International Fraternity Vs National Power

International Fraternity vs.
National Power: A Contradiction in the Communist World

Author(s): Peter Mayer
Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Apr., 1966), pp. 193-209
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International Fraternity vs. National Power:
A Contradiction in the Communist World
Peter Mayer
T HEofSino-Soviet dispute
the 1962-1963 Congresses entered
of the national its present phase at the time
Communist
Parties. Then the esoteric struggle among the international
parties was replaced by direct confrontation, referred to by Com-
munists as the "open polemics." The present article will examine
some of the causal factors in the changing relationships between
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist
Party of China, as these have found expression in the Sino-Soviet
dispute.
Before 1961, scholars hesitated to accept a conflict model as a
working hypothesis for the study of interstate Communist relations.
Early proponents of such a thesis were showered with gentle ridi-
cule. Since the period of "open polemics" the pendulum has swung
in the opposite direction. The first major study of conflict within
the Communist camp1 established the conflict thesis by a method
of careful contextual analysis. By 1962 it was no longer possible
to ignore the fissiparous tendencies within the international move-
ment. Now the number of interpretations regarding the motiva-
tions and explanations of the Sino-Soviet rift are almost as numer-
ous as the individual authorities. While there is general agreement
respecting the specific points of difference between the parties,
assessments of the relative importance vary greatly.
In one sense the struggle is ideological. Nevertheless, those who
find in ideological differences the major explanation for the present
split2 have not made a persuasive case. More in keeping with the
facts is the "power struggle" thesis,3 which posits that the Com-
munists are locked in a struggle for control of the international
movement, and ultimately the world. Yet the thesis seems untenable
in anything but the most tentative manner. More sophisticated
1 Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton,
1962).
20Only the most eminent will be cited: Wolfgang Leonhard, "A World
in Disarray," Problems of Communism, XIII (no. 2, 1964), 16-26; and
Richard Loewenthal, World Communism (New York, 1964).
8 Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York, 1963); Harry Schwartz,
Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars (Philadelphia, 1964).
193
194 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
accounts4 discuss the points of contention

Communist powers - nationalism, strateg
policies, role conceptualization, and the
draw (usually) limited and tentative conclu
It is perhaps too early to attempt a de
causes of a rift that has generated so much
of the rift are ineluctable, the failure of th
at an acceptable solution, in spite of sustain
the breakdown has not been primarily poli
Thus an examination of some pertinent org
factors that led to the present impasse ma
Neither theory nor ideological precepts co
pared Communist leaders for the current b
have poisoned Communist interstate and
tions as well. Marxist-Leninist theory pr
understanding of the political-social forces
era. It viewed the Communist world, at
irreconcilable conflict with the Western Powers. There has been
no evidence to suggest that the model has been updated. The
ideology still claims such concepts as class, color, and particularly
nationalism, to be applicable to pre-Communist societies only. One
of the inherent difficulties here is that the theories lack precise
definition. The fury of the Kremlin, expressed in comments on
the current Chinese policy aimed to exclude the Soviets from par-
ticipation in Afro-Asian internal affairs, and openly based on racial
appeals, can only be comprehended through the teachings of the
proletarian ideology, based on a raceless class structure.
This is not to claim that real differences, based on the present
view within each society, do not exist. They do, and they are im-
portant to an understanding of the dispute itself. The main areas
of disagreement can probably be limited to four: economic, mili-
tary, atomic, and territorial.5 A catalog of issues involved in these
4David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (London, 1964); William E.

Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass., 1964); and Robert C.
North, Moscow and Chinese Communists (2nd ed., Stanford, 1963).
5The documentation of the dispute is most readily accessible in the
following: G. F. Hudson, R. Loewenthal, R. MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet
Dispute (New York, 1961); Floyd, op. cit.; Griffith, op. cit., and Albania and
the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, 1963); and Alexander Dallin, Diversity in
International Communism. A Documentary Record, 1961-1963. (New York,
1963).
INTERNATIONAL FRATERNITY vs. NATIONAL POWER 195
four areas should lead to a greater comprehension of som

major divisive forces within the Communist Bloc.
1. Territorial: Much of the Russo-Chinese border is "unde-
marcated" on Chinese maps. Territory now under Soviet ju
diction had been ceded to Tsarist Russia by a decaying Chin
empire within the past one hundred years. The People's Rep
of China has demanded its eventual return. It should be no
however, that Chinese irredentist claims are not of an immedia
pressing nature. If a settlement is not urgent at present, the te
torial issue does impinge on two vital areas of Soviet intere
First, and most obvious, the old Chinese lands have been in
porated into the Soviet Union. The Soviets cannot, even sh
they so desire, relinquish these without losing prestige and stan
within the international Communist movement. Second, the Chi
claims impinge upon the Kremlin's expressed desire for rev
tionary universality. While the Communist Party of China, at l
for the present, claims only those lands which had been un
Chinese suzerainty in the past, the Communist Party of the S
Union is less parochial. It claims the entire world for commun
2. Military: During the early phase of the revolution t
Chinese army was consciously molded on Soviet lines. Imit
was the order of the day, especially during, and for some y
after, the Korean War. Equipment and military advisors w
obtained from the Soviet Union. This period coincided with
of rapid industrialization. Indications suggest that the Peop
Republic of China relied on Soviet military supplies fo
war machine. The withdrawal of Soviet technicians in 1960-
1961 coincided with a severe curtailment of both economic and
military assistance. Peking was thus forced to face the implic
tions of a political reality largely of its own making. The Sovi
Union served notice that it would not assume responsibility, und
the terms of the 1950 Agreements, to defend the People
Republic of China in case of enemy attack resulting from Chines
adventurism abroad. At the same time the flow of war material
from the Soviet Union was either cut off completely, or reduced
to a trickle. Heavy industry, except as it impinged on war pro
duction, had to be severely curtailed. Withdrawal of Soviet eco
nomic and military aid meant that the Communist Party of Chin
faced internal economic chaos on a broad front. The abrupt notice
by the Kremlin left Peking no choice but to retrench-or rather,
to retool. The most spectacular achieveme

atomic breakthrough. But the price p
terms of the people's living standards.
forced Peking to look inward, to build th
the world through China's own unaided
3. Atomic: The usual difficulty respe
sources is compounded by their scarci
Chinese have charged the Soviets with "
dreds of treaties,"6 and reneging on t
People's Republic of China's atomic develo
ern experts are of the opinion that the p
for Chinese support in their internal difficu
group" in 1957 included the promise to su
land with atomic information and weapon
Khrushchev group felt itself firmly entre
the People's Republic was flexing its in
Kremlin withdrew its previously pledged
the Soviets were not at all prepared to ris
the issue of Taiwan. Neither were the
Chinese aggression against India in 19
atomic, and economic relations clashed
tional interests, and served to convince t
the Soviet Union of the necessity to isola
of China's role inside the international Communist movement. The
December 15, 1964, abortive Consultative Conference was to result
in the isolation of Peking, to reduce its influence within the inter-
national movement. The attempt to achieve Soviet aims was carried
out on three fronts: geographic, ideological, and military-economic.
4. Economic: The best single indicator of stresses and strains
within the alliance can probably be found in the Soviet-Chinese
economic relationship. While no accurate quantitative measure-
ments can be established, an accurate working hypothesis would be
that when the volume of such relations is increasing, the political
climate is favorable; when decreasing, the Party-States experience
mutual difficulties. In that sense the economic relationship serves
6 Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, "The Origin and Development of the Differ-
ences Between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves. Comment on
the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.," (Peking, 1963),
I, 32. The series numbers ten, and will be referred to henceforth as "Com-
ment," followed by the appropriate numeral.
7 Ibid., p. 26.
as a political indicator. The original Sino-Soviet Agreement

initialled in February, 1950, after more than three month
level negotiations. Although the Agreements witnessed
instance of Soviet aid (in the form of low-interest loan
other country, and thus reversed the postwar practice of
tions," the Moscow negotiations were not entirely satisfac
the Chinese. Such a conclusion is indicated both by the len
discussions, and by the relatively small sum (in relation to
need) advanced. Indications are that Peking expected te
the actual loan of 300 million United States dollars.8
Soviet "aid" to China was increased rather markedly on several
occasions after the death of Stalin. These satisfied neither Peking'
requirements nor expectations. Beginning in 1956 the Chines
proceeded, with a caution soon to be abandoned, to prod the Soviets
along two lines: markedly to step up aid to the People's Republi
of China's industrialization-modernization program, and to allow
greater weight to the Chinese point of view in international mat-
ters. In the event the two categories proved self-enforcing. After
the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians from China, earlier claims
respecting Chinese self-sufficiency proved deceptive. By that tim
the prestige of the regime itself had become identified with the
industrialization of the Chinese mainland, which had perforce to
be postponed beyond the immediate future.
The Soviets claim that the dispute began with the publication
in the People's Republic of China of the Long Live Leninism
pamphlet.9 The Chinese have established a much earlier date:
Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" to the Twentieth Congress of th
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.1o0 Strictly speaking neither
statement is accurate. International disputes of such intensity are
not generated by the publication of articles or speeches. The sub-
jects with which they deal is an entirely different matter. But in
both cases the dispute was claimed to be caused by publication, an
not by the revelations they contained.
These international disputes in the Communist world hav
8 The treaty is reproduced in the Appendixes of Peter Mayer, Sino-Sovie
Relations Since the Death of Stalin (Hong Kong, 1962).
S "The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to Party
Organizations and all Communists of the Soviet Union," translated from
Pravda, July 14, 1963, London, Soviet Booklet no. 114, 1963, p. 7; Long Live
Leninism (Peking, 1960).
To Reprinted in The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism
(New York, 1957).
erupted, although Communist theory assum

nal, Communist unity-without divulging
be attained. There is no provision for an
handle the embarrassing quarrels which h
comrades. The most flagrant culprit so
the dilemma has existed in other places an
political history of Communism.
The lack of an organizational council, to
ences could be referred for final arbitrat
Were institutional machinery for conflict
lished-all indications are contrary-it m
similar to that of the United States Supre
system: the "balancer" of political coequ
lishment would presume a degree of consen
in the Communist world. The Communist
to participate in conferences deemed to b
tional movement. Meanwhile Peking con
Soviet support among the world's "fratern
"greatest splitter"?
At this point a more meaningful (and
intrudes. Both Chinese and Soviet stateme
tial. Usually phrased as appeals to "unit
placed on the area of the dispute. Such a c
foremost, the cessation of the "open polem
plead for "unity"-on their own terms.
goal has escaped them. After the middl
open polemics did indeed revert to their ea
They were resumed by the Chinese as well
note of protest sent to the People's Rep
lated throughout the Soviet Union.12 Both
statements, are not at all anxious to fol
threatens the very existence of the intern
ment itself. Then why perpetuate the p
Contemporary Communist statements s
cially, the conflict among the world's Com
place within a larger "co-operative" fr
model" for relations among Communist sta
11 For example, N.S. Khrushchev, "Speech" (
Socialist Unity Party of Germany), Berlin, Jan
"I to X," supra.
12 Pravda, March 13, 1965, p. 3; Peking Review no. 13, 1965.
This makes for an impossible situation. Both sides agree th

putes among the Party-States must be settled in accordanc
the procedures laid down in the 1960 "Statement." The per
passage reads as follows:
The Communist and Workers' Parties hold meetings

ever necessary to discuss urgent problems, to exchange expe
to acquaint themselves with each other's views and p
work out common views through consultations and co-o
joint actions in the struggle for common goals.
Whenever a Party wants to clear up questions relating
activities of another fraternal Party, its leadership app
the leadership of the Party concerned; if necessary, th
meetings and consultations.13
Both sides continually quote the "Statement" when it su

purpose, but ignore it when it contravenes their respectiv
tions. The Chinese, but not the Soviets, have publicly
as much.14
The 1957 and 1960 Conferences, the postponed meeting
Consultative Assembly of the Parties, originally scheduled
cember 15, 1964, have demonstrated the difficulty face
international parties in their quest for consensus. The one
of direct Sino-Soviet bargaining, the Lenin Hills meeting
1963, proved completely abortive. These experiences tend
gest that "meetings and consultations" designed to "exchang
are a poor substitute for organizational cohesion. The four
ings serve to emphasize the essential lack of an organization
work without which a coherent policy for international Com
will continue to prove utterly elusive.
Khrushchev's "separate paths to socialism," propoun
time of extreme crisis both inside the Soviet Union and t
munist camp, opened the floodgates of heterodoxy within
ment whose doctrinal views were still based on monolithic
doxy. The two main positions were most clearly propounde
the Stalin-Trotsky power struggle. It certainly is "no
(as the Soviets would say) that the various positional view
the disputants are referred to as either "Stalinist" or "Tro
18 "Statement," p. 30.
14 For example, "Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.C
to the Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. dated J
1964," Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1964, p. 10.
Thus the present-day polemics have their

aspects of Marxian thought, which lie
itself. Yet as long as the Communist P
retained control over the international m
dencies could be kept in check.
The lack of international Party control
practices and policies of the past, when
sole Communist state, was not faced wi
cising control within parties whose politi
derived from indigenous sources. Stalin,
a Great Russian by inclination, used the m
Soviet Union during the 1930's to rule the
the Second World War. "Permanent Rev
all-pervasive purges, held the populace
built through the instrument of terror-
or the European Socialists, was preclud
a degree never before approximated anyw
time of war. The system was held toge
vozhd. And being personal, it did not s
While domestic Soviet policy followed t
revolution, its foreign policy was based
One Country." The importance of that fa
relationships can hardly be overstated.
experience of forcing the separate nationa
of Union Republics was disregarded. T
suggestion that Yugoslavia be incorpora
as a Union Republic.15 The same consider
Federation Scheme to be vetoed. The Part
as individual entities, each subservient to
no broader cooperation could take place, e
Yugoslav "break" in 1948, the relations
and its satellites was maintained on a st
emergence of Communist interstate un
those circumstances. No attempt was mad
policy until late 1956. By that time th
unpopular decisions by Kremlin fiat wa
were the appeals to unity; but the politic
Yet if the appeals to unity were genuin
15 See M.M. Drachkovitch, "Yugoslavia," in Bromke (ed.), The Com-

munist States at the Crossroads '(New York, 1965), p. 254, n.l.
to suggest that they were not, then the centrifugal forces

in the Party-States, such as differences in industrial-agric
development, historic enmities, cultural heritage, education
tunities, and the like, would have to be brought under
And such control, in the present context of Communist in
tional politics, is out of the question.
The rather peculiar fact is that Communist internat
ganizations have functioned only during periods when the
almost by definition, redundant. The Comintern was disba
precisely the moment when, at least in altered form, it mi
served the purpose of keeping the non-Soviet Party-States
This would suggest that, rather than submit to some form
sensus, the Kremlin decided to impose its will on the inte
Party-States. The price paid was fragmentation. An institu
ized system of Party-States would have to be based on som
of majority rule, a concept with which Communists ha
been comfortable. From Lenin to the present such concep
been based on "democratic centralism" and the "dictato
the proletariat." Both were conducive to effective supervi
the Party elite.
All questions of the Comintern's raison d'etre were laid
in 1920 with the publication of the "Twenty-one Theses
mission." The international parties were forced to accept t
ganizational and ideological leadership of the Russian Co
Party. And the greatest emphasis was placed on organ
conformity.16 The last is of the utmost importance. The r
that organizational control is more important than policy
ment came as early as 1903. Yet allegiance, during th
which ended in 1928, was to the organizational principl
Comintern, as these were decreed by the Kremlin, and no
Soviet organization. That distinction was conveniently f
by Stalin. He used the Comintern, when it was not ign
enforce the will of the Kremlin upon the national Parties
senting Communist Parties were broken, and leaders pliab
will of the Soviet Union installed. The expelled factions, e
16 U.S. House of Representatitives, Committee on Un-American A

The Communist Conspiracy, Part I, Section C, pp. 40-44. House Report,
no. 2242, 84th Congress, 2nd session (1956). See especially the second of the
twenty-one "theses."
17Franz Borkenau, World Communism (Ann Arbor, 1962); Ruth Fischer,
Stalin and German Communism (Cambridge, 1948).
these comprised a majority of the "comrad

Only Moscow could fill the Party coffers.
The end of the Comintern coincided with Stalin's view that the
organization had outlived its usefulness. The Western nations de-
sired closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. The West, espe-
cially the United States, had viewed the Comintern as a fomenter
of international strife. Its demise was heralded as a gesture of
good will. Yet only four years later the Cominform was founded.
The very title, Communist Information Bureau, differentiates it
from its predecessor. In spite of the loss of both power and prestige,
the Comintern had been the political organ of world Communism.
The Cominform was used mainly to keep the Kremlin au courant
with the affairs of its satellites. For one brief moment, during the
Soviet-Yugoslav confrontation in 1948, it appeared as though the
Cominform could become the instrument of the Kremlin's aggres-
sive policies. But saner councils prevailed, and the Cominform
reverted to its earlier information gathering and intelligence
functions.
If the organizational substance had departed, it was hardly
missed. Stalinist measures"s ensured the cohesiveness of the Com-
munist camp by other means. The death of Stalin in 1953 loosened
these bonds, but did not destroy them. The Soviet leaders, however,
were too preoccupied with internal problems to pay the necessary
attention to the affairs of the Communist camp. Events in Poland
and Hungary, October-November, 1956, reversed the picture.
Somewhat earlier Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" provided his oppo-
nents with an issue around which to muster their forces. Further,
by attacking the "cult of the individual," Khrushchev was in effect
denigrating Mao. This was no doubt purely unintentional. But
the Secret Speech contained the seeds of the ideological terminology
in which part of the later dispute was to be clothed.
Only in this last sense did ideology become an important factor
in the dispute. In the Sino-Soviet polemics, the differences within
the Communist camp wear the mask of ideology and the mask hides
concrete issues. Ideological differences did not become apparent
until 1959-60, when state, but especially Party relations, had been
strained over economic-military issues. As long as the Chinese had
cause to believe that the Soviet Union would continue to under-
Is I am indebted to the brilliant discussion in Zbigniew Brzezinski, The

Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (rev. ed., New York, 1961).
write the mainland's modernization-industrialization progr

discussion remained esoteric, and the differences were not p
to intrude upon the political realm. Once diversity had
reality, the political organs to limit its effects were lacki
The issues of Yugoslavia and "revisionism"'9 are the
indicators of the new trend. Serious difficulties arose within the
Communist alliance once that question was linked to the "separate
paths to socialism" doctrine. The discussion thereupon turned t
Communist tactics in the present era of development. Once debated
in those terms, the dispute ceased to be "ideological." Instead i
became political, and ideological preconceptions were used to re
inforce, to give legitimacy to, the positions of the disputants. Ideol
ogy then served to deepen the conflict. Compared to the Western
world, where ideologies are weaker, and not "scripturalized," Com-
munist ideologies are cogently expressed, and the texts (but not the
interpretations) are identical.
The dispute coincided with the revolt of the "anti-party group"
in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev was forced to manipulate, t
bend the political system into new shapes. He also needed to look
for all possible allies to support his course among the fraterna
Parties, and especially the Party-States. The result was an extension
of the "separate roads to socialism" doctrine. The events of 195
and 1957, considered in conjunction with the absence of organiza-
tional unity, dismantled the last vestiges of "monolithic cohesion"
in the Communist camp. Communism, in fact if not in theory
was being established on national bases.
The Polish and Czech refusals to join the Marshall Plan illus
trate the earlier relationships within the Communist camp. Both
countries had evinced a strong desire to participate. Both wer
reluctant to renounce United States aid-but both did so at Stalin's
behest. There simply was no question of further participation onc
the vozhd had spoken. No organization was needed to enforce the
Kremlin's will. Such a situation no longer exists. The erstwhile
satellites now make their own political decisions, within the per-
missible framework established by the Polish and Hungarian revo-
lutions. The Kremlin's fiat no longer extends beyond the boun-
daries of the Soviet Union. The exceptions are questions deemed
vital to the Soviet state interest, such as defection from the camp
itself.
19 "Statement of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties" (New York, 1961),
p. 29.
These developments were viewed with tr

by the Kremlin. The control of the inter
slipping from its grasp. The theory-practi
splintered by political events. Communis
continues to insist, that the theory of interna
recognizes but one correct road toward the
world Communist society. The Sino-Soviet d
ened to leave both structure and concept
had to be met, from the Soviet viewpoint,
And, political measures having failed, ec
applied.
Multilateral East European cooperation, established in Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance in 1949, was extended through
further Warsaw Pact commitments in 1955. The earlier almost
purely military aspects of the treaty were changed to provide th
framework for future economic organization. The divergenc
which came to the attention of the Kremlin early the followi
year led to measures designed to bind the East European countrie
closer together, thus cementing ties with the Soviet Union. Thes
steps amounted to Soviet loss of hegemony within the non-Europe
Communist nations, as well as in Albania. The projected "Socialist
Commonwealth" aimed to "build the socialist world economy as a
single entity."2'0 But the intent of the Khrushchev pamphlet, th
result of a meeting of the Central Committee of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, June, 1962, was to limit the int
gration effort to Europe.21 Further, the political means for imple
mentation did not exceed those mentioned in the "Statement."22
The Council was to be limited to economic functions and to be
without political efficacy.23
At this stage communism lost its internal cohesion. In spi
of meetings and congresses, communications and exhortations, t
unity of the international Communist movement was shattered.
was no longer possible to discuss Communist international affair
as taking place under the aegis of a single organizational rubr
20 N. S. Khrushchev, "Vital Questions of the Development of the Social

World System" (Moscow, 1962), p. 22.
21 Such a conclusion seems inescapable; see "Programme of the Commu
nist Party of the Soviet Union," in The Road to Communism (Moscow, 196
pp. 445-634.
22 See n. 14.
23 "Vital Questions," p. 40.
Yet this is precisely the tenor of present-day Communist

Reality and dogma are growing ever further apart. As lon
a situation continues, no solution to the present debate is
The following pages will chronicle the amazing feat of a
perpetual motion while standing perfectly still. The earlier
changed to a monologue as both Parties exhorted the f
close ranks. In this situation the Soviets exerted whatever
were available to them to ensure the cooperation of their E
pean allies. But the means of welding the camp into a
economic framework, which would then "grow together"
political entity,24 proved elusive. Resistance to the pla
obviously involved Soviet domination without countervaili
because of the People's Republic of China's exclusion, enco
total opposition by smaller Party-States afraid of perman
gation to the status of secondary, mainly agricultural, st
Communist discussion took place on the usual esoteric
its intent was unmistakable. Togliatti's "polycentrism" ha
way to fissiparous tendencies amounting to centrifugal re
The problems debated during the first meeting of the
States in 1957 had little bearing on the shifting political
within the Communist empire. These necessitated a new m
of the Parties in 1960. Meeting in Moscow, the 81 "Co
and Workers' Parties" adopted a compromise program to
future Communist behavior. One aspect concerned th
lationships between the now no longer "fraternal" states.
tion advanced proved worse than useless. Differences whi
arise between the Parties were to be resolved either by t
munist Parties directly involved, through bilateral con
or, if important enough, a new meeting of the internati
munist movement was to take place. Both instances,
depend on the willingness of the Party-States to part
such discussions. Yet the Lenin Hills (Moscow) Conferen
1963, and the later Consultative Conference attended b
ties in Moscow, March 1-5, 1965, testify to the failure of
"Statement." Lacking enforcement organs, differences w
Communist movement can only be discussed, far less
when the major Communist powers agree to come to the
24Pravda, January 7, 1963, p. 1.

25 Palmiro Togliatti, "9 Domande sullo Stalinismo," Nuovi Argo
20, June 16, 1956, in The Anti-Stalin Campaign, pp. 138-39.
ence table. The two developments should disp

regarding the efficacy of the measure. As lo
parties remain as deeply divided on the basic
content and organization, the present impass
The dichotomy within the international m
cally underscored during the Twenty-Second
munist Party of the Soviet Union, October, 1
New Party Program. The point has often
Program makes virtually no mention of Chin
its first part, more than fifty pages, is devot
to the future of world Communism. Less tha
international meeting of the Parties, the Sov
tures contained in the "Statement" declarin
the "main danger"27 to the internal cohesion
Communist movement. Yet the clause again
the minimal price extracted by the Comm
for continued adherence to the leadership
Party of the Soviet Union. Instead, the Kr
"secondary" danger, "dogmatism and sectaria
for Chinese concepts), as the potentially g
In subsequent pronouncements the latter dis
Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation entered a s
phase. If "communist legality" is considered t
the Soviets acted in an illegal manner:
The Communist Parties unanimously con

variety of opportunism.... The Yugoslav rev
versive work against the socialist camp. .
of an extra-bloc policy, they engage in acti
the unity of all the peace-loving forces an
exposure of the leaders of Yugoslav revisionist
to safeguard the Communist movement an
movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the
remain an essential task of the Marxist-Leninist Parties.29
The publication of the "Program" ushered in the second stage

of the dispute. Peking attacked the Communist Party of the Sovie
26 Herbert Ritvo, The New Society. Final Text (with comments) of the
Program of the C.P.S.U. (New York, 1962).
27 "Statement of 81 Cornmunist and Workers' Parties," p. 29.
28 The Road to Communism, pp. 488-89.
29 "Statement of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties," p. 29.
Union through rhetoric directed against Yugoslavs, and

responded in the same vein in polemics ostensibly leveled a
Albania. Such indirection is not synonymous with direct id
cation. Albania and Yugoslavia could represent, but not
the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Th
for the future rapprochement was kept open as long as nei
the two major disputants became directly identified in the p
Chou En-lai's walkout from the Congress over the A
issue30 indicated that the period of esoteric polemics w
brief. The various Party Congresses in 1962 and 1963 u
in the present period of open polemics. These were given f
pression at the Berlin Congress in January, 1963. The
question of strategy and tactics in the contemporary perio
terically discussed during the second stage, was now brough
the open. The publication of Ulbricht's and Khrushchev
constituted a direct attack on the Chinese. Once these differences
were mooted in the press, escalation of the dispute, as well a
specific differences, could no longer be contained. Both sides aired
their views with a vengeance. Each recitation of "grievances"
brought a rebuttal - and more charges.31 The specific differences
were lost in the crescendo of dispute.
The deeper the morass in which the dispute mired, the louder
became the protestation of "unity." Neither side was willing t
renounce its most deeply cherished interests. The Soviets, however,
were to make one more attempt to unify the movement or, failing
that, to return the open polemics to the esoteric realm of the Party
journals. Discussed on the level of ideas, rather than of action,
the differences between the two Party-States could be debated in
a more reasonable manner and the ever-present and increasing
danger of a rupture within the international movement would be
avoided. Then it might even be possible to close the rift in various
countries, for example, Belgium, Brazil, and India, where the
Communist Party had performed as protozoa, and split into "Rus-
sian" and "Chinese" factions. The attempt proved abortive.
Khrushchev, in spite of an irrevocable threat by the Commu-
nist Party of China to secede from the international movement and
30 See Chou En-lai, reprinted in Floyd '(Appendix), op. cit., pp. 316-17.
31 Particularly on the part of the Chinese. The first of their "Comments"
consists of cogent charges against the Soviets. Subsequent "Comments,"
however, are much more general, broader, inconsistent-and vituperative.
found a new international,32 had sched

lected Parties to draft the agenda for
world's Communist Parties. Both sides we
to withdraw. Internal events, particul
Soviet First Secretary from office, gave t
treat. All subsequent concessions were ma
no noticeable reciprocity on the part o
exception: both sides agreed, in the "perio
frain from "open polemics." Student de
against Soviet "acquiescence" in the war
short period of truce.
The preliminary Communist Parties' me
March 1, 1965. Of the invited 26 Parties
to nothing was decided: The agenda ha
China and her allies boycotted the conf
published in Pravda33 made it abundant
to the dilemma was in sight. Neverthel
tacked the meeting with invectives not u
Khrushchev.34 The one concession the S
make (and we are here admittedly "rea
was to risk a direct confrontation with the United States. The
concessions offered on the ideological (and perhaps military-eco
nomic) front were contemptuously rejected by the Chinese. Th
price was total acceptance of the Peking "line."
The reasons for Chinese intransigence are perhaps not too d
ficult to indicate. The contents of Khrushchev's "Secret Spee
the cancellation of the 1957 atomic development pact only
years later, Soviet reluctance to entangle their state power
test of strength over the issue of Taiwan, and the withdrawal
all Soviet technicians from the Chinese mainland by 1961, m
have convinced the already skeptical Chinese leaders of the absol
necessity of "going it alone." Out of such necessity they perfor
made a virtue. But the virtue demanded a fanatical devotion to
national reconstruction. Only by continual exhortations to e
greater efforts can the present (and still inadequate) pace
maintained. But unlike Stalin's Russia, where industrial constru
32 "Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. in Reply to the Le

of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. dated July 30, 1964" (Peking,
1964), pp. 4-7.
33 March 6, 1965, p. 1.
34 Peking Review, no. 13, 1965, pp. 7 ff., and no. 14, 1965, p. 27.
tion was achieved through the use of unrestrained ter

Chinese Communists have opted for the methods of p
backed by social ostracism, which in turn masks force, t
their ends.
The major aims of the Moscow and Peking regime
longer compatible. The Soviet Union seeks limited
abroad, and further economic development at home. The
regime demands that national revolutionary cohesion be m
The tools chosen for the task have been threefold: 1. To
threat of foreign enemies, as exemplified by the Unit
Chiang presence on Taiwan (and now the war in V
American "imperialism," and aggressive Indian hostility,
in the consciousness of its people. 2. The promise of al
the form of "wars of liberation," with the underprivileg
of the world, particularly in Asia and Africa. To achieve
more struggle is required. 3. The "mistaken policies" of t
in the Kremlin have made Peking's lonely road necessary
the purity of the revolution may remain pristine. Th
common meeting ground between the two positions.
The lack of cohesion in the present Communist wor
traced to Stalin's "Socialism in One Country," which ha
in the atomized isolation of the individual Communist states.
Khrushchev's "Separate Paths to Socialism" only carried the
dition one step further. The Leninist principle, Lenin's guid
light and greatest aim, "Organization, organization, and still m
organization," has been deposited in the "trashcan of histor
One wonders how previous generations of Socialists and Bolshev
would have viewed the dispute. Perhaps with greater tolera
than does the present. After all, such disputations were not exac
alien to them.

International Fraternity Vs National Power

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International Fraternity vs.

National Power: A Contradiction in the Communist World

Cambridge University Press, University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of

accounts4 discuss the points of contention

4David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (London, 1964); William E.

four areas should lead to a greater comprehension of som

to retool. The most spectacular achieveme

as a political indicator. The original Sino-Soviet Agreement

erupted, although Communist theory assum

This makes for an impossible situation. Both sides agree th

The Communist and Workers' Parties hold meetings

Both sides continually quote the "Statement" when it su

Thus the present-day polemics have their

15 See M.M. Drachkovitch, "Yugoslavia," in Bromke (ed.), The Com-

to suggest that they were not, then the centrifugal forces

16 U.S. House of Representatitives, Committee on Un-American A

these comprised a majority of the "comrad

Is I am indebted to the brilliant discussion in Zbigniew Brzezinski, The

write the mainland's modernization-industrialization progr

These developments were viewed with tr

20 N. S. Khrushchev, "Vital Questions of the Development of the Social

Yet this is precisely the tenor of present-day Communist

24Pravda, January 7, 1963, p. 1.

ence table. The two developments should disp

The Communist Parties unanimously con

The publication of the "Program" ushered in the second stage

Union through rhetoric directed against Yugoslavs, and

found a new international,32 had sched

32 "Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. in Reply to the Le

tion was achieved through the use of unrestrained ter

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