AlGhazali

FirstpublishedTueAug14,2007substantiverevisionMonSep22,2014

AlGhazl(c.10561111)wasoneofthemostprominentandinfluentialphilosophers,theologians,jurists,
andmysticsofSunniIslam.HewasactiveatatimewhenSunnitheologyhadjustpassedthroughits
consolidationandenteredaperiodofintensechallengesfromShiiteIsmlitetheologyandtheArabic
traditionofAristotelianphilosophy(falsafa).AlGhazlunderstoodtheimportanceoffalsafaanddeveloped
acomplexresponsethatrejectedandcondemnedsomeofitsteachings,whileitalsoallowedhimtoaccept
andapplyothers.AlGhazl'scritiqueoftwentypositionsoffalsafainhisIncoherenceofthe
Philosophers(Tahfutalfalsifa)isasignificantlandmarkinthehistoryofphilosophyasitadvancesthe
nominalistcritiqueofAristoteliansciencedevelopedlaterin14thcenturyEurope.OntheArabicand
MuslimsidealGhazl'sacceptanceofdemonstration(apodeixis)ledtoamuchmorerefinedandprecise
discourseonepistemologyandafloweringofAristotelianlogicsandmetaphysics.WithalGhazlbegins
thesuccessfulintroductionofAristotelianismorratherAvicennismintoMuslimtheology.Afteraperiodof
appropriationoftheGreeksciencesinthetranslationmovementfromGreekintoArabicandthewritingsof
thefalsifauptoAvicenna(IbnSn,c.9801037),philosophyandtheGreekscienceswerenaturalized
intothediscourseofkalmandMuslimtheology(Sabra1987).AlGhazl'sapproachtoresolvingapparent
contradictionsbetweenreasonandrevelationwasacceptedbyalmostalllaterMuslimtheologiansandhad,
viatheworksofAverroes(IbnRushd,112698)andJewishauthorsasignificantinfluenceonLatin
medievalthinking.
1.Life
2.AlGhazl'sReportsofthefalsifa'sTeachings
3.AlGhazl'sRefutationsoffalsafaandIsmlism
4.ThePlaceofFalsafainIslam
5.TheEthicsoftheRevivaloftheReligiousSciences
6.CosmologyintheRevivaloftheReligiousSciences
7.CausalityinalGhazl
7.1OccasionalismversusSecondaryCausality
7.2The17thDiscussionoftheIncoherence
7.3TwoDifferentConceptsoftheModalities
7.4TheCumPossibilityofOccasionalismandSecondaryCausality
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1.Life
1.Life
LaterMuslimmedievalhistorianssaythatAbHmidMuhammadibnMuhammadalGhazlwasbornin
1058or1059inTabarnTs(15milesnorthofmodernMeshed,NEIran),yetnotesabouthisageinhis
lettersandhisautobiographyindicatethathewasbornin1055or1056(Griffel2009,2325).AlGhazl
receivedhisearlyeducationinhishometownofTustogetherwithhisbrotherAhmad(c.10601123or1126)
whobecameafamouspreacherandSufischolar.MuhammadwentontostudywiththeinfluentialAsharite
theologianalJuwayn(102885)attheNizmiyyaMadrasainnearbyNishapur.Thisbroughthiminclose
contactwiththecourtoftheGrandSeljuqSultanMalikshh(reg.107192)andhisgrandvizierNizmal
Mulk(101892).In1091NizmalMulkappointedalGhazltotheprestigiousNizmiyyaMadrasain
Baghdad.InadditiontobeingaconfidanteoftheSeljuqSultanandhiscourtinIsfahan,henowbecame
closelyconnectedtothecaliphalcourtinBaghdad.Hewasundoubtedlythemostinfluentialintellectualof
histime,whenin1095hesuddenlygaveuphispostsinBaghdadandleftthecity.Undertheinfluenceof
SufiliteraturealGhazlhadbeguntochangehislifestyletwoyearsbeforehisdeparture(Griffel2009,67).
Herealizedthatthehighethicalstandardsofavirtuousreligiouslifearenotcompatiblewithbeinginthe
serviceofsultans,viziers,andcaliphs.Benefitingfromtherichesofthemilitaryandpoliticaleliteimplies
complicityintheircorruptandoppressiveruleandwilljeopardizeone'sprospectofredemptioninthe
afterlife.WhenalGhazlleftBaghdadin1095hewenttoDamascusandJerusalemandvowedatthetomb
ofAbrahaminHebronneveragaintoservethepoliticalauthoritiesorteachatstatesponsoredschools.He
continuedtoteach,however,atsmallschools(singl.zwiya)thatwerefinancedbyprivatedonations.After
performingthepilgrimagein1096,alGhazlreturnedviaDamascusandBaghdadtohishometownTs,
wherehefoundedasmallprivateschoolandaSuficonvent(khnqh).In1106,atthebeginningofthe6th
centuryintheMuslimcalendar,alGhazlbrokehisvowandreturnedtoteachingatthestatesponsored
NizmiyyaMadrasainNishapur,wherehehimselfhadbeenastudent.Tohisfollowershejustifiedthisstep
withthegreatamountoftheologicalconfusionamongthegeneralpublicandpressurefromauthoritiesatthe
Seljuqcourt(alGhazl1959a,4550=2000b,8793).AlGhazlregardedhimselfasoneoftherenewers
(singl.muhy)ofreligion,who,accordingtoahadth,willcomeeverynewcentury.Hecontinuedtoteachat
hiszwiyainTswherehediedin1111(Griffel2009,2059).

2.AlGhazl'sReportsofthefalsifa'sTeachings
Afterhavingalreadymadeanameforhimselfasacompetentauthoroflegalworks,alGhazlpublished
around1095anumberofbookswhereheaddressesthechallengesposedbyfalsafaandbythetheologyof
theIsmliteShiites.Themovementoffalsafa(fromGreek:philosopha)resultedfromthetranslationof
GreekphilosophicalandscientificliteratureintoArabicfromthe8thtotheearly10thcenturies.TheArabic
philosophers(falsifa)wereheirstothelateantiquetraditionofunderstandingtheworksofAristotlein
Neoplatonicterms.InphilosophythetranslatorsfromGreekintoArabicfocusedontheworksofAristotle
andalthoughsomedistinctlyNeoplatonictextsweretranslatedintoArabicmostnotablythepseudo
AristotelianTheology,acompilationfromPlotinus'EnneadsthemostsignificantNeoplatoniccontributions
reachedtheArabsbywayofcommentariesontheworksoftheStagirite(Wisnovsky2003,15).Falsafawas
amovementwhereChristians,Muslims,andevenpaganauthorsparticipated.Afterthe12thcenturyitwould
alsoincludeJewishauthors.Forreasonsthatwillbecomeapparent,alGhazlfocusedhiscommentsonthe
Muslimfalsifa.Intheearly10thcenturyalFrb(d.950)haddevelopedasystemicphilosophythat
challengedkeyconvictionsheldbyMuslimtheologians,mostnotablythecreationoftheworldintimeand
theoriginalcharacteroftheinformationGodrevealstoprophets.FollowingAristotle,alFrbtaughtthat
theworldhasnobeginninginthepastandthatthecelestialspheres,forinstance,movefrompreeternity.
Prophetsandtherevealedreligionstheybringarticulatethesameinsightsthatphilosophersexpressintheir
teachings,yettheprophetsusethemethodofsymbolizationtomakethiswisdommoreapproachableforthe
ordinarypeople.AvicennacontinuedalFrb'sapproachanddevelopedhismetaphysicsandhis
prophetologytoapointwhereitofferscomprehensiveexplanationsofGod'sessenceandHisactionsaswell
asapsychologythatgivesadetailedaccountofhowprophetsreceivetheirknowledgeandhowthey,for
instance,performmiraclesthatconfirmtheirmissions.Avicenna'sphilosophyoffersphilosophical
explanationsofkeyMuslimtenetslikeGod'sunity(tawhd)andthecentralpositionofprophetsamong
humans.
InhisautobiographyalGhazlwritesthatduringhistimeattheBaghdadNizmiyyahestudiedtheworks
ofthefalsifafortwoyearsbeforehewrotehisIncoherenceofthePhilosophersinathirdyear(Ghazl
1959a,18=2000b,61).Itishardlycredible,however,thatalGhazlbegantooccupyhimself
withfalsafaonlyafterhebecameprofessorattheNizmiyyainBaghdad.Thisaccountisapologeticand
aimstorejecttheclaimofsomeofhiscriticsthathehadlearnedfalsafabeforehisownreligiouseducation
wascomplete.MostprobablyhehadbecomeacquaintedwithfalsafawhilestudyingwithalJuwayn,whose
worksalreadyshowaninfluencefromAvicenna.AlGhazl'sresponsetoAristotelianism,theIncoherence
ofthePhilosophers,isamasterworkofphilosophicalliteratureandmayhavebeendecadesinthemaking.It
isaccompaniedbyworkswherealGhazlprovidesfaithfulreportsofthephilosophers'teachings.Twoof
thoseworkshavecomedowntous.Thefirstisanalmostcompletefragmentofalongbookwhereal
Ghazlcopiesorparaphrasespassagesfromtheworksofphilosophersandcombinesthemtoa
comprehensivereportabouttheirteachingsinmetaphysics(Griffel2006,alAkiti2009).Thefragment
unfortunatelybearsnotitle.Thesecondwork,theDoctrinesofthePhilosophers(Maqsidalfalsifa,onthe
translationofthetitleseeShihadeh2011,9092),isalooselyadaptedArabictranslationofthepartson
logics,metaphysics,andthenaturalsciencesinAvicenna'sPersianworkPhilosophyforAlal
Dawla(DnishnamahyiAl)(Janssens1986).PreviouslyithasbeenassumedthattheDoctrinesofthe
Philosopherswaswrittenasapreparatorystudytohismajorwork,theIncoherence.Thiscannolongerbe
upheld.BothreportsofalGhazlstandonlyinaverylooseconnectiontothetextoftheIncoherenceofthe
Philosophers.TheIncoherenceandtheDoctrinesusedifferentterminologiesandthelatterpresentsits
materialinwaysthatdoesnotsupportthecriticismintheIncoherence(Janssens2003,4345).
TheDoctrinesofthePhilosophersmayhavebeenatextthatwasinitiallyunconnectedtotheIncoherenceor
thatwasgeneratedafterthecompositionofthelatter.Onlyitsintroductionanditsbriefexplicitcreatea
connectiontotherefutationintheIncoherence.Thesepartswerealmostcertainlywritten(oradded)afterthe
publicationoftheIncoherence(Janssens2003,45Griffel2006,910).
TheDoctrinesofthePhilosopherswastranslatedintoLatininthethirdquarterofthe12thcenturyandinto
Hebrewfirstin1292andatleastanothertwotimeswithinthenextfiftyyears.Thesetranslationsenjoyed
muchmoresuccessthantheArabicoriginal.Infact,intheLatinaswellasintheHebrewtraditionsthey
overshadowedallofalGhazl'sotherwritings.TheLatintranslation,sometimesreferredtoasLogicaet
philosophiaAlgazelis,wastheonlybookbyalGhazltranslatedduringtheperiodofthetransmissionof
ArabicphilosophytoChristianEurope(thepartonlogiciseditedinLohr1965,thetworemainingpartson
metaphysicsandthenaturalsciencesinalGhazl1933).ItwastranslatedbyDominicusGundisalivi
(Gundissalinus,d.c.1190)ofToledoincollaborationwithsomeonereferredtoasMagisterIohannes(d.
1215),alsoknownasIohannesHispanus(orHispalensis),probablyanArabizedChristian(aMozarab),who
wasdeanatthecathedralofToledointhe1180sand1190s(Burnett1994).Thetwotranslatorsseemtohave
omittedtheshortintroductionandtheexplicitwheretheworkisdescribedasanuncommittedreportof
thefalsifa'steachings.AsmallnumberofLatinmanuscriptsshowsignsthatthistranslationwasrevised
duringthe13thcentury(Lohr1965,229)andinonecasetheypreserveaLatinrenditionofalGhazl's
originalintroduction(editedinSalman1935,12527).That,however,hadnexttonoinfluenceonthetext's
reception(Salman1935),andtheversionthatcirculatedamongreadersofLatindoesnotincludealGhazl's
distancingstatements(alGhazl1506).ThebookthusconcealeditscharacterasareportofAvicenna's
teachingsanditsauthorAlgazelwasconsideredafaithfulfollowerofAvicennawhohadproduceda
masterfulcompendiumofthelatter'sphilosophy.Duringthe12thand13thcenturiestheLogicaet
philosophiaAlgazeliswasaprincipalsourceforLatinauthorsontheteachingsoftheArabicphilosophers
(dAlverny1986Alonso1958).AlGhazl'sidentificationasoneofthemisusuallyattributedtothelimited
knowledgeofLatinscholarsaboutmattersrelatingtotheauthorsofthetextstheyread.Theassumption,
however,thattheDoctrinesofthePhilosophersisnotmerelyareportoftheteachingsofthefalsifabut
ratherrepresentsalGhazl'sgenuinepositionsinphilosophyisnotlimitedtotheLatintradition.Thereare
ArabicmanuscriptsthatattributeatextthatisquitesimilartotheDoctrinesofthePhilosopherstoalGhazl
withoutmentioningthattheteachingsthereinareanuncommittedreport.Theoldestofthesemanuscripts
wasproducedatthebeginningofthe13thcenturyatMaragheh,animportantcenterofscholarshipinNW
Iranandisavailableinfacsimile(Pourjavady2002,262).ItshowsthatalsointheArabictradition,the
positionsreportedintheDoctrinesofthePhilosophywerecloselyassociatedwithalGhazl.Themis
identificationofalGhazlasafollowerofAvicennamayhaveitsrootsinanattitudeamongsomeArabic
readersofalGhazlwhosawinhimacloserfollowerofthefalsifathanthemainstreamArabictradition
wishedtoacknowledge.
InitsseveralHebrewversions,alGhazl'sDoctrinesofthePhilosophers(knownasDetha
flsfmandKavvanthaflsfm)wasoneofthemostwidespreadphilosophicaltextsstudiedamong
JewsinEurope(Steinschneider1893,1:296326Harvey2001).ThetranslatorofthefirstHebrewversion
of1292,theJewishAverroistIsaacAlbalag,attachedhisownintroductionandextensivenotestothetext
(Vajda1960).ThisandtheothertwoHebrewtranslationsattractedagreatnumberofcommentators,
includingMosesNarboni(d.1362),whowasactiveinsouthernFranceandSpain,andMosesAlmosnino
(d.c.1580)ofThessalonica(Steinschneider1893,1:31125).AlGhazl'sDoctrinesofthePhilosopherswas
averypopulartextuptothe16thcenturyandover50manuscriptsoftheHebrewtranslationsareextant
(Eran2007).SomeJewishscholars,likethe14thcenturyKatalanHasdaiCrescas,sawinthisAvicennantext
awelcomealternativetotheequallywidespreadteachingsofAverroes(HarveyandHarvey2002).Although
theHebrewtranslationsmakethecharacteroftheworkasareportclear,alGhazlwasasintheLatin
traditionregardedasamuchcloserfolloweroffalsafathaninthemainstreamArabictradition.The
Hebrewtradition,forinstance,makeswidelyavailablethetranslationofatextascribedtoalGhazlwhere
theauthorrespondstoquestionsaboutastronomyandcosmologythatarequitefarfromAsh'arismandmuch
closertoAristotelianism(Langermann2011).ThisrelativelywidespreadHebrewtext(editedandtranslated
inalGhazl1896),referredtoasTeshuvtshe'alt,AnswerstoQuestions,ormorerecentlyasthe
HebrewAjwiba,isknowninitsArabicoriginalonlyfromaverysmallnumberofmanuscripts,among
themtheonefromMaragheh(Pourjavady2002,6399).AccountssayingthatalGhazltaught
philosophicalpositionshehadopenlycondemnedinhisIncoherencewererelativelywidespreadinHebrew
literature(Marx1935,410,42224).MosesNarboni,forinstance,believedthatalGhazlusedastratagem
toteachphilosophyatatimewhenitwas,accordingtoNarboni,officiallyprohibited.Bypretendingto
refutephilosophyinhisIncoherencehecouldjustifythewritingoftheDoctrines.TheDoctrinesistherefore
themainworkonphilosophybyalGhazl,Narbonisuspected,whiletheIncoherenceservesonlythe
functionoflegitimizingtheformer'spublicationbysayingthatarefutationmustrelyonathorough
knowledgeofwhatistoberefuted(Chertoff1952,part2,67).ThistendencyamongHebrewauthorsto
disentanglealGhazlfromthecriticismofphilosophyexpressedinhisIncoherenceledtheAlgerianJewish
scholarAbrahamGavison(fl.16thcent.)toreporterroneouslythatalGhazlwastheauthorof
bothTheIncoherenceofthePhilosophersaswellasitsrepudiationTheIncoherenceofthe
Incoherence(Tahfutaltahfut),aworkinrealitywrittenbyAverroes(Gavison1748,fol.135a).Inaddition
tohisDoctrines,hisIncoherence,whichwastranslatedin1411,andthetextknownasTeshuvt
she'alt(whoseascriptiontoalGhazlisstilluncertain),atleasttwootherworksbyalGhazlwere
translatedintoHebrew:MishktalanwrandMznal'amal(Steinschneider1893,1:32648,the
textMozneiha'iyyunmmentionedthereisnotbyalGhazl).

3.AlGhazl'sRefutationsoffalsafaandIsmlism
3.AlGhazl'sRefutationsoffalsafaandIsmlism
AlGhazldescribestheIncoherenceofthePhilosophersasarefutation(radd)ofthephilosophical
movement(Ghazl1959a,18=2000b,61),andthishascontributedtotheerroneousassumptionthathe
opposedAristotelianismandrejecteditsteachings.Hisresponsetofalsafawasfarmorecomplexandallowed
himtoadoptmanyofitsteachings.Thefalsifaareconvinced,alGhazlcomplainsatthebeginningof
theIncoherence,thattheirwayofknowingbydemonstrativeproof(burhn)issuperiortotheological
knowledgedrawnfromrevelationanditsrationalinterpretation.Thisconvictionledagroupamongthe
MuslimfalsifatodisregardIslamandtoneglectitsritualdutiesanditsreligiouslaw(shara).In
hisIncoherencealGhazldiscussestwentykeyteachingsofthefalsifaandrejectstheclaimthatthese
teachingsaredemonstrativelyproven.InadetailedandintricatephilosophicaldiscussionalGhazlaimsto
showthatnoneoftheargumentsinfavorofthesetwentyteachingsfulfillsthehighepistemologicalstandard
ofdemonstration(burhn)thatthefalsifahavesetforthemselves.Rather,theargumentssupportingthese
twentyconvictionsrelyuponunprovenpremisesthatareacceptedonlyamongthefalsifa,butarenot
establishedbyreason.Byshowingthatthesepositionsaresupportedbymeredialecticalargumentsal
Ghazlaimstodemolishwhatheregardedwasanepistemologicalhubrisonthesideofthefalsifa.In
theIncoherencehewishestoshowthatthefalsifapracticetaqld,meaningtheymerelyrepeatthese
teachingsfromthefoundersoftheirmovementwithoutcriticallyexaminingthem(Griffel2005).
TheinitialargumentoftheIncoherencefocusesonapodeixisandthedemonstrativecharacterofthe
argumentsrefutedtherein.Whilethebookalsotouchesonthetruthoftheseteachings,itrefutesnumerous
positionswhosetruthsalGhazlacknowledgesorwhichhesubscribedtoinhislaterworks.Inthesecases
alGhazlwishestoshowthatwhiletheseparticularphilosophicalteachingsaresoundandtrue,theyarenot
demonstrated.Theultimatesourceofthefalsifa'sknowledgeaboutGod'snature,thehumansoul,orabout
theheavenlyspheres,forinstance,aretherevelationsgiventoearlyprophetssuchasAbrahamandMoses.
Theirinformationmadeitintothebooksoftheancientphilosopherswhofalselyclaimedthattheygained
theseinsightsbyreasonalone.
AmongthetwentydiscussionsoftheIncoherence,sixteenareconcernedwithpositionsheldinthefalsifa's
metaphysics(ilhiyyt)andfourwithpositionsthatappearintheirnaturalsciences(tabiyyt).The17th
discussiononcausalitywillbeanalyzedbelow.Thelongestandmostsubstantialdiscussionisthefirst,
whichdealswithAvicenna'sandalFrb'sargumentsinfavoroftheworld'spreeternity(Hourani1958,
Marmura1959).AlGhazldeniesthatthispositioncanbedemonstrativelyprovenanddrawsfrom
argumentsthatwereearlierdevelopedbyantiAristoteliancriticssuchastheChristianJohnPhiloponus
(YahylNahw,c.490c.570)ofAlexandria.Philoponus'arguments,mostimportantlythosethatdenythe
possibilityofaninfinitenumberofeventsinthepast,hadenteredtheArabicdiscourseontheworld's
creationearlierduringthe9thcentury(Davidson1987,5556,86116,36675).
AttheendoftheIncoherencealGhazlaskswhetherthetwentypositionsdiscussedinthebookarein
conflictwiththereligiouslaw(shara).Mostofthemarewrong,hesays,yetposenoseriousproblemsin
termsofreligion,wheretheyshouldbeconsideredinnovations(singl.bid'a).Asmallgroupofpositionsis
consideredwrongaswellasreligiouslyproblematic.ThesearethreeteachingsfromAvicenna'sphilosophy,
namely(1)thattheworldhasnobeginninginthepastandisnotcreatedintime,(2)thatGod'sknowledge
includesonlyclassesofbeings(universals)anddoesnotextendtoindividualbeingsandtheircircumstances
(particulars),and(3)thatafterdeaththesoulsofhumanswillneveragainreturnintobodies.Inthesethree
casestheteachingsofIslam,whicharebasedonrevelation,suggesttheopposite,alGhazlsays,andthus
overruletheunfoundedclaimsofthefalsifa.What'smore,thesethreeteachingsmaymisleadthepublicto
disregardingthereligiouslaw(shara)andare,therefore,dangerousforsociety(Griffel2000,3013).Inhis
functionasaMuslimjurisprudentalGhazladdsabrieffatwattheendofhisIncoherenceanddeclares
thateverybodywhoteachesthesethreepositionspubliclyisanunbeliever(kfir)andanapostatefromIslam,
whocanbekilled(alGhazl2000a,226).
AlGhazl'seffortsindealingwiththephilosophicalmovementamounttodefiningtheboundariesof
religioustoleranceinIslam.SoonaftertheIncoherence,hewroteasimilarbookaboutthemovementofthe
IsmliteShiites,knownastheBtinites(thosewhoarbitrarilyfollowaninnermeaningintheQuran).
InitiallytheIsmliteShiitesweresupportersoftheFtimidcountercaliphateinCairoandopposedthe
politicalandreligiousauthorityoftheSunnicaliphinBaghdadandtheSeljuqSultansthatheinstalled.
DuringalGhazl'slifetime,however,thereoccurredaschismwithintheclandestineIsmlitemovement.
ThenewpropagandaoftheIsmlitesinIraqandIranwasnowindependentfromthecenterinCairoand
developeditsownstrategies.Akeyelementoftheirnotentirelyunsuccessfuleffortstopersuadepeople
totheircampwastheircriticismofsenseperceptionandofrationalarguments(alGhazl1954,341964b,
76,80).AlGhazlwascloselyfamiliarwiththeIsmlites'propagandaeffortsbuthehadlittlereliable
informationontheirteachingsoncosmologyandmetaphysics.Theseweredeeplyinfluencedby
cosmologicalnotionsinlateantiqueGnosticandNeoplatonicliterature(Walker1993,deSmet1995).Al
Ghazlalsodidnotknowabouttheschismwithinthemovement.InhisbookontheScandalsofthe
Esoterics(FadihalBtiniyya)helookscloselyatthoseteachingsthatheknewanddiscusseswhichof
themaremerelyerroneousandwhichareunbelief.HeassumeswronglythattheIsmlitepropagandists
teachtheexistenceoftwogods.ThisdualismandtheIsmlites'denialofbodilyresurrectionintheafterlife
leadstotheircondemnationbyalGhazlasunbelieversandapostates(alGhazl1964b,15155=2000b,
22829).

4.ThePlaceoffalsafainIslam
InhisattempttodefinetheboundariesofIslamalGhazlsinglesoutalimitednumberofteachingsthatin
hisopinionoversteptheborders.Inaseparatebook,TheDecisiveCriterionforDistinguishingIslamfrom
ClandestineUnbelief(FaysalaltafriqabaynalIslmwalzandaqa)heclarifiesthatonlyteachingsthat
violatecertainfundamentaldoctrines(uslalaqid)shouldbedeemedunbeliefandapostasy.These
doctrinesarelimitedtothree:monotheism,Muhammad'sprophecy,andtheQuranicdescriptionsoflife
afterdeath(alGhazl1961,195=2002,112).Hestressesthatallotherteachings,includingthosethatare
erroneousorevenregardedasreligiousinnovations(singl.bida),shouldbetolerated.Againother
teachingsmaybecorrect,alGhazladds,anddespitetheirphilosophicalbackground,forinstance,should
beacceptedbytheMuslimcommunity.Eachteachingmustbejudgedbyitself,andiffoundsoundandin
accordancewithrevelation,shouldbeadopted(alGhazl1959a,2527=2000b,6770).Thisattitudeleads
toawidespreadapplicationofAristotelianteachingsinalGhazl'sworksonMuslimtheologyandethics.
AlGhazl'srefutationsofthefalsifaandtheIsmliteshaveadistinctlypoliticalcomponent.Inbothcases
hefearsthatthefollowersofthesemovementsaswellaspeoplewithonlyacursoryunderstandingofthem
mightbelievethattheycandisregardthereligiouslaw(shara).InthecaseoftheIsmlitestherewasan
additionaltheologicalmotive.IntheirreligiouspropagandatheIsmlitesopenlychallengedtheauthorityof
Sunnitheology,claimingitsreligiousspeculationanditsinterpretationofscriptureisarbitrary.TheSunni
theologianssubmitGod'swordtojudgmentsthatappeartobereasonable,theIsmlitessaid,yettheyare
purelycapricious,afactevidentfromthemanydisputesamongSunnitheologians.Norationalargumentis
moreconvincingthananyofitsopposingrationalarguments,theIsmlitesclaimed,sinceallrational
proofsaremutuallyequivalent(takfualadilla).OnlythedivinelyguidedwordoftheShiiteImamconveys
certainty(alGhazl1964b,76,80=2000b,189,191).InresponsetothiscriticismalGhazlintroducesthe
Aristoteliannotionofdemonstration(burhn).Sunnitheologiansargueamongeachother,hesays,because
theyarelargelyunfamiliarwiththetechniqueofdemonstration.ForalGhazl,reason(aql)isexecuted
mostpurelyandpreciselybyformulatingargumentsthataredemonstrativeandreachalevelwheretheir
conclusionsarebeyonddoubt.Theresultsoftruedemonstrationscannotconflictwithrevelation,alGhazl
says,sinceneitherreasonnorrevelationcanbeconsideredfalse(Heer1993,18688).Ifdemonstration
provessomethingthatviolatestheliteralmeaningofrevelation,thescholarmustapplyinterpretation(tawl)
totheoutwardtextandreaditasasymbolofadeepertruth.Thereare,forinstance,validdemonstrative
argumentsprovingthatGodcannothaveahandorsitonathrone.TheseprompttheMuslimscholarto
interprettheQuranicpassageswherethesewordsappearassymbols(alGhazl1961,17589=2002,96
103).Theinterpretationofpassagesinrevelation,however,whoseoutwardmeaningisnotdisprovedbya
validdemonstration,isnotallowed(Griffel2000,332352009,11116).
AlGhazl'sruleforreconcilingapparentconflictsbetweenreasonandtheliteralmeaningofrevelationwas
widelyacceptedbyalmostalllaterMuslimtheologians,particularlythosewithrationalisttendencies.Ibn
Taymiyya(12631328),however,criticizedalGhazl'srulefromanscriptualistangle.IbnTaymiyya(1980,
1:8687)rejectedalGhazl'simplicationthatincasesofconflictbetweenreasonandtherevealedtext,
priorityshouldbegiventotheformeroverthelatter.HealsoremarkedthatalGhazl'sownarguments
denyingthepossibilitythatGodsitsonathrone(Quran2.255),forinstance,failtobedemonstrative.Ibn
Taymiyyaflatlydeniedthepossibilityofaconflictbetweenreasonandrevelationandmaintainedthatthe
perceptionofsuchadisagreementresultsfromsubjectingrevelationtopremisesthatrevelationitselfdoes
notaccept(Heer1993,18892).
Onthefalsifa'ssideAverroesacceptedalGhazl'sruleforreconcilingconflictsbetweenreasonandthe
outwardmeaningofrevelationbuthedidnotagreewithhisfindingsonwhatcanandcannotbe
demonstrated(Griffel2000,43761).AverroescomposedarefutationofalGhazl'sIncoherence,whichhe
calledTheIncoherenceofthe[Bookofthe]Incoherence(Tahfutaltahfut).Thisworkwastranslatedtwice
intoLatinin1328and1526,thelateroneonthebasisofanearlierHebrewtranslationofthetext
(Steinschneider1893,1:33038).ThetwoLatintranslationsbothhavethetitleDestructiodestructionum(the
lateroneiseditedinAverroes1961).Theywereprintednumeroustimesduringthe16thcenturyandmade
alGhazl'scriticismofAristotelianismknownamongtheAverroistsoftheRenaissance.TheItalian
AgostinoNifo(c.1473after1538),forinstance,wroteaLatincommentarytoAverroes'book.While
acceptingtheprinciplethatonlyavaliddemonstrationallowsinterpretingtheQuransymbolically,Averroes
maintainedthatAristotlehadalreadydemonstratedthepreeternityoftheworld,whichwouldelevateit,
accordingtoalGhazl'srules,toaphilosophicalaswellasreligiousdoctrine.Averroesalsoremarkedthat
thereisnopassageintheQuranthatunambiguouslystatesthecreationoftheworldintime(Averroes2001,
16).AlGhazlwasclearlyawareofthisbutassumedthatthistenetisestablishedthroughtheconsensus
(ijm)ofMuslimtheologians(Griffel2000,278,429302002,58).WhilealGhazlcondemnsthepre
eternityoftheworldattheendofhisIncoherenceofthePhilosophers,thesubjectoftheworld'spreeternity
isnolongerraisedinhislatermoresystematicworkontheboundariesofIslam,TheDecisiveCriterionfor
DistinguishingIslamfromClandestineUnbelief.

5.TheEthicsoftheRevivaloftheReligiousSciences
SoonafteralGhazlhadpublishedhistworefutationsoffalsafaandIsmlismhelefthispositionatthe
NizmiyyamadrasainBaghdad.DuringthisperiodhebeganwritingwhatmostMuslimscholarsregardas
hismajorwork,TheRevivaloftheReligiousSciences(Ihyulmaldn).ThevoluminousRevivalisa
comprehensiveguidetoethicalbehaviorintheeverydaylifeofMuslims.Itisdividedintofoursections,
eachcontainingtenbooks.Thefirstsectiondealswithritualpractices(ibdt),thesecondwithsocial
customs(dt),thethirdwiththosethingsthatleadtoperdition(muhlikt)andhenceshouldbeavoided,
andthefourthwiththosethatleadtosalvation(munjiyt)andshouldbesought.Inthefortybooksof
theRevivalalGhazlseverelycriticizesthecovetingofworldlymattersandremindshisreadersthathuman
lifeisapathtowardsJudgmentDayandtherewardorpunishmentgainedthroughit.Comparedwiththe
eternityofthenextlife,thislifeisalmostinsignificant,yetitsealsourfateintheworldtocome.Inhis
autobiographyalGhazlwritesthatreadingSufiliteraturemadehimrealizethatourtheologicalconvictions
arebythemselvesirrelevantforgainingredemptionintheafterlife.Notourgoodbeliefsorintentionscount
onlyourgoodandvirtuousactionswilldetermineourlifeintheworldtocome.Thisinsightpromptedal
GhazltochangehislifestyleandadopttheSufipath(alGhazl1959a,3538=2000b,7780).In
theRevivalhecomposedabookabouthumanactions(mumalt)thatwishestosteerclearofanydeeper
discussionoftheologicalinsights(mukshaft).Rather,itaimsatguidingpeopletowardsethicalbehavior
thatGodwillrewardinthisworldandthenext(alGhazl193738,1:45).
IntheRevivalalGhazlattackshiscolleaguesinMuslimscholarship,questioningtheirintellectual
capacitiesandindependenceaswellastheircommitmenttogainingrewardintheworldtocome.This
increasedmoralconsciousnessbringsalGhazlclosetoSufiattitudes,whichhaveaprofoundinfluenceon
hissubsequentworkssuchasTheNicheofLights(Mishktalanwr).Theselaterworksalsoreveala
significantphilosophicalinfluenceonalGhazl.IntheRevivalheteachesethicsthatarebasedonthe
developmentofcharactertraits(singl.,khulq,pl.akhlq).Performingpraiseworthydeedsisaneffectof
praiseworthycharactertraitsthatwarrantsalvationinthenextlife(alGhazl193738,1:34.45).He
criticizesthemoretraditionalconceptofSunniethicsthatislimitedtocompliancewiththeordinancesofthe
religiouslaw(shara)andfollowingtheexampleoftheProphetMuhammad.TraditionalSunniethicsare
closelylinkedtojurisprudence(fiqh)andlimititself,accordingtoalGhazl,todeterminingandteaching
therulesofshara.TraditionalSunnijurisprudentsaremerescholarsofthisworld(ulamalduny)
whocannotguideMuslimsonthebestwaytogaintheafterlife(alGhazl193738,1:3038,98140).
InhisownethicsalGhazlstressesthattheProphetandnootherteachershouldbetheonepersona
Muslimemulates.HesupplementsthiskeySunninotionwiththeconceptofdiscipliningthesoul(riydat
alnafs).Atbirththeessenceofthehumanisdeficientandignobleandonlystricteffortsandpatient
treatmentcanleadittowardsdevelopingvirtuouscharactertraits(alGhazl193738,book23).Thehuman
soul'stemperament,forinstance,becomesimbalancedthroughtheinfluenceofotherpeopleandneedsto
undergoconstantdisciplining(riyda)andtraining(tarbiya)inordertokeepthesecharactertraitsat
equilibrium.BehindthiskindofethicsstandstheAristoteliannotionofentelechy:humanshaveanatural
potentialtodeveloprationalityandthroughitacquirevirtuouscharacter.Education,literature,religion,and
politicsshouldhelprealizingthispotential.AlGhazlbecameacquaintedwithanethicthatfocusesonthe
developmentofvirtuouscharactertraitsthroughtheworksofMuslimfalsifalikeMiskawayh(d.1030)and
MuslimscholarslikealRghibalIsfahn(d.c.1025),whostrovetomakephilosophicalnotionscompatible
withMuslimreligiousscholarship(Madelung1974).AsaresultalGhazlrejectedthenotion,forinstance,
thatoneshouldtrytogiveuppotentiallyharmfulaffectionslikeangerorsexualdesire.Thesecharactertraits
arepartofhumannature,alGhazlteaches,andcannotbegivenup.Rather,discipliningthesoulmeans
controllingthesepotentiallyharmfultraitsthroughone'srationality(aql).Thehumansoulhastoundergo
constanttrainingandneedstobedisciplinedsimilartoayounghorsethatneedstobebrokenin,schooled,
andtreatedwell.
AtnopointdoesalGhazlrevealthephilosophicaloriginsofhisethics.Hehimselfsawacloseconnection
betweentheethicsofthefalsifaandSufinotionsofanasceticandvirtuouslifestyle.InhisRevivalhe
mergesthesetwoethicaltraditionstoasuccessfulandinfluentialfusion.InhisautobiographyalGhazl
saysthattheethicsofthefalsifaandthatoftheSufisareoneandthesame.Congruentwithhispositionthat
manyteachingsandargumentsofthefalsifaaretakenfromearlierrevelationsandfromthedivinely
inspiredinsightsofmystics,whoexistedalreadyinpreIslamicreligions(Treiger2012,99101)headdsthat
thefalsifahavetakentheirethicsfromtheSufis,meaningheremysticsamongtheearlierreligions(al
Ghazl1959a,24=2000b,67).
AnotherimportantfieldwherealGhazlintroducedAvicennanideasintoAsh'aritekalminawaythatthis
traditioneventuallyadoptedthemishumanpsychologyandtherationalexplanationofprophecy(Griffel
2004,alAkiti2004).BasedonpartlymistranslatedtextsbyAristotle(Hansberger2011),Avicenna
developedapsychologythatassumestheexistenceofseveraldistinctfacultiesofthesoul.Thesefaculties
arestrongerorweakerinindividualhumans.Prophecyisthecombinationofthreefacultieswhichthe
prophethasinanextraordinarilystrongmeasure.Thesefacultiesfirstlyallowtheprophettoacquire
theoreticalknowledgeinstantlywithoutlearning,secondlyrepresentthisknowledgethroughsymbolsand
parablesaswellasdivinefutureevents,andthirdlytobringabouteffectsoutsideofhisbodysuchasrainor
earthquakes.Thesethreefacultiesexistineveryhumaninasmallmeasure,afactprovenbytheexperience
ofdjvu,forinstance,aphenomenonreferredtointheArabicphilosophictraditionastheveridical
dream(almanmalsdiq).AlGhazladoptedtheseteachingsandappropriatedthemforhisown
purposes(Treiger2012).Theexistenceofthethreefacultiesinhumansoulsthatmakeupprophecyserves
forhimasanexplanationofthehigherinsightsthatmysticssuchasSufimastershaveincomparisontoother
people.Whileprophetshavestrongpropheticfacultiesandordinaryhumansveryweakones,thefriendsof
God(awliy',i.e.Sufimasters)standinbetweenthesetwo.Theyareendowedwithinspiration(ilhm),
whichissimilartoprophecyandwhichservesinalGhazlasoneofthemostimportantsourcesofhuman
knoweldge.UnlikeAvicenna,forwhomprophetsandmaybealsosomeparticularlytalentedhumans
('rifninhislanguage)acquirethesameknowledgethatphilosophersreachthroughapodicticreasoning,in
alGhazltheprophetsandawliy'haveaccesstoknowledgethatissuperiortothatavailablesolelythrough
reason.
DespitethesignificantphilosophicalinfluenceonalGhazl'sethics,hemaintainedinIslamiclaw(fiqh)the
antirationalistAsharitepositionthathumanrationalityismutewithregardtonormativejudgmentsabout
humanactionsandcannotdecidewhetheranactionisgoodorbad.Whenhumansthinktheyknow,for
instance,thatlyingisbad,theirjudgmentisdeterminedbyaconsiderationoftheirbenefits.Withregardto
theethicalvalueofouractionswehaveatendencytoconfusemoralvaluewithbenefit.Wegenerallytendto
assumethatwhateverbenefitsourcollectiveinterestismorallygood,whilewhateverharmsuscollectivelyis
bad.Thesejudgments,however,areultimatelyfallaciousandcannotbethebasisofjurisprudence(fiqh).
Goodactionsarethosethatarerewardedintheafterlifeandbadactionsarethosethatarepunished(al
Ghazl190407,1:61).Thekindofconnectionbetweenhumanactionsandrewardorpunishmentinthe
afterlifecanonlybelearnedfromrevelation(Hourani1976,Marmura196869).Muslimjurisprudenceisthe
sciencethatextractsgeneralrulesfromrevelation.Likemostreligioussciencesitaimsatadvancinghumans'
prospectofredemptionintheworldtocome.ThereforeitmustbebasedontheQuranandthesunnaofthe
Prophetwhileituseslogicandotherrationalmeanstoextractgeneralrules.
AlGhazlwasoneofthefirstMuslimjuristswhointroducedtheconsiderationofapublicbenefit
(maslaha)intoMuslimjurisprudence.Inadditiontodevelopingclearguidanceofhowtogainredemptionin
theafterlife,religiouslaw(shara)alsoaimsatcreatinganenvironmentthatallowseachindividual
wellbeingandthepursuitofavirtuousandpiouslifestyle.AlGhazlarguesthatwhenGodrevealeddivine
law(shara)Hedidsowiththepurpose(maqsad)ofadvancinghumanbenefitsinthisworldandthenext.
AlGhazlidentifiesfiveessentialcomponentsforwellbeinginthisworld:religion,life,intellect,offspring,
andproperty.Whateverprotectsthesefivenecessities(aldarriyytalkhamsa)isconsideredpublic
benefit(maslaha)andshouldbeadvanced,whilewhateverharmsthemshouldbeavoided.Thejurisprudent
(faqh)shouldaimatsafeguardingthesefivenecessitiesinhislegaljudgments.Inrecommendingthis,al
Ghazlpracticallyimpliesthatamaslahamursala,apublicbenefitthatisnotmentionedintherevealed
text,isconsideredavalidsourceoflegislation(Opwis2007and2010,6588).

6.CosmologyintheRevivaloftheReligiousSciences
Despitehisdeclaredreluctancetoenterintotheologicaldiscussions,alGhazladdressesin
hisRevivalimportantphilosophicalproblemsrelatedtohumanactions.Inthe35thbookonBeliefinDivine
UnityandTrustinGod(KitbalTawhdwaltawakkul)hediscussestherelationshipbetweenhuman
actionsandGod'somnipotenceascreatoroftheworld.InthisandotherbooksoftheRevivalalGhazl
teachesastrictlydeterministpositionwithregardtoeventsintheuniverse.Godcreatesanddetermines
everything,includingtheactionsofhumans.Godistheonlyagentortheonlyefficientcause(fil,the
Arabictermmeansboth)intheworld.Everyeventincreationfollowsapredeterminedplanthatiseternally
presentinGod'sknowledge.God'sknowledgeexistsinatimelessrealmanddoesnotcontainindividual
cognitions(ulm)likehumanknowledgedoes.God'sknowledgedoesnotchange,forinstance,whenits
object,theworld,changes.WhiletheeventsthatarecontainedinGod'sknowledgeareorderedinbefore
andafter,thereisnopast,present,andfuture.God'sknowledgecontainsthefirstmomentofcreationjust
asthelast,andHeknowsinHiseternity,forinstance,whetheracertainindividualwillendupinparadise
orhell(Griffel2009,175213).
ForallpracticalpurposesitbefitshumanstoassumethatGodcontrolseverythingthroughchainsofcauses
(Marmura1965,19396).Wewitnessinnaturecausalprocessesthatadduptolongercausalchains.Would
webeabletofollowacausalchainlikeaninquiringwayfarer(sliksil),whofollowsachainofevents
toitsorigin,wewouldbeledthroughcausalprocessesinthesublunarsphere,theworldofdominion
(lamalmulk),furthertocausesthatexistinthecelestialspheres,theworldofsovereignty(lamal
malakt),untilwewouldfinallyreachthehighestcelestialintellect,whichiscausedbythebeingbeyondit,
God(alGhazl193738,13:2497509=2001,1533seealsoidem1964a,22021).Godisthestarting
pointofallcausalchainsandHecreatesandcontrolsallelementstherein.Godistheonewhomakesthe
causesfunctionascauses(musabbibalasbb)(Frank1992,18).
God'scausaldeterminationofalleventsalsoextendstohumanactions.Everyhumanactioniscausedby
theperson'svolition,whichiscausedbyacertainmotive(diya).Theperson'svolitionandmotiveare,in
turn,causedbytheperson'sconvictionsandhisorherknowledge(ilm).Humanknowledgeiscausedby
variousfactors,likeone'sexperienceoftheworld,one'sknowledgeofrevelation,orthebooksonehasread
(alGhazl193738,13:250911=2001,3437).Thereisnosingleeventinthisworldthatisnot
determinedbyGod'swill.Whilehumansareundertheimpressionthattheyhaveafreewill,theiractionsare
inrealitycompelledbycausesthatexistwithinthemaswellasoutside(Griffel2009,21334).
AlGhazlviewedtheworldasaconglomerateofconnectionsthatareallpredeterminedandmeticulously
plannedinGod'stimelessknowledge.Godcreatestheuniverseasahugeapparatusandemploysitinorder
topursueacertaingoal(qasd).IntwoofhislaterworksalGhazlcomparestheuniversewithawater
clock.Herehedescribesthreestagesofitscreation.Thebuilderofthewaterclockfirsthastomakeaplanof
it,secondlyexecutethisplanandbuildtheclock,andthirdlyhehastomaketheclockgoingbysupplyingit
withaconstantsourceofenergy,namelytheflowofwater.Thatenergyneedstobecarefullymeasured,
becauseonlytherightamountofenergywillproducethedesiredresult.InGod'screationoftheuniverse
thesethreestagesarecalledjudgment(hukm),decree(qad),andpredestination(qadar)(alGhazl1971,
981021964a,1214).GoddesignstheuniverseinHistimelessknowledge,putsitintobeingatonepoint
intime,andprovidesitwithaconstantandwellmeasuredsupplyofbeing(wujd).Accordingto
Avicenna'sexplanationofcreationwhichalGhazlwasnotopposedtobeingispasseddownfrom
Godtothefirstandontologicallyhighestcreationandfromthereinachainofsecondaryefficientcausesto
allotherexistents.Itisimportanttoacknowledge,however,thatGodistheonlytrueefficientcause(fil)in
thischain.Heistheonlyagent,allotherbeingsaremerelyemployedinHisservice(Griffel2009,236
53).
Natureisaprocessinwhichallelementsharmoniouslydovetailwithoneanother.Celestialmovements,
naturalprocesses,humanactions,evenredemptionintheafterlifeareallcausallydetermined.Whetherwe
willberewardedorpunishedintheafterlifecanbeunderstood,accordingtoalGhazl,asthemerecausal
effectofouractionsinthisworld.Inthe32ndbookofhisRevivalalGhazlexplainshowknowingthe
Qurancausestheconviction(itiqd)thatoneispunishedforbaddeeds,andhowthatconvictionmaycause
salvationintheafterlife:

andtheconviction[thatsomehumanswillbepunished]isacause(sabab)forthesettinginoffear,
andthesettinginoffearisacauseforabandoningthepassionsandretreatingfromtheabodeof
delusions.ThisisacauseforarrivingatthevicinityofGod,andGodistheonewhomakesthecauses
functionascauses(musabbibalasbb)andwhoarrangesthem(murattibuh).Thesecauseshavebeen
madeeasyforhim,whohasbeenpredestinedineternitytoearnredemption,sothatthroughtheir
chainingtogetherthecauseswillleadhimtoparadise.(alGhazl193738,11:2225.)

AlltheseareteachingsthatareveryclosetothoseofAvicenna(Frank1992,2425).AlGhazlalso
followedAvicennainhisconvictionthatthisuniverseisthebestofallpossibleworldsandthatthereisin
possibilitynothingmorewondrousthanwhatis(laysaflimknabdamimmkn)(alGhazl193738,
13:251518=2001,4750).ThisledtoalonglastingdebateamonglaterMuslimtheologiansaboutwhatis
meantbythissentenceandwhetheralGhazlis,infact,right(Ormsby1984).Itmustbestressed,however,
thatcontrarytoAvicennaandcontrarytoFrank's(1992,5563)understandingofhimalGhazlfirmly
heldthatGodexercisesagenuinefreewillandthatwhenHecreates,Hechoosesbetweenalternatives.God's
willisnotinanywaydeterminedbyGod'snatureoressence.God'swillistheundetermineddeterminatorof
everythinginthisworld.

7.CausalityinalGhazl
AlGhazl'scosmologyofGod'sdeterminationandHiscontrolovereventsinHiscreationthroughchainsof
causes(singl.sabab)aimedatsafeguardingtheSunnidoctrineofomnipotenceanddivinepredetermination
againstthecriticismofMutazilitesandShiites.Humanshaveonlytheimpressionofafreewill(ikhtiyr).In
realitytheyarecompelledtochoosewhattheydeemisthebestaction(khayr)amongthepresent
alternatives.Avicenna'sdeterministontology,whereeveryeventinthecreatedworldisbyitselfcontingent
(mumkimalwujdbidhtihi)yetalsonecessitatedbysomethingelse(wjibalwujdbighayrihi),provided
asuitableinterpretationofGod'spredeterminationandisreadilyadoptedbyalGhazlalthoughhenever
admitsthatorusesAvicenna'slanguage.InAvicennatheFirstBeing,whichisGod,makesallotherbeings
andeventsnecessary.InalGhazlGod'swill,whichisdistinctfromHisessence,necessitatesallbeingsand
eventsincreation.TheadaptationoffundamentalassumptionsinAvicenna'scosmologytogetherwithan
almostwholesaleacceptanceofAvicenna'spsychologyandhisprophetologyledFrank(1992,86)to
concludethatfromatheologicalstandpointmostof[Avicenna's]theseswhichherejectedarerelatively
tameandinconsequentialcomparedtothoseinwhichhefollowsthephilosopher.
WhilealGhazl'sdeterministcosmologyisaradicalbutfaithfulinterpretationoftheAsharitetenetof
divinepredetermination,thewayalGhazlwritesaboutitinhisRevivalandlaterworksviolatesother
principlesofAsharismandhasledtomuchconfusionamongmoderninterpreters.Theremainderofthis
articlewillmakeanattempttoresolvecurrentinterpretativeproblemsandexplainalGhazl'sinnovative
approachtowardscausality.

7.1OccasionalismversusSecondaryCausality
AlAshari(873935),thefounderofthetheologicalschoolthatalGhazlbelongedto,hadrejectedthe
existenceofnatures(tabi)andofcausalconnectionsamongcreatedbeings.Inaradicalattemptto
explainGod'somnipotence,hecombinedseveralideasthatweredevelopedearlierinMuslimkalmtowhat
becameknownasoccasionalism.Allmaterialthingsarecomposedofatomsthathavenoqualitiesor
attributesbutsimplymakeuptheshapeofthebody.Theatomsofthebodiesarethecarrierofaccidents
(singl.arad),whichareattributeslikeweight,density,color,smell,etc.InthecosmologyofalAsharall
immaterialthingsareconsideredaccidentsthatinhereinasubstance(jawhar).Onlytheatomsof
spatiallyextendedbodiescanbesubstances.Aperson'sthoughts,forinstance,areconsideredaccidentsthat
inhereintheatomsoftheperson'sbrain,whilehisorherfaithisanaccidentinheringintheatomsofthe
heart.Noneoftheaccidents,however,cansubsistfromonemoment(waqt)tothenext.Thisleadstoa
cosmologywhereineachmomentGodassignstheaccidentstobodiesinwhichtheyinhere.Whenone
momentends,Godcreatesnewaccidents.Noneofthecreatedaccidentsinthesecondmomenthasany
causalrelationtotheonesintheearliermoment.Ifabodycontinuestohaveacertainattributefromone
momenttothenext,thenGodcreatestwoidenticalaccidentsinheringinthatbodyineachofthetwo
subsequentmoments.MovementanddevelopmentgeneratewhenGoddecidestochangethearrangementof
themomentbefore.Aballismoved,forinstance,wheninthesecondmomentoftwotheatomsoftheball
happentobecreatedinacertaindistancefromthefirst.Thedistancedeterminesthespeedofthemovement.
Theballthusjumpsinleapsovertheplayingfieldandthesameistruefortheplayers'limbsandtheir
bodies.Thisalsoappliestotheatomsoftheairiftherehappentobesomewind.Ineverymoment,Godre
arrangesalltheatomsofthisworldanewandHecreatesnewaccidentsthuscreatinganewworldevery
moment(Perler/Rudolph2000,2862).
AllAsharitetheologiansuptothegenerationofalGhazlincludinghisteacheralJuwaynsubscribed
totheoccasionalistontologydevelopedbyalAshar.OneofalJuwayn'slateworks,theCreedforNizm
alMulk(alAqdaalNizmiyya),shows,however,thathealreadyexploreddifferentontologicalmodels,
particularlywithregardtotheeffectsofhumanactions(alJuwayn1948,3036Gimaret1980,12228).A
purelyoccasionalistmodelfindsitdifficulttoexplainhowGodcanmakehumansresponsiblefortheirown
actionsiftheydonotcausethem.Asaviablealternativetotheoccasionalistontology,alGhazlconsidered
theAvicennanmodelofsecondarycauses.WhenGodwishestocreateacertaineventHeemployssomeof
Hisowncreationsasmediatorsorsecondarycauses.Godcreatesseriesofefficientcauseswhereany
superiorelementcausestheexistenceoftheinferiorones.Avicennastressesthatnocausalseries,inanyof
thefourtypesofcauses,canregressindefinitely.Everyseriesofcausesandeffectsmusthaveatleastthree
components:afirstelement,amiddleelement,andalastelement.Insuchachainonlythefirstelementis
thecauseintherealsenseoftheword(illamutlaqa)ofallsubsequentelements.Itcausesthelastelementof
thatchaintheultimateeffectthroughoneormanyintermediaries(singl.mutawassat),whicharethe
middleelementsofthechain.Lookingatachainofefficientcauses,thefinitenessofthecauses(tanh
lilal)servesforAvicennaasthebasisofaproofofGod'sexistence.Tracingbackallefficientcausesinthe
universewillleadtoafirstefficientcause,whichisitselfuncaused.WhentheFirstCauseisalsoshowntobe
incorporealandnumericallyone,onehasachievedaproofofGod'sexistence(Avicenna2005,2579,270
3Davidson1987,33940).

7.2The17thDiscussionoftheIncoherence
AlGhazloffersabriefyetverycomprehensiveexaminationofcausalitywithinthe17thdiscussionof
hisIncoherenceofthePhilosophers.The17thdiscussionisnottriggeredbyanyoppositiontocausality.
RatheritaimsatforcingalGhazl'sadversaries,thefalsifa,toacknowledgethatallpropheticalmiracles
thatarereportedintheQuranarepossible.Iftheirpossibilityisacknowledged,aMuslimphilosopherwho
acceptstheauthorityofrevelationmustalsoadmitthattheprophetsperformedthesemiraclesandthatthe
narrativeinrevelationistruthful.AlGhazldividesthe17thdiscussionintofourdifferentsections.He
presentsthreedifferentpositions(singl.maqm)ofhis(various)opponentsandaddressesthemonebyone.
Hisresponsetothesecondposition,whichisthatofAvicenna,isfurtherdividedintotwodifferent
approaches(singl.maslak).Thisfourfolddivisionofthe17thdiscussioniscrucialforitsunderstanding.
AlGhazladdressesdifferentconceptsaboutcausalitywithinthedifferentdiscussionsanddevelopsnot
one,butatleasttwocoherentresponses.
Foradetaileddiscussionofthefourpartsinthe17thdiscussionthereadermustbereferredtochapter6in
Griffel2009(14773).ThefollowingpagesgiveonlyanoutlineofalGhazl'soverallargument.Inthe
openingsentenceofthe17thdiscussionalGhazlintroducesthepositionhewishestorefuteandhelines
outelementsthatalternativeexplanationsofcausalitymustincludeinordertobeacceptableforalGhazl.
Thisopeningstatementisamasterworkofphilosophicalliterature:

Theconnection(iqtirn)betweenwhatishabituallybelievedtobeacauseandwhatishabitually
believedtobeaneffectisnotnecessary(darr),accordingtous.But[with]anytwothings[thatare
notidenticalandthatdonotimplyoneanother]()itisnotnecessarythattheexistenceorthe
nonexistenceofonefollowsnecessarily(mindarra)fromtheexistenceorthenonexistenceofthe
other().Theirconnectionisduetothepriordecision(taqdr)ofGod,whocreatesthemsidebyside
(alaltaswuq),nottoitsbeingnecessarybyitself,incapableofseparation.(alGhazl2000a,166)

AlGhazllaysoutfourconditionsthatanyexplanationofphysicalprocessesthatisacceptabletohimmust
fulfill:(1)theconnectionbetweenacauseanditseffectisnotnecessary,(2)theeffectcancometoexist
withoutthisparticularcause(theyarenotincapableofseparation),(3)Godcreatestwoevents
concomitant,sidebyside,and(4)God'screationfollowsapriordecision(taqdr).Onfirstsight,itseems
thatonlyanoccasionalistexplanationofphysicalprocesseswouldfulfillthesefourconditions,andthisis
howthisstatementhasmostlybeenunderstood.Rudolph(inPerler/Rudolph2000,7577),however,pointed
outthatnotonlyoccasionalismbutothertypesofexplanationsalsofulfillthesefourcriteria.Most
misleadingisthethirdrequirementthatGodwouldneedtocreateeventssidebyside.Thesewordsseem
topointexclusivelytoanoccasionalistunderstandingofcreation.Oneshouldkeepinmind,however,that
thisformulaleavesopen,howGodcreatesevents.EvenanAvicennanphilosopherholdsthatGodcreatesthe
causeconcomitanttoitseffect,anddoessobymeansofsecondarycausality.Whilethe17thdiscussionofal
Ghazl'sIncoherencepointstowardsoccasionalismasapossiblesolution,italsopointstoothers.Al
Ghazlchoosesacertainlinguisticassociationtooccasionalism,whichhasledmanyinterpretersofthis
discussiontobelievethathere,hearguesexclusivelyinfavorofit.
ItisimportanttounderstandthatalGhazldoesnotdenytheexistenceofaconnectionbetweenacauseand
itseffectratherhedeniesthenecessarycharacterofthisconnection.IntheFirstPositionofthe17th
discussionalGhazlbringstheargumentthatobservationcannotprovecausalconnections.Observationcan
onlyconcludethatthecauseanditseffectoccurconcomitantly:

Observation(mushhada)pointstowardsaconcomitantoccurrence(alhuslindahu)butnottoa
combinedoccurrence(alhuslbihi)andthatthereisnoothercause(illa)forit.(alGhazl2000a,
167.)

Itwouldbewrong,however,toconcludefromthisargumentthatalGhazldeniedtheexistenceofcausal
connections.Whilesuchconnectionscannotbeproventhroughobservation(orthroughanyothermeans),
theymayormaynotexist.IntheFirstPositionalGhazlrejectstheviewthattheconnectionbetweenan
efficientcauseanditseffectissimplynecessaryperse,meaningthattheproximatecausealoneisfully
responsiblefortheeffectandthatnothingelseisalsonecessaryfortheeffecttooccur.Inanotherworkthis
positionisdescribedasoneheldbymaterialists(dahriyn)whodenythattheworldhasacauseoramaker
(alGhazl1959a,19=2000b,61).TheMutaziliteviewoftawallud,meaningthathumansarethesole
creatorsoftheirownactionsandtheirimmediateeffects,alsofallsunderthisposition(alGhazl2000,
226.1314).Likeintheconnectionbetweenafatherandhisson,wherethefatherisnottheonlyefficient
causefortheson'sexistence,sotheremaybeineverycausalconnectionefficientcausesinvolvedotherthan
themostobviousorthemostproximateone.Theproximateefficientcausemaybejustthelastelementina
longchainofefficientcausesthatextendsviatheheavenlyrealm.Theintellectsofthecelestialspheres,
whichwerethoughttobereferredtoinrevelationasangels,maybemiddleelementsorintermediariesin
causalchainsthatallhaveitsbeginninginGod.AlGhazlrejectsthepositionofthematerialistsandthe
MutazilitesbecauseitdoesnottakeaccountofthefactthatGodistheultimateefficientcauseofthe
observedeffect.Godmaycreatethiseffectdirectlyorbywayofsecondarycausality.Discussingthe
examplethatwhenfiretouchesaballofcottonitcausesittocombust,alGhazlwritesabouttheFirst
Positionthatthefirealonecausescombustion:

This[position]isoneofthosethatwedeny.Ratherwesaythattheefficientcause(fil)ofthe
combustionthroughthecreationofblacknessinthecottonandthroughcausingtheseparationofits
partsandturningitintocoalorashesisGodeitherthroughthemediationoftheangelsorwithout
mediation.(alGhazl2000a,167.)

SecondarycausalityisaviableoptionforalGhazlthatheiswillingtoaccept.Stillhedoesnotacceptthe
teachingsofAvicenna,whicharediscussedintheSecondPosition.Avicennacombinessecondarycausality
withtheviewthatcausalprocessesproceedwithnecessityandinaccordwiththenaturesofthings,andnot
bywayofdeliberationandchoiceonthesideoftheefficientcause.Theultimateefficientcauseina
cosmologyofsecondarycausalityis,ofcourse,God.TheAvicennanopponentoftheSecondPosition
teachessecondarycausalityplusheholdsthatthecausalconnectionsfollowwithnecessityfromthenature
oftheFirstBeing.TheyarenotcreatedthroughGod'sdeliberationandchoicebutareanecessaryeffectof
God'sessence.

7.3TwoDifferentConceptsoftheModalities
WhenalGhazlwritesthattheconnectionbetweenacauseanditseffectisnotnecessaryheattacks
Avicenna'snecessitarianontologynothissecondarycausality.ThedisputebetweenalGhazlandAvicenna
isnotaboutcausalityassuch,ratheraboutthenecessarynatureofGod'screation.Kukkonen(2000)and
Dutton(2001)haveshownthatthetwostartwithquitedifferentassumptionsaboutnecessity.Avicenna's
viewofthemodalitiesfollowsthestatisticalmodelofAristotleandconnectsthepossibilityofathingtoits
temporalactuality(Bck1992).Atemporallyunqualifiedsentencelike,Firecausescottontocombust,
containsimplicitlyorexplicitlyareferencetothetimeofutteranceaspartofitsmeaning.Ifthissentenceis
truewheneveruttered,itisnecessarilytrue.Ifitstruthvaluecanchangeinthecourseoftime,itispossible.
Ifsuchasentenceisfalsewheneveruttered,itisimpossible(Hintikka1973,6372,846,1035,14953).
InAristotelianmodaltheories,modaltermsweretakentorefertotheoneandonlyhistoricalworldofours.
ForAvicenna,firenecessarilycausescottontocombustbecausethesentenceFirecausescottonto
combust,was,is,andwillalwaysbetrue.
AlGhazl'sunderstandingofthemodalitiesdevelopedinthecontextofAsharitekalmanddoesnotshare
thestatisticalmodelofAristotleandAvicenna.Asharitekalmdevelopedanunderstandingthatiscloserto
ourmodernviewofthemodalitiesasreferringtosynchronicalternativestatesofaffairs.Inthemodern
model,thenotionofnecessityreferstowhatobtainsinallalternatives,thenotionofpossibilityrefersto
whatobtainsinatleastinonealternative,andthatwhichisimpossibledoesnotobtaininanyconceivable
stateofaffairs(Knuuttila1998,145).AsharitekalmpursuedthenotionthatGodistheparticularizing
agent(mukhassis)ofalleventsintheworld,whodetermines,forinstance,whenthingscomeintoexistence
andwhentheyfalloutofexistence(Davidson1987,15961,17680).Theideaofparticularization(takhss)
includesimplicitlyanunderstandingofpossibleworldsthataredifferentfromthis.Theprocessof
particularizationmakesoneofseveralalternativesactual.InhisCreedforNizmalMulk,alJuwayn
explainstheAshariteunderstandingofthemodalities.Everysoundthinkingpersonfindswithinherself,
theknowledgeaboutthepossibilityofwhatispossible,thenecessityofwhatisnecessary,andthe
impossibilityofwhatisimpossible(alJuwayn1948,89).Weknowthisdistinctioninstinctivelywithout
learningitfromothersandwithoutfurtherinquiryintotheworld.Itisanimpulse(badha)inourrational
judgment(aql).AlJuwaynexplainsthisimpulse:

Theimpulsivepossibilitythattheintellectrushestoapprehendwithout[any]consideration,thinking,or
inquiryiswhatbecomesevidenttotheintelligentpersonwhenheseesabuilding.[Thebuilding]isa
possibilitythatcomesintobeing(minjawzhudthihi).Thepersonknowsdecisivelyandoffhandthat
theactualstate(hudth)ofthatbuildingisfromamongitspossiblestates(jaizt)andthatitisnot
impossibleintheintellecthaditnotbeenbuilt.(alJuwayn1948,9)

Theintelligentperson(alqil)heresimplymeaningapersonwithfullrationalcapacityrealizesthatall
thefeaturesofthebuilding,itsheight,itslength,itsform,etc.,areactualizedpossibilitiesandcouldbe
different.Thesameappliestothetimewhenthebuildingisbuilt.Weimmediatelyrealize,alJuwaynsays,
thatthereisasynchronicalternativestatetotheactualbuilding.Thisiswhatwecallpossibilityormore
preciselycontingency(imkn).Realizingthatthereissuchanalternativeisanimportantpartofour
understanding:Theintelligentpersoncannotrealizeinhismindanythingaboutthestatesofthebuilding
withoutcomparingitwithwhatiscontingentlikeit(imknmithlihi)orwhatisdifferentfromit(khilfihi).
(alJuwayn1948,9.)
InatleastthreepassagesoftheIncoherencealGhazlcriticizesAvicenna'sunderstandingofthemodalities.
Herehereferstoanother,closelyrelateddispute,namelythatforAvicennathemodalitiesexistinreality
whileforalGhazltheyexistonlyasjudgmentsinthemindsofhumans(alGhazl2000,42.25,124.10
11,207.414).HedeniesAvicenna'spremisethatpossibilityneedsasubstrate.ThispremiseisAristotelian
itisthebasistotheprincipleofentelechy,namelythatallthingshavepotentialitiesandaredrivento
actualizethem(Dutton2001,267)AlGhazlshifts,asKukkonen(2000,4889)putsit,thelocusofthe
presumptionofathing'sactualexistencefromtheplaneoftheactualizedrealitytotheplaneofmental
conceivability.
WhenalGhazlsaysthataccordingtoustheconnectionbetweentheefficientcauseanditseffectisnot
necessary,heaimstopointoutthattheconnectioncouldbedifferentevenifitneverwillbedifferent.For
Avicenna,thefactthattheconnectionneverwasdifferentandneverwillbedifferentimpliesthatitis
necessary.NowhereinhisworksrequiresalGhazlthatanygivencausalconnectionwasdifferentorwill
bedifferentinordertobeconsiderednotnecessary.Wewillseethathe,likeAvicenna,assumescausal
connectionsneverwereandneverwillbedifferentfromwhattheyarenow.Stilltheyarenotnecessary,he
maintains.Theconnectionbetweenacauseanditseffectiscontingent(mumkin)becauseanalternativetoit
isconceivableinourminds.Wecanimagineaworldwherefiredoesnotcausecottontocombust.Or,to
continuereadingtheinitialstatementofthe17thdiscussion:

()itiswithindivinepowertocreatesatietywithouteating,tocreatedeathwithoutadeepcut(hazz)
intheneck,tocontinuelifeafterhavingreceivedadeepcutintheneck,andsoontoallconnected
things.Thefalsifadenythepossibilityof[this]andclaimittobeimpossible.(alGhazl2000a,166.)

Ofcourse,aworldwherefiredoesntcausecombustionincottonwouldberadicallydifferentfromtheone
welivein.Achangeinasinglecausalconnectionwouldprobablyimplythatmanyotherswouldbedifferent
aswell.Still,suchaworldcanbeconceivedinourminds,whichmeansitisapossibleworld.God,however,
didnotchoosetocreatesuchanalternativepossibleworld(Griffel2009,1723).
Intheinitialstatementofthe17thdiscussionalGhazlclaimsthattheconnection[betweencauseand
effect]isduetothepriordecision(taqdr)ofGod.WhenheobjectstoAvicennathattheseconnectionsare
notnecessary,alGhazlwishestopointoutthatGodcouldhavechosentocreateanalternativeworldwhere
thecausalconnectionsaredifferentfromwhattheyare.Avicennadeniedthis.Thisworldisthenecessary
effectofGod'snatureandaworlddifferentfromthisoneisunconceivable.AlGhazlobjectsandsaysthis
worldisthecontingenteffectofGod'sfreewillandHisdeliberatechoicebetweenalternativeworlds.

7.4TheCumPossibilityofOccasionalismandSecondaryCausality
IntheSecondPositionofthe17thdiscussionalGhazlpresentstwodifferentapproaches(singl.maslak)
inordertocounterAvicenna'spositionthatthenecessaryconnectionbetweenexistingcausesandeffects
renderssomemiraclesintheQuranimpossible.IntheFirstApproachalGhazldeniestheexistenceof
natures(tabi)andofcausalconnectionsandmaintainsthatGodcreateseveryeventimmediately.Thisis
thepartofthe17thdiscussionwherehepresentsoccasionalismasaviableexplanationofwhatwehave
usuallycometoreferasefficientcausality.God'seternalandunchangingknowledgealreadycontainsall
eventsthatwillhappenincreation.Bycreatingcombustioneverytimefiretouchescotton,Godfollowsa
certaincustom(da).Inrealterms,however,combustionoccursonlyconcomitantlywhenfiretouches
cottonandisnotconnectedtothisevent.IntheFirstApproachoftheSecondPositioninthe17thdiscussion
(alGhazl2000a,169.14171.11)andinsomeofhislaterworks(alGhazl1962),hemaintainsthatcausal
processesmaysimplybetheresultofGod'shabitandthatHecreateswhatweconsideracauseanditseffect
individuallyandimmediately.WhenGodwishestoperformamiracleandconfirmthemissionofoneofHis
prophets,hesuspendsHishabitandomitstocreatetheeffectHeusuallydoesaccordingtoHishabit.
TheSecondApproach(alGhazl2000a,171.12174.8)presentsaverydifferentexplanationofprophetical
miracles.Marmura(1981)calleditalGhazl'ssecondcausaltheory.HerealGhazlacceptsthe
existenceofnatures(tabi)andofunchangingconnectionsbetweencausesandtheireffects.Inthe
secondcausaltheoryalGhazlmerelypointsoutthatdespitehumaneffortsinthenaturalsciences,weare
farawayfromknowingallcausesandexplainingallprocessesinnature.Itmaywellbethecasethatthose
miraclesthatthefalsifadenyhaveimmanentnaturalcausesthatareunknowntous.WhenMoses,for
instance,threwhissticktothegroundanditchangedintoaserpent(Quran,7.107,20.69,26.32)the
materialofthewoodenstickmayhaveundergonearapidtransformationandbecomealivinganimal.We
knowthatwooddisintegrateswithtimeandbecomesearththatfertilizesandfeedsplants.Theseplantsare,
inturn,thefodderofherbivores,whichareconsumedbycarnivoreslikesnakes.Thefalsifacannotexclude
thatsomeunknowncausemayrapidlyexpeditetheusuallyslowprocesswherethematterofawoodenstick
istransformedintoasnake.TheseandotherexplanationsgivenintheSecondApproachareonlyexamples
ofhowthepropheticalmiraclesmaybetheresultofnaturalcausesthatarenotfullyunderstoodbyhumans.
Marmura(1965,1831981,97)rejectedthesuggestionthatalGhazlmighthaveheldoccasionalismand
secondarycausalityastwocumpossiblecosmologicalexplanations.MarmuraconcededthatalGhazl
makesuseofcausalistlanguagesometimesinthewayitisusedinordinaryArabic,sometimesinamore
specificallyAvicennian/AristotelianwayandthatthisusageoflanguageisinnovativefortheAsharite
schooldiscourse(1995,89).YetinallmajorpointsofMuslimtheologyalGhazlheldpositionsthatfollow
closelytheonesdevelopedbyearlierAsharitescholars,namelythepossibilityofmiracles,thecreationof
humansacts,andGod'sfreedomduringthecreationoftheuniverse(1995,91,9397,99100).InMarmura's
view,alGhazlneverdeviatedfromoccasionalism,whilehesometimesexpressedhisopinionsin
ambiguouslanguagethatmockedphilosophicalparlance,probablyinordertolurefollowersoffalsfainto
theAshariteoccasionalistcamp.
ThatalGhazlconsideredoccasionalismandsecondarycausalityascumpossibleexplanationsofGod's
creativeactivityisstated,however,inapassageinthe20thdiscussionoftheIncoherenceonthesubjectof
corporealresurrectionintheafterlife.Thefalsifaarguethatcorporealresurrectionisimpossiblebecauseit
requiresthetransformationofsubstanceslikeironintoagarment,whichisimpossible.Inhisresponse,al
GhazlreferstotheSecondApproachoftheSecondPositioninthe17thdiscussionwhere,hesays,hehad
alreadydiscussedthisproblem.Hearguesthattheunusuallyrapidrecyclingofthematterthatmakesupthe
pieceofironintoapieceofgarmentisnotimpossible.Butthisisnotthepointatissuehere,alGhazl
says.Therealquestioniswhethersuchatransformationoccurspurelythrough[divine]powerwithoutan
intermediary,orthroughoneofthecauses.Hecontinues:

Boththesetwoviewsarepossibleforus(kilhummumkinnindan)()[Inthe17thdiscussionwe
stated]thattheconnectionofconnectedthingsinexistenceisnotbywayofnecessitybutthrough
habitualevents,whichcanbedisrupted.Thus,theseeventscomeaboutthroughthepowerofGod
withouttheexistenceoftheircauses.Thesecond[view]isthatwesay:Thisisduetocauses,butitis
notaconditionthatthecause[here]wouldbeonethatiswellknown(mahd).Rather,inthetreasury
ofthingsthatareenactedby[God's]powertherearewondrousandstrangethingsthatonehasntcome
across.Thesearedeniedbysomeonewhothinksthatonlythosethingsexiststhatheexperiencessimilar
topeoplewhodenymagic,sorcery,thetalismanicarts,[prophetic]miracles,andthewondrousdeeds
[donebysaints].(alGhazl2000a,222.)

AlGhazlmaintainedthisundecidedpositionthroughouthislifetime.Giventhefactthatneither
observationnoranyothermeansofknowing(includingrevelation)givesadecisiveprooffortheexistenceor
nonexistenceofaconnectionbetweenacauseanditseffect,wemustsuspendourjudgmentonthismatter.
GodmaycreatethroughthemediationofcausesthatHeemploys,ordirectlywithoutsuchmediation.This
undecidedpositionisunfortunatelynowhereclearlyexplained.Itcanbegatheredfromisolatedstatements
liketheoneaboveandthefactthataftertheIncoherencealGhazlwrotebookswherehemaintaineda
distinctlyoccasionalistcosmology(alGhazl1962)andotherslikethe35thbookofhisRevivalor
theNicheofLights,whereheuseslanguagethatisexplicitlycausalist.Innoneofthesebooks,however,he
commitshimselftothepositionthatthecauseisconnectedtoitseffect.Godmaycreatethetwo
independentlyfromoneanotherorHemaycreatethemthroughthemediationofsecondarycauses.Inhis
verylastwork,completedonlydaysbeforehisdeath,alGhazldiscusseswhetherGodcreatesthroughthe
mediation(biwsita)ofhiscreationsornot,andmaintainsthatthemattercannotbesettleddecisively(al
Ghazl1985,6869).
InallthisalGhazlacceptedtheunchangingcharacterofthiscreation.OnceGodchosetocreatethisworld
amongalternatives,Healsochosenottochangetherulesthatgovernit.Whileitisconceivableandtherefore
possiblethatGodwouldbreakhishabitorinterveneintheassignedfunctionofthesecondarycauses,He
informsusinHisrevelationthatHewillnotdoso.Inthe31stbookofhisRevival,alGhazlsaysthatGod
createsallthingsoneaftertheotherinanorderlymanner.AftermakingclearthatthisorderrepresentsGod's
habit(sunna),hequotestheQuran(33:62and48:23):YouwillnotfindanychangeinGod'shabit.(al
Ghazl193738,11:208485.)ThisverseisquotedseveraltimesintheRevivalinonepassagealGhazl
addsthatweshouldnotthinkGodwilleverchangeHishabit(ibid,4:12).Propheticalmiraclesaremerely
extraordinaryoccurrencesthattakeplacewithinthesystemofthestrictlyhabitualoperationofGod'sactions
orwithinthenaturallawsthatgovernthesecondarycauses.MiraclesareprogrammedintoGod'splanfor
Hiscreation,sotospeak,fromtheverybeginninganddonotrepresentadirectinterventionorasuspension
ofGod'slawfulactions(Frank1992,59idem,1994,20).GiventhattherewillneverbeabreakinGod's
habit,anoccasionalistuniversewillalwaysremainindistinguishablefromonegovernedbysecondary
causality.

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