LAWYERS DUTY TO SOCIETY

Lee vs Tambago, 544 SCRA 393, February 12, 2008

FACTS: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation
of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be
spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and
two other witnesses, which were also questioned for the unnotated Residence Certificates that
are known to be a copy of their respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such, the contested will
was executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence
Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was never submitted for filing to the
Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for
Culture and Arts (NCAA). Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely
given because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due
regards to the provision of existing law and had complied with elementary formalities in the
performance of his duties and that the complaint was filed simply to harass him based on the
result of a criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper. However, he did
not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of NCAA. In resolution, the
court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with modification
against the respondent and in favor of the complainant.

ISSUE: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal
Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament?

HELD: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of professional misconduct
as he violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01nof the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil Code and provision of the Notarial
Law. Thus, Atty. Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one year and his Notarial
commission revoked. In addition, because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of
him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified from
reappointments as a Notary Public.
In Re: Diosdado Gutierrez

5 SCRA 661 Legal Ethics Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment

FACTS: Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in
1956. He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of
the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the
condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a
disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted
pardon.

HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted
his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his
conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was
actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use
of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged
from the profession.

Cabildo vs Judge Navarro

54 SCRA 26 Legal Ethics Client May Enter Into Compromise Agreement Independent
of Counsel Quantum Meruit

FACTS: The Northcotts, represented by Robert Northcott, were the owners of the Dungon-
Dungon Estate in Ilocos Norte. Due to their failure to pay taxes, their land were sold to the Ilocos
Norte Coconut Producers Association, Inc. in a public auction held by Provincial Treasurer Pedro
Cabildo. The Northcotts later exercised their right of redemption but the same were opposed by
INCPA. The Northcotts then filed a civil case against INCPA. Judge Navarro initially ruled against
the Northcotts but later reversed his decision based on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the Northcotts. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court and this time the Northcotts
were represented by Atty. San Jose with an arrangement of a 60% contingent fee of whatever
properties Atty. San Jose may recover for the Northcotts.

But while the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the Northcotts entered into a
compromise agreement with INCPA whereby the two agreed to 1.) drop the pending case, 2.)
donate the land in question to the Province of Ilocos Norte except 14 hectares thereof where they
will have 7 hectares each of the remaining 14 hectares.

Atty. San Jose then filed a Manifestation indicating that the donation and the compromise
agreement entered into by his client was meant to defraud him of his attorneys fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. San Jose is correct.

HELD: No. Atty. San Joses prior arrangement for attorneys fees does not render the compromise
agreement infirm and the same is not an obstacle to the validity and approval by the court of the
compromise agreement for a client has an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the
intervention of his lawyer. However, since it is not disputed that Atty. San Jose had rendered legal
services (although short of recovery by the Northcotts of any property) as stipulated in the
retainer contract, and the non-recovery may in the very least be partially attributable to the
Northcotts entering into the compromise agreement, it is but fair and just that Atty. San Jose be
compensated for his services on a quantum meruit basis and, to assure the payment thereof,
that a lien be constituted in favor of Atty. San Jose on the 7 hectares retained by the Northcotts
under the deed of donation, without prejudice to the immediate effectivity of the compromise
agreement.

People of the Philippines vs Rosqueta Jr. et al

55 SCRA 486 Legal Ethics Duty of Counsel to His Client Failure of Client to Raise
Funds for Appeal

FACTS: Rosqueta Jr and two others were convicted of a crime. They appeal their conviction until
it reached the Supreme Court. Their lawyer (counsel de parte), Atty. Gregorio Estacio, failed to
file their Brief. And so the Supreme Court ordered Atty. Estacio to show cause why he should not
be disciplined for failure to file said Brief. Atty. Estacio failed yet again to submit his explanation.
The Supreme Court then suspended him from the practice of law except for the purpose of filing
the Brief in this particular case. Atty. Estacio then filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he
explained that he did actually prepare an explanation the same being left with Rosqueta Sr
(father of accused) for the latter to mail it. But then Rosqueta Sr.s house burned down together
with the explanation. He only came to know of this fact when he was preparing for the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Atty. Estacio also explained that his clients are withdrawing their appeal by reason of their failure
to raise the needed fund for the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Estacios suspension should continue.

HELD:No. His liability is mitigated. But the Supreme Court noted that Atty. Estacio has been
irresponsible, has been negligent and inattentive to his duty to his clients. Atty. Estacio should be
aware that even in those cases where counsel de parte is unable to secure from his clients or
from their near relatives the amount necessary to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily
conclude his connection with the case. He should be aware that in the pursuance of the duty
owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot be too casual and unconcerned about the filing
of pleadings. It is not enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly mailed.
Such inattention as shown in this case is inexcusable.

Felisa De Roy vs Court of Appeals

 157 SCRA 757 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application of Laws Publication of
Laws Publication of Supreme Court Decisions in the Official Gazette

FACTS: The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed
the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the death
of Bernals daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but that she was
ignored.

In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roys counsel filed a
motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the case of
Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because said
ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding.

HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law
journals.

Generoso Trieste, Sr. vs Sandiganbayan

145 SCRA 508 Legal Ethics Prosecutor Must Recommend Dismissal of Case If There
is No Ground To Sustain It

FACTS: Trieste was the mayor of Numancia, Aklan. In 1980, during his term, the Municipality of
Numancia purchased construction materials from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation. Trieste was allegedly the president of said corporation. Trieste was then sued for
allegedly violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly for wilfully and unlawfully
having financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with
which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited
by law from having any interest.

Trieste, in defense, said that he already divested his interest from the corporation when he took
his office as mayor; that he sold his shares to his sister; he presented evidence to that effect. The
Solicitor General doubted said sale because it was not registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Further, the advertisement of Trigen in the local rotary club shows that Trieste is the
president of the corporation.

In time, the old Sol-Gen was replaced by a new one. The new Sol-Gen gave credit to the
arguments presented by Trieste as it recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground that
Trieste did divest his interest from the corporation by virtue of his selling his shares to his sister;
that said sale cannot be doubted simply because it was not reported to the SEC; that sales of
stocks are not required to be reported in the SEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation of the Solicitor General is correct.

HELD: Yes. The Solicitor General is well within his rights to make such recommendation. A public
prosecutor should not hesitate to recommend to the court the accuseds acquittal if the evidence
in his possession shows that the accused is innocent. If on appeal by the accused from a
conviction by the trial court he finds no legal basis to sustain the conviction, he should not also
hesitate to recommend that the accused be acquitted.

LAWYERS DUTY TO SOCIETY

Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio Angeles

 A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000

FACTS: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others in a civil case.
Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP
50,000 from one of the defendants in the case as partial fulfillment of the judgement against the
latter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told his clients of the amount he had received and never
remitted the same to him, leaving them to discover such fact on their own. Rivera and his co-
plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angeles.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Angeles is guilty of malpractice

HELD: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act amounted to
serious misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good
moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot be
denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of a
lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be
exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There
should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of
his own lawyer. For deceit in dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles was suspended from the
practice of law for 1 year.

A.C. No. 3910 June 28, 2001

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.

On August 14, 2000, a Decision was rendered by this Court in the above-entitled case, finding
respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. guilty of gross misconduct. The dispositive portion of the
Court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross
misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent
Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the
latter's TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from
receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his
disbarment.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

From the afore-quoted Decision respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. seeks this reconsideration.

The finding of guilt for gross misconduct was based on the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon whom the case was
referred for investigation. We again quote the said findings for emphasis:

Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and
candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the
Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent
failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the complainant and his witness which can impel
them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony
of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission's full faith and credence.
Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he
considered himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose
Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.

FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly,
respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to
him the said property unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a Special
Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has
vigorously denied having given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too
difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property.

SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property,
whether gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable
that he would consider himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or
oral "giving" of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have
said that.

THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and Exh. "A-2" for the
complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon
and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared
allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose
Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a
falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the signature over
the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being
a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wife's
signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale
of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to
substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of
note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which
denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.

FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. "2" for the respondent and Exh. "A-3"
for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the
subject property (which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is
likewise of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having
executed said document. He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr.
whom he does not know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe
to the document; and that he has never received the amount of P450,000.00 representing the
consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that there was
no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the document only to make it
appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer,
respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the
document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his
defense.1

We remain convinced that respondent was remiss in his duty to abide by his sworn oath as a
member of the bar to "do no falsehood nor consent to its commission"2 and further violated the
mandate of his profession to "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."3

In the instant case, after a review of the records, we note that this is the first and only
administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Villalon in his long career as a member of the
bar. At one time, he was even the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Manila 1
Chapter, and as such he introduced various programs to uphold the confidence of the public in
the integrity of the legal profession and to uplift the welfare of his brethren. Furthermore, it
appears that as of July 8, 1997, respondent Atty. Villalon already returned to the complainant
himself the owner's duplicate of the subject TCT No. M-3023 and the complainant acknowledged
receipt4 thereof, thus there is a need to delete the directive to deliver the said TCT from the
Court's Decision. Hence, we agree to reduce the penalty imposed on respondent Atty. Villalon.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and MODIFIES the
Decision dated August 14, 2000 in that respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS only with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. The directive in the Decision
to deliver TCT No. M-3023 to complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. is DELETED, the delivery thereof having
been accomplished as of July 8, 1997.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and
as a member of the Integrated Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez

FACTS: DIAO was admitted to the Bar. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications. Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from
the roll of attorneys. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:

1. Did not complete his high school training

2. Never attended Quisumbing College
3. Never obtained a diploma.

DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he
entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma
Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious:
i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.
ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949

He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his

school records.

ISSUE: WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing
pre-law requirements? NO.

HELD: STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS
LAWYERS DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS.
Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable. Had his application disclosed his having
obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949,
thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:
a. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).
b. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations
c. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked.
Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking
the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
Cordova vs Cordova
179 SCRA 680 Legal Ethics Moral Delinquency

FACTS: In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to Salvacion Delizo and with
two children, left his wife and children to cohabit with another married woman. In 1986,
Salvacion and Cordova had a reconciliation where Cordova promised to leave his mistress.
But apparently, Cordova still continued to cheat on her wife as apparently, Cordova again
lived with another woman and worse, he took one of his children with him and hid the child
away from Salvacion.

In 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Cordova. Eventually,

multiple hearing dates were sent but no hearing took place because neither party appeared.
In 1989, Salvacion sent a telegraphic message to the Commission on Bar Discipline intimating
that she and her husband has reconciled. The Commission, since Salvacion failed to submit
her evidence ex parte, merely recommended the reprimand and admonishment of Cordova.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely reprimanded.

 HELD: No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence that he has been
morally reformed and that there was true reconciliation between him and his wife. Before a
person can be admitted to the bar, one requirement is that he possesses good moral
character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition
for membership in the Bar in good standing. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of
a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery
of the inviolable social institution or marriage such was the case in the case at bar.
ARCIGA vs MANIWANG
106 SCRA 591 Legal Ethics Gross Immoral Conduct

FACTS: In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then
a medical technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga
got pregnant. The two then went to Arcigas hometown to tell the latters parent about the
pregnancy. They also made Arcigas parents believe that they were already married but they
would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams.
Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license.

In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with
Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married another
woman. Arciga confronted Maniwangs wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted physical
injuries upon Arciga.

Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct.
Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arcigas child; that he did promise to marry Arciga
many times; that he broke those promises because of Arcigas shady past because apparently
Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwangs case is different from the cases of Mortel
vs Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwangs refusal to marry
Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion
was provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state
with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has
been defined as that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
VILLASANTA April 30, 1957
In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality,
vs.
HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent.

G.R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case originated from a
criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan by the complainant against the
respondent for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the respondent was
found guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The appeal by
certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was dismissed for lack of merit.

The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar candidate, from being
admitted to the bar. The basic facts are the same as those found by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
On April 16, 1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or
before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal
knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which
was then a blank document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document
was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and
the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and
the respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on
a religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was
performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the
production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After the
ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and wife and lived with some
friends. The complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously married to
someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for
immorality in this court..

Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this Court is of the
opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral
turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in making love
to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality.

Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby
declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar. So ordered.

A.C. No. 195 January 31, 1958

In re: Attorney JESUS T. QUIAMBAO, respondent.
Jose G. Gatchalian and Santiago F. Alidio for respondent.

On 17 May 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. No. 11104-R, Pedro R.
Peralta, plaintiff appellee vs. Jesus T. Quiambao, defendant-appellant, affirming that of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (case No. 1783) and transmitted the record of the case to this Court for
whatever action it may deem proper, to take against Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao for having
committed acts unbecoming a member of the Ba.

It appears that sometime in January 1949 Manuel Quiambao, an agent of the Yek Tong Lin Fire &
Marine Insurance Company offered for sale to Pedro R. Peralta a parcel of land located in barrio
Moriones, Tarlac, Tarlac containing an area of 44 hectares for P15,000. Peralta accepted the offer,
and on 7 February 1949 he opened a checking account with the Tarlac branch of the Philippines
National Bank by depositing therewith the sum of P11,000. With a cheek of P11,000 drawn upon
the bank in Manila, Peralta and Manuel Quiambao proceeded to Manila and contacted Attorney
Jesus T. Quiambao, brother of Manuel, at his house to seek his help in the purchase of the parcel
of land. On 9 February Peralta and the two brothers cashed the check at the bank in Escolta and
repaired to the law office of Honesto K. Bausa, attorney for the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine
Insurance Company, at the Regina building, where upon reaching the door Peralta handed to
Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao the sum of P11,000. Attorney Quiambao went inside the office of
Attorney Bausa, where he stayed for about an hour, leaving Peralta at the door waiting for him.
As he emerged from the law office, Attorney Quiambao told Peralta to wait for a while because
"they will place your name in the title," and later on executed a document (Exhibit A),
acknowledging receipt from Peralta of the sum of P12,000 to kept by the former as attorney-in-
fact of the latter pending issuance of the title to the parcel of land. The receipt acknowledges the
sum of P12,000, because Peralta had given Attorney Quiambao the sum of P1,000 as earnest
money. Days passed and as Peralta d not receive the title to the period of land, he went to the
office of the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company to inquire to the parcel of land had
already been issued in his name and there he learned from the bookkeeper of the company that
the title had not yet been issued in his name. He then demanded the return of the sum of
P12,000 from Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao b the later failed to return it to him.

Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao does not deny having received the sum of P12,000 from Peralta, but
claims that the same had been returned to him be installments through his brother Manuel
Quiambao, who was Peralta's friend, and in whose house Peralta and his family lived; that he
gave Attorney Bausa the sum of P500 as earnest money when they went to see hi that the
balance of P12,000 was left in his custody; that Peralta was authorized to take possession of the
property and make improvements on it pending actual transfer to him; that the balance of
P11,500 in his (Attorney Quiambao's) custody was withdrawn from him by brother Manuel by
authority of Peralta; that the first withdrawal in the sum of P3,000 was made sometime in the
first week of March 1949, the second in the sum of P4,000 in April 1949, the third in the sum of
P3,000 or P2,000 on or about the 24th of May, 1949, and the last for the balance of the sum,
paid by his wife, sometime in June 1949; that he and his wife did not ask any receipt for all the
withdrawals; that all these sums were spent to build an earth dam in the parcel of land, to hire a
bulldozer, to buy seedlings, and to construct houses for 28 tenants, except the sum of P4,000,
withdrawn by Manuel Quiambao by way of loan from Peralta, which the former promised to pay
to the latter as soon as he would secure a loan from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation; that
on 10 March 1950, a document (Exhibit 1) was signed by Jesus T. Quiambao, Pedro R. Peralta and
Manuel Quiambao reciting, among others, that the sum of P12,000 in the custody of Attorney
Quiambao was periodically withdrawn from him by Manuel Quiambao at the behest and/or with
the knowledge and consent of Pedro R. Peralta; and that on that same day Pedro R. Peralta
executed another document (Exhibit 2) releasing Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao from liability for the
sum of P12,00 entrusted to him. It recites
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I should collect the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS, (P12,000.00) from
Mr. Manuel Quiambao, from the proceeds of the sale of his property, as satisfaction of the money
receipted by Mr. Jesus T. Quiambao and withdrawn from him with my knowledge and consent.

This is made in order to secure the realization of said sum from Mr. Manuel Quiambao exclusively.

Manila, March 10, 1950

(Sgd.) PEDRO PERALTA

The Court of Appeals is of the opinion that Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao engineered the whole
scheme to induce, through his brother Manuel, Pedro R. Peralta to purchase the parcel of land in
question, knowing fully well that it was not for sale because the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine
Insurance Company was just a mortgagee and not in a position to sell it. In that way succeeded
in taking from Peralta the sum of P12,000 which he appropriated for his own use and benefit;
that he fraudulently and maliciously induced Peralta to sign the document marked Exhibit 1,
thereby relieving him from the obligation of paying the said sum to Peralta and at the same time
caused the latter to execute another document marked Exhibit 2 where Peralta undertook to
collect from Manuel Quiambao the whole sum of P12,00.

The respondent attorney was required by this Court to answer the charges against him. In his
answer he set up the same defenses he had set up in case No. 17837 of Court of First Instance of
Rizal and CA-G.R. No. 11104-R of the Court of Appeals which were overruled by the two Court.

By his acts the respondent has shown that he is unworthy to continue as a member of the Bar.
He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
Rosa Yap-Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras [A.C. No. 4947. February 14, 2005]

FACTS: Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus Paras-
Sumabong namely Conegunda, Justo, Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all surnamed Paras
executed a Special Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent to sell parcels of land located
in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority to their mother to sell the subject real
properties previously registered in the name of the heirs of Vicente Paras wherein respondent
was one of the signatories therein.

Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power of Attorney,
Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Aurora Dy-Yap over the
subject real property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental which was with the
respondents full knowledge since he was residing at the house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time
and from that time, the Yap family had been in possession of the subject real property up to the
present.Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was called to the fact that
a free patent title to the aforesaid property was issued in respondents name and upon
verification with the DENR, Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant was able to get
copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585 pertaining to the Notice of Application for
Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by the respondent; over the aforesaid lots previously sold
by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D. Yap; Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest
Over Real Property executed by Ledesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application
dated April 2, 1985 signed by respondent under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized officer to
administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio Tan dated June 4, 1985 and Order of
Approval dated August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free
Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J. Paras.

Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by the respondent without
her knowledge and consent and those acts of deceit, machinations and falsification of documents
were deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by the respondent in violation of Art. 172
in relation to Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal of his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously
obtained a free patent title over real properties which had been previously sold by his own
mother to Aurora D. Yap and now still under the control and possession of complainants natural
family, a fact respondent allegedly withheld from the Bureau of Lands which he had full
knowledge in successfully causing the release of a free patent in his name and unjustly and
unlawfully deprived the rightful owners of their legitimate title to the said property in betrayal of
the court to pervert the administration of justice in gross violation of his oath of office.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may be suspended for violating the Canons of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD: The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession as the bar should always maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing among its members. By and large, a lawyer can
do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. In the instant case, it is clear
to the Court that respondent violated his lawyers oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the courts, the
obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court. Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the
Bar and an officer of the court in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the
properties in issue despite his knowledge that the same had already been sold by his mother to
complainants sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed before
this Court when he alleged that the said properties were public land under the Forestal Zone
when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of entire occupancy of
the Parases. Moreover, respondent committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free
patent over the said properties when he manifested under oath that he had been in the actual
possession and occupation of the said lands despite the fact that these were continuously in the
possession and occupation of complainants family, as evidenced no less by respondents own
statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.

Idonah Slade Perkins vs Eugene Arthur Perkins

57 Phil 223 Legal Ethics Use of Improper Language

FACTS: This is just one of the several cases between Idonah and Eugene. Idonah and Eugene are
husband and wife. Idonah sued Eugene for support. The case eventually reached the Supreme
Court where the counsel for Eugene in his Brief used heated and acrimonious tone in remarking
about the actions of the trial judge who handled the case subject of appeal. (Said remarks were
not specified in the SCRA).

ISSUE: Whether or not such remarks are proper.

HELD: No. The use of excessive language weakens rather than strengthens the persuasive force
of legal reasoning. The same is not conducive to the orderly and proper administration of justice.
The Supreme Court stated that lawyers should desist from such practices, and to treat their
opposing attorneys, and the judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely to
their contentions with that courtesy all have a right to expect.

In Re: Clemente Soriano

Legal Ethics Lawyers Negligence

Atty. Clemente Soriano entered his appearance in the case Peoples Homesite vs Mencias and
Tiburcio et al. He sought to represent Marcelino Tiburcio. The odd thing is that, when he entered
his appearance before the Supreme Court, the case has long been decided by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court then directed Atty. Soriano to show cause why he should not be
subjected to disciplinary actions.
Atty. Soriano, in his defense, stated that he merely relied on the assurance made by one Atty.
Dalangpan who assured him that the case is still pending with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Soriano should be suspended.

HELD: No. But he is severely censured. The only reason why hes not suspended is that he
exhibited candor before the Supreme Court in acknowledging his mistake. He has been negligent
in his duty and this violates his duty to be diligent on his responsibility to his client. He should
have checked with the former lawyer of Tiburcio as to the status of the case. If not, he could
have simply checked with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court instead of relying upon the
assurances of Atty. Dalangpan (who even denied before the Supreme Court that he made such
assurances).

Camacho vs. Pangulayan

FACTS: PANGULAYAN INDICTED FOR VIOLATION OF CANON 9: Lawyer should not communicate
upon subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake
to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. Lawyer
must avoid everything that may tend to mislead party not represented by counsel and should not
advise him as to law. HIRED LAWYER OF DEFENDANTS who had compromised agreements with
CAMACHOS CLIENTS. Required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against
AMACC (principal defendant) and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings
filed against it.

a. Denied that they had negotiations, discussion, formulation or execution.

b. No longer connected with Pagulayan and Associates Law Offices.

c. Re-Admission Agreements nothing to do with DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE involving 9

students of AMACC.

Civil case involved publishing of features or articles in Editorial Board of DATALINE. Found guilty
by Student Disciplinary Tribunal of using indecent language and unauthorized use of student
publication funds. Expulsion. Students appeal and was denied by the AMACC President which
gave rise to civil case. During civil case, apology letters and Re-Admission Agreements were
separately executed by some expelled students.

ISSUE: Does the Re-Admission Agreements have nothing to do with DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE
involving 9 students of AMACC?

HELD: 3 MONTHS SUSPENSION AND DISMISSAL OF CASE AGAINST OTHER RESPONDENTS THAT
DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE NEGOTIATION.

Individual letters and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized in which PANGULAYAN was
already counsel of AMACC. Had full knowledge; did not discuss it with the students parents or
their counsel. Re-Admission Agreements affected the dismissal of the civil case because
signatories agreed to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings against AMACC.

People vs de luna et al GR 10236-48

FACTS: vOreste Arellano y Rodriguez.Pedro B. Ayuda.Alawadin I. Bandon.Roque J.

Briones.Abraham C. Calaguas. Balbino P. Fajardo.Claro C. Gofredo.Estela R. Gordo.Generoso H.
Hubilla.Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.Angelo T. Lopez.Eustacio de Luna. Jaime P. Marco.Santos L.
Parina.Florencio P. Sugarol, andMaria Velez y Estrellas -took an oath as a lawyer even though
they did not pass the bar exams.

HELD:
It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gefredo, and Sugarol, have not passed
the examinations, it was resolved:
A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriate action in
connection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64;

B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10days from
notice thereof, within which to explain why he should not be dealt with for contempt of the
Court;

C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegally administered
the oath to the said persons in disregard of this Court's resolution denying them admission
to the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause
why he should not be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law;

D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court of Appeals and
to all courts of first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service
Commission, and the Department of Justice;

E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in their respective
cases.

(pp. 36-37, rec., G.R. No. L-10245.)It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not
intend to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by
appellees herein and that we preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal
of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no jurisdiction over the
cases at the bar.
AMALGAMATED LABORERS ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M. JAVIER for himself and as
General
President, ATTY. JOSE UR. CARBONELL, ET.AL.(petitioners) vs. CIR and ATTY.
LEONARDO C.FERNANDEZ (respondent)GR No. L-23467 March 27, 1968FA
CTS:
FACTS: Amalgamated Laborers Association won a case of unfair labor practice against
Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom). Upon motion of the complainants, CIR sent
the Chief Examiner to go to Biscom and compute the back wages. Total net back wages
amounted to P79,755.22. Appeals were made against this decision. In the interim, Atty. Leonardo
C. Fernandez (herein respondent), in the same case, filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien over the
amount to be awarded. He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for the said
case since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court in
Appeal, as chief counsel. He claimed that the labourers have voluntarily agreed to give him as
attorneys fees on contingent basis 25% of the award. He further averred that this is already a
discounted fee out of the plea of the unions president to reduce it from 30% for them to also
satisfy Atty. Jose Ur Carbonell. Meanwhile, CIR decided the appeals still in favour of the
petitioners and ordered Biscom to deposit the amount representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the
cashier of the court to be awarded and granted to Atty. Fernandez. Atty. Carbonell and
ALA appealed from the decision contending that 1) CIR is bereft of jurisdiction to adjudicate
contractual disputes over attorneys fees averring that a dispute arising from contracts for
attorneys fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIRs
authority and to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may
validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said courts
jurisdiction; 2) the award of 25% as attorneys fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and
illegal. This and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
ISSUE: Is 25% of the award a reasonable attorneys fee?

HELD:Yes. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of 25%
attorneys fees reasonably compensates the whole legal services rendered in the case. This must
however be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty. Fernandez. After all, they
are the counsel of record of the complainants. Though common effort is presumed, the rightful
shares of both must be ascertained. As such, the case has been remanded to the CIR for the sole
determination of shares.

OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS:

Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns the arrangement wherein union presidents should share in
the attorneys fees. No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer,
based upon a division of service and responsibility. The union president is not the attorney for the
labourers. He may seek compensation only as union president.
 A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in as
uit should be reasonable under all circumstances of the case, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.

Tan Tek Beng vs Atty. Timoteo David

126 SCRA 389 Legal Ethics Malpractice Solicitation of Cases

FACTS: In 1970, Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, entered into an agreement whereby
Tan Tek Beng will supply clients to Atty. David and in exchange thereof, Atty. David shall give Tan
Tek Beng 50% of the attorneys fees collected as the latters commission. Atty. David also agreed
not to deal with clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng directly without the latters consent. The
agreement went sour due to allegations of double-cross from both sides. Tan Tek Beng
denounced Atty. David before the Supreme Court but did not seek the enforcement of their
agreement.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. David is guilty of Malpractice.

HELD: Yes. The agreement between Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.
Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term malpractice.

That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional.

On the agreement to divide the attorneys fees, the Supreme Court noted: No division of fees for
legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility.

On the agreement that Atty. David shall not deal with clients supplied by Beng directly: The
professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency,
personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyers responsibilities
and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his
duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyers relation to his client should be
personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . .

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA, March 23, 1929

FACTS: Atty. Tagorda, in his card written in Spanish and Ilocano, noted his capability as a lawyer
such as executing a deed of sale, collection of loans, etc. Also, in his letter addressed to a
lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality, he also advertised his profession as a lawyer and
even asked a favor to disseminate this information to the barrio people in any of their meetings
or social gatherings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the advertisement of Atty. Tagorda through the card and letter is wrong
and be punished.

HELD: Yes. The acts of Atty Tagorda of direct and indirect advertising and stirring up litigation
were violative of the Code of Ethics. Still, the most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.

It becomes the duty of the court to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of
solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the
standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise
peacefully inclined citizens.

The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the
bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his
intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future.
Atty. Tagorda is suspended for one month.

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME SYCIP, SALAZAR,

FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.

July 30, 1979

FACTS: Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May
5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976,
praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of
partners who had passed away.

Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partners name in a professional firms name; there is no custom or
usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name
of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.

ISSUE: WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the
partners who already passed away in the name of the firm?
HELD: NO

In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:

The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners
from their firm name.

The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages
and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have
to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm,
can initially ride on that old firms reputation established by deceased partners.

The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:

A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association
for a particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property. Thus, it has been stated that the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.

We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute
the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Petition
suffers legal and ethical impediment.

Mercedes Cobb-Perez and Damaso Perez vs Judge Gregorio Lantin

24 SCRA 219 Legal Ethics Counsels Assertiveness

FACTS: A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latters failure to
pay a debt of P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff was
to conduct a public sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k. This was opposed by
Damaso as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the amount of the debt. Judge
Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he amended his earlier decision and so he issued
a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale on Damasos 210 shares of
stock approximately worth P17k.

Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the
public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that the petition
of the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous petitions for injunction are
contemplated for delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost
of the suit but said cost should be paid by their counsels. The counsels now appeal said decision
by the Supreme Court as they claimed that such decision reflected adversely against their
professionalism; that If there was delay, it was because petitioners counsel happened to be
more assertive . . . a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.

HELD: No. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyers insistence
despite the patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel
to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or
lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden
duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to
litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable.

LAWYERS DUTY TO THE COURTS

Eduardo Berenguer vs. Pedro Carranza, 26 SCRA 210

FACTS: A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July 15, 1966, for
deception practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of the falsity of an
Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer executed by the mother of his client to the effect that her
own mother left no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except herself,
when, as a matter of fact, the deceased was survived by four other daughters and one son,
father of the complainant, he introduced the same in evidence.

Repondents Answer: [Respondent's] failure to notice the existence of an incorrect statement in

the said affidavit was a mere oversight. It was not [wilful], for he has not consented to the doing
of the falsity therein made, since the same was prepared by petitioner's lawyer in Pasay City; nor
did [respondent] willingly do falsehood in the hearing mentioned above; ...
Solicitor General: Respondent's failure to read the affidavit proves that he did not properly inform
himself of the evidence he was going to present in court, thereby exhibiting an indifference to
proof inconsistent with facts he definitely knows. Thus, respondent has contributed to confusion
and the prolongation of the cadastral suit, which pends as a petition for Relief...."
It was the recommendation that the corresponding complaint for the violation of his oath against
respondent be instituted. Respondent's failure to discharge his duties as a lawyer consistent with
his oath of office finds sanction in Rule 138, Section 27, Revised Rules of Court."
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Carranza should be held responsible of the said falsehood
committed in court
HELD: YES. Respondent was reprimanded. Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest
through oversight or inadvertence, the way he conducts his case or the evidence he presents
could conceivably result in a failure of justice. Time and time again, lawyers have been
admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients
the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict
accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned.
Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in this case, betrays
inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a charge thereafter
instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not willful and that he has not
consented to the doing of the falsity.
A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost seriousness; it must not be taken lightly. Every
lawyer must do his best to live up to it. There would be a failure of justice if courts cannot rely on
the submission as well as the representations made by lawyers, insofar as the presentation of
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is concerned. If, as unfortunately happened in this case,
even without any intent on the part of a member of the bar to mislead the court, such deplorable
event did occur, he must not be allowed to escape the responsibility that justly attaches to a
conduct far from impeccable.

Santa Pangan vs Atty. Dionisio Ramos

93 SCRA 87 Legal Ethics Lack of Candor by a Lawyer Proper name to be used by a

lawyer

FACTS: In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio
Ramos was delayed because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the
records of the said case was checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that he
used the name Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use
such name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos. D.D.
stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mothers surname. However, in the roll of
attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.

ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.

HELD: No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name
other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath
obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of
justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In
representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of Dionisio D. Ramos,
respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The Supreme Court
hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar infraction will warrant
suspension or disbarment.

Atty. Manuel Macias vs Atty. Benjamin Malig

September 3, 2012 No comments

157 SCRA 762 Legal Ethics Mutual Bickering Between Lawyers

FACTS: Atty. Macias was the counsel of Spouses Valdes for at least 20 years. Spouses Valdes was
wealthy couple owning certain properties and corporations. There were still pending cases
against the spouses and their properties when they died. Their adopted daughter, Rosario Llora
sought to continue said cases but she intimated to Macias that she would like him to withdraw as
their counsel and that he be replaced by Atty. Malig. Atty. Macias then filed a motion in the
testate proceedings involving the properties of the late Valdes where he asked for the payment
of legal services that he had been performing for the late spouses. Llora through Atty. Malig
opposed the said motion arguing among others that what Atty. Macias is asking for fees is too
much. Llora then asked for a meeting with Macias where she said shell withdraw their opposition
to his Motion if Macias shall withdraw from all pending cases hes handling which involve
properties of the late Valdes and that Macias shall give her P10k. Macias complied so he signed a
waiver and issued a check in the amount of P10k. But Macias changed his mind and so he filed a
civil case for damages against Llora. He also filed a disbarment case against Atty. Malig where he
accused the latter of representing Llora while Macias was still the familys family representative;
that Malig extorted P10k from Macias; that he induced Llora to disposed of their properties which
have pending cases in order to evade attorney fees which were due Macias. Malig filed a
counterclaim in the disbarment case where he accused Macias of filing in bad faith a civil case
against Llora; that Macias made unethical representation of Llora; Malig also accused Macias as a
denizen of a jungle who prey[s] upon his brother lawyer [and] his [own] clients and likened
him to a baneful snake biting the hand of the client who fed him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of both counsels should be given credit.

HELD: No. Both their allegations against each other are baseless. HOWEVER, both should be
given disciplinary sanctions for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court. Both
are too eager to throw baseless accusations against each other. On the part of Macias for
instance, hes too eager to accuse Malig of extorting money from him (the P10k asked from him
by Llora) when in fact said money was asked in consideration of Lloras withdrawal of her
opposition to Macias Motion in the testate proceedings. On the part of Malig, his use of tactless
language against Macias is deplorable. Each party here has shown himself to be too ready to
believe the other is guilty of serious misconduct in the practice of the profession to which they
both belong while vehemently asserting his own good faith. Each attorney here was too prone to
use intemperate and offensive language in describing the professional behavior of the other.

The court however noted that Macias has been subjected to previous administrative complaints
because of his use of improper and unethical language where he was severely reprimanded
hence his punishment is more severe than Malig this time around. Macias is suspended for three
months while Malig is fined P5,000.00.

Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez

June 25, 2012 1 comment

166 SCRA 316 Legal Ethics Contemptuous Language Duty of a Lawyer

FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who
was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and
Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Zaldivar.

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against
Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one
on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the
rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult
for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered
Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true;
that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the
Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even
attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask
him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call
for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily
imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements
constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly
debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of
Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide.
In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the
Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case. The Supreme Court
suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

Judge Luis De Leon vs Atty. Jose Torres

September 16, 2012 No comments

99 Phil 463 Legal Ethics Duty to Respect Court Orders

FACTS: In 1953, Atty. Jose Torres sent a telegram to Judge Luis De Leon where he threatened
that if the judge wont lift his order of arrest, he shall file criminal, civil and administrative
charges against him. Judge De Leon then issued an order requiring Atty. Torres to show cause
why he should not be disciplined. Torres did not appear but instead he evaded arrest and went to
Manila. Judge De Leon then decreed an order suspending Torres from the practice of law until
otherwise ruled upon by the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding this order, Torres still practiced law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct of Atty. Torres is proper.

HELD: No. He openly defied a lawful order of the court. It must be impressed upon all lawyers
that court orders, even though erroneous, must be respected, especially by the bar or the
lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. Court orders are to be respected not because
the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration
that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the Government to which they
belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system. Torres was suspended for
three months.