CALO, MICHAEL JOHN T.

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: State Principles and Policies

Citation: Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649)

Facts:

Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming

Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to
morals, public policy and order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a right
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the
Manila Cit governments right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the local
governments right to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.

Issue:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.

Ruling:

1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent

right to impose taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to
tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having
been passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax.

The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed

that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress, which has the
power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general
legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over the
Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to
tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.

2. The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling, has long
been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National
Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the power to
issue license or permits for the operation of gambling.

3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National

Government. PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the
National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the
category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is
exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened,
impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government.

4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution
will be violated by P.D. No. 1869.

Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines
and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy
on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local government.

SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to

impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress
may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state.

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

Topic: State Principles

Citation: ARTURO TOLENTINO AND ARTURO MOJICA VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH RECTO AND SENATOR GREGORIO
HONASAN
G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004

Facts: Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-

President of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed
Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special
election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14,
2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June
30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC
proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators
to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full
term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked
13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed
the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution
No. 01-005.

Issue: Whether or not the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be
nullified: (1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and (2) for
not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Held: (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special
election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the
happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of
notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a
nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the
failure to give notice of the special election is whether want of notice has
resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the
result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial
number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to
fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.

(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the
COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a
nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates
and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such
requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2
of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if necessary, and
state among others, the office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special

election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by
the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution
as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by
which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled.
However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to
amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial
cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for
the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

Topic: Adherence to International Law

Citation: Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Facts:

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese

Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was
charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He
questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War
Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He
contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on
Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of
crimes not based on law, national and international.

ISSUE: Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality
of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts

the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of
the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of
planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution
Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the
generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our
Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to

try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and
the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first
and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and
regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these
rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United
State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines
was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution
has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined
to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Topic: Adherence to International Law

Citation: Philip Morris v. CA (G.R. No. 91332)

Facts:

P, are corporations organized under the laws of USA, not doing business in
the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction. As registered owners
MARK VII, MARK TEN, and LARK, Ps asserts that R has no right to
manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly
similar trademark MARK in contravention of the Trademark Law, and should
therefore be precluded during the pendency of the case from performing the
acts complained of via a PI.

R alleges that it has been authorized by the BIR to manufacture and sell
cigarettes bearing the trademark MARK, and that MARK is a common
word which cannot be exclusively appropriated.

Ps prayer for PI was denied by the RTC because the circumstances of the
case in itself has created a dispute between the parties which to the mind of
the court does not warrant the issuance of a WPI, hence the status quo
existing between the parties prior to the filing is maintained. P filed for MR
but was denied. Second motion for issuance of the injunctive writ was
likewise denied.

P filed a petition for certiorari before the Court but was referred to the CA.

CA initially granted the issuance of WPI, and Rs MR was denied.

R then filed a motion to dissolve the disputed WPI with offer to post a
counter bond, which was favorably acted upon by the CA. The counter bond
is to answer for whatever perjuicio petitioners may suffer as a result. R points
out in its motion that lots of workers employed will be laid off as a
consequence of the injunction and that the government will stand to lose the
amount of specific taxes being paid by R. P filed their own motion for re-
examination geared towards imposition of WPI but to no avail.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not P may afford protection from the Convention of Paris; and
(2) Whether or not Injunctive Relief may be granted to P.

Ruling:

(1) In other words, petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement
irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on account of
Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question whether they have an
exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial
writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line
with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners
to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually
using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign
corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it
may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of
the emblem in the local market.

(2) More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint (p. 319,
Rollo G.R. No. 91332) as well as in the very petition filed with this Court (p. 2,
Rollo in G.R. No. 91332) indicating that they are not doing business in the
Philippines, for these frank representations are inconsistent and incongruent
with any pretense of a right which can breached (Article 1431, New Civil
Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 3, Rule 58, Revised Rules of Court).
Indeed, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there
exists a right to be protected and that the facts against which injunction is
directed are violative of said right (Searth Commodities Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 207 SCRA 622 [1992]). It may be added in this connection that
albeit petitioners are holders of certificate of registration in the
Philippines of their symbols as admitted by private respondent, the
fact of exclusive ownership cannot be made to rest solely on these
documents since dominion over trademarks is not acquired by the mere fact
of registration alone and does not perfect a trademark right (Unno
Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. General Milling Corporation, 120 SCRA 804
[1983]).

Even if we disregard the candid statements of petitioners anent the

absence of business activity here and rely on the remaining statements
of the complaint below, still, when these averments are juxtaposed with the
denials and propositions of the answer submitted by private respondent,
the supposed right of petitioners to the symbol have thereby been
controverted. This is not to say, however, that the manner the complaint was
traversed by the answer is sufficient to tilt the scales of justice in favor of
private respondent. Far from it. What we are simply conveying is another
basic tenet in remedial law that before injunctive relief may properly
issue, complainants right or title must be undisputed and demonstrated
on the strength of ones own title to such a degree as to unquestionably
exclude dark clouds of doubt, rather than on the weakness of the adversarys
evidence, inasmuch as the possibility of irreparable damage, without prior
proof of transgression of an actual existing right, is no ground for injunction
being mere damnum absque injuria (Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. CFI of
Negros Occidental, 42 SCRA 577 [1971]; Francisco, Rules of Court, Second
ed., 1985, p. 225; 3 Martin, Rules of Court, 1986 ed., p. 82).

On the economic repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered by the

thought of having to participate in throwing into the streets Filipino workers
engaged in the manufacture and sale of private respondents MARK
cigarettes who might be retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many
unemployed and unproductive as a result of the issuance of a simple writ of
preliminary injunction and this, during the pendency of the case before the
trial court, not to mention the diminution of tax revenues represented to be
close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the status quo
is maintained, there will be no damage that would be suffered by petitioners
inasmuch as they are not doing business in the Philippines.
In viewof the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint
that they are not engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably
follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to
mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the absence
of their right to be At any rate, and assuming in gratia argument that
respondent court erroneously lifted the writ it previously issued, the same
may be cured by appeal and not in the form of a petition for certiorari (Clark
vs. Philippine Ready Mix Concrete Co., 88 Phil. 460 [1951]). Verily, and
mindful of the rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory
order which is always under the control of the court before final judgment,
petitioners criticism must fall flat on the ground, so to speak, more so when
extinction of the previously issued writ can even be made without previous
notice to the adverse party and without a hearing (Caluya vs. Ramos, 79 Phil.
640 [1974]; 3 Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 81).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the CA Resolutions are

hereby AFFIRMED.

Topic: Adherence to International Law

Citation: Secretary of Justice vs Lantion and Mark Jimenez (private

respondent)

G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000

Facts: On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to furnish private

respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and
to grant the latter reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
Private respondent states that he must be afforded the right to notice and
hearing as required by our Constitution. He likens an extradition proceeding
to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary
investigation.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration assailing the mentioned

decision.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process

Held: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which

will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of
the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged
in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by
one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the
US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:

An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the

constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do
not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation

stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation,
the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the
former.
The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances must
begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action. The concept of due process is flexible for not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
procedure.

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses
that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at
all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial
proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what
process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated
otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural
protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on
the extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer grievous loss.

As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty
affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against
him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the
basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court
of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditees right to know
is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to
prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by
premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less
compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be
more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government,
the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater
power over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this
balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be
adjusted as the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to
the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will
come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private
respondents privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to
due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he
decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is
no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

Topic: Doctrine of Transformation

Citation: Government of USA vs Purganan G.R. No.

148571. September 24, 2002

Facts: This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of

Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion where the court held that Jimenez was bereft of
the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of

America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May
2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as
Extradition Case 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was
the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that Jimenezs application for
an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC
granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on 5 June 2001.
In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be
heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative
prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15 June 2001.
Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July 2001 Order, directing the
issuance of warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated 4 July 2001. Hence, this petition.

Issues: Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant

for his arrest can be issued
 Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending

Held:

No.

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the

Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation
of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants
of arrest.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely

further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case,
validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing
the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with
the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard
and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his
entire plethora of defenses at this stage if he so desires in his effort to
negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire
proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This
scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

***Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents,

the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie
finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is
extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses
of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie
finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge.

On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then
the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to
appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant,
the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency
of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and
frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will best
serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.***

No.

Extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal proceedings. The

constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt.It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence
is not at issue.

Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Parettiin arguing that,

constitutionally, [n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without
due process of law.

Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the

extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is
the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine
does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the
circumstances such as those present in an extradition case call for it,
a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.

Topic: Conflict of Municipal Law vs International Law

Citation: Ichong vs Hernandez G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions
of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of
the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8
of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law

Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation

enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary
or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the
matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly
related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be
no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So
the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is
due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been
made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen
in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out
its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power
and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere;
that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this
suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of
the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered
into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered
by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Topic: Conflict of Municipal Law vs International Law

Citation: GONZALES v. HECHANOVA 9 SCRA 230

Facts: Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive

agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without
complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Natl
Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence,
Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to
the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo
Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements.
Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by
the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements

entered into by Macapagal.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to

enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is
latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to
are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement
may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC
may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

Topic: Separation of Church and State

Citation: Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu G.R. No.

95770, March 1, 1993

Facts:

In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers

and pupils belonging to the Jehovahs Witness, and enrolled in various public
and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute
the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division

of DECS and her Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov.
17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of
Private Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process,
teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from
the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag
ceremony and doesnt obey flag salute rule.

Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find such memorandum to be

contrary to their religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of
appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the
directives, still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As a result,
an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of
Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the dropping from the list in the school
register of all Jehovahs Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6
who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law,
however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.

Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education

but the latter did not answer to their letter.

On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for
Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation
of their right to due process, their right to free public education and their
right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the
voiding of the order of expulsion or dropping from the rolls issued by the
District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them
from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him
to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.

On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction, commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit
the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the

petitions defending the expulsion orders issued by the respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or behavior that would
offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country
through observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention
during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Issue:

Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the
schools violates right receive free education.

Held:

The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness from the schools where
they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to
protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to
make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their
right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to
disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag
ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and present danger
of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to prevent.

It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-

1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the
invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier,
perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they
would not quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.

The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders
are hereby annulled and set aside.

Topic: Separation of Church and State

Citation: Aglipay v. Ruiz G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

Facts:

1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that
he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, in the fulfilment of what he considers to be a civic duty,
requested Vicente Sotto, a member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney,
the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the
designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and
sold though the greater part remained unsold.

3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. He alleged

that the provisions of Section 23, Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution
were violated in the issuance and selling of the commemorative postage
stamps. It was provided therein that, No public money or property shall ever
be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to
any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in violation of the

principle of separation of church and state

Ruling:

NO.

1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of

profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. In so far as it instils into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated.

2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the Constitution, implored

"the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall
embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,
promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity
the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions
are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.

3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act No. 4052
granted the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Sec. of Public Works
and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs.
Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment
in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question, still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor
judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is
yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as
coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved to deny the
petition for a writ of prohibition.

Topic: Separation of Church and State

Citation: IMBONG VS OCHOA G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible

Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the

constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products.

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of

the Constitution.

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the
Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy.

Power of Judicial Review

Actual Case or Controversy

Facial Challenge
Locus Standi

Declaratory Relief

One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the:

Right to life

Right to health

Freedom of religion and right to free speech

Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

Freedom of expression and academic freedom

Due process clause

Equal protection clause

Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

Actual Case or Controversy

Facial Challenge
Locus Standi

Declaratory Relief

One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or

controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it
is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as
a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning
not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.
These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom
of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to
ones freedom of expression, as they are modes which ones thoughts are
externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and

substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.

One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The one subject/one title
rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading,
either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one
is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act.

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is

not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon
the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence.
But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid
portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law;
and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL

Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the

traditional meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited
by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to
the moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent
abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line
with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in
defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec.
3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization.
This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason,
the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses
the term primarily, must be struck down.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729
in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only
safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate
under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of
RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered

mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested,
evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or

participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH
Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy
or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution
or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with
only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding
spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates
the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood
and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The
RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a

procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH
Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the
portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases
where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about

family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and
control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH

Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of

Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role
of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term
primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of
the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of

the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents
in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and

other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very
well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as
the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in

relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service
provider. The private health care institution cited under Section 7 should
be seen as synonymous to private health care service provider.

The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section
7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to
Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH

program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the
State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled,
women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number,
since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the
RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH

education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize
the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons.
First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that
it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order
to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only
encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should
they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their

religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or
otherwise

Topic: Sec 10 (Art. II, 1987 Const.),"Promotion of social justice"

Citation: MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., G.R. No.
47800 December 2, 1940

Doctrine: Social Justice

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940

recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of th
e provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and re
gulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval

of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents

pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the

constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to
the greatest number.

To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to

determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in
view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements
of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom
is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is
the making of the law.
Topic: Honest Public Service and Full Disclosure

Citation: VALMONTE vs BELMONTE February 13 1989G.R No 74930

FACTS:

Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then

GSIS General Manager, requesting to be furnished with the list of names of
the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa including the ten (10)
opposition members who were able to secure a clean loan of P 2 million each
on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if such is not possible, an access to
those said documents. Apart from Valmontes letter, he is stressing the
premise of the request on the present provision of the Freedom constitution
at that time which is Art. IV, Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern. Mr. Belmonte, aware that such
request contains serious legal implications seek the help of Mr. Meynardo A.
Tiro, a deputy General Counsel. In Mr. Tiros reply letter, a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it,
whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve
this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach
this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

On June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS
Deputy General Counsel, Petitioner Valmonte wrote another letter saying
that for failure to receive a reply, they are now considering themselves free
to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue their desired
objective in pursuance of public interest. Separate comments were filed by
respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a
consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.

In his comment, respondent raise procedural objection to the issuance of a

writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General
Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS petitioners.
However, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees, It is therefore
asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then
petitioners have no cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are
entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to
information.

RULING:

The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of

power by the people to the state.

Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the

authority conferred by the people. Yet, like all constitutional guarantees, the
right to information is not absolute. Peoples right to information is limited to
matters of public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its

employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the Revised
Government Service Insurance act of 1977 provide for annual appropriations
for to pay for contributions, premiums , interest and other amounts payable
to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the
Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the
nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost
prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. It
is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds
are managed properly with end in view of maximizing the benefits that
accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed
borrowers were members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who
themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to
be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest
degree of fidelity and that its transactions were above board.

Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the

GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts
the indiscriminate dissemination of information. He further contends that in
view of the right to privacy, which is equally protected by the Constitution
and by existing laws, the documents, evidencing loan transactions of the
GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.

There can be no doubt that the right to privacy is constitutionally protected.

In the landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc, speaking through then Mr. Justice
Fernando stated that ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system
of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control.

Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the court in Morfe is that the
right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and the government agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right
cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no
right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an
injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would
have no such ground for relief.

Neither can the GSIS through its General manager, the respondent, invoke
the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature,
and hence, may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to
be violated.

Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan

transactions are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the
Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which
guarantees access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions only. Further, they
argued that GSIS, is a governmental corporation performing proprietary
functions, are outside the coverage of the peoples right to access to official
records.

This Dichotomy characterizing government function has long been

repudiated in ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government
Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government, WHETHER
carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges
the SAME FUNCTION of service to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS ,
in granting the loans, was exercising proprietary function would NOT justify
the exclusion of transactions from the coverage and scope of right to
information.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the respondent
General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED
to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans
granted to members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may
specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to time and manner of
inspection, not incompatible with the decision, as the GSIS may deem
necessary. SO ORDERED.