MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY: WHAT IS THE QUESTION?

Author(s): Penelope Maddy

Source: The Monist, Vol. 67, No. 1, The Philosophy of Mathematics (JANUARY, 1984), pp.
46-55
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902842
Accessed: 18-05-2017 08:39 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Monist

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY: WHAT IS THE QUESTION?*

The tenor of much recent work in the philosophy of mathematics has

been dictated by the popular assumption that Platonism is defunct.1 Some
embrace that assumption and look for alternatives,2 others deny it and at
tempt to revive Platonism,3 but either way it is the starting point. The fate of
Platonism took center stage with the appearance of Paul Benacerraf s
"Mathematical truth"4, but a decade has passed since then, and the
philosophical climate has changed. Most important, the quarter from which
Platonism was to receive its mortal wound?epistemology?has developed
considerably; the epistemological theory presupposed by Benacerraf is no
longer popular. This makes it difficult to assess the value of work in the
philosophy of mathematics done under the influence of Benacerrafs formula
tion.
My goal here is a modest one. I will first suggest that the concern over
Platonistic epistemology remains in spite of the changes in epistemological
theory, and that those changes have steered general epistemological concerns
away from the ideas on which Benacerrafs argument is based. These observa
tions point up a need for a new formulation of the epistemological challenge
to Platonism. My second goal is to provide one by tracing the true source of
the persistent worry about Platonistic epistemology and to survey the
resulting options.
The Outmoded Version

In its Benacerrafian formulation, the epistemological challenge to

Platonism rests on two premises:
(1) mathematical entities are causally inert
(2) the causal theory of knowledge
The first of these can be spelled out as the claim that since abstract entities
are not spatiotemporal, they cannot participate in causal interactions. (See
[15], section II.) The second is a bit less precise.
In his presentation of the causal theory, Goldman proposes adding to the
standard account of knowledge the additional requirement that there be a
causal connection between the fact that makes the belief true and the sub
ject's having the belief. (See [9], p. 358.) It may be less than obvious what it is
to require that a fact about an abstract mathematical entity play a causal
role, but Benacerraf revises the requirement to make the causal efficacy of the
entity itself more explicit:

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 47

... for X to know that S is true requires some causal relation between X and the
referents of the names, predicates and quantifiers of S. ([141, p. 671 )5

Something like the version of the causal requirement is adopted by various

writers on this subject. (See [141, especially pp. 124ff.) From these two
premises follows a widely accepted conclusion which I will call the
Untenability Thesis (UT):
(3) Platonism is untenable.
Mathematical Platonists, naturally, have not taken this lying down.
Their responses to the above argument for UT fall into two categories
depending on which of the two premises they deny. Kim has denied that
mathematical entities are causally inert (in [151), and I have made a similar
claim (in [17], though cf. n6). Resnik, on the other hand, grants the premise
on causal inertness, but implicitly denies that causal efficacy is necessary (in
[19]). Steiner also defends Platonism by rejecting the causal theory of
knowledge, though his attack (in [20]) is more explicit than Resnik's.
I'd like to consider the tone of the reactions elicited by moves of these
two sorts. To those who would defend Platonism by denying the causal theory
of knowledge, there is Hart's classic rebuttal.

... it is a crime against the intellect to try to mask the problem of naturalizing the
epistemology of mathematics with philosophical razzle-dazzle. Superficial wor
ries about the intellectual hygiene of causal theories of knowledge are irrelevant
to and misleading from this problem... ([14], pp. 125-126)

Now if the real epistemological problem for the Platonist is UT as based on

the two premises described above, then a successful rejection of one of those
premises constitutes a solution. Hart's denial that the problem has been
solved suggests that the Benacerrafian formulation has not captured the real
problem. Hart feels a deep uneasiness about Platonistic epistemology which
is not fully diagnosed in the two-premise argument for UT.
This by itself should be enough to convince us that the problem needs
restating, but consider for a moment the tone of replies to those Platonists
who deny the other premise and claim causal efficacy for mathematical en
tities. Replies of the sort I have in mind rarely appear in print because they
question the importance rather than the correctness of a piece of
philosophical work. In conversation, they run along the following lines:
"Why bother to defend Platonism against the causal theory? Everyone knows
that the causal theory is false. You gain nothing by meeting a dead theory!"
In response, let me say that I doubt it would come as a surprise to Kim that
the causal theory of knowledge is no longer accepted in its original form,
and I must declare myself also aware of this development. Again, if the real
problem were the UT as defended above, any Platonist aware of the current
disrepute of the second premise would not require the additional solace of a

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
48 PENELOPE MADDY

denial of the first premise. Yet, speaking for myself, I think work of this sort
is of value regardless of the ultimate fate of the causal theory of knowledge. I
share Hart's deep and undiagnosed uneasiness, the feeling that there is an im
portant epistemologica! problem for the Platonist which is independent of the
usual argument for UT.
Clearly the question needs reformulation. There is an important
epistemological problem for the Platonist which is closely related to the pur
ported causal inertness of mathematical entities, but which is not adequately
captured by the usual defense of UT. I will approach the reformulation of the
question from two angles: first, by the examing the developments in
epistemology since the introduction of the causal theory to see why it was dis
carded and what has taken its place, so that the requirements of general
epistemology can be assessed, and second, by reexamining the positions of
Benacerraf and Hart in hope of isolating the source of the aforementioned
uneasiness.

The Requirements of General Epistemology

Counterexamples to the causal theory are as old as the theory itself;
Goldman presents several in his original paper ([9]). All of these involve in
ferential knowledge, for example: my belief that you will go to town tomor
row is inferred from my belief that you told me you planned to do so, (though
your going to town didn't cause my belief that you will); or my belief that sm
oke is coming out of the chimney is inferred from my belief that I'm sitting in
front of a roaring fire, (though the smoke didn't cause my belief about it); or
finally, my belief that all swans are white is inferred from my perceptual
beliefs about various particular swans, (though all swans didn't cause my
belief). These examples suggest that the theory should be divided into two
clauses, one for inferential knowledge and one for noninferential knowledge.
The noninferential knowledge would be caused by its object, just as Grice re
quires in perceptual cases (see [121), while the inferential knowledge would be
obtained by cogent inferential techniques from true premises.6 This sort of
adjustment is incorporated into Goldman's reliabilist theory (in [11]): S's
belief that is justified if (1) it results immediately from a reliable process, or
(2) it results, via a reliable inferential process, from justified beliefs (An in
ferential process is reliable if it usually generates true beliefs from true
beliefs.)
Notice that this reliabilist theory is only a theory of justification, not of
knowledge. For this reason, Goldman restricts his attention to the cognitive
processes of the subject. Upgrading the reliabilist theory to an account of
knowledge would presumably involve reinstating some requirement on the
extra-knower causal history of the belief. That this requirement cannot simp

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 49

ly be a version of the causal connection required by the original causal theory

is shown by another counterexample of Goldman's (See f 10], pp. 772?73.)
Imagine that Henry sees a barn in the usual way, but that unbeknowst to
Henry, the country-side is strewn with papier-mache facsimilies of barns
which Henry wouldn't be able to tell from the real barn he's now observing.
In this case, Goldman feels we would deny that Henry knows there is a barn
before him, even though the causal conditions are impeccable. Thus, an ap
propriate causal connection is insufficient; the surrounding circumstances
must not defeat the knowledge claim. Various remarks (see [ 11], pp. 12?13)
suggest that this might be accommodated by extending the reliability require
ment to cover the extra-knower genesis of the belief. Then Henry doesn't
know there is a barn before him because his perceptual mechanisms are not
reliable in an environment which includes facsimilies.
Two other departures from the original theory should also be noted.
First, the reliable process is not required to be causal, and second, the fact
that is not required to participate in the generation of the justified belief
that p. The causal requirement is dropped because it was the reliability, not
the causality, that was the aim when the "appropriate causal connection" was
originally introduced. The second omission is to be expected in the account of
justification, but other observations7 suggest that it would probably also be
omitted in the corresponding reliabilist account of knowledge.
In this context, the burden placed on the Platonist by general
epistemological considerations can be rephrased. Assuming that theorems
are justified by deductive inference, and that this is a reliable inferential
process, all that's left is accounting for our knowledge of the axioms. Here
the Platonist has two options: (1) describe a reliable (perhaps noncausal)
mechanism (not necessarily involving mathematical entities) which im
mediately generates our belief in the axioms, or (2) describe a reliable
(presumably nondeductive) inferential process which, when applied to various
justified beliefs, produces our belief in the axioms. Even if the causal inertness
of mathematical entities is granted for the sake of argument, any one of three
developments (the elimination of the causal requirement in the base clause,
the elimination of the object participation requirement in the base clause, or
the addition of the inferential clause) can be used to block the argument for
UT in its original form.
So, if there is an important cause for epistemological uneasiness about
Platonism, its source is not to be found in reliabilism, the contemporary
descendent of the causal theory.8 Of course, this is not enough to show that
general epistemological considerations will never have consequences for
Platonistic philosophy of mathematics. It might well be argued that exclusive
attention to reliabilism is no way to assess the requirements of general

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
50 PENELOPE MADDY

epistemology because competing epistemological accounts might set very dif

ferent requirements on knowledge. In my own defense, let me first say that a
descendent of the causal theory is more likely than other positions to revive
the UT; if it does not, this is significant.
Second, consider the opponents of reliabilism. Many opponents claim
that production by a reliable mechanism is not enough to justify a belief on
the grounds that the knower must also have reason to believe that the
mechanism is reliable. (See [4], pp. 63-64.) Others object that production by
a reliable mechanism is not necessary to justify a belief because, for example,
we would be justified in trusting our perceptual mechanisms even if an evil
demon had secretly rendered them 100% unreliable. (See [6].) Objections of
these sorts suggest that what matters for justification is not only the truth
about the mechanism, but what the subject might reasonably believe about
the mechanism. In the philosophy of mathematics, though, it seems pointless
to make much of the distinction between the facts about justification and
knowledge, and what we have reason to believe these facts to be. We are
concerned with whether or not any of us has mathematical knowledge. To de
fend the claim that we do, we must describe what we take to be a reliable
mechanism which produces our belief in the mathematical axioms. If we suc
ceed, this description will include our reasons for thinking that mechanism is
reliable (even if it isn't). Thus it makes sense to begin with the reliabilist's
goals.9

The Source of the Uneasiness

Let's return for a moment to the presentations of Benacerraf and Hart.
First, it should be noted that Benacerraf explicitly acknowledges that inferen
tial knowledge requires separate treatment:

... an account of our knowledge of medium-sized objects ... will involve, causal
ly, some direct reference to the facts known, and through that, reference to the
objects themselves... other cases of knowledge can be explained as being based
on inferences based on cases such as these . . . this is meant to include our
knowledge of general laws and theories, and, through them, our knowledge of the
future and much of the past. ([ 1 ], p. 672)

Still, in the base clause, he is requiring both causality and object participa
tion. In his discussion of Godei, he may back off a bit from the first of these,
but not from the second:

. . . what is missing is ... an account of the link between our cognitive faculties
and the objects known. In physical science we have at least a start on such an ac
count, and it is causal. ([11, p. 674)

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 51

Finally, though this may be dictated by his focus on G?delian Platonism,

there is an implicit assumption that not all mathematical beliefs are inferen
tial. So, Benacerraf makes two requirements beyond those imposed by simple
reliabilism: (1) at least some mathematical beliefs must fall under the base
clause, and (2) the reliable (causal?) mechanism of the base clause must in
volve the objects of belief. The same two additional requirements are implicit
in Hart:

Granted just conservation of energy . . . you must not deny that when you learn
something about an object, there is a change in you . . . such a change can be ac
counted for only by some sort of transmission of energy from, ultimately, your
environment to, at least proximately, your brain. And I do not see how what you
learned about that object can be about that object (rather than some other) unless
at least part of the energy that changed your state came from that object... this .
. . leaves unexplained how our beliefs could be about energetically inert objects.
(?141, p. 125)

Whence these two additional requirements? They were originally sup

ported by the causal theory, but if my analysis has been correct, they produce
a deep uneasiness about Platonism that is independent of the causal theory.
Their source, then, is the true source of the feeling that there is an important
epistemological problem for Platonism.
Let me ask first about the requirement that not all mathematical belief be
inferential; I think an understanding of this will lead naturally to an under
standing of the object participation requirement. Of course, as mentioned
earlier, a good deal of mathematics is justified inferentially by deduction
from axioms. It was once hoped that the axioms themselves could be justified
inferentially by deduction from pure logic, thus shifting the epistemic
problem outside the range of mathematics proper. As this has proved impos
sible, it seems the only form of inferential justification available for the
mathematical axioms is inductive. It has been persuasively argued that sim
ple enumerative induction is not suitable for mathematics (see, e. g., f 15], sec
tion I), but a more theoretical form of induction yields a position like Quine's
or Putnam's10: we are justified in believing the mathematical axioms because
they form part of our best-confirmed scientific theory.
So the question becomes: why should Benacerraf and Hart reject the view
of this sort out of hand? There are, of course, various objections, among
them: (i) in justifying their claims, mathematicians do not appeal to applica
tions, so the suggested position is untrue to mathematical practice, and (ii)
some parts of mathematics (even some axioms) aren't used in applications, so
the suggested position would demand reform of existing mathematics. Now
intuitionists or nominalists might be inclined to accept consequences of this

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 52 PENELOPE MADDY

sort, but they are not likely to appeal to the Platonist. A common formula
tion of Platonism is that mathematics is the science of mathematical entities
just as physical science is the science of physical objects. Here the feeling is
that mathematics and physical science are similar structures, interrelated in
various important ways without one being subservient to the other. This
science/mathematics analogy is of central importance to Godei, who traces
it in turn to Russell. (See [8], pp. 212-13.) It is a profound assumption about
the nature of mathematics.
I suggest that the source of Benacerraf and Hart's two additional re
quirements, the source of the oft-mentioned uneasiness about Platonistic
epistemology, is not a general epistemological principle descended from the
causal theory, but this underlying assumption about the nature of
mathematics itself: the science/mathematics analogy. If mathematics is
parallel to, not a theoretical adjunct to, physical science, then not all its
claims are inferentially justified; some must fall, as some do in physical
science, under the base clause. Furthermore, in physical science the reliable
mechanism of the base clause is ordinary perception. Though reliabilism does
not require it, this is the paradigm case in which the object of belief par
ticipates in the production of that belief. Thus, if mathematics is to be the
science of mathematical entities, the reliable mechanism of the mathematical
base clause should involve the object of belief (perhaps causally); it should be
"perception-like." Here is the second additional requirement.
The situation could be described like this: the epistemological challenge
to Platonism comes not from Goldman, but from Grice. A new argument for
the UT might be defended along the following lines:
(1) mathematical entieies are causally inert
(2) the causal theory of perception
(3) Platonism involves the science/mathematics analogy
Therefore,
(4) Platonism is untenable.
(Note that this is not the old argument for the UT because it is not claimed
that the conclusion follows from general epistemology and (1) alone.) This
new argument has several weaknesses. First, as the Quine/Putnam position
shows, (3) is false. Second, even if science and mathematics are analogous
structures, even if both enjoy both "perception-like" and theoretical justifica
tions, it is not pre-determined how far this analogy must extend. Perhaps, as
Benacerraf hinted in a passage cited earlier, the mathematical base clause
mechanism could be "perception-like" without being causal. And finally, as
with the old argument, premise (1) is debatable.
These considerations indicate that arguments for the UT based on the
purported causal inertness of mathematical entities need more defense than

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 53

they have yet been given, even if the inertness premise is granted. A more in
teresting and important suggestion, though, is that the underlying source of
the persistent uneasiness about Platonistic epistemology comes not from
general epistemological considerations, but from a strong assumption about
the nature of mathematics: the science/mathematics analogy. Platonism?
the view that mathematical entities are the subject of mathematics and that
its statements are true or false depending on their properties?can be main
tained ? la Quine/Putnam without assuming this analogy. Even if the argu
ments for the UT are defused once and for all, the task of describing a
perception-like base clause mechanism remains for any Platonist making this
assumption.
It might well seem that the best course for the mathematical Platonist
would be to jettison the scienceTmathematics analogy. Some reasons against
this have already been mentioned: the desire to remain true to mathematical
practice and to avoid calls for mathematical reform. I personally would
recommend retaining the assumption of a science/mathematics analogy for
two further reasons. First, a Quine/Putnam style dependence on the in
dispensibility of mathematical entities for science leaves the Platonist
vulnerable to arguments to the effect that few (see [3]) or even no (see [5|)
mathematical entities actually must be postulated for scientific purposes.
And second, I agree with Godei; I think the assumption is true.

Penelope Niaddy
University of Illinois
at Chicago

NOTES

* I have benefited from conversations with Richard Foley, Aron Edidin, and Paul
Benacerraf. (Naturally this should not be taken to mean that they, especially the last
mentioned, agree with my way of putting things.) This paper grew from comments on
Kim [15] and Resnik [ 19), and an abstract appeared as my [16]. Versions have been
read at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, the University of Notre Dame,
and the 1982 Western Division APA meeting in Columbus, Ohio. I have Miss Stein to
thank for my title.
1. The term "PfeUonism" is often used in the philosophy of mathematics for any
position which holds that the subject matter of mathematics is a realm of
mathematical entities existing independently of human thought, and that
mathematical statements are true or false depending on the properties of these en
tities. Lumping all such positions together masks a myraid of differences concerning
the nature of those entities, but I will bow to common parlance here and use the
blanket term.

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 54 PENELOPE MADDY

2. For example, Field |5|. See especially p. 98. The references cited there give
further supporters of this position.
3. See, for example, Steiner |20|, especially chapter 4, and Kim 115|. I have also
contributed to this side of the debate in ( I7|.
4. I should emphasize that Benacerraf s conclusion is only that Platonism is not
compatible with the current best epistemological theories. Many philosophers have
taken this as an argument against Platonism (see those cited in n2), though it is oc
casionally taken to count against the current epistemological theory (see Burgess |2|,
pp. 100?01). I will be considering the argument presupposed by the first group.
5. Benacerraf has suggested (in conversation) that the talk of semantic machinery
in this quotation is irrelevant. He now agrees with Goldman's version which takes the
required connection to be between the believer and the fact that makes S true. The ob
jects of belief become involved when one further assumes that the fact that makes S
true is determined by the referential structure of S.
6. I'm assuming here that perceptual beliefs about medium-sized physical objects
are not inferential. In doing so, I don't mind assuming that they are not inferred from
sense-data statements, or some such thing, but I don't want to rule out the view that
perception is a sort of "inference to the best explanation." (See 113|, chapter II.) But
even if perceptual beliefs are inferred in this way, they are not inferred from other
beliefs, but from states of our sensory apparatus. This is a special kind of inference; I
will use the word exclusively for inferences from beliefs to beliefs.
7. For example, even in a straightforward perceptual case, Fido's being a dog
doesn't cause light rays to be reflected into my eyes in such a way as to bring about my
belief that Fido is a dog, rather, it is various structural features of Fido that are
causally efficacious. (See [ 101, P- 785, 14). Whether or not this kind of consideration
should release Fido himself from his causal responsibilities is unclear. For the sake of
argument, let me assume that it would, that is, that in a reliabilist account of
knowledge, the extra knower genesis of the belief must be reliable, period. (See also
n8.)
8. Some newer versions of reliabilism suggest that processes can only be reliable if
they involve some sort of participation in a causal nexus closed to mathematical en
tities if they are indeed causally inert. The point remains that while the causal clause in
the original causal theory has come under considerable fire and is debatably absent
from its direct descendents, this seems not to have eliminated our worries about
Platonistic epistemology. I think an uneasiness about Platonistic epistemology re
mains if causal considerations are dropped from general epistemology entirely. But
even if they are eventually reinstated, I would contend that it is not they, but the
somewhat different considerations discussed in the next section, that make
philosophers of mathematics worry so much about the epistemological status of
Platonism.
9. A greater epistemological consensus could probably be reached if the
reliabilist's requirements were replaced by a more general one to the effect that beliefs
which amount to knowledge should not be arrived at "accidentally." Naturally there
are radical epistemologists who would even reject the extremely general "nonac
cidental" requirement. See |7|. I will stick to the formulation given in the text for the
sake of definiteness.
10. This line of thinking originated with Quine, but received its most Platonistic
formulation from Putnam in [18). Of course, Putnam's current views are somewhat
different.

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MATHEMATICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 55

REFERENCES

fil Paul Benacerraf, "Mathematical Truth," Journal of Philosophy

(1973): 661-79.
[2] John Burgess, "Why I Am Not a Nominalist," Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic 24(1983): 93-105.
[3] Charles Chihara, Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle,
(Cornell, 1973).
[41 Roderick Chisholm Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Prentice Hall,
1977).
[51 Hartry Field, Science Without Numbers, (Princeton, 1980).
[61 Richard Foley, "Rationality and Reliability," forthcoming.
[7] Richard Foley, "The Purely Epistemic," forthcoming in the
American Philosophical Quarterly.
[81 Kurt Godei, "Russell's Mathematical Logic," in Benacerraf and Put
nam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics, (Prentice Hall, 1964), pp.
211-32.
[91 Alvin Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowledge," Journal of
Philosophy 70 (1973): 357-72.
[101 Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge", Jour
nal of Philosophy 73(1976): 771-91.
[Ill Alvin Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?," in G. Pappas (ed.),
Justification and Knowledge, (Reidel, 1979), pp. 1-23.
[121 Paul Grice, "A Causal Theory of Perception," in R. Swartz (ed.),
Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, (California, 1965). pp. 438?72.
[131 Gilbert Harman, Thought, (Princeton, 1973).
[ 141 W. H. Hart, "Review of Steiner's Mathematical Knowledge," Jour
nal of Philosophy 74(1977), pp. 118-29.
[151 Jaegwon Kim, "The Role of Perception in A Priori Knowledge,"
Philosophical Studies 40(1981), pp. 339-54.
[161 Penelope Maddy, "Mathematical Epistemology: What Is the
Question?," abstract, Nous 16(1982): pp. 106-07.
[171 Penelope Maddy, "Perception and Mathematical Intuition,"
Philosophical Review 89(1980): pp. 163-96.
[181 Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of Logic (Harper Torchbooks, 1971).
Reprinted in Mathematics, Matter and Method, 2nd ed.,
(Cambridge, 1979), pp. 323-57.
[191 Michael Resnik, "Mathematics as a Science of Patterns:
Epistemology", Nous 16(1982): 93-106.
[201 Mark Steiner, Mathematical Knowledge, (Cornell, 1975).

This content downloaded from 95.183.200.251 on Thu, 18 May 2017 08:39:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms