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Primer on R.A. 6557 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law:
Principles
A. Section 2, R.A. 6557
b. How does the Comprehensive Agrarian Law plan to achieve this end?
- To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due
regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the
ecological needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers and
farmworkers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the
quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands.
d. What are the principles that should guide the state in achieving this end?
- The State shall be guided by the principles that land has a social function
and land ownership has a social responsibility. Owners of agricultural
lands have the obligation to cultivate directly of through labor
administration the lands they own and thereby make the land productive.
C. The Issue of Constitutionality of the law (Re: Assoc. of Small Landowners in the
Philippines vs. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform)
Definitions
A. Agrarian Reform it is the redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced
to farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial
arrangement, to include the totality of factors and support services designed to lift the
economic status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical
redistribution of lands, such as production or profit-sharing, labor administration, and the
distribution of shares of stocks, which will allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of
the fruits of the lands they work.
C. Agricultural Land is a land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
E. Agricultural Tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by,
another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
G. Stock Distribution Option a mode of complying with the land reform law that did not
require actual transfer of the land to the tiller; that instead of subdividing haciendas and
distributing small lots to tenants or small farmers, shares of stocks are issued to
beneficiaries through a stock distribution plan.
Rules of Coverage
Who are the beneficiaries of the Act?
- Landless farmers, including agricultural lessees, tenants, as well as
regular, seasonal and other farmworkers. The Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) identifies and screens potential beneficiaries and validates
their qualifications. For example, to qualify, you must be at least 15 years
old, be a resident of the barangay where the land holding is located, and
own no more than 3 hectares of agricultural land.
d. Period for Compliance: If within TWO (2) YEARS from the approval of
CARL or from the approval of the PARC of the plan for stock distribution, the
stock transfer is not made or realized, the agricultural land shall be subject to
compulsory coverage of the CARL.
Primer on R.A. 9700 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with
Reforms:
FACTS:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions
of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in
Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted
that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the
operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-
beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose
actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects,
consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing
their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
ISSUE/s:
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation
(Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI)
November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on
May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA
scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs
be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
HELD:
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC,
et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of
Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court
thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified
FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY
directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative
agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said
decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this
score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted
from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority
stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011
decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the
benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given
the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the
resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot
and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The
majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave
violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,
which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is
constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this
should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from
subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco
that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of
the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily
result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders
its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per
FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper
distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform
laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with
which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been
acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial
Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the
government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court
however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare
converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21,
1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were
considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these
lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme
only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a
notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the
minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the
SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to
receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the
stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The
foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary
and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an
original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation.
The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has
NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell
their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate
of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued
to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the
agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed
the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform
would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to
persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain
control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court
noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the
holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely,
control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at
least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares
(590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85
shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares
needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]
Rosalinda Bonifacio et. al., v. Judge Dizon
G.R. No, 79416
FACTS:
Olimpio Bonifacio as the owner of a land which the private respondent, Pastora San
Miguel, was an agricultural lessee. On July 1, 1968, Olimpio filed a complaint seeking the
ejectment of private respondent from Bonifacios 2-hectare agricultural land. The CAR granted
the ejectment of Pastora San Miguel. On appeal by the private respondent, the CA modified the
judgement with respect to her counterclaim by ordering Olimpio to pay her in P1,376.00. Still
dissatisfied, private respondent sought relief to SC. During the pendency of the case, Olimpio
died andwas succeeded by his heirs. However, no notice of such death was given to the Court,
hence no order of substitution of his heirs was made. SC resolved to deny the petition of the
private respondent for lack of merit, SC affirmed the decision of CA. Subsequently, petitioners
(heirs of Olimpio) moved for the execution of the decision by RTC of Bulacan. The Deputy
Sheriff submitted his report stating in part that except for a portion thereof occupied by the
private respondent which the latter refused the vacate. Private respondent moved to quash the
execution. RTC held the decision of the sheriff to be null and void, and that the motion for
demolition was denied. Petitioners conteded that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion.
They assert that the CAR case, being an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Private
respondent, on the other hand, stress on the fact that the action is not an ordiary ejectment but an
agrarian case for the ejectment of the agricultural lessee.
ISSUE:
Won, the compulsory heirs inherit the favorable judgment obtained by the decedent,
thereby vesting to the former, all rights conferred by the judgment to the decedent.
RULING:
Petition is granted. SC reads Sec. 36 (1), R.A. 3844, which provides, for the continuation
in the enjoyment and possession of an agricultural lessee of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory. Under
such provision, the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the
landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate
family so desired. The right of cultivation was extended to the landowners immediate family
members evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was
(and still) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. Whether used in
reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term personal cultivation cannot b given
restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either the lessor or lessee. In
either case, the right extends to the members of the lessors or lessees immediate family. The
CAR case not being a purely personal right, the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and
successors-in-interest.
Spouses Pagtalunan vs. Honorable Dizon G.R. No. L-54281 March 19, 1990
FACTS:
Respondent Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for expropriation of a parcel of
land located in Bo. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, and owned by the Aldabas (as evidenced by a TCT
issued by the Register of Deeds of the province of Bulacan). The CFI issued a writ of possession
placing the Republic in possession of the land, upon its deposit of P7,200.00 as provisional value
of the land.Petitioners (sp. Pagtalunans) filed a supplemental motion for leave to intervene, with
complaint in intervention attached thereto, alleging that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has been the
bona fide agricultural tenant of a portion of the land. Petitioners asked the trial court to order
payment to Celso Pagtalunan of just compensation for his landholding or, in the alternative, to
order payment of his disturbance compensation as bona fide tenant in an amount not less than
P15,000.00 per hectare. December 8, 1978 Order: respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo denied
the petitioners' supplemental motion, holding that to admit petitioners' complaint in intervention
would be tantamount to allowing a person to sue the State without its consent since the claim for
disturbance compensation is a claim against the State. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was denied by respondent judge. Thus, the petitioners filed an instant
petition, which was denied for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
limiting the discussion on the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the expropriation
case. The Court granted the motion for reconsideration and gave due course to the petition.
December 22, 1978: The OSG (appealing from the portion of the December 8, 1978 decision of
the CFI which fixed the compensation for the land expropriated at P30.00 per square meter) filed
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines a notice of appeal and a first motion for extension of
30 days from January 12, 1979 within which to file record on appeal which was granted by
respondent court. Counsel for private respondents filed an objection to the public respondent's
record on appeal claiming that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. The CFI
dismissed the appeal interposed by the Republic. The OSG moved for reconsideration but this
was denied for lack of merit. The public respondent filed a petition for certiorari , prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the CFI orders. The CA
dismissed public respondent's petition. The public respondent filed a petition asking this Court to
annul the CA decision and to direct and compel the lower court to approve the Government's
record on appeal and to elevate the same to the CA. In a decision dated August 10, 1981, the
Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to approve the Government's record on
appeal and to elevate the same to the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners had the right to intervene in the expropriation proceedings
instituted by the State against the Aldabas (private respondents) as registered owners of the
subject property.
HELD:
Petition is denied for lack of merit. - Intervention is not a matter of right but may be
permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies
a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
an officer thereof. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent
and expectant.
The Court is fully aware that the phrase "deemed to be the owner" is used to describe
the grantee of a certificate of land transfer. But the import of such phrase must be construed
within the policy framework of Pres. Decree No. 27, and interpreted with the other stipulations
of the certificate issued pursuant to this decree. Pres. Decree No. 27 (Tenant Emancipation
Decree) recognized the necessity to encourage a more productive agricultural base of the
country's economy. To achieve this end, the decree laid down a system for the purchase by small
farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. A
careful study of the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 27, and the certificate of land transfer issued
to qualified farmers, will reveal that the transfer of ownership over these lands is subject to
particular terms and conditions the compliance with which is necessary in order that the grantees
can claim the right of absolute ownership over them.
Ramon A. Gonzales vs Land Bank of the Philippines and Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76759 March 22, 1990
FACTS:
On the strength of a Deed of Assignment executed on August 8, 1981 by Ramos Plantation
Company, Inc. (hereafter referred to as the corporation) through its president, Antonio Vic
Zulueta, assigning its rights under Land Transfer Claim No. 82-757 unto petitioner Ramon A.
Gonzales, the latter filed an action before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to compel public
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to issue Land Bank Bonds for the amount of
P400,000.00 in the name of petitioner instead of in the name of the aforesaid corporation as the
original and registered owner of the property which had been brought under the land transfer
program of the government.
Defendant corporation was declared in default for failure to file its answer within the
reglementary period while defendant Land Bank filed an answer alleging that the complaint
states no cause of action since there is no privity of contract between plaintiff and itself and that
it deals only with the landowner whose land was subjected to operation land transfer of the
government under Presidential Decree No. 27 in order to save time and effort in ascertaining the
identities of additional claimants.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Land Bank can be compelled to issue Land Bank bonds in the name
of petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment executed by the landowner-assignor Ramos
Plantation Company, Inc. in favor of petitioner.
HELD:
However, petitioner relying on the provisions of Article 1311 of the Civil Code, 8
maintains that by virtue of said deed, he stepped into the shoes of his assignor and acquired all
the rights of the latter and it was error on the part of the appellate court to find that the aforesaid
Deed of Assignment is not effective to authorize the Land Bank of the Philippines to issue the
Land Bank Bonds in the name of petitioner upon compliance with the remaining six (6)
requirements for the first release thereof. The act of assignment could not operate to erase liens
or restrictions burdening the right assigned. The assignee cannot, after all, acquire a greater right
than that pertaining to the assignor.
This Court is in total agreement with respondent appellate court's finding that it must be
the Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. which should comply with all the requirements imposed by
respondent bank to effect the release of payments under land transfer claims because of the
restriction that the bonds will only be released in the name of the landowner-assignor corporation
which may thereafter indorse the same to petitioner. In fact, in the decision of the trial court,
Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. was directed to comply with the six (6) requirements 12 listed in
paragraph 1 of the Supplemental Stipulation of Facts dated September 10, 1985. Since no appeal
was taken by Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. from said decision, said directive has become
final and executory.
Talavera vs. Laxamana
GR. 77830
Facts:
Jose Laxamana instituted an action for recovery of possession on July 10, 1984 against the
petitioners over a parcel of land located in Brgy. Sto. Domingo 11, Sition Tambo, Capas Tarlac.
Private respondent alleged that he had been a bonafide tenant of the said land since 1958. He had
been in continuous possession of the said land until the petitioners took possession of it and
planted palay without private respondents knowledge and through force and intimidation. The
private respondent suffered damages amounting to P500.00 and the price equivalent to sixty-five
cavans of palay per agricultural year. In the petitioners defence, they stated that the taking of the
private respondents possession was in accordance with their Casunduan executed on March
30, 1973 and that he was not actually a tenant of the petitioners. The document states that private
respondent sold his rights and interests over the property for a consideration of P1, 000.00. The
Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of the private respondent to which the petitioners appealed
in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision that the
Casunduan did not constitute valid surrender of the land contemplated under the law.
Issue: Whether or not the surrender of the land by the private respondent constitutes valid
surrender contemplated by the law
Held:
No, the surrender did not constitute a valid surrender as contemplated by the law. The
Decision of the RTC and the CA is affirmed. Under the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 3844) Section 8, agricultural leasehold shall only be extinguished based
on the following grounds: 1. Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor; 2. Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written
notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or 3. Absence of the person under
Section rune to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.
Voluntary surrender does not require any court authorization since it involves the tenants own
volition however, it must be shown that the surrender was voluntary through convincing and
sufficiently proved evidence. It cannot be presumed nor implied otherwise, the right of the tenant
to security of tenure becomes illusory one. It was shown that the Casunduan was prepared by
petitioner Visitacion Talavera and that Jose Laxamana, at the time the Casunduan was made,
needed money for his wifes illness which later caused her death. Laxamana could also hardly
sign his own name. Laxamana also continued working on the land until 1984 even after the
Casunduan was made while the Talaveras claimed that they cultivated the land themselves.
Exhibits presented as evidence showed that Talaveras did not cultivate the land and actually
resides in another barangay. The circumstances showed that Laxamana was forced to sign the
Casunduan without fully understanding it and continued cultivating the land after.