Fujiki v Marinay (Conflict of Laws)

Fujiki v Marinay
2013

MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner, -versus- MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI

MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR
AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,

FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

ISSUES & RULING:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law,
the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove
the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.

Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.Rule 108, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Yes. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations.

BAYOT VS CA G.R. NO. 155635

Posted by kaye lee on 6:57 PM
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa.
They had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was
docketed as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court
also issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in
March 4, 1997.

She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of
gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente
be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P
220,000.00.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action
and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside
RTC's incidental orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to
dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree
was granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and
remains to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which
follows the principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She
was, and still may be, a holder of American passport.

She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as
shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in
Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce.

The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the
ex-couple's property relations.

The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree
must be proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy
of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as
here, sufficient.

Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by force of the June
8, 2000 affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition
will not, stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would
come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is
the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

Civil Law Equity Change of Name Change of Sex Marriage

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. Hes a biological male who feels trapped
in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The
procedure was successful he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a
petition for the change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female)
in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these
changes, among others, so that he can marry his American fianc.

The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity;
that Silverios misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be
in any way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did
not make any basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fianc and
the realization of their dreams.

Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may
be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in
existing legislation.

Issue on the change of first name

In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR
IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER
WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This law provides that it should be the
local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names and not the
regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is
procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still
because the ground upon which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided
for by the law. Under the law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;
or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-
assignment as the basis.

Issue on the change of sex

This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for
the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with
the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it
was just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of
a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error, is immutable.

But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?

No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by
Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws
which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore
the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if Silverios petition
were to be granted.

But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone
sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned
sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of
that privilege.

Noveras v. Noveras G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014 Facts: David and Leticia Noveras are US
citizens who own properties in the US and in the Philippines. Upon learning that David had an
extra-marital affair, Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California
wherein the court awarded all the properties in the US to Leticia. With respect to their
properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property
before the RTC. The RTC awarded the properties in the Philippines to David, with the
properties in the US remaining in the sole ownership of Leticia. The trial court ruled that in
accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because
the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of
their national law. On appeal, the CA directed the equal division of the Philippine properties
between the spouses. David insists that the CA should have recognized the California
Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether
or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the California properties Held: No. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. For Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our Rules of Evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law. Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption, the
recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because divorce is not recognized in the
Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still
legally married in the Philippines. The Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states
that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

Case Digest: In Re Petition for Adoption of Lim & Lim

G.R. Nos. 168992-93 : May 21, 2009

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim

Monina Lim, petitioner

Facts: Monina and Primo Lim were married. Two children whose parents were unknown and
whose whereabouts were unknown were brought to them. They reared and took care of the
two kids. Primo died in 1998 but Monina got married to Angel Olario, an American citizen.
When the children were brought to them, they registered them making it appear that they
were the natural parents. Monina decided to adopt the two (2) children by availing of the
amnesty under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child, hence, she
filed the petition on April 24, 2002. Michelle was 25 years old and already married at the time
of the filing of the petition. Michael was 18 years old. The husband of Michelle gave his
consent to the adoption. The DSWD issued a certification that they were abandoned children.
After trial, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the husband of Monina did not
join her in the petition as required by Section 7(c), Article III, RA 8552 and Article 185 of the
Family Code. She filed a Motion for reconsideration as she did not fall under any of the
exceptions provided for by the law. (Sec. 7(c), Article III, RA 8552). It likewise ruled that the
contention that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the
law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification,
which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely
for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only
for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain
rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.

Hence, she filed a petition with the Supreme Court raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

She contended that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the
court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted.
She aargued that the legal maxim dura lex sed lex is not applicable to adoption cases. She
argued that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already
18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been
emancipated having attained the age of majority.

ISSUE: Is the petition proper? Explain.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative.

The husband and wife should have jointly filed the petition for adoption. The principle of dura
lex sed lex is applicable as the law is explicit that the husband and wife shall jointly adopt.

The use of the word shall means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses. (Rep. v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994, 233 SCRA 9).

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, the trial court was correct in denying
the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First,
the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and her
husband are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that her husband gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that her husband must comply being
an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such
as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the
adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the
adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of her husband. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
OBLIGATION OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL TO SUPPORT HIS MINOR CHILD UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW

Petitioner Norma and respondent Ernst Johan contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.
Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in
the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Cebu City, and since
then, have been residing thereat. Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing
of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent with the RTC-Cebu.
The RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case against
respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien,
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents
obligation to support their child under Article 195 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligors nationality."
The RTC-Cebu issued an Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under our Philippine Law?

RULING:
A foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child. Petitioner cannot rely on Article
195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen,
since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and
duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well
as the consequences of his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son
under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioners
son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or
after the issuance of a divorce decree). In view of respondents failure to prove the national
law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under
this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since
the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded
and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith. Such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

ORIONS SAVINGS BANK VS SUZUKI

FACTS: Suzuki a Japanese national bought a property (condominium unit and a parking lot)
from Mr. Kang, a Korean national through his agent Soneja. A deed of absolute sale was
executed, however even after several demands from Mr Suzuki to have the titles of the
properties delivered by Mr Kang, still he failed to deliver the documents. Later he found out
that Kang has already left Philippines, this prompted Suzuki to verify the status of the
property.Suzuki learned the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations although
it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer,
through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the
purchase price of Unit. No. 53610 and Parking Slot No. 42. The title to the condominium unit
had no existing encumbrance, except for annotation which provided that any conveyance or
encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement
Authority (PRA). Although the title to the condominium contained an annotation representing a
mortgage in favor of Orion for a P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently
cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the
mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.To protect his
interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim12 withthe Registry of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles.13 Orion, (through Perez),
however, refused to surrender the titles.Thereafter, Suzuki received a letter from Orions
counsel dated stating that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of P1,800,000.00. When
Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pago dated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion
covering Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15,
2003. The registration was made only after Suzukis demand for the delivery of the titles to
the properties.Suzuki thus then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No.
42. Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Suzukis right over the properties in litigation,
contending that he was a buyer in good faith and the dacion was belatedly registered, only
two months after the sale has been executed. Orion elevated the case to the Supreme Court
contending that the deed of sale executed was null and void for under the Korean law the sale
of a conjugal properties should be made with the consent of both spouses.

ISSUE: What law shall govern in the case at bar?

aRULING: Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property.Orion believes that the CA erred
in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this position, however,
because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled
principle that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the
trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court.20
To consider these belated arguments would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due
process.Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if
only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present
petition.It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively subject to the
laws of the country or state where it is located.21

The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property its immobility. Immovables
are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their
natural center of gravity there.22Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal
property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe
the mode by which a title canpass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein
can be gained or lost.23 This general principle includes all rules governing the descent,
alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills
and other conveyances.24This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a
deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument
will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci
rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the
instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.25

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses.26 However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.27 He is
presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.28

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer havingthe legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issuespertaining to the conjugal natureof the property shall be governed
by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. Thiscertification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.30Accordingly,
the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor processual presumption comes
into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same asPhilippine Law.31Under Philippine Law, the
phrase "Yung Sam Kang married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status
of Kang.32

In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the
properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook
Jung.We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the
property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or
community property.33 In those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though
registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community
properties.34 Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kangs conveyance in favor of
Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent