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LOURDES C. FERNANDEZ vs.

NORMA VILLEGAS
The Court laid down the following guidelines with respect to noncompliance with the requirements on or submission of a defective verification and certification against forum shopping, viz.:
1) A distinction must be madebetween non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strictcompliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the endsof justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially compliedwith when one who has ample knowledge to swear tothe truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when
matters alleged in the petition have been made in goodfaith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission orcorrection thereof,
unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interestand invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one
of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. 37 (Emphases supplied)

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR.


Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had the occasion to rule that:
dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon the commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the Court did not
hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on employees found guilty of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.

We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the rush to judgment (even before the filing of the parties memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas undue interest and unseemly haste, especially when taken
together with other circumstances.

Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary

although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of Meralco contrary to his brothers advice, Justice Sabios unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco case, seemed to indicate that he may have been actually
influenced by his brother to help GSIS. In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division although the
regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC
to comment on Meralcos Motion for Justice B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9 th Division, which he probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the
prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.

Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had been influenced by his brother by speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered the decision
in the Meralco case.

Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latters rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should
have acted in preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which he belongs.

IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO


To reiterate, the Gilbert copy bearing the signatures of 14 Justices was photocopied and that a copy thereof was intentionally leaked directly or indirectly to Biraogo. As will be discussed below, the committee FINDS that
the leak came from the Office of Justice Reyes.

the committee FINDS that based on the circumstantial evidence reflected above, particularly the evident undue interest of Justice Reyes to circulate a draft ponencia of the case soonest even beforethe memoranda
of all the parties fell due, and to withhold the information to Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that the promulgation of the ponencia was put on hold and, instead, allow the immediate promulgation after
lunch despite his admission that the decision to hold the promulgation was arrived at at lunchtime, it was Justice Reyes himself who leaked a photocopy thereof.

To the members of the committee, the foregoing proven facts and circumstances constitute more than substantial evidence which reasonably points to Justice Reyes, despite his protestations of innocence, as THE
source of the leak. He must, therefore, be held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT.

For leaking a confidential internal document of the En Banc, the committee likewise finds Justice Reyes administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he may be disbarred or suspended per Sec 27, Rule 138 of the RoC.

Once the said impeachable officer is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, retirement or permanent disability, the Court may proceed against him or her and impose the corresponding sanctions for
misconduct committed during his tenure, pursuant to the Courts power of administrative supervision over members of the bar. Provided that the requirements of due process are met, the Court may penalize retired
members of the Judiciary for misconduct committed during their incumbency.

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,
SANDIGANBAYAN
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while "gross" has
been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused." 12 We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles
during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or
bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray."28Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.

Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog
Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties. 9 They are likewise charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which
relate to the scope of their authority. They are dutybound to observe and abide by these rules and procedures, designed, as they are, primarily to ensure the orderly administration of justice.
Thus, confronted with a serious challenge to one's authority, an ordinary prudent man would perceive the reasonableness, if not the wisdom, of the suggestion/request that the question at
hand be referred to this Court. The hasty and reckless attitude of respondent judge in taking cognizance of and deciding Civil Case No. 12172 despite the strong objection against her
authority and the reasonable request for referral of the question to this Court, constitutes misconduct in office warranting disciplinary sanction.

Libarios vs. Dabalos


It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary
release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to a violation of due process. 12 Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt
against herein accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, if bail was
at all justified. Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to
gross ignorance of the law, which is subject to disciplinary action.
Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo, Jr. as a former employee of the said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded that
he should have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from concluding that the evidence against him was merely "circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as to his judicial impartiality.
Respondent judge should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge
should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.