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[No. L5877.

September 28, 1954]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and


appellee, vs. ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant and
appellant.

BIGAMY; MARRIAGE CONTRACTED DURING THE


EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE is VOID AB
INITIO; No JUDICIAL DECREE is NECESSARY TO
ESTABLISH ITS INVALIDITY.A subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his espouse is
illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity. A prosecution for bigamy
based on said void marriage will not lie.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of


Laguna. Yatco. J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.
Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo
R. Rosete for appellee.

846

846 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED


People vs. Mendoza

PARS, C. J.:

The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a


judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding
him guilty of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months
and 1 day to 6 years, with costs.
The f following f facts are undisputed: On August 5,
1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in
Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence
of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga
Lema in the City of Manila. On Febrauary 2, 1943, Jovita
de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted
another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba,
Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for
and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga
Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and, therefore, non
existent, having been contracted while his first marriage
with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and
that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August
19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because
it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor
General, however, argues that, even assuming that
appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not
exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous
judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the
case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited. The
decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the
Court of Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is essentially
different, because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas,
impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of
necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his
factual contention to be without merit.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second
marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the
existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section
29 of the marriage law (.act 3613), in force at the time the

847

VOL. 95, SEPTEMBER 28, 1954 847


People vs. Mendoza

appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides


as follows:

Illegal marriages.Any marriage subsequently contracted by any


person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee
being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case
until declared null and void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent


marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of
his first spouse illegal and void from its perf ormance, and
no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is
here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with
Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first
spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent ex or seven
consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
competent court.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the
defendantappellant acquitted, with costs de officio so
ordered.

Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,


Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

REYES, J., dissenting:

I, dissent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with
prison mayor "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved".

848

848 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED


Caaveral and Bautista vs. Encarnacion, etc., et al.

Though the logician may say that where the former


marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve still
it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was
void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As
Viada says "La santidad e importancia del matrinonio no
permite que los casados juzguen por si mismos de su
nulidad; esta ha de someterse precisamente al judicio del
Tribunal competente, y cuando este declare la nulidad del
matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras
no exista esta declaracin, la presuncion esta siempre a
favor de la validez del matrimonio, y de consiguiente, el que
contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaracin de nulidad,
no puede menos de incurrir la pena de este articulo." (3
Viada, Cdigo penal p. 275.)

"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of


People vs. Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz., 3145, "and is in line with
the wellknown rule established in cases of adultery, that "until
by competent authority in a final judgment the marriage contract
is set aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the
family exist.'"

Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed.

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