WHITMAN COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

325 SE Paradise Street, Pullman, Wa. 99163

CITATION NO.

CONTEST PARKING INFRACTION

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(PCC 12.10.092)
(CR 56)

TIME: 00:35 OFFICER BADGE NO.: 466

FINE: $25.00 VIOLATION CODE: 12.10.092 May 16, 2017

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (CR 56)

Pursuant to CR 56, respondent, respectfully requests summary judgment granting
dismissal of the contested parking infraction no. 93597 without cost to the respondent.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION:

This case involves a parking citation issued on private residential property on May 04, 2017 at 12:35am,
Officer, Badge No. 466 entered private property at Pullman, Wa. 99163 to issue a $25.00
parking infraction upon respondents vehicle, parked on the lawn of respondents private property.

The statement of facts support that the statutory language, and the spirit of the legislative intention of PC
12.10.092 did not meet the threshold requirement of an infraction AND even if this honorable court were to
conclude that it did, municipal police do not have the authority to issue citations on private property.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED:

In deciding this motion, the court is presented with THREE issues:

(1) The evidence do not support the threshold requirement of the language of PC 12.10.092 and
therefore no infraction of the ordinance took place.

(2) Municipal Police Officers do not have the authority to issue parking infractions on vehicles
parked on private residential property in violation of municipal ordinance since such property
is not a thoroughfare or street upon which the public has right to travel by motor vehicle.

(3) Parking infractions fines are a, Double Tax on registered vehicle owners having already paid
excise / use tax for the privilege of storing their vehicle on their private property.

CONTEST PARKING INFRACTION

(PCC 12.10.092)
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 III. THE LAW:

PCC 12.10.092 Parking-Residential-Prohibited-Exceptions: Parking of vehicles is prohibited within any

yard abutting a public street on any property located within a residential zone district as set forth in Title 17;
provided, however, this prohibition shall not apply to public safety vehicles, vehicles in use for maintenance
of property grounds, vehicles parking in a driveway as defined in Section 17.05.020 and improved in
accordance with Section 17.40.040, or vehicles parking in a parking area improved in accordance with Section
17.40.040 and authorized by the Director of Public Works. For purposes of this section, yard shall mean
that area extending across the full width of a property, from the property line to the first supporting member
of a structure.

IV. FACTUAL BASIS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

1. Under RCW 36.70; Municipalities are given broad latitude to legislate ordinances, however, the town
does not have statutory authority for levying fines against private citizens parking on their own private
property (emphasis) which is not a part of -or- interfering with - a public right of way. Therefore
municipal police have no authority to issue parking infractions on private property. (See Exhibit 3)

2. There are no public signs posted of no parking, nor any private property posting of no parking, and
while certain infractions may not require public posting of no parking; vehicles parked on private
property does not fall within this criteria as a property owner has the presumptive rights to regulate
the behavior conducted upon his property and the vehicle was not parked on a public right of way.

3. The officer attestment (as stated) citing PC 12.10.092 are absent facts under which the language of the
ordinance determines an infraction because a sidewalk interposes between the yard and the street, the
vehicle was not parked in a yard which abuts a public street.

4. The vehicle having plate no. BBC6802 was not parked on a municipal public road, right of way or on
any other trafficked location where the public had access, nor was the vehicle parked in a yard that
was abutted to a public road, nor was it a hazard or interfering with any manner of public transportation
right of way, nor was it blocking a driveway. (See Exhibit 2)

5. No third-party complaint was issued, published, cited, attested, served or furnished to respondent.

V. ARGUMENT(S):
1. Standard of Review:

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Keck, 184 Wn.2d at 370 Nickerson v. Wash. State
Dep't of Revenue, No. 48702-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2016)

All facts and reasonable inferences are considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and
summary judgment is appropriate only if, from all the evidence reasonable persons could reach but one
conclusion. Vallandigham, 154 Wn. 2d at 26. The moving party has the burden to show that there is not
genuine issue as to any material fact. If that burden is satisfied, the non-moving party must present
evidence demonstrating that material facts are in dispute. Vallandigham, 154 Wn. 2d at 26. If it fails to
do so, entry of Summary Judgment is proper.

CONTEST PARKING INFRACTION

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 2. PC 12.10.092 was not violated pursuant to the plain language of the ordinance.

The street, Parr Drive does not abut the private property owners yard (Exhibit 2) and the ordinance is
not applicable. PCC 12.10.092 must be interpreted on its face in favor of the respondent that the ordinance
as written, was not violated. Where the meaning of statutory language is plain on its face, we must give
effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Id. In discerning the plain meaning of a
provision, we consider the entire statute in which the provision is found, as well as related statutes or other
provisions in the same act that disclose legislative intent. Id.; Advanced Silicon Materials, L.L.C. v. Grant
County, 156 Wn.2d 84, 89-90, 124 P.3d 294 (2005)

As best illustrated in Exhibit 1, a sidewalk interposes between the private property yard, and the Street.
Parr drive does not pursuant to definition, legislative intent and the plain language of the statute abutt
the subject private property. Our purpose when interpreting a statute is to "`discern and implement the
intent of the legislature.'" Id. at 295 (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003)).

Definition for Abutt: From Dictionary.com; to be adjacent; touch or join at the edge or border
(often followed by on, upon, or against): This piece of land abuts on a street. verb (used with
object), abutted, abutting. 2. to be adjacent to; border on; end at.

THEREFORE; Respondent respectfully requests this court enter judgment that the circumstances
outlined in infraction no. 93597 fail to meet the requirements set forth in the ordinance, and the infraction
is dismissed.

3. Municipal Police Officers do not have the authority to enforce local parking ordinances on private
property.

Bangert should have known that he did not have the authority to enforce the ordinance on
private property. People v. Cartmill, 2013 IL App (4th) 120820, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

There is very little case law found in WA. or nationally on this specific issue; (Most likely because
very few people will escalate the cost of a $25.00 fine to a superior court decision) There is a presumption
that property owners, residents of private property - are vested with certain rights under the constitution
of the State of Washington and the United States, and that absent a formal complaint by a person having
standing, the presumption of rights extends to vehicles which are parked within the confines of private
property and not interfering with the public right of way.

The 'essential purpose' of the fourth amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon
the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officers to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions." People v. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 266, 940 N.E.2d
1100, 1106 (2010) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)). "[T]he
reasonableness of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests against its intrusion of fourth amendment interests, i.e., the
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement
officers." McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 267-68, 940 N.E.2d at 1106.

CONTEST PARKING INFRACTION

(PCC 12.10.092)
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 Fortunately, the Attorney Generals of several states were presented this question by the attorneys for city
municipalities seeking legal advisory. What follows is a thoughtful and detailed analysis of State Statute
granting authority for municipalities to regulate and govern their public rights of way as compared with
the authority for municipal police to specifically issue parking infractions on private property and as in
the instant action, specifically, to issue parking infractions to vehicles parked on private property lawns.
(See Exhibit 3)

The respondent has determined that the State of Florida most commonly resembles the statutory ensemble
that best represents Washington State. Floridas A.G. issued conclusive legal guidance to municipalities
on the specific topic relating to the instant action. The A.G. determined that local police do not have the
authority enforce local ordinances by issuing parking infractions to vehicles on private property.

Floridas state statute (316.008(1)) is analogous to RCW 36.70 which does not prevent local authorities
from regulating and or prohibiting, stopping, standing, or parking on streets and highways in their
jurisdiction. The provisions of these statutes are enforceable on private property only if (emphasis) the
public may travel by motor vehicle on such property.

Embedded within this issue are concerns for encroachment of public policing in issues solely requiring
civil remedy and rights guaranteed to private property owners through use of such property.

..seizure not justified by the community caretaking doctrine because the police have no duty to
protect a vehicle parked on the owners' property. Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858,
860 (9th Cir. 2005)

IN THE ALTERNATIVE:

4. The city ordinance PCC 12.10.092 violates private property owner rights not to be, double taxed
and any statute that violates rights of property guaranteed under the constitution is void ab initio
and unenforceable.

The registration of a vehicle in Whitman county requires the payment of an excise use - tax,
purpose is in part to cover the allowance of the vehicles location on private property to which it is
registered. The fine for a parking infraction and the relevant penalties numerated on the back of the
citation for not paying it is inequitable to the private property vehicle owner, to be double taxed, fined -
for a tax it has already paid for the right to use its private property to store its vehicle.

5. RCW 42.23 offers guidance on Ethics; Police cannot by contract or otherwise profit from fines
waged against vehicles located on the owners private property. Policing private property through
agreements or self-interest implies conditions ripe for conflicts of interest.

A parking infraction is the exercise of enforcing a public ordinance. Public ordinances are established
through state statute to benefit the public. Fees paid from infractions benefit the General Fund which City
Hall has confirmed that a portion supports the police department implicating a conflict of interest and a
potential violation of RCW 42.23 as municipal police cannot by contract, agreement, or otherwise
enforce municipal ordinances of parking on private property.

CONTEST PARKING INFRACTION

(PCC 12.10.092)
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 VI. CONCLUSION:

The amount of time, expense, and research that went into the defense of this parking infraction are almost
nearly as absurd as the $25.00 parking infraction issued to a vehicle parked on private property itself. There was
no reasonable choice to balance the economic cost of my time and energy against the value of a right in law.
Respondent respectfully requests this honorable court find judgment in his favor.

WHEREFORE; For all the aforementioned reasons, summary judgment in respondent Currans favor
should be issued and Mr. Curran found not responsible to pay the parking infraction fine of $25.00

AND

That reasonable costs associated for defense of the infraction including but not limited to certified mail
expenses in the amount of $13.00 be granted to respondent in an amount to be set by the court.

AND | OR

If the court sees any redeemable merit to the thoroughness of this motion, the petitioner respondent is
open to an offer of employment.

VII. CERTIFICATION:

The undersigned represents that on May 16, 2017, within 15-days of receiving the Parking Infraction, I did
mail a copy of this motion and my first set of interrogatories to the Pullman Police Dept. at 260 SE Kamiaken
Street.

Dated: Tuesday, May 16, 2017 Signed:

CONTEST PARKING INFRACTION

(PCC 12.10.092)
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