FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147607. January 22, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963,
finding appellant Benhur Mamaril guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 8[1] of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended by RA No. 7659.

The Information filed against appellant reads:

That on or about the 1st day of February, 1999 and sometime prior thereto, in
the municipality of Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally [did] keep and possess crushed marijuana leaves
contained in seventy eight (78) sachets with a total weight of two hundred
thirty six and eighty three hundredth (236.83) grams and two (2) bricks of
marijuana fruiting tops weighing one thousand six hundred grams, each brick
weighing eight hundred (800) grams, with a total weight of one thousand
eight hundred thirty six and eighty three hundredth (1,836.83) grams, a
prohibited drug, without authority to possess the same.

CONTRARY to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known

as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[2]

When arraigned on October 8, 1999, appellant pleaded not guilty.[3] At the

pre-trial conference held on October 18, 1999, the parties admitted the
following facts:
1. That the search was made in the house and premises of the parents of the
accused where he (accused) also lives, at Ramos St., Lingayen, Pangasinan,
on February 1, 1999 at about 2:30 o clock in the afternoon;

2. That the search was conducted by the elements of the PNP particularly
SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, SPO1 Alfredo Rico and others;

3. That the policemen brought along with them a camera;

4. That the accused was in the balcony of the house when it was searched;

5. The existence of the report of physical science report No. (DT-077-99)

issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory through Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong
Cid;

6. That accused was subjected to urine sample laboratory on February 2,

1999.[4]

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Prosecutions Evidence

On January 25, 1999, the Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police
Station, represented by SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda, applied[5] before the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, for a search warrant
authorizing the search for marijuana, a prohibited drug, at the family
residence of appellant Benhur Mamaril, situated at Ramos Street, Poblacion,
Lingayen, Pangasinan. On said date, then presiding Executive Judge Eugenio
G. Ramos (now retired) issued Search Warrant No. 99-51.[6]

On February 1, 1999, at about 2:30 p.m., the Chief of Police of the Lingayen
Police Station, SPO3 Alfredo Rico, SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police
officers went to the residence of appellant and implemented Search Warrant
No. 99-51. When they arrived at appellants house, they saw appellants
mother under the house. They asked her where appellant was, and she told
them that appellant was in the house, upstairs. When they went upstairs,
they saw appellant coming out of the room. Upon seeing the policemen,
appellant turned back and tried to run towards the back door. SPO3 Rico told
appellant to stop, which appellant did. SPO3 Rico informed appellant that
they had a search warrant to search the house premises. They showed
appellant and his mother the search warrant. Appellant looked at the search
warrant and did not say anything. Thereafter, the policemen searched the
house. The search was witnessed by two members of the barangay council in
said area, namely, Barangay Kagawad Leonardo Ramos and Barangay Tanod
Valentino Quintos, whom the police brought with them.[7]

The searching team confiscated the following: (1) fifty-five (55) heat-sealed
plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves, which were found in a
buri bag (bayong) under appellants house; (2) three heat-sealed plastic
sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds contained in an
eye-glass case; (3) twenty-two (22) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
suspected marijuana leaves and seeds taken under a pillow placed on a
monobloc chair; and (4) two (2) bricks of suspected marijuana contained
inside a white and gray bag found inside the closet of appellants room. SPO3
Alfredo Rico took pictures[8] of the confiscated items and prepared a
receipt[9] of the property seized. SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. prepared a
certification[10] that the house was properly searched, which was signed by
appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the
search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to
the Lingayen Police Station and turned them over to the desk officer.[11]

The next day, on February 2, 1999, police officers Alfredo Rico, Alberto
Santiago and Rodolfo Madrid brought the confiscated articles to the Crime
Laboratory at Camp Florendo, San Fernando, La Union for examination.
Appellant was also brought there for a drug test.[12]

Police Superintendent Ma. Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, forensic chemist and
head of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Regional Office I, Camp Florendo, Parian,
San Fernando City, La Union, testified that on February 2, 1999, she received
from the Chief of Police of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a request[13] for a drug test
on the person of appellant Benhur Mamaril and a laboratory examination of
the confiscated specimens.[14] After weighing the specimens and testing the
same, Police Superintendent Cid issued a report[15] finding the
specimens[16] to be POSITIVE to the test for the presence of marijuana x x x.
[17]

Moreover, Police Superintendent Cid affirmed the findings in her report[18]

that the examination conducted on the urine sample of appellant was
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as
shabu.[19]

After the prosecution formally offered its testimonial and documentary

exhibits on March 5, 2000, appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion with
memorandum[20] contending that: (1) the exhibits of the prosecution are
inadmissible in evidence under Section 2 and Section 3 (2) of Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution as the search warrant, by virtue of which
said exhibits were seized, was illegally issued, considering that the judges
examination of the complainant and his two witnesses was not in writing; and
(2) said search warrant was illegally or improperly implemented. Appellant
prayed that all the exhibits of the prosecution be excluded as evidence or in
the alternative, that the resolution of the admissibility of the same be
deferred until such time that he has completed the presentation of his
evidence in chief. On August 25, 2000, the prosecution opposed the motion,
and the trial court denied appellants motion.[21]

The Defenses Evidence

Appellant Benhur Mamaril, 31, single, laborer, denied that he was residing at
his parents house at Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan since he has been
residing at a rented house at Barangay Matic-matic, Sta. Barabara,
Pangasinan since December 18, 1998. Appellant declared that on February 1,
1999, it was his brother and the latters family who were residing with his
mother at Ramos Street, but on said day, his brother and family were not in
the house since they were at the fishpond.[22]

Appellant testified that on February 1, 1999, he was at his parents house at

Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan, because he and his live-in partner
visited his mother on said day and arrived there at 10:00 a.m. At about 2:00
p.m. of February 1, 1999, while appellant was at the back of his parents
house, about seven to nine policemen, in civilian clothes, arrived. The
policemen asked appellant to go upstairs and they immediately handcuffed
him and brought him to the balcony of the house. He stayed at the balcony
until the search was finished after more than 30 minutes. Thereafter, he was
brought to the clinic of one Dr. Felix and a medical examination was
conducted on him. Then he was brought to the municipal hall.[23]

Appellant testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye-glass case, and the gray
and white bag containing suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of
the search when he was at the balcony of their house. He also testified that
he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time while he was testifying
in court. He admitted that the signature on the certification that the house
was properly searched was his.[24]

Moreover, appellant testified that in the early morning of February 2, 1999,

he was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, La Union where
he gave his urine sample. Appellant insinuated that the confiscated items
were only planted because he had a misunderstanding with some policemen
in Lingayen. However, he admitted that the policemen who searched his
parents house did not threaten or harm him in any way and he had no
misunderstanding with SPO3 Alfredo Rico.[25]

Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39, Lingayen,

Pangasinan, was requested to testify on the available records regarding
Search Warrant No. 99-51 on file in the trial court and to identify said
documents. Atty. Castillo testified that he only had with him the application
for search warrant, the supporting affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and
Diosdado Fernandez and the return of the search warrant.[26]

Atty. Enrico declared that before he assumed office as Branch Clerk of Court,
the person supposed to be in custody of any transcript of the searching
questions and answers made by Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos in
connection with the application for Search Warrant No. 99-51 was Mrs.
Liberata Ariston, who was then a legal researcher and at the same time OIC-
Branch Clerk of Court. However, during the trial of this case, Mrs. Liberata
Ariston was in the United States of America. Atty. Enrico averred that he
asked Mrs. Liberata Aristons daughter, Catherine Ramirez, who is a court
stenographer, about said transcript, but it has not been found. Atty. Enrico
testified that based on the records, there is no stenographic notes. He added
that they tried their best to locate the subject transcript, but they could not
find it.[27]

The Trial Courts Decision

On January 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt

the guilt of the accused of the crime of possession of marijuana defined and
penalized under Section 8 of RA 6425, as amended, this Court in the absence
of any modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000), plus costs of this suit.

The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be

credited in full in service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[28]

The Appeal

Appellant contends that the trial court made the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE

THE ARTICLES ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING
THAT SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-51 WAS ILLEGALLY ISSUED.

II

THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS TOTALLY

INADMISSIBLE THE INVENTORIED ARTICLES IN THE RECEIPT OF SEIZED
PROPERTY AND THE CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATION ISSUED THERETO
(EXHS. J AND I) SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT ASSISTED BY
COUNSEL WHEN HE SIGNED THE SAME.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[29]

Appellant prays for his acquittal on the ground that Search Warrant No. 99-51
was illegally issued considering that there was no evidence showing that the
required searching questions and answers were made anent the application
for said search warrant. Appellant pointed out that Branch Clerk of Court
Enrico O. Castillo testified that based on the records, there was no transcript
of stenographic notes of the proceedings in connection with the application
for said search warrant. Appellant thus asserts that it cannot be said that the
judge made searching questions upon the alleged applicant and his
witnesses, which is in violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and
Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Our Ruling

Appellants contention is meritorious.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under

Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of

Court, thus:

Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing

the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only
upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched.[30] In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses
personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination
must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
[31]
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39 of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, who was requested to testify on the available records kept in
their office regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51, presented before the court
only the application for search warrant[32] and the supporting affidavits[33]
of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez. Atty. Castillo could not
produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing
that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and
answers in writing as required by law. Atty. Castillo testified, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of
the proceedings of a searching questions and answers made by the Executive
Judge upon the complainant as well as the two (2) witnesses not only in
connection with application for Search Warrant 99-51 but in all of those
application covered by that record namely, 99-49, 99-50, 99-51, 99-52, 99-53
and 99-54?

A Sir, based on the records there is no transcript of [s]tenographic notes.

Q Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs. Liberata
Ariston about said transcript?

A I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday
and she told me that she will try to find on (sic) the said transcript.

Q But until now there is no transcript yet?

A Yes, sir.

Q Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the

records of this case together with the application for search warrant as well
as the supporting affidavit of the said application, but there is no records
available to have it with you and there is no proof with you?

A Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store
room which they placed is topsy turvy and all the records are scattered. So,
we are having a hard time in scanning the records, sir.

Q But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate
said transcript, Mr. Witness?

A Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the said
transcript.

Q You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic notes?

A No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir.

Q That is by a machine steno?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who
are using the machine steno to identify what cases does that stenographic
notes (sic)?

A Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find the
transcript of stenographic notes concerning Search Warrant No. 99-49 to 99-
54.[34] (Underscoring ours)

Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the
prosecution failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into
writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. The
records only show the existence of an application[35] for a search warrant
and the affidavits[36] of the complainants witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona,[37]
we held:

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.

We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the
issuing judge examined under oath, in the form of searching questions and
answers, the applicant SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda and his witnesses on January
25, 1999 as it is so stated in Search Warrant No. 99-51. Although it is possible
that Judge Ramos examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence
that the examination was put into writing as required by law. Otherwise, the
depositions in writing of the complainant and his witnesses would have been
attached to the record, together with the affidavits that the witnesses
submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor General that
the subject stenographic notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of
Court Enrico Castillo testified before the trial court because of the confused
state of the records in the latters branch when he assumed office.

The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his
right to question the legality of the search because he did not protest against
it, and even admitted during his testimony that he was neither threatened
nor maltreated by the policemen who searched their residence.
We disagree. The cases[38] cited by the Solicitor General involved a
warrantless search. In this case, the police authorities presented a search
warrant to appellant before his residence was searched. At that time,
appellant could not determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance
with the law. It was only during the trial of this case that appellant, through
his counsel, had reason to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued
causing appellant to file a motion with memorandum objecting to the
admissibility of the evidence formally offered by the prosecution. In People v.
Burgos,[39] we ruled:

Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was
given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To
constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact
that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount
to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770).
As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin
(supra):

xxxxxxxxx

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative

act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either
contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not
a consent, or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard
for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp.1180, 1181).

We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458).
In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen
showed him the search warrant as a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected[40] on
constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to
said warrant during the trial of the case,[41] after the prosecution formally
offered its evidence.[42] Under the circumstances, no intent to waive his
rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.

No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be,
their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant.[43] In Mata v. Bayona,[44]
we ruled:

.[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of
the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:

It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs,
books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to
search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal
construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the
Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify it.

We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the
examination of the complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and
reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers was not
complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the
evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in
evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2),[45] Article III of
the Constitution.

It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to

exclude the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant.

Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis

to sustain the conviction of appellant.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,

Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Judgment is hereby rendered declaring Search Warrant No. 99-51 NULL and
VOID and the search and seizure made at appellants residence illegal. For
lack of evidence to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
appellant BENHUR MAMARIL is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to IMPLEMENT without

delay this Decision and to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement.

The confiscated marijuana is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the
trial court is hereby directed to deliver or cause its delivery to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for proper disposition.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ.,

concur.

139 Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin [GR 45950, 20 June 1938]
First Division, Laurel (J): 6 concur

Facts: On 10 November 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury

Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search
warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or
store of Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books,
lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as
usurer." The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said
Almeda "that he has and there is just and probable cause to believe and he
does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house
and store at Victoria, Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents,
and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to
the statute in such cases made and provided." On the same date, Almeda,
accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office
of Pasion de Garcia in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to
the latter's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without Pasion de Garcia's
presence who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution
thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing
several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor
issued by him to Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a
considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were
turned over by it to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently
filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases
against Pasion de Garcia for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several
occasions, after seizure, Pasion de Garcia, through counsel, demanded from
the Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents seized. On January 7, and,
by motion, on 4 June 1937, the legality of the search warrant was challenged
by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in the 6 criminal cases and the devolution of
the documents demanded. By resolution of 5 October 1937, Judge Diego
Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia's motion of June 4 for the reason that
though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the latter's part.
A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order of 3
January 1938. Pasion de Garcia registered her exception.

Issue: Whether the lack of personal examination of witnesses renders the

warrant void.

Held: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular

right and for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant
and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued
must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized.
These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure,
particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search
warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the
same to the corresponding court. Herein, the existence of probable cause was
determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge
did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not
decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his
witnesses, if any.

Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient

and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within
the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court
which issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over
to the provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases against Pasion de
Garcia. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no
case pending against Pasion de Garcia, the averment that the warrant was
issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. The search
warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac. In
any event, the failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to
resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied
waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a
submission to the authority of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but
is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Thus,

140 Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda [GR 47021, 15 June 1940]

Laurel (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result

Facts: In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of

the Anti-Usury Board, dated 5 May 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay,
Occidental Negros, after taking the testimony of applicant's witness, Jose
Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a
search warrant commanding any peace officer to search during day time the
store and premises occupied by Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay,
Occidental Negros, as well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co., and to seize
the documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory notes being used by
said Sam Sing & Co. in connection with their activities of lending money at
usurious rates of interest in violation of law, or such as may be found, and to
bring them forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On
the same date, at 10:30 a.m., search was accordingly made by Mariano G.
Almeda, Jose Estrada, 2 internal revenue agents and 2 members of the
Philippine Army, who seized certain receipt books, vales or promissory notes,
chits, notebooks, journal book, and collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co.
and enumerated in the inventory receipt issued by Mariano G. Almeda to the
owner of the documents, papers and articles seized. Immediately after the
search and seizure thus effected, Mariano G. Almeda filed a return with the
justice of the peace of Sagay together. With a request that the office of the
Anti-Usury Board be allowed to retain possession of the articles seized for
examination, pursuant to section 4 of Act 4109, which request was granted.
Under the date of 11 March 1939, Godofredo P. Escalona, counsel for Sam
Sing & Co. filed a motion with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Occidental
Negros praying that the search warrant and the seizure effected thereunder
be declared illegal and set aside and that the articles in question be ordered
returned to Sam Sing & Co., which motion was denied in the order dated 24
July 1939. A similar motion was presented to the justice of the peace of Sagay
on 27 October 1939 but was denied the next day. Meanwhile, an information
dated 30 September 1939 had been filed in the CFI Occidental Negros,
charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing
& Co., with a violation of Act 2655. Before the criminal case could be tried,
Yee Sue Koy and Yee Tip filed the petition with the Supreme Court on 6
November 1939. The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the
search warrant issued on 2 May 1938, by the justice of the peace of Sagay
and the seizure accomplished thereunder are illegal, because the warrant
was issued three days ahead of the application therefor and of the affidavit of
the Jose Estrada which is insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a
search warrant, and because the issuance of said warrant manifestly
contravenes the mandatory provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of
Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58, and (2)
that the seizure of the aforesaid articles by means of a search warrant for the
purpose of using them as evidence in the criminal case against the accused,
is unconstitutional because the warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and
amounts to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against compelling the
accused to testify against themselves.

Issue: Whether the application of the search warrant is supported by the

personal knowledge of the witness,besides the applicant, for the judge to
determine probable cause in issuing the warrant.

Held: Strict observance of the formalities under section 1, paragraph 3, of

Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58 was
followed. The applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his application, swore that "he
made his own personal investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is
lending money without Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 )Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) license, charging usurious rate of interest and is keeping, utilizing
and concealing in the store and premises occupied by it situated at Sagay,
Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists, receipts, promissory notes,
and book of accounts and records, all of which are being used by it in
connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in
violation of the Usury Law." In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his testimony
before the justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that he knew that Sam Sing &
Co. was lending money without license and charging usurious rate of interest,
because he personally investigated the victims who had secured loans from
said Sam Sing & Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest; that he knew
that the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using books of accounts and
records containing its transactions relative its activities as money lender and
the entries of the interest paid by its debtors, because he saw the said Sam
Sing & d make entries and records of their debts and the interest paid
thereon. As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore that they had
personal knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they
could be held liable for perjury if the facts would turn out to be not as their
were stated under oath. That the existence of probable cause had been
determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay before issuing the search
warrant complained of, is shown by the following statement in the warrant
itself, to wit: "After examination under oath of the complainant, Mariano G.
Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury Board, Department of Justice and
Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and the witness he
presented, . . .and this Court, finding that there is just and probable cause to
believe as it does believe, that the above described articles, relating to the
activities of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at usurious rate of
interest, are being utilized and kept and concealed at its store and premises
occupied by said Sam Sing & Co.,

all in violation of law."

141 Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January
1937]

First Division, Imperial (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board,
of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David
then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit
alleging that according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his
house in Infanta, Tayabas,books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other
papers used by him in connection with his activities as a moneylender,
charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the
end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to
the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not
swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but
upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the
affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject
matter of the petition, ordering the search of the Alvarez's house at any time
of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the
law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered
Alvarez's store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized and
took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the
years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4
notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4
stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles of bills of
lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, 2
packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14
bundles of invoices and other papers, many documents and loan contracts
with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of
used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). The
search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of
Alvarez who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the
agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not
been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant,
Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a motion on 8 June 1936, praying that the
agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to
deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said
agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the
court. On said date the court issued an order directing Siongco to deposit all
the articles seized within 24 hours from the receipt of notice thereof and
giving him a period of 5 days within which to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt of court. On 10 June, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez,
representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order of
the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be
authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of 30 days for the
necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an order requiring
agent Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the
court, together with the proceedings taken by him, and to present an
inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2, the
attorney for the petitioner filed a petition alleging that the search warrant
issued was illegal and that it had not yet been returned to date together with
the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrant
be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles
seized to Alvarez, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of
contempt of court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of
authority. On September 10, the court issued an order holding: that the
search warrant was obtained and issued in accordance with the law, that it
had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled, and
that agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must,
therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in
Manila to show cause, if any, within the unextendible period of 2 days from
the date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the
inventory should not be returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-
Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the
reasons stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the
purpose of conducting an investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law
committed by Alvarez. On October 10, said official again filed another motion
alleging that he needed 60 days to examine the documents and papers
seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10,
16, 23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said
period of 60 days. In an order of October 16, the court granted him the period
of 60 days to investigate said 19 documents. Alvarez, herein, asks that the
search warrant as well as the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury
Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and
prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has
been based upon the affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared
that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a
basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof
through mere information secured from a person whom he considered
reliable, and that it is illegal as it was not supported by other affidavits aside
from that made by the applicant.

Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97

of General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the
issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon
an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by
which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act
faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge
given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance
of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency
of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be
held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive
basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of
the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant
and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are
illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at
least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the
judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the
deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders
58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the
existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of
the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the
search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the
judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more
witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the
warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of
the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

142 Mata vs. Bayona [GR 50720, 26 March 1984]

Second Division, de Castro (J): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part

Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as
amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata
offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets
known as 'Masiao tickets' without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."
Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere
from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and
other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had
to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge
Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Jufe of the City Court of Ormoc replied, "it is
with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached
them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the
search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking,
among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has
made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U.
Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd
PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that
effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were
not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment,
considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be
attached to the records. Mata's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition
for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search
warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under
such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings
on the matter.

Issue: Whether the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine
on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce
and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.

Held: Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce". More emphatic and detailed
is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide
that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore,
hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the
Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid.

143 Olaez vs. People of the Philippines [GR 78347-49, 9 November 1987]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur

Facts: Adolfo Olaes and Linda M. Cruz were charged for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Olaes and Cruz filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, challenging the admission by Judge
Alicia L. Santos (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City, Branch 73) of evidence seized by virtue of an allegedly
invalid search warrant and of an extrajudicial confession taken from them
without according them the right to assistance of counsel; and thus seek to
restrain further proceedings in the criminal case against them and ask that
they be acquitted with the setting aside of the questioned orders (the facts
do not provide the disposition of the said orders). Olaes and Cruz claim that
the search warrant issued by the judge is unconstitutional because it does
not indicate the specific offense they are supposed to have committed. There
is, therefore, according to them, no valid finding of probable cause as a
justification for the issuance of the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of
Rights.

Issue: Whether the lack of specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act
renders the caption vague, and negate the claim that the specific offense was
committed to serve as basis for the finding of probable cause.

Held: No. The search warrant issued does not come under the strictures of
the Stonehill doctrine. While in the case cited, there was a bare reference to
the laws in general, without any specification of the particular sections
thereof that were alleged to have been violated out of the hundreds of
prohibitions contained in such codifications, there is no similar ambiguity
herein. While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is
in connection with "Violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Acts of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "There is
probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of
No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession
and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and
other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the
subject of the offense stated above." Although the specific section of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of
probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill
of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."

144 Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14 December 1989]

En Banc, Padilla (J): 14 concur

Facts: On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the

Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District
(WPD), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided
over by Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
an application for the issuance of a search warrant (Search Warrant 87-14) for
violation of Presidential Decree 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Nemesio E. Prudente." On the same
day, the Judge issued the Search Warrant, commanding Dimagmaliw "to
make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the premises of
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the
Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other
rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at
PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize
and take possession of the following personal properties, to wit: (a) M 16
Armalites with ammunition; (b) .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols; (c)
explosives and hand grenades; and (d) assorted weapons with ammunitions."
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy
Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member
of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside
the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with 3 live
fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers. On 6
November 1987, Prudente moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed
that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no
personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of
the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not in the
form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a
general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place
to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the
search warrant was issued in violation of Circular 19 of the Supreme Court in
that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the
search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. On 9 March 1988, the Judge issued
an order, denying Prudente's motion and supplemental motion to quash.
Prudente's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the order dated
20 April 1988. Prudente filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin

Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition
were sufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.

Held: The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched." This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
based on mere hearsay. Thus, for a valid search warrant to issue, there must
be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection
with one specific offense,and the judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted. Herein, in his application for search
warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that
Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and
explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it
to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C.
Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several
days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of
the said firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other
words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search
warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other
sources or persons. While it is true that in his application for search warrant,
applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had
earlier received that petitioner had in his possession and custody the firearms
and explosives described in the application, and that he found it to be a fact,
yet there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said
applicant verified the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his
conclusion that he found such information to be a fact. He might have
clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers, but
there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether
searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant. Evidently, the allegations
contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the
declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient
basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.

145 Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs [GR L-43810, 26 September 1989]

First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur

Facts: Acting on a verified report of a confidential informant that assorted

electronic and electrical equipment and other articles illegally imported into
the Philippines by a syndicate engaged in unlawful "shipside" activities
(foreign goods are unloaded from foreign ships in transit through Philippine
waters into motorized bancas and landed on Philippine soil without passing
through the Bureau of Customs, thereby evading payment of the
corresponding customs duties and taxes thereon) were found inside "Tom's
Electronics" and "Sony Merchandising (Philippines)" stores located at 690 and
691 Gonzalo Puyat corner Evangelista Street, Quiapo, Manila, a letter-request
dated 23 April 1976 was addressed to the Collector of Customs by the Deputy
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Director of the
Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center, Manila Bay Area (RASAC-MBA) for the
issuance of warrants of seizure and detention. After evaluation, the Collector
of Customs issued Warrants of Seizure and Detention 14925 and 14925-A,
directing the Anti-Smuggling Action Center to seize the goods mentioned
therein, i.e. various electronic equipments like cassette tape recorders, car
stereos, phonograph needles (diamond), portable TV sets, imported long
playing records, spare parts of TVs and radios and other electrical appliances.
A RASAC team was formed and given a mission order to enforce the warrants,
which it implemented with the assistance of: (1) the National Customs Police
(augmenting the team with 2 members), (2) the Detective Bureau of the
Manila Western Police District Headquarters (with 3 detectives), as well as,
(3) Precinct 3 of the Manila Western Police District which exercised
jurisdictional control over the place to be raided. The intended raid was
entered in the respective police blotters of the police detective bureaus. On
the strength of the warrants of seizure and detention, the raid was conducted
in the afternoon of 25 April 1976 at the 2 stores of Tomas Chia. ASAC team
leader Gener Sula, together with his agents Badron Dobli, Arturo Manuel,
Rodolfo Molina and Servillano Florentin of Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City,
assisted by two customs policemen, Val Martinez and Renato Sorima, and
Manila policemen Rogelio Vinas and John Peralta, recovered from the stores,
assorted electronic equipment and other articles, the customs duties on
which allegedly had not been paid. They were turned over to the Customs
Auction and Cargo Disposal Unit of the Bureau of Customs. On 17 May 1976,
in the afternoon, the hearing officer of Acting Collector of Customs Alfredo
Francisco conducted a hearing on the confiscation of the goods taken by
Gener Sula and his agents. 2 days later, Chia filed the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court to enjoin the Collector
of Customs and/or his agents from further proceeding with the forfeiture
hearing and prayed that the search warrants be declared null and void, that
the latter be ordered to return the confiscated articles to Chia, and to pay
damages.

Issue: Whether the warrants issued by the Collector of Customs partakes the
nature of a general warrants, and thus are invalid.

Held: Not only may goods be seized without a search and seizure warrant
under Section 2536 of the Customs and Tariff Code, when they (the goods)
are openly offered for sale or kept in storage in a store as herein, but the fact
is that Chia's stores "Tom's Electronics" and "Sony Merchandising (Phil.)"
were searched upon warrants of search and detention issued by the Collector
of Customs, who, under the 1973 Constitution, was "a responsible officer
authorized by law" to issue them. Sections 2208 and 2209 of the Tariff and
Customs Code provide when a search may be made without a warrant and
when a warrant is necessary. Section 2208 provides that "For the more
effective discharge of his official duties, any person exercising the powers
herein conferred, may at any time enter, pass through or search any land or
inclosure or any warehouse, store or other building, not being a dwelling
house. A warehouse, store or other building or inclosure used for the keeping
or storage of articles does not become a dwelling house within the meaning
hereof merely by reason of the fact that a person employed as watchman
lives in the place, nor will the fact that his family stays there with him alter
the case." On the other hand, Section 2209 provides that "A dwelling house
may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a Judge of the
court or such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law, upon
sworn application showing probable cause and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." The warrants
issued by the Collector of Customs in this case were not general warrants for
they identified the stores to be searched, described the articles to be seized
and specified the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code violated. Upon
effecting the seizure of the goods, the Bureau of Customs acquired exclusive
jurisdiction not only over the case but also over the goods seized for the
purpose of enforcing the tariff and customs laws. Further, a party dissatisfied
with the decision of the Collector may appeal to the Commissioner of
Customs, whose decision is appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law and regulations. The decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals may be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
Since Chia did not exhaust his administrative remedies, his recourse to this
Court is premature.

146 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-76649-51,
19 August 1988]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 29 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

Third Division, Gutierrez J. (J): 4 concur

Facts: In a letter-complaint dated 26 August 1985, 20th Century Fox Film

Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's
(NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with
the NBI's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged
that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form
which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree 49 (Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property). Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI
conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the film
corporation and subsequently filed 3 applications for search warrants against
the video outlets owned by Eduardo M. Barreto, Raul Sagullo, and Fortune
Ledesma. The applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 132. On 4 September 1985, the lower court
issued the desired search warrants, describing the articles sought to be
seized as"(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, accessories, equipments and other machines used or intended to
be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of the
above-mentioned video tapes which she is keeping and concealing in the
premises above-described.". Armed with the search warrants, the NBI
accompanied by the film corporation's agents, raided the video outlets and
seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was
made and left with Barreto, et. al. Acting on a motion to lift search warrants
and release seized properties filed by Barreto, et. al., the lower court issued
an order dated 8 October 1985, lifting the 3 search warrants issued earlier
against them by the court, due to the failure of the NBI to deliver the articles
to the Court, and thus ordered the return of the articles to their respective
owners. The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the film
corporation in its order dated 2 January 1986. The film corporation filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the orders of the
lower court. The petition was dismissed. The 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the inclusion of certain articles of property which are usually
connected to legitimate business, and not involving piracy of intellectual
property or infringement of copyright laws, renders the warrant to be
unreasonable.

Held: Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners
are articles which can be found in a video tape store engaged in the
legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these
articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a
legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or
infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without
specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in violating
an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general which could result in
the confiscation of all items found in any video store. In fact, this actually
happened in the present case. Although the applications and warrants
themselves covered certain articles of property usually found in a video store,
the Court believes that the search party should have confined themselves to
articles that are according to them, evidence constitutive of infringement of
copyright laws or the piracy of intellectual property, but not to other articles
that are usually connected with, or related to, a legitimate business, not
involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of copyright laws. So
that a television set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax tapes,
video cassette cleaners video cassette recorders as reflected in the Returns
of Search Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged in the video
tape industry, and which could not be the subject of seizure. The applicant
and his agents therefore exceeded their authority in seizing perfectly
legitimate personal property usually found in a video cassette store or
business establishment. The search and seizure is unreasonable.

147 Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano [GR L-69803, 8 October 1985]

En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in the result, 1 took no

part, 1 reserves his vote

Facts: Prior to 6 August 1984, Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of the accused of
Rebellion in Criminal Case SMC-1-1 before Special Military Commission 1, and
also one of the accused of Subversion in Criminal Case MC-25-113 of Military
Commission 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose
Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large. At around 9:00 a.m. on August 6,
Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from the
Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon
City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be
the leased residence of Aguilar-Roque, after almost a month of "round the
clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the
CPP/NPA." Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted by the military for

being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines,

particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases. At 11:30
a.m., Aguilar-Roque and Cynthia D. Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary
Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall
Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had
previously been issued against Nolasco. At 12:00 noon on the same day,
elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon
City. Willie C. Tolentino, a person then in charge of the premises, was arrested
by the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest. The searching
party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a
portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. On August
10, Aguilar-Roque, Nolasco and Tolentino, were charged before the Quezon
City Fiscal's Office upon complaint filed by the CSG against the former for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion. On
August 13, the City Fiscal filed an Information for Violation of Presidential
Decree (PD) 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against Aguilar-
Roque, et. al. before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding. On August 16, CSG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the City Fiscal, praying that Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco
be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16. On
September 10, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the Search Warrant
case praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431
documents and articles, "in connection with cases that are presently pending
against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the
court." On December 13, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and ruled
that the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal
trying the case against respondent." A day before that, Aguilar-Roque, et. al.
filed a Motion to Suppress, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to
them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the
Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on 7 January
1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated
in the other case, apparently unaware of the Order issued by Judge Pao on
December 13. Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque, and Tolentino filed the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search
Warrant issued by RTC Judge Pao; (2) his Order admitting the Amended
Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of MTC
Judge Santos denying Aguilar-Roque, et. al.'s Motion to Suppress.

Issue: Whether the description of the personalities to be seized in the search

warrant is too general to render the warrant void.

Held: The disputed Search Warrant (80-84) describes the personalities to be

seized as "Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such
as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of
possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not
otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local
sources." It is at once evident that the Search Warrant authorizes the seizure
of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-
embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does
not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized
thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they
should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden
boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be
seized. Search warrants of similar description were considered null and void
for being too general. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search
Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search
warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned to Aguilar-
Roque. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Section 12, Rule 126,
Rules of Court, is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search,
without a search warrant,of a person who had been arrested. It is also a
general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the
arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter
case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its
own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application
of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what
constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched".
Considering that Aguilar-Roque has been charged with Rebellion, which is a
crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been
served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the
general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made
within a half hour of her arrest, the Court was of the opinion that, in her
respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a
search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public
order. Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained by CSG,
for possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to
Aguilar-Roque to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military
Commission 1 to return to her any all irrelevant documents and articles.

148 Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines vs. Asuncion [GR 122092,
19 May 1999]

Third Division, Panganiban (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 25 January 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied

for a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of
Quezon City, stating "(1) that the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G.
Santiago, is in possession or has in its control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or
intended to be used in committing the offense, and which are being kept and
concealed in the premises herein described; (2) that a Search Warrant should
be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this
Honorable Court the following described properties: 'Seventy (70) M16
Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2)
UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal 40mm., ten
(10) cal. 45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition
reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and
ten (10) handgrenades.'" The joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and
SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, as well as a summary of the information and the
supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno were attached to
the application. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On 4 February
1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and
seized various firearms and ammunition. Believing that the warrant was
invalid and the search unreasonable, Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, Evaristo M. Narvaez Jr., Ricardo G. Santiago, Roberto A.
Dormendo, Reydande D. Azucena, Niceforo V. Avila, Florentino M. Mula, Felix
O. Baito, Harold B. Celestial, Elmedencio C. Calixtro, Carlito S. Legacion,
Albino T. Lubang, Jeremias I. Abad and Herminio V. Villamil filed a "Motion to
Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a
"Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress
Evidence." On 23 March 1995, the RTC issued the Order which denied PICOP,
et. al.'s motions. On 3 August 1995, the trial court rendered its Order denying
their Motion for Reconsideration. PICOP, et. al. filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition.

Issue: Whether the fact that the warrant identifies only one place, i.e. the
"Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur," satisfies the requirements of the
particularity of the place to be search, and thus render the warrant valid.

Held: No. The fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures
and the basic conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Consistent with the foregoing
constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The requisites
of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in
writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In view of the
manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to
those described in the warrant. Thus, this Court has held that "this
constitutional right is the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to
value the privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional
protection against the long reach of government no less than to value human
dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards."
Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more
specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient
showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in a
particular place. Herein, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial
court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents:
(2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of
the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that PICOP, et. al. were not
licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched
was not described with particularity. As to the particularity of the place to be
searched, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place with
particularity. It simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises,"
but it did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place,
and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at
PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur." The PICOP
compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff
houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick
service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which spread
out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." Obviously, the warrant gives
the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the
structures found inside the PICOP compound. Because the search warrant
was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the
firearms, explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."

149 Yousef Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals [GR 126859, 4 September 2001]

Second Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 31 March 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the

Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan
City, issued search warrants 54-95 and 55-95 for the search and seizure of
certain items in Apartment 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road,
Kalookan City. On 1 April 1995, the police searched Apartment 8, in the same
compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment 2 were 2
M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions, 1 Bar of
demolition charge, 1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos. were placed
with magazine of Caliber .45 and 3 live 45 ammunitions, 1 22 Caliber
handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its cylinder, 1 Box containing 40 pieces of
.25 caliber ammunitions, 2 pieces of fragmentation grenade, 1 roll of
detonating cord color yellow, 2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to
be explosives substance, 22 detonating cords with blasting caps, and
pound of high explosives TNT, 1 timer alarm clock, 2 bags of suspected gun
powder, 2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive substance, 1 small box of
plastic bag of suspected dynamites, One weighing scale, and 2 batteries 9
volts with blasting caps and detonating cord. The firearms, ammunitions,
explosives and other incendiary devices seized at the apartments were
acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz. Yousef Al
Ghoul, Isam Mohammad Abdulhadi, Wail Rashid Al-Khatib, Nabeel Nasser Al-
Riyami, Ashraf Hassam Al-Yazori, and Mohammad Abushendi were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, in informations
(Criminal Cases C-48666-67) accusing them with illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree 1866.
Thereafter, they were arrested and detained. They filed a motion for bail on
24 May 1995, the resolution of which was held in abeyance by the RTC
pending the presentation of evidence from the prosecution to determine
whether or not the evidence presented is strong. On 7 February 1996, at the
hearing for bail, the RTC "admitted all exhibits being offered for whatever
purpose that they maybe worth" after the prosecution had finished adducing
its evidence despite the objection by the petitioners on the admissibility of
said evidence. On 19 February 1996, the RTC denied their motion for bail
earlier filed. As their action before appellate court also proved futile, with the
appellate court dismissing their special civil action for certiorari, they filed the
petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the search and seizure orders are valid, and the objects
seized admissible in evidence.

Held: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be

changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be
restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be
taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion
of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence,
the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken
thereat is inadmissible in evidence against Al-Ghoul, et. al. In contrast, the
search conducted at Apartment 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search
warrants specifically mentioned Apartment 2. The search was done in the
presence of its occupants, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised
Rules of Court. The articles seized during the search of Apartment 2 are of the
same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant. The
items seized from Apartment 2 were described with specificity in the warrants
in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a
technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room
for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be
virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they
would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once
described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not
be so invariant as to require absolute concordance between those seized and
those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles
described as a class or species would suffice.

Del Rosario vs People

Del Rosario vs People

G.R. No. L-16806

December 22, 1961

Facts:

Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by
the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal possession of said forged
treasury notes and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8
years and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and pay a fine of
P5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as a
proportionate part of the costs. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate
penalty which was increased to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision
mayor.

Issue:

Whether the accused-appellants are liable for the crime of illegal possession
and use of false treasury or bank notes under Art. 168?

Held:

It is clear from the provisions Art 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code that
the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the
figures, letters, words or signs contained" in which had been erased and or
altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein
and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable under
said Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised
Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785). Being
in accordance with the facts and the law, the decision appealed from is,
accordingly, affirmed, with costs against petitioner Sergio del Rosario.

plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANNABELLE FRANCISCO y DAVID, @ ANNABELLE

TABLAN, accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, accused-appellant Annabelle
Francisco, were placed under surveillance after the police confirmed, through
a test-buy operation, that they were engaged in selling shabu or
methamphetamine hydrochloride. SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto San Juan
of OADDI-WPDC, U.N. Avenue, Manila applied for a search warrant before
Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to authorize them to search
the premises at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.

Attached to the application was the After-Surveillance Report[1] of SPO2

Teneros. It stated that Dante Baradilla, of 1726 Lallana St., corner Sta.
Catalina St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed to be one of Federico Veronas
runners in the illegal drugs operations, allegedly sought the assistance of
SPO2 Teneros for the arrest of Verona.[2] The search warrant[3] was
subsequently issued by Judge Bayhon authorizing the search of shabu and
paraphernalia at No. 122 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City.

Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine months pregnant,

was resting inside the second floor masters bedroom of their two- storey
apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City, when she heard a loud
bang downstairs as if somebody forcibly opened the front door. Eight
policemen suddenly entered her bedroom and conducted a search for about
an hour. Accused-appellant inquired about their identities but they refused to
answer. It was only at the police station where she found out that the team of
searchers was led by SPO2 Teneros. The police team, along with Barangay
Chairwoman Miguelita Limpo and Kagawad Bernie de Jesus, both of Barangay
64, Zone-6, District 2, Caloocan City, enforced the warrant and seized the
following:[4]

1. One (1) Salad Set marked Pyrex wrapped in a plastic containing white
crysthalline (sic) substance or methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu with
markings by the undersigned inside the house of subjects residence weighing
(230) two hundred thirty (sic) grams of methampetamine hydrochloride or
shabu by Aida Abear-Pascual of NBI Forensic Chemist;

2. Several plastics in different sizes;

3. Two (2) roll of strip aluminum foil;

4. Five (5) tooter water pipe and improvised and two burner improvised;

5. Two (2) pantakal or measuring weight in shabu;

6. Two (2) cellular phone motorola with markings;

7. One (1) monitoring device with cord and with markings;

8. Several pcs. with strip aluminum foil;

9. Two (2) masking tip (sic) with markings;

10. Twentee (sic) two thousand nine hundred ninetee (sic) pesos.

The police team also allegedly seized the amount of P180,000.00, a Fiat car,
jewelry, set of keys, an ATM card, bank books and car documents.

Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 16,

Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, in an information[5] which reads:

That about 10:30 oclock in the morning of 30 March 1996 at No. 122 SCL M.
Hizon St., Kalookan City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court,
the above-named accused grouping herself together with some other persons
whose liabilities are still being determined in a preliminary investigation,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody
and/or control, methamphetamine hydrochloride popularly known as shabu, a
regulated drug, with a total weight of 230 grams, without the corresponding
license and/or prescription to possess, have custody and/or control over the
aforesaid regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Accused-appellant filed a motion to quash the search warrant[6] asserting

that she and her live-in partner Federico Verona had been leasing an
apartment unit at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, District 2, Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, since 1995 up to the present as certified by the owner of the
apartment unit.

On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[7] after which, trial on

the merits ensued.

The trial court denied the motion to quash and upheld the validity of the
search warrant. It rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty as
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE premises considered, and the prosecution having established

beyond an iota of doubt the guilt of the Accused for Violation of Sec. 16, Art.
III, RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 and considering that the total net weight
of subject drugs consists of 230 grams, this Court in the absence of any
modifying circumstance hereby imposes upon the Accused the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and a fine of P1,000,000.00 pesos, and to pay the costs.

The period of Accuseds preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full in

the service of her sentence pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

Subject drugs and paraphernalia are hereby declared confiscated and

forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with law.

The return to the Accused of the two (2) cellular phones, (Motorola Micro Fac)
(sic) Nos. S-2968A and S-3123A, which were turned over by the Acting Branch
Clerk of Court of Manila RTC, Br. 3 to her counterpart in this sala (Exh. 30) as
well as the deposit of cash money in the amount of P22,990.00 with the
Manila RTC Clerk of Court JESUS MANINGAS as evidenced by acknowledgment
receipt dated 21 May 1996, are hereby ordered.

SO ORDERED.[8]

On appeal, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:[9]

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF SHABU;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH
CONDUCTED WAS ILLEGAL AND VIOLATIVE OF ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED AFTER
FINDING THAT THE SEARCH WAS INDEED CONDUCTED AT A PLACE DIFFERENT
FROM THAT DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.

The appeal is impressed with merit.

Plainly, the basic issue submitted for resolution is the reasonableness of the
search conducted by the police officers at accused-appellants residence.

The trial court, in upholding the validity of the search, stated that:[10]

Re 3rd argument - the fact that the search warrant in question was served at
apartment No. 120 and not at the specific address stated therein which is 122
M. Hizon St., Caloocan City will not by itself render as illegal the search and
seizure of subject stuff seized by the operatives pursuant thereto. While it is
true that the rationale behind the constitutional and procedural requirements
that the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched is
to the end that no unreasonable search warrant and seizure may not be
made (sic) and abuses may not be committed, however, this requirement is
not without exception. It is the prevailing rule in our jurisdiction that even a
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended
(People vs. Veloso, G.R. No. L-23051, Oct. 20, 1925).

Significantly in the case at bar the implementing officer SPO2 Teneros was
principally the concerned official who conducted an active surveillance on the
Accused and subject house (Surveillance Report, Exh. 9) and pursued this
case by filing the corresponding application for the issuance of a search
warrant. Perforce, SPO2 TENEROS was thereby placed in a position enabling
him to have prior and personal knowledge of particular house intended in the
warrant which definitely refer to no other than the very place where the same
was accordingly served.

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the search was grossly
infirm as the subject search warrant authorized the police authorities to
search only No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. However, the actual search
was conducted at No. 120 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.

The basic guarantee to the protection of the privacy and sanctity of a person,
his home and his possessions against unreasonable intrusions of the State is
articulated in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which reads:

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES,

PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND
NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER
EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE
WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE
TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED.

For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that there be a
particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient
if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Any designation or description known to the locality that leads
the officer unerringly to it satisfies the constitutional requirement.[11]

Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the
judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.[12]

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification
of the search warrants. The proceedings upon search warrants must be
absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to the law,
the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is
none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly without,
however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify it.[13]

The application for search warrant filed by SPO2 Teneros requested for
authority to search specifically the premises of No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan
City. The application was accompanied by a sketch[14] of the area which
bears two parallel lines indicated as 10th Avenue drawn vertically on the left-
hand side of the paper. Intersecting these lines are two other parallel lines
drawn horizontally and indicated as M. Hizon. Above and on the left-hand side
of the upper parallel line of the lines identified as M. Hizon, is a square
marked as Basketball Court. A similar drawing placed near the right-hand side
of the upper parallel line is another square marked as PNR Compound.
Beneath the lower parallel line of the lines marked as M. Hizon and right at
the center is also a square enclosing an X sign marked as 122, presumably
No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.

During the hearing for the application of the search warrant, police asset
Dante Baradilla described the house to be searched as:

Bale dalawang palapag po, semi concrete, color cream na ang mga bintana
ay may rehas na bakal at sliding at sa harap ay may terrace at may sasakyan
sila na ginagamit sa pagdeliver ng shabu.[15]

The trial court then conducted an ocular inspection of the area. It turned out
that No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was a concrete two-storey residential
building with steel-barred windows and a terrace. It was owned by a certain
Mr. Joseph Ching. The house, however, bore no house number. The house
marked No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was actually two houses away
from accused-appellants house at No. 120 M. Hizon St.

On the other hand, No. 120 Hizon St. was a compound consisting of three
apartments enclosed by only one gate marked on the outside as No. 120. The
different units within No. 120 Hizon St. were not numbered separately.
Accused-appellant rented the third unit from the entrance which was
supposedly the subject of the search. The entire compound had an area of
approximately ninety (90) square meters. The second unit was located at the
back of the first unit and the third unit was at the rear end of the compound.
Hence, access to the third unit from M. Hizon Street was only through the first
two units and the common gate indicated as No. 120. The occupants of the
premises stated that they commonly use No. 120 to designate their
residence.

In People v. Veloso, this Court declared that even a description of the place to
be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.[16] The description of the
building in the application for a search warrant in Veloso as well as in the
search warrant itself refer to the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippine Islands which was considered sufficient designation of the
premises to be searched.[17]

The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely different from
those in Veloso. At first glance, the description of the place to be searched in
the warrant seems to be sufficient. However, from the application for a
search warrant as well as the search warrant itself, the police officer serving
the warrant cannot, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended precisely because it was wrongly described as No. 122, although it
may have been located on the same street as No. 120. Even the description
of the house by police asset Baradilla referred to that house located at No.
122 M. Hizon St., not at No. 120 M. Hizon St.

The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search

warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion. Hence,
the trial court erred in refusing to nullify the actions of the police officers who
were perhaps swayed by their alleged knowledge of the place. The controlling
subject of search warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself and not
the place identified by the police.[18]

It may well be that the police officer identified No. 120 M. Hizon St. as the
subject of the actual search. However, as indicated in the witness
affidavit[19] in support of the application for a search warrant,[20] No. 122 M.
Hizon St. was unmistakably indicated. Inexplicably, a few days after the
search warrant was issued by the court and served at No. 120 M. Hizon St.,
SPO2 Teneros informed Judge Bayhon in the return of search warrant[21] that
the warrant was properly served at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City, Metro
Manila as indicated in the search warrant itself.

SPO2 Teneros attempted to explain the error by saying that he thought the
house to be searched bore the address 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City
instead of No. 120 M. Hizon St.[22] But as this Court ruled in Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion,[23] thus:

The police had no authority to search the apartment behind the store, which
was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they really intended it to be
the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be
changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:

x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The

ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting
of the minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the
warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to
substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have
been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a
place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place
actually searchedalthough not that specified in the warrant[was] exactly what
they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in
their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a
search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in
their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court
issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of the
facts of the case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigails Variety
Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or
modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a
change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search
warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power
of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be delineated in the
warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and
grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the
Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the
police officers conducting the search.

All told, the exclusionary rule necessarily comes into play, to wit:

Art. III, Sec. 3 (2), 1987 Constitution. -- ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN

VIOLATION OF THIS OR THE PRECEDING SECTION SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE
FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING.

Consequently, all the items seized during the illegal search are prohibited
from being used in evidence. Absent these items presented by the
prosecution, the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime charged loses
its basis.

As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized

evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Verily, they are the
fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional
right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence.[24]

On another note, we find disturbing the variety of the items seized by the
searching team in this case. In the return of search warrant, they admitted
the seizure of cellular phones, money and television/monitoring device items
that are not within the palest ambit of shabu paraphernalia, which were the
only items authorized to be seized. What is more disturbing is the suggestion
that some items seized were not reported in the return of search warrant, like
the Fiat car, bankbooks, and money. In an attempt to justify the presence of
the car in the police station, SPO2 Teneros had to concoct a most incredible
story that the accused-appellant, whose pregnancy was already in the third
trimester, drove her car to the police station after the intrusion at her house
even if the police officers had with them several cars.

A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to

undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to a crime.[25]

It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed to the
doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a mandatory character and
therefore must be strictly complied with. To quote from the landmark
American decision of Boyd v. United States: It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis.[26]

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding
the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to
pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that
some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.
It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.[27]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, Caloocan City, convicting accused-appellant of violation of
Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing her to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 as well as
the costs, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco y David @
Annabelle Tablan is ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from
confinement, unless she is lawfully held in custody for another cause.

SO ORDERED.
Vitug, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163858

June 28, 2005

FACTS:

UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be

manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The
agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing
operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which
thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of
Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant
directing the police to seize finished or unfinished products of UNILAB,
particularly REVICON multivitamins. No fake Revicon was however found;
instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml
bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by
UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the
custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court
granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search
warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are
considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the
boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The
court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened,
contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view
doctrine.

HELD:

It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the
plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant
cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove
that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the
executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial
intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a
particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to
prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the
sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI
failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was
enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently,
and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately
apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal
knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were
incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no
showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before
they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that
the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Katz (the petitioner), was convicted of
transmitting wagering information over telephone lines in violation of federal
law. The government had entered into evidence the petitioners end of
telephone conversations that the government had obtained by placing a
listening device to the phone booth that the petitioner used. The Court of
Appeals rejected the petitioners contention that the evidence should be
suppressed.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the

United States Constitution (Constitution), against unreasonable searches
and seizures, follows the person and not the place.

Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering

information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law.
After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of
the telephone booth and recorded the petitioners end of the telephone
conversations which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The
petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of
Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari
was granted.
Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone
conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from
introduction as evidence against a person?

Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner
strenuously asserted that the phone booth was a constitutionally protected
area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from
unreasonable intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his person. Although the petitioner did
not seek to hide his self from public view when he entered the telephone
booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his
right to do so simply because he went to a place where he could be seen. A
person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he
utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is
acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Governments activities in electron

ically listening to and recording the petitioners telephone conversations

constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a
search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence
obtained is inadmissible.

Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black
observed that eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the Framers were
certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution
(Constitution). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution they would have added such language that
would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it
plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures
of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied
to eavesdropped evidence of conversations.

Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) filed a dissenting opinion. The
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons, not places. There is
a twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to those people. First,
that a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a
telephone booth shuts the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely
entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted. On the
other hand, conversations out in the open public would not be protected
against being overheard as the expectation of privacy would not be
reasonable.
150 People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992]

Third Division, Davide (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: In the morning of 12 September 1988, PC constables with the Mt.

Province PC Command put up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one
going to Sagada and the other to Bontoc. They stopped and checked all
vehicles that went through the checkpoint. At 9:15 a.m., they flagged down a
cream-colored Ford Fiera (ABT-634) coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and
headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by Conway Omaweng and
had no passengers. The Constables (Layong, et.al.) asked permission to
inspect the vehicle to which Omaweng acceded to. When they peered into
the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered
by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the
vehicle. They asked permission to see the contents of the bag to which
Omaweng consented to. When they opened the bag, they found that it
contained 41 plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized
substances. The constable gave a packet to his team leader, who, after
sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana. The Constables thereafter
boarded the vehicles and proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the
incident to the PC Headquarters. The prohibited drugs were surrendered to
the evidence custodian. The PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet conducted 2 chemistry examinations of the substance
contained in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them to be
positive for hashish or marijuana. Omaweng was indicted for the violation of
Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended,
in a criminal complaint filed with the MTC Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12
September 1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-affidavits despite the
granting of an extension of time to do so, the court declared that he had
waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause
against Omaweng, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper court. On
14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province
filed an Information charging Omaweng with the violation of Section 47
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended (Crim Case 713).
After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal,
Omaweng entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment on 20 June
1989. During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented 4 witnesses.
Omaweng did not present any evidence other than portions of the Joint
Clarificatory Sworn Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution
witnesses Joseph Layong and David Fomocod. On 21 March 1991, the trial
court promulgated its Judgment convicting Omaweng of the crime of
transporting prohibited drugs (Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended).
Omaweng appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized
as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed
to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of the
PC Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by
Omaweng for he chose not to testify on his own behalf. Omaweng waived his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures when he voluntarily
submitted to a search or consents to have it made in his person or premises.
He is precluded from later complaining thereof right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid search
41 packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same;
no warrant was necessary for such seizure.

151 People vs. Correa [GR 119246, 30 January 1998]

En Banc, Martinez (J): 12 concur

Facts: A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under
surveillance by the Police Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Western Police District Command (DEU-WPDC) on account of confidential and
intelligence reports received in said Unit about his drug trafficking around
Bambang Street, Tondo, Manila. The police surveillance brought forth positive
results and confirmed Dulay's illegal drug trade. On 17 June 1994, operatives
were alerted that Dulay would transport and deliver a certain quantity of
drugs that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948). Thereafter, the
operatives, together with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on
board 3 vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the side of North
Cemetery and waited for the suspect. The police informant spotted Dulays
vehicle at 3:00 am. The operatives tailed the subject jeepney until they
reached Bambang extension and Jose Abad Santos Avenue, where they
accosted the passengers of said jeepney. The team inspected a cylindrical tin
can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard, about two feet high, loaded in the
vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8 bundles of suspected dried
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic tapes. The
team seized the suspected contrabands and marked each bundle
consecutively. The 3 suspects were brought to the police headquarters at
DEU-WPDC for investigation. The packages of suspected marijuana were
submitted to the NBI for laboratory analysis to determine their chemical
composition. The tests confirmed that the confiscated stuff were positive for
marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms. The defense, however, contends
that the 3 accused were arrested without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan
City, enroute to Dulays house to get the things of his child allegedly rushed
previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge of trafficking on
'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where
they were detained. On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC
Manila (Branch 35) indicting AntonioCorrea y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y
Sesante @ "Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" for having
violated Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended. When arraigned, the 3
accused pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 3 March 1995, the lower court
found the appellants guilty as charged and were sentenced to death and a
fine of P10 million.

Issue: Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless
search and seizure, due to waiver on their part.

Held: Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @ "Dodong,"

and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from assailing the
warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted to it as
shown by their actuation during the search and seizure. They never protested
when the police officer opened the tin can loaded in their vehicle, nor when
he opened one of the bundles, nor when they, together with their cargo of
drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation
and subsequent prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a search or
consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded from
later complaining thereof The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either
expressly or impliedly." Further, they effectively waived their constitutional
right against the search and seizure by their voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon
arraignment and by participating in the trial.

152 People v. Ramos [GR 85401-02, 4 June 1990]

Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics

Command Office in Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the
name of "Mama Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling marijuana at the corner
of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City. Tests buys were made using
marked money. The Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the
place where appellant was selling cigarettes, and arrested the latter for illegal
peddling of marijuana. Ramos was requested to take out the contents of her
wallet. The four marked five-peso bills used in the test buys were found
among her possessions and were confiscated after the serial numbers were
confirmed. Search of Ramos stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in
a trash can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the wares
she was selling. Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station,
Ramos executed a statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to
before Assistant City Fiscal. The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the
Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter
were confirmed to be marijuana. The defense contends however that she
assented to the invitation of the NARCOM operatives for investigation, after
search of her buri bags (which she stores the fruits that she sells) were
fruitless. She claimed that she was forced to affix her signature on the four 5-
peso bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to be the same money which was
used to buy marijuana from her, but which she insists was her money being
saved for the rentals. She was later brought to the Fiscals Office after
investigation, where she signed a document. She claimed she was not
assisted by any counsel during the investigation, neither during the time she
signed the document at the Fiscals Office. Two informations were filed
against Ramos, one for sale (Criminal Case 5991) and the other for
possession of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990). After trial, the RTC Olongapo
City (Branch 73) found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case
5990 for violating Section 8 of RA 6425 and sentenced her to imprisonment of
6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She was likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA 6425
and was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos sought
reversal of the decisions with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the
trash can, where illegal drugs were found, under her control.

Held: The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the
table where her legitimate wares were being sold. Ramos he was the only
person who had access to the trash can. The same was under her immediate
physical control. She had complete charge of the contents of the trash can
under the table to the exclusion of all other persons. In law, actual possession
exists when the thing is in the immediate occupancy and control of the party.
But this is not to say that the law requires actual possession. In criminal law,
possession necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of controlled
substances with intent to distribute may be constructive as well as actual. It
is only necessary that the defendant must have dominion and control over
the contraband. These requirements are present in the situation described,
where the prohibited drugs were found inside the trash can placed under the
stall owned by Ramos. In fact, the NARCOM agents who conducted the search
testified that they had to ask Ramps to stand so that they could look inside
the trash can under Ramos' papag. The trash can was positioned in such a
way that it was difficult for another person to use the trash can. The trash can
was obviously not for use by her customers. Therefore, the twenty sticks of
marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial court's finding that Ramos
is guilty of possession is correct.

153 People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994]

Third Division, Feliciano (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 6 September 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan,
both members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus
bearing Plate ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon
reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both
M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw Bonifacio
Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat 18 after
putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon
reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it
being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton
under seat 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that it
contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the owner of the
carton was but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the
carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited Barros to the detachment
for questioning as the latter was the suspected owner of the carton
containing marijuana. Upon entering the detachment the carton was opened
in the presence of Barros. When Barros denied ownership of the carton of
marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to
Barros as the owner of the carton of marijuana. Barros was charged with
violating Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of
RA 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. Barros appealed.

Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made
in the moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.

Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The evidence secured thereby i.e., the "fruits" of the
search and seizure will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any
proceeding." The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior
to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There
are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the
search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of
moving vehicles automobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it
not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle,
since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant may be sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of
moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that
is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to
physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to
visual inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a
lawoffender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial
warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there
had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents
of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police
("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable
volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search
was conducted; (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an
undercover "deep penetration" agent that prohibited drugs would be brought
into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date; (4) Narcom
agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada,
Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous
bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do so; and (5) Narcom agents had
received confidential information that a woman having the same physical
appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. Herein,
there is nothing in the record that any circumstance which constituted or
could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to
search the carton box allegedly owned by Barros. The testimony of the law
enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-
as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession,
(C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of
any such probable cause. Further, The accused is not to be presumed to have
waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless
arrest "simply because he failed to object." To constitute a waiver, it must
appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly,
that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that
the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a
permission to make a search therein. As the constitutional quaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but
is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was
equally nonpermissible and invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid search and
seizure i.e., the 4) kilos of marijuana should therefore not have been
admitted in evidence against Barros.

154 Veroy v. Layague [GR 95630, 18 June 1992]

En Banc, Paras (J): 12 concur

Facts: Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy are husband and wife residing in Davao
City. When Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of
the Social Security System sometime in June 1988, he and his family
transferred to Quezon City. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao
City was left to 2 houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their
assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally
send money to Edna Soquilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other
expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the
interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers
were located, was entrusted to Edna Soquilon to give her access in case of an
emergency. On 12 April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol
Station, PC/INP raided Veroys house in Davao City on information that the
said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were
able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the
house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search
warrant. Permission was requested by phone to Ma. Luisa Veroy who
consented on the condition that the search be conducted in the presence of
Major Macasaet. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met at
the Veroys house to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by
Ma. Luisa. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine
containing 7 live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer in
the childrens room. 3 half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-
SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's
recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted
clothing, a small black bag containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution
Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a
plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found
in the master's bedroom. Inventory and receipt of seized articles were made.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to the Quezon City
Assistant Prosecutor , who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for
Davao City by the DOJ through Department Order 88 (16 May 1990). In a
resolution dated 6 August 1990, the Fiscal recommended the filing of an
Information against the Veroys for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August
1990, an Information for the said offense was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTC Davao City). No bail was
recommended by the prosecution. The fiscals resolution was received by the
Veroys on 13 August 1990. The latter filed a motion for bail on the same day
which was denied for being premature, as they have not been arrested yet.
The Veroys voluntarily surrendered to Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, but who
refused to receive them o the ground that his office has not received copies
of their warrants of arrest. In the meantime, on 15 August 1990, the Veroys
were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for various ailments brought about or
aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal
complaint. On 17 August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they
be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard thereat.
Upon arraignment on 1 October 1990, the Veroys pleaded not guilty and filed
a motion for hospital confinement, which was denied. The court ordered their
commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on the
merits. At the conclusion thereof, the court issued a second order denying
their motion for reconsideration. The Veroys were returned to the St. Luke's
Hospital where their physical condition remained erratic. Gen. Dumlao
informed the Veroys that he had issued a directive for their transfer from the
St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the 2 October 1990 Order.
They would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of the trial
court, unless otherwise restrained by the court. The Veroys filed the petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

Issue: Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy for ascertaining
thereat the presence of alleged rebel soldiers include the authority to
conduct a room to room search once inside the house.

Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule
that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search
incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing). The necessity of the permission
obtained from Ma. Luisa underlines the recognition of Capt. Obrero of the
need of a search warrant to enter the house. The permission granted by was
for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel"
soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to
room search once inside the house. The police officers had ample time to
procure a search warrant but did not. Warrantless searches were declared
illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to
secure a search warrant. The items taken were, therefore, products of an
illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are
inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions instituted against them. The
offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not
follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is
immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not
be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is
still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore
protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence
against the Veroys in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of
firearms. Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in
mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be
knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness
there is no crime.

155 People vs. Damaso [GR 93516, 12 August 1992]

First Division, Medialdea (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary

officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and
some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in
Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group
apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and
Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed
that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the
group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive
documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items. After the raid,
the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance
the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba
whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor
of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie
Mendoza/Basilio Damaso. She guided the group to the house rented by
Damaso(@Mendoza). When they reached the house, the group found that it
had already vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give
the new address of Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the Barangay
Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented by
Damaso (@Mendoza). The group again required Morados to go with them.
When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They
told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the
area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the
group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as
the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox
copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who were
companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa,
Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group
requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz
Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive
orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial
beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other
items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters
for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to
the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that Damaso
(@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated
therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of
Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @
Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @
Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka
Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz. Such information was later
amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the criminal
charge. Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its
exhibits for admission. The defense counsel interposed his objections to the
admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay,
immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant; and
thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the
accused. On 17 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, finding
Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing the latter to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Damaso appealed.

Issue: Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the
warrantless search of his house.

Held: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance
of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. There is no
substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is
allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle
and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of the house,
the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law
enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure
proceedings. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the
person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so
in his or her . The records show that Damaso was not in his house at that
time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the
authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establish the fact that
Luz Morados was indeed Damaso's helper or if it was true that she was his
helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his
absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such
an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into Damaso's
dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and
seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to
the basic principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted
by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation
here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to
dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact
that they came to Damaso's house at nighttime, does not grant them the
license to go inside his house.

156 Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs [GR L-27968, 3 December 1975]

Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict surveillance by the combined
team of agents of the NBI, PC,RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior to its
apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao City. M/V [Jolo Lema]
was skippered (sic) by Capt. Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by Mr. Tomas
Velasco. During the period from the latter part of August to September 18,
1966, the said vessel was in Indonesian waters where it loaded copra and
coffee beans from Taruna, Pitta, and Mangenito, all of Indonesia. In its trip to
Indonesia it brought various merchandise from the Philippines which were
exchanged and/or bartered for copra and coffee beans and subsequently
taken to Davao City. Said vessel passed Marore, Indonesia on 18 September
1966 on its a way to Tahuna, Indonesia before proceeding to Davao City
where it was apprehended on 19 September 1966. At about 3:00 p.m. of the
said day, when the vessel was searched and after Captain Pantinople
informed the team that Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other
documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia carrying smuggled
copra and coffee, a combined team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-
Smuggling Center operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of
Davao, proceeded to the Velasco's room at the Skyroom Hotel in Davao City,
to ask for said document. Velasco was not inside the hotel room when they
entered the room. There are conficting claims whether the manicurist Teofila
Ibaez or whether Velasco's wife, who was allegedly inside the room at that
time, voluntarily allowed the police officers to enter; and whether the police
officers "forcibly opened luggages and boxes from which only several
documents and papers were found, then seized, confiscated and took away
the same," or whether Mrs. Velasco volunteered to open the suitcases and
baggages of Velasco and delivered the documents and things contained
therein to Reynolds. The Collector of Customs of Davao seized 1,480 sacks of
copra and 86 sacks of coffee from the M/V motor vessel Jolo Lema. The
seizure was declared lawful by the Court of Tax Appeals, and its decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court on 29 November 1974 in Nasiad vs. Court of
Tax Appeals (GR L-29318, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 238). In the present
special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; the only question
left then is whether the search conducted by a party headed by Reynolds
without the search warrant for the hotel room of Velasco, who entered into a
contract with Jose G. Lopez, the awardee of such Philippine Reparations
Commission vessel, for its operation and use ostensibly for fishing, is violative
of such constitutional provision.

Issue: Whether there was consent on the part of the person who was the
occupant of the hotel room then rented by Velasco.

Held: There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and Velasco to counteract
the force of the recital of the written statement of Teofila Ibaez (allegedly
wife of Tomas Velasco) by an affidavit of one Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated
that she is the legal wife of Velasco, and another by Velasco himself;
reiterating that the person who was present at his hotel room was one Teofila
Ibaez, "a manicurist by occupation." If such indeed were the case, then it is
much more easily understandable why that person, Teofila Ibaez, who could
be aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong
time, would have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the
circumstances, that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her
and even Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers
of the law be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There was a
person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their request.
Even common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too
closely as to why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can
readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with
the need for a search warrant.

157 Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002]

First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 41 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan,
Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police
officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y
Taio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he
appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers
checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at
P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes
answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers
away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the
highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale
took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which were
turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes
was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with
the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the
arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits
ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna
rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied
Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by
certiorari.

Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja

that the latter "will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive" be considered as waiver on Caballes part on warrantless search and
seizure.

Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be

secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule
under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of
moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with.
In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a
warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted
by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The mere
mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if
made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual
inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the
kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the
cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also,
Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on
routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle
was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is
not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute
"probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any
confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen
cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their
suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless
search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further,
the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers
allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search
leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt.
Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his
vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot
be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they
be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes,
they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his
vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is
no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in
cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for
the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused
was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive
submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on
record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be
established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable search and seizure.

158 People vs. Asis [GR 142531, 15 October 2002]

En Banc, Panganiban (J): 7 concur, 6 on official leave

Facts: Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged
in an Information dated 18 February 1998; the information stating "That on or
about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by
means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing
one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different
parts of the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit:
Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00; one (1) wristwatch' one (1) gold
necklace; and undetermined items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00
more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING against his will,
to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount more
or less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a result thereof, he
sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death." When arraigned on 9 July 1998, both accused pleaded not guilty.
Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio,
but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. The prosecution
presented 9 witnesses. Although none of them had actually seen the crime
committed, strong and substantial circumstantial evidence presented by
them attempted to link both accused to the crime. After due trial, both
accused were found guilty and sentenced to death. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila (Branch 54; Criminal Case 98-163090), on 8 March 2000, held
that the "crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under Article
294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code," ruled that "although no witnesses to
the actual killing and robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence
including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely
proved that the two (2) x x x committed the crime," and appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior strength and
treachery and thus sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death.
Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court. Both the accused do
not question the legality of their arrest, as they made no objection thereto
before the arraignment, but object to the introduction of the bloodstained
pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the bag of Formento; arguing that the
search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal
and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand,
contends that it was Formento's wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag
that contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims that
her act constituted a valid consent to the search without a warrant.

Issue: Whether Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the recovery of

the bloodstained pair of short, in his possession during the warrantless
search.
Held: Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the
person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on
his or her behalf. In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was
recovered, Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being
the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given
consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come
from any other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as
the accused therein was not present when the search was made. Further, to
constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second,
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. Herein, Formento could not have consented to a warrantless search
when, in the first place, he did not understand what was happening at that
moment. There was no interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the
arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case Pasion vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin, i.e. "as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law," becomes even more
pronounced in the present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there
was no interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming
acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and
simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece
of evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it
is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly, as to
evidence vis-a-is the case in its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely
arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It
must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt.
It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption
of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal.

159 People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September 2003]

Second Division, Tinga (J): 3 concur, 1 filed a separate dissenting opinion

Facts: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police
Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong
Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have
been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald
Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all
members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted
surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days,
they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal
drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.
On 1 August 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana.
Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At
around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1
Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and
McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About
8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a
carton marked King Flakes. Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1
Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds
description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1
Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police
officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information
that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who
resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1
Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged,
saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion
looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two
bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers.
PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what
seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested
Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to
the police station. The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned
over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.
Forensic tests on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the
police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana
leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and
his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited
drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense,
however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the
seizure of the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying
the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecutions
evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting
both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud
and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of
the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: Whether the Tudtuds implied acquiescence (Tudtuds statement of its
all right when the police officers requested that the box be opened) be
considered a waiver.

Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless
search of appellants belongings under the first exception, as a search
incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned
by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question
preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede
the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the
police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to
arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a
great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this
Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone
is insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting
officers that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as
personal, having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier,
for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors
and the friends of Tudtud. Soliers information is hearsay. Confronted with
such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct
their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually
consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade,
but of a mere gathering of information from the assets there. The police
officers who conducted such surveillance did not identify who these
assets were or the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such
information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge. Finally, there is an
effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures only if
the following requisites are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist;
(2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third
requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced
themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the
carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said it was alright.
He did not resist and opened the box himself. Tudtud's implied acquiescence,
if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at
all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's
lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of
his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search
and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under the
recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves
obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence
other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant,
the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.