7. Brown-Araneta vs.

Araneta

To test the argument that a petition for certiorari is an absolutely prohibited pleading, let us push
the present case to its logical extreme.

What if a woman claiming to be a battered wife leaves one of her children with her parents and
another with a sibling of hers? She then went to another place, transferred residency, and filed a
petition for TPO. Her parents and sibling, who reside in another locality, likewise files a petition
for TPO in behalf of the grandchild and nephew/niece entrusted]in their custody. x x x What if
the family courts refuse consolidation? Is the man devoid of any remedy and would have to
spend his time shuttling between three (3) localities since a petition for certiorari is a prohibited
pleading?

What if the woman went to another locality purposely in order to find a friendly venue x x x?
Again, if we are to strictly construe Section22 (j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC that man would just
have to bear the consequences since he cannot seek the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Or, what
if both of the spouses do not reside within the courts jurisdiction, but the judge refuses to grant a
motion to dismiss due to his zeal? What remedy would a man have since he cannot resort to a
petition for certiorari?

FORUM shopping
Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping (1) whenever as a result of an
adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another; or (2) if, after he has filed a petition before the
Supreme Court, a party files another before the CA since in such case said party
deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular
remedy is sought is dismissed, another case(offering a similar remedy) would still
be open"; or (3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another
court after failing to obtain it from the original court.
MAY FORUM SHOPPING

The cases have identical parties

Clearly, the Petition for Custody and the Petition for Protection Order have the same parties who
represent the same interests. The fact that Avaand Ara, who are parties in the Petition for
Protection Order, are not impleaded in the Petition for Custody is of no moment because they are
precisely the very subjects of the Petition for Custody and their respective rights are represented
by their mother, Michelle. In a long line of cases on forum shopping, the Court has held that
absolute identity of the parties is not required, it being enough that there is substantial identity of
the parties40 or at least such parties represent the same interests in both actions. It does not matter,
as here, that in the Petition for Custody, Juan Ignacio is the petitioner and Michelle is the
respondent while in the Petition for Protection Order, their roles are reversed. That a party is the
petitioner in one case and at the same time, the respondent in the other case does not, without
more, remove the said cases from the ambit of the rules on forum shopping. So did the Court
hold, for example in First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, that forum shopping
exists even in cases like this where petitioners or plaintiffs in one case were impleaded as
respondents or defendants in another.41 Moreover, this Court has constantly held that the fact that
the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in
the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining
whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.42

The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for are based on the same facts

Further, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 08-023 are practically based
on the same facts and are so intertwined with that in SP. PROC. Case No. 6543, such that any
judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, will amount to
res judicata.

In the custody case, Juan Ignacio mainly asserted his right, as father, to visit his children and
enjoy joint custody over them. He prayed for a judgment granting him joint custody, or
alternatively, permanent visitation rights over Ava and Ara.

The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against

forum shopping is present in this case

The grave mischief sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping, i.e., the rendition
by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions, is well-nigh palpable in
this case. If the Muntinlupa RTC were to rule that Michelle was entitled to a Protection Order,
this would necessarily conflict with any order or decision from the Makati RTC granting Juan
Ignacio visitation rights over Ava and Ara. As aptly pointed out by Juan Ignacio in his Comment
such a conflict had already occurred, as the TPO issued by the Muntinlupa RTC actually
conflicted with the Orders issued by the Makati RTC granting Juan Ignacio temporary visitation
rights over his children. There now exists an Order from the Muntinlupa RTC which, among
others, directed Juan Ignacio to stay at least one (1) kilometer away from Ava and Ara, even as
the Makati RTC recognized, in two (2) separate Orders, that he had the right, albeit temporarily
to see his children.

8. Bolos vs. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400

NOT APPLICABLE

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15,
2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word
"marriages."

8. Bolos
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer;
and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of
the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial
proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.
WALANG NASUSUSPEEEND

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it.
Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the
issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate
courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of
the case because after it denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow
the husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when,
under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case,
Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the
extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to
file an answer.

Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first
for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court.
However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for
certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is
an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the
rendition of the judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating
that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent
from further proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary
restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to
present her evidence.

WALANG COLLUSION
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the court
order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report
to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties
and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in
his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion
within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for
pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-
trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the
required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested
that there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because
Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack
of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the
proceedings in the trial court:

WALA PA MUSLIM CODE THAT TIME

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. 50
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except
during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 51 which was not availed of during its
effectivity.
PEDE PAG CASE NG BIGAMY

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in
the following manner, viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages
and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have
a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to
the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is
unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.

it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and
cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply,
Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is
likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had
filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.
11. Fujiki

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

WHO MAY FILE

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.

FOR BIGAMY

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning,
is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is
a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

PEDE CORRECTION OF ENTRY PG CIVIL CASE

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses
and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and
the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction
of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A.
No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

11. ANDO

DI NAEXHAUST ADMIN REMEDIES

First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner
incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first
appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was
toquestion the DFAs refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husbands
name.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner
should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her
first husband.

In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like
any other fact.10

While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court
actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,11 we are still unable to grant the prayer of
petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on
record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce
decree under that national law.12 Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can
only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the
national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.

12. Quiao
CRIMPRO/ CIVPRO

In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,1[25] we clarified that to standardize the

appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, we held that it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.2[26]

In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule
40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on

2
petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.3[27] In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of
appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or
final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure
to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.

In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The
petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On
December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order
granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after
123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the
writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270
days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net
profits earned. From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to
question the RTCs Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner
never raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed.
Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts
decision has become final and executory. A judgment becomes final and executory
when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within
such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself
appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became final.4
Nd void judgment

4
 The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void
judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal
separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the
Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide,
among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and property
relations of the husband and wife or those living together.5[32] The Rule on Legal
Separation6[33] provides that the petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the
Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a
non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election
of the petitioner.7[34] In the instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside
in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to the date of filing of the
petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's petition
below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both
parties, considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes
were served upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein
petitioner filed his Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001. 8[35] Thus,
without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has
jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it

applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article
5

8
102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies
because there is no other provision under the Family Code
which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a
result of legal separation.
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or
when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.

Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the
property relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of
gains. And under this property relation, the husband and the wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work
or industry.9[56] The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the
conjugal partnership of gains.

WALANG NAVIOLATE NA VESTED RIGHT

Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the conjugal
partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children
pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?

We respond in the negative.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do

not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term

9
 vested right expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in
right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened
free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he
was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her.10[65] In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that
the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and
inventory of all the community properties of the parties.11[66] Second, when the
Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned
the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant
to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.12[67] Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.
CONJUGAL

(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and
of the wife shall be returned to each of them.13[84] In the instant case, since it was
already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties,14[85] there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties
above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs.15[86] However, since the trial court found the
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership

10

11

12

13

14

15
is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime,
nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime,
because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty
party's favor.