SURVEY OF CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of
January-December 2013 circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. It is
Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra
Book II
FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OF A PRIVATE,
PUBLIC, OR COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT: ELEMENTS
Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, 26 June 2013.
On different occasions, accused Tanenggee affixed, forged,
or caused to be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and payee
of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show that
the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed
the checks to the loans clerk for encashment. Once said documents
were forged and falsified, Tanenggee released and obtained from
the bank
All the elements of the crime of estafa through falsification
of commercial documents were established in this case.
First, Tanenggee is a private individual. Second, the acts of
falsification consisted in Tanenggees (1) counterfeiting or imitating
the victims handwriting or signature and causing it to appear that
the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to
appear that victim has participated in an act or proceeding when
he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was
committed in promissory notes and checks which are commercial
documents.
USURPATION OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS: ELEMENTS
Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. Nos.
186739-960, 17 April 2013.
As mayor, accused Ruzol issued permits to transport
salvaged forest products to various recipients. An information for
usurpation of authority or official functions was filed against him on
the ground that he was not lawfully entitled to issue said permits,
such authority properly belonging to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The Supreme Court acquitted Ruzol.Good faith is a defense
in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. The
term good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind
actually a question of intent and although something internal, it can
be ascertained by relying not on ones self-serving protestations of
good faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.
In this case, Ruzol should be acquitted because he acted in
good faith. Contrary to the conclusions made by the
Sandiganbayan, Ruzols act of consulting with the public through an
organizational meeting was not a badge of bad faith. Rather, it was
a sign supporting Ruzols good intentions to regulate and monitor
the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and
occurrence of untoward illegal logging.
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS: PRESUMPTION, MODES
OF COMMISSION
Cantos v. People, G.R. No. 184908, 3 July 2013.
Accused Cantos was convicted of the crime of malversation
of public funds.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) states that the
failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds
or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, isprima facie evidence that he has put such
missing fund or property to personal uses. This presumption,
however, may be rebutted upon evidence that can nullify any
likelihood that the accused put the funds or property to personal
use.
Cantos failed to overcome this prima facie evidence of guilt.
He failed to explain the missing funds in his account and to
restitute the amount upon demand. His claim that the money was
taken by robbery or theft is self-serving and has not been
supported by evidence. In fact, Cantos even tried to unscrew the
safety vault to make it appear that the money was forcibly taken.
Moreover, Cantos explanation that there is a possibility that the
money was taken by another is belied by the fact that there was no
sign that the steel cabinet was forcibly opened. Finally, it was only
Cantos who had the keys to the steel cabinet.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: CONSPIRACY
Bacasmas v. People, G.R. Nos. 189343, 189369, and
189553, 10 July 2013.

A Commission of Audit (COA) report
showed that petitioners Bacasmas, Gaviola,
Cesa, and Jaca not only signed, certified,
and approved the City Government of
Cebus cash advance vouchers, but also
signed and countersigned the checks
despite the deficiencies, which amounted to
violations of R.A. 7160, P.D. 1445, and COA
Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002.2.
Petitioners are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e)
of R.A. No. 3019. Gross and inexcusable
negligence is characterized by a want of
even the slightest care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation in which there is a duty
to act not inadvertently, but wilfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons are
affected. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or simple negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of a known duty due to some motive
or interest or ill will that partakes of the
nature of fraud.
Petitioners were well aware of their
responsibilities before they affixed their
signatures on the cash advance vouchers.
Yet, they still chose to disregard the
requirements laid down by the law, rules,
and regulations by approving the vouchers
despite the incomplete information therein,
the previous unliquidated cash advances,
the absence of payroll to support the cash
requested, and the disparity between the
requested cash advances and the total net
pay. Worse, they continue to plead their
innocence, allegedly for the reason that it
was "common practice" in their office not to
follow the law and rules and regulations to
the letter.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT: SECTION 3(E)
Sanchez v. People, G.R. No.
187340, 14 August 2013
Petitioner Sanchez, a city engineer,
approved and submitted documents
concerning the improvement of an existing
canal to the Cebu City Council. In the
course of the project preparation, however,
Sanchez never ordered any of his
subordinates to verify the ownership of the
land through which the canal would pass
because, according to him, it appeared to
2
be public land. The City Council
consequently passed a resolution,
authorizing the city mayor to enter into a
contract for and on behalf of the city for
said canals construction.
A certain Nadela discovered that a
canal was being constructed on her lot
without her consent. Despite the
governments assurances, it never initiated
efforts to remove the canal,
promptingNadela to file the instant
complaint against Sanchez.
Sanchez conviction was
proper.Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be
committed either by dolo, as when the
accused acted with evident bad faith or
manifest partiality or by culpa as when the
accused committed gross inexcusable
negligence.
There is manifest partiality when
there is a clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favour one side
or person rather than another. Evident bad
faith connotes not only bad judgment but
also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. Finally, gross inexcusable
negligence refers to negligence
characterized by want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally,
with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may
be affected.
Sanchez failure to validate the
ownership of Nadelas land on which the
canal is to be built because of his
unfounded belief that it is public land
constitutes gross and inexcusable
negligence. Sanchez even impliedly
admitted that it fell squarely under his
duties to check the ownership of the land
with the Register of Deeds. Yet, he
concluded that it was public land solely on
his evaluation of its appearancethat
Nadelas land looked swampy.
Plameras v. People, G.R. No.
187268, 4 September 2013;
 Posadas and Dayco v. People,
G.R. Nos. 168951 and 169000,
27 November 2013. (same
doctrine as discussed above)
MURDER: ELEMENTS
The victim was about to ride his
tricycle when petitioner Escamilla shot the
former four times, hitting him once in the
upper portion of his right chest.

People v. Peteluna, G.R. No.

187048, 23 January 2013.
On the way home, appellants
followed the victim and his companion. The
companion saw the appellants place their
arms on the victims shoulder, after which
they struck the latter with stones. The
victim pleaded appellants to stop, but they
did not. When the victim fell to the ground,
one of the appellants smashed his head
with a stone as big as the victims head.
Afterwards, appellants dragged him
downhill toward a farm.
Appellants claim that the crime
committed is only homicide because of the
absence of the circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation, which would
have qualified the killing to murder, and
that their respective defenses of denial and
alibi were meritorious.
The Supreme Court upheld
appellants conviction. As a qualifying
circumstance to the crime of murder, the
essence of treachery is a deliberate and
sudden attack, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or to escape, and that it
may still exist even if the attack is frontal so
long as the same is sudden and
unexpected.
It was clear that the victim, an elder,
had no inkling of the impending danger
against him. The attack was sudden
notwithstanding the prior act of placing the
assailants arms on the shoulder of the
victim because such was done in a friendly
manner.
People v. Zapuiz, G.R. No.
199713, 20 February 2013.
(same doctrine as discussed
above)
HOMICIDE: ELEMENTS
Escamilla was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide,
which the Supreme Court upheld on appeal.
Intent to kill, as an essential element of
homicide at whatever stage, may be before
or simultaneous with the infliction of
injuries. The evidence to prove intent to kill
may consist of, among others:
1. the means used;
2. the nature, location, and number
of wounds sustained by the
victim; and
3. the conduct of the malefactors
before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of
the victim.
Escamillas intent to kill was
simultaneous with the infliction of injuries.
Using a gun, he shot the victim in the chest.
Despite a bloodied right upper torso, the
victim still managed to run towards his
house to ask for help. Nonetheless,
Escamilla continued to shoot at him three
more times, albeit unsuccessfully.
The attending physician, finding that
the bullet had no point of exit, did not
attempt to extract it; its extraction would
just have caused further damage. The
doctor further said that the victim would
have died if the latter were not brought
immediately to the hospital. All these facts
belie the absence of Escamillas intent to
kill the victim.

RAPE: ELEMENTS
Escamilla v. People, G.R. No.
188551, 27 February 2013.
3
 People v. Buado, Jr., G.R. No.
170634, 8 January 2013; People
v. Zafra, G.R. No. 197363, 26
June 2013; People v. Manalili,
G.R. No. 191253, 28 August
2013.
Carnal knowledge of a female simply
means a male having bodily connections
with a female. The presence or absence of
injury or laceration in the victims genitalia
is not decisive of whether rape has been
committed. Such injury or laceration is
material only if force or intimidation were
an element of the rape charged. Otherwise,
it is merely circumstantial evidence of the
commission of the rape.
People v. Penilla, G.R. No.
189324, 20 March 2013; People
v. Vitero, G.R. No. 175327, 3
April 2013; People v. Cabungan,
G.R. No. 189355, 23 January
2013; People v. Lomaque, G.R.
No. 189297, 5 June 2013; People
v. Zafra, G.R. No. 197363, 26
June 2013; People v. Basallo,
G.R. No. 182457, 30 January
2013; People v. Candellada, G.R.
No. 189293, 10 July 2013; People
v. Cedenio, G.R. No. 201103, 25
September 2013; People v.
Galagar, Jr., G.R. No. 202842, 9
October 2013.
By the very nature of the crime of
rape, conviction or acquittal depends
almost entirely on the credibility of the
complainants testimony because of the
fact that, usually, only the participants can
directly testify as to its occurrence. Since
normally only two persons are privy to the
commission of rape, the evaluation of the
evidence thereof ultimately revolves around
the credibility of the complaining witness.
The moral character of the victim is
immaterial. Rape may be committed not
only against single women, but also against
those who are married, middle-aged,
separated, or pregnant. Even a prostitute
may be a victim of rape.
Physical resistance need not be
established in rape when threats and
intimidation are employed, and the victim
submits herself to her attacker because of
fear. It is not the sole test to determine
whether a woman has involuntarily
4
succumbed to the lust of an accused. It is
not an essential element of rape.
Delay in revealing the commission of
a crime, such as rape, does not necessarily
render such charge unworthy of belief. This
is because the victim may choose to keep
quiet rather than expose her defilement to
the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the
delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it
work to discredit the complainant.
People v. Bacatan, G.R. No.
203315, 18 September 2013
In rape cases, the law does not
impose a burden on the rape victim to
prove resistance because it is not an
element of rape. Hence, the absence of
abrasions or contusions in AAAs body is
inconsequential. Also, not all victims react
the same way. Some people may cry out,
some may faint, some may be shocked into
insensibility, while others may appear to
yield to the intrusion. Some may offer
strong resistance while others may be too
intimidated to offer any resistance at all.
The failure of a rape victim to offer
tenacious resistance does not make her
submission to accuseds criminal acts
voluntary. What is necessary is that the
force employed against her was sufficient to
consummate the purpose which he has in
mind.
Sufficient force does not mean great
or is of such character that is irresistible; as
long as it brings about the desired result, all
considerations of whether it was more or
less irresistible are beside the point.
People v. Espenilla, G.R. No.
192253, 18 September 2013.
When a rape victims testimony is
straightforward and marked with
consistency despite grueling examination, it
deserves full faith and confidence and
cannot be discarded. If such testimony is
clear, consistent and credible to establish
the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a
conviction may be based on it,
notwithstanding its subsequent retraction.
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness
does not necessarily vitiate her original
testimony.
A retraction is looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. It is
exceedingly unreliable for there is always
the probability that such recantation may
later on be repudiated. It can easily be
obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or monetary consideration. Like
any other testimony, it is subject to the test
of credibility based on the relevant
circumstances and, especially, on the
demeanor of the witness on the stand.
People v. Caoile, G.R. No.
203041, 5 June 2013; People v.
Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, 30
January 2013.
The law provides that there are two
circumstances for the carnal knowledge of a
woman with mental disability to be
considered rape. It may either be rape of a
person deprived of reason or rape of a
demented person.
The term deprived of reason
pertains to those suffering from a mental
abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.
Meanwhile, a demented person pertains
to one having dementiaa form of mental
disorder in which cognitive and intellectual
functions of the mind are prominently
affected and where total recovery is not
possible.
People v. Gaduyon, G.R. No.
181473, 11 November 2013
In rape under paragraph 1 or rape
through sexual intercourse, carnal
knowledge is the crucial element which
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
This is also referred to as organ rape or
penile rape and must be attended by any
of the circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.
There must be evidence to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators
penis touched the labia of the victim or slid
into her female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, to
ensure his conviction of rape by sexual
intercourse.
Rape under paragraph 2 of the
above-quoted article is commonly known as
rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator,
under any of the attendant circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this
kind of rape by inserting his penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object into the genital or
5
anal orifice of another person. It is also
called instrument or object rape, also
gender-free rape, or the narrower
homosexual rape.
CONSUMMATED RAPE
People v. Reyes, G.R. No.
173307, 17 July 2013; People v.
Manalili, G.R. No. 191253, 28
August 2013; People v. De Jesus,
G.R. No. 190622, 7 October
2013; People v. Guillen, G.R. No.
191756, 25 November 2013.
Slightest penetration of the labia of
the female victim's genitalia consummates
the crime of rape. As the text of the law
itself shows, the breaking of the hymen of
the victim is not among the means of
consummating rape. All that the law
requires is that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman under the
circumstances described in the law. By
definition, carnal knowledge was "the act of
a man having sexual bodily connections
with a woman." This understanding of rape
explains why the slightest penetration of
the female genitalia consummates the
crime.
In objective terms, carnal
knowledge, the other essential element in
consummated statutory rape, does not
require full penile penetration of the female.
The mere touching of the external genitalia
by a penis capable of consummating the
sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge. All that is necessary to reach
the consummated stage of rape is for the
penis of the accused capable of
consummating the sexual act to come into
contact with the lips of the pudendum of
the victim. This means that the rape is
consummated once the penis of the
accused capable of consummating the
sexual act touches either labia or the
pudendum.
Also, the touching that constitutes
rape does not mean mere epidermal
contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or
a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on
the external layer of the victims vagina, or
the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis
touching the labias or sliding into the
female genitalia. Accordingly, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or
the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape proceeds
from the physical fact that the labias are
physically situated beneath the mons pubis
or the vaginal surface, such that for the
penis to touch either of them is to attain
some degree of penetration beneath the
surface of the female genitalia. It is
required, however, that this manner of
touching of the labias must be sufficiently
and convincingly established.
People v. Guillen, G.R. No.
191756, 25 November 2013
Rape may be committed even in
places where people congregate. Thus, it is
not impossible or unlikely that rape is
perpetrated inside a room adjacent to a
room occupied by other persons, as in this
case.
RAPE: WHEN COMMITTED WITH A
DEADLY WEAPON
People v. Basallo, G.R. No.
182457, 30 January 2013.
The gravamen of the offense of rape
is sexual intercourse with a woman against
her will or without her consent. Relating
thereto, when a victim is threatened with
bodily injury as when the rapist is armed
with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or
bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient
to bring the victim to submission to the
lustful desires of the rapist.
The victims failure to shout for help
does not negate rape. Even the victims
lack of resistance, especially when
intimidated by the offender into submission,
does not signify voluntariness or consent.
The law does not impose an obligation on
the part of the victim to exhibit defiance or
to present proof of struggle.
People v. Penilla, G.R. No.
189324, 20 March 2013.
Rape victims react differently. Some
may offer strong resistance, while others
may be too intimidated to offer any
resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by
itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at
least intimidation, and threatening the
victim with a knife, much more poking at
her, as in this case, is sufficient to bring her
into submission.
6
People v. Veloso, G.R. No.
188849, 13 February 2013;
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No.
183091, 19 June 2013.
Due to its intimate nature, rape is
usually a crime bereft of witnesses and,
more often than not, the victim is left to
testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of
rape cases, the victims credibility becomes
the primordial consideration.
It is settled that when the victims
testimony is straightforward, convincing,
and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things, unflawed by any
material or significant inconsistency, it
passes the test of credibility. The accused
then may be convicted solely on the basis
thereof.
Also, the law does not impose a
burden on the rape victim to prove
resistance. What has to be proved by the
prosecution is the use of force or
intimidation by the accused in having
sexual intercourse with the victim.
RAPE THROUGH FORCE OR
INTIMIDATION
People v. Vitero, G.R. No.
175327, 3 April 2013; People v.
Deligero, G.R. No. 189280, 17
April 2013; People v. Amistoso,
G.R. No. 201447, 9 January
2013; People v. Diaz, G.R. No.
200882, 13 June 2013.
In rape committed by close kin, such
as the victims father, stepfather, uncle, or
the common-law spouse of her mother, it is
not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed. Moral influence
or ascendancy takes the place of violence
and intimidation.
RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT
Pielago v. People, G.R. No.
202020, 13 March 2013.
The gravamen of the crime of rape
by sexual assault is the insertion of the
penis into another persons mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another persons genital or anal orifice. In
this case, this element is clearly present
when the minor victim has straightforwardly
testified in court that accused Pielago has
inserted his forefinger in her vagina and
anus.
STATUTORY RAPE: ELEMENTS
People v. Rayon, Sr., G.R. No.
194236, 30 January 2013; People
v. Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, 5
June 2013; Caballo v. People,
G.R. No. 198732, 10 June 2013;
People v. Manalili, G.R. No.
191253, 28 August 2013; People
v. Gaduyon, G.R. No. 181473, 11
November 2013.
Sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610 has three elements:
1. The accused commits an act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child is below 18 years old.
Corollarily, the Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases define
the following terms:
1. Sexual abuse, which includes the
employment, use, persuasion,
inducement, enticement, or coercion
of a child to engage in or assist
another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or
the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children; and
2. Lascivious conduct, which means
the intentional touching, either
directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus, or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a
person.
Notably, previous jurisprudence has
held that a child is deemed subjected to
other sexual abuse when the child indulges
7
in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of an adult.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is
immaterial in cases involving violation of
Section 5, Article III, R.A. No. 7610. The
mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child
who is exploited in prostitution or subjected
to sexual abuse constitutes the offense.
QUALIFIED RAPE
People v. Rayon, Sr., G.R. No.
194236, 30 January 2013; People
v. Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, 5
June 2013; People v. Candellada,
G.R. No. 189293, 10 July 2013.
Rape is qualified and the penalty is
death, pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC,
when the victim is below 18 years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.
To justify the imposition of the death
penalty, however, it is required that the
special qualifying circumstances of minority
of the victim and her relationship to the
appellant be properly alleged in the
information and duly proved during the
trial. Needless to say, these two
circumstances must concur.
People v. Hilarion, G.R. No.
201105, 25 November 2013.
For a charge of rape under Article
266-A of the RPC, the prosecution must
prove that
1. the offender had carnal knowledge
of a woman; and
2. he accomplished this act through
force, threat or intimidation, when
she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under 12 years of age or was
demented.
RAPE: SWEETHEART DEFENSE
People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 201728,
17 July 2013.
 As to the "sweetheart defense", it is
said that love is not a license for lust. "A
love affair does not justify rape for a man
does not have the unbridled license to
subject his beloved to his carnal desires
against her will." In this case, Cruzs
argument that they are lovers may be true;
however, the sexual incidents between him
and AAA have not been proven to be
consensual.
People v. Rivera, G.R. No.
200508, 4 September 2013
In determining whether the act was
consensual and that no force of any kind
and degree was employed, circumstances
as to the age, size and strength of both
parties must also be looked into because
force in rape is relative. The sweetheart
defense is an affirmative defense that must
be supported by convincing proof.
As correctly ruled by the CA, such
defense is "effectively an admission of
carnal knowledge of the victim and
consequently places on accused-appellant
the burden of proving the alleged
relationship by substantial evidence."
Independent proof is required.
People v. Cayanan, G.R. No.
200080, 18 September 2013
For the Court to even consider giving
credence to the sweetheart defense, it must
be proven by compelling evidence. The
defense cannot just present testimonial
evidence in support of the theory.
Independent proof is required such as
tokens, mementos, and photographs. And
while Cayanan produced two love letters
allegedly written by AAA, the CA correctly
sustained the finding of the RTC that these
letters were unauthenticated and therefore,
bereft of any probative value.
People v. Alcober, G.R. No.
192941, 13 November 2013.
When the accused in a rape case
claims, as in the case at bar, that the sexual
intercourse between him and the
complainant was consensual, the burden of
evidence shifts to him, such that he is now
enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove the relationship. Being an affirmative
defense, it must be established with
convincing evidence, such as by some
8
documentary and/or other evidence like
mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and
the like. The sweetheart theory as a
defense necessarily admits carnal
knowledge, the first element of rape.
Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the
burden to prove only force or intimidation,
the coupling element of rape. This
admission makes the sweetheart theory
more difficult to defend, for it is not only an
affirmative defense that needs convincing
proof; after the prosecution has successfully
established a prima faciecase, the burden
of evidence is shifted to the accused, who
has to adduceevidence that the intercourse
was consensual.
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION: ELEMENTS
People v. Salvador, G.R. No.
201443, 10 April 2013.
Here, the Supreme Court affirmed
the accuseds convictions. Based on the
victims clear and categorical testimony,
the accuseds overt acts were undoubtedly
geared toward unlawfully depriving the
victim of his liberty and extorting ransom in
exchange for his release. That no ransom
was actually paid does not negate the fact
of the commission of the crime, it being
sufficient that a demand for it was made.
KIDNAPPING WITH RANSOM:
ELEMENTS
People v. Niegas, G.R. No.
194582, 27 November 2013
In countering the charge against
him, Niegas contends that the victims
testimonies do not prove that he has
kidnapped them. He denies all allegations
against him and furthers that it is not him
who has demanded or received the ransom
money.
Niegas defenses cannot be upheld.
The victims testimonies proved that the
offenders detained them for more than
three days, for the purpose of extorting
ransom. Also, the mere circumstance that
Niegas did not personally perform all the
acts necessary to consummate the crime of
murder would be irrelevant when
conspiracy was proven here since, in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE: ELEMENTS
People v. Cachuela, G.R. No.
191752, 10 June 2013.
Homicide is said to have been
committed by reason or on the occasion of
robbery if, for instance, it was committed:
1 To facilitate the robbery or the
escape of the culprit;
2 To preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot;
3 To prevent discovery of the
commission of the robbery; or
4 To eliminate witnesses in the
commission of the crime.
In this case, the victim was killed to
facilitate the robbery. The fact that the
cartridge bullet shells found at the firing
range where the victims lifeless body was
discovered matched with one of the guns
found from one of the accused during an
entrapment operation clinches the case
against accused insofar as establishing the
nexus between the robbery and the victims
killing. Also, the gunshot wounds suffered
by the victim also came from the same
caliber of gun recovered from said accused.
THEFT: SIMPLE THEFT AND QUALIFIED
THEFT DISTINGUISHED
Almuete v. People, G.R. No.
179611, 12 March 2013.
This case is an offshoot of an earlier
case, convicting petitioner Almuete for
violating Section 68 of the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines, as amended. A
person violating said section shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Accordingly, Articles 309 and 310 of
the RPC provide:
Art. 309. Penalties.Any
person found guilty of theft
shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen
is more than 12,000
pesos but does not
9
exceed 22,000 pesos; but
if the value of the thing
stolen exceed[s] the latter
amount, the penalty shall
be the maximum period
of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one
year for each additional
ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty
which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and
in connection with the
accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or
reclusion perpetua, as the
case may be.
XXX
Art. 310. Qualified theft.The
crime of theft shall be
punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees
than those respectively
specified in the next
preceding articles, if
committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse
of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of
the plantation or fish taken
from a fishpond or fishery, or
if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
XXX
Perusal of the records would show
that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) imposed
the penalty prescribed in Article 310, which
is two degrees higher than those specified
in Article 309. This is erroneous considering
that Article 310 only applies if the theft
were committed under the circumstances
provided therein. In this case, however,
none of these circumstances were present.
The proper imposable penalty then is that
provided in Article 309.

QUALIFIED THEFT
Viray v. People, G.R. No. 205180,
11 November 2013
The crime charged against petitioner
Viray is theft qualified by grave abuse of
confidence.
The elements constituting the crime
of simple theft are present here. First, it was
proved that the subjects of the offense were
all personal or movable properties,
consisting as they were of jewelry, clothing,
cellular phone, a media player and a
gaming device. Second, these properties
belong to private complainant Vedua. Third,
circumstantial evidence places petitioner in
the scene of the crime during the day of the
incident, as numerous witnesses saw him in
Veduas house and his clothes were found
inside the house. He was thereafter seen
carrying a heavy-looking sack as he was
leaving private complainants house. All
these circumstances portray a chain of
events that leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that petitioner took the personal
properties with intent to gain, especially
considering that, fourth, Vedua had not
consented to the removal and/or taking of
these properties.
Notably, however, the very fact that
Viray forced open the main door and
screen because he was denied access to
Veduas house negates the presence of
such confidence in him by Vedua. Without
ready access to the interior of the house
and the properties that were the subject of
the taking, it cannot be said that Vedua had
a firm trust on Viray or that she relied on
his discretion and that the same trust
reposed on him facilitated Virays taking of
the personal properties justifying his
conviction of qualified theft.
ANTI-FENCING LAW: ELEMENTS
Ong v. People, G.R. No. 190475,
10 April 2013.
As to the element of the crime that
the accused knew or should have known
that the said article, item, object, or
anything of value has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft, the words should know denote the
fact that a person of reasonable prudence
10
and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that
such fact exists.
Circumstances normally exist to
forewarn a reasonably vigilant buyer that
the object of the sale may have been
derived from the proceeds of robbery or
theft. Such circumstances include the time
and place of the sale, both of which may
not be in accord with the usual practices of
commerce. The nature and condition of the
goods sold, and the fact that the seller is
not regularly engaged in the business of
selling goods may likewise suggest the
illegality of their source, and therefore
should caution the buyer.
Accused Ong, who was in the
business of buy and sell of tires for the past
24 years, ought to have known the ordinary
course of business in purchasing from an
unknown seller. Nevertheless, Ong bought
the tires subject of this case without even
asking for proof of ownership thereof and
allowing the entire transactionthat is,
from the proposal to buy until delivery of
the tires, to happen in just one day. His
experience from the business should have
given him doubt as to the legitimate
ownership of the tires, considering that it
was his first to transact with the seller of
the tires and that the sellers conduct as if
he were peddling said tires on the streets.
Also, while for all practical purposes,
the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is
proof of a legitimate transaction and may
be raised as a defense in the charge of
fencing, this defense is disputable. Ong
failed to overcome the evidence presented
by the prosecution in rebutting this
presumption.
CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE:
ELEMENTS
People v. Mallari, G.R. No.
179041, 1 April 2013.
The Supreme Court sustained
Mallaris conviction for the special complex
crime of carnapping with homicide.To prove
this special complex crime, there must be
proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing
was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.
Mallari stole the FX taxi driven by
the victim after he agreed to illegally supply
his co-accused with this type of vehicle. It
was correctly found that Mallari killed the
victim in the course of the commission of
the carnapping.
ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF A
PRIVATE, PUBLIC, OR COMMERCIAL
DOCUMENT: ELEMENTS
Tanenggee, G.R. No. 179448.
The falsification of a public, official,
or commercial document may be a means
of committing estafa because, before the
falsified document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of falsification
has already been consummated, damage or
intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of
public, official, or commercial document. In
other words, the crime of falsification has
already existed.
Actually utilizing that falsified public,
official, or commercial document to defraud
another is estafa. But the damage is caused
by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document. Therefore, as
a special complex crime, the falsification of
the public, official, or commercial document
is only a necessary means to commit
estafa.
The elements of estafa are obtaining
in this case. By falsely representing that the
victim requested accused Tanenggee to
process purported loans on the latters
behalf, Tanenggee counterfeited or imitated
the victims signature in the cashiers
checks. Thus, Tanenggee succeeded in
withdrawing money from the bank. Clearly,
he employed deceit in order to take hold of
the money, and misappropriated and
converted it to his own personal use and
benefit, resulting to the damage and
prejudice of the bank.
ESTAFA: MODES OF COMMISSION
Espino v. People, G.R. No.
188217, 3 July 2013
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) provides
for the liability for estafa committed by
11
misappropriating or converting to the
prejudice of another money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even
though that obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or
other property. This is clearly shown by the
factual allegations of the Informations.
Applying these standards to this
case, first, accused Espino received
personal property in the form of checks in
trust or on commission, with the duty to
deliver it to another. Even though Espino
misrepresented the existence of a
deliverable commission, it is a fact that he
was obliged by the injured party, to deliver
the check and account for it. Second,
Espino rediscounted the checks to his aunt-
in-law. Third, this rediscounting resulted in
the wrongful encashment of the checks by
someone who was not the payee and
therefore not lawfully authorized to do so.
Finally, this wrongful encashment
prejudiced the injured party, which lost the
proceeds of the check. When accounting
was demanded from the accused, he could
not conjure any justifiable excuse.
ESTAFA WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE:
ELEMENTS
Jandusay v. People, G.R. No.
185129, 17 June 2013.
Misappropriation or conversion may
be proved by the prosecution by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence. The
failure to account upon demand, for funds
or property held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation.
In the instant case, it cannot be
denied that accused Jandusay, as
CALAPUPATODA treasurer, received and
held money for administration of and in
trust for the association. He was thus under
an obligation to turn over the same upon
conclusion of his term as treasurer. Instead,
he misappropriated the money to the
prejudice of the association and, despite
demand, failed to account for or return
them. Such failure to account, upon
demand, of funds or property held in trust is
circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation.
ESTAFA: ELEMENTS OF SECTION 2(D)
People v. Wagas, G.R. No.
157943, 4 September 2013
Accused Wagas placed an order for
200 bags of rice from complainant Ligaray.
Ligaray accepted Wagas proposed
payment of the order by postdated check,
upon the latters assurance of his lending
business and money with the bank. Upon
Ligarays deposit of the check, it was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Wagas countered that it was a
certain Canada and not him who had
transacted with Ligaray. While he admitted
to receiving a letter from the prosecution
regarding his outstanding liability against
Ligaray, he signed it only to accommodate
the pleas of his sister and Canada and to
avoid jeopardizing Canadas application for
overseas employment.
Wagas should be acquitted here,
however. It is the criminal fraud or deceit in
the issuance of a check that is punishable,
not the non-payment of a debt. Prima facie
evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof
that the drawer of the check failed to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three days from receipt of the
notice of dishonor.
But, in every criminal prosecution,
the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In that regard, the
prosecution did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who
had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
ESTAFA: TRUST RECEIPTS LAW
Hur Tin Yang v. People, G.R. No.
195117, 14 August 2013
The fact that the entruster bank,
Metrobank in this case, knew even before
the execution of the alleged trust receipt
agreements that the covered construction
materials were never intended by the
entrustee, accused Yang, for resale or for
the manufacture of items to be sold would
take the transaction between petitioner and
12
Metrobank outside the ambit of the Trust
Receipts Law.
The subject transactions in the
instant case are not trust receipts
transactions. Thus, the consolidated
complaints for Estafa in relation to P.D. No.
115 have no leg to stand on. The practice of
banks of making borrowers sign trust
receipts to facilitate collection of loans and
place them under the threats of criminal
prosecution should they be unable to pay it
may be unjust and inequitable, if not
reprehensible. Such agreements are
contracts of adhesion which borrowers have
no option but to sign lest their loan be
disapproved. The resort to this scheme
leaves poor and hapless borrowers at the
mercy of banks and is prone to
misinterpretation.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. 22):
ELEMENTS
San Mateo v. People, G.R. No.
200090, 6 March 2013.
Petitioner San Mateo issued
postdated checks in partial payment of the
assorted yarns bought from ITSP
International. When Sehwani deposited one
of the checks, it was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. San Mateo failed to
settle her outstanding account, despite
Sehwanis requests for payment.
Relating to the second element of
violation of B.P. 22, Section 2 of said law
creates the presumption that the issuer of
the check has been aware of the
insufficiency of funds when he has issued a
check and the bank dishonors it. This
presumption, however, arises only after it
has been proved that the issuer has
received a written notice of dishonor and
that, within five days from receipt thereof,
has failed to pay the amount of the check or
to make arrangements for its payment.
In this case, there is no basis in
concluding that San Mateo knew of the
insufficiency of her funds. While she may
have requested to Sehwani to defer
depositing all checks, this did not amount to
an admission that, when she issued the
checks, she knew that she would have no
sufficient funds in the drawee bank to pay
for them.
BIGAMY: ELEMENTS
Capili v. People, G.R. No.
183805, 3 July 2013
All the elements of the crime of
bigamy were present in this case when the
Information was filed on 28 June 2004. It is
undisputed that a second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on 8 December 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-
Capili contracted on 3 September 1999.
Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for
being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Capili may still be charged with the
crime of bigamy, even if there is a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the
second marriage was celebrated.
What makes a person criminally
liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. Parties
to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity
of the marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption that the
marriage exists.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS: ELEMENTS
People v. Lomaque, G.R. No.
189297, 5 June 2013.
Accused Lomaque was convicted of
the crime of acts of lasciviousness against
his stepdaughter for acts prejudicial to the
childs psychological and emotional
development, and which debase, demean,
and degrade her intrinsic worth and dignity
as a human being.
The elements of acts of
lasciviousness are:
13
1 that the offender commits any
acts of lasciviousness or
lewdness;
2 that it is done under any of the
following circumstances:
a By using force or
intimidation;
b When the offended party is
deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or
c When the offended party is
under 12 years of age.
3 that the offended person is
another person of either sex.
To obtain conviction for the same,
the prosecution is bound to establish the
elements of sexual abuse under Section 5,
Article III of Republic Act No. 7610:
1 The accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct;
2 The said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
3 The child, whether male or
female, is below 18 years of age.
Lascivious conduct is defined under
Section 2 (H) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7610 as a crime
committed through the intentional
touching, either directly or through the
clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh or buttocks with the intention to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
among others. In this case, it is undisputed
that appellant committed lascivious
conduct when he smelled the victims
genital area and inserted his finger inside
her vagina to gratify or arouse his sexual
desire. At the time this happened, the
victim was barely eight years old. Without a
doubt, all the said elements are obtaining in
this case.
People v. Velasco, G.R. No.
190318, 27 November 2013.
The Supreme Court upheld accused
Velascos conviction. The victims testimony
was made in a straightforward and
convincing manner. Her testimony detailed
how she was forced and intimidated by
Velasco and how the latter succeeded in
molesting her by kissing and touching her
private parts, thus, satisfying the required
elements of the crime charged.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT: ILLEGAL
SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
People v. Linda, G.R. No.
200507, 26 June 2013; People v.
Lucio, G.R. No. 191391, 19 June
2013; People v. Resurreccion,
G.R. No. 188310, 13 June 2013;
People v. Dumalag, G.R. No.
180514, 17 April 2013; People v.
Aguilar, G.R. No. 191396, 17
April 2013; People v. Soriano,
G.R. No. 189843, 20 March 2013;
People v. Adrid, G.R. No.
201845, 6 March 2013; People v.
Secreto, G.R. No. 198115, 22
February 2013; People v. Diwa,
G.R. No. 194253, 27 February
2013; People v. Tapere, G.R. No.
178065, 20 February 2013;
People v. Galido, G.R. No.
192231, 13 February 2013;
People v. Alviz, G.R. No. 177158,
6 February 2013; People v.
Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, 6
February 2013; People v. De
Jesus, G.R. No. 198794, 6
February 2013; People v.
Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, 9
January 2013; People v. Hong
Yeng E, G.R. No. 181826, 9
January 2013; People v. Somoza,
G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013;
People v. Blanco, G.R. No.
193661, 14 August 2013; People
v. Salonga, G.R. No. 194948, 2
September 2013; People v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 197550, 25
September 2013; People v.
Monceda and Lai, G.R. No.
176269, 13 November 2013;
People v. Spouses Gani, G.R. No.
198398, 27 November 2013;
People v. Loks, G.R. No. 203433,
27 November 2013.
The elements necessary to
successfully prosecute an illegal sale of
drugs case are:
1. The identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the
consideration; and
2. The delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor.
14
It is material in this crime that the
sale has actually taken place. What
consummates the buy-bust transaction is
the delivery of the drugs to the poseur-
buyer and, in turn, the sellers receipt of the
marked money. While the parties may have
agreed on the selling price of the shabu and
delivery of the payment was intended,
these do not prove consummated sale.
People v. Aguilar, G.R. No.
191396, 17 April 2013; People v.
Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, 9
January 2013.
When the accused is charged with
the sale of such drugs, the following
defenses cannot be set up:
1 That facilities for the commission
of the crime were intentionally
placed in his way;
2 That the criminal act was done at
the solicitation of the decoy or
the poseur-buyer seeking to
expose his criminal act; or
That police authorities feigning
complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisted
in its commission.
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
182417, 3 April 2013; People v.
Lagos, G.R. No. 184658, 6 March
2013.
To secure a conviction of the
accused of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the following elementsmust concur:
1 The transaction or sale took
place between the accused and
the poseur buyer; and
2 The dangerous drugs subject of
the transaction or sale is
presented in court as evidence of
the corpus delicti.
As to the second element, it is
indispensable for plaintiff to establish that
the dangerous drugs subject of the
transaction or sale and subsequently
examined in the laboratory are the same
dangerous drugs presented in court as
evidence. The identity of the dangerous
drug is essential to prove the corpus delicti.
 People v. Langcua, G.R. No.
190343, 6 February 2013.
To establish the crime of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs, the material proof is
that the transaction or sale has actually
taken place, coupled with the presentation
in court of evidence of the corpus
delicti. The commission of illegal sale
merely consummates the selling
transaction, which happens the moment the
buyer receives the drug from the seller.
As long as the police officer went
through the operation as a buyer, whose
offer was accepted by the seller, followed
by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to
the former, the crime is already
consummated.
People v. Bartolome, G.R. No.
191726, 6 February 2013.
The crime of illegal sale of shabu is
committed simply when the selling
transaction has been consummated, which
happens at the moment the buyer receives
drugs from the seller. In short, what is
material is the proof showing that the
transaction or sale has actually taken place,
coupled with the presentation in court of
the thing sold as evidence of the corpus
delicti.
As in the instant case, if the police
officer would go through the operation as a
buyer, the crime is consummated when the
police officer makes an offer to buy that is
accepted by the accused, and there is an
ensuing exchange between them involving
the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the
police officer.
People v. Somoza, G.R. No.
197250, 17 July 2013.
Illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
committed when the sale transaction is
consummated, that is, upon delivery of the
illicit drug to the buyer and the receipt of
the payment by the seller. While the
marked money may be used to prove
payment, it is not material in proving the
commission of the crime. What is material
is the proof that the sale transaction
actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
the dangerous drug subject of the sale.
15
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT: ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
People v. Lucio, G.R. No.
191391, 19 June 2013; People v.
Resurreccion, G.R. No. 188310,
13 June 2013; People v.
Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, 17
April 2013; People v. Aguilar,
G.R. No. 191396, 17 April 2013;
People v. Soriano, G.R. No.
189843, 20 March 2013;
Marquez v. People, G.R. No.
197207, 13 March 2013; People
v. Secreto, G.R. No. 198115, 22
February 2013; People v. Diwa,
G.R. No. 194253, 27 February
2013; People v. Galido, G.R. No.
192231, 13 February 2013; Sales
v. People, G.R. No. 191023, 6
February 2013; People v.
Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, 6
February 2013; People v. De
Jesus, G.R. No. 198794, 6
February 2013; Valleno v.
People, G.R. No. 192050, 9
January 2013; People v. Hong
Yeng E, G.R. No. 181826, 9
January 2013; People v. Somoza,
G.R. No. 197250, 17 July 2013;
People v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
197550, 25 September 2013.
When prosecuting an illegal
possession of dangerous drugs case, the
following elements must be established:
1. The accused is in possession of
an item or object, which is
identified to be a prohibited
drug;
2. Such possession is not
authorized by law; and
3. The accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug.
Possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi, which is
sufficient to convict him, unless there is a
satisfactory explanation of such possession.
People v. Quesido, G.R. No.
189351, 10 April 2013.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs necessitates that the
elemental act of possession of a prohibited
substance be established with moral
certainty, together with the fact that the
same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of
its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction. Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established beyond doubt. Be that
as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized
possession will not suffice to create in a
reasonable mind the moral certainty
required to sustain a finding of guilt. More
than just the fact of possession, the fact
that the substance illegally possessed in the
first place is the same substance offered in
court as exhibit must also be established
with the same unwavering exactitude as
that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT:
TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS
DRUGS
People v. Laba, G.R. No. 199938,
28 January 2013.
Transport, as used under R.A. No.
9165, means to carry or convey from one
place to another. The essential element of
the charge is the movement of the
dangerous drug from one place to another.
Appellant Laba was apprehended in
the airport, as he had intended to board a
certain flight with a substantial amount of
shabu in his possession. While it may be
argued that Laba has yet to board the
aircraft or travel, it cannot be denied that
his presence at the airport at that particular
instance is for the purpose of transporting
or moving the dangerous drugs from one
place to another.
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT: CHAIN OF
CUSTODY RULE
People v. Abdul, G.R. No.
186137, 26 June 2013; People v.
Rebotazo, G.R. No. 192913, 13
June 2013; People v. Adrid, G.R.
No. 201845, 6 March 2013;
People v. Sadidia, G.R. No.
191263, 16 October 2013.
The chain of custody rule requires
that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. It would
16
include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it was offered in
evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where
it was and what happened to it while in the
witness possession, the condition in which
it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item
and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.
Hence, every link the chain of
custody must not show any possibility of
tampering, alteration, or substitution. But, it
is accepted that a perfect chain is not the
standard.
Nevertheless, two crucial links must
be complied with:
1. The seized illegal drug must be
marked in the presence of the
accused and immediately upon
confiscation; and
2. The turnover of the seized drugs
at every stagefrom
confiscation from the accused,
transportation to the police
station, conveyance to the
chemistry lab, and presentation
to the courtmust be shown and
substantiated.
People v. Quesido, G.R. No.
189351, 10 April 2013; People v.
Langcua, G.R. No. 190343, 6
February 2013; People v.
Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, 6
February 2013; People v.
Spouses Oniza, G.R. No. 202709,
3 July 2013; People v. Clara, G.R.
No. 195528, 4 July 2013; People
v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 197550, 25
September 2013.
The prosecution must prove the
following links in order to establish the
chain of custody in a buy-bust operation:
1 The seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer;
 2 The turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating
officer;
3 The turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
4 The turnover and submission of
the marked illegally drug seized
by the forensic chemist to the
court.
People v. Lucio, G.R. No.
191391, 19 June 2013; People v.
Dumalag, G.R. No. 180514, 17
April 2013; People v. Aguilar,
G.R. No. 191396, 17 April 2013;
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
182417, 3 April 2013; Marquez v.
People, G.R. No. 197207, 13
March 2013; Sales v. People,
G.R. No. 191023, 6 February
2013; People v. Langcua, G.R.
No. 190343, 6 February 2013;
People v. Manalao, G.R. No.
187496, 6 February 2013,
People v. Somoza, G.R. No.
197250, 17 July 2013; People v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 197550, 25
September 2013; People v.
Castillo, G.R. No. 190180, 27
November 2013; People v. Loks,
G.R. No. 203433, 27 November
2013.
Failure to strictly comply with the
chain of custody rule under Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 will not render an arrest
illegal or the items seized from the accused
inadmissible in evidence. What is crucial is
that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are preserved, for they will
be used in determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Rontos v. People, G.R. No.
188024, 5 June 2013.
In illegal drugs cases, the identity
and integrity of the drugs seized must be
established with the same unwavering
exactitude as that required to arrive at a
finding of guilt.
The chain of custody rule under R.A.
No. 9165 is intended precisely to ensure the
identity and integrity of the dangerous
drugs seized. This provision requires that
17
upon seizure of illegal drug items, the
apprehending team having initial custody of
the drugs shall:
1. conduct a physical inventory of the
drugs;
2. take photographs thereof;
3. in the presence of the person from
whom these items were seized or
confiscated and;
4. a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice and any
elected public official; and
5. who shall all be required to sign the
inventory and be given copies
thereof.
People v. Somoza, G.R. No.
197250, 17 July 2013.
"Marking" is the placing by the
apprehending officer of some distinguishing
signs with his/her initials and signature on
the items seized. It helps ensure that the
dangerous drugs seized upon apprehension
are the same dangerous drugs subjected to
inventory and photography when these
activities are undertaken at the police
station or at some other practicable venue
rather than at the place of arrest.
People v. Dumalag, G.R. No.
180514, 17 April 2013; People v.
Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17
July 2013; People v. Ocfemia,
G.R. No. 185383, 25 September
2013.
Consistency with the chain of
custody rule requires that the marking of
the seized itemsto truly ensure that they
are the same items that enter the chain and
are eventually the ones offered in evidence
should be done:
1 in the presence of the
apprehended violator; and
2 immediately upon confiscation.
To be able to create a first link in the
chain of custody then, what is required is
that the marking be made in the presence
of the accused and upon immediate
confiscation. Immediate confiscation has
no exact definition. Notably, previous
jurisprudence has held that testimony that
includes the marking of the seized items at
the police station and in the presence of the
accused is sufficient in showing compliance
with the rules on chain of custody. Marking
upon immediate confiscation contemplates
even marking at the nearest police station
or office of the apprehending team.
People v. Octavio, G.R. No.
199219, 3 April 2013; People v.
Calumbres, G.R. No. 194382, 10
June 2013.
To be admissible in evidence, the
prosecution must be able to present
through records or testimony the
whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from
the time these were seized from the
accused by the arresting officers, turned
over to the investigating officer, forwarded
to the laboratory for determination of their
composition, and up to the time these were
offered in evidence.
The integrity of the evidence is
presumed to have been preserved, unless
there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or
proof that the evidence has been tampered
with. Appellants bear the burden of showing
that the evidence has been tampered or
meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the handling of
exhibits by public officers and the
presumption that public officers have
properly discharged their duties.
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
182417, 3 April 2013.
The law on dangerous drugs
pertinently provides for the chain of custody
rule. The provisions defining it obviously
demand strict compliance, for only by such
strict compliance may be eliminated the
grave mischiefs of planting or substitution
of evidence and the unlawful and malicious
prosecution of the weak and unwary that
they are intended to prevent. Such strict
compliance is also consistent with the
doctrine that penal laws shall be construed
strictly against the government and liberally
in favor of the accused.
The first stage in the chain of
custody is the marking of the dangerous
drugs or related items. Marking, which is
the affixing on the dangerous drugs or
related items by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature
or other identifying signs, should be made
in the presence of the apprehended violator
immediately upon arrest.
18
The importance of the prompt
marking cannot be denied because
succeeding handlers of the dangerous
drugs or related items will use the marking
as reference. The marking also operates to
set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs
or related items from other materials from
the moment they are confiscated until they
are disposed of at the close of the criminal
proceedings, thereby forestalling switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence.
Otherwise stated, the marking immediately
upon confiscation or recovery of the
dangerous drugs or related items is
indispensable in preserving their integrity
and evidentiary value.
People v. Adrid, G.R. No.
201845, 6 March 2013.
Coordination with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) is
likewise not an indispensable requirement.
While it is true that Section 86 of R.A. No.
9165 requires the NBI, PNP, and the Bureau
of Customs to maintain close coordination
with the PDEA on all drug-related matters,
the provision does not make PDEAs
participation a condition sine qua non for
every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-
bust operation is just a form of an in
flagrante arrest sanctioned by Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which the
police authorities may rightfully resort to in
apprehending violators of R.A. No. 9165 in
support of the PDEA.
People v. Secreto, G.R. No.
198115, 22 February 2013.
In the prosecution of dangerous
drugs offenses, the primary consideration is
to ensure that the identity and integrity of
the seized drugs and other related articles
have been preserved from the time they
have been confiscated from the accused
until their presentation as evidence in court.
Pertinently, a buy-bust operation
resulting from the tip of an anonymous
confidential informant, although an
effective means of eliminating illegal drug-
related activities, is susceptible to police
abuse. Worse, it is usually used as a means
for extortion. It is for this reason that
procedures to counter these abuses are
provided in R.A. No. 9165.
 In the instant case, the Supreme
Court found meritorious accused-appellant
Secretos appeal. With the requirements of
the chain of custody rule not being
followed, the prosecution has the burden to
prove that, despite this non-observance,
the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are nonetheless preserved.
This was not done in this case. The
prosecution failed to show how SPO1 Pamor
had ensured the integrity of the seized
items from time they had been entrusted to
him at the place of confiscation until the
team had reached the police station, as well
as until he had handed them over to PO2
Lagmay for the marking of the sachets. The
prosecution did not likewise show to whom
the confiscated articles were turned over
and how they were preserved after the
laboratory examination and until their final
presentation in court as evidence of the
corpus delicti. Clearly, these lapses raise
doubt on the integrity and identity of the
drugs presented as evidence in court.
The prosecution also did not follow
the proper marking of the seized evidence,
pursuant to the chain of custody rule.
Consistency with the chain of custody rule
requires that the marking of the seized
itemsto truly ensure that they are the
same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence
should be done:
1 in the presence of the
apprehended violator; and
2 immediately upon confiscation.
This step initiates the process of
protecting innocent persons from dubious
and concocted searches, and of protecting
as well the apprehending officers from
harassment suits based on planting of
evidence under Section 29 of R.A. No. 9165
and on allegations of robbery or theft.
People v. Alviz, G.R. No. 177158,
6 February 2013; People v.
Salonga, G.R. No. 194948, 2
September 2013.
Chain of custody means the duly
recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals, or plant sources of dangerous
drugs, or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure or
19
confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction.
Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of
custody was made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.
This rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time
it is offered into evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened
to it while in the witness possession, the
condition in which it was received, and the
condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken
to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same.
People v. Nacua, G.R. No.
200165, 30 January 2013.
Sale or possession of a dangerous
drug can never be proven without seizure
and identification of the prohibited drug. In
prosecutions involving narcotics, the
narcotic substance itself constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense. The fact of its
existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Of paramount importance in these
cases therefore is that the identity of the
dangerous drug be likewise established
beyond reasonable doubt.
There must be strict compliance with
the prescribed measures to be observed
during and after the seizure of dangerous
drugs and related paraphernalia, during the
custody and transfer thereof for
examination, and at all times up to their
presentation in court. This is considering
the unique characteristic of dangerous and
illegal drugsthat is, they are indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily susceptible
to tampering, alteration, or substitution,
either by accident or otherwise.
Relating thereto, previous
jurisprudence has settled that the marking
of seized drugs must be done immediately
after they are seized from the accused.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link; thus, it is vital that the
seized contraband are immediately marked
because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as
reference.
Failure to do so suffices to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties and raises
reasonable doubt as to the authenticity of
the corpus delicti.
Valleno v. People, G.R. No.
192050, 9 January 2013; People
v. Somoza, G.R. No. 197250, 17
July 2013; People v. Ocfemia,
G.R. No. 185383, 25 September
2013; People v. Spouses Gani,
G.R. No. 198398, 27 November
2013.
20
The failure to submit the required
physical inventory of the seized drugs and
the photograph, as well as the absence of a
member of the media or the DOJ, does not
make the arrest of the accused illegal or the
seized items inadmissible in evidence. What
is of utmost importance is that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items
have been preserved. These characteristics
would be utilized in determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
People v. Spouses Oniza, G.R.
No. 202709, 3 July 2013.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
prescribes certain procedures in keeping
custody and disposition of seized dangerous
drugs like the shabu that the police
supposedly confiscated from the accused.
Compliance with the law, especially the
required physical inventory and photograph
of the seized drugs in the presence of the
accused, the media, and responsible
government functionaries, would be clear
evidence that the police had carried out a
legitimate buy-bust operation.
o0o