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C R I TI CAL I S S UES IN POLICIN G SERIES:

Patrol-Level Response to
a Suicide Bomb Threat:
Guidelines for Consideration

Lisa L. Spahr with


Joshua Ederheimer and
David Bilson
CRITICAL ISSU ES IN POLICIN G S ER IES :
Patrol-Level Response to a
Suicide Bomb Threat:
Guidelines for Consideration

April 2007
This publication was supported by Motorola, Incorporated. The points of view expressed
herein are the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Motorola, Inc., or
individual Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) members.

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, but
authors do not endorse any information of the sponsor organization or other information
on the websites.

Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C. 20036


Copyright 2007 by Police Executive Research Forum

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 978-1-934485-01-9

Cover design by Dave Williams


Photos are (clockwise from upper left corner): March 9, 2005 attack on Baghdad Head-
quarters of the U.S. Police Advisory Mission in Iraq, courtesy of Michael Heidingsfield;
July 2005 London bombings, EMPICS Limited of Pavilion House, 16 Castle Boulevard,
Nottingham, NG7 IFL; September 2004 suicide bombing in Jakarta, courtesy of Reuters/
Bea Wiharta; and December 2005 Miami International Airport bomb threat, [2007]
Lou Toman/South-Florida Sun-Sentinel.
Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Patrol-Level Response to


Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii a Suicide Bomb Threat:
PERF Guidelines for
Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Risks to the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Graduated Force
Option Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Perspectives from
Around the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
United States: Los Angeles Police Department . . . . . . . 5
About the Authors/PERF/CFA/Motorola . . . . . . . . . . 23
United Kingdom: Metropolitan Police
Service of London . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Appendices

Iraq: Training Iraqi Police Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1. Participant List from the Suicide Bombing
Preparedness and Response Conference,
Washington, D.C., March 31, 2006. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
The Development of the
2. Suicide Bombing Preparedness and
PERF Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Response Conference Agenda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Overview of Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. Participant List from the Patrol-Level
Initial Conference: Suicide Bombing Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit,
Preparedness and Response, March 31, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Baltimore, Md., January 17-18, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
PERF Interview Guide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb
Site Visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Threat Summit Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Site Visit and Interview Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Open-Source Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence
Restricted Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Centers Improvised Explosive Device
Guideline Development and Review Process . . . . . . . 11 Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb
Threat Summit, January 1718, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Guideline Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Description of the Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Description of the Graduated
Force Options Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Foreword

T he United States has not had an extensive


history of dealing with suicide bomb attacks. As a
result, few police and sheriffs departments have felt
In 2006, the Police Executive Research Forum
(PERF) began a dialogue with the policing commu-
nity to better understand what needs to be done to
the need to develop policies and training programs prepare for the threat of suicide bombers. In March
specifically addressing the issues raised by such of that year, PERF held a conference in Washington,
incidents. D.C. on suicide bombing preparedness. Fifty partic-
However, the 9/11 attacks drastically changed ipants from federal, state, local, and international
how the United States views its own vulnerability to policing agencies identified policy issues that
terrorism in general. The implications of Septem- should be considered. PERF followed up on that
ber 11 regarding the threat of suicide bombers are conference, and spent the remainder of 2006 con-
still being felt around the world. After all, the 9/11 ducting research, making site visits to police agen-
hijackers were the ultimate suicide bombers. They cies in New York City, Los Angeles, London,
used commercial aircraft as bombs rather than Washington, D.C., and elsewhere, and writing a set
devices that fit inside a backpack. But at their core, of proposed guidelines for consideration by polic-
ing agencies. In January 2007, PERF held a second
their motivations were the samethey believed
conference in Baltimore, during which we asked
that political or religious ideology justified murder-
participants to vet the guidelines.
ing innocent bystanders and killing themselves in
This report is the result of those meetings and
the process.
research. It presents 68 guidelines for departments
There have already been several incidents in
to consideralong with related documents such as
this country over the last few years involving per-
a Glossary of Terms, to prevent confusion by ensur-
sons wearing or carrying explosives who killed
ing that the terminology is used consistently. Some
themselves or were killed by police. Knowledgeable of the guidelines offer broad recommendations
people agree that potential suicide bomb attacks in about law enforcement agencies entire approach to
the United States are unfortunately part of what Sir incidents that may involve a suicide bomberfor
Ian Blair refers to as the New Normality. For example, setting criteria for assessing the threats
example, a 2006 survey of more than 100 foreign- posed by the attacker and the risks of various police
policy expertsRepublicans and Democrats responses. Other guidelines offer very detailed
alikefound that 91 percent said it is likely or cer- advice based on what we learned from policing
tain that within the next decade the United States agencies around the worldfor example, how far
will suffer an attack similar in scale to the July 2005 away from an attacker police should remain if they
London bombings. And when the experts were asked are using various types of radios that could inad-
which two types of attacks are most likely, the most vertently trigger a suicide bombers explosives.
common response was suicide bombing attacks, Fundamentally, the purpose of the guidelines
followed closely by attack on major infrastructure. is to answer this question: What should first
Other types of attacks, such as use of radiological or responders doand what should they not do
biological weapons, were ranked far lower. when encountering a potential suicide bomber?

Foreword i
The guidelines recommend that law enforce- type of threat that involves many considerations
ment agencies create a stand alone policy and/or not present in other types of incidents.
training curriculum on suicide bomb threats. PERF At the same time, it should be noted that the
recognizes that this is controversial. At our first Suicide Bomb Threat Guideline Number 1 states
meeting in March 2006, it became evident that that suicide bomb protocols generally should be
there was some reluctance to put suicide bomber consistent with an agencys use-of-force policies,
policies into writing. Perhaps some chiefs think of procedures, and training. In other words, suicide
the adage, If the only tool you have is a hammer, bomb policies should expand upon policing agen-
you will see every problem as a nail. In other cies existing policies on use of force in general.
words, if officers are trained to think carefully Motorola, Inc. and PERF are pleased to pres-
about suicide bombing scenarios, will it increase ent the Guidelines for Consideration, Graduated
the chance that they will misinterpret situations, Force Option Protocol, and Glossary of Terms
seeing a suicide-bomber terrorist every time an which culminated from our year-long efforts to
incident involves someone wearing a backpack? research the international policing response to sui-
This is particularly important because we also rec- cide bomb threats. It is our hope that this publica-
ognize that a patrol officer is usually the first to tion will help more local law enforcement
arrive at a scene that may involve a suicide bomber. executives openly discuss this issue with other com-
But in the end, there was a strong consensus munity leaders, examine current policies and prac-
that policing agencies need stand alone guidelines tices, and create or modify planning and training
because suicide bombing incidents are a unique strategies to address the threat of suicide bombers.

Chuck Wexler
Executive Director
Police Executive Research Forum

ii Foreword
Acknowledgments

T his publication represents a culmination of


PERFs year-long effort to work with the interna-
tional policing community on a highly sensitive
Police; Chief Charles Payne and his staff from the
Department of Homeland Securitys Office for
Bombing Prevention; Major General Mickey Levy
topic. We received many valuable contributions and Brigadier General Simon Perry, Israel Police
from policing agencies, and had the pleasure to Force; Chief William Bratton, Deputy Chief Mark
learn about the committed efforts and interest of so Leap, Commander Michael Downing, Lieutenant
many more. James West, Sergeant Sean Malinowski, and Detec-
We would like to thank the Metropolitan tive Supervisor Ralph Morten, Los Angeles Police
Police Service of London for approaching PERF Department; Commissioner Raymond Kelly,
with its concerns regarding the preparation, plan- Deputy Commissioner Michael Farrell, Inspector
ning, and training for suicide bomb attacks. Assis- Michael Healey, Captain Hugh ORourke, Lieu-
tant Commissioner Stephen House, at the direction tenant Mark Torre, Sergeant Bacharik, and mem-
of Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner of the Metropolitan bers of the Emergency Services Unit, New York City
Police, led PERF to investigate the matter, which Police Department; Former Chief Charles Ramsey
resulted in the joint research efforts of this project, and Chief Cathy Lanier, Washington, D.C. Metro-
a conference to lay out the issues, and a summit to politan Police Department; Deputy Chief Consta-
finalize much needed guidelines for consideration. ble Ian Arundale, Association of Chief Police
Special thanks are due to our partners at Officers, West Mercia Police Department, UK;
Motorola, Inc., for their support of the Critical Commanders Simon Foy and Jo Kay, Staff Officer
Issues in Policing Series. Motorola has supported Helen Cryer, Former Superintendent Stephen
PERF for many years in our effort to stimulate Swain, and Police Constable Spike Townsend, Lon-
progress in policing. We are especially grateful to don Metropolitan Police Service; Dr. Jonathan
Greg Brown, President and Chief Operating Offi- Crego, Hendon Training Center, UK; Chief Gil
cer; Mark Moon, Corporate Vice President and Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Department; and Chief
General Manager, Government and Commercial Liz Woollen, University of Oklahoma Police
Markets; and Rick Neal, Vice President, Govern- Department.
ment Strategy and Business Development. We also would like to thank Chief John Tim-
Our project would have been incomplete oney, Miami Police Department; Chief Thomas
without the openness and hospitality we received Robbins, Boston University Police Department;
on our many site visits with departments here and Assistant Director Michael Bouchard, Bureau of
abroad. We wish to thank the following people and Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Assis-
agencies for sharing their insights on this complex tant Director John Miller and Deputy Assistant
issue: Assistant Director Michael Bouchard and Directors Joseph Billy and Donald Van Duyn, Fed-
Division Chief Joseph Riehl, Bureau of Alcohol, eral Bureau of Investigation; Assistant Director
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Agent Charles Michael Stenger and Assistant Special Agent in
Wood and Detective Jack Dineen, U.S. Capitol Charge Robert Novy, U.S. Secret Service; President

Acknowledgments iii
and CEO Michael Heidingsfield, Memphis Shelby PERF staffers. Executive Director Chuck Wexler
Crime Commission; Detective Supervisor Ralph guided the project from start to finish with insight,
Morten, Los Angeles Police Department Bomb thoughtfulness, and determination to provide a
Squad; and Captain Jeffrey Herold, Washington, meaningful product for the field. Corina Sol Brito
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department for their pre- and Andrea Luna coordinated the first conference
sentations during the Suicide Bombing Prepared- and set the pace for the work to follow. Emily Mil-
ness and Response Conference in March 2006 and stein-Greengart was instrumental in planning a
the Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat successful summit and conducting site visits perti-
Summit in January 2007. nent to the project. PERF Fellow Rick Weger, San
Critically important to the completion of this Jose Police Department, assisted staff on site visits.
report was the willingness of an exceptional group Eric Albertsen delivered essential support at the
of individuals to participate in these two events. summit. Bill Tegeler, acting director of the CFA,
These extremely busy professionals graciously gave contributed to the writing and editing of this pub-
their time and expertise to determine the key issues lication. Jerry Murphy and Craig Fischer both pro-
related to suicide bomb preparedness at the first vided helpful editorial reviews of this document.
conference and to produce and revise the Guide- Jim Cronin and Jason Cheney provided additional
lines for Consideration during the summit. (A support throughout the project to ensure its suc-
complete list of participants can be found in cess. We thank each of them for their valuable con-
Appendices 1 and 3.) tributions. Finally, this document reflects the many
This report could not have been produced talents of Dave Williams, who provided layout and
without the strong efforts of talented and dedicated cover design.

Lisa L. Spahr Joshua Ederheimer


Associate Captain
Police Executive Research Forum Metropolitan Police Department
Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.

David Bilson
Chief Superintendent
Metropolitan Police Service
London

iv Acknowledgments
Overview

T he United States is fortunate in comparison


to countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel
with respect to suicide bomb threats. These coun-
of them said they considered such an attack likely
within a year. Two-thirds of the participants pre-
dicted that the next attack will be in the form of a
tries are constantly on heightened alert to the threat suicide bombing.1 The increase in suicide bombing
of suicide bombers. Security is at the forefront of incidents internationally, coupled with the unrest
everyones mind, not just those of the police forces. over current foreign policy, should be reason enough
And while the events of September 11, 2001 for police and sheriffs departments to put plans in
opened our eyes to the threats to our homeland, place to combat such threats before they occur.
particularly when a committed group of people In fact, there have been a number of such
wishes to cause unimaginable harm to our country, threats and attacks that have already occurred in the
as time goes on the threat of a new suicide bomb United States. These include:
incident fades in many Americans minds. The
n In September 1995, a man killed himself and his
tragic bombings of underground trains and a bus
in London in 2005 were a terrible reminder that the family in a car packed with explosives in Balti-
United Kingdom, the United States, and other more County, Md. The man lured his estranged
nations are at risk of continued attacks from indi- family into the car by promising to take them
viduals and organizations that are willing to kill school-shopping. The police ascertained that he
innocent people for a particular cause or out of dis- fully intended to kill them in this manner.2
n
agreement with government actions. In December 2001, Richard Reid (the Shoe
Bomber) attempted to ignite an explosive in his
RISKS TO THE UNITED STATES shoe while on board an airplane from Paris to
Miami. He was subdued by passengers and the
Many experts agree that a suicide bomb attack is
flight crew. He pled guilty to the crime and
inevitable on U.S. soil. A 2006 survey of more than
acknowledged his associations with al-Qaeda.3
100 of Americas top foreign-policy experts found
that 80 percent expect an attack similar in scale to n In August 2003, a man, likely a victim himself,
9/11 within a decade. Ninety-one percent of the par- was killed by an explosive locked around his neck
ticipants believe that an attack similar to that of the in Erie, Pa., after he was forced to rob a bank. The
2005 London bombings is likely by 2016; 57 percent explosive detonated while he was surrounded by

1. The Terrorism Index. July/August 2006. Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress Publica-
tion. Retrieved February 7, 2007 from www.foreignpolicy.com
2. New York Times. September 13, 1995. Man Kills Estranged Wife and Children with Bomb. Retrieved
February 6, 2007 from www.nytimes.com
3. CNN. January 22, 2003. Richard Reid Pleads Guilty. Retrieved on February 6, 2007 from www.cnn.com

Overview 1
police, who were waiting for the bomb squad.4 suicide bomber classification. This document is not
This case remains unsolved, and no one has been meant to delineate between a lone-wolf type of
charged with any crime related to it. bomber and one with a highly organized plot with
multiple bombers; it is intended to provide tools for
n In June 2005, a 52-year-old male walked into a
law enforcement agencies to begin considering how
federal courthouse in Seattle with a backpack
patrol-level officers should respond to a suicide
strapped to his chest and a grenade in his hand. He
bomber threat. Although each incident will be
had a history of legal battles over child-support unique, they all require situation and threat assess-
payments. The man was shot twice and killed by ments by the officer who responds to the call.
police officers. The grenade was found to be inac- Most law enforcement experts agree that a patrol
tive, and the man was carrying a living will.5 officer is the most likely person to identify and
n In October 2005, a student with explosives in a potentially confront a suicide bomber. Although
backpack blew himself up outside a packed uni- many agencies have highly skilled specialized units
versity football stadium in Oklahoma. It is to deal with bombs and active shooters, patrol offi-
unknown whether he intended to kill others or cers will require training to handle such situations
not. A review of his background uncovered years if they arise.
of bomb-making and an interest in explosives.6 Some U.S. police departments, including
A search of his property yielded high quantities those in Los Angeles and New York City, have iden-
of explosive materials and a significant amount tified the risk of future suicide bombers as immi-
of jihadist literature.7 nent. They have written policies and conducted
department-wide training, and are consistently
n In December 2005, Air Marshals at Miami Inter- assessing and improving their readiness. On the
national Airport shot and killed a man who ran other hand, some departments have not yet begun
from an airplane and onto the jetway, claiming to specifically address this issue. Some dont see the
he had a bomb. The mans wife said he was suf- threat as imminent or they feel that their jurisdic-
fering from mental illness and had failed to take tion would not be a likely target. Others feel that
his medication. The Air Marshals defended the due to the complexities, and specifically the uncer-
decision to shoot and noted the adherence to tainties, of a suicide bomb attack, little can be done
protocol for use of lethal force.8 until an event actually occurs. A lack of resources or
expertise remains an obstacle for readiness in some
Subject matter experts often disagree about departments. Many police departments in the
the language and definitions related to suicide United States have recently experienced increases in
bombing, using terms such as suicide terrorism, violent crime, and therefore are devoting more
homicide bomber, and body bomber. Depend- resources to that area rather than to crisis prepared-
ing upon an agencys definitions and terminology, ness. Although there are many reasons why police
some of the examples above may not fit into a departments are not actively preparing for a suicide

4. Fox News. September 1, 2003. Investigators Probe Bizarre Bomb Death of Pizza Man. Retrieved
February 6, 2007 from www.foxnews.com
5. Seattle Times. June 21, 2005. Man Killed at Court was Upset over Child Support. Retrieved February 15,
2007 from www.seattletimes.nwsource.com
6. Chief Liz Wollen, Oklahoma University Police, Presentation at the Forum on Crime and Justice,
Luncheon Series. August 25, 2006.
7. Accuracy in Media. October 7, 2005. Terrorism Strikes the Heartland. Retrieved February 6, 2007
from www.aim.org
8. New York Times. December 8, 2005. Marshals Shoot and Kill Passenger in Bomb Threat. Retrieved
February 7, 2007 from www.nytimes.com

2 Overview
bomb threat, we believe that police agencies would guidelines, see The Development of the PERF
be well served by devoting time to assessing their Guidelines, page 9. By absorbing the lessons
own capacity to deal with these kinds of situations. learned by our national and international policing
Our country should not put off planning for a sui- partners, the work of bomb squads and specialists,
cide bomb threat until another bombing of cata- and the progressive actions of a number of depart-
strophic proportions occurs. ments, PERF hopes to provide information to initi-
PERF set out to conduct research and develop ate the development of training and policy as well
guidelines to assist departments in this area. For as to foster further discussion on this complex and
details about PERFs process in developing these sensitive topic.

Overview 3
Bus destroyed by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in Baqubah, Iraq, January 2,
2006. Photo by Pfc. Danielle Howard, courtesy of Department of Defense (released to public).
Perspectives from
Around the World

The United States Perspective


WILLIAM BRATTON
CHIEF, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
PRESIDENT, POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM

As the paradigm shift in modern policing continues attempt to deto-


to evolve, we must challenge ourselves to open our nate an explosive
minds to what may have been unthinkable in the device in an urban area, inflicting mass casualties
past. The reality is that as we improve our methods and killing himself or herself in the process.
of target hardening in response to the threat posed The Los Angeles Police Department is fortu-
by terrorists in our cities and towns, we may at some nate enough to have developed a cadre of personnel
point encounter individuals bent on destruction with specialized knowledge in this area. Our officers
and willing to sacrifice their own lives in the process. and detectives have worked closely with the police in
While we must continue to fight crime, we various countries who have encountered these
now have a clear mandate to continue to expand threats in the past. We have developed detailed poli-
our mission into the homeland security arena. It is cies and tactics to respond to a rapidly unfolding
incumbent upon us as police leaders to anticipate event involving a homicide bomber. Recognizing the
the myriad of possible threats posed by extremist need for an in-depth analysis leading to best practice
groups. We must actively pursue best practices in this area, PERF assembled a prestigious group of
when it comes to scenario-based training, tactical professionals and other stakeholders to create guide-
planning and preparation. lines to assist departments across the country in
There are still those who will say that we are addressing this potential threat to public safety.
erring on the side of caution as we explore all possi- The work group developed a series of guide-
ble scenarios, including the homicide bomber strik- lines for a patrol-level response to a suicide bomb
ing in the heart of U.S. cities. They say, That topic threat. These guidelines represent the latest thinking
is too complex or sensitive to address, or that the from some of the top names in counter-terrorism
threat posed is an unlikely one in our context. They training and tactical response, and encompass rec-
are wrong. We would be doing ourselves and our ommendations on threat assessment, operations,
jurisdictions a disservice by not confronting this and training. By disseminating this information to
threat head-on and planning for all eventualities. as wide a range of police agencies across the country
To that end, the Los Angeles Police Depart- as possible, we will be heightening officer awareness,
ment has, for a number of years, been painstakingly spurring further discussion of the issue, and lessen-
researching, analyzing, and planning for the even- ing the possibility of a tragic outcome should the
tuality that, at some point, an individual will hypothetical threat become a horrible reality.

Perspectives from Around the World 5


The United Kingdom Perspective
SIR IAN BLAIR
COMMISSIONER , METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE OF LONDON

The Metropolitan Police Service has more than 30 The changed


years of experience dealing with terrorist attacks on threat, referred to in
the streets of London, but the July 7, 2005 attacks London as the New
on our public transport system were a type of Normality, demands
onslaught that was new to the city: suicide that we identify new ways of working. But our
bomber attacks. It is impossible to overstate the efforts to counter terrorism must not become sepa-
impact that those assaults had on the Metropolitan rated from mainstream policing as a new discipline.
Police Service, just as the police departments of the Terrorism is a crime, and like other crimes, it can
United States were changed forever by the 9/11 sui- be successfully frustrated through tried and proven
cide bombers attacks on the World Trade Center approaches in policingvisible patrol, intelligence,
and the Pentagon. forensics, and detection. Efforts to counter terror-
I asked Assistant Commissioner Stephen ism must not become separated from mainstream
House to contact the Police Executive Research policing as a new discipline of science.
Forum in order to progress further study of what Successful resolution of such complex events
policing agencies in the United States and the UK also requires the highest level of training to ensure
are doing to plan for attacks by suicide bombers. It that officers fully understand their agencies plans
is important that our two nations continue to work and make the best decisions at all levels. We are very
together to consider what this new threat means to proud of our Hydra and Minerva simulation train-
police departments. ing systems, developed within the Police Service, in
One thing we have learned is that developing which officers train in a specially-built facility to
a response to counter the threat of a suicide bomber simulate the complexity, chaos, and challenges of
will not be successfully achieved by the police serv- real-time incidents. The approach allows officers to
ice acting alone. Even with the best police work, it participate in scenarios that test and develop their
will be communities that uncover terrorists and operational decision-making and professional skills.
defeat terror. That is why it is essential to build trust The MPS has developed strong operational
through strong working partnerships between frameworks to respond to terrorist threats and inci-
communities and the police, involving all levels of dents, to provide security and reassurance to the
government as well as voluntary and private-sector people of London, and to protect the citys infra-
organizations. All have a crucial contribution to structure. We must continually search to improve
make in protecting our citizens. our response and find the best measures to protect
It is also important to understand that while our citizens and the cities that we serve. That is why
there is always the need to protect operationally it is so important that PERF, with the support of the
sensitive tactics, we must share policing plans with Metropolitan Police Service, New Scotland Yard,
those to whom we are held to account. Police man- has developed this essential guidance for first-
agement and oversight authorities must ensure that response officers. By preparing officers for the
plans are appropriate and proportionate, while they threat of suicide bombers and training them to
hold police to account and inform citizens about respond effectively, we can disrupt terrorism and
police activities, objectives, and outcomes. save life.

6 Perspectives from Around the World


The Iraq Perspective
MICHAEL HEIDINGSFIELD
PRESIDENT AND CEO, MEMPHIS SHELBY CRIME COMMISSION

Suicide bombers in the United States? That seems to find and develop
be one of many of the dire challenges facing local law that life-saving
enforcement in America today. The answer seems to technology.
n
be more of a question of when and not if, but no
Second, we must
one can be absolutely sure. However, as the target of
continue to pursue and strike the enemy where he
four suicide bombing attempts while heading the
begins production or planning of such attacks.
U.S. Department of State Police Advisory Mission in
Once the threat is deployed and our adversaries
Iraq from 2004 to 2006, I can speak with absolute
certainty about the outcomes of such attacks: chaotic are on the move against their targets, our ability to
aftermaths, unprecedented frustration at the enemys mitigate or defeat that threat is severely
ability to strike with relative impunity, and frenzied compromised.
searches for countermeasures. n Third, we must never dismiss the experiences of
As we tried to rebuild Iraqs Police Service, 13 law enforcement professionals who have dealt
U.S. police advisors under my command lost their with the specter of such attacks for decades. We
lives; those losses were overwhelmingly tied to sui- must embrace, in particular, our Israeli and
cide bombers using improvised explosive devices British counterparts, to whom we can turn for
against us and against what we represented. For me, lessons learned. The concept of jointness cannot
there were never the right words to express the be overstated.
depth of our grief to those officers families. Multi-
ply those scenarios, which were my personal expe- n Fourth, we must recognize that it is the patrol
rience, against the impact of the thousands of officer on the street who will be the first to con-
civilian Iraqi casualties by suicide bombers, and you front this threat on American soil. We will not
have a measurable sense of just how quickly any have the luxury of containment and a traditional
sense of order can devolve out of control. Explosive Ordnance Disposal response. We must
The public safety of our communities, our train patrol officers in the most foreign and
management of the risk to our police officers, and unthinkable scenarios that they have ever faced.
n
our control of the consequences of such attacks lie
Fifth and finally, it is not just technology or street
in five elements:
skills that will save us. It is the development of
n First, we must develop technology that detects, real time intelligence that reveals the enemys
neutralizes, or destroys suicide bomb threats at intentions, tactics and strategies.
either a speed or distance that minimizes risk. In
this effort, agencies in the defense industry, such In Iraq, we continuously tried to understand
as the Department of Defense and the Joint and forecast the enemy course of action. Regret-
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organiza- tably, we must now bring that military concept
tion, are expending blood, sweat and tears to home to the domestic front.

Perspectives from Around the World 7


U.S. Air Force (USAF) Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Phillips, an Explosive Ordnances and Devices
(EOD) specialist from the 824th Airborne Red Horse (ARH), examines a bomb attached to
a simulated suicide bomber during a Safe Flag exercise at Avon Park Air Range, Florida (FL).
Safe Flag exercise is designed to ready troops to become a highly capable and responsive team
when opening air bases worldwide. Photo by SSGT Matthew Hannen (USAF), courtesy of
Department of Defense (released to public).
The Development of the
PERF Guidelines

OVERVIEW OF in Washington, D.C. The 50 participants were from


RESEARCH METHODS federal, state, and local policing agencies in the
United States; policing units in Canada, New
Prior to the development of PERFs Patrol-Level
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Israel; and
Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Guidelines for
private-sector partners, including the Memphis
Consideration, little had been offered, nationally,
Shelby Crime Commission and the Center for
to police departments about this topic. Our inter-
Technology Commercialization (See Appendices 1
national colleagues, specifically Israel and more
and 2 for the Participant List and Agenda respec-
recently the United Kingdom, appear to have devel-
tively). The conference participants discussed the
oped the majority of the responses to suicide bomb
nature of suicide bombing missions, international
threats as a direct result of their experiences. The
experiences, and challenges to policy and training
United States is less prepared, perhaps because of
development and implementation. They also iden-
limited experiences, other priorities, and/or the
tified policy concerns, such as whether a police
sheer number of departments nationwide to coor-
agencys suicide bomb policies should be developed
dinate. Other challenges to preparedness include
as a separate document or should be encapsulated
the complexity of the issue, the belief of some that
an attack is not imminent, and the feeling that there into the general use-of-force policy. This work
is little that can be done to prepare for such an allowed the PERF staff to begin developing the
unpredictable event. guidelines, as well as to identify site visits and fur-
PERF set out to examine the issues pertaining ther research that would be necessary to complete
to suicide bomb threat response, identify American the project.
and international departments that have developed
policy and/or tactics to address such threats, and PERF Interview Guide
develop guidelines that could assist departments in
preparing for a suicide bomb incident. The research PERF developed an interview guide to facilitate dis-
model included: a conference and summit with cussion during the site visits and interviews (See
stakeholders, site visits, interviews, and review of Appendix 5). This guide was designed to help the
open-source and restricted data for relevant arti- interviewers focus their research on certain topics,
cles, training materials, and/or protocols. such as: whether a police agencys existing policies
specifically addressed suicide bombers; how an
agency would respond to various scenarios suggest-
Initial Conference: Suicide Bombing ing that a suicide bombing might be imminent;
Preparedness and Response agencies use of various terms regarding suicide
PERF began this project with the first of two stake- bombings; agencies use of bomb squads; and the
holders meetings, the Suicide Bombing Prepared- specific tactics that patrol officers are taught to
ness and Response Conference, on March 31, 2006 address threats of suicide bombers.

The Development of the PERF Guidelines 9


Site Visits a myriad of topics pertinent to international
PERF conducted site visits with the following police policing communities and less-lethal force alter-
departments/agencies: New York City; Los Angeles; natives, including suicide bomb response and the
U.S. Capitol Police; Metropolitan Police Service of potential use of chemical calmatives to inca-
London; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and pacitate individuals or crowds.
Explosives; Department of Homeland Security; n The Federal Bureau of Investigation created two
U.S. Secret Service; and the Israel Police Force. Dur- multicast DVDs related to suicide bombing
ing each site visit, PERF staffers met with bomb threats. The multicasts feature prominent police
squad specialists, special weapons and tactics chiefs and federal officials talking about pre-
(SWAT) and related specialized units, counter-ter- paredness and response to threats and related
rorism units, and patrol divisions. Site visits were situations.
integral to identifying department policies, proce-
dures, equipment, and future needs with regard to
suicide bomb threat response. Data
Open-Source Data
Interviews PERF utilized open-source materials such as:
academic articles related to suicide bomber ideolo-
In addition to the interviews conducted during the
gies and evolutions; military documents related to
site visits, PERF interviewed a number of individu-
explosives and standoff distances; police doctrines
als with expertise in this area, including Terry
such as active-shooter protocols; explosives training
Gainer, then-chief of the U.S. Capitol Police; Major
materials offered by government and private-sector
General Mickey Levy, former Israel Police com-
sources; and media reports of bombing incidents. A
mander of the district of Jerusalem; and Michael
sample of articles and documents reviewed include:
Heidingsfield, former U.S. State Department Police
Robert Papes The Chicago Project on Suicide Terror-
Advisor to Iraqi Police Forces. Interviews also
ism; the Institute of Land Warfares paper on Sui-
included various meetings and briefings attended by
cide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004);
PERF staff to obtain further insight on the topic:
Penn State Universitys Advantages and Limitations
n The U.S. Department of Homeland Security of Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal Technique
Office of Bombing Prevention held an Advisory (2000); and Department of the Army, National
Group Conference on December 45, 2006 to Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), Intelligence
discuss a national strategy for bombing preven- and Security Commands Improvised Explosive
tion to present to the President. Device Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet. All of this
n
information was useful in understanding the wide
The Forum on Crime & Justice, a University of
picture of suicide bomb threats, policing, and soci-
Pennsylvania program that brings federal legisla-
ety at large, as well as the specifics of thwarting such
tive- and executive-branch officials together with
attacks, such as training opportunities and tactics.
criminal justice practitioners and other leaders to
discuss critical issues, held a luncheon discussion Restricted Data
on suicide bombers on August 25, 2006. Speakers
PERF examined restricted-source data from
included Chief (and former PERF President) Gil
police departments, bomb specialists, policing and
Kerlikowske, Seattle; Chief Liz Wollen, University
specialized membership organizations, and other
of Oklahoma; and Jeff Fuller of the National
sources. These documents are labeled sensitive,
Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board.
for law enforcement only, for official use only,
n The International Law Enforcement Forum, an and so on. The material contained in the docu-
international network of security professionals, ments included information such as specific tactical
held an event on November 79, 2006 to discuss maneuvers and drafts of departmental protocols.

10 The Development of the PERF Guidelines


GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT AND departments. The event highlighted the complexi-
REVIEW PROCESS ties and sensitivities surrounding various prepared-
ness and response methods that could be utilized.
The PERF site visits, interviews, and open and
However, it was abundantly clear that most depart-
restricted-source research led to the development of
ments wanted national guidelines to help them
nearly 100 initial draft Guidelines for Consideration
begin developing policies within their own agen-
regarding patrol-level response to a suicide bomb
cies. Nearly two days worth of discussion regarding
threat. The overall purpose of the guidelines was
the guidelines resulted in another evolution of the
to answer the question: What should first
process, with the nearly 100 initial draft guidelines
responders doand what should they not do
boiled down to 68 vetted guidelines.
when encountering a potential suicide bomber?
The guideline development process posed a
challenge: Those drafting the guidelines strove to Guideline Considerations
avoid too much specificity, which could render
The Guidelines for Consideration were finalized
guidelines inapplicable to certain agencies, but also
and vetted by PERF. Feedback from Summit partic-
to avoid writing guidelines that were so general they
ipants resulted in modification of some guidelines,
would fail to offer much assistance. Guidelines
elimination of others, and creation of new ones.
often were based on multiple sources of informa-
Inclusion of guidelines in the final document (and
tion; in some cases guidelines were based on a
strong consensus in the literature and research, exclusion of others through the vetting process) are
while other guidelines reflected a melding of several not meant to imply 100-percent consensus. PERF
perspectives. Guidelines were first vetted by PERF took into consideration all feedback and comments
executive management and lead researchers on the related to each guideline. And while the guidelines
project. As a result of this review, guidelines were may not necessarily reflect the individual views of
revised, eliminated or newly created. each participant or each participating department,
they do reflect the amassed wealth of knowledge
collected during this project regarding suicide
Patrol-Level Response to a bomb threat preparation and response.
Suicide Bomb Threat Summit PERF recognizes that each potential suicide
The most critical step in the process was the vetting bomb threat will include a dynamic set of variables
of the guidelines at the summit meeting in Balti- that may not be fully covered by each guideline. The
more on January 1718, 2007. Participants from guidelines do not discount the need for proper train-
the previous conference were invited, as well as oth- ing in risk and situational assessments. Further, the
ers identified during the project, to review the guidelines are meant to be considered in conjunc-
PERF proposed guidelines, protocol, and glossary. tion with existing use-of-force policies and train-
(See Appendices 3 and 4 for the Participant List and ing protocols. Departments should consult their
Agenda respectively.) Prior to the summit, the legal counsel prior to guideline implementation to
guidelines and supporting materials (the Glossary ensure that the guidelines are legally sound and
and the Graduated Force Options Protocol) were acceptable within their jurisdiction and in conjunc-
sent to each participant for preliminary review. Par- tion with other legal requirements. This legal review
ticipants were asked to review the guidelines with will also encourage the cooperation of local govern-
their police leadership and bring feedback to the ment officials and employees in a comprehensive
summit. During this event, participants from more and collective approach to this very sensitive issue.
than 30 policing agencies, both national and inter- Further, guidelines should be examined in the con-
national, revised the guidelines through discussion text of the National Incident Management System
and debate on each guidelines appropriateness to (NIMS) and coordinated at the local, state, regional
policy and/or training domains for individual and federal levels as most appropriate.

The Development of the PERF Guidelines 11


The following guidance alone will not prevent The glossary was also vetted through the Summit
or successfully eliminate threats of suicide bombing participants and modified as necessary.
incidents. However, our goal is to provide some
assistance to preparing for a sensitive and complex
issue: first-responder actions in a suicide bomb Description of the
threat situation. Graduated Force Options Protocol
PERF developed the Graduated Force Options Proto-
col, a visual tool to use in conjunction with the guide-
Description of the Glossary of Terms lines, to demonstrate how threat assessments of
The Glossary of Terms was developed early in various suicide bomb incident scenarios lead to differ-
PERFs work to ensure that the research staff was ent levels of intervention and force. Although each
using terminology consistently and uniformly in scenario is likely to be different, a threat assessment
discussions. Further, PERF identified subtleties in must take place based on the scenario, and an inter-
terminology and definitions during site visits and vention level will be determined based on the assess-
interviews that, if not clarified with a glossary, ment. Assessments are not static and may in fact
could have led to confusion when speaking about change as the scenario develops. Therefore, continual
the topic to a wider audience. assessments may change the level of intervention ap-
Items were included in the glossary if they plied to each scenario. The Graduated Force Options
commonly appeared in research or conversation re- Protocol is meant to highlight the various dynamics
garding the topic. Definitions were adopted using related to assessments and interventions while also al-
open source materials, departmental definitions, or lowing mobility between the categories as the threat
a hybrid of both. This glossary proved useful in de- changes. The Protocol should be considered as a tool
veloping guidelines and sharing them with others. in conjunction with the Guidelines for Consideration.

12 The Development of the PERF Guidelines


Patrol-Level Response
to a Suicide Bomb Threat:
PERF Guidelines for Consideration

GENERAL 6. Policy development should include a review of


officers legal authority and tactics (on private
1. Generally, the principles of an agencys suicide and public property).
bomb response protocols should be consistent 7. Agencies suicide bomb response policies should
with an agencys use of force policies, procedures be flexible in order to adapt to the variation in
and training. threats and level of response.
2. Similarly, the principles of an agencys active 8. Agencies should develop strong operational link-
shooter protocol should be considered in the ages between patrol and SWAT, bomb squad and
development of the suicide bomb response policy. specialized units.
3. Law enforcement agencies should create a stand 9. Agencies should partner with other public and
alone policy and/or training curriculum ad- private organizations, as necessary, to develop
dressing the response to suicide bomb threats. interagency and multijurisdictional collabora-
4. The suicide bomb response policy should state tion, policy, planning and training.
clear strategic objectives that include: 10. In developing a suicide bomber response pro-
n Preservation of life; tocol, agencies should consider graduated use
n Prevention and reduction of the impact of of force options consistent with the depart-
terrorism; ments use of force policies (see suggested sui-
n
cide bomb Graduated Force Option Protocol).
Providing for responses that include other
agencies; and 11. Officers should consider the suicide bomb
n Providing a framework for law enforcement graduated force option protocol prior to the use
and emergency response for other similar of deadly force.
incidents of crime, significant accidents, or 12. In the event of any suicide bomb threat, a
natural emergencies. supervisor should immediately respond and
5. A suicide bomb response policy should include take charge.
incident response and contingency plans for pre- 13. Upon confirmation of a credible suicide bomb
incident, incident, and post-incident phases, as threat, a member of the executive command
well as address required support unit response. should assume responsibility for the incident as
soon as practical.

NOTE: Words/phrases in boldface in the guidelines are included in the glossary of terms. Some guidelines
are repeated because they are applicable to more than one section of the document.

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration 13


14. Agencies should consult, inform and engage they use a handheld police radio (0-29 watts) in
elected and other community leaders about proximity to a suspected suicide bomber.
suicide bomb response policies.
18. Officers should position themselves at least 170
ft. (10 police car lengths) away from a suspect if
Threat and Risk Assessments they use a vehicle-mounted police radio (3049
watts) in proximity to a suspected suicide
15. Agency response plans should include bomber.
processes that require the completion of threat
19. Upon arrival at the scene, responding officers
and risk assessments and the extent of the dan-
should report the following information:
ger posed to police and the public.
n Location of suspect and officer;
a. Threat assessments should include:
n
n
Description of suspect and/or device;
Location of the incident, whether
contained, static or mobile; n Areas/streets unsafe for responding units or
n
general public to enter;
The method of the attacker (i.e., bomb
worn on the body, carried, or in a vehicle); n Number and location of innocent persons
n
in close proximity to suspect; and
Descriptions of suspects and suspected
n Presence of any injured persons and the
devices; and
n
possibility of safe evacuation.
If possible, identify the intended/possible
target (e.g. crowded public spaces, notable 20. Officers should request the response of special-
buildings, events, VIP presence, etc.). ized support units when threat and risk assess-
b. Risk assessment should include: ment dictates such a response.
n Danger posed by the device and potential
evacuation area size; Safe Distances and Evacuations
n Risks of evacuation (versus sending to
cover); 21. When possible, officers should confront a sus-
pected suicide bomber in an isolated or less
n Hazards and danger to emergency
populated area.
responders; and
n Other safety issues. 22. While every effort should be made to maintain
a safe distance from a suicide bomb suspect,
c. Responders should continue to review the
there may be unanticipated situations in which
threat and risk assessments throughout the officers find themselves within close proximity
incident and consider designating a specific to the suspect. Under these extreme circum-
officer to that task. stances, it may be necessary to grab a suspects
arms and keep them away from the torso or in
OPERATIONS AND TACTICS some other restraint tactic.

Communications 23. If the bomber is on the ground while detained


by an officer(s), officers should restrain the sus-
16. Officers should limit the use of electronic com- pects hands to prevent movement.
munications in close proximity to a suspected
suicide bomber. 24. When maintaining a safe distance, officers
should seek cover from a potential blast, heat
17. Officers should position themselves at least 100 and shrapnel from both the device and other
ft. (6 police car lengths) away from a suspect if objects (glass, bomb debris, etc.).

14 Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration


25. Officers should attempt to contain the sus- and assess the situation in a possible suicide
pected suicide bomber, and should not allow bomb threat.
the suspect to leave the area or enter a vehicle.
36. Patrol vehicles should include specific equip-
26. In general, take cover and attempt to maintain ment needed to implement suicide bomb/
a safe standoff distance from a suspected sui- critical incident plans. Equipment may include:
cide bomber.9 n 3 rolls each of inner and outer perimeter
27. If a suspect is aware of the officers presence, tape
officers should not close on these distances to n Megaphone/bullhorn
negotiate with, or handcuff, a suspect.10 n Maps
28. Where applicable, officers should evacuate n Personal Protective Equipment
endangered citizens. n Visibility gear
29. In evacuation decisions, officers should con- n Reference/flashcards
sider background and collateral injuries to n Copies of operational plans
bystanders upon the possible detonation of an
n Decision logs
explosive device.
n Radiation Protection Pagers
30. Officers should be aware that evacuation of
n Gauze masks; eyewear; gloves and boot
persons from public areas or buildings can
coverings
carry as great of a risk as keeping them in place.
37. Officers should not use Conducted Energy
31. Locking or making a building secure at the time
Devices on a suspected suicide bomber.
of the threat or attack can disrupt an attackers
movements, bar entry and save lives (be mind- 38. Shooting an area of the body that might contain
ful that a need may arise to evacuate premises a bomb carries an increased risk of detonation.
soon after).
39. If the area is secure and contained, officers should
32. Officers should remain vigilant in their efforts to generally not approach a suspect (bag, vehicle, or
detect secondary devices, additional suspects or body), even if a suspect is willing to surrender
attacks. Consideration should be given to deploy- (or appears to be dead/incapacitated) until the
ing plainclothes officers to conduct such duties. explosives are rendered safe by bomb technicians.
33. Agencies should maintain different color 40. In order to manage the police response to a sui-
perimeter tape to designate inner and outer cide bomb threat, agencies should consider
perimeters (e.g. red and yellow). developing suggested defined tasks for the first
officers arriving on the scene with three pri-
mary objectives:
General Operations and Tactics
a. Identify, locate, and contain the suspect,
34. Consider all suspected bombs live devices. take cover, pass information back to a com-
mand center, and challenge the suspect if
35. If available, and if time allows, plainclothes appropriate.
officers should respond to conduct surveillance

9. See the U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence Centers IED Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet in Appendix 6.
10. Ibid.

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration 15


b. Focus on warning bystanders, clearing the 49. Based on the actions of the suspect (e.g. the
immediate vicinity of people, and securing officers have established probable cause to
witnesses/informants. believe the suspect is in possession of an explo-
c. Conduct perimeter search and surveillance sive device) and the officers belief that the sus-
activities, seeking secondary devices and/or pect represents an immediate threat of death or
accomplices. serious bodily injury to the officers or others,
officers may need to utilize deadly force to inca-
41. To avoid confusion and conflicting messages, pacitate the suspect and/or prevent detonation.
a single lead officer should be designated to
communicate with the suspect. 50. Shooting an area of the body that might contain
a bomb carries increased risk of detonation.
42. The deployment of a canine in order to intercept
a suspected suicide bomber may be considered.
TRAINING
43. Officers should attempt to seek compliance/
surrender of a suspected suicide bomber.
Behavioral Anomalies

51. Law enforcement officers should focus on


If the Suicide Bomb Suspect is Compliant behaviors rather than age, race, ethnicity, and
gender in regard to suicide bomber suspects.
44. Officers should order the suspect to show his/
52. Suicide bomb suspects may display behavioral
her hands with palms open.
anomalies that would draw attention to them-
45. When responding officers identify a suspect in selves (such as behaviors or indicators that
possession of a bomb, they should order the would be out of the ordinary). However, law
suspect to gently and slowly place the object on enforcement agencies should work to develop
the ground and have the suspect step away skills in identifying behavioral anomalies.
from the device. Anomalies include:
a. Irregularitysomething that deviates
46. If the bomber wants to surrender, officers
from the norm or from expectations.
should order him/her to remove all explosives
and clothing, and turn 360 degrees. Items b. Peculiaritysomething strange and
should be gently placed on the ground. difficult to identify or classify.

47. Officers should avoid ordering the suspect to


drop to his knees or lie on the ground. Some General Training
bomb switches are located in the chest or waist
area and may cause the explosive device to det- 53. Law enforcement agencies should create a
onate if the suspect lies down. stand alone policy and/or training curriculum
addressing the response to suicide bomb
threats.
If Suicide Bomb Suspect is Noncompliant
54. Suicide bomb training should include decision
48. If the suicide bomb suspect is contained and at making and critical thinking components in
a safe distance from others, attempts should be order to strengthen an officers ability to con-
made to negotiate with the suspect to resolve duct a situational assessment.
the situation without the need to use deadly
55. Patrol officer training should regularly include
force.
bomb technicians and representatives from
partner agencies as expert presenters.

16 Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration


56. Officers should be aware that a suicide bomb and other hazards) as well as variation in the
triggering device may be in hands, on belt, numbers of responding officers.
waistband and/or chest. Triggers may also be
63. Training should include exercises that simulate
held by a third party (handler) in the crowd.
terrorist activities to be played out by a group
57. Suicide bomb response training for patrol offi- of officers to test and better prepare responses
cers should incorporate live explosives demon- to such situations (e.g. the purchase of explo-
strations to highlight realistic threats. sive materials at a local hardware store, parking
a large vehicle in front of a precinct, etc.).
58. Training should provide a comprehensive
understanding of suicide bomb preparation 64. Training should include instructions not to
and delivery processes (e.g. recruiting, training; approach the bomber, even if dead/incapaci-
planning, reconnaissance, surveillance; bomb tated, wounded or apparently willing to sur-
assembly; support, etc.). render. In this scenario, officers should be
aware that a threat still exists; and the bomber
59. Patrol officers should receive suicide bomb-
may be attempting to initiate the explosive
making recognition trainingenabling them to
device when officers approach.
detect/identify bomb making equipment, odors,
supplies and other paraphernalia (such as explo- 65. Agencies should develop training for officers
sive device switches and various types of both that allows them to make contact with, and
commercial and homemade explosive materials). immobilize, suspected suicide bombers when
deadly force is not reasonable (intermediate
60. Dedicated in-service training should be consid-
strategies).
ered for patrol officers on terrorism/suicide
bomb intelligence, situational assessments, and 66. Training should include instructions not to use
explosives recognition. Training should include a Conducted Energy Device on a suspected
tabletop exercises, simulation-based training suicide bomber.
and/or role-playing activities.
67. Training should include use of force options to
61. Terrorism and suicide bomb topics (to include incapacitate suicide bombers.
current events) should occur regularly in roll
68. Training should incorporate the Department of
call training and agency bulletins.
Homeland Securitys reference library (known
62. Training should include multiple variations of as TRIPwire), for contemporary suicide bomb/
an incident (e.g. number of bombers, threats terrorism information.

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration 17


Graduated Force
Option Protocol

THREAT SUICIDE BOMB GRADUATED FORCE


ASSESSMENT INCIDENT SCENARIO INTERVENTION LEVEL

Low Person acting suspiciously and: Citizen contact: Conventional


a. No device seen stop and/or frisk without
firearms drawn
b. No intelligence other than call
c. Possibly some behavioral
anomalies

Medium Person acting suspiciously and: Armed felony stop (including


a. No device seen less lethal optionsnot CED)
b. Suspicion from intelligence,
information, or behavioral
anomaly

High Suicide bomb device observed Armed Intervention Graduated


or probable cause that device Force Option Sequence
is present. 1. When feasible, warning
2. Critical shot to incapacitate

Detonation

18 Graduated Force Option Protocol


PERF Patrol-Level Response
to a Suicide Bomb Threat:
Glossary of Terms

A received by the public or a member of the service,


indicating that an explosive device has been, or will
Active Shooter An active shooter is an armed be placed at a particular location(s).
person who has used deadly physical force on other
persons and continues to do so while having unre- C
stricted access to additional victims.
Conducted Energy Device (CED) A weapon
Active Shooter Protocol An agency protocol for primarily designed to disrupt a subjects central
addressing a situation involving an active shooter nervous system by means of deploying electrical
(see above). energy sufficient to cause uncontrolled muscle con-
tractions and override an individuals voluntary
Authorization to Use Deadly Force An officer is motor responses.
authorized to use lethal force when it reasonably
appears necessary: to protect himself or others Contained An incident is fixed at a location, or
from an immediate threat of death or serious bod- law enforcement has secured the scene so that a sus-
ily injury; or to prevent a crime where the suspects pect(s) is unable to move away from that point.
actions place persons in jeopardy of death or seri-
ous bodily injury; or to apprehend a fleeing felon D
for a crime involving serious bodily injury or the
use of lethal force where there is substantial risk Deadly Force Any tactic or use of force that has
that the person whose arrest is sought will cause an intended, natural, and probable consequence of
death or serious bodily injury to others if appre- serious physical injury or death.
hension is delayed.
E
B
Executive Command A level/rank of law
Bomb Any article, detonated by mechanical or enforcement leadership that is beyond simply oper-
electrical means, which may possibly contain ational or supervisory, and which maintains
chemical, gas, liquid or other substance capable of responsibility for the wider resources of the agency.
causing a fire, explosion, burn, or other chemical
reaction intended to cause injury to a person or G
result in damage and/or destruction of property.
Graduated Force Option Protocol A graduated
Bomb Threat Any communication, including use of force model that may be considered when
written correspondences or telephone calls, responding to a threat of a suicide bomb suspect.

PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms 19


Graduated Use of Force A training philosophy reasonable person under the attendant circum-
that supports the progressive and reasonable escala- stances to believe that an individual has committed
tion and de-escalation of officer-applied force in or is committing a criminal offense or an infraction.
proportional response to the actions and level of
resistance offered by a suspect. The level of R
response is based upon the situation encountered at
the scene and the actions of the suspect in response Reasonable Suspicion Knowledge of articulable
to the officers commands. Such a response may facts or circumstances that are objectively, and
progress from the officers physical presence at the without resort to arbitrary profiling, sufficient to
scene to the application of deadly force. induce a reasonable person under the attendant cir-
cumstances to suspect that an individual has
H engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in crim-
inal activity.
Handler A person who delivers a bomb to a sui-
cide bomber and then escorts them to the target. S
The handler also provides security and instruction
on how to detonate the bomb. Secondary Devices Explosive devices placed at
the scene of an ongoing emergency response that
Homicide Bomber See suicide bomber. are intended to cause casualties among responders.
Secondary explosive devices are designed to
I explode after a primary explosion or other major
emergency response event that has attracted large
Incapacitate To make someone unable to per- numbers of responders to the scene in order to
form a certain action. inflict additional injury, damage, and fear.

Inner and Outer Perimeter Tape The inner Specialized Units Law enforcement and/or
perimeter tape in a suicide bomb threat situation is emergency response personnel trained in unique
used to alert law enforcement personnel of danger areas that require particular knowledge and skills.
from the possible detonation of an explosive device Examples include: special weapons; bomb disposal;
or to secure an area immediately adjacent to where air support; hostage negotiation; investigations;
such an incident occurred. The outer perimeter media interaction; surveillance; hazardous materi-
tape is used to protect others from similar risks or als; and canines.
to secure the area adjacent to the inner perimeter.
Stand Alone Policy An agency sanctioned docu-
M ment that is specific to an issue or circumstance
focusing narrowly on the subject.
Mobile A suicide bomb incident/suspect is not
at a fixed location, and suspects are traveling or Static A suicide bomb incident/suspect is sta-
moving, and law enforcement has not secured the tionary at a point or location, but, which has not
scene. been secured by law enforcement personnel.

P Suicide Belt/Vest A garment filled with explo-


sive materials and armed with a detonator (toggle
Probable Cause Knowledge of articulable facts or rocker-type switch attached to the mid-section
or circumstances that are objectively, and without of the device or handheld), worn by suicide
resort to arbitrary profiling, sufficient to induce a bombers. Explosive belts and vests are usually

20 PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms


packed with nails, screws, bolts, and other objects Surrogate A third party or person who is used to
that serve as shrapnel to maximize the number of transport, carry or wear a bomb or improvised
casualties in the explosion. Belts and vests may con- device, whether knowingly (by coercion or threat) or
tain some types of anticoagulant making them innocently (without knowledge of the explosives).
more deadly.
n
T
Belts may be worn on the stomach or lower
abdomen area.
Terrorist A person who employs terror as a
n Vests may be worn on the chest and stomach political weapon.
area. They often have shoulder straps.
Third-Party Attackers Additional suspect(s) in
Suicide Bomber An individual (including a ter- a suicide bombing that may include support team
rorist) who is willing to die by means of an explo- to the initial attack phase (transport, logistics, look-
sion in order to kill or injure other people and/or out, camera operator, and third-party explosive
cause property damage. detonator) or second phase (suspects that launch a
further attack after the primary assault).
Suicide Bombing An attack using explosives on
people or property, committed by a person who TRIPwire Technical Resource for Incident Pre-
knows the explosion will cause his or her own death. vention: an online, collaborative, information-shar-
ing network for bomb squads and other law
Suicide Mission A scheme in which planning enforcement officials to learn about current terror-
takes place to facilitate a person killing him/herself ist bombing tactics, techniques, and procedures,
by means of an explosion in order to kill or injure including improvised explosive device (IED) design
other people and/or cause property damage. and emplacement.

PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms 21


About the Authors

Lisa L. Spahr Josh Ederheimer


Lisa Spahr is an Associate for Police Executive Joshua Ederheimer is a Captain with the Metropol-
Research Forums (PERF) Center on Force and itan Police Department of the District of Columbia.
Accountability (CFA). She has more than 14 years of He is currently serving in the Executive Office of
experience in research and development in various the Chief, coordinating the transition efforts for
areas including law enforcement, military applica- newly appointed police Chief Cathy L. Lanier.
tions, and the dual field of law and psychiatry. At Captain Ederheimer is the former Director of
PERF, Ms. Spahr manages multiple research projects, the Police Executive Research Forums (PERF) Cen-
including: the 2006 Critical Issues in Policing Series, ter on Force & Accountability (CFA) in Washing-
patrol response to suicide bombing threats; ton, D.C. He joined PERF in January 2004, as a
redesigning an officer discipline system; less lethal Senior Associate after a successful career with the
weapons impact on injuries and liabilities; and iden- Metropolitan Police Department. He subsequently
tifying effective homicide investigative strategies. returned to MPD in January 2007.
Prior to joining PERF, Ms. Spahr served as a At MPD, he had attained the rank of Inspector
project manager for the University of Pittsburgh, and was named Director of the D.C. Police Civil
Law and Psychiatry Research Department, inter- Rights and Force Investigations Division. During his
viewing psychopaths in prisons and juvenile deten- tenure at the MPD, he acquired expertise as a com-
tion facilities. In this capacity, she screened and manding officer in several areas, including: internal
interviewed more than 400 prisoners, trained inter- affairs; use of force; equal employment opportunity;
viewers on various interviewing techniques, and and civil rights divisions. Captain Ederheimer
administered a battery of clinical assessments. Ms. reengineered numerous processes, and developed
Spahr has also served as adjunct faculty, instructing and led several operational units that emerged as
in both law enforcement and psychology course- national models in such areas as: internal and force
work, and has managed a community corrections investigations; consent decree implementation,
facility in Philadelphia. She has traveled extensively police accountability, policing in public housing,
and has experience working with both interna- and environmental crimes investigations.
tional and domestic policing communities. He specializes in police leadership, management
Ms. Spahr received her Bachelor of Arts reform, and business process reengineering. Captain
degree in psychology from Temple University in Ederheimer is also an adjunct professor at American
Philadelphia, and Master of Science degree in inves- Universitys Department of Law, Justice, and Society,
tigative psychology from the University of Liver- where he has taught both graduate and undergradu-
pool, England. She is a member of the American ate courses. He holds a Bachelors Degree in justice
Psychological Association, the Psychology-Law from American University, and a Masters Degree in
Society, and the American Society of Criminology. management from Johns Hopkins University.

About the Authors 23


David Bilson research to develop a model for police leadership.
Chief Superintendent David Bilson has served in For the past three years Chief Superintendent
the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), New Scot- Bilson has been focused on the development of
land Yard, London, for over 28 years. He has sub- police performance metrics and operational frame-
stantial borough policing experience at operational works within the operational commands, with
and command levels in addition to more strategic partner agencies and at group command and cor-
posts at command group and corporate headquar- porate levels. He has continued to develop his
ters levels. He has worked on policy and program knowledge of performance metrics, frameworks
development; leadership, performance and review and mapping systems through field research visits
frameworks; and in internal affairs investigations. to U.S. policing agencies in Philadelphia, New York,
He holds a Masters Degree in Business Administra- Baltimore, Chicago, Newark and Washington. Cur-
tion from Middlesex University, where he attended rently, he is a Fellow at PERF, contributing his inter-
full-time on an MPS Scholarship, completing national experience to a host of ongoing projects.

24 About the Authors


About the Police Executive
Research Forum

T he Police Executive Research Forum


(PERF) is a professional organization of progressive
chief executives of city, county and state law
they are primarily from Harvard Universitys
Kennedy School of Government.
PERFs success is built on the active involve-
enforcement agencies who collectively serve more ment of its members. The organization also has
than 50 percent of the U.S. population. In addition, types of membership that allow it to benefit from
PERF has established formal relationships with the diverse views of criminal justice researchers, law
international police executives and law enforce- enforcement professionals of all ranks and others
ment organizations from around the globe. Mem- committed to advancing policing services to all
bership includes police chiefs, superintendents, communities. As a nonprofit organization, PERF is
sheriffs, state police directors, university police committed to the application of research in polic-
chiefs, public safety directors, and other law ing and to promoting innovation that will enhance
enforcement professionals. Established in 1976 as a the quality of life in our communities. PERFs
non-profit organization, PERF is unique in its com- objective is to improve the delivery of police serv-
mitment to the application of research in policing ices and the effectiveness of crime control through
and the importance of higher education for police the exercise of strong national leadership, the pub-
executives. Besides a commitment to police innova- lic debate of criminal justice issues, the develop-
tion and professionalism, PERF members must ment of a body of research about policing and the
hold a four-year college degree. provision of vital management services to all police
PERF continues to conduct some of the most agencies.
innovative police and criminal justice research and PERF has developed and published some of
provides a wide variety of management and techni- the leading literature in the law enforcement field.
cal assistance programs to police agencies through- Recently, PERF released three publications on con-
out the world. PERFs groundbreaking work on temporary law enforcement issues. The books
community and problem-oriented policing, racial entitled Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of
profiling, use of force, less lethal weapons, and crime Force, Police Management of Mass Demonstrations:
reduction strategies has earned it a prominent posi- Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches and A
tion in the police community. PERF continues to Gathering StormViolent Crime in Americaserve
work toward increased professionalism and excel- as practical guides to help police leaders make more
lence in the field through its publications and train- informed decisions. In addition, PERF has released
ing programs. PERF sponsors and conducts the a series of white papers on terrorism in the local law
Senior Management Institute for Police (SMIP). enforcement context, including: Protecting Your
This program provides comprehensive professional Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law
management and executive development training to Enforcement, which examined such issues as local-
police chiefs and law enforcement executives. federal partnerships, working with diverse commu-
Convened annually in Boston, SMIP instructors nities, bioterrorism, and intelligence sharing. Other
include professors from leading universities, though publications include Increasing Community-Police

About the Police Executive Research Forum 25


Partnerships to Fight Crime: A Case Study of Analysis Through Computer Mapping (1995);
USAIDs Grants Pen Anti-Crime Initiative in And Justice For All: Understanding and Controlling
Jamaica (2005); Managing a Multijurisdictional Police Use of Deadly Force (1995); Why Police
Case: Identifying Lessons Learned from the Sniper Organizations Change: A Study of Community-
Investigation (2004); Community Policing: The Oriented Policing (1996); and Police Antidrug
Past, Present and Future (2004); and Command Tactics: New Approaches and Applications. PERF
Performance: Career Guide for Police Executives publications are used for training, promotion
(1999). Other PERF titles include the only authori- exams and to inform police professionals about
tative work on racial profiling, Racial Profiling: A innovative approaches to community problems.
Principled Response (2001); Recognizing Value in The hallmark of the program is translating the lat-
Policing (2002); The Police Response to Mental Illness est research and thinking about a topic into police
(2002); Citizen Review Resource Manual (1995); practices that can be tailored to the unique needs of
Managing Innovation in Policing (1995); Crime a jurisdiction.

Other publications in the Critical Issues in Policing series are:

Challenge to Change: The 21st Century Policing Project


Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force
Police Management of Mass Demonstrations
A Gathering StormViolent Crime in America
Violent Crime in America: 24 Months of Alarming Trends
Police Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Case Studies and Lessons from the Field
Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force

To learn more about PERF, visit www.policeforum.org.

26 About the Police Executive Research Forum


About the PERF Center on
Force and Accountability

C reated in April 2005, the PERF Center on


Force and Accountability (CFA) is designed to be a
significant resource for PERF members and others
statistics, tracking, and analysis; vehicle pursuits;
and violence against law enforcement officers. As it
relates to police accountability, CFA competencies
in law enforcement, and to serve as the principal include community involvement; consent decrees/
clearinghouse for ideas, strategies, and data that memoranda of agreement; discipline and conduct
will address problems related to police use of force review; early intervention systems and processes;
and accountability. Ultimately, the CFA provides equal employment opportunities; internal investi-
law enforcement executives with information and gations; law enforcement ethics; misconduct statis-
strategies that will help them make more informed tics, tracking, and analysis; policy development;
decisions as they serve their communities. technology; training; and trends and identification
The PERF Center on Force and Accountabil- of promising approaches.
ity has four primary objectives: The CFA released national guidelines for con-
n
ducted energy devices that have been embraced by
Identify emerging trends and seek effective new
law enforcement agencies throughout the country.
strategies;
Most recently, the CFA gained national recognition
n Conduct groundbreaking research; for work conducted on the rise in violent crime.
n
The outcome was a 2006 publication entitled,
Provide high quality technical assistance to law
A Gathering StormViolent Crime in America.
enforcement agencies;
Further, the CFA completed two guides on early
n Create a central resource for information regard- intervention systems to help agencies better man-
ing use-of-force and police accountability issues. age their human resources. The CFA provided
technical assistance to municipalities seeking to
To that end, the CFA is continually develop- assess their use of force and disciplinary systems
ing competencies in several specific areas. For use of within their police departments. The CFA also
force, CFA competencies include community out- examined critical use of force issues in a 2005
reach and accountability; equipment and weapons; publication entitled Exploring the Challenges of
investigations; police canines; policy development; Police Use of Force, and a 2006 publication entitled
review boards; tactics; technology; training; trends Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing
and identification of promising approaches; Use of Force.

To learn more about PERF and the


Center on Force & Accountability, visit www.policeforum.org.

About the PERF Center on Force and Accountability 27


About Motorola

M otorola is a Fortune 100 global com-


munications leader that provides seamless mobility
products and solutions across broadband, embed-
by providing innovative products and services to
the home.
Mobile Devices offers market-changing icons
ded systems and wireless networks. Seamless of personal technologytransforming the device
mobility means you can reach the people, things formerly known as the cell phone into a universal
and information you need in your home, auto, remote control for life. A leader in multi-mode,
workplace and all spaces in between. Seamless multi-band communications products and tech-
mobility harnesses the power of technology conver- nologies, Mobile Devices designs, manufactures, sells
gence and enables smarter, faster, cost-effective and and services wireless subscriber and server equip-
flexible communication. Motorola had sales of U.S. ment for cellular systems, portable energy storage
$35.3 billion in 2005. products and systems, servers and software solutions
Today, Motorola is comprised of three busi- and related software and accessory products.
nesses: Connected Home Solutions; Mobile Networks & Enterprise is a leading provider
Devices; and Networks & Enterprise. of end-to-end infrastructure, integrated voice and
Connected Home Solutions provides a scala- data communications, and information solutions.
ble, integrated end-to-end system for the delivery of Networks & Enterprise delivers mission-critical
broadband services that keeps consumers secure two-way radio, cellular and wireless broad-
informed, entertained and connected. Its technol- band systems to meet the needs of public safety,
ogy enables network operators and retailers to government, private, service provider and enter-
create and execute on new business opportunities prise customers worldwide.

To learn more about Motorola, visit www.motorola.com.

28 About Motorola
APPENDIX 1
Critical Issues in Policing Series:
Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response
Washington, D.C. n March 31, 2006

PARTICIPANTS

Major Barry Barnard Helen Cryer Captain Jeffrey Herold


Prince William County Staff Officer to AC House D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department Metropolitan Police Service, Police Department
London
Anna Berke Chief Melvin High
Conference Manager Lieutenant Richard Cundiff Prince Georges County
Police Executive Research Prince William County Police Department
Forum Police Department
Deputy Chief Stephen Holl
Joseph Billy Captain Nancy Demme Arlington Police Department
Deputy Assistant Director Montgomery County
FBI, Counter Terrorism Unit Police Department Assistant Commissioner of
Operations Stephen House
Michael Bouchard Josh Ederheimer Metropolitan Police Service,
Assistant Director Director, Center on London
ATF, Field Operations Force and Accountability
Police Executive Research Sergeant John Ingoldsby
Tim Boyle Forum New York Police Department
Vice President
Motorola, Inc. Chief Terrance Gainer Clifford Karchmer
U.S. Capitol Police Director of Federal Programs
Lieutenant Jeff Cotner Center for Technology
Dallas Police Department Sergeant Joseph Gentile Commercialization
D.C. Metropolitan
Jim Cronin Police Department Inspector Matthew Klein
Associate Director of Internal
Police Executive Research Chief Polly Hanson Affairs Division
Forum Metro Transit Police D.C. Metropolitan
Department Police Department
Lieutenant Mike Crosbie
Prince William County Michael Heidingsfield Sergeant Apollo Kowalyk
Police Department President and CEO Edmonton Police Service
Memphis Shelby Crime Police Executive Research
Commission Forum Fellow

Appendix 1. Participant List from the Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference 29
Commander Cathy Lanier Emeka Moneme Commander David Sobczyk
D.C. Metropolitan Chief of Staff Chicago Police Department
Police Department Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority Corina Sol Brito
Commander Mickey Levy Senior Associate
Israel Police Department Major Larry Moser Police Executive Research
Fairfax County Police Forum
Deputy Chief Sharon Lubinski Department
Minneapolis Police Department Lisa Spahr
Jerry Murphy Associate
Andrea Luna Director, Homeland Security Police Executive Research
Senior Associate and Program Development Forum
Police Executive Research Police Executive Research
Forum Forum Michael Stenger
U.S. Secret Service
Chet Lunner Officer Marcos Perez
Acting Director Miami Police Department Captain Kathy Suey
Office of State and Local Las Vegas Police Department
Coordination, DHS Brigadier General Simon Perry
Israel Police Department Chuck Wexler
Superintendent Neville Executive Director
Matthews Captain Charles Roper Police Executive Research
New Zealand Embassy Los Angeles Police Department Forum

Lieutenant Mike McCrimon Thomas Ryan Lieutenant Andrew White


Las Vegas Metropolitan D.C. Emergency Management D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department Agency Police Department

Lieutenant Tom Monahan Michael Seelman


Las Vegas Metro Police Management and
Department Program Analyst
FBI

30 Appendix 1. Participant List from the Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference
APPENDIX 2
Critical Issues in Policing Series:
Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response
Washington, D.C. n March 31, 2006

AGENDA

Friday March 31, 2006


9:00 AM 10:00 AM
Welcome & Introductions
Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum

10:00 AM 10:30 AM
U.K. Police Preparedness and Response
Stephen House, Assistant Commissioner of Operations, London Metropolitan Police Service

10:45 AM 11:30 AM
Israel Police Force: Lessons Learned
Brigadier General Simon Perry, Israel Police

11:30 AM 12:15 PM
Lessons from Iraq
Michael Heidingsfield, President and CEO, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

1:00 PM 1:30 PM
Facilitated Group Discussion: U.S. Federal Law Enforcement and Security Preparedness Response
Michael Stenger, Assistant Director Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service
Joseph Billy, Deputy Assistant Director Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Michael Bouchard, Assistant Director Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

1:30 PM 3:30 PM
Facilitated Group Discussion: Critical Issues for Major U.S. Cities
Local Law Enforcement Preparedness

3:30 PM 4:30 PM
Where Do We Go From Here?

Appendix 2. Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference Agenda 31


APPENDIX 3
Critical Issues in Policing Series:
Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb
Threat Summit
Baltimore, MD n January 17 18, 2007

PARTICIPANTS

Eric Albertsen Jim Cronin Lieutenant Kevin Gaddis


Project Assistant Associate Metro Transit Police
Police Executive Research Police Executive Research Department
Forum Forum
Captain Steven Gallagher
Kristopher Baumann Captain Mike Crosbie Norfolk Police Department
Chairman Prince William County
Fraternal Order of Police, Police Department Major Dale Greene
D.C. Metropolitan Police Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Department Lieutenant Richard Cundiff Police Department
Prince William County
David Bilson Police Department Michael Heidingsfield
Chief Superintendent President and CEO
Metropolitan Police Service, Sergeant Dennis Dudley Memphis Shelby Crime
London Frederick Police Department Commission

Michael Bouchard Josh Ederheimer Captain Jeffrey Herold


Assistant Director Director, Center on Force D.C. Metropolitan
ATF, Field Operations and Accountability Police Department
Police Executive Research
Major Sean Breslin Forum Steven Izzett
U.S. Army Asymmetric Staff Inspector
Warfare Office Errol Etting Toronto Police Department
Director of Intelligence
Major Jeff Caslin Maryland Transportation Lieutenant Randy Jones
Baltimore County Authority Police Department Anne Arundel County
Police Department Police Department
Captain Horace Frank
Shawn Coffey Los Angeles Police Department Matthew Klein
Deputy Chief Inspector
U.S. Secret Service, Captain Gregory Fremin D.C. Metropolitan
Uniformed Division Houston Police Department Police Department

Appendix 3. Participant List from the Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit 33
Neville Matthews Albert Pearsall Lisa Spahr
Superintendent Senior Policy Analyst Associate
New Zealand Embassy COPS Office Department Police Executive Research
U.S. Department of Justice Forum
Sergeant Kevin McGoldrick
Boston Police Department Carl Peed Chief John Timoney
Director Miami Police Department
John Miller COPS Office
Assistant Director U.S. Department of Justice Drew Tracy
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Assistant Chief
Office of Public Affairs Joseph Pietro Montgomery County
Baltimore County Police Department
Ken Miller Police Department
Deputy Chief Donald Van Duyn
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Lieutenant Fred Plitt Deputy Assistant Director
Police Department Anne Arundel County Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Police Department Counterterrorism Unit
Emily Milstein-Greengart
Project Assistant Capt. Dave Pressley Dee Walker
Police Executive Research Acting Deputy Chief Assistant Chief
Forum Anne Arundel County Montgomery County
Police Department Police Department
Ralph Morten
Detective Supervisor Jim Pryor Chuck Wexler
Los Angeles Police, Bomb Squad Assistant Chief Executive Director
Seattle Police Department Police Executive Research
Jerry Murphy Forum
Director, Homeland Security Lisa Quinn
Police Executive Research Assistant to SAC Lieutenant Andrew White
Forum U.S. Secret Service D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department
Lieutenant Col. Eric Naeseth Chief Joseph Riehl
U.S. Army Asymmetric ATF, Arson & Explosives Col. Scott Williams
Warfare Office Programs Division Baltimore City Police
Department
Rick Neal Chief Thomas Robbins
Vice President, Boston University Special Agent Charles Wood
General Manager Police Department U.S. Capitol Police Department,
Motorola, Inc. Bomb Squad
Amy Schapiro
Robert Novy Senior Research Analyst
Assistant to SAC COPS Office
U.S. Secret Service U.S. Department of Justice

James Owens Sergeant Thomas Sharkey


Deputy Chief Metro Transit Police
Las Vegas Metropolitan Department
Police Department

34 Appendix 3. Participant List from the Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit
APPENDIX 4
Critical Issues in Policing Series:
Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb
Threat Summit
Baltimore, MD n January 1718, 2007

AGENDA

Wednesday, January 17, 2007


8:30 AM 8:45 AM
Welcome & Introductions
Joshua Ederheimer, Director, PERF Center on Force & Accountability
Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum
Dave Pressley, Acting Deputy Chief, Anne Arundel County Police Department

8:45 AM 9:45 AM
International Perspective
David Bilson, Chief Superintendent, Metropolitan Police Service, London
Michael Heidingsfield, President and CEO, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission (Iraq Police Advisor)

9:45 AM 10:30 AM
Chiefs Perspective
Chief John Timoney, Miami Police Department
Chief Thomas Robbins, Boston University Police

10:45 AM 11:30 AM
Local Perspective
Ralph Morten, Detective Supervisor, Los Angeles Police Department
Jeffrey Herold, Captain, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

11:30 AM 12:15 PM
Federal Perspective
Michael Bouchard, Assistant Director of Field Operations, ATF
Donald Van Duyn, Assistant Director of Counter Terrorism, FBI
Robert Novy, Assistant to SAC, U.S. Secret Service

1:15 PM 4:30 PM
Review Guidelines for Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat

Appendix 4. Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit Agenda 35


Thursday, January 18, 2007
8:30 AM 8:45 AM
Review of Progress

8:45 AM 12:30 PM
Review Guidelines for Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat (continued)

12:30 PM 12:45 PM
Closing Remarks and Adjourn

36 Appendix 4. Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit Agenda


APPENDIX 5
Critical Issues 2006
Suicide Bomber Project
Site Visit and Interview Guide (Amended)
This guide is meant to serve as a useful tool for interviews and site visits for the suicide bomber project.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT bombing and (2) there is a debate on whether it is


necessary to have specific policies regarding tactics
Experts agree that police in the United States need
and training related to suicide bombing or if these
to prepare for a suicide bomber attack. More specif-
are incorporated (or should be) into existing use of
ically, we need to prepare for our response to the
force policies.
threat of a suicide bomber. How will dispatchers
handle the calls of a detected or perceived threat?
How will first responders handle the suspected TASKING
bomber and civilians that may be nearby? Once a PERF plans to conduct a number of site visits over
threat is confirmed and in preparation of a detona- the next six months to learn more about what
tion, what do we expect will happen and how will departments (nationally and internationally) are
law enforcement respond? These split second deci- doing to prepare patrol for the imminent threats of
sions will most likely need to be made by patrol suicide bombers.
officers who will arrive on the scene first.
Law enforcement can begin preparing a
response to the threat of a suicide bomber by con- SITE VISIT GUIDE
ducting immediate and comprehensive reviews of General Language Do you use language
current policies and developing training for all offi- such as suicide bomber in policies and training? Do
cers. We can better prepare all officers to respond to you use other language, i.e., suicide terrorist?
suicide bomb threats with greater confidence in: Define the language you use. For instance, would
(1) what decisions need to be made, (2) a firm the 9/11 hijackers be called suicide bombers in your
understanding of how to assess the situation and vocabulary? If not, what would they be called?
make those decisions, and (3) tactical solutions for (Make sure you understand the language they are
handling the situation, considering the multiple using. Working definitions can be misunderstood
variables that may exist. or assumed incorrectly.)
In March PERF held a one-day forum in Scenario A call comes in saying a suspi-
Washington, D.C. in which participants began to cious person is in the city center yelling religious
discuss the multitude of issues surrounding policy ideologies and wearing a large backpack. What hap-
and tactical decisions that may be necessary in pens? How does the call get labeled and where does
addressing this threat. Two specific issues emerged: it go? Who responds (if anyone)? Now, the suspi-
(1) departments seem reluctant to talk about suicide cious person appears to be holding an object that is

Appendix 5. Site Visit and Interview Guide 37


connected underneath their clothing and their rich answer. If so, document the scenario or use the
behavior continues to be erratic. They do not above noted scenario.)
respond to the police verbal commands. What does Bomb Squads Quick overview of the squad
the responding officer do? and their work. Date of squad inception and signif-
icant changes to squad, protocol, etc How
quickly does the bomb squad assemble in a targeted
What are specific tactics that patrol are taught place? What working relationship does the bomb
to address threats of suicide bombers? squad have with patrol? Is it assumed that the bomb
Historical Perspective Identify the evolu- squad would handle a call about a suspicious per-
tion of related incidents in their jurisdiction (as son who could be a suicide bomber? If this has hap-
well as nationally recognized incidentssuch as pened, get the details of how it was processed. What
9/11) and overlay that information with the evolu- other agencies/departments does the bomb squad
tion of their bomb oriented and counter-terrorism work with to prepare for suicide bombers? Why?
squads and/ or protocols to address such threats How often? In what capacity?
(and related threats). When did they begin to start Counter-terrorism Units Same questions as
talking about suicide bomber threats? What action- above for Bomb Squad.
able items resulted from those talks and when? Do SOPS & Policies The following areas
you have an active shooter protocol? What is cur- should be examined for guidance on policy recom-
rently on the table related to suicide bomber threats mendations and tactical decisions:
(discussions, disagreements, tactics, training, n Current use of force policies, procedures and
etc)? Do you participate in Red Cell exercises? training (including active shooter protocols);
Speaking to the front line It is essential that
n Bomb squad protocols and training; and
you talk with patrol officers to gauge their under-
standing of what to do if they get a call or observe n Suicide bombing-specific policies, training and
behavior that could be a suicide bomber. What protocols (if they exist).
would they do? Have they been given guidance?
What sort of guidance have they been given and by (In all of these itemsHow do they relate to
whom? What guidance would they like? (It may or guide patrol response? Remember that an
help to deliver a scenario to get a more contextually absence of something is a finding.)

38 Appendix 5. Site Visit and Interview Guide


APPENDIX 6
U.S. Department of the Army,
National Ground Intelligence Center,
Intelligence and Security Command,
Estimates of Dangers Posed by Various Types of Explosives
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES

Challenge to Change: The 21st Century Policing Project


Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force
Police Management of Mass Demonstrations
A Gathering StormViolent Crime in America
Violent Crime in America: 24 Months of Alarming Trends
Police Planning for an Influenza Pandemic:
Case Studies and Lessons from the Field
Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force

Special thanks are due to our partners at Motorola, Inc.,


for their support of the Critical Issues in Policing Series.
This report would not have been possible without their help.

Police Executive Research Forum


1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930
Washington, DC 20036
202-466-7820
202-466-7826 fax
www.PoliceForum.org