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Corazon G. Ruiz v.

Court of Appeal and Consuelo Torres

G.R. No. 146942 April 22, 2003


Herein petitioner Ruiz made several loans with respondent Torres. To loan was summed
up at 750,000 pesos on one set of transactions which is evidenced by one promissory note.
Another, 300,000 pesos was further loaned after the execution of the first promissory note.

The first promissory note states that surcharges at 1% compounded interest per month
and a penalty charge of 10% compounded interest per month was imposed upon default, and the
obligation to pay 750,000 pesos shall subsist from April 1995 to April 1996, during which the
outstanding obligation shall accrue 3% compounded interest per month. All loans are secured
with mortgages in the form of jewelries pledged and real property.

Ruiz eventually defaulted and the mortgaged property are about to be subjected for
auction, Ruiz petitioned for an injunction against the auction proceedings in the trial court, which
was approved, but it was set aside by the Court of Appeals. The trial court contended that it was a
unilateral contract of adhesion which was invalidated by the same, because of its repugnancy to
public policy and that Ruiz, being the weaker party, was disadvantaged because of the
transaction. This contention was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which now contends that Ruiz
made multiple loan agreements with Torres with almost similar imports of the promissory notes,
there being only minor differences in interest rates; there being no contract of adhesion, Ruiz
gave her consent.

Whether or not the subject loan agreement and evidenced by the promissory notes are
contracts of adhesion

The Supreme Court ruled that there was no contract of adhesion; Ruiz could not have her
consent to the transaction vitiated. It was clear in the records that Ruiz made multiple loan
agreements with Torres, all of which had similar imports when it comes to the period of
payment, interests, charges and penalties, she had all those chances to ensure that she knows
what she was consenting herself to do. There is no fine print of whatever nature that can be found
anywhere in the promissory notes that could not have vitiated Ruiz will to consent.

To further bolster her claims, she was compelled to pay the outstanding balance of loan.
The Supreme Court does not agree to this claim. She was not compelled to give her consent and
agree to the stipulations in the promissory notes; she had all the choice to reject the imports of
the document. There is nothing in the records that show that she was compelled to agree to the
stipulations. She had every opportunity to study the agreement and make her decision from the
same. The Supreme Court affirms the deletion of the 3% monthly compounding interest, and the
10% compounding interest by the trial court and Court of Appeals for being usurious.