Proof of an External World?

By raising his hands, G.E. Moore claims to have proven the existence of an

external world in his Proof of an External World. This proof, he claims, satisfies

three necessary conditions for a rigorous proof. I will explain the proof and its

necessary conditions which Moore claims are satisfied. Subsequently, I will

critically evaluate Moores arguments for the proof satisfying these conditions, and

how the Cartesian sceptic might response to this. Consequently, I will argue that

Moores proof is not a convincing proof of the external world, that is does not provide

a compelling response to the Cartesian sceptic, and that Moore does indeed beg the

question again the Cartesian sceptic.

I will briefly explain G.E. Moores proof and his three conditions for a

rigorous proof. Basically, Moores proof of an external world is as follows:

(P1): If hands exist, there exists an external world.

(P2): Here is one hand, and here is another.

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(C): Therefore, there exists an external world (Moore, 1993, p. 166).

He claims this to be a rigorous proof because it satisfies these three conditions:

(1): The premise must be different from the conclusion.

(2): The premise must be known to be true.

(3): The conclusion must follow from the premise (Moore, 1993, p. 166).

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The conditions Moore provides are important to him because the conditions justify

his proof as being perfectly rigorous, and that a better or more rigorous proof cannot

be given (Moore, 1993, p. 166).

I will now critically evaluate Moores arguments for the proof satisfying these

conditions, and how the Cartesian sceptic might respond to this. I think that

condition (3) is good because it makes a proof valid. Moore argues that his proof

meets condition (3). He claims that if he were to change his premise to here is one

hand and here is another now, then it follows that there are two hands in existence

now (Moore, 1993, p. 167). It seems here that the Cartesian sceptic would not be

able to respond because Moores proof does appear to satisfy (3) (C) does follow on

from (P1) and (P2).

I think that condition (2) is also good because it makes a proof sound as (2)

states the truth of the premise is required. Moore further claims that his proof

satisfies (2) by arguing that he knows (P2) to be true and says that it would be

absurd to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it (Moore, 1993, p.

166). The Cartesian sceptic could ask how does he actually know (P2)? And proceed

to refute by providing the following modus ponens argument:

(P1): If I cannot tell the difference between waking and dreaming,

then I cannot be sure that I have two hands.

(P2): I cannot tell the difference between waking and dreaming.

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(C): Therefore, I cannot be sure that I have two hands (Preston, 2004).

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Moore later concedes to this because he says in his paper that even though he has

conclusive evidence that he is awake, this is a very different thing from being

able to prove it (Moore, 1993, p. 169). However, Moore could respond to the

Cartesian sceptic by changing the modus ponens argument to a modus tollens

argument whilst keeping (P1) the same. This is called the Moore shift and appears

as:

(P1): If I cannot tell the difference between waking and dreaming,

then I cannot be sure that I have two hands.

(P2): Im sure that I have two hands.

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(C): Therefore, I can tell the difference between waking and dreaming

(Preston, 2004).

Both arguments are valid because the conclusion follows logically from the

premises. However, only one of these arguments can be sound because if one

premise for example (P2) is true, the other (P2) must be false. Moore would

suggest that we would have more reason to believe in (P2) than in (P2) because

(P2) seems more plausible than the plausibility of hyperbolic doubt that we are

dreaming right now or being controlled by an evil demon a method Cartesian

sceptics use to prove (P2) (Preston, 2004). This comparative plausibility, I think,

gives Moores proof some weight, but ultimately means that condition (2) is

unsatisfied because Moore concedes to not being able to prove that he knows (P2) to

be true.

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 For condition (1), I think that this condition allows for a premise to be

different from a conclusion, but still presuppose the conclusion. Condition (1)

therefore will make the proof less convincing because begging the question doesnt

further the proof. Moore argues that his proof satisfies (1) because his premise is

more specific than his conclusion (Moore, 1993, p. 166). Which is correct, (P1) and

(P2) are more specific than, and different to (C). Hence, (1) is satisfied. However, the

problem with (1), the Cartesian sceptic may argue, is there are examples which

meet condition (1) but seem to beg the question. Take the example here:

(P1): If writing essays is fun, philosophy is fun!

(P2): Writing essays is fun.

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(C): Philosophy is fun!

Clearly, this meets condition (1) because (P1) and (P2) are more specific and

different from (C). However, it seems that this argument begs the question

because the statement philosophy is fun is in both (P1) and (C). It seems like

both this example, and Moores proof presuppose the conclusion in the premise.

I will argue why Moores proof is not a convincing proof. It could be argued

that Moore is not trying prove his knowledge of the existence of the external world,

but rather, he is trying to prove the existence of an external world (Baldwin, 2010).

That means that (P2) is simply just known, meaning condition (2) is satisfied.

However, this does not make it a convincing proof of the external world. This is

because he still presupposes (C) in (P1), even though (2) is met and the proof is

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sound and valid. By doing so, the proof isnt furthered in any way. Therefore,

Moores proof is not a convincing proof of the external world.

Finally, I will argue that this proof is not a compelling response to the

Cartesian sceptic, and that he does indeed beg the question against the Cartesian

sceptic. I do not think Moores proof is a compelling response to the Cartesian

sceptic because in the Moore shift, the factor that determines which premise is more

plausible is intuition. That is, a person such as a Cartesian sceptic could find

more reason to believe in the plausibility of (P2) than that of (P2). For a Cartesian

sceptic, this is already intuitively more plausible as they take hyperbolic doubt

seriously. Hence, this is not a compelling response because it will not change the

Cartesian sceptics view. Even if we accept that (P2) is true, there still exists the

problem of (P1) presupposing (C), which ultimately means that Moore does indeed

beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic.

This essay has explained Moores proof of an external world and the

conditions he presents that make his proof a rigorous proof. I have critically

evaluated Moores arguments for the proof satisfying these conditions, and how the

Cartesian sceptic might response to this. I therefore conclude through my

evaluation, that Moores proof is not a convincing proof of an external world, that it

does not provide a compelling response to the Cartesian sceptic and Moore does

indeed beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic.

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References

Baldwin, T. (2010). George Edward Moore. (E. N. Zalta, Editor) Retrieved April 24,

2016, from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/

Moore, G. E. (1993). Proof of an External World. In T. Baldwin, G. E. Moore Selected

Writings (pp. 147-170). London: Routledge.

Preston, A. (2004). George Edward Moore (18731958). Retrieved April 25, 2016,

from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/moore/#SH2d

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