Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
[9] J. Wang and P. A. Regalia, Sensor network localization via boundary Joint Cooperative Beamforming, Jamming, and
projections, in Proc. IEEE Int. CISS, Baltimore, MD, USA, Mar. 2009, Power Allocation to Secure AF Relay Systems
pp. 224229.
[10] C.-L. Wang, Y.-W. Hong, and Y.-S. Dai, A decentralized positioning
method for wireless sensor networks based on weighted interpolation, Hui-Ming Wang, Member, IEEE, Feng Liu, and Mengchen Yang
in Proc. IEEE ICC, Glasgow, U.K., Jun. 2007, pp. 31673172.
[11] T. S. Rappaport, Wireless Communications: Principles and Practice,
2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall, 2002.
[12] K. Pahlavan and P. Krishnamurthy, Networking Fundamentals: Wide, Lo- AbstractThe idea of multiuser (nodes) cooperation is an efficient way
cal and Personal Area Communications, 1st ed. Hoboken, NJ, USA: to improve the physical-layer security of a wireless transmission in the
Wiley, 2009. presence of passive eavesdroppers. However, due to the half-duplex con-
[13] N. Patwari, A. O. Hero, III, M. Perkins, N. S. Correal, and R. J. ODea, straint of the practical transceivers, two phases are required for one round
Relative location estimation in wireless sensor networks, IEEE Trans. of data transmission, which grants the eavesdroppers two opportunities
Signal Process., vol. 51, no. 8, pp. 21372148, Aug. 2003. to wiretap the information. Therefore, protecting the data transmissions
[14] W.-Y. Chiu, B.-S. Chen, and C.-Y. Yang, Robust relative location es- in both phases is critical. Toward this end, we propose a joint coopera-
timation in wireless sensor networks with inexact position problem, tive beamforming, jamming, and power-allocation scheme to enhance the
IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput., vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 935946, Jun. 2012. security of an amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperative relay network in
[15] C.-L. Wang, Y.-S. Chiou, and Y.-S. Dai, An adaptive location estimator this paper. Different from the existing works assuming that the source
based on alpha-beta filtering for wireless sensor networks, in Proc. IEEE node always uses its total power, we show that the secrecy rate is a
WCNC, Kowloon, China, Mar. 2007, pp. 32853290. quasi-concave function of the power of the source node so that allocating
[16] P. M. Clarkson, Optimal and Adaptive Signal Processing. Boca Raton, its total power may not be optimal. The beamformer design and power
FL, USA: CRC, 1993. optimization problem can be solved by a bisection method together with a
[17] J. M. Martnez and R. J. B. D. Sampaio, Parallel and sequential generalized eigenvalue decomposition, which has a semiclosed form and is
Kaczmarz methods for solving underdetermined nonlinear equations, computationally very convenient. Simulations show that the joint scheme
J. Comput. Appl. Math., vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 311321, Jul. 1986. greatly improves the security.
[18] A. Nedic and D. P. Bertsekas, Convergence rate of incremental sub-
gradient algorithms, in Stochastic Optimization: Algorithms and Appli- Index TermsBeamforming, physical layer security, power allocation,
cations, S. Uryasev and P. Pardalos, Eds. Norwell, MA, USA: Kluwer, relay system.
2000, pp. 263304.
[19] N. A. Pantazis, S. A. Nikolidakis, and D. D. Vergados, Energy-efficient
routing protocols in wireless sensor networks: A survey, IEEE Commun.
Surveys Tuts., vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 551591, 2nd Quart., 2013.
[20] R. W. Ouyang, A. K.-S. Wong, and C.-T. Lea, Received signal strength- I. I NTRODUCTION
based wireless localization via semidefinite programming: Noncoopera-
tive and cooperative schemes, IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 59, no. 3, Exploiting multiple-node cooperation to improve the physical layer
pp. 13071318, Mar. 2010. security of wireless communications has attracted increasing interest
[21] W.-Y. Chiu and B.-S. Chen, A mixed-norm approach using sim- very recently [1][15]. For a cooperative system where all termi-
ulated annealing with changeable neighborhood for mobile location nals are only equipped with a single antenna, generally, there are
estimation, IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput., vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 633642, two efficient ways to take advantage of the multiple nodes in the
May 2010.
[22] K. Yu and Y. J. Guo, Statistical NLOS identification based on AOA, system: cooperative beamforming and cooperative jamming. Coop-
TOA, and signal strength, IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 58, no. 1, erative beamforming [1][5] helps improve the channel quality to
pp. 274286, Jan. 2009. the legitimate destination, whereas cooperative jamming (also called
[23] Crossbow Technology Inc., Milpitas, CA, USA, MICAz Datasheet, 2014, artificial noise) degrades the channel condition of the eavesdrop-
http://www.xbow.com
pers [6][10]. However, the data transmission in relay networks re-
quires two phases, i.e., phase I (broadcasting phase) and phase II
(relaying phase), due to the half-duplex constraint of the transceivers
(let us assume that there is no direct link between the source and
destination). This grants the potential eavesdroppers two opportu-
nities to intercept the information. Therefore, protecting the data
Manuscript received October 18, 2013; revised January 1, 2014 and June 3,
2014; accepted November 11, 2014. Date of publication November 13, 2014;
date of current version October 13, 2015. This work was supported in part by
the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61102081 and
Grant 61221063; by the Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program
of Higher Education of China under Grant 20110201120013; by the New
Century Excellent Talents Support Fund of China under Grant NCET-13-0458;
by the Industrial Research Fund of Shaanxi Province under Grant 2012GY2-
28; by the Fok Ying Tung Education Foundation under Grant 141063; and
by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central University under Grant
2013jdgz11. The review of this paper was coordinated by Prof. H.-H. Chen.
The authors are with the Key Laboratory of Intellectual Network and
Network Security of the Ministry of Education, School of Electronic and
Information Engineering, Xian Jiaotong University, Xian 710049, China
(e-mail: xjbswhm@gmail.com).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online
at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TVT.2014.2370754
0018-9545 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
4894 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 64, NO. 10, OCTOBER 2015
(1)
where nE is the additive noise at the eavesdropper.
In phase II, the N 1 relay nodes do a distributed beamforming
transmissions in both phases is critical to guarantee the security of the
to forward the received signal to the destination. The transmitted
data transmission.
signal x R [xR,1 , xR,2 , . . . , xR,N1 ] is x R = W y R , where W is
However, most previous works only consider taking cooperative
the weight matrix in the form of W = diag([w1 , w2 , . . . , wN1
]),
beamforming or jamming in phase II to protect the transmission
and diag() is a diagonal matrix. Concurrently, the jammer transmits
[1][5]. In phase I, they assume that the source node broadcasts with (2)
its total power and all the relay nodes listen. Some even simply interference signal again as z (2) with power PJ . The received signals
assume that the transmission in phase I is perfectly secured [2], [3], at the destination D and the eavesdropper E are respectively
[10], which is obviously over optimistic. In our previous works [12],
(1)
[13], we have already shown that the joint cooperative beamforming yD = Psg TRW f R s + PJ g TRW h R z (1) + n
D (3)
and jamming in both phases will greatly improve the secrecy rate.
However, power allocation of the source node still has not been (2)
yE = Psc TE W f R s +
(1)
PJ c TE W h R z (1) + n
(2)
E (4)
considered.
In this paper, we aim to enhance the security of an amplify-and-
(2) (2)
forward (AF) cooperative relay network. Based on the joint coop- where D
n PJ gJ z (2) + g TRW n R + nD , and E
n
erative beamforming and jamming scheme in [12], we optimize the
(2) (2)
power allocation of the source node to improve the secrecy rate further. PJ qE z (2) + c TE W n R + nE , respectively. c E [cE,1 , cE,2 , . . . ,
(2)
We show that the secrecy rate is a quasi-concave function of the cE,N1 ]T , and nD and nE are additive noise terms at D and E
transmission power of the source node so that allocating its total during phase II, respectively. Equation (3) can be reformulated as
power may even harm the secrecy. This is intuitively reasonable since
increasing the source transmission power will increase both the rate to (1)
yD = Psw H a f g s + PJ w H a gh z (1) + n
D (5)
the legitimate destination and that to the eavesdropper. Therefore, the
power allocation should balance these two effects. The beamformer
design and power optimization problem can be solved by a bisec- where a f g [fR,1 gR,1 , fR,2 gR,2 , , fR,N1 gR,N1 ]T and simi-
tion method together with a generalized eigenvalue decomposition, larly for a gh , and w [w1 , w2 , . . . , wN1 ]T .
which has a semiclosed form and is computationally very conve- For the eavesdropper, each transmission phase grants it an opportu-
nient. Simulations show that the joint scheme greatly improves the nity to get the information. Combining (2) and (4) yields the receiving
security. model of the eavesdropper in the whole procedure as
y E = H E s + nE (6)
II. S YSTEM M ODEL
where
We consider an AF wireless network in which a source S wants to
send information to the destination D under the existence of an eaves-
dropper E. There are N intermediate relay nodes Rn , n = 1, 2, . . . , N , HE = PsH
fE
Psw a cf
between S and D. Each node in the whole network is only equipped
(1)
with a single antenna and is subject to the half-duplex constraint. n
E
We assume that there is no direct connection between S and D. Our nE = (1) (2)
(7)
joint beamforming and jamming scheme is to divide the intermediate PJ c TE W h R z (1) + n
E
nodes into two groups: One node is jammer J, and all the other N 1
are relay nodes, as shown in Fig. 1. The relay nodes will forward with a cf [cE,1 fR,1 , cE,2 fR,2 , , cE,N1 fR,N1 ]T , acg
(1)
E,1 gR,1 , cE,2 gR,2 , , cE,N1 gR,N1 ] ,
the received signal using cooperative beamforming, and the jammer T
[c and n
E =
transmits interference signals to confuse the eavesdropper. The quasi- (1) (1) (1)
stationary flat-fading channels between S, R, J, and E are also shown PJ qE z (1) + nE . We assume that all the noise terms nD , nE ,
(2)
in Fig. 1. nE , and n R are zero-mean and time-spatially white independent
During phase I, S broadcasts its data. In conventional schemes complex Gaussian random variables with variance 2 . We also assume
[1][3], all N relay nodes will listen to the signal, whereas in our that the jamming signals z (1) and z (2) are both complex Gaussian
scheme, the N 1 relay nodes listen and the jammer sends interfer- random variables.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 64, NO. 10, OCTOBER 2015 4895
heuristic scheme to achieve a suboptimal but reasonably good solution. problem can be decoupled into two concatenate subproblems as
Observing (8)(10), we can see that we hope to increase I(yD ; s) follows:
as large as possible while keeping I(yy E ; s) as small as possible.
Therefore, we can do the following three steps. vHR v
2 + Ps maxv fg
gg v
vH R
1+v
1) Design w in the null space of a cf to completely eliminate the max
Ps a + bPs
information leakage in phase II, i.e., let H a cf = 0 so that the
second row of H E in (7) can be eliminated. s.t. v T (Ps )vv = PR ,
H
Ps PT (15)
2) Design w in the null space of a gh to eliminate the interference to
the destination by the jamming signal in phase I, i.e., H a gh = 0 where inner optimization is performed over v , solely taking Ps as a
(it has been forwarded by the relay nodes in phase II). constant, and the solution of which is a function of Ps (Note that Ps
3) Since no information leakage happens in phase II (by 1)), the is an argument in T (Ps )), and the outer optimization problem is taken
jammer should stop sending interference so that D will not be over Ps . Let us first focus on the inner optimization.
(2)
jammed in phase II, i.e., PJ = 0. From the definition, T (Ps ) is a positive definite matrix, and there
exists an invertible
matrix A (Ps ) satisfying
A (Ps )H A(Ps ) = T (Ps ).
With all these considerations, (9) and (10) can be rewritten as Let v (1/ PR )A A(Ps )vv , and v = PRA (Ps )1v. Substituting v
into (15), we can rewrite the inner optimization as
1 Ps w H R f gw
I(yD ; s) = log 1+ (11)
2 2 1 + w H R gg w vH B (Ps )
v
max
v vH D (Ps )v
1 Ps |fE |2
I(yy E ; s) = log 1+ (1)
. (12) s.t. vH v = 1 (16)
2 2 + PJ |qE |2
where B (Ps ) = PRA (Ps )H R f gA (Ps )1 , and D (Ps ) =
1 Although the source power-allocation problem has been investigated in [1], I + PRA (Ps )H R gg A (Ps )1 . Obviously, the optimization problem
the proposed scheme is a hill-climbing method, which has no optimality (16) is a generalized eigenvalue problem. The optimal value is the
guarantee. largest eigenvalue of D (Ps )1B (Ps ) achieved at the eigenvector
4896 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 64, NO. 10, OCTOBER 2015
associated with the largest eigenvalue. Mathematically, we have the Note that f (Ps ) is the nonzero eigenvalue of a rank-1 positive
optimal vo as semidefinite matrix, it is obvious that f (Ps ) 0, and then h(Ps ) 0.
Recalling that a > 0 and b 0, the denominator of (24) is always pos-
vo = E D (Ps )1B (Ps ) (17) itive in the range of Ps . Therefore, the positivitynegativity of g (Ps )
depends on the numerator only. Let m(Ps ) = (a + bPs )h (Ps )
where is a scalar to normalize vo to satisfy voH vo = 1, and E [X] is
b 2 bh(Ps ). Since h(Ps ) is a real polynomial function of Ps , it
one eigenvector of matrix X associated with the largest eigenvalue.
f g is a rank-1 matrix; thus, B (Ps ) is a rank-1 matrix is continuous and its first derivative is m (Ps ) = bh (Ps ) + (a +
Note that R
bPs )h (Ps ) bh (Ps ) = (a + bPs )h (Ps ) < 0 due to h (Ps ) < 0.
as well. Therefore, matrix D (Ps )1B (Ps ) has only one nonzero
This indicates that the numerator m(Ps ) is a strictly decreasing
eigenvalue, which is the largest one. Since (18) holds, i.e.,
function. The positivitynegativity of g (Ps ), Ps [0, PT ] has the
following cases.
D (Ps )1B (Ps ) D (Ps )1A (Ps )H H H
af g
If m(0) 0, then g (Ps ) is always negative, and the maximum
= D (Ps )1 PRA (Ps )H H H
af g objective value is g(0) = log( 2 /a) < 0, which suggests that the
1
secrecy rate is 0 and it is impossible to communicate safely.
aH
f g H A (Ps ) D (Ps )1A (Ps )H H H
af g If m(PT ) 0, then g (Ps ) is always positive so that g(Ps ) is an
1
increasing function, and the maximum happens to be g(PT ).
= PRa H
f g H A (Ps ) D (Ps )1A (Ps )H H H
af g
Finally, if m(0) > 0 and m(PT ) < 0, which implies that g (0) > 0,
D (Ps )1 A(Ps )H H H
af g (18) then g (PT ) < 0. Since m(Ps ) is a strictly decreasing continuous real
function, there must be a unique point, for example, Pc (0, Ps ),
where, in the first equation, we just substitute B (Ps ) in such that m(Pc ) = 0, and for Ps Pc , m(Ps ) > 0 and for Ps Pc ,
and, in the second equation, we change the positions of the m(Ps ) < 0. Then, we conclude that, for Ps Pc , g(Ps ) is strictly
1
productions, the only nonzero eigenvalue is PRa H f g H A (Ps ) increasing, and for Ps Pc , g(Ps ) is strictly decreasing. According
1 H H
D (Ps ) A (Ps ) H a f g , and the associated eigenvector is to the definition [17], g(Ps ) is a quasi-concave function Ps . In this
D (Ps )1 B (Ps )) = D (Ps )1 A(Ps )H H H
E(D af g . situation, Ps = Pc achieves the maximum g(Pc ) of problem (22).
We now have Since Pc is the unique real root of the equation m(Ps ) = 0, we can
calculate Pc by using the bisection method.
= D (Ps )1A (Ps )H H H
af g
(19) From this discussion, we can see that the optimal Ps depends on the
positivitynegativity of m(0) and m(PT ). Only when m(PT ) 0,
vo = PRA (Ps )1D (Ps )1A (Ps )H H H
af g (20)
allocating the total power of the source is optimal. In the case that
and the maximum objective function of (16) is m(0) > 0 and m(PT ) < 0, only a part of its total power should
be allocated. This can be intuitively explained as follows. Since the
1
f (Ps ) PRa H
f g H A (Ps ) D (Ps )1A (Ps )H H H
af g legitimate channel from the source to the destination is a two-hop
relay channel, both power values Ps and PR will impact the secrecy
= PRa H 1H H a f g .
f g H (T (Ps ) + PRR gg ) (21) rate. From a traditional two-hop AF relay network without security
consideration, we know that if PR is fixed, increasing Ps will first
Substituting (21) into (15), we get the outer optimization
increase the rate, but it will achieve a limit and will not increase any
2 + h(Ps ) more no matter how large Ps is since then the fixed PR becomes a
max g(Ps ) log
Ps a + bPs bottleneck of the two-hop channel, as shown in [16]. In the security
transmission of the AF two-hop network, however, increasing Ps too
= log( 2 + h(Ps )) log(a + bPs ) much not only will not increase the rate of the legitimate channel but
s.t. 0 Ps PT (22) also will increase the leakage rate to the eavesdropper [from (12)]
and thus harms the secrecy rate. This is the reason that Ps should not
where h(Ps ) Ps f (Ps ) = PR Psh H J (Ps )h h, h H H always be the maximal available power PT .
a f g , and
J (Ps ) (PsR f f + PJ R hh + I + PRR gg )1 . The objective
2 After the optimal Pso = Pc has been obtained, the optimal cooper-
function is a difference of two logarithm functions, which is neither ative beamformer w o has a closed form w o = H v o where v o is in
convex nor concave, and generally difficult to solve. However, in the the form of (20). Finally, we substitute the so-obtained Pso and w o
following, we will show that it is a quasi-concave function of Ps . into (11) and (12) to get the secrecy rate. We summarize the whole
Toward this end, let us first evaluate the convexity of h(Ps ). The first algorithm in Table I.
and second derivatives of h(Ps ) to PS are
IV. S IMULATION R ESULTS
h (Ps ) = PR h H J (Ps )h ffh
h Psh H J 2 (Ps )R
In the simulation cases, all the channel coefficients are randomly
h (Ps ) = 2PRh H J 3 (Ps )(PJ R
hh + 2I + PRR
gg )R
f f h (23)
generated in each simulation run as complex zero-mean Gaussian
respectively. The detailed derivations are given in the Appendix. random vectors with unit covariance. Noise power 2 is normalized to
Since J (Ps ) is a positive definite matrix and so as J 3 (Ps ), we have be at 0 dBm. In addition, 5000 Monte Carlo runs were done for each
h (Ps ) < 0, i.e., h(Ps ) is a concave function of Ps . point in the figures. Jammer power PJ is assumed to be PR /(N 1),
The first derivative of g(Ps ) is where N is the number of the intermediate nodes.
In Fig. 2, we show the secrecy rate of the proposed joint opti-
1 h (Ps ) b mization scheme and compare it with the scheme where all N nodes
g (Ps ) =
ln 2 2 + h(Ps ) a + bPs do null-space beamforming in phase II without jamming in phase I
(labeled as Relay only in the figure). We show cases with differ-
(a + bPs )h (Ps ) b 2 bh(Ps ) ent N = 8, 12, respectively. The total power of the source is PT =
= . (24)
ln 2 ( 2 + h(Ps )) (a + bPs ) 10 dBm. The x-axis PM is the total power consumed by all the relay
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 64, NO. 10, OCTOBER 2015 4897
TABLE I
P ROPOSED A LGORITHM
Fig. 4. Secrecy rate enhancement of the joint scheme versus the sum power
Fig. 2. Secrecy rate comparison of the proposed joint scheme and the relay- PM , where PT = 10, 20, and 30 dBm.
only scheme.
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Here, we will give the detailed derivation of (23). First, we have
h(Ps ) = Ps f (Ps ) = PR Psh H J (Ps )h
h, and its first derivative is
hh + 2I +PRR
= 2PRh H J 3 (Ps )(PJ R gg )R
ffh
=R 2
ffR
ff .
where J 3 (Ps ) = J (Ps )J
J (Ps )J
J (Ps ), and R ff
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