivebargaining
representative. It becomes readily understandable then why this Court is firmly committed to such a view. To
paraphrase People v. Mapa, 8 as the law cannot be any clearer, the task of the judiciary is equally clear, its first and
fundamental duty being to yield obedience to what is ordained. So it has been since Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unionsv.BureauofLaborRelations.9Thereareatleastsevendecisionstothateffect,thelatestofwhichwaspromulgated
earlythismonth. 10TheapproachinPeoplev.Mapa 11ofunyieldingobediencetotheplainandexplicitphraseologyofthe
applicablestatutehasbeenfollowedinsubsequentcases.12

ItcantraceitsorigintotheleadingcaseofLizarragaHermanosv.YapTico, 13a1913decision.Assoemphatically
expressedbyitsponente,JusticeMoreland:"Thefirstandfundamentaldutyofcourts,inourjudgment,istoapplythelaw.
Constructionandinterpretationcomeonlyafterithasbeendemonstratedthatapplicationisimpossibleorinadequatewithout
them. They are the very last functions which a court should exercise. The majority of the laws need no interpretation or
construction. They require only application, and were there more application and less construction, there would be more
stability in the law, and more people would know what the law is. 14Such a thought was reiterated by Justice Laurel in
DirectorofLandsv.Abejas.15Where"thelawisclear,"accordingtohim,thisCourt"cannotoveremphasizethe[necessity
thattherebe]adherence."16

2.Thisisnottodenythatanadministrativeagencyentrustedwiththeenforcementofaregulatorystatuteisvested
withdiscretion.Suchdiscretion,however,isnotunbounded.Where,asinthiscase,thelaborCodeitselfsetslimits,
theymustbeobserved.Thatistheonlywaytomanifestfealtytotheruleoflaw.WeturnagaintoArticle258.Itslast
sentencespecificallydefineswhatmustbedonebytheBureauofLaborRelationsoncethecertificationelectionis
conducteditmust"certifythewinnerastheexclusivecollectivebargainingrepresentativeofalltheemployeesin
theunit."ThatistheextentandscopeoftheauthorityentrustedtorespondentNorielasDirectoroftheBureauof
Labor Relations. He cannot go further than that. Yet, in the assailed order, he would direct respondent Union "to
renegotiatewiththemanagementatuniversalTextileMillsthebenefitsandotherconditionsofemploymentforthe
second and third year of the contract within three (3) months from receipt of this Resolution and to submit the
renegotiatedbenefitstotheworkersforacceptanceandratificationthroughasecretballotingtobesupervisedby
thisOffice."17Andthis,too,withoutthebenefitofacertificationelectionmandatedbylaw.Thefailuretoabidebywhatthe
LaborCodecategoricallyrequiresisthusplainandmanifest.WhatwasdonebyrespondentNorielisbereftofsupportinlaw,
Tocountenanceitwouldbetofoilthestatutoryscheme.'Therecanbenootherconclusionexceptthathisassailedorderis
taintedwithaseriousjurisdictionaldefect.Thisisthentheproperoccasionfortheexerciseofthecorrectiveauthorityofthis
Tribunal.18

3. In thus so ruling, we are not unmindful that the supplemental collective bargaining contract entered into in the
meanwhile between management and respondent Union contains provisions beneficial to labor. So as not to
prejudice the workers involved, it must be made clear that until the conclusion of a new collective bargaining
contractenteredintobyitandwhateverlabororganizationmaybechosenafterthecertificationelection,theexisting
collectivelaborcontractasthussupplementedshouldbeleftundisturbed.Itstermscallforstrictcompliance.This
modeofassuringthatthecauseoflaborsuffersnoinjuryfromthestrugglebetweencontendinglabororganizations
followsthedoctrineannouncedintherecentcaseofVassarIndustriesEmployeesUnionv.Estrella.19Toquotefrom
the opinion: "In the meanwhile, if as contended by private respondent labor union the interim collective bargaining
agreement,whichitenginderedandenteredintoonSeptember26,1977,hasmuchmorefavorabletermsfortheworkersof
private respondent Vassar Industries, then it should continue in full force and effect until the appropriate bargaining
representativeischosenandnegotiationsforanewcollectivebargainingagreementthereafterconcluded."20

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of respondent Noriel of September 29, 1977
reversing an order of the MedArbiter calling for a certification election is nullified, reversed, and set aside. A
certificationelectionmustbeconductedforthwith.Thisdecisionisimmediatelyexecutory.Nocosts.

Barredo,Antonio,Aquino,Concepcion,Jr.andSantos,JJconcur.

Footnotes

1UniversalTextileMills,Inc,waslikewiseincludedasprivaterespondent.

2Therecordsofthecasecontain1,766pages.Thataccountsforthefactthatwhilethepetitionwas
filedonOctober25,1977,itwasnotuntilJuly17,1978thatitwassubmittedfordecision.

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3AccordingtoArticle258oftheLaborCode:"Requisitesforcertificationelection.Anypetitionfor
certificationelectionfiledbyanylegitimatelabororganizationshallbesupportedbythewrittenconsent
ofatleastthirtypercent(30%)ofalltheemployeesinthebargainingunit.Uponreceiptandverification
ofsuchpetition,itshallbemademandatoryfortheBureautoconductacertificationelectionforthe
purposeofdeterminingtherepresentativeoftheemployeesintheappropriatebargainingunitand
certifythewinnerastheexclusivebargainingrepresentativeofalltheemployeesintheunit."

4Petition,DecisionofrespondentNoriel,AnnexC,3.

5Ibid.

6Ibid,4.

7Ibid,6.

8L22301,August30,1967,20SCRA1164.

9L42115,January27,1976,69SCRA132.ThisCourtwentevenfurtherbyrecognizingthe
discretionaryauthorityintheBureauofLaborRelationstoorderacertificationelectionevenwhenthe
30%requirementisnotmet.

10ScoutRamonV.Albanov.Noriel,L48347,October3,1978.Theothercasesfollow:Federacion
Obrerav.Noriel,L41937,July6,1976,72SCRA24Today'sKnittingFreeWorkersUnionv.Noriel,L
45057,Feb.28,1977,75SCRA450BenguetExplorationMinersUnionv.Noriel,L44110,March29,
1977,76SCRA107KapisananngmgaManggagawav.Noriel,L45475,June20,1977,77SCRA
414MonarkInternationalInc.v.Noriel,L4757071,May11,1978NationalMinesandAlliedWorkers
Unionv.Luna,L46722,June15,1978.

1120SCRA1164.

12Cf.PacificOxygen&AcetyleneCo.v.CentralBank,L21881,March1,1968,22SCRA917
Dequitov.Lopez,L27757,March28,1968,22SCRA1352Padillav.CityofPasay,L24039,June29,
1968,23SCRA1349Garciav.Vasquez,L26808,March28,1969,27SCRA505LaPertaCigarand
CigaretteFactoryv.CaparasL27948and2800111,July31,1969,28SCRA1085MobilOilPhil.,Inc.
v.DiocaresL26371,Sept.30,1969,29SCRA656LuzonSuretyCo.,Inc,v.DeGarcia,L25659,Oct.
31,1969,30SCRA111Vda.deMacabentav.DavaoStevedoreTerminalCo.,L27489,April30,
1970,32SCRA553RepublicFlourMills,Inc.v.CommissionerofCustoms,L28463,May31,1971,
39SCRA269MaritimeCo.ofthePhil.v.ReparationsCommission,L29203,July26,1971,40SCRA
70AlliedBrokerageCorp.v.CommissionerofCustoms,L27641,Aug.31,197140SCRA555:
Gonzagav.CourtofAppeals,L27455,June28,1973,51SCRA381Villangcav.Ariola,L29226,
Sept.28,1973,53SCRA139Jalandoniv.Endaya,L23894,Jan.24,1974,55SCRA261Pacisv.
Pamaran,
L23996,March15,197456SCRA16:Cabanasv.Pilapil,L25843,July25,1974,58SCRA94.

1324Phil.504.

14Ibid,513.OutsideofPeoplev.Mapa,LizarragaHermanoswascitedinLambertv.Fox26Phil.588
1914)andYangcov.CourtofFirstInstance,79Phil.183(1915).

1564Phil.428(1937).

16Ibid,429.

17DecisionofrespondentNoriel,Petition,AnnexC6.

18Cf.SanMiguelCorporationv.SecretaryofLabor,L39195,May16,1975,64SCRA56,perAquino,
J.

19L46562,March31,1978.

20Ibid,8.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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